Docket No. 86215--–Agenda 14--–November 1999.

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Special

Adm'’r for the Estate of Renee Kazmierowski, Deceased,

								 Appellant,

 v. THE CITY OF

  CHICAGO et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed JAugust 10, 2000.

	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

	The plaintiff, American National Bank and Trust Company, as

special administrator of the estate of Renee Kazmierowski, brought

the present action in the circuit court of Cook County against the

defendants, the City of Chicago and two of its paramedics, John

Glennon and Kevin T. O'’Malley. Raising several theories of

liability, the plaintiff sought recovery for the defendants'’ alleged

failure to respond properly to an emergency call by the decedent

for medical assistance. The circuit court granted the defendants'’

motion for dismissal of the complaint. The appellate court affirmed

that judgment in an unpublished order. No. 1--–97--–1212 (1998)

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the

plaintiff'’s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and

we now affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the

appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further

proceedings.

	The following factual summary is derived from the allegations

in the plaintiff'’s amended complaint and from the information

contained in its accompanying exhibits, which include a transcript

of the decedent'’s emergency call and the paramedics'’ report. At

around 7:55 a.m. on April 24, 1995, the decedent, Renee

Kazmierowski, suffered an asthma attack while at home at her

apartment in Chicago. She called 911 to request help. She provided

her address and telephone number and said that she lived on the

third floor of the building. The 911 operator replied that

paramedics were on the way; the operator did not attempt to keep

the decedent on the telephone while the paramedics were

responding to the call.

	Two paramedics, John Glennon and Kevin T. O'’Malley, were

directed to respond to what they were told was a "“heart attack"”

victim. They were allowed into the decedent'’s apartment building by a neighbor in the building and went to the third floor. They

asked the neighbor whether he had summoned help, and the

neighbor replied that he had not. The paramedics then knocked on

the door of the only other apartment located on the third floor, but

they received no response. The neighbor escorted a firefighter, who

had also responded to the call, through his apartment to the back

of the building. The firefighter knocked on the back door, but he

received no response and was not able to see into the apartment.

While the firefighter was checking the back of the building, the

paramedics called the dispatcher, who confirmed that they were at

the correct address. In response to the paramedics'’ questions, the

dispatcher also said that the caller had not provided her age, and

that an attempt to return the call had reached an answering

machine. The neighbor told the paramedics that the apartment was

occupied by a young couple, who did not appear to have any

medical problems. The paramedics concluded that they were not

needed at the address in question, and they left the scene. That

afternoon, the same paramedics returned to the apartment, again

in response to an emergency call. On this occasion, a man let the

paramedics into the apartment, and they found the decedent lying

dead on the floor.

	The plaintiff'’s amended complaint comprised a total of 11

counts. These alleged negligence and willful and wanton

misconduct, and sought recovery from the City and the two

paramedics under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act.

An additional count sought to impose liability on the City under a

federal civil rights provision. The complaint alleged that the 911

operator acted negligently, willfully, and wantonly in failing to keep

decedent on the phone while the paramedics responded. The

complaint further alleged that the front door of decedent'’s

apartment was unlocked when the paramedics responded to her

call, and that the paramedics acted negligently, willfully, and

wantonly in failing to try the unlocked door and enter the

apartment.

	The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint

under section 2--–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

5/2--–615 (West 1994)). The defendants argued that they were

immune from liability for the decedent'’s death under the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (EMS Act) (210

ILCS 50/1 through 33 (West 1994)). The defendants further

contended that the plaintiff had failed to adequately allege that they

owed the decedent a special duty of care or engaged in willful and

wanton misconduct. The circuit court granted the defendants'’

motion, ruling that the defendants were immune from liability

under the EMS Act and that the plaintiff had failed to adequately

allege a special duty or willful and wanton misconduct.

	The appellate court affirmed the circuit court judgment in an

unpublished order. No. 1--–97--–1212 (1998) (unpublished order

under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court rejected the

defendants'’ contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that

section 5--–101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental

Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS

10/5--–101 (West 1994)) granted immunity to the defendants. The

appellate court concluded, however, that section 17 of the EMS

Act (210 ILCS 50/17 (West 1994)) immunized the defendants

from liability for the decedent'’s death. The appellate court also

held that the plaintiff had failed to adequately allege that the

defendants owed the decedent a special duty or that their conduct

was willful and wanton. We allowed the plaintiff'’s petition for

leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We later granted leave to the

Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and to the Illinois Governmental

Association of Pools and the Illinois Municipal League to submit

briefs as amici curiae. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of

the appellate court, and we remand the cause to the circuit court

for further proceedings.

	Before this court, the plaintiff does not challenge the dismissal

of counts I, II, and XI of the amended complaint; counts I and II

charged the City with negligence, and count XI alleged a violation

of the decedent'’s civil rights. Among the counts that remain,

counts III and IV allege willful and wanton misconduct by the City

for its failure to implement and enforce proper training for

paramedics and for its failure to train and supervise the paramedics;

count V seeks to recover from the City for its vicarious liability for

the willful and wanton misconduct of the two paramedics in this

case. Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX are directed against paramedics Glennon and O'’Malley; these counts allege negligence by the

paramedics and seek recovery under the Wrongful Death Act and

the Survival Act. The final count remaining for our consideration

is count X, which alleges willful and wanton misconduct by the

two paramedics.

	A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2--–615 of the

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--–615 (West 1994)) attacks

the legal sufficiency of a complaint. In ruling on a section 2--–615

motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

complaint. The court is to interpret the allegations of the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. A cause of action should

not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no

set of facts can be proved under the pleadings that will entitle the

plaintiff to recover. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 90 (1988).

	The plaintiff initially argues that the defendants'’ section 2--–615

motion to dismiss should not have been considered by the trial

court because portions of the motion instead should have been

included in a motion brought under section 2--–619 of the Code of

Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--–619 (West 1994)), which permits

the dismissal of an action because of certain affirmative defects or

defenses. We believe that the plaintiff has waived this objection,

however, for the plaintiff failed to raise it in the circuit court. See Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). We now turn to the merits of the present appeal.

	In support of the appellate court'’s and circuit court'’s rulings,

the defendants contend that the present action is barred by the

immunity provision found in section 5--–101 of the Tort Immunity

Act (745 ILCS 10/5--–101 (West 1994)). The defendants did not

raise this contention in the circuit court, but they argued the point

before the appellate court in support of the circuit judge'’s

favorable ruling. The appellate court disagreed with the defendants,

who renew the contention before this court, arguing that section

5--–101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to this case and grants

them immunity in these circumstances. Section 5--–101 provides:

			"“Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is

liable for failure to establish a fire department or otherwise to provide fire protection, rescue or other emergency

service.

			As used in this Article, '‘rescue services'’ includes, but is

not limited to, the operation of an ambulance as defined in

the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act."”

745 ILCS 10/5--–101 (West 1994).

	The appellate court ruled that section 5--–101 provides

immunity "“only where a public entity chooses not to provide any

fire protection, rescue or emergency services at all, and not where

a public entity offers these services in general but fails to provide

them in a particular case."” The defendants challenge the appellate

court'’s interpretation, arguing that the statute immunizes a local

public entity that establishes a rescue service but fails to

competently use that service when summoned by a particular

plaintiff. We do not agree.

	We believe that section 5--–101 immunizes only a local public

entity that has not established a fire department or rescue service,

or has not instituted a system for otherwise providing fire or rescue

services. This result is clear from a reading of section 5--–102, which

immediately follows section 5--–101. Section 5--–102 immunizes "“a

local public entity that has undertaken to provide fire protection

service"” from liability for injuries "“resulting from the failure to

suppress or contain a fire."” 745 ILCS 10/5--–102 (West 1994).

Because section 5--–102 applies to municipalities that have

"“undertaken to provide"” fire protection service, it was clearly

meant to contrast with section 5--–101, which governs municipalities

that have not undertaken to provide such service. Further support

for this interpretation comes from section 5--–101 itself, which

defines "“rescue services"” as including the "“operation of an

ambulance."” 745 ILCS 10/5--–101 (West 1994). Under section

5--–101, public entities that have not provided for the "“operation of

an ambulance"” are thus immune from liability for that omission,

while public entities that do provide for the "“operation of an

ambulance"” are not covered by the statute--–they are covered by the

provisions of the EMS Act instead. Because the complaint in the

instant case alleged that the City of Chicago has established a

system for providing emergency rescue services, section 5--–101

does not apply in these circumstances.

	We next consider the provisions of the EMS Act and the

immunity afforded by it. As an initial matter, the plaintiff argues

that the provision is not applicable at all to this case. At the time of

the decedent'’s death, in April 1995, section 17(a) of the EMS Act

provided as follows:

			"“Any person, agency or governmental body licensed or

authorized pursuant to this Act or its rules, who in good

faith provides life support services during a Department

approved training course, in the normal course of

conducting their duties, or in an emergency shall not be

civilly or criminally liable as a result of their acts or

omissions in providing those services unless the acts or

omissions, including the bypassing of nearby hospitals or

medical facilities for the purpose of transporting a trauma

patient to a designated trauma center in accordance with

the protocols developed pursuant to section 27 of this Act,

are inconsistent with the persons'’s training or constitute

willful or wanton misconduct."” 210 ILCS 50/17(a) (West

1994).

Section 17(b) of the EMS Act similarly provided immunity for acts

or omissions "“in connection with administration, sponsorship,

authorization, support, financem, or supervision of emergency

medical services personnel, where the act or omission occurs in

connection with their training or with services rendered outside a

hospital unless the act or omission was the result of gross

negligence or willful misconduct."” 210 ILCS 50/17(b) (West

1994). We note that both provisions have been amended since the

decedent'’s death. The legislature has now omitted, from section

17(a), the reference to acts or omissions "“inconsistent with the

person'’s training,"” and has reformulated, in section 17(b), the

standard of non-immunized conduct to be that involving "“willful

and wanton misconduct."” See 210 ILCS 50/3.150(a), (b) (West

1996). The parties agree that the operative provisions in this case

are the ones that were in force at the time of the decedent'’s death.

	The plaintiff contends that section 17(a) applies only when

paramedics have actually rendered life support treatment to a

patient; the plaintiff maintains that the failure of the responding

paramedics in this case to administer any treatment at all to the decedent means that the provision has no application here. In

support of this interpretation, the plaintiff cites the provisions

appearing in sections 4.02, 4.06, and 4.20 of the EMS Act, which

respectively define the terms "“aAdvanced lLife sSupport--–mMobile

iIntensive cCare sServices,"” "“bBasic lLife sSupport sServices,"” and

"“iIntermediate lLife sSupport sServices."” 210 ILCS 50/4.02, 4.06,

4.20 (West 1994). The plaintiff notes that each of these levels of

life support treatment involves the performance of acts or

procedures directly involving patient care. The plaintiff thus

construes these definitions as signifying that the reference to life

support services in the immunity provision of section 17(a) must

refer to the actual rendition of medical treatment, and not to the

conduct at issue in this case, in which no treatment was ever

administered.

	We do not believe that the scope of section 17(a) is as narrow

as the plaintiff believes it to be. We conclude that the provision

applies to this case, even though the acts and omissions alleged

here do not relate to the actual rendition of life support treatment.

Although the EMS Act does not define the general term "“life

support services,"” we do not believe that we are limited, in

interpreting section 17(a), by the specialized meanings assigned to

the terms "“advanced life support--–mobile intensive care services,"”

"“basic life support services,"” and "“intermediate life support

services."” Those definitions are designed to distinguish one level or

form of care from another, and the legislature could reasonably

have decided to omit from the definitions conduct that is common

to them all or, though preparatory to the actual rendering of

medical care, is no less an integral part of providing life support

services. Moreover, section 17(a) also refers to the transportation

of patients. If transporting a patient to a hospital is an aspect of life

support services, then so too should locating a patient in the first

place. Other provisions in the EMS Act also demonstrate that the

immunity provisions of section 17 apply in these circumstances.

Elsewhere, the Act regulates matters such as communications,

response time, and standards for ambulance operation. 210 ILCS

50/7, 7.1, 9 (West 1994). These additional measures are evidence

of the Act'’s broad scope, and of the equally broad meaning we believe must be given to the term "“life support services"” in the

immunity provisions.

	The parties also dispute the scope of the immunity provided by

section 17(a) of the EMS Act. That provision, by its terms, affords

immunity to two distinct types of activity: conduct that is

"“inconsistent with the person'’s training"” as a paramedic, and

conduct that is willful and wanton. The parties do not agree on the

reach of the former category, involving conduct that is

"“inconsistent with the person'’s training."” The plaintiff insists that

the provision does not afford immunity for conduct that is contrary

to or violates training received by a paramedic. The defendants, in

contrast, construe this exception more narrowly, contending that

it withholds immunity merely for conduct that is beyond the level

of a paramedic'’s training; the defendants maintain that the

provision otherwise provides complete immunity for negligence.

	We agree with the defendants'’ interpretation. We believe that

this portion of section 17(a) means that conduct that is beyond the

level of a paramedic'’s training is not immunized, while conduct

that merely deviates from a paramedic'’s training and constitutes

negligence is subject to immunity. The appellate court has adopted

this interpretation in a series of cases. Bowden v. Cary Fire Protection District, 304 Ill. App. 3d 274, 280 (1999); Brock v. Anderson Road Ass'’n,, 287 Ill. App. 3d 16, 23-24 (1997); Gleason v. Village of Peoria Heights, 207 Ill. App. 3d 185, 188-89 (1990). We believe that that construction of the statutory language better

effectuates the legislative intent. Under the plaintiff'’s broad

reading, which would withhold immunity for conduct that violates

a person'’s training, the exception would threaten to supplant the

immunity rule, for virtually any negligent act could be said to be

inconsistent with or in violation of a person'’s training. The plaintiff

has not alleged that the actions of the paramedics were beyond

their level of training, and therefore we conclude that section 17(a)

operates to immunize them for their conduct, unless it rises to the

level of willful and wanton misconduct.

	We next consider whether the plaintiff'’s amended complaint

sufficiently alleges willful and wanton misconduct. The circuit

court believed that the allegations were merely conclusory, and the appellate court agreed. The defendants argue that the lower courts'’

determinations were correct.

	It is the plaintiff'’s duty to sufficiently allege conduct that falls

within the scope of a recognized cause of action. Moreover, mere

conclusory allegations are not sufficient. We believe, however, that

the allegations contained in the plaintiff'’s amended complaint are

sufficient to withstand the defendants'’ motion to dismiss.

	This court has previously defined "“willful and wanton

misconduct"” in the following terms:

			"“ '‘A wilful or wanton injury must have been intentional

or the act must have been committed under circumstances

exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others,

such as a failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to

exercise ordinary care to prevent it or a failure to discover

the danger through recklessness or carelessness when it

could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary

care.'’ ” "““ Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267, 273 (1994), quoting Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 583 (1946).

	We believe that the allegations in the plaintiff'’s amended

complaint are sufficient, creating a question for the trier of fact to

determine whether the defendants'’ conduct was willful and

wanton. According to the complaint, the decedent, Renee

Kazmierowski, called 911 on the morning of April 24, 1995, and

requested help, explaining that she was having an asthma attack.

She provided her address and telephone number and said what

floor she lived on. She also told the dispatcher, "“I think I'’m going

to die. Hurry."” The dispatcher did not attempt to keep Renee on

the line, however, as required by applicable standards.

	Moreover, according to the allegations in the plaintiff'’s

amended complaint, paramedics routinely receive instruction on

how to respond to calls and, in particular, on how to locate persons

in need of emergency medical treatment. The plaintiff alleges that

training given to paramedics in Chicago, like training given to

paramedics everywhere else, includes the following:

			"“[I]nstruction, training and enforcement of the standard

‘‘Try Before You Pry’’ which dictates that firefighters, paramedics and other rescue personnel should always

attempt to open a shut door by turning the door knob

before engaging in destructive methods to gain access, or

before exiting the scene altogether, without gaining access

in order to ensure delivery of emergency health care

services to the critically ill caller."”

	In the present case, the victim'’’s door was unlocked. If the

paramedics had been following these vital and basic precepts of

their training, as alleged, they would have found the victim inside

the residence, and perhaps then they could have saved her life.

Locating a person in need of emergency medical treatment is the

first step in providing life support services. Not even that first step

was taken here. We believe that the portions of the amended

complaint that allege willful and wanton misconduct by the

defendants are sufficient to withstand the defendants'’’ motion to

dismiss, and we therefore remand the action to the circuit court for

further proceedings.

	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,

affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, is

affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to

the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings.

								Affirmed in part and reversed in part;

									cause remanded.

	JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:

	On April 24, 1995, Renee Kazmierowski (decedent) suffered

an asthma attack at her apartment in Chicago. Decedent called 911

and stated: “I need help. I’m having an asthma attack. I think I’m

going to die. Please hurry.” The 911 operator told decedent that

paramedics were on the way, but failed to keep decedent on the

phone while the paramedics were responding. When the defendant

paramedics arrived at the reporting apartment, they knocked loudly

but received no response. A next-door neighbor escorted one of

the responding officers through his apartment to check the back

door of the reporting apartment, but the officer received no

response there either. The neighbor told the paramedics that in the apartment lived a young couple who appeared to have no medical

problems. The paramedics called the dispatcher, who confirmed

that they were at the correct address. Concluding that there was no

indication that they were needed at the address, the paramedics

reported back in service. Later that day, the defendant paramedics

were again called to the same apartment. This time, a man let them

into the apartment and showed them on the floor the dead body of

his girlfriend, who had died of an asthma attack.

	The majority holds that the complaint filed by the

administrator of decedent’s estate adequately alleged willful and

wanton misconduct under section 17(a) of the Emergency Medical

Services (EMS) Systems (EMS) AAct (EMS Act) (210 ILCS 50/17(a)

(West 1994)). Contrary to the majority’s holding, this statutory

section does not even apply to this case.

	Section 17(a) states that a person who “provides life support

services” shall not be liable for the results of their acts or omissions

unless those acts or omissions are “inconsistent with the person’s

training or constitute willful or wanton misconduct.” 210 ILCS

50/17(a) (West 1994). The majority errs in holding that the

defendants in this case provided life support services within the

meaning of the statute. The statute defines life support services as

“emergency medical care,” and lists as examples of such services

“airway management, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, control of

shock and bleeding and splinting of fractures.” 210 ILCS 50/4.02,

4.06, 4.20 (West 1994). According to the allegations of the

complaint, the defendant paramedics provided no life support

services to the decedent. Although the 911 dispatcher promised to

provide such services, the services were never provided because

the paramedics did not locate the decedent. The majority seems to

believe that because the statute applies to the transportation of patients, it necessarily applies to the locating of patients as well. There is absolutely nothing in the statute to support such a reading.

Defendants never even began to provide life support services,

because they did not even see the patient. Because the statute

immunizes only “acts or omissions in providing [life support]

services,” the statute does not apply to any acts or omissions of the

instant defendants, whether willful and wanton or otherwise. 210

ILCS 50/17(a) (West 1994).

	The City argues, however, that even if this immunity statute

does not apply, it is still immune from liability in the instant case

under the common law “public duty” rule. The public duty rule

prevents units of local government from being held liable for their

failure to provide adequate governmental services such as police

and fire protection. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1998); Leone v. City of Chicago, 156 Ill. 2d 33, 37 (1993); Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 509 (1990). The rationale for the rule is that the duty of government to provide such protective

services is owed to the public at large and therefore takes

precedence over any duty owed to a particular plaintiff.

Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (1998); Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 345. The public duty rule exists independently of any statutory immunities and notwithstanding the

abolition in Illinois of common law sovereign immunity.

Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45-46; Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 345, 347; Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 363 (1968). Under the public duty rule, then, the City is presumptively immune from

liability for its failure to promptly locate and treat the decedent.

	This court has recognized, however, an exception to the public

duty rule known as the “special duty” doctrine. Under this

doctrine, a municipality may be held liable for its failure to provide

adequate governmental services if the legislature has not granted

immunity to the municipality. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 347. To invoke the special duty doctrine, a plaintiff must prove the

following elements:

			(1) that the municipality was uniquely aware of the

particular danger or risk to which the plaintiff was

exposed;

			(2) that the municipality engaged in specific acts or

omissions that were affirmative or willful in nature; and

			(3) that the injury occurred while the plaintiff was under

the direct and immediate control of municipal employees

or agents.

See Leone, 156 Ill. 2d at 37; Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d at 508. For example, in Leone v. City of Chicago, 156 Ill. 2d 33 (1993), this court found a special duty where a police officer directed the

plaintiff to stand between her car and his police car, which was

then struck from behind, injuring her.

	Assuming arguendo that the complaint in the instant case satisfies the first of the requirements for a special duty, I would

hold that it fails to satisfy the remaining elements. The complaint

fails to establish that the City or its employees engaged in

affirmative or willful acts or omissions in connection with

decedent’s death. The complaint simply alleges that the 911

dispatcher failed to keep decedent on the phone while the

paramedics were responding and that the paramedics failed to try

the doorknob in order to enter decedent’s apartment. At most,

these allegations show that the city employees neglected to

perform certain tasks. There is no indication of a conscious

decision by the employees not to perform the tasks. Rather, the

employees attempted to locate decedent but neglected to try the

doorknob to gain entry to her dwelling. This conduct was neither

affirmative nor willful.

	Furthermore, the complaint fails to adequately allege that

decedent was under the direct and immediate control of the City.

Although decedent called 911 for assistance, the paramedics had

not located her and were not physically in her presence at the time

of her death. In Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374 (1994), this court refused to find a special duty where police officers failed to

enter an apartment to prevent a violent crime that was occurring. Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 387. We held that because the officers had not initiated the circumstances that brought harm to the victims, the

victims were not under the officers’ direct and immediate control. Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 387. Similarly, in the instant case the City had no part in initiating the harm that befell decedent. Although the

complaint may establish that the City employees performed their

duties incompetently, it fails to establish that they owed decedent

a special duty. The public duty rule therefore immunizes the City

from liability for her death.

	For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

	JUSTICES BILANDIC and RATHJE joins in this dissent.