Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

May 2004 MILITARY BASE 

CLOSURES 

Assessment of DOD’s 

2004 Report on the 

Need for a Base 

Realignment and 

Closure Round 

GAO-04-760 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-760.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barry W. 

Holman at (202) 512-8412 or 

holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-760, a report to 

congressional committees 

May 2004

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES 

Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on 

the Need for a Base Realignment and 

Closure Round 

DOD’s report to Congress generally addressed all legislative reporting 

requirements in section 2912 of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure 

Act of 1990, as amended, and separately complied with requirements under 

Section 2913 in adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. 

The degree of coverage on some reporting requirements was limited to avoid 

prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 round. 

As directed, GAO analyzed DOD’s worldwide installation inventory, force 

structure plan, and selection criteria. While all three are important in setting 

a framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in 

guiding DOD’s analyses for the 2005 round. The unclassified portion of 

the 20-year force structure plan, extending through 2009, provides a 

macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions), and reflects limited 

changes across the military services, even though the services have 

initiatives under way that could affect future force structure and 

infrastructure requirements. Today’s security environment is evolving, as are 

force structure requirements along with technology advancements, and 

defense transformation efforts. The department must consider these factors 

in its BRAC analyses with appropriate allowances for future uncertainties. 

DOD’s selection criteria closely parallel criteria used in previous rounds, 

while incorporating the provisions required by legislation authorizing the 

2005 round. The analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed 

through their application in the ongoing BRAC process. 

GAO addressed other BRAC-related issues such as excess defense 

infrastructure capacity and BRAC savings because of their importance to 

DOD’s certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round. DOD’s excess capacity 

analysis, completed for the 2004 report, has some limitations that could 

result in either overstating or understating excess capacity across various 

functional areas, and make it difficult to project a total amount of excess 

capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives some indications of excess 

capacity within the department, the issue warrants a more complete 

assessment in the BRAC process. That process will also consider joint base 

use with the potential for better identifying excess capacity. DOD’s historical 

financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 

and 1995 rounds, each of the military departments could achieve annual net 

savings by 2011, as stipulated by the mandate. While the potential exists for 

substantial savings from the upcoming round, it is difficult to conclusively 

project the expected magnitude of the savings because there are too many 

unknowns at this time. Additionally, improvements are needed in DOD’s 

accounting for savings after BRAC decisions are made. 

GAO found no basis to question DOD’s certification of the need for an 

additional BRAC round. While clear limitations exist in DOD’s assessment 

of excess capacity, it does point to some areas that warrant additional 

analysis-and the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so.

The Defense Base Realignment and 

Closure Act of 1990, as amended, 

required the Department of 

Defense (DOD) to address several 

base realignment and closure 

(BRAC) issues in 2004 for the 2005 

BRAC round to proceed. The 

requirements included reporting on 

a 20-year force structure plan, an 

inventory of military installations, 

and separately adopting selection 

criteria for the upcoming round. 

The legislation also required DOD 

to certify whether an additional 

BRAC round was needed, and, if 

so, that annual net savings would 

be realized not later than fiscal year 

2011. If the certifications were 

provided, GAO was required to 

evaluate DOD’s submissions and 

report to Congress. DOD reported 

on March 23, 2004, and provided 

the certifications. 

In this report GAO evaluates 

(1) DOD’s responsiveness to 

legislative requirements; (2) the 

force structure plan, infrastructure 

inventory, and selection criteria; 

(3) other key issues included in 

DOD's report; and (4) DOD’s 

certification regarding the need for 

an additional BRAC round. 

This report includes a 

recommendation for executive 

action by DOD and a matter for 

congressional consideration to 

strengthen the BRAC process. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD agreed with the report 

contents. 
Page i GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

DOD’s Report Generally Addressed All of the Legislatively 

Required Information 6

Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and 

Selection Criteria 8

Observations on Other Key BRAC-Related Issues Included in 

DOD’s Report 16

Certification of the Need for an Additional BRAC Round 23

Conclusion 23

Recommendation for Executive Action 24

Matter for Congressional Consideration 25

Agency Comments 25

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28 

Appendix II BRAC 2005 Timeline 32 

Appendix III GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 

2005 Base Closure Round 33 

Appendix IV DOD’s Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity 39 

Appendix V Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the 

Need for an Additional BRAC Round 42 

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 45 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Appendix VII Key Prior GAO Reports on DOD’s Base Realignments 

and Closures 46 

Appendix VIII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 47 

Tables 

Table 1: GAO Assessment of DOD’s Responsiveness to Legislative 

Requirements in its Section 2912 Report to Congress 7

Table 2: DOD’s 20-year Force Structure Plan (unclassified portion 

through fiscal year 2009) 11

Table 3: Comparison of BRAC Criteria for the 1995 Round and 

Those Adopted for the 2005 Round 14

Table 4: Net Annual Savings In the Sixth Year of Implementation 

for BRAC 1993 and 1995 Rounds by Military Department 20

Table 5: Army Analysis of Proportional Capacity 39

Table 6: Estimated Percentage of Excess Capacity 41

Abbreviations 

BRAC base realignment and closure 

CBO Congressional Budget Office 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page 1 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

May 17, 2004 

Congressional Committees 

While the Department of Defense (DOD) continues its work in preparing 

for the upcoming base realignment and closure (BRAC) round in 2005, 

legislation1

 required DOD to report to Congress on several BRAC-related 

issues in 2004 in order for the 2005 round to proceed. The legislation 

directed, among other things, that the Secretary of Defense provide 

Congress with a 20-year force structure plan and a worldwide inventory of 

military installations in its submission of its fiscal year 2005 budget 

documentation and separately publish the final selection criteria for the 

2005 BRAC round no later than February 16, 2004. Of particular 

importance was the requirement that the Secretary of Defense certify the 

need for additional base realignments and closures and, if such a need 

exists, certify that annual net savings would be realized by each military 

department not later than fiscal year 2011. DOD published its final 

selection criteria on February 12, 2004, and reported on the other 

legislative requirements, including the necessary certifications, on March 

23, 2004.2

 The legislation also directed us, if DOD’s certifications were 

provided, to submit a report to Congress, within 60 days of the issuance of 

DOD’s report, evaluating specific aspects of DOD’s legislatively required 

submissions. 

In this report, we evaluate (1) DOD’s responsiveness to the legislative 

reporting requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure 

inventory, and final selection criteria for the 2005 BRAC round, including, 

as appropriate, observations on the relative analytical sufficiency and 

accuracy of each; (3) other key BRAC-related issues included in DOD’s 

report, such as excess infrastructure capacity, estimated savings, and the 

economic impact of BRAC on nearby communities; and (4) the Secretary’s 

 1

 The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107, Title XXX, 

Dec. 28, 2001) authorized a defense base realignment and closure round for 2005 by 

amending the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX, 

Nov. 5, 1990). Provisions in Section 2912 and 2913 of the 1990 Act, as amended, require 

DOD to address various BRAC-related issues in order for the 2005 round to continue. 

2

 Department of Defense, Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2003, (Washington, D.C., March 2004). 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC round. While the 

mandate did not direct us to address the third objective, we chose to 

include this information because of widespread interest in the 2005 

BRAC process among Congress and the public and its relevance to the 

Secretary’s certification of the need for the 2005 BRAC round. 

In performing our review, we conducted work at the BRAC Office in the 

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment and the Army, Navy, and Air Force BRAC offices. We also 

relied on our previous and ongoing work on BRAC-related issues. Because 

we were required to report within 2 months after DOD issued its report, 

we did not have time to fully assess the accuracy of all data used in the 

report; but we did perform limited reliability assessments of key data 

contained in DOD’s report and determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report with relevant limitations noted in 

our report. We performed our work from March to May 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Further information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

DOD’s report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in 

section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as 

amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 2913 

for adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. According 

to DOD officials, the degree of coverage on some reporting requirements, 

such as the impact of joint basing and the extent of excess capacity, was 

limited in order to avoid preempting or prejudging the ongoing analytical 

process for the 2005 BRAC round. 

While the worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force 

structure plan, and selection criteria are important in setting a framework 

for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in guiding DOD’s 

analyses for the 2005 round. The worldwide inventory extends well 

beyond that required for the domestic BRAC process,3

 which focuses on a 

smaller subset of the inventory. The unclassified portion of the 20-year 

force structure plan covers only the 2005 through 2009 time period and 

provides more of a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions). The 

 3

 The BRAC legislation for the 2005 round applies to military installations in the 50 states, 

the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, 

American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 

United States. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

plan depicts little change in the force structure through that period, even 

though the services have a number of initiatives underway that could 

affect force structure and infrastructure requirements. DOD’s ongoing 

BRAC analysis, however, will need to consider the impact of this and other 

potential future force structure changes on infrastructure requirements. 

Further, as provided in the legislation, DOD has an opportunity to update 

the plan with its fiscal year 2006 budget submission in February 2005, 

which would be expected prior to the Secretary’s announcement of his 

proposed closure and realignment recommendations in May 2005. DOD’s 

selection criteria for the 2005 round, while incorporating the requirements 

required by legislation authorizing the 2005 round, closely parallel the 

criteria that provided a solid foundation for BRAC analyses conducted in 

previous rounds. Even so, the analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best 

be assessed through their application, as DOD completes its data 

collection and analyses for the upcoming round. 

Other BRAC-related issues—excess defense infrastructure, estimated 

savings, and community impact from BRAC actions—have historically 

been and continue to be areas of widespread interest to Congress and the 

public in considering the need for another BRAC round. DOD’s analysis of 

excess infrastructure capacity, which was completed for the 2004 report 

outside the BRAC process, has some limitations that could result in either 

overstating or understating the amount of excess capacity across various 

functional areas, and make it difficult to project a total amount of excess 

capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives some indication of excess 

capacity within the department, the issue warrants a more complete 

assessment in the official BRAC process. Moreover, in completing this 

analysis, the military services assessed their bases as though they were 

being used for a single function, and did not consider existing or the 

potential for increased multi-functional/joint use that is expected to be 

considered in the 2005 BRAC round—and provides the potential for better 

identifying excess capacity. As to estimated savings, DOD’s historical 

financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 

1993 and 1995 rounds, each of the military departments could achieve 

annual net savings in the 2005 round by fiscal year 2011, as stipulated by 

the mandate. While the potential exists for substantial savings and 

efficiencies to result from the BRAC 2005 round, it is difficult to 

conclusively project levels of expected savings from the 2005 round. There 

are too many unknowns at this time, such as the timing of individual 

closure or realignment actions, and the implementation costs that may be 

required. Further, important differences exist in the upcoming round, 

compared with prior rounds that could affect costs and savings. For 

example, this round has a greater focus on supporting force 
Page 4 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

transformation and the potential need to support stateside redeployment 

of some forces currently based overseas as a result of separately ongoing 

overseas basing reviews. Additionally, we have previously noted the need 

for improvements in DOD’s tracking and periodic updating of savings 

estimates from BRAC recommendations once they have been approved 

and are being implemented. DOD needs to firm up plans to implement 

previously proposed improvements as it moves forward with the 2005 

BRAC round. As to economic impact, the department’s report recognized 

that BRAC actions can affect the local economies of the surrounding 

communities but also notes that it has sought to minimize any adverse 

local impacts with a coordinated program of federal assistance from both 

DOD and domestic agencies. Our work has shown that many communities 

surrounding closed bases from the previous rounds have fared better than 

the national average, in terms of changes in unemployment rates and per 

capita income, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some 

negative impact from the economic downturn in recent years. 

Although we identified some limitations with DOD’s assessment of excess 

capacity and factors that could affect the timing and amount of savings 

from a future BRAC round, we found no basis to question DOD’s 

certification of the need for an additional BRAC round. As directed by 

DOD, the upcoming round is expected to encompass more than a 

capacity-reduction and cost-savings effort; rather, it is also an effort to 

align the defense infrastructure with the transformation of its forces. 

Further, the need for an additional BRAC round has long been recognized 

by various defense officials and studies—and noted in several of our 

products since the time of the 1995 BRAC round. 

This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to 

strengthen the BRAC analytical process, documenting allowance for future 

force structure and surge requirements, and a matter for congressional 

consideration to ensure steps are taken by DOD to improve the accounting 

for savings from BRAC decisions. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

DOD agreed with the report contents. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20024

 extended the 

authority of the 1990 BRAC legislation, with some modifications, to 

authorize an additional BRAC round in 2005. Under section 2912 of the 

 4

 P.L. 107-107, Title XXX, (Dec. 28, 2001). 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

1990 Act and as part of its fiscal year 2005 budget submission, DOD was 

required to submit a 20-year force structure plan, an infrastructure 

inventory, and a certification that additional closures and realignments 

were needed and that annual net savings would be achieved for each 

military department by fiscal year 2011. The force structure plan was to be 

based on assessments by the Secretary of Defense of the probable threats 

to national security between fiscal years 2005 and 2025. Furthermore, the 

plan was to be based on the probable end strengths and major military 

force units (land divisions, carrier and other major combatant vessels, and 

air wings) needed to meet these threats. DOD was also required to prepare 

a comprehensive inventory of military installations worldwide that 

indicated the number and type of facilities in the active and reserve forces 

of each military department. 

Using the force structure plan and the infrastructure inventory, the 

Secretary of Defense’s submission to Congress was required to address 

(1) the inventory necessary to support the force structure, (2) the 

categories of excess infrastructure and infrastructure capacity, and (3) an 

economic analysis of the effect of the closure or realignment of military 

installations to reduce excess capacity. In analyzing the infrastructure 

requirements, DOD was to consider the continuing need for and 

availability of military installations outside the United States and any 

efficiency that may be gained from joint tenancy by more than one branch 

of the Armed Forces on military bases. On the basis of the force structure 

plan, the infrastructure inventory and the economic analysis, the Secretary 

was required to certify whether the need existed for further closures and 

realignments and, if so, that an additional round would result in annual net 

savings for each military department, beginning not later than 2011. 

Collectively, these requirements were to be addressed in a report to 

Congress at the time it submitted its fiscal year 2005 budget justification 

documentation. The legislation also stipulated that if the certifications 

were provided in DOD’s report to Congress, we were to evaluate the force 

structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and the final selection criteria, 

and the need for an additional BRAC round. We were required to issue a 

report not later than 60 days after DOD submitted its report to Congress. 

Section 2913 of the 1990 Act, as amended, also required the Secretary of 

Defense to publish in the Federal Register the selection criteria for use in 

the BRAC 2005 round and to provide an opportunity for public comment. 

The legislation required that military value be the primary criteria for 

making recommendations to close or realign military installations, and 

directed inclusion of a number of considerations in formulating the 

selection criteria. The proposed selection criteria were published on 
Page 6 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

December 23, 2003, with a public comment period ending January 30, 

2004. The final criteria were published on February 12, 2004. We were also 

required by the legislation to evaluate the final selection criteria as part of 

our overall assessment of DOD’s reporting on BRAC issues in 2004. This is 

in keeping with GAO’s longstanding role as an independent, objective 

observer of the BRAC process. 

Legislation authorizing the 2005 round continued the previous legislative 

requirement, applicable to earlier BRAC rounds that we review the 

Secretary’s recommendations and selection process; it requires us to 

report to the congressional defense committees no later than July 1, 2005, 

45 days after the last date by which the Secretary must transmit to the 

congressional defense committees and the BRAC Commission his 

recommendations for closures and realignments.5

 To make an informed 

and timely assessment, we have consistently operated in a real-time 

setting and have had access to significant portions of the process as it has 

evolved, thus affording the department an opportunity to address any 

concerns we raised on a timely basis. From our vantage point, we are 

looking to see to what extent DOD follows a clear, transparent, 

consistently applied process, where we can see a logical flow between 

DOD’s analysis and its decision making. 

DOD’s report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in 

section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as 

amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 2913 

for adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. In some 

instances, according to DOD officials there were limitations in the data 

provided in DOD’s Section 2912 report in order to avoid preempting or 

prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round. Table 

1 details the legislative requirements for DOD’s Section 2912 report, 

indicates the pages in DOD’s report where the issues are addressed, and 

provides our observations on the extent to which DOD provided the 

information required by each subsection in the legislation. 

 5

 See app. II for other key BRAC dates. 

DOD’s Report 

Generally Addressed 

All of the Legislatively 

Required Information 
Page 7 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Table 1: GAO Assessment of DOD’s Responsiveness to Legislative Requirements in its Section 2912 Report to Congress 

Section 2912 citation Legislative requirement DOD report citations 

GAO assessment of 

information provided 

Force structure plan and 

worldwide installation 

inventory 

 

(a)(1)(A) A force structure plan for the Armed 

Force based on an assessment by the 

Secretary of the probable threats to 

national security during the 20-year 

period beginning with fiscal year 2005, 

the probable end strengths and major 

military force units (including land force 

divisions, carrier and other major 

combatant vessels, air wings, and other 

comparable units) needed to meet these 

threats, and the anticipated levels of 

funding that will be available for national 

defense purposes during such period. 

Section 2, pp. 17-23 DOD provided an unclassified 

force structure plan through 

fiscal year 2009 and a separate 

classified force structure plan 

through fiscal year 2024. 

(a)(1)(B) A comprehensive inventory of military 

installations worldwide for each military 

department, with specifications of the 

number and type of facilities in the active 

and reserve forces of each department. 

Section 3, pp. 25-35. 

App. B, compact disk 

DOD provided a worldwide 

inventory of installations, but the 

inventory did not include all 

overseas installations where 

U.S. forces are deployed. 

(a)(2)(A) A description of the infrastructure 

necessary to support the force structure 

described in the force structure plan. 

Section 6, pp. 43-54 DOD broadly compared the 

infrastructure required to 

support the force structure for 

certain functional areas through 

fiscal year 2009 (and not 2024) 

without specificity concerning 

infrastructure requirements. 

(a)(2)(B) A discussion of categories of excess 

infrastructure and infrastructure 

capacity. 

Section 6, pp. 43-54 DOD provided the required 

information for selected 

functional areas, but the excess 

capacity methodology has some 

limitations. 

(a)(2)(C) An economic analysis of the effect of the 

closure or realignment of military 

installations to reduce excess 

infrastructure. 

Section 7, pp. 55-62 DOD provided information on 

the savings realized from the 

previous BRAC rounds and the 

reuse of selected former bases. 

(a)(3)(A) The anticipated continuing need for and 

availability of military installations 

outside the United States, taking into 

account current restrictions on the use of 

military installations outside the United 

States and the potential for future 

prohibitions or restrictions on the use of 

such military installations. 

Section 4, pp. 37-40 DOD provided a general 

discussion on the need for the 

availability of a worldwide 

network of bases, operating 

locations, and access 

arrangements, but no specific 

information on the continuing 

need for or restrictions on the 

use of specific bases. 
Page 8 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Section 2912 citation Legislative requirement DOD report citations 

GAO assessment of 

information provided 

(a)(3)(B) Any efficiencies that may be gained from 

joint tenancy by more than one branch 

of the Armed Forces at a military 

installation. 

Section 5, p. 41 DOD did not identity specific 

efficiencies but emphasized that 

joint basing is a priority for the 

2005 BRAC round. 

Certifications of need for 

further closures and 

realignments and requisite 

savings 

 

(b)(1)(A) Certification regarding whether the need 

exists for the closure or realignment of 

additional military installations. 

Cover letter DOD provided the required 

certification. 

(b)(1)(B) Certification that the additional round of 

closures and realignments would result 

in annual net savings for each of the 

military departments beginning not later 

than fiscal year 2011. 

Cover letter DOD provided the required 

certification. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD’s Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2003, March 2004. 

Likewise, as discussed in a subsequent section, DOD also complied with 

the requirements of Section 2913 in adapting its selection criteria for the 

2005 BRAC round. 

While DOD’s worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force 

structure plan, and selection criteria are all important in setting a 

framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in 

guiding BRAC analyses for the 2005 round. Although DOD provided a 

worldwide inventory of installations and facilities for each military 

department as required by the legislation, it exceeds the needs of the 2005 

BRAC process, which focuses on domestic bases.6

 Further, to the extent 

one looks to the inventory as providing a total accounting of DOD facilities 

worldwide, it should be noted that the inventory lacks completeness in 

that not all overseas installations and associated facilities where U.S. 

forces are deployed are included—primarily because some are considered 

temporary in nature. The unclassified portion of the force structure plan, 

extending through 2009, has more of a macro-level focus reflecting limited 

change across the military services, even though the services have a 

 6

 At the same time, DOD has indicated that the domestic BRAC process may be used to 

accommodate any decisions to relocate forces from overseas bases that may result from an 

ongoing but separate study of overseas basing. 

Worldwide 

Installation Inventory, 

Force Structure Plan, 

and Selection Criteria 
Page 9 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

number of initiatives under way that could affect force structure and 

infrastructure requirements. Nevertheless, DOD’s ongoing BRAC 

analysis will need to consider the impact of such changes on infrastructure 

requirements. The department’s final selection criteria, although 

incorporating legislatively directed language, essentially follows a 

framework similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds. The full 

analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their 

application, as DOD completes its data collection and analysis for the 

2005 round. 

As required by the legislation, DOD provided a worldwide inventory of 

installations, which included the number and type of facilities in the active 

and reserve forces. While the inventory provides a detailed listing of 

facilities, it extends beyond the needs of the 2005 BRAC round with its 

focus on domestic installations. At the same time, it has some limitations 

in terms of a complete inventory for use beyond BRAC because it does not 

include all overseas installations. For example, the inventory omits various 

installations and associated facilities located in parts of the Middle East, 

such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. DOD and military service officials 

told us that these installations are considered temporary or classified in 

support of contingency operations, and are not included in the database 

used to generate the inventory. This limitation should not impact the 

conduct of the 2005 BRAC round since the focus is on domestic bases, and 

DOD has identified the domestic bases in the database to assess in the 

BRAC 2005 round. 

The inventory of installations and facilities was derived from DOD’s 

services’ real property databases.7

 Because of time constraints, we 

performed only limited work on the accuracy of the inventory. Contractors 

who maintain the Facilities Assessment Database told us that since 1998 

they have validated and verified facility data annually by performing data 

queries—such as verifying the size of buildings or the year a facility was 

acquired or built—to identify anomalies in the data. Contractor officials 

stated the queries have been successful in correcting erroneous data 

 7

 These databases include the Army’s Integrated Facilities System; the Navy’s and Marine 

Corp’s Navy Facility Assets Database; and the Air Force’s Automated Civil Engineer 

System. 

Worldwide Installation 

Inventory Provided but 

Extended Beyond 

Requirements for 2005 

BRAC Round 

Facilities Assessment Database, which is updated annually from the military 
Page 10 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

reported by the services and that the quality of the data has improved 

since 1998. 

As with prior BRAC rounds, DOD has provided Congress with a force 

structure plan that will guide or inform BRAC decisions in 2005, except 

legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round required development of a 

20-year plan instead of a 6-year plan required in prior rounds. DOD’s 

Section 2912 report contains the unclassified portion of DOD’s 20-year 

plan extending through fiscal year 2009; the remaining years of the plan 

are addressed in a classified annex to the report. The unclassified report 

provides more of a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions) 

reflecting limited changes across the military services, even though the 

services have a number of initiatives under way that could affect force 

structure and infrastructure requirements, and which will need to be 

considered by DOD as it performs its 2005 round analyses. DOD has the 

option of modifying its force structure plan, as needed, with its fiscal year 

2006 budget submission which would be expected prior to its issuance of 

BRAC recommendations. 

Table 2 summarizes DOD’s force structure plans at the macro-level 

through 2009 by service force units and by end strength. It depicts limited 

changes in force units and end strength for active and reserve components 

of most services. Exceptions include the Navy, which expects to reduce 

personnel but increase the number of ships in its inventory, and the Air 

Force, which plans a slight increase in reserve personnel end strength. 

No Major Force Structure 

Changes Identified through 

Fiscal Year 2009 in 

DOD’s 20-Year Force 

Structure Plan 
Page 11 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Table 2: DOD’s 20-year Force Structure Plan (unclassified portion through 

fiscal year 2009) 

 Fiscal year 

Service force units 2005 2009 Change

Army divisions Active 10 10 –

 Reserve 8 8 –

Aircraft carriers 12 12 –

Carrier air wings Active 10 10 –

 Reserve 1 1 –

Battle force ships 332 347 15

Air and Space Expeditionary Forces 10 10 –

Marine Corps divisions Active 3 3 –

 Reserve 1 1 –

End strength (in thousands) 

Army Activea 482 482 –

 Reserve 555 555 –

Navy Active 366 357 (9)

 Reserve 83 76 (7)

Marine Corps Active 175 175 –

 Reserve 40 40 –

Air Force Active 360 360 –

 Reserve 183 184 1

Source: DOD Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended though the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, March 2004. 

a

The Army end strength figures do not reflect the temporary increase of 30,000 spaces for fiscal year 

2004 through fiscal year 2007 to accelerate the Army transformation process while remaining fully 

engaged in worldwide operations. 

While the Army showed no force structure changes through 2009, Army 

officials told us that they have a number of initiatives under way that may 

affect the force structure and related infrastructure requirements. 

Specifically, the Army is restructuring the way it organizes its forces to 

achieve greater flexibility by increasing the number of brigade combat 

teams from 33 to 43 or more. To achieve these goals while maintaining 

global commitments, the Army has been authorized by the Secretary of 

Defense to temporarily increase its end strength by 30,000 personnel 

through fiscal year 2007. Congress is considering legislation to 

permanently authorize this increase. In addition, the Army is in the 

process of rebalancing capabilities between the active and reserve 

components by moving certain early-deploying and high-demand 
Page 12 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

capabilities such as military police and civil affairs from the reserve 

components into the active force. Although the BRAC statute allows DOD 

to submit a revised force structure plan with the fiscal year 2006 budget 

submission, Army officials told us that many of the details about this 

restructuring would not be completed by this timeframe. 

Navy officials told us that their plans include the commissioning of 17 new 

ships (13 Arleigh Burke destroyers, 2 submarines, 1 amphibious ship, and 

1 littoral combat ship) while decommissioning 2 older ships. Navy officials 

indicated that the projected reductions in the number of active personnel 

result primarily from decommissioning ships and air squadrons and 

changes to crew requirements on some ships, and the projected reduction 

in reserve personnel is caused primarily by plans to deactivate 7 maritime 

patrol squadrons. Navy officials also noted plans to increase the number of 

ships in its inventory in future years but also have efforts under way to 

reduce average crew size per ship. Although the force structure plan 

shows a planned increase in the number of ships, available information 

indicates some uncertainty over the total number of ships the Navy may 

expect for its future force structure. 

Air Force end strength levels shown in the force plan reflect authorized 

levels and not the current over-strength levels, reflecting Air Force 

expectations of reducing the current levels to those authorized. While the 

Air Force showed minimal force structure changes through 2009, an Air 

Force official stated that the service plans to increase the number of 

aircraft per squadron as well as increase crew ratios to make more 

effective use of fewer but more capable aircraft, which would most likely 

reduce future infrastructure requirements. We have previously reported8

that the Air Force could not only reduce infrastructure by increasing the 

number of aircraft per fighter squadron but could also save millions of 

dollars annually by doing so. 

We recognize that developing a 20-year force structure plan is a 

challenging task for the department, given a host of uncertainties about 

the future security environment, potential technology advances and their 

application to the future force, and ongoing departmental transformation 

efforts. The uncertainties are evident in various ongoing defense 

programs. While increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles, for example, 

 8

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating Fighter 

Squadrons Could Reduce Costs, GAO/NSIAD-96-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996). 
Page 13 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

could have far-reaching effects for future defense force structure, we 

noted in a recent report that DOD’s approach to planning for developing 

and fielding this capability does not provide reasonable assurance that its 

investment will facilitate the integration of these vehicles into the force 

structure efficiently.9

 Further, DOD officials told us that another 

challenging aspect of its force structure planning resides in the longer 

term (those years beyond 2009) of the plan. In addition to the uncertainties 

cited above, these longer-term years are characterized by additional 

unknowns regarding future funding levels that could impact the future 

force structure and associated requirements, such as the total number of 

ships for the Navy. Despite these inherent uncertainties, however, the 

department must factor in relevant assumptions about potential future 

force structure changes and surge requirements as it performs its analyses 

for the upcoming BRAC round. 

The department’s final selection criteria essentially follow a framework 

similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds, with specificity added in 

selected areas in response to requirements contained in legislation 

authorizing the 2005 BRAC round. The Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1990, as amended in 2002, required DOD to give 

priority to selection criteria dealing with military value, including (1) the 

impact on joint war fighting, training, and readiness; (2) the availability 

and condition of training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or 

air forces throughout diverse climates and terrains and staging areas for 

use by the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions; and (3) the ability 

to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements. 

The legislation also required DOD to give special consideration to other 

criteria, many of which parallel those used in prior BRAC rounds. 

Furthermore, the legislation required DOD to consider cost impacts to 

other federal entities as well as to DOD in its BRAC decision making. 

Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200410

requires DOD to consider surge requirements in the 2005 BRAC process. 

Table 3 compares the 1995 BRAC criteria with that adopted for 2005, with 

changes highlighted in bold. 

 9

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can 

Enhance DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 17, 2004). 

10 P.L. 108-136, section 2822, (Nov. 24, 2003). 

Final Selection Criteria 

Address Legislative 

Requirements and Provide 

Sound Framework for 

Follow-on BRAC Analyses 
Page 14 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Table 3: Comparison of BRAC Criteria for the 1995 Round and Those Adopted for the 2005 Round 

Criteria for 1995 Round Criteria for 2005 Round 

Military Value Military Value 

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on 

operational readiness of DOD’s total force 

The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the Defense Department’s total force, 

including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 

readiness

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations 

The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace—including training areas suitable for maneuver by 

ground, naval, or air forces throughout diversity of climate 

and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed 

Forces in homeland defense missions—at both existing and 

potential receiving locations 

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and 

future total force requirements at both the existing and potential 

receiving locations 

The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future 

total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving 

locations to support operations and training

4. Cost and manpower implications The cost of operations and the manpower implications 

Return on Investment Other Considerations 

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including 

the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of 

the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs 

The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 

number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the 

closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs 

Community Impacts 

6. The economic impact on communities The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of 

military installations

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving 

communities’ infrastructures to support forces, missions, and 

personnel 

The ability of both the existing and potential receiving 

communities’ infrastructure to support forces, missions, and 

personnel 

8. The environmental impact The environmental impact, including the impact of costs 

related to potential environmental restoration, waste 

management, and environmental compliance activities

Source: DOD. 

Note: Bolding added by GAO to denote changes from 1995. 

Our analysis of lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds affirmed the 

soundness of these basic criteria and generally endorsed their retention 

for the future, while recognizing the potential for improving the process by 

which the criteria are used in decision making.11 Notwithstanding our 

endorsement of the criteria framework, in a January 27, 2004, letter to 

DOD, we identified two areas in which we believed the draft selection 

 11 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base 

Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997). 
Page 15 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

criteria needed greater clarification to fully address special considerations 

called for in the legislation (see app. III). Specifically, we noted that the 

criterion related to cost and savings does not indicate the department’s 

intention to consider potential costs to other DOD activities or federal 

agencies that may be affected by a proposed closure or realignment 

recommendation. Also, we pointed out the criterion on environmental 

impact does not clearly identify to what extent costs related to potential 

environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental 

compliance activities would be included in cost and savings analyses of 

individual BRAC recommendations. We suggested that DOD could address 

our concerns by incorporating these considerations either directly, in its 

final criteria, or through later explanatory guidance. DOD indicated it 

would address our concerns through clarifying guidance rather than a 

change to the criteria. We have not yet seen that guidance. 

DOD also received a variety of other comments on the draft criteria from 

members of Congress, other elected representatives, and the general 

public but did not make any changes before issuing the final criteria. Most 

of these comments involved the military value criteria (see table 3: 1-4) 

and centered on the maintenance of adequate surge capacity; the roles 

military installations fulfill in homeland defense missions; the unique 

features of research, development, test, and evaluation facilities; and the 

preservation of vital human capital in various support functions. In 

responding to those comments, DOD expressed the view that the draft 

criteria adequately addressed these issues and did not see the need to 

make any changes to its draft criteria. For example, DOD said that surge 

requirements will be addressed under criterion one, which requires the 

department to consider “current and future mission capabilities,” and 

criterion three, which requires DOD to consider an installation’s ability to 

“accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force 

requirements” to support operations and training. Furthermore, DOD 

noted that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 

requires the Secretary of Defense to “assess the probable threats to 

national security” and determine “potential, prudent, surge requirements” 

as part of BRAC 2005. DOD also noted that criterion two recognizes the 

role of military installations as staging areas for forces conducting 

homeland defense missions. 

Collectively, in our view, many of the public comments on DOD’s criteria 

expressed concern that the criteria for the 2005 BRAC round focused more 

on assessing military value based on military missions and operational 

capabilities without recognizing important support capabilities such as 

research, development, test, and evaluation. Although modifications to the 
Page 16 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

criteria might have been made to address some of these concerns, the 

absence of such changes does not necessarily mean that these issues will 

not be considered in applying the criteria during the BRAC process. For 

example, the department has established a variety of joint cross-service 

groups12 to analyze various support functions during the upcoming round 

and each group will have to adapt the final criteria for its particular 

support area to assess military value related to each functional area. While 

our monitoring of the ongoing BRAC process indicates this is occurring, 

the effectiveness of these efforts will best be assessed as these groups 

complete their work. 

Other BRAC-related issues included in DOD’s report—excess 

infrastructure capacity, estimated savings for the 2005 round, and the 

economic impact of prior BRAC actions on communities—are of 

widespread interest to Congress and the public and important to DOD’s 

certification regarding the need for a BRAC round. Although the 

methodology DOD employed to identify excess capacity has some 

limitations, DOD’s report does provides a rough indication that excess 

base capacity exists. Further, historical financial data would suggest that, 

assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 round, each of 

the military departments could achieve annual net savings by 2011. As to 

economic impact, our work has shown that many communities 

surrounding closed bases from the previous rounds have fared better than 

the national average, in terms of changes in unemployment rates and per 

capita income, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some 

negative effect from the economic downturn in recent years. 

While DOD’s analysis of its infrastructure capacity for the 2004 report, 

which was completed outside the 2005 BRAC process, gives some 

indication of excess capacity across certain functional areas through fiscal 

year 2009, the methodology for that analysis has some limitations that 

could cause the results to be either overstated or understated, and raises 

questions about use of the methodology to project a total amount of 

excess capacity across DOD. At the same time, DOD’s methodology did 

not consider any additional excess capacity that might occur by analyzing 

 12 DOD has established seven joint cross-service groups to examine the following defense 

functional support areas—industrial, technical, medical, headquarters and support 

activities, supply and storage, education and training, and intelligence—during the 2005 

BRAC process. 

Observations 

on Other Key 

BRAC-Related 

Issues Included in 

DOD’s Report 

DOD Analysis Indicates 

Excess Infrastructure 

Capacity Exists 
Page 17 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

facilities or functions on a joint or cross-service basis, a priority for the 

2005 round. A more complete assessment of capacity and the potential to 

reduce it must await the results of the current BRAC analyses being 

conducted by DOD. 

To estimate excess capacity, the military services and the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA) compared the capacity for a sample of bases in 

1989 with the projected capacity of a sample of bases in 2009. The services 

and DLA categorized the bases according to their primary function, and 

they identified a variety of indicators, or metrics, to measure capacity for 

each functional category. For example, they used total maneuver acres per 

brigade to establish capacity for Army training bases, total square feet of 

parking apron space to establish capacity for active and reserve Air Force 

bases, and total direct labor hours (versus budget or programmed direct 

labor hours) to establish capacity for Navy aviation depots. See app. IV for 

additional information on how DOD computed excess capacity. 

This methodology has some limitations as we reported13 in 1998 when 

DOD used it to project excess capacity in supporting the need for a future 

BRAC round. DOD’s use of 1989 as a baseline did not take into account the 

excess base capacity that existed in that year prior to base closures in the 

1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds. As a result, the percentage of 

increased excess capacity reported understated actual excess capacity by 

an unknown amount for some functional categories, and may have 

overstated excess capacity for other categories. The Congressional Budget 

Office (CBO) also reported14 that the department’s use of 1989 as a 

baseline did not take into account the excess capacity that might have 

existed in 1989. Furthermore, CBO reported that the approach could 

understate the capacity required if some types of base support are truly a 

fixed cost, regardless of the size of the force. The methodology also did 

not consider any additional excess capacity that might occur by analyzing 

facilities or functions on a cross-service basis, a priority for the 2005 

round. In addition, capacity for some functions was measured differently 

for each service. For example, the Army and Air Force measured capacity 

for test and evaluation facilities in terms of physical total square feet of 

space, while the Navy measured its capacity for these facilities in terms of 

 13 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1988 Report on 

Base Realignment and Closure, GAO/NSIAD-99-17 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 1998). 

14 See Congressional Budget Office: Review of the Report of the Department of Defense on 

Base Realignment and Closure (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 1998). 
Page 18 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

work years. Finally, as we recently noted, the variety of metrics and 

differences across the military services makes it difficult to be precise 

when trying to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD.15

Military service officials told us that they typically use most of the capacity 

metrics included in DOD’s report, along with other measures, to assess 

excess capacity. For example, these officials stated that the metrics for 

depots, industrial, shipyards, logistics bases, and supply are used, along 

with other measures, as indicators of excess capacity. However, we found 

that some of the metrics used in DOD’s report were less reliable than 

others as indicators of excess capacity. For example, the metric for Marine 

Corps bases compared the acres at five Marine Corps bases to the total 

authorized military personnel for the Marine Corps, and not just the 

authorized personnel at the five bases. Marine Corps officials 

acknowledged that this was not a requirements-based metric to measure 

excess capacity at Marine Corps bases. Likewise, the metric for 

administrative space in the Air Force was based on the administrative 

space at only one Air Force base. Air Force officials stated that this 

occurred because under the methodology each Air Force base could only 

be considered in one functional area. 

While prior BRAC rounds have focused primarily on reducing excess 

capacity, DOD officials have stated this is not the sole focus of the 2005 

BRAC round. These officials noted that the 2005 round aims to further 

transform the military by rationalizing base infrastructure to the force 

structure, enhance joint capabilities by improving joint utilization, and 

convert waste to war-fighting capability by eliminating excess capacity. 

This approach has the potential to identify greater excess capacity than 

previously identified. However, a true assessment of excess capacity must, 

of necessity, await the completion of DOD’s ongoing official analyses 

under BRAC 2005. 

DOD’s financial data would suggest that, assuming conditions similar to 

those of the 1993 and 1995 rounds, the net annual savings for each of the 

military departments for the 2005 round could be achieved by 2011, as 

certified by the Secretary in DOD’s report. DOD estimated that it would 

 15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Observations on 

Preparations for the Upcoming Base Realignment and Closure Round, GAO-04-558T

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2004). 

Extent of Savings from 

2005 Round Are Unknown 

but Could Be Achieved 

by 2011 
Page 19 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

accrue net annual savings of $3 billion to $5 billion departmentwide by 

2011. While we believe that the potential exists for significant savings to 

result from the 2005 BRAC round, it is difficult to conclusively project the 

expected magnitude of the savings because there simply are too many 

unknowns, such as the specific timing of individual closure or realignment 

actions and the extent to which DOD’s efforts to maximize joint utilization 

and further its transformation efforts, would impact savings. Finally, to 

what extent forces that are currently based overseas may be redeployed to 

the United States and what effect that redeployment may have on BRAC 

and subsequent savings remains an unknown as well.16

The Secretary’s estimate of $3 billion to $5 billion in net annual savings by 

2011 was based in part on savings achieved from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC 

rounds. The lower estimate assumes that the actions in the 2005 round 

would reduce infrastructure by about 12 percent, comparable to the 

reduction that occurred in the 1993 and 1995 rounds combined. The higher 

estimate assumes that infrastructure would be reduced by 20 percent, 

which is about 67 percent higher than the previous two rounds combined. 

While we believe the potential for significant savings exists, a more 

reliable estimate of savings is not practical until the department has 

developed actual closure and realignment proposals. 

While DOD’s report estimated net annual savings of $3 billion to $5 billion 

could be achieved departmentwide, it did not explicitly indicate the 

amount of savings that each service would achieve by 2011. Our analysis 

of the savings from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, however, indicates 

that each department accrued net annual savings by the sixth year of 

implementation, as seen in table 4. 

 16 As previously noted, the Secretary of Defense has already undertaken a comprehensive 

study of global basing and presence—the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy 

(IGPBS). DOD has indicated that it expects that BRAC will accommodate any decisions 

from that study that relocate forces to the U.S. and that DOD will incorporate its global 

basing strategy into a comprehensive BRAC analysis, thereby ensuring that any overseas 

redeployment decisions inform its recommendations to the BRAC Commission. See 

Analysis of Public Comments in 69 F.R. 6948, Feb. 12, 2004: DOD Final Selection Criteria 

for Closing and Realigning Military Installations Inside the United States. 
Page 20 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Table 4: Net Annual Savings In the Sixth Year of Implementation for BRAC 1993 and 

1995 Rounds by Military Department 

Dollars in millions 

 Net Annual Savings 

Department 1993 BRAC round 1995 BRAC round

Army $62 $22

Navy 1,099 297

Air Force 168 120

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD’s Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Estimates, February 2004. 

Another way of looking at net savings is to consider the point at which 

cumulative savings exceed the cumulative costs of implementing BRAC 

decisions over a period of years. Experience has shown that the 

department incurs significant upfront investment costs in the early years 

of a BRAC round, and it takes several years to fully offset those cumulative 

costs and begin to realize cumulative net savings. The difference in the 

terminology is important to understand because it has a direct bearing on 

the magnitude and assessment of the savings at any given time. As 

previously discussed, each military department achieved net annual 

savings during the 1993 and 1995 rounds by the sixth year of 

implementation. However, with the exception of the Navy in 1995, the 

military departments did not achieve cumulative net savings for both the 

1993 and 1995 rounds until after the sixth year of implementation. 

Notwithstanding the issues we raise that could affect savings, we continue 

to believe that it is vitally important for DOD to improve its mechanisms 

for tracking and updating its savings estimates. We have previously noted 

that DOD’s BRAC savings estimates have been imprecise for a variety of 

reasons such as weaknesses in DOD’s financial management systems that 

limit the ability to fully account for the cost of its operations; the fact the 

DOD’s accounting systems like other accounting systems are oriented to 

tracking expenses and disbursements, not savings; the exclusion of 

BRAC-related costs incurred by other government agencies; and 

inadequate updating of the savings estimates that are developed. 

Improvements can and should be made to address this issue. In its 1998 

report to the Congress on BRAC issues, DOD proposed efforts that, if 

adopted, could provide for greater accuracy in the estimates. Specifically, 

DOD proposed developing a questionnaire that would be completed 

annually by each base affected by BRAC rounds during the 6-year 

implementation period. The questionnaire would request information on 

costs, personnel reductions, and changes in operating and military 
Page 21 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

construction costs in order to provide greater insight into the savings 

created by each BRAC action. DOD suggested that developing such a 

questionnaire would be a cooperative effort involving the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the military services, the defense agencies, the 

Office of the DOD Inspector General, and the service audit agencies. This 

proposal recognizes that better documentation and updating of savings 

will require special efforts parallel to the normal budget process. DOD has 

not yet initiated actions to implement this proposal. We strongly endorse 

such action. If DOD does not take steps to improve its estimation of 

savings in the future, then previous questions about the reliability, 

accuracy, and completeness of DOD’s savings estimates will likely 

continue. We intend to examine DOD’s progress in instituting its proposed 

improvements during our review of the 2005 BRAC process. 

The department’s report recognized that BRAC actions can affect the local 

economies of the surrounding communities. It noted that from 1988 

through 1995, realignment or closure actions were approved at 387 

locations; and that, in implementing the actions, the department had 

sought to minimize any adverse local impacts with a coordinated program 

of federal assistance from both DOD and domestic agencies. 

Our own work has shown that while the short-term impact can be very 

traumatic, several factors, such as the strength of the national and regional 

economies, play a role in determining the long-term economic impact of 

the base realignment or closure process on communities. Our work has 

also shown that many communities surrounding closed bases from the 

previous rounds have fared better than the national average, in terms of 

changes in unemployment rates and per capita income, with more mixed 

results recently, allowing for some negative effect from the economic 

downturn in recent years. 

Our analysis of selected economic indicators has shown that over time the 

economies of BRAC-affected communities compare favorably with the 

overall U.S. economy. We used unemployment rates and real per capita 

income rates as broad indicators of the economic health of those 

communities where base closures occurred during the prior BRAC rounds. 

Our analysis included 62 communities surrounding base realignment and 

closure sites from all four BRAC rounds for which government and 

contractor civilian job losses were estimated to be 300 or more. 

We previously reported that as of September 2001, of the 62 communities 

surrounding these major base closures, 44 (71 percent) had average 

Many Affected 

Communities Are 

Recovering from BRAC 

Actions in Prior Rounds 
Page 22 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

unemployment rates lower than the (then) average 9-month national rate 

of 4.58 percent.17 We are currently updating this analysis and attempting to 

assess the impact of the recent economic downturn on these communities. 

Our preliminary results indicate that, in keeping with economic downturn 

in recent years, the average unemployment rate in 2003 had increased for 

60 of the 62 communities since 2001. However, the 2003 unemployment 

figures indicated that the rates for these 62 communities continue to 

compare favorably with the overall U.S. rate of 6.1 percent; that is, 43 (or 

69 percent) of the communities had unemployment rates at or below the 

U.S. rate. 

In our previous work, we had also reported that annual per capita income 

growth rate of affected communities for these 62 BRAC-affected 

communities compared favorably with national averages. We found that 

from 1996 through 1999, 33 (or 53 percent) of the 62 communities had an 

estimated annual real per capital income growth rate that was at or above 

the average of 3.03 percent for the nation at that time. Our recent analysis 

has also noted that changes in the average per capita income growth rate 

of these communities over time compared favorably with corresponding 

changes at the national level. This analysis indicates that 30 (48 percent) of 

the 62 areas examined had average income growth rates higher than the 

average U.S. rate of 2.2 percent, a drop from the rate during the previous 

time period. 

In our previous report,18 we identified a number of factors that affected 

economic recovery, based on our discussions with various community 

leaders. These factors included 

• robustness of the national economy, 

• diversity of the local economy, 

• regional economic trends, 

• natural and labor resources, 

• leadership and teamwork, 

• public confidence, 

• government assistance, and 

• reuse of base property. 

 17 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing 

Actions from Prior Realignments and Closures, GAO-02-433 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 5, 2002). 

18 GAO-02-433. 
Page 23 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

If history is any indication, these factors are likely to be equally applicable 

in dealing with the effects of closures and realignments under BRAC 2005. 

In transmitting the 2004 report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense 

certified the need for an additional BRAC round. The certification was 

predicated on the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory 

included with the report and was reinforced by the department’s 

assessment of excess capacity, economic impact, and a certification that 

net annual savings from a 2005 round could be achieved by 2011. The 

Secretary’s certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round was echoed by a 

separate March 22, 2004, memorandum to the Secretary from the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It stated that the Joint Chiefs 

unanimously agree that additional base realignments and closures are 

necessary if DOD is to transform the armed forces to meet the threats to 

national security and execute national strategy. The Chairman also noted 

that “(d)uring this period of transition, we are fundamentally reconfiguring 

our forces to meet new security challenges. The military value 

requirements that flow from future force structure and future strategy 

needs will differ in character and shape from those of today. BRAC offers 

a critical tool to turn transformational goals into reality.” We found no 

basis to question DOD’s certification of the need for an additional BRAC 

round. The need for an additional BRAC round has long been recognized 

by various defense officials and studies—and noted in various GAO 

products since the time of the 1995 BRAC round. (See app. V for a 

summary of key points from selected GAO products.) 

The Secretary’s certification of the need for a 2005 BRAC round is 

underscored by the department’s desire to realize broader objectives in 

the 2005 round, including fostering jointness, transformation, assessing 

common business oriented functions on a cross-service basis, and 

accommodating the potential redeployment of some forces from overseas 

bases back to the United States. Analyses conducted in these areas could 

identify opportunities to achieve consolidations and reduce capacity not 

previously identified. Having said that, we believe the efficacy and 

sufficiency of DOD’s BRAC analyses now under way—considering the 

force structure plan, inventory, and selection criteria—can best be 

assessed as the BRAC process unfolds. 

While we found no basis to question the Secretary’s certification of the 

need for an additional BRAC round, we identified some limitations with 

the department’s assessment of excess capacity, completed outside the 

Certification of 

the Need for an 

Additional BRAC 

Round 

Conclusion 
Page 24 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

BRAC process, to meet the 2004 reporting requirement. While clear 

limitations exist in DOD’s assessment of excess capacity, it does 

nonetheless point to some areas that warrant additional analysis—and the 

current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so. 

Today’s security environment is evolving, as are force structure 

requirements along with technology advancements, and defense 

transformation efforts. The department must consider ongoing force 

transformation initiatives in its BRAC analyses as well as factor in 

relevant assumptions about the potential for future force structure 

changes—changes that likely will occur long after the timeframes for 

the 2005 BRAC round. This includes consideration of future surge 

requirements. Assuring Congress and the public that this analysis has been 

done and that appropriate allowances for future force structure changes 

have been incorporated into the process will be key to building public 

confidence in the soundness of 2005 closure and realignment 

recommendations. Full discussion of these issues by the department in its 

report accompanying its BRAC recommendations in 2005 is warranted. 

At the same time, consideration of these longer term issues should not 

detract from opportunities available to DOD in the upcoming BRAC round 

to achieve greater economies and efficiencies in support capabilities and 

use of infrastructure through cross-servicing and joint utilization of bases. 

Finally, many questions have previously existed about the accuracy and 

precision of DOD’s estimates of savings from prior BRAC rounds. 

Weaknesses in DOD’s financial management systems have contributed to 

this problem and are not likely to be resolved in the near term. At the same 

time, we have previously recommended, and DOD has agreed that 

improvements can and should be made to the accounting for and periodic 

updating of BRAC savings. That notwithstanding, DOD has not made 

sufficient efforts to address this issue. DOD needs to provide assurance 

that it has plans in place for improvements in this area before it begins 

implementing any closure and realignment decisions from the upcoming 

BRAC round. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense include in his May 2005 

report on recommendations for base closures and realignments a full 

discussion of relevant assumptions, and allowances made for potential 

future force structure requirements and changes, including the potential 

for future surge requirements. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 
Page 25 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

To ensure that the Department of Defense and the military services 

improve their tracking and updating of BRAC savings estimates associated 

with implementing closure and realignment decisions for the upcoming 

BRAC round, Congress may want to consider requiring DOD and the 

military services to provide certification that actions have been taken to 

implement previously planned improvements for tracking and updating its 

BRAC savings estimates. This certification should be submitted with its 

fiscal year 2006 budget request documentation. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Installations and Environment) agreed with our report. DOD’s 

comments are included in appendix VI of this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the 

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget. The report will also be available to others upon request and 

can be accessed at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. In 

addition, a list of our key prior reports on base realignments and closures 

is included in appendix VII and these reports can be accessed on our Web 

site as well. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any 

questions regarding this report. Additional contacts and staff 

acknowledgments are provided in appendix VIII. 

Barry W. Holman, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 
Page 26 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John Ensign 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Chairman 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 
Page 27 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg 

Chairman 

The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 28 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

The scope of this report was determined by the legislative requirements 

imposed on us and included in sections 2912 and 2913 of the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended. Our focus was to 

assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) March 24, 2004, report to 

Congress regarding issues associated with the need for an additional 

BRAC round as well as the final selection criteria for the upcoming 2005 

BRAC round as published in the Federal Register on February 12, 2004. 

Because of time constraints, we could not fully assess the accuracy of all 

data used in the report but performed limited reliability assessments of 

key data contained in DOD’s report and determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, with relevant 

limitations noted. 

We evaluated DOD’s responsiveness to the legislative reporting 

requirements by comparing individual requirements as presented in the 

legislation with DOD’s presentation of information in its report and final 

selection criteria. Where appropriate, we made judgments as to the extent 

to which DOD addressed the requirements, and discussed with DOD 

officials those areas where we believed the requirements were not fully 

addressed. In some cases, DOD officials from the BRAC Office within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) told us that the information 

provided was somewhat limited in order to avoid preempting or 

prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round. 

To address the importance of the worldwide installation inventory, force 

structure plan, and selection criteria and evaluated, where appropriate, the 

analytical sufficiency and accuracy of each, we interviewed DOD officials 

to obtain their views on the relative importance and applicability of each 

to the BRAC 2005 process and analyzed the corresponding documentation 

for analytical sufficiency and accuracy where it was reasonable to do so. 

More specifically, to evaluate the worldwide installation inventory, we 

interviewed officials from the contracting firm responsible to DOD for 

managing its Facilities Assessment Database, the DOD-wide database that 

was used to compile the worldwide inventory. Our interest was in 

documenting the contractor’s process for validating the real property data 

in the database. Because the DOD-wide database draws from the services’ 

real property databases, we reviewed the contractor’s analysis of 

anomalies identified in the services’ real property databases (i.e., the 

Army’s Integrated Facilities System, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ Navy 

Facility Assets database, and the Air Force’s Automated Civil Engineer 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

DOD Responsiveness 

to Legislative 

Requirements 

Worldwide 

Installation Inventory, 

Force Structure Plan, 

and Selection Criteria 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 29 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

System) to gain a sense of the relative accuracy of the data. We also 

compared the list of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations 

receiving the recent data capacity call for the 2005 BRAC round to the 

installation inventory to assure ourselves that these installations were a 

subset of the worldwide inventory. Furthermore, to determine if the 

inventory included all overseas installations, we compared the listed 

installations by country to a list of countries where U.S. forces are 

currently deployed. We then interviewed a DOD official to verify and 

obtain rationale for the absence of some overseas installations in the 

inventory. 

To evaluate the unclassified portion (fiscal years 2005 through 2009) of 

DOD’s 20-year force structure plan as presented in DOD’s 2004 report, we 

identified major force unit and personnel end strength changes by service 

over the specified time frame and sought out rationale for the increases or 

decreases. We discussed with service officials the nature of these changes 

and how these revisions would be considered in the BRAC process. We 

also interviewed service officials regarding a number of initiatives under 

way, such as the Army’s efforts to increase the number of brigades in its 

force, that have implications for the future sizing and composition of the 

force structure and associated infrastructure for those respective services. 

We inquired as to when planned force structure changes stemming from 

these initiatives would be incorporated into DOD’s force structure plan. 

To evaluate the final selection criteria for the upcoming 2005 round, 

we compared the criteria as published in the Federal Register on 

February 12, 2004, with those used in the 1995 BRAC round. In so doing, 

we noted the differences and evaluated whether the legislatively directed 

language1

 regarding selection criteria was incorporated into the revised 

criteria for the upcoming round. In addition to discussing with DOD 

officials the use of these criteria as part of a framework for conducting its 

base analyses for the 2005 round, we relied on our prior work that 

reported on lessons learned from previous base closure rounds, which 

covered, among other topics, the analytical sufficiency of the selection 

criteria. We also referred to a January 27, 2004, letter we sent to the Acting 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 

commenting on our analysis of the draft criteria that were out for public 

comment at that time. Finally, we reviewed the public comments received 

 1

 The language appeared in Section 3002 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002, 

P.L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 30 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

on the draft selection criteria and discussed with DOD officials their 

rationale for not incorporating any of the suggested changes into the final 

selection criteria. 

While the mandate did not specifically require us to address excess 

defense infrastructure capacity, estimated BRAC savings from the 2005 

round, and economic impact of communities surrounding base closures in 

prior rounds, as discussed in DOD’s 2004 report, we chose to do so 

because of widespread interest in Congress and the public and its 

importance to DOD’s certification of the need for a BRAC round. In 

addition to an analysis of these topics as presented in DOD’s 2004 report, 

we relied on prior and ongoing work related to these areas of interest. 

More specifically, to evaluate the analytical sufficiency of DOD’s excess 

capacity analysis, we interviewed DOD and service officials and reviewed 

documentation describing DOD’s methodology. We inquired about the 

reasonableness of the various metrics used to develop the capacity 

measures for the various functional support areas, such as depots, 

identified in the analysis in DOD’s report. We verified the calculations of 

increases in each of the functional areas and on an aggregate basis, and 

partially verified the data reported by the services in making the 

comparisons of capacity between the 1989 baseline year and 2009. DOD’s 

BRAC Office provided the services with the 1989 baseline numbers for the 

various metrics used to measure capacity. We were unable to verify the 

1989 baseline data in DOD’s report for the Army and Department of the 

Navy, which had accepted the numbers, because supporting 

documentation from DOD’s development of that data had not been 

retained from the time that data were first developed in 1998 for an earlier 

DOD report. However, we did verify the Air Force’s 1989 baseline numbers 

because it revised the DOD-provided 1989 baseline numbers using 

available data. We also selectively verified the projected 2009 data in the 

analysis. 

To evaluate whether DOD’s estimates for expected savings from the 

upcoming 2005 round were reasonable, we interviewed a DOD official in 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) BRAC Office and examined 

the methodology, to include assumptions and the underlying basis 

employed by DOD in deriving the estimates. Because a key assumption for 

building the estimates focused on the probable range of reductions for 

aggregate plant replacement value reductions (i.e., the scope of the 

infrastructure reduction) that had occurred across a combination of the 

1993 and 1995 rounds, we were not in a position to question whether this 

Excess Defense 

Infrastructure 

Capacity, Estimated 

BRAC Savings, and 

Economic Impact 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

assumption would be valid for the 2005 round, given that the analysis for 

the 2005 round has not yet been completed. As to whether DOD can 

achieve the net annual savings for each military department by 2011, we 

reviewed DOD’s historical financial data for the 1993 and 1995 round to 

ascertain if the military departments achieved net annual savings by the 

final or sixth year of implementation for these rounds. This would 

correspond to the year 2011 for the 2005 round and again would assume 

that the 2005 round would be similar to that of the 1993 and 1995 rounds. 

To evaluate the economic recovery of communities affected by the BRAC 

process in the prior rounds, we first performed a broad-based economic 

assessment of 62 communities where more than 300 civilian jobs were 

eliminated during the prior closure rounds.2

 This work was essentially an 

update of similar work we had performed and reported on in April 2002. 3

We used two key economic indicators—unemployment and real per 

capital growth rates—as measures to analyze changes in the economic 

condition of communities over time in relation to the national averages. 

We chose unemployment and real per capital income as key performance 

indicators because (1) DOD used these measures in its community 

economic impact analysis during the BRAC location selection process and 

(2) economists commonly use these measures in assessing the economic 

health of an area over time. While our assessment does provide an overall 

picture of how these communities compare with the national averages, it 

does not necessarily isolate the condition, or the changes to the condition, 

that may be attributed to the BRAC action. 

We conducted our work from March to May 2004 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 2

 The impact areas for communities were defined by using standard definitions for 

metropolitan and nonmetropolitan statistical areas and reflected the impact areas used in 

the 1995 round. 

3

 See GAO-02-433. 
Appendix II: BRAC 2005 Timeline 

Page 32 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Appendix II: BRAC 2005 Timeline 

DOD issues selection criteria for 2005 BRAC round

DOD submits force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, 

and certifies need for 2005 BRAC round

GAO reports on DOD's force structure plan, infrastructure 

inventory, and selection criteria

Secretary of Defense must submit to the defense

committees and BRAC Commission the list of proposed 

closures and realignments

GAO must submit report to defense committees on its 

analysis of the DOD BRAC process and recommendations

President approves or disapproves Commission recommendations 

in their entirety. If approved, recommendations are sent to 

Congress, which has 45 days or until the adjournment of Congress 

to disapprove recommendations on an all-or-none basis; 

otherwise, they become binding

Deadline for President to forward revised Commission 

recommendations to the Congress if the President had rejected 

original recommendations

Deadline for Commission to consider the President's

objections and to send revised report back to the President

 March 23, 2004 

May 16, 2005

July 1, 2005

BRAC Commission recommendations submitted to

the President

September 8, 2005

September 23, 2005

November 7, 2005

Source: P.L. 107-107.

October 20, 2005 

(If required) 

May 17, 2004

February 12, 2004
Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection 

Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round 

Page 33 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection 

Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round 
Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection 

Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round 

Page 34 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 
Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection 

Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round 

Page 35 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 
Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection 

Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round 

Page 36 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 
Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection 

Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round 

Page 37 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 
Appendix III: GAO’s Letter on Draft Selection 

Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round 

Page 38 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 
Appendix IV: DOD’s Methodology for 

Estimating Excess Capacity 

Page 39 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

To perform the capacity analysis, the services and the Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA) compared capacity in a sample of bases in 1989 to the 

capacity for a sample of bases in 2009. The services then categorized the 

bases according to their primary missions and defined indicators of 

capacity, or metrics, for each category. DOD divided the metric by 

measures of force structure to determine a ratio and calculated the extent 

to which the ratio of capacity in 2009 exceeded the ratio in 1989. As an 

example, table 5 shows the results for the Army as shown in DOD’s report. 

Similar tables appear for the Navy, Air Force, and DLA in DOD’s report. 

Table 5: Army Analysis of Proportional Capacity 

 Input Indexa 

Change in capacity 

relative to force 

structure since 1989

Base category/metric 

Fiscal 

year 1989 

Fiscal 

year 2009

Fiscal year 

1989

Fiscal year 

2009

Proportional 

capacityb

Delta 

from 

2009 

capacityc

Excess 

2009 

capacityd

Administration 

Administrative space square 

feet (000)

Military/civilian authorized 

6,627

81,518 

6,121

64,598 .0813 .0948 5,251 870 14%

Depots 

Capacity direct labor hours 

(000)

Budgeted/programmed direct 

labor hours 

29,000

21,000 

16,957

12,828 1.3810 1.3219 17,715 

No 

increase

No 

increase

Industrial 

Total facilities square feet 

(000)

Military/civilian authorized 

34,707

23,897 

24,324

9,498 1.4524 2.5610 13,795 10,529 43%

Major training active 

Base acres

Maneuver brigades 

1,509,334

48 

1,242,842

43 31,444 28,903 1,352,112 

No 

increase

No 

increase

Major training reserve 

Base acres

End strength 

258,413

319,000 

330,393

205,000 0.8101 1.6117 166,065 164,328 50%

Maneuver 

Base acres

Maneuver brigades 

3,053,623

48 

3,361,679

43 63,617 78,179 2,735,537 626,142 19%

Appendix IV: DOD’s Methodology for 

Estimating Excess Capacity 
Appendix IV: DOD’s Methodology for 

Estimating Excess Capacity 

Page 40 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

 Input Indexa 

Change in capacity 

relative to force 

structure since 1989

Base category/metric 

Fiscal 

year 1989 

Fiscal 

year 2009

Fiscal year 

1989

Fiscal year 

2009

Proportional 

capacityb

Delta 

from 

2009 

capacityc

Excess 

2009 

capacityd

Schools 

Instructional space square 

feet (000)

Military/civilian authorized 

14,964

350,108 

14,854

222,723 .0427 .0667 9,519 5,335 36%

Test and evaluation 

Total facilities square feet 

(000)

Acquisition workforce 

48,924

157,964 

51,321

62,193 .3097 .8252 19,262 32,059 62%

Source: DOD. 

a

The index for each functional area is computed by dividing the denominator into the numerator. For 

example, the 1989 administration index .0813 is derived by dividing 81,518 into 6,627. 

b

The proportional capacity is computed by multiplying the denominator of the fiscal year 2009 input 

times the fiscal year 1989 index. For example, the administration proportional capacity 5,251 is 

computed by multiplying 64,598 times .0813. 

c

The delta from 2009 capacity is computed by subtracting the proportional capacity from the fiscal 

year 2009 index numerator. For example, the administration delta from 2009 capacity 870 is 

computed by subtracting 5,251 from 6,121. 

d

The percent of 2009 capacity is computed by dividing the delta from 2009 capacity by the fiscal year 

1989 input numerator. For example, the administration percent of 2009 capacity (14 percent) is 

computed by dividing 6,627 into 870. 

DOD then took a weighted average of all functional areas to determine 

the overall excess capacity for each department. The weights were 

computed by the number of bases in a functional area divided by the 

total number of bases in all functional areas. Table 6 shows the overall 

estimated percentage of excess capacity for each military department and 

the DLA. 
Appendix IV: DOD’s Methodology for 

Estimating Excess Capacity 

Page 41 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Table 6: Estimated Percentage of Excess Capacity 

Department Estimated percentage of excess capacity

Army 29

Navy 21

Air Force 24

Defense Logistics Agency 17

Total 24

Source: DOD. 

Likewise, DOD computed a weighted average to estimate an overall 

percentage of excess capacity for DOD. The weights were computed from 

the number of bases per department divided by the total of all bases 

included in the analysis. 
Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO 

Products Regarding the Need for an 

Additional BRAC Round 

Page 42 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

At the time the 1995 BRAC round was being completed and subsequently, 

DOD officials, including the Secretary and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, recognized that additional excess capacity would remain following 

that round and that future base realignments and closures would be 

needed. Various GAO products have noted that issue in subsequent years. 

The following are selected excerpts from key GAO products. 

• “Despite these recent BRAC rounds, DOD continues to maintain large 

amounts of excess infrastructure, especially in its support functions, such 

as maintenance depots, research and development laboratories, and test 

and evaluation centers. Each service maintains its own facilities and 

capabilities for performing many common support functions and, as a 

result DOD has overlapping, redundant, and underutilized infrastructure. 

DOD has taken some steps to demolish unneeded buildings on various 

operational and support bases; consolidate certain functions; privatize, 

outsource, and reengineer certain workloads; and encourage 

interservicing agreements—however, these are not expected to offset the 

need for additional actions. At the same time, DOD officials recognize that 

significant additional reductions in excess infrastructure requirements in 

common support areas could come from consolidating workloads and 

restructuring functions on a cross-service basis, something that has not 

been accomplished to any great extent in prior BRAC rounds.” U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior 

Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 

1997, p. 3). 

• “Notwithstanding the results of the four recent BRAC rounds, DOD 

officials recognized, even while they were finishing the 1995 round, that 

they had missed OSD’s goal in terms of reductions needed through base 

closures. DOD calculated that the first three BRAC rounds reduced the 

plant replacement value (PRV)1

 of DOD’s domestic facilities by 15 percent. 

It established a goal for the fourth round of reducing PRV by an additional 

15 percent, for a total of 30 percent. When the Secretary announced his 

recommendations for base closures and realignments in 1995, OSD 

projected that if all of the Secretary’s recommendations were adopted, the 

 1

 PRV is defined as the cost to replace current facilities using today’s construction costs 

and standards. PRV is recognized as an imprecise measure, one that is calculated 

differently by each service. However, it was a key measure used by OSD to establish its 

goals for base closures. 

Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO 

Products Regarding the Need for an 

Additional BRAC Round 
Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO 

Products Regarding the Need for an 

Additional BRAC Round 

Page 43 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

total PRV would be reduced by 21 percent, nearly a third less than OSD’s 

goal.”2 GAO/NSIAD-97-151, p. 17. 

• “The Secretary of Defense’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which 

assessed defense strategy, programs, and policies, included the issue of 

future base closures in the infrastructure portion of the review. In his 

May 19, 1997, report to Congress on the results of this review, the 

Secretary asked Congress to authorize domestic base closure rounds in 

1999 and 2001. That recommendation was endorsed by the National 

Defense Panel, the independent, congressionally mandated board that is 

reviewing the work of the Quadrennial Defense Review and completing 

its own review of defense issues.” GAO/NSIAD-97-151, p. 3. 

• DOD’s Support Infrastructure Management has been designated as HighRisk by GAO since 1997. GAO’s January 2003 update noted that “DOD 

plans an additional base closure round in 2005; this could enable it to 

devote its facility resources on fewer, more enduring facilities. With or 

without base closures, DOD faces the challenge of adequately maintaining 

and revitalizing the facilities it expects to retain for future use. Available 

information indicates that DOD’s facilities continue to deteriorate because 

of insufficient funding for their sustainment, restoration, and 

modernization.” U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An 

Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003). 

• In commenting on DOD’s investment plans for reversing the aging of its 

facilities, we noted that “...because of competing priorities, DOD is not 

likely to realize its investment objectives for facilities in the near term. 

More specifically, the services do not propose to fully fund all of OSD’s 

objectives for improving facilities or, in some instances, the services have 

developed funding plans that have unrealistically high rates of increase in 

the out-years compared with previous funding trends and other defense 

priorities. The base realignment and closure round authorized for fiscal 

year 2005, while it carries with it a significant up-front investment cost to 

implement realignment and closure decisions, offers an important 

opportunity to reduce excess facilities and achieve greater efficiencies in 

sustaining and recapitalizing the remaining facilities if sufficient funding 

levels are maintained into the future. Additionally, DOD is reexamining its 

worldwide basing requirements, which could potentially lead to significant 

changes in facility requirements over the next several years. As these 

 2

 The 1995 BRAC Commission did not approve all of the Secretary’s recommendations and 

it added other bases to the closure list. Since that time, OSD has not recalculated the net 

reduction in PRV. 
Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO 

Products Regarding the Need for an 

Additional BRAC Round 

Page 44 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

decisions are implemented over the next several years, this should permit 

DOD and the services to increasingly concentrate future resources on 

enduring facilities.” U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense 

Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military 

Construction Program, GAO-04-288 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2004). 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix VII: Key Prior GAO Reports on 

DOD’s Base Realignments and Closures 

Page 46 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 

Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2004. 

Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve 

Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003. 

Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior Base 

Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2002. 

Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains 

Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001. 

Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998. 

Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and 

Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998. 

Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds. 

GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997. 

Military Bases: Closure and Realignments Savings Are Significant, but 

Not Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations 

for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.: 

April 14, 1995. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection 

Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173. 

Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993. 

Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed 

Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.: 

May 15, 1991. 

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and 

Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.: 

November 29, 1989. 

Appendix VII: Key Prior GAO Reports on 

DOD’s Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 47 GAO-04-760 Military Base Closures 

Michael Kennedy (202) 512-8333 

James Reifsnyder (202) 512-4166 

In addition to the individuals named above, Nelsie Alcoser, Nancy Benco, 

Ray Bickert, Joel Christenson, Warren Lowman, Tom Mahalek, David 

Mayfield, Charles Perdue, James Reynolds, and Laura Talbott made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

(350485) 
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