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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLAUDE ADAMS : CIVIL ACTION

:

 v. : NO. 05-1341

:

JO ANNE BARNHART, :

Commissioner of Social Security :

Administration : 

______________________________________________________________________________

Diamond, J. March 2, 2005

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Claude Adams challenges the denial of his claim for Disability Insurance

Benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433. The

Commissioner and Plaintiff have cross-moved for Summary Judgment. I deny Plaintiff’s Motion

and grant Summary Judgment in favor of the Commissioner.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Claude Adams is 49 years old, has at least a seventh grade education, and has

worked as a material handler. (Tr. 17, 20, 44–45, 76). At the time of the administrative hearing,

he lived with his seven-year old son. (Tr. 43).

On September 22, 2002, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that he had been

disabled since March 20, 1999, due to high blood pressure, diabetes, obesity, and muscle and

knee problems. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–83 (2004); (Tr. 16). Following the denial of his applications,

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Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. On May 20, 2002, the ALJ

held a hearing at which Plaintiff, his witness Lucille Adderly, and vocational expert Steve

Gumerman testified. (Tr. 37–78). On September 20, 2002, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was

not disabled, finding that he retained the ability to perform the full range of light work. (16–24). 

On January 18, 2005, the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision which, thus,

became final. (Tr. 5–7).

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on March 29, 2005. Pursuant to a procedural order, he

and the Commissioner filed cross motions for summary judgment. The matter was referred to a

Magistrate Judge, who has recommended that I deny Plaintiff’s motion, grant the

Commissioner’s motion, and affirm the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I may not review de novo the Commissioner’s decision, nor may I re-weigh the evidence

of record. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986). Rather, I

must affirm the Commissioner’s decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. See

42 U.S.C. §405(g); Montes v. Apfel, No. 99-2377, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4030, at *2 (E.D. Pa.

Mar. 27, 2000) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1972)).

Substantial evidence is "that which would be sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder

to reach the same conclusion; while it must exceed a scintilla, it need not reach a preponderance

of the evidence." Id. at *2; see also Jesurum v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. Of Health and Human

Services, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995). The ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the

record and provide some indication of the evidence she rejected and why she rejected it. See

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Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.

1981). If the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, then the District Court is

bound by them even if the Court would have found different facts. See Fargnoli v. Massanari,

247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).

The extent of District Court review of a Magistrate Judge’s Report is committed to the

Court’s discretion. See Jozefick v. Shalala, 854 F. Supp. 342, 347 (M.D. Pa., 1994); see also

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984); Heiser

v. Ryan, 813 F. Supp. 388, 391 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 15 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1994). The District

Court must review de novo those portions of the Report to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(c) (2004). See generally Goney, 749 F.2d at 7. The Court may "accept, reject or

modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate’s findings or recommendations." Brophy v. Halter,

153 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

DISCUSSION

To prove disability, a claimant must show that (1) he is not currently engaged in

“substantial gainful activity,” as defined by the regulations, (2) he suffers from a “severe

impairment,” (3) his disability meets or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt.

P. App. 1, and (4) he does not have sufficient residual functional capacity to perform his past

relevant work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)–(e). The ALJ then

considers a claimant’s “ability to perform (‘residual functional capacity’), age, education, and

past work experience to determine whether or not he is capable of performing other work which

exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

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Here, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff has not retained the residual functional

capacity to perform his past relevant work as a material handler, “there are other jobs existing in

significant numbers in the national economy that [he] can perform, consistent with his residual

functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” (Tr. 22). The ALJ first rejected

Plaintiff’s claim that his obesity, hypertension, diabetes, hyperglycemia, sleep apnea, mental

impairment, hand pain, and back pain qualified as “severe impairments.” (Tr. 18–19). The ALJ

then found that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disease of the right shoulder and left knee, but

that this impairment does not render Plaintiff disabled. Rather, the ALJ noted that “the

limitations about which [Plaintiff] testified such as sitting no more than 15 minutes, not

supported by medical records nor his demeanor and posture at the hearing.” (Tr. 21). She also

rejected the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Bruce Williams, because it was

“inconsistent with all of the essentially minimal or negative objective findings contained in his

own records and in the entire file.” (Tr. 21). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not

disabled.

The Magistrate concluded that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation, arguing that the ALJ (1) improperly failed

to consider Plaintiff’s “severe impairments” of obesity and sleep apnea and (2) had a duty to

contact Plaintiff’s treating physician to clarify the basis of his medical assessment.

I. The ALJ’s Severity Determination

The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disease of the right shoulder and

left knee, and that this severe impairment does not prevent him from performing jobs requiring

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“light” or “sedentary” work. (Tr. 22). Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence also established

that Plaintiff suffers from obesity and resulting sleep apnea. The ALJ found that neither of these

complaints constituted “severe impairments.” (Tr. 22).

A medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments is severe if it

significantly limits an individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1521. An impairment is “not severe” if it is only a slight abnormality or a

combination of slight abnormalities that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s

ability to perform basic work activities. Id.; SSR 96-3p. A determination of whether an

impairment is severe is based solely on medical factors affecting a claimant’s ability to perform

basic work activities. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. Basic work activities are “the abilities and

aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). To be deemed disabled, an

individual must demonstrate impairments resulting in physical or mental limitations. Plummer v.

Apfel, 186 F.2d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). This determination is reserved to the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527.

Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings regarding severe impairments. 

Though the record is clear that Plaintiff is obese, “there is no specific level of weight or B[ody]

M[ass] I[ndex] that equates with a ‘severe’ or a ‘not severe’ impairment.” See S.S.R. 02-1p,

“Evaluation of Obesity.” The ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s weight had remained constant over a

long period, including the many years when he worked without complications. (Tr. 18). In

addition, Plaintiff presented no evidence that his obesity imposed functional limitations. Drs.

Jerry Ginsburg and Muhammed I.A. Khan, who examined Plaintiff, each opined that he had no

work-related physical limitations. (Tr. 238, 291). Plaintiff’s own physical therapist stated that

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Plaintiff required no assistive devices for walking or standing, as he was “fully weight bearing.” 

(Tr. 278). The ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff’s obesity “imposes at most a slight abnormality with

no more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities” is thus

supported by substantial evidence. (Tr. 18).

As for his sleep apnea, the ALJ’s findings are once again supported by substantial

evidence. Although Plaintiff testified that he sometimes falls asleep during the day, the ALJ

observed that he drives a car, was awarded sole custody of and cares for his then-seven-year-old

son, and runs a household largely by himself. (Tr. 19–20). Moreover, Dr. Francis Cordova

conducted a sleep study of Plaintiff and found that a CPAP device would effectively control

Plaintiff’s sleeping problems. (Tr. 282). As the ALJ noted, “were [Plaintiff] falling asleep

without warning, [the doctor supervising the sleep study] would have been obliged to either

advise him or authorities [that he should] terminate driving.” (Tr. 19). Substantial evidence thus

supported the ALJ’s decision that plaintiff’s sleep apnea is not a “severe impairment.”

III. The ALJ’s Obligation to Contact Plaintiff’s Treating Physician

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ had a duty to contact Dr. Williams to clarify his opinion

before rejecting it. Social Security regulations provide that an ALJ is required to develop the

record further only when “the evidence we receive from [a claimant’s] treating physician is

inadequate for us to determine whether [the claimant] is disabled.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1512(e)(1)

(emphasis added). Here, the ALJ found the record adequate to determine whether or not Plaintiff

was disabled. Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff only saw his “treating physician,” Dr.

Williams, eight times in the course of two years. (Tr. 21). Accordingly, the law support’s the

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ALJ’s decision not to seek clarification from Dr. Williams. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 958 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The requirement for additional information is triggered only when the

evidence from the treating medical source is inadequate to make a determination as to the

claimant’s disability.”).

CONCLUSION

In sum, Plaintiff asks me to re-weigh evidence and change credibility determinations

made by the ALJ. Because I find substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual determinations,

I overrule Plaintiff’s Objections and adopt the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge.

An appropriate Order follows.

/s Paul S. Diamond, J.

__________________________

PAUL S. DIAMOND, J.

Case 2:05-cv-01341-PD Document 18 Filed 03/03/06 Page 7 of 8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLAUDE ADAMS : CIVIL ACTION

:

 v. : NO. 05-1341

:

JO ANNE BARNHART, :

Commissioner of Social Security :

Administration : 

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

AND NOW, this 2nd day of March, 2006, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 9), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11),

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scuderi’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 14), Plaintiff’s

Objections (Doc. No. 15), and Defendant’s Response (Doc. No. 17), it is hereby ORDERED that

Magistrate Judge Scuderi’s Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Jo Ann Barnhart, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration, is GRANTED.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, Claude Adams, is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court shall close this matter for statistical purposes.

BY THE COURT

/s Paul S. Diamond, J.

______________________

PAUL S. DIAMOND, J.

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