14 November 2000

Joint Warfare

of the Armed Forces

of the United States

Joint Publication 1
Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United

States, serves as the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine. This

revision represents the evolution in our warfighting guidance since the last

edition — including sections on consideration for the use of force, interagency

operations, and multinational operations. This publication also includes an

expanded scope that bridges the gap among the national, strategic, and

operational levels.

JP 1 now ties joint doctrine to the national security strategy and national

military strategy and describes the military’s role in the development of national

policy and strategy. It provides the linkage between joint doctrine and the

contribution of other government agencies and multinational endeavors. JP 1

sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified

action of joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This publication

also addresses the importance of doctrine in the development of future

concepts and capabilities, since joint doctrine provides the foundation for

addressing the future.

Most of all, JP 1 is about the employment of the Armed Forces as an instrument

of national power, with the enduring theme — joint warfare is team warfare.

The philosophy is reflected throughout this publication, from the mindset

and attitudes described in joint values through the guidance on fundamentals

of joint operations. It is the attitude of the team approach, established on the

foundation of joint doctrine that is universally understood and practiced, that

ensures the most effective employment of our Armed Forces.

The knowledge and use of joint doctrine positions us for success in fighting

the Nation’s wars — where winning is the only choice. To that end,

commanders must understand, teach, and apply joint doctrine as they prepare

and train the Nation’s Service men and women for joint force employment.

Please ensure the widest distribution of this and the other supporting joint

publications, promoting their use at every opportunity.

HENRY H. SHELTON

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PREFACE

i

1. Scope

Joint Publication 1 is the capstone joint

doctrine publication. It guides the Armed

Forces of the United States in joint,

multinational, and interagency activities at all

levels across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial

roles, defending the United States against all

adversaries and serving the Republic as a

bulwark and the guarantors of its

independence. When called to action, they

support and defend national interests

worldwide. The Armed Forces embody the

highest values and standards of American

society and the profession of arms. They fulfill

their roles, missions, and functions within the

American system of civil-military relations.

They serve under the civilian control of the

President who is the Commander in Chief.

The nature of the challenges to the United

States and its interests in the contemporary

security environment demand that the Armed

Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team

in combat and noncombat operations. These

operations often take place with forces of allies

and coalition partners, and with US and

foreign governmental and nongovernmental

nonmilitary agencies. The challenges are best

met when the unified action of the Armed

Forces elicits the maximum effect from the

unique but complementary capabilities of each

Service and command, and from the synergy

that results from their synchronized and

integrated action.

Joint warfare is team warfare.

Effectively integrated joint forces expose no

weak points or seams to an adversary, while

they rapidly and efficiently find and engage

those adversary weak points and

vulnerabilities that assure mission

accomplishment. This does not mean that all

forces will be equally represented in each

operation. Joint force commanders may

choose the capabilities they need from the air,

land, sea, space, and special operations forces

at their disposal.

3. Application

This publication is written to assist

members of the Armed Forces of the United

States to operate successfully together. The

joint team is comprised of the members of

each Service, active and reserve, as well as

associated civilians in the supporting

governmental and private sector workforces.

The guidance in this publication is broad and

authoritative. It requires a leader’s judgment

in application. This doctrine will be followed

except when, in the judgment of the

commander, exceptional circumstances

dictate otherwise.

The Services have the principal

responsibility to organize, train, equip, and

sustain forces. These forces are employed

under joint force commanders. Therefore, to

assure that the Armed Forces achieve their

fullest potential, all American military leaders

must integrate the content of this publication

into their efforts to develop leaders and train

forces for joint, multinational, and interagency

operations.

Service skills form the very core of US

military capability. Joint warfare relies upon

Service traditions, cohesion, and expertise.

Successful joint operations are made possible

by the capabilities developed and embodied

in each Service, including Service “cultures,”

heroes, and professional standards. The

Armed Forces of the United States continue

to build on the tradition of joint victory in war

that began with the Revolutionary War.
ii

Preface

JP 1

The Armed Forces of the United States face

unparalleled challenges to US interests around

the world, unlike nations whose military

forces can concentrate on a more limited range

of operational environments. This means that

joint forces must master multifaceted

conditions in conducting successful unified

action. The chapters that follow describe the

principles for forming, training, and

employing joint teams in unified action at all

levels across the range of military operations.

These broad principles that guide operations

are neither policy nor strategy — they are

doctrine. The principles apply to action

undertaken by the Armed Forces of the United

States to execute applicable national policies,

as well as the contemporary national security

and military strategies.

Today, joint action is practiced and routine.

The key to maintaining and enhancing joint

force effectiveness is the military leader’s

diligence in studying, applying, teaching, and

ultimately improving joint doctrine, which

provides the foundation for joint warfare.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

• National Security — Developing Strategy and Policy ............................................... I-1

• The Political Context ................................................................................................ I-4

• Instruments of National Power .................................................................................. I-5

• The Role of Doctrine — “An Engine of Change” ...................................................... I-8

CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1

• Threats to US Interests ............................................................................................. II-1

• Assessing the National Strategic Situation ................................................................ II-3

• Operations and Conflict Termination ........................................................................ II-5

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER

• The Purpose of the Military .................................................................................... III-1

• National Military Objectives .................................................................................. III-1

• Core Military Competencies................................................................................... III-2

• Joint Warfighting ................................................................................................... III-3

• Conclusion ............................................................................................................ III-17

CHAPTER IV

THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER

• Considerations for the Use of Military Force .......................................................... IV-1

• National Military Strategy ...................................................................................... IV-3

• Enduring Concepts................................................................................................. IV-6

• Enduring Enablers.................................................................................................. IV-8

CHAPTER V

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

• Elements of Joint Operational Art ........................................................................... V-1

• The Campaign ......................................................................................................... V-4

• Unified Command and Theater Strategies ............................................................... V-6

• Unified Action ........................................................................................................ V-7

• Command Relationships ......................................................................................... V-7
iv

Table of Contents

JP 1

CHAPTER VI

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

• The Interagency Process and Participants ............................................................... VI-1

• Interagency Coordination ....................................................................................... VI-2

• Command Relationships ........................................................................................ VI-4

• Organizing for Interagency Operations................................................................... VI-4

• JTF Interagency Operations ................................................................................... VI-6

CHAPTER VII

FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• Overview .............................................................................................................. VII-1

• Definition and Types of Multinational Operations ................................................. VII-1

• Strategic Context................................................................................................... VII-2

• Considerations ...................................................................................................... VII-6

CHAPTER VIII

ADDRESSING THE FUTURE

• Identifying Future Challenges .............................................................................. VIII-1

• Preparing for Change and the Future .................................................................... VIII-3

• Transforming the Force ........................................................................................ VIII-4

APPENDIX

A The Strategic Estimate ...................................................................................... A-1

B Principles of War ............................................................................................... B-1

C Principles of Military Operations Other Than War ............................................. C-1

D Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... D-1

FIGURE

I-1 National Security Planning Processes ............................................................. I-3

I-2 Instruments of National Power ....................................................................... I-6

III-1 Joint Warfare Values.................................................................................... III-4

III-2 Principles of War ......................................................................................... III-8

III-3 Principles of MOOTW ................................................................................ III-8

III-4 Joint Warfare Fundamentals ........................................................................ III-8

III-5 Range of Military Operations ..................................................................... III-15

IV-1 Considerations for Use of Military Force ..................................................... IV-2

IV-2 Enduring Concepts and Enablers ................................................................. IV-9

V-1 Elements of Operational Art ......................................................................... V-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

•

v

Fundamental Concepts

Guides the Joint Action of the Armed Forces of the United

States

Describes the Strategic Security Environment

Explores the Purpose of American Military Power and Its

Core Competencies

Provides Considerations for the Application of Military

Force Guided by National Military Strategy

Specifies Fundamentals for Joint, Interagency, and

Multinational Operations

Addresses the Challenges of the Future

The Armed Forces of the United States hold in trust for the

American people the military power of the Nation and are the

ultimate guarantors of its territorial integrity and independence.

Challenges and threats may arise from adversaries who are

opposed to US values and interests. The fundamental

purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation’s wars.

The employment of American military power adheres to

constitutional and other legal imperatives, the highest societal

values, and the concepts of proportionality, decisiveness, and

accountability to the American people. Military commanders

at all levels are responsible for infusing in the fighting forces

an attitude of willing joint integration of effort that recognizes

that all forms of combat power present advantages for

exploitation.

The United States relies for its security on the complementary

application of the basic instruments of national power:

diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Guided

by national security policy and strategy, the Armed Forces of

the United States shape and employ the military instrument to

advance and defend national security interests and objectives.

The fundamental purpose

of the Armed Forces is to

win the Nation’s wars.

National security depends

on the complementary

application of the

instruments of national

power.
vi

Executive Summary

JP 1

Senior US military leaders are responsible for providing advice

and recommendations to the President and the Congress on

military aspects of national security including the development

of forces, implications of the use of force, and integration of

military planning and actions with the other instruments of

national power. Combatant commanders also have the unique

responsibility for execution of military actions under the

National Command Authorities — the President and the

Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates or

successors — in furtherance of national security policy and

strategy.

American military power has vital roles in peace, crisis, and

conflict. In peace, the political imperative is to maintain visible,

credible military capability and readiness for response across

the range of military operations. Demonstrated military

capability is the cornerstone of deterrence, which remains

a principal means for dissuading would-be aggressors and

adversaries from action harmful to the United States. During

crisis, US military authorities focus on activities that bolster

deterrence in conjunction with the other instruments of national

power and prepare for rapid and effective transitions to conflict

should deterrence fail. During conflict, the principal

responsibility of the Armed Forces of the United States is to

employ rapid and decisive military power to achieve US

objectives, and do so in a manner that sustains the fruits of

success in the postconflict environment. In unilateral or

multinational operations, the United States adheres to domestic

and international law governing warfare. It also conforms to

domestic and international legal conventions and prescriptions

supporting human rights.

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide

the employment of forces. Joint doctrine provides authoritative

guidance, based upon extant capabilities of the Armed Forces

of the United States. It incorporates time-tested principles for

successful military action as well as contemporary lessons

which together guide aggressive exploitation of US advantages

against adversary vulnerabilities. Doctrine shapes the way

the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument

of national power.

Senior US military leaders

provide the advice and

recommendations on the

application of the military

instrument and its

integration with the other

instruments.

Effective deterrence

depends on visible,

credible, military

capability that can be

demonstrated. Its use in

conflict must be decisive

and overwhelming.

Military doctrine shapes

the way the Armed Forces

think about the use of the

military instrument of

national power.
vii

Executive Summary

The international security environment is dynamic and

uncertain, with recurring disputes, crises, and conflicts in many

regions, and endemic conflicts in regions of particular

importance to the security of the United States. Challengers

and adversaries may be states or groups of states, as well as

nonstate groups including terrorist, criminal, ethnic, religious,

and special-interest organizations. Military assessments and

estimates must include threats abroad as well as the projections

of those threats to US territory. The United States itself is not

a sanctuary from many of the forces threatening US security;

it is not immune from attack.

Military leaders have fundamental responsibilities in

developing national assessments of the strategic situation.

Specifically, in the US system of civil-military relations, senior

military leaders provide recommendations on the feasible

military options, resources required and anticipated

consequences of military action, and the military requirements

for conflict termination. They also are uniquely responsible

for the military components of operation plans developed in

response to decisions prompted by national assessments of

the strategic situation.

Success in combat in defense of national sovereignty, territorial

integrity, societal values, and national interests is the essential

goal and measure of the value of the profession of arms in

American society. The Armed Forces also have a long history

of unconditional service in military operations other than war

that support broad national objectives including such areas as

participating in humanitarian relief efforts for victims of natural

disasters in the United States and abroad.

The Armed Forces of the United States must have extant

capabilities and maintain core military competencies for

successful action across the range of potential military

operations, including the ability to deploy rapidly from the

United States or other locations to the region of need. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commanders have

unique responsibilities for planning and directing the

employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. This

is their core competency. The Military Services, the United

The Strategic Security Environment

American Military Power

The international security

environment is dynamic

and uncertain. Military

estimates must include

threats abroad and their

projection to US territory.

Senior military leaders

provide recommendations

on feasible military

options, resources

required, and anticipated

consequences of military

action, as well as the

military requirements for

conflict termination.

The Armed Forces are

measured by success in

combat and unconditional

service in military

operations other than war.

The Armed Forces of the

United States must have

extant capabilities and

maintain core military

competencies for

successful action across

the range of military

operations.
viii

Executive Summary

JP 1

States Special Operations Command, and Defense agencies

that develop and provide force elements to combatant

commands for employment have as primary responsibilities

organizing, training, and equipping forces for joint employment

by combatant commanders in accordance with joint doctrine.

War is a human undertaking that does not respond to

deterministic rules. Of primary importance, therefore, are

the values that US military experience has proven to be the

bedrock of combat success. The foremost value is integrity,

the cornerstone for building trust. Military men and women

must know that they can count on each other to say what they

mean and do what they say, relying with confidence on others

to carry out assigned tasks. Competence is at the core of the

profession of arms and includes both the technical competence

to perform the relevant task to standard as well as the ability to

integrate that skill with others according to joint doctrine.

Physical and moral courage have defined warriors throughout

history. Even in warfare characterized by advanced technology,

individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration

for teamwork. Moral courage involves competent risk taking

and tenacity and includes the willingness to stand up for what

one believes to be right, accepting full responsibility for the

outcome. Finally, teamwork results from cooperative efforts

based on demonstrated competence and a willing attitude to

achieve common goals.

Joint warfare is team warfare. This requires the integrated

and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities.

The synergy that results maximizes combat capability in unified

action. Joint doctrine stipulates joint operations guided by the

principles of war, the adaptation of these principles to military

operations other than war, and the fundamentals of joint warfare

that result from applying the basic principles to actual

experience of American arms in warfare.

The principles of war adopted by the Armed Forces of the

United States are objective, offensive, mass, economy of

force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and

simplicity.

In the human undertaking

of war, military values

provide the bedrock of

combat success. They are

Integrity,

Competence,

Physical and moral

courage,

and Teamwork.

Joint warfare is team

warfare, requiring

integration and

synchronization of

capabilities.

The principles of war are:

objective, offensive, mass,

economy of force,

maneuver, unity of

command, security,

surprise, and simplicity.
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Executive Summary

Adapting these, the principles for military operations other

than war are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint,

perseverance, and legitimacy. The fundamentals that guide

joint operations are anchored on these principles. They do not

supercede the principles of war. They must be considered

together when conducting joint operations.

The fundamentals of joint warfare are unity of effort,

concentration, initiative, agility, extension, freedom of

action, sustainment, clarity, knowledge of self, and

knowledge of the enemy. These principles and fundamentals

should be applied broadly in peace, crisis, or conflict, avoiding

literal or dogmatic interpretations, across the range of military

operations (war and military operations other than war).

Military operations typically represent only one dimension of

US action and require integration with the other instruments

of national power.

The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to

conduct a complex set of military operations simultaneously

across and within theaters. A combat operation to contain a

major conflict in one part of the world may be taking place

alongside a number of supporting and independent operations

to reinforce peace, provide foreign humanitarian assistance,

and assist civil authorities. The military power of the United

States must be prepared to fulfill both its fundamental purpose

of winning the Nation’s wars and provide unconditional service

in support of other broad national objectives.

The use of military force is the most important military decision

that the United States can make. It is a civilian decision, based

on sound military advice. There are no unbending rules to

handling the countless possible crises, but the following

important considerations inform the decision making process.

When the use of military force is considered, that use should

be linked to discernible national interests; have a clearly defined

and achievable mission, end state, termination conditions, and

exit strategy; and include overwhelming and decisive force

for combat. It should also have a campaign plan showing the

path to success with measurable milestones; provide for

Application of Military Force

The principles of military

operations other than war

are: objective, unity of

effort, security, restraint,

perseverance, and

legitimacy.

Applying the principles of

war to American

experience in joint warfare

derives the fundamentals

of joint warfare: unity of

effort, concentration,

initiative, agility,

extension, freedom of

action, sustainment,

clarity, knowledge of self,

and knowledge of the

enemy.

The Armed Forces must be

prepared to conduct a

complex set of military

operations simultaneously

across and within theaters.

The use of military force is

the most important

military decision that the

United States can make. It

must be based on sound

military advice, be

overwhelming and decisive

when used for combat, and

remain clear in purpose

and resolute in action.
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Executive Summary

JP 1

alternative courses of action if the military action is

unsuccessful; integrate national and international agencies and

the other instruments of national power; seek the support of

multinational partners; and ensure the support of the American

people. Once the President makes the decision, the use of

military force must remain very clear in purpose and resolute

in action.

The US national military strategy guides the Armed Forces in

employing their resources to achieve national security and

defense objectives in peace, crisis, and conflict. These

objectives traditionally include promoting a stable international

order that promotes democracy, economic well-being, and

peaceful change. Military forces can provide a degree of

security to deter or contain violence in a region so that

democratic processes can address the root causes of societal

dysfunctions and conflict. Military forces contribute

significantly to deterrence by presenting visible evidence of

their ability to decisively defeat aggression. Defense of US

interests worldwide entails the unambiguous ability of the

Armed Forces of the United States to fight and win in largescale, sustained combat operations abroad. In addition,

simultaneous occurrence of challenges and threats to US

interests worldwide often require concurrent commitment of

US forces to a variety of relatively small-scale contingency

operations.

The ability to commit US military power depends on the

posture and readiness of the forces. A set of enduring concepts

assists the Armed Forces of the United States in this regard.

Strategic agility addresses the ability to adapt, conceptually

and physically, to changes in the international security

environment. Overseas presence, which includes permanently

stationed and rotationally or temporarily deployed forces

forward in important regions, helps shape the security

environment to directly advance and defend US interests.

Force projection is the military dimension of national power

projection. It is the ability to project the military instrument

of national power from the continental United States or another

theater, in response to requirements for military operations.

Decisive force entails forces powerful enough to unequivocally

and rapidly defeat an opponent. Campaigns use these concepts

in a timely manner, sequenced and integrated with the other

instruments of national power, to achieve US strategic aims.

Campaigns may include forcible entry to establish a military

lodgment in the face of armed opposition, and must provide

US national military

strategy guides the Armed

Forces to achieve national

security objectives. To

defend US interests

worldwide, the Armed

Forces must have the

unambiguous ability to

fight and win in largescale, sustained combat

operations abroad.

The ability to commit US

military power in defense

of national security

depends on readiness and

posture, guided by

enduring concepts.
xi

Executive Summary

for timely application of military power in a manner that

accomplishes the mission while making every effort to ensure

the combat capability and survival of the men and women in

uniform and supporting the force.

The campaign is the central organizing instrument for joint

warfare. Campaigns, by their nature, are joint undertakings.

They are planned and executed by applying operational art.

The joint operational art encompasses the translation of national

security and military strategies into operational design for the

joint employment of forces at all levels of war. Combatant

commands develop command and theater strategies to apply

the joint operational art to their contemporary missions and

situations. The purpose of these command and theater strategies

is to assure unified action by all command components and

supporting commands. Unified action under the overall

direction of the combatant commander will then be able to

encompass the actions of military, interagency, multinational,

and nongovernmental organizations in execution of the

campaign plan.

The Armed Forces of the United States routinely participate

with other governmental entities in interagency operations, in

the United States and abroad. Early inclusion of interagency

considerations in military assessments, estimates, and plans

will facilitate civil-military integration of effort. The

interagency process in the United States, under the National

Security Council, focuses on the appropriate functions for

military and nonmilitary participants and facilitates unified

action in pursuit of national objectives. Overseas, ordinarily

the US ambassador and the country team take the lead for

interagency operations. For domestic interagency operations

that may require that the Armed Forces support civil authorities,

the Federal Emergency Management Agency has the lead for

crises precipitated by natural and man-made disasters and civil

defense. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the domestic

lead for crises relating to terrorism. The United States Joint

Forces Command is responsible for providing military

assistance to the appropriate civil authorities within the United

States for managing and mitigating the consequences of

terrorist employment of nuclear, biological, chemical, and

radiological weapons and other high-yield explosive weapons.

Fundamentals of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations

Campaigns are joint. They

are the central organizing

instrument for joint

warfare.

The Armed Forces

routinely operate in the

interagency environment.

Unified action in pursuit

of national objectives

requires early inclusion of

interagency

considerations.
xii

Executive Summary

JP 1

Since the Revolutionary War, American military operations

have benefited from participation by other like-minded

countries. The Armed Forces of the United States must be

prepared to operate abroad within a multinational framework,

and should be prepared to operate under other-than-US

leadership. However, US forces must maintain the ability to

operate unilaterally across the range of military operations.

US multinational operations adhere to four tenets. Respect

confirms the importance of genuine partnership and includes

due regard to each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history,

and values. Rapport is a personal direct relationship that

facilitates teamwork and unity of effort. Knowledge of

partners is vital, and as important to success as knowledge of

the enemy. Patience is needed because it takes time to establish

respect, rapport, knowledge of each other, and understanding

and agreement on the best methods of accomplishing the

common mission. Unity of effort, assuring unified action, for

multinational operations requires clear and effective command

and control structures. Consensus and compromise are vital

in multinational military operations characterized by voluntary

participation by the partners who retain their sovereignty and

national interests.

The Armed Forces of the United States simultaneously

participate in shaping the strategic environment to prevent war,

respond when deterrence fails, and prepare for an uncertain

future. Joint doctrine establishes the foundation for addressing

the future for the Armed Forces. Joint operational concepts

focused on plausible future environments and military

requirements assist the Armed Forces in developing concepts

for future joint operations and force development activities

under control of the responsible Services, commands, and

agencies, and facilitating interagency and multinational efforts

aimed at future operations.

Shaping the future in the present calls for a blend of continuity

and audacious innovation. Analysis supported by modeling,

simulation, and experimentation has a vital role in developing

the future Armed Forces of the United States. Joint

experimentation, a concepts-based process focused on the

capabilities required by future joint force commanders, is an

essential component of addressing the future.

The Armed Forces of the

United States must be

prepared to operate abroad

within a multinational

framework, and should be

prepared to operate under

other-than-US leadership.

However, US forces must

maintain the ability to

operate unilaterally across

the range of military

operations.

Joint doctrine establishes

the foundation for

addressing the future.

Shaping the future in the

present calls for a blend of

continuity and audacious

innovation.

Addressing the Future
xiii

Executive Summary

CONCLUSION

Both the human and technological dimensions of warfare in

the future are vital. Academe has a significant role, since US

educational and research institutions play unique roles in

establishing and furthering societal values and, with

commercial and nonprofit laboratories, are the centers of

scientific and technological innovation. Shaping the future

capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States is a

collaborative responsibility of five major groups of

institutions in contemporary society. These include: the

Military Services and other organizations charged with future

force development, combatant commands responsible for

ensuring interoperability and coherence of joint operations,

multinational partners without whose assistance US interests

may be irreparably compromised, nonmilitary agencies

including educational and research institutions that are

responsible for the majority of societal activities, and industry

with its unique roles in enhancing the general welfare and

providing the bulk of the capacity for realizing military

innovation.

The Armed Forces of the United States are the instruments of

the people exercised through their constitutional duly-elected

and appointed civilian leaders. They must be prepared to fight

and win against any foe under any circumstances, and to assist

civil authorities in meeting challenges that cannot be

adequately addressed by nonmilitary institutions. The Armed

Forces must reflect and support the highest values of American

society.

Both the human and

technological dimensions

of warfare in the future

are vital.

Five groups of institutions

assist the Armed Forces of

the United States in

shaping the future: US

Military Services;

combatant commands;

multinational partners;

educational and research

institutions and other

nonmilitary agencies; and

industry.
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Executive Summary

JP 1

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

I-1

The Armed Forces of the United States hold

in trust for the American people the military

power of the Nation and are the ultimate

guarantors of its territorial integrity and

independence against all adversaries.

Fundamental concepts of national security and

the principles of the military profession in

democratic societies establish the general

character of the Armed Forces. Contemporary

assessments of the international security

environment, the interests of the United States,

and the will of the citizenry expressed through

US constitutional institutions guide the Armed

Forces in developing their capabilities.

Military doctrine establishes principles that

provide direction for the employment of those

capabilities.

1. National Security —

Developing Strategy and

Policy

National security is among the fundamental

national purposes that the American people

embedded in the Constitution. The United

States relies on the complementary application

of the basic instruments of national power

(diplomatic, economic, informational, and

military) for its security. Under the

framework of shared responsibilities set out

by the Constitution, the United States

establishes specific policies and strategies in

order to preserve its values, to identify its

interests, and to assure the best use of its

resources in advancing its interests and

defending the security of the Republic and its

citizens.

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a

common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”

GEN George H. Decker, USA

In order to be relevant to the contemporary

international security environment, national

security policy and strategy must be guided

by a clear understanding of the capabilities,

limitations, and consequences of military

action. US military leaders therefore have

constitutional, legal, and professional

obligations to provide advice and

recommendations on the military aspects of

national security to national leaders in the

executive and legislative branches. These

obligations include advice and

recommendations on the use of force, the

development and employment of military

forces, and the integration of military planning

and actions with the other instruments of

national power. Combatant commanders also

have the unique responsibility for effective

execution of military actions under the

National Command Authorities (NCA) in

furtherance of national security policy and

strategy.

a. Participants. Developing national

security policy and strategy involves the

interaction of the highest level US civilian and

military authorities, principally the President

and the members of the National Security

Council (NSC). Supporting these primary

participants are the senior officials of the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and

the individual Services, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),

the combatant commanders, and a number of

agencies with unique defense responsibilities.
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“[My job is] to give the President and

Secretary of Defense military advice

before they know they need it.”

GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA,

Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

• National Command Authorities. The

NCA, which consist of the President and

the Secretary of Defense or their duly

deputized alternates or successors, are

the highest levels in the military chain

of command. The NCA exercise

authority over the Armed Forces both

through the combatant commanders for

those forces assigned to combatant

commands, through the Secretaries of

the Military Departments for those forces

not assigned to combatant commands,

and through the Secretary of

Transportation for the US Coast Guard.

• National Security Council. The

President chairs the NSC. In addition to

the President and Vice President, the

NSC’s statutory members are the

Secretaries of State and Defense. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is

the statutory military advisor to the

Council and discharges the responsibility

for professional military advice and

recommendations in this forum as well

as in other ways as stipulated by the

NCA. The Director of Central

Intelligence is the NSC’s statutory

intelligence advisor.

• Department of Defense. The supporting

participants in the Department of Defense

(DOD) — the individual Services,

combatant commands, and agencies —

provide their advice and

recommendations through the Secretary

of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. In the American system

of civil-military relations, civilian-elected

officials and their duly appointed

subordinates have primary responsibility

for broad national policies and

procedures that reflect the will of the

people. Military officials have primary

responsibility for advice and

recommendations on professional

military matters including capabilities,

limitations, and implications of military

action, as well as for commanding the

military forces in carrying out their

assigned missions.

b. Processes. Under the direction of the

NCA, the Armed Forces of the United States

participate in US national security activities

guided by the following interrelated planning

systems and associated processes (Figure I-1).

• NSC System. The NSC is the President’s

principal forum for considering national

security and foreign policy matters. The

NSC functions to advise and assist the

President by presenting assessments and

options for decision that reflect all

relevant government agencies and

considerations. The NSC also

coordinates the dissemination and

monitors the implementation of

Presidential and other high-level national

security decisions among the various

government agencies. The NSC

prepares, disseminates, and oversees

execution of Presidential national

security decisions and directives, the US

National Security Strategy (NSS), and

other directives that provide the basis for

military action.

• Planning, Programming, and

Budgeting System (PPBS). The PPBS,

presided over by the Secretary of

Defense, has as its primary objective the

allocation of resources needed by the

Armed Forces of the United States to

execute military aspects of the NSS and

the National Military Strategy (NMS).

The PPBS enables the Services and

selected commands and agencies to
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develop and sustain necessary military

capabilities. Under this system, the

Department of Defense translates

requirements for forces, personnel,

materiel, and facilities into budgetary

requirements to be presented to the

President for approval and to the

Congress for authorization and

appropriation. The principal participants

in this system are civilian leaders in the

OSD, and the individual Services and US

Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM). The PPBS system assures

professional military advice by the

participation of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the other members of

the JCS, the combatant commanders, and

selected Defense agency officials.

• Joint Strategic Planning System

(JSPS). The JSPS is the primary formal

system by which the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with

the other members of the JCS and the

combatant commanders, provides

military advice to the NCA and

recommendations to the PPBS. JSPS

products — such as the NMS and the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan —

provide guidance and instructions on

military policy, strategy, plans, forces,

and resource requirements and

allocations essential to successful

execution of the NSS and other

Presidential directives. They also

provide a means to evaluate extant US

military capabilities, to assess the

adequacy and risk associated with current

programs and budgets, and to propose

changes for NCA and Congressional

approval.

• Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES). The

JOPES is the principal DOD system for

translating policy decisions into

operation plans and orders in order to

make the most effective use of US

military capabilities and to meet US

requirements for the employment of

military forces. The JOPES includes

deliberate and crisis action planning

Figure I-1. National Security Planning Processes

NATIONAL SECURITY

PLANNING PROCESSES

National

Security

Council

System

Planning,

Programming,

and

Budgeting

System

Joint

Strategic

Planning

System

Joint

Operation

Planning and

Execution

System

Four Interrelated Planning Systems

Support National Security:
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processes. It guides US military action

during crises and transition to operations

through rapid, coordinated planning and

implementation of plans. Campaign

planning encompasses both the deliberate

and crisis action planning processes. If

the scope of contemplated operations

requires it, campaign planning begins

with or during deliberate planning. It

continues through crisis action planning,

thus unifying both planning processes.

2. The Political Context

The Armed Forces of the United States

operate in a democratic political context that

enables the American people to express their

views and preferences about the employment

of military forces. In due course, those views

influence the use of the military instrument,

including the scope and limitations of military

action. Under the Constitution’s framework,

American military power operates for and

under the conditions determined by the people

through their elected representatives. This

political context establishes the objectives and

the limits of legitimate military action in

peace, crisis, and conflict in the United States

and abroad.

“Our armies must be subject to ultimate

civilian control and command at all

times, in war as well as peace. The

basic decisions on our participation in

any conflict and our response to any

threat — including all decisions relating

to the use of nuclear weapons, or the

escalation of a small war into a large

one — will be made by the regularly

constituted civilian authorities.”

President John F. Kennedy

a. Peace, Crisis, and Conflict

• In peace, the political imperative for the

Armed Forces of the United States is to

maintain visible, credible military

capability and readiness for employment

across the range of military operations.

Demonstrated military capability is the

cornerstone of deterrence, which remains

a principal means for dissuading wouldbe aggressors and adversaries from action

harmful to the United States. Within the

United States, primacy for action rests

with civil authority, with military power

playing a supporting role. Interagency

task forces with civilian agency and

military participation, and with civilian

officials in charge, are the norm. In

countries abroad, US military activities

undertaken outside the established

procedures of formal alliances and

similar international arrangements fall

under the oversight of the US ambassador

and the country team, with command

authority over US forces remaining under

a US military commander.

• During crisis, US military authorities

focus on military activities that bolster

deterrence in conjunction with

coordinated actions by civil authorities

in charge of the other instruments of

national power. The NSC has a lead role

in managing crises that may involve

military action. When military support

for predominantly civilian noncombat

activities is envisioned, other US

governmental agencies may assume

the lead role. Essential military

considerations during crisis include

preplanned and specially tailored flexible

options to bolster deterrence and ensure

rapid and effective transition to conflict

including war.

• During conflict, the principal

responsibility of the Armed Forces of the

United States is to employ rapid and

decisive military power to achieve US

objectives in a manner that sustains the

fruits of success in the postconflict

environment. Conflict encompasses

combat (including formally declared

war) or situations in which there is a risk

of combat, such as those that result in
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Fundamental Concepts

multinational peace operations. The

rapidity and visible capability of US force

deployments alone may be sufficient to

deter conflict expansion and achieve US

objectives. In conflict situations, US

military commanders adhere to US joint

doctrine and ratified multinational

doctrine, and integrate their efforts with

multinational and interagency partners.

They also integrate the actions of the

military instrument with those of the civil

authorities responsible for the other

instruments of national power. Joint US

military operations are normally

integrated with US and foreign military

and civil organizations in pursuit of

common or complementary objectives.

b. Public Opinion. The opinions of the

American citizenry, and of peoples elsewhere,

concerning the legitimacy, appropriateness,

and effectiveness of US military action have

an important effect on the activities of the

Armed Forces of the United States. Public

opinion influences the ability of the Armed

Forces to accomplish their missions and to

prepare for future uses of US military power.

US military leaders are responsible for

providing timely and accurate information to

the citizenry concerning the activities of the

Armed Forces of the United States. The

responsibility of US military leaders to the

public is complementary to, not in conflict

with, their responsibility for providing

confidential professional military advice to the

NCA in support of the Constitution. Similarly,

US military leaders are responsible for

providing professional military advice and

recommendations as well as timely and

complete information to the Legislative

Branch in order to enable it to fulfill its

constitutional responsibilities for military

affairs.

c. Legal Considerations. The United

States adheres to domestic and international

law governing warfare. The United States also

supports human rights worldwide, and

conforms to customary international law and

those international legal conventions and

prescriptions supporting human rights to

which it is a party. These considerations apply

to the Armed Forces of the United States

across the range of military operations.

3. Instruments of National

Power

The ability of the United States to influence

events to its advantage worldwide depends in

large measure on the will of its citizenry, the

vitality of its societal institutions, the strength

Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence.
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of its relations with like-minded multinational

partners, and the effectiveness of the

Government in employing the instruments of

national power (Figure I-2). These

instruments are diplomatic, economic,

informational, and military and are normally

coordinated by the appropriate Executive

Branch officials often with NSC assistance.

They are the tools the United States uses to

apply its sources of power; including its

human potential, economy, industry, science

and technology, academic institutions,

geography, and national will.

The NCA establish the rules for and

integrate military power with the other

instruments of national power to advance and

defend US values, interests, and objectives.

To accomplish this integration, the Armed

Forces interact with the other responsible

agencies to ensure mutual understanding of

the capabilities, limitations, and consequences

of military and civilian actions, and to identify

the ways in which military and nonmilitary

capabilities best complement each other. The

NSC plays key roles in the integration of all

the instruments of national power, facilitating

mutual understanding, cooperation, and

integration of effort, as well as adherence to

Presidential and other national-level

directives.

a. The Diplomatic Instrument. The

diplomatic instrument of national power is the

principal instrument for accomplishing

engagement with other states and foreign

groups in order to advance US values,

interests, and objectives. However, without

the credible threat of force, diplomacy

historically is inadequate against a determined

and powerful adversary. Leaders of the

Armed Forces of the United States have a

responsibility to understand US foreign policy

and to assure that those responsible for US

diplomacy have a clear understanding of the

capabilities, limitations, and consequences of

military action. Combatant commanders are

responsible for integrating military activities

Figure I-2. Instruments of National Power

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER









DIPLOMATIC

ECONOMIC

INFORMATIONAL

MILITARY

The four instruments of national power

are used to employ the many sources of

national power.
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Fundamental Concepts

with diplomatic activities in their geographic

regions. The US ambassador and the

corresponding country team are normally in

charge of diplomatic-military activities in

countries abroad. When directed by the NCA,

the combatant commander employs military

forces in concert with the other instruments

of national power. In these circumstances,

the US ambassador and the country team may

have complementary activities (employing the

diplomatic instrument) that do not entail

control of military forces, which remain under

command authority of the combatant

commander.

b. The Economic Instrument. The

economic instrument of national power is only

partially controlled by governmental agencies.

In keeping with US values and constitutional

imperatives, American individuals and entities

have broad freedom of action abroad. The

responsibility of the US Government (USG)

lies with facilitating economic and trade

relationships worldwide that promote US

fundamental objectives, such as promoting

general welfare and supporting security

interests and objectives. A strong domestic

US economy with free access to global

markets and resources is a fundamental engine

of the general welfare, the guarantor of a

strong national defense, and an influence for

economic expansion by US trade partners

worldwide. The Armed Forces must

coordinate with USG agencies responsible for

employing the economic instrument to

facilitate unity of action. The NSC has

primary responsibility for the integration of

the economic and military instruments of

power abroad.

c. The Informational Instrument. The

informational instrument of national power

has a diffuse and complex set of components

with no single center of control. In the

American culture, information is freely

exchanged with minimal government

controls.

• Information itself is a strategic resource

vital to national security. This reality

extends to the Armed Forces at all levels.

Military operations in particular are

dependent on many simultaneous and

integrated activities that, in turn, depend

on information and information systems.

Information and information-based

technologies are vital elements for

modern war and military operations other

than war (MOOTW).

• Constraints on public access to USG

information normally may be imposed

only for national security and individual

privacy reasons. Information readily

available from multiple sources

influences domestic and foreign

audiences including citizens, adversaries,

and governments. It is important for the

official agencies of government,

including the Armed Forces, to recognize

the fundamental role of the media as a

conduit of information. The Armed

Forces must assure media access

consistent with classification

requirements, operations security, legal

restrictions, and individual privacy. The

Armed Forces must also provide timely

and accurate information to the public.

• Success in military operations depends

on acquiring and integrating essential

information and denying it to the

adversary. The Armed Forces are

responsible for conducting defensive and

offensive information operations,

protecting what should not be disclosed,

and aggressively attacking adversary

information systems. Information

operations may involve complex legal

and policy issues that require approval,

review, and coordination at the national

level.

d. The Military Instrument. This

publication focuses on the employment of the

Armed Forces of the United States. In
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wielding the military instrument of national

power, the Armed Forces must ensure their

adherence to the values and constitutional

principles of American society. They must

also meet the standards for the profession of

arms demanded by American society. While

responsibility for wielding the other

instruments of power rests outside the military

establishment, US military leaders are

responsible for providing the advice and

recommendations necessary for the overall US

effort in order to properly incorporate the

military instrument with the other instruments

of national power.

4. The Role of Doctrine — “An

Engine of Change”

a. Joint Doctrine

• Military doctrine presents fundamental

principles that guide the employment of

forces. It provides the distilled insights

and wisdom gained from experience in

warfare and other operations requiring

the use of the military instrument of

national power. Nevertheless, doctrine

does not replace or alter a commander’s

authority and obligation to determine the

proper course of action (COA) under the

circumstances prevailing at the time of

decision.

• Joint doctrine enables the Armed Forces

of the United States to conduct the most

effective joint activities and unified

action. Joint doctrine is based on extant

capabilities and incorporates time-tested

principles for successful military action

as well as contemporary lessons that

together guide aggressive exploitation of

US advantages against adversary

vulnerabilities. It does this by promoting

a common perspective from which to

plan, train, and conduct military

operations in combat and noncombat

situations. It also fundamentally shapes

the way the Armed Forces think about

the use of the military instrument of

national power.

• Though neither policy nor strategy, joint

doctrine serves to make US policy and

strategy effective in the application of

US military power. Joint doctrine and

its supporting tactics, techniques, and

procedures focus on how best to employ

the Armed Forces in order to achieve US

objectives at strategic, operational, and

tactical levels. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff has the statutory

responsibility to develop and disseminate

joint doctrine, and does so in coordination

with the Services and combatant

commands. As such, joint doctrine is

authoritative guidance and will be

followed except when, in the judgment

of the commander, exceptional

circumstances dictate otherwise. Joint

Joint doctrine enables the most effective joint

activities and unified action.
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Fundamental Concepts

doctrine applies to the commanders of

combatant commands, subunified

commands, joint task forces, subordinate

components of these commands, combat

support agencies, and other Defense

agencies. Joint doctrine takes precedence

over individual Service doctrines, which

must be consistent with joint doctrine.

When the Armed Forces of the United

States participate in multinational

operations, US commanders should

follow multinational doctrine and

procedures that have been ratified by the

United States. For multinational doctrine

and procedures not ratified by the United

States, commanders should evaluate and

follow the multinational command’s

doctrine and procedures where

applicable.

b. Evolution of Doctrine. Joint doctrine

— an “engine of change” — serves as an

important method for implementing change

as forces train and build effective joint teams.

It facilitates development of a common joint

culture from which to integrate Service

cultures and doctrines. The joint doctrine

development process provides the conceptual

basis by which Armed Forces assess, review,

and revise doctrine and concepts for the

future. The continuous application of joint

doctrine in training and leader development

also encourages development of new and

innovative capabilities — including joint

tactics, techniques, and procedures — that

improve upon extant capabilities. Because

the Armed Forces of the United States operate

and fight jointly, all the men and women in

its ranks must learn and practice joint doctrine

and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Feedback to the doctrine process from joint

exercises and operations is essential for the

continuing vitality and improvement of joint

doctrine and the consistency of Service

doctrine and procedures. This process of

deliberate and experience-based doctrinal

change is crucial for the present and future

effectiveness of the Armed Forces of the

United States.

“Military doctrine cannot be allowed to

stagnate, especially an adaptive

doctrine like maneuver warfare.

Doctrine must continue to evolve based

on growing experience, advancements

in theory, and the changing face of war

itself.”

Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

II-1

1. Introduction

a. The international security environment is

dynamic and uncertain, with recurring disputes,

crises, and conflicts in many regions as well as

endemic conflicts in regions of particular

importance to the security of the United States.

Challenges and threats may arise from

adversaries who are inherently opposed to US

values, power, and role in the international

system, or from adversaries for whom the United

States presents an obstacle to their specific

objectives. These adversaries may be states or

groups of states as well as nonstate groups,

including terrorist, criminal, ethnic, religious,

and special-interest organizations. While states

have defined territorial and population bases of

power, nonstate groups may rely on state

sponsorship, have transnational bases of power,

or rely on the support of adherents to their points

of view regardless of citizenship or place of

residence.

b. The United States and its key allies and

like-minded partners exercise significant

influence on current events and have important

roles in determining the nature of the future.

The Armed Forces of the United States have

the responsibility to shape and employ the

military instrument of power to advance and

defend US interests in this turbulent international

security environment.

2. Threats to US Interests

a. The complex range of threats to US

interests arises from the perspectives and

“The superpower conflict is over, but many complex and dangerous

challenges remain. The enemy we face today is instability and

unpredictability. It is a virulent drug trade, and the spread of the weapons of

mass destruction. And it is terrorism, the weapon of cowards and

malcontents.”

President George Bush

actions of a variety of potential adversaries.

Some states aspire to global influence and

act to achieve that influence in ways that are

harmful to US interests. Other states may seek

to enhance their power and influence by

opposing US interests and objectives within their

regions. Territorial disputes and armed conflicts

spurred by social, ethnic, and religious

differences, as well as civil wars, pose threats to

regional and international peace. Man-made

or natural disasters may also threaten US

interests within the United States and abroad.

While contemporary assessments of US interests

and threats to those interests evolve over time to

conform to reality, joint doctrine provides broad

guidelines that are not limited solely to a single,

unique assessment or period of time. When the

environment, interests, and threats change

significantly — as occurred following the end

of the Cold War — joint doctrine also evolves

to conform to the new reality. The Armed

Forces of the United States must take into

account the entire range of challenges and

threats to the United States. Military

assessments and estimates must include

threats abroad as well as the projections of

those threats to US territory.

b. In assessing threats, it is essential to

understand clearly what is being threatened.

The United States holds as most dangerous

the threats to its fundamental well-being,

territory, and safety; these vital interests

include US social and economic

infrastructures. Threats to the vital interests

of US allies may also threaten the United

States.
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c. The United States exists in a community

of interdependent states. Threats to the

international norms of state behavior, to global

democratic and economic progress, and to the

global environment also threaten important

US interests. The United States also has an

interest in promoting the values of individual

worth, human rights, and democratic selfdetermination that are at the core of the

American social contract. Threats to those

values abroad compromise US efforts to create

a hospitable international environment.

• Regional and Space Threats. A number

of states have the capability to threaten

US vital interests in overseas regions

through aggression and coercion. If

unchecked, these threats may constrain

or interrupt the flows of resources and

commerce that are vital to the economic

well-being of the United States, its allies,

and other states. Some regional powers

also have long-range delivery systems as

well as clandestine means to threaten the

territories of the United States and its

allies. Similarly, regional powers may

have the capability to threaten the flow

of vital information and communications

that rely on space-based systems.

Unimpeded access and freedom to

operate in space are essential to

protecting US vital interests.

• Transnational Threats. A number of

nonstate groups pursue objectives

directly threatening to US vital and other

important interests. These include

organizations that have the means and

motivation to employ terrorism, conduct

attacks on critical infrastructures, engage

in international crime, and direct illicit

drug and arms traffic. Uncontrolled

refugee migrations resulting from

conflict or environmental causes threaten

to overwhelm the capabilities of

international organizations, the United

States, and other countries, upsetting

regional economic and political stability.

The global diffusion of sophisticated

technologies and means of

communication permit US adversaries to

achieve transnational reach even into US

territory. Moreover, adversaries not party

to an ongoing conflict may seize that

opportunity for their own purposes and

hold US interests at risk, perhaps at

locations beyond the region in which the

conflict is taking place, including US

territory. Taken together, these

transnational threats challenge the Armed

Forces to assess likely threats beyond the

immediate regions of disputes, crises, and

conflicts.

• Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Weapons that are capable of a high order

of destruction pose a significant threat to

US interests worldwide. In the hands of

regional and nonstate groups, these

weapons may be used in a widespread

manner or against specific point targets

of particularly high value to the United

States. These weapons include nuclear,

biological, chemical, and radiological

weapons as well as other weapons

capable of a high order of destruction or

of being used in such a manner as to

destroy large numbers of people. In

addition to their direct physical effects,

the threat or use of these weapons will

have significant psychological effects in

the immediate target area and in other

vulnerable areas that may be potential

targets.

• Spread of Dangerous Technologies.

The global diffusion of knowledge,

improved communications capabilities,

and sophisticated technologies empowers

adversaries and facilitates their

development of capabilities that may

attempt to exploit vulnerabilities of the

United States, its allies, and other friendly

states. The United States, with

cooperation from like-minded states and

nonstate groups, seeks to limit the
II-3

The Strategic Security Environment

dissemination of dangerous technologies

(such as advanced weapon and missile

technologies) in order to contain this

threat.

• Failed States. Governments under

pressure from internal and external forces

— social, economic, or military — may

lose their ability to meet even the minimal

expectations of their citizens. “Failed”

states may become powerless to prevent

internal conflict, massive killing, vast

migrations, environmental disasters, loss

of control of their armed forces, and

armed conflict with neighboring states.

The uncontrolled violence in failed states,

therefore, can threaten neighboring states

and groups, US citizens and interests in

the region, and require US and

international assistance.

• Foreign Intelligence Collection.

Foreign threats may exploit the versatility

of human intelligence as well as the

advances in science and technology, thus

presenting a range of traditional and new

challenges to the instruments of national

power. Invasive intelligence operations

may use common and specialized global

information networks to penetrate key

US governmental and private

organizations as well as their

unclassified and classified data systems

and individual computers.

• Asymmetric Threats. Contemporary

threats share an important characteristic

with past threats. A timeless and

fundamental principle of the profession

of arms is to avoid the strengths and focus

on the vulnerabilities that will most

rapidly and decisively cause the

opponent’s defeat. The capabilities of

American military power make it difficult

for any adversary to develop a

symmetrical force that mirrors that of the

United States. The Armed Forces of the

United States must, therefore, expect

adversaries — whether states or nonstate

groups — to seek to exploit asymmetries

and focus on US vulnerabilities.

Combatant commanders must anticipate

asymmetric threats in preparing for and

conducting joint, multinational, and

interagency operations.

3. Assessing the National

Strategic Situation

a. US national security demands periodic

assessments of the adequacy of strategies and

resources available to achieve national

Weapons of mass destruction pose a significant threat to US interests.
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security objectives. Unity of effort is essential

for timely and accurate assessments and for

actions taken in light of the assessments.

Ordinarily, the NSC is the lead agency for this

effort. The Armed Forces routinely carry out

assessments of the effectiveness of the military

instrument in accomplishing national

objectives, and contribute to the assessment

of the effectiveness of the other instruments

(diplomatic, economic, and informational).

These assessments inform US leaders in the

executive and legislative branches, and when

security permits, the general public.

b. Developing assessments of national

strategic issues requires the coordinated and

integrated action of the USG agencies

responsible for wielding the instruments of

national power. When the military instrument

is employed in coordination with other

instruments, the NSC normally coordinates

the effort. In wielding the economic and

informational instruments, the United States

must be cognizant of the significant role of the

private sector in these arenas. As a result, the

Armed Forces and the other USG agencies that

have responsibilities and activities in these areas

must incorporate private sector perspectives into

their assessments of strategic issues.

• Military Participation. Military

leaders have fundamental

responsibilities and roles in the

assessment of national strategic issues.

Specific tasks and methods of

participation will be stipulated in NCA

directives and instructions from the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In addition to the roles discharged by

the Chairman and the other members of

the JCS, the combatant commanders

have unique roles. In view of their

assigned missions and/or geographic

responsibilities, the combatant

commanders provide assessments of

threats, strategies, and resources to

support national assessments of strategic

issues. The fundamental purpose of

professional military participation in the

development of these assessments is to

fulfill military responsibilities in the US

system of civil-military relations.

Specifically, senior military leaders

provide advice and recommendations on

the feasible military options, resources

required, and anticipated consequences

of military action. They also are

uniquely responsible for developing the

military components of operation plans

Terrorist bombings such as the Khobar Towers attack are an example of

asymmetric attack that must be anticipated and for which military forces must

prepare.
II-5

The Strategic Security Environment

developed as a consequence of decisions

prompted by national strategic

assessments.

• Interagency Participation. The NSC

is responsible for guiding and

coordinating interagency participation in

strategic assessments. The NSC is also

responsible for assisting the President in

actions taken to execute plans and

activities that result from these

assessments. Contingency operations,

particularly peace operations, require a

high degree of integrated and

synchronized interagency participation.

These operations call for assessments that

involve a wide range of nonmilitary

agencies.

• Executive Committee Participation.

To assist in assessments of strategic

situations, development of policy and

options, and planning and execution of

interagency operations, the NSC may

organize an executive committee

consisting of high-level officials of

participating agencies, including those

not normally part of the NSC structure.

This committee, with appropriate

professional military representation, may

develop organizational arrangements to

integrate interagency efforts, monitor

their progress, and assess their operations.

For example, the executive committee

may be tasked to manage day-to-day

interagency planning and integration in

complex peace operations.

• Political-Military Plans and

Rehearsals. Due to their complexity,

situations that call for significant military

and nonmilitary participation will require

specific political-military plans

cooperatively developed by the

participants, under the coordination of

the NSC and its executive committee (if

activated for the situation at hand). To

the maximum extent feasible prior to

execution, all participants at the

appropriate level will rehearse these

political-military plans.

Appendix A, “The Strategic Estimate,”

provides a guide for developing

assessments of national strategic issues.

4. Operations and Conflict

Termination

National political objectives guide military

action. This includes establishment of

supporting military objectives, development

of strategies and plans to achieve the

objectives, conduct of operations, and

definition of criteria for cessation of

operations. These national objectives also

influence requirements for military operations

and support to achieve the desired end state

and maintain it in the theater following

cessation of operations.

a. Military plans and operations serve to

support the attainment of the overarching

political objectives that give rise to military

involvement. Therefore, military plans and

operations must focus both on achieving the

political objectives and on establishing the

military conditions necessary to sustain the

objectives following cessation of military

operations. This calls for planning based on

the desired end state, ensuring that the longerterm postconflict environment called for by

US political objectives is preserved following

conclusion of military involvement. Military

plans at all levels should therefore include

consideration of conditions under which

conflict termination and termination of

military involvement can be executed.

“The formulation of a clear and precise

mission statement which defines

measurable and attainable objectives

is paramount.”

Gen Joseph P. Hoar, USMC
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b. Senior military leaders have a

responsibility to clarify to the NCA and other

civilian leaders the military aspects of

operations. This includes the manner by

which military force will achieve and sustain

political objectives, considerations for conflict

termination, and the potential need for followon operations. Military advice and

recommendations on conflict termination

have political and military dimensions.

• Political. Control of Armed Forces of

the United States participation in joint,

multinational, and interagency operations

rests with the NCA, assisted by the NSC

and any groups specifically empowered

by the NCA to accomplish this task.

Participation of US forces with other

countries, international bodies, and other

designated groups must be authorized by

the NCA. Clear political objectives

established in advance of military

planning and operations facilitate

determination of supporting military

objectives aimed at achieving the desired

The Medal of Honor is Awarded to

Signalman First Class Douglas Albert Munro, United States Coast Guard

Signalman First Class Munro was Petty Officer in Charge of a group of 24

Higgins boats, engaged in the evacuation of a battalion of marines trapped by

enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz Guadalcanal, on 27 September 1942.

After making preliminary plans for the evacuation of nearly 500 beleaguered

marines, Munro, under constant strafing by enemy machineguns on the island,

and at great risk of his life, daringly led 5 of his small craft toward the shore.

As he closed the beach, he signaled the others to land, and then in order to

draw the enemy’s fire and protect the heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed

his craft with its 2 small guns as a shield between the beachhead and the

Japanese. When the perilous task of evacuation was nearly completed, Munro

was instantly killed by enemy fire, but his crew, 2 of whom were wounded,

carried on until the last boat had loaded and cleared the beach. By his

outstanding leadership, expert planning, and dauntless devotion to duty, he

and his courageous comrades undoubtedly saved the lives of many who

otherwise would have perished. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

end state. Nevertheless, combatant

commanders must be prepared to adapt

to unforeseen events and to the evolution

of political objectives as the situation

develops.

• Military. The combatant commander is

responsible for executing the military

dimensions of conflict termination as

directed by the NCA. Military

considerations for conflict termination

are an essential element in national

strategic assessments that guide

operations across the range of military

operations. Combatant commanders

should infuse in the fighting forces an

attitude of willing joint integration of

effort, based on joint doctrine, and

recognize that all forms of combat power

present advantages for exploitation. The

remainder of this publication provides

context and describes the principles that

guide military operations in combat and

noncombat situations, both abroad and

in the United States.
CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER

III-1

1. The Purpose of the Military

a. The Armed Forces of the United States

fulfill the constitutional imperative to provide

the common defense. They are the sole

instrument that enforces national will by the

threat or employment of organized violence.

The fundamental purpose of the Armed

Forces is to win the Nation’s wars. Success

in combat in defense of national sovereignty,

territorial integrity, societal values, and

national interests is the essential goal and

measure of value of the profession of arms in

American society.

b. The Armed Forces also serve to advance

and defend other important national interests

and objectives, including participation in

operations that do not envision combat, as

directed by the NCA. American military

forces have a long history of unconditional

service in operations that support broad

national purposes. From surveying railroad

rights-of-way in the 19th century to

participating in humanitarian relief efforts for

victims of natural disasters in the present, the

Armed Forces maintain as their inherent

secondary purpose the advancement and

protection of national interests in MOOTW.

2. National Military Objectives

The operations of the Armed Forces focus

on military objectives derived from

preeminent national political objectives. The

range of military action as well as the

geographical location of the United States

“No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances,

we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on the team that are

individual Services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed,

clenched fist of American military power. The days of single Service warfare

are gone forever.”

ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN

define particular characteristics that US

military power must exhibit to achieve its

military objectives. The Armed Forces of the

United States must be able to successfully

accomplish a wide variety of missions and

tasks. They must possess capabilities across

the full range of potential military operations,

including the ability to deploy rapidly from

the United States or other locations to the

theater of focus.

a. Promote Peace and Stability. In

pursuit of its national interests, the United

States seeks to influence the character of the

international security environment. An

international order hospitable to US values,

democratic principles, human rights, and the

rule of law facilitates both promotion of the

general welfare and the common defense.

Peaceful progress and peaceful resolution of

disputes are at the core of US interests abroad.

• Stability is not an end in itself. It is a

desirable characteristic of a theater

strategic environment that enables the

United States to achieve its objectives

abroad, but may not be desirable in

environments that threaten US interests.

• American military power has vital roles

in encouraging, promoting, and

preserving an environment favorable to

US interests abroad. Most important is

maintaining the visible ability to act

rapidly and decisively in regions of US

interests, in combat or noncombat

operations. This central capability relies
III-2

Chapter III

JP 1

on the combination of several factors: the

presence of forces in a region; the ability

to tailor an appropriate package of

additional forces that may be required

from locations outside the region; and

their rapid deployment (if required) and

employment to overcome challenges and

preserve US interests in the region.

• Deterrence is a central concept in

shaping and employing the Armed

Forces. The force development activities

of the Services, the USSOCOM, and

other agencies focus their efforts on

effective forces that can discourage

potential threats to US interests.

Doctrine, employment concepts, and

training reinforce these capabilities with

visible evidence to reduce the possibility

of miscalculation by a challenger or

potential adversary. Force readiness and

military professionalism lessen the risk

of having to fight at all. If deterrence

fails, then the preeminent military

objective is winning the war. When

American Service men and women fight,

they fight to win.

“The ultimate promise of our doctrine

is its potential to accomplish the

mission, achieve the warfighter’s

objectives, and not insignificantly, to

save lives on the battlefield.”

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF

b. Defeat Adversaries. The Armed Forces

of the United States develop their capabilities

for prompt, sustained engagement and

decisive defeat of adversaries worldwide.

Force development exploits fully the

capabilities of the individual and the best

available technology, guided by joint doctrine

that seeks to maximize the effects of American

combat power.

• American arms seek rapid decision in

simultaneous application of all

appropriate dimensions of combat power

against adversary centers of gravity

(COGs) and vulnerabilities. US forces

seek to destroy or neutralize the

adversary’s capability for organized

resistance and to facilitate post-combat

termination objectives. This central end

orients the actions of Services and others

in force development, establishes the

purpose of joint doctrine, and guides the

actions of combatant commanders in

preparing their assigned forces.

• The United States requires decisive,

overwhelming military capabilities.

This characteristic of American military

power influences the application of the

time-tested principles of war and serves

as the basis for deriving subordinate

fundamentals of joint operations.

3. Core Military Competencies

In pursuit of its roles in peace and war, the

Armed Forces of the United States develop

and maintain core military capabilities that

enable their success across the range of

military operations. At the highest

professional levels, senior leaders develop

joint warfighting core competencies that are

the capstone to American military power. The

Services, USSOCOM, and other agencies

develop capabilities oriented on their core

competencies embodied in tradition, law, and

NCA directives.

a. Military Competencies at Senior

Levels. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the other members of the JCS, and the

combatant commanders have unique

responsibilities for planning and directing the

employment of the Armed Forces of the

United States. This is their core competency.

The combination of joint professional military

education, as well as progressive and

sequential assignments toward higher levels

of joint operations, supports the development

and continuous revitalization of this core

competency. It is supported by the systems
III-3

United States Military Power

that prepare and assign the most competent

officers to the staffs that support these senior

military leaders.

b. Military Competencies of the Armed

Forces. The Services, USSOCOM, and

defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence

Agency, Defense Logistics Agency) that

develop and provide force elements to

combatant commands have the primary

responsibility for organizing, training, and

equipping forces for joint employment in

accordance with joint doctrine. These force

elements enable the Services, USSOCOM,

and agencies to carry out their respective

responsibilities. These force elements

undergo periodic review at the national level

to ensure that there are no capability gaps or

unwanted overlaps, and that they are

appropriately integrated for successful

mission accomplishment by combatant

commands. The combatant commanders are

responsible for the integration of military core

competencies across all the forces at their

disposal. This integration should be based

on joint doctrine and take account of all force

characteristics (including personnel and

materiel, training, and leader development)

in order to facilitate coherent joint operations.

“With the draw-down of our forces over

the years, each of the Services has

become more and more dependent on

the other. In fact I can think of very

few instances where any one Service

is capable of doing the challenging jobs

that are presented to us in today’s world

by itself. Each of us brings a particular

core competency to the missions that

are presented to the joint force

commander and presents that core

competency to the joint force

commander for him to be able to layer,

overlap and use the force the way he

needs to be able to accomplish his

mission. We will be forever dependent

on each other for the missions that

challenge the nation today.”

Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF

4. Joint Warfighting

a. Joint warfare is team warfare. The

engagement of forces is not a series of

individual performances linked by a common

theme; rather, it is the integrated and

synchronized application of all appropriate

capabilities. The synergy that results from

the operations of joint forces according to joint

doctrine maximizes combat capability in

Organizing, training, and equipping force elements are part of the

military core competencies.
III-4

Chapter III

JP 1

unified action. Joint warfare does not require

that all forces participate in a particular

operation merely because they are available.

The joint force commander (JFC) has the

authority and responsibility to tailor forces for

the mission at hand, selecting those that most

effectively and efficiently ensure success.

Joint Warfare is Team Warfare

“When a team takes to the field,

individual specialists come together to

achieve a team win. All players try to

do their very best because every other

player, the team, and the home town

are counting on them to win.

So it is when the Armed Forces of the

United States go to war. We must win

every time.

Every soldier must take the battlefield

believing his or her unit is the best in

the world.

Every pilot must take off believing there

is no one better in the sky.

Every sailor standing watch must

believe there is no better ship at sea.

Every Marine must hit the beach

believing that there are no better

infantrymen in the world.

But they all must also believe that they

are part of a team, a joint team, that

fights together to win.

This is our history, this is our tradition,

this is our future.”

GEN Colin L. Powell, USA

Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

b. War is a human undertaking that

does not respond to deterministic rules.

Indeed, the rapid advance of technology and

the diversity of threats to national interests

have accelerated and amplified the effects of

the traditional obstacles to military operations

of friction, chance, and uncertainty. The

cumulative effect of these obstacles is often

described as “the fog of war” and places a

burden on the commander to remain

responsive, versatile, and able to adjust in real

time to seize opportunities and reduce

vulnerabilities. This is the art of war.

c. Values of Joint Warfare. American

military service is based on values that US

military experience has proven to be the

bedrock of combat success (Figure III-1).

These values adhere to the most idealistic

societal norms, are common to all the Services,

and represent the essence of American military

professionalism. The discussion that follows

focuses on those values that have a special

impact on joint matters.

• The foremost value is integrity. It is the

cornerstone for building trust. American

Service men and women must be able to

rely on each other, regardless of the

challenge at hand; they must individually

and collectively say what they mean and

do what they say. Integrity inspires

confidence in others to carry out assigned

tasks and is a fundamental requirement

for building effective teams.

• Competence is at the core of the

profession of arms and of the relationship

Figure III-1. Joint Warfare Values

JOINT WARFARE

VALUES

INTEGRITY

COMPETENCE

PHYSICAL COURAGE

MORAL COURAGE

TEAMWORK

INTEGRITY

COMPETENCE

PHYSICAL COURAGE

MORAL COURAGE

TEAMWORK
III-5

United States Military Power

of the profession with the American

people. Competent performance

includes both the technical competence

to perform the relevant task to standard

as well as the ability to integrate that skill

with others according to joint doctrine.

The American people and multinational

partners expect US military competence

in every aspect of warfare. Service men

and women deserve no less from those

who lead them into battle. Successful

joint action relies on each of the Services

to deliver trained and ready, competent

and confident forces and leaders, able to

fight decisively under joint force

commanders. For the dedicated

professional, building Service

competence is an intense, lifelong affair.

Moreover, many serve in assignments

requiring additional competency in joint

skills, and all members of the Armed

Forces must understand their fellow

Services to the extent required for

effective operations. Those who will lead

joint forces must develop skill in

orchestrating air, land, sea, space, and

special operations forces into smoothly

functioning joint teams.

• Throughout the history of mankind,

physical courage has defined warriors.

The United States of America is blessed

with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,

Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, whose

courage knows no boundaries. Even in

warfare characterized by advanced

The Medal of Honor is Awarded to

Second Lieutenant Audie L. Murphy, United States Army

2d Lt Murphy commanded Company B, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, which

was attacked by 6 tanks and waves of infantry near Holtzwihr France on 26

January 1945. 2d Lt Murphy ordered his men to withdraw to prepared positions

in a woods, while he remained forward at his command post and continued to

give fire directions to the artillery by telephone. Behind him, to his right, 1 of

our tank destroyers received a direct hit and began to burn. Its crew withdrew

to the woods. 2d Lt Murphy continued to direct artillery fire which killed large

numbers of the advancing enemy infantry. With the enemy tanks abreast of

his position, 2d Lt Murphy climbed on the burning tank destroyer, which was

in danger of blowing up at any moment, and employed its .50 caliber

machinegun against the enemy. He was alone and exposed to German fire

from 3 sides, but his deadly fire killed dozens of Germans and caused their

infantry attack to waver. The enemy tanks, losing infantry support, began to

fall back. For an hour the Germans tried every available weapon to eliminate

2d Lt Murphy, but he continued to hold his position and wiped out a squad

which was trying to creep up unnoticed on his right flank. Germans reached

as close as 10 yards, only to be mowed down by his fire. He received a leg

wound, but ignored it and continued the single-handed fight until his

ammunition was exhausted. He then made his way to his company, refused

medical attention, and organized the company in a counterattack which forced

the Germans to withdraw. His directing of artillery fire wiped out many of the

enemy; he killed or wounded about 50. 2d Lt Murphy’s indomitable courage

and his refusal to give an inch of ground saved his company from possible

encirclement and destruction, and enabled it to hold the woods which had

been the enemy’s objective.
III-6

Chapter III

JP 1

members having trust and confidence in

each other. This trust does not result from

good feelings or devout wishes. Trust is

based on the mutual confidence resulting

from honest efforts to learn about and

understand the capabilities each member

brings to the team. Trust and confidence

within a joint force are built the same way

as within a Service tactical unit, by hard

work, demonstrated competence, and

planning and training together.

•• Successful teamwork requires

delegation of authority commensurate

with responsibility. This is a necessary

part of building and maintaining the trust

based on competence that characterizes

the successful team. Oversupervision

disrupts teamwork. Delegation

unleashes the best efforts and greatest

initiative among all members of military

teams. Delegation is especially important

in joint warfare where Service expertise

is an essential building block.

•• Successful teamwork also requires

cooperation. While this aspect of

teamwork can be at tension with

competition and both are central human

characteristics, the nature of modern

warfare puts a premium on cooperation

within the team in order to compete

successfully with the adversary. Higher

echelons should never have to mandate

cooperation. Cooperation requires team

players and the willingness to share credit

with all team members.

“Our military forces are one team — in

the game to win regardless of who

carries the ball. This is no time for

‘Fancy Dans’ who won’t hit the line with

all they have on every play, unless they

can call the signals. Each player on

this team — whether he shines in the

spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt on

the line — must be an all-American.”

GEN Omar N. Bradley, USA

technology, individual fighting spirit and

courage remain the inspiration for

teamwork.

• Moral courage is also essential in

military operations. This includes the

willingness to stand up for what one

believes to be right even if that stand is

unpopular or contrary to conventional

wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage

involve risk taking and tenacity:

making bold decisions in the face of

uncertainty, accepting full responsibility

for the outcome, and holding to the

chosen course despite challenges or

difficulties. Competence is an essential

foundation for moral courage.

Competence separates the professional

from the foolhardy. Military power must

be wielded in an unimpeachable moral

fashion, with respect for human rights

and adherence to the Geneva

Conventions. This morality should not

be a matter of legality, but of conscience.

Moral behavior is essential for gaining

and maintaining the positive worldwide

reputation of American fighting men and

women as well as the confidence and

support of the American people, a basic

source of American military strength.

• Teamwork is the cooperative effort by

the members of a group to achieve

common goals. The Armed Forces of

the United States — every military

organization to the lowest level — are a

team. Deterring adversaries, and when

necessary, winning the Nation’s wars are

the team’s common goals. Americans

respond to and respect teamwork as an

important value. This societal approval

provides to the Armed Forces of the

United States a solid basis upon which

to build effective joint teams.

•• Trust and confidence are central to

military unity of effort. A highly

effective team is based on the team
III-7

United States Military Power

When the members of the Armed Forces

of the United States internalize and embody

these values of joint warfare, their attitude

about joint warfighting produces a synergy

that multiplies the effects of their individual

actions. A freely developed cooperative

attitude is the key to the most productive

integration of all force competencies and

capabilities, and to the effective prosecution

of the campaign.

d. The Principles of War. The principles

of war provide the basis for the fundamentals

of joint warfare and for the Services to develop

their respective doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and procedures. The principles adopted by

the Armed Forces of the United States are

objective, offensive, mass, economy of

force, maneuver, unity of command,

security, surprise, and simplicity (see Figure

III-2). They are the bedrock of US military

doctrine. JFCs should exercise judgment in

applying these principles, recognizing that

they are in some cases paired juxtapositions

that address opposite aspects of warfare; mass

and economy of force and security and

surprise are examples. Appendix B,

“Principles of War,” contains a description of

the principles of war and their applications to

joint warfare.

CHAMBERLAIN HOLDS AT GETTYSBURG

COURAGE AND COMPETENCE IN ACTION

On the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, Brigadier General Gouverneur

K. Warren ordered Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain’s 20th Maine Regiment to

hold Little Round Top, a critical hill on the left end of the Union line. If

Confederate forces took the hill, they could roll up the Union flank, precipitating

a general collapse. Then General Robert E. Lee could move toward Washington

as he liked, and the war might be lost. Chamberlain was ordered to hold that

ground at all costs. The fate of the Union depended on the tactical performance

of fewer than 400 men and officers.

Confederate forces attacked up the hill repeatedly. Chamberlain recognized

that the more numerous Confederates were spreading to the unprotected left

of his force. Under fire, he thinned his ranks to extend his line and bent back

(refused) his left flank to prevent being attacked from behind. With each

Confederate charge, his force shrank. As the day wore on, the Confederates

were near exhaustion, but the 20th Maine was down to 200 men, all short on

ammunition.

In a tactical inspiration, Colonel Chamberlain ordered bayonets to be fixed,

and his entire regiment charged. The men on the refused flank spontaneously

raced to straighten the line. Faced with what seemed like two regiments, the

Confederates began a retreat, which soon turned into a rout. As the fight

ended, the 20th took 400 prisoners. More important, they took from the

Confederates all chance of turning the Union’s flank.

Without Colonel Chamberlain’s physical and moral courage — his willingness

to make bold decisions in the face of uncertainty — backed by his tactical

competence and the brave performance of his troops, the Union cause may

have been lost.

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

15 July 1997
III-8

Chapter III

JP 1

e. The Principles of Military Operations

Other Than War. Joint doctrine adapted the

classic principles of war to situations short of

war that require the use of US military forces.

The resulting principles for MOOTW are

objective, unity of effort, security, restraint,

perseverance, and legitimacy (see Figure

III-3). The definitions of these principles take

into account the unique political

considerations and nature of the operations,

which differentiates the principles of

MOOTW from the principles of war. The

first three — objective, unity of effort, and

security — closely parallel their combat

counterparts. Restraint, perseverance, and

legitimacy address the uniqueness of

MOOTW and the political context in which

they are conducted. Appendix C, “Principles

of Military Operations Other Than War,”

contains a description of the principles of

MOOTW and their applications to joint

operations.

f. Fundamentals of Joint Warfare. The

fundamentals that guide joint operations of

the Armed Forces of the United States (Figure

III-4) are anchored in the application of the

time-tested principles of war and the actual

experience of American arms in warfare.

These fundamentals do not supercede the

principles of war. Rather, both must be

considered together when conducting joint

operations. As in all cultures, the application

of general principles is best accomplished with

due regard to the uniqueness — including

cultural background — of the forces involved

and the contemporary challenges they face in

the envisioned battlespace. Therefore, the

fundamentals of joint warfare that follow

should be applied broadly, avoiding literal or

dogmatic interpretations.

Figure III-2. Principles of War

PRINCIPLES

OF WAR

OBJECTIVE

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

OBJECTIVE

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

Figure III-3. Principles of MOOTW

PRINCIPLES

OF MOOTW

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Figure III-4. Joint Warfare Fundamentals

JOINT WARFARE

FUNDAMENTALS

UNITY OF EFFORT

CONCENTRATION

INITIATIVE

AGILITY

EXTENSION

FREEDOM OF ACTION

SUSTAINMENT

CLARITY

KNOWLEDGE

UNITY OF EFFORT

CONCENTRATION

INITIATIVE

AGILITY

EXTENSION

FREEDOM OF ACTION

SUSTAINMENT

CLARITY

KNOWLEDGE
III-9

United States Military Power

• The fundamental of unity of effort

demands that all undertakings be directed

toward achievement of common aims.

Unity of effort is first achieved at the

national level when the President

develops national security strategy

(otherwise known as “national” or “grand

strategy”). In support of this national

security strategy, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with

the other members of the JCS, advises

the NCA concerning the application of

military power. The resulting national

military strategy provides strategic focus

for US military activity. Strategy

involves understanding the desired policy

goals for a projected operation; that is,

what should be the desired state of affairs

when the conflict is terminated. The clear

articulation of aims and objectives and

the resulting strategic focus are

fundamental prerequisites for unity of

effort. National military strategy

provides focus not only for war involving

simultaneous major combat in multiple

theaters (e.g., World War II), but also for

regional crises, to which the Armed

Forces respond rapidly, conduct

operations, redeploy forces, and prepare

for future operations. In such cases, a

single combatant command is normally

supported with the others in a supporting

role. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff assists the NCA as coordinator

of the whole effort. Even here, however,

where only one combatant command is

supported, use of American military

power directly or indirectly affects the

other combatant commands and Federal

agencies. Of the ten combatant

commands of the Armed Forces of the

United States in 1990, for instance, nine

played major roles in the Gulf War, and

the tenth (US Southern Command

(USSOUTHCOM)) was affected. Six

of these commands supported

USSOUTHCOM in Operation JUST

CAUSE in Panama. Cooperation among

the combatant commanders and their

supporting joint force and component

commanders — within the framework of

unity of effort directed and arranged at

the national level — is crucial.

• Concentration of military power is a

fundamental consideration. The Armed

Forces of the United States should strive

to operate with overwhelming force,

based not only on the quantity of forces

and materiel committed, but on the

quality of their planning and skill of their

employment. Properly trained and

motivated forces, armed with superior

technology and executing innovative,

flexible, and well-coordinated plans,

provide a decisive qualitative edge.

Careful establishment of priorities aids

concentration at the decisive point and

time. Action to affect the enemy’s

dispositions and readiness prior to battle

and to prevent enemy reinforcement of

the battle by land, sea, or air also

promotes concentration. The purpose of

these and related measures is to achieve

an advantage and exploit that advantage

decisively to win quickly, with as few

casualties as possible.

• Seizing and maintaining the initiative

is an American military tradition.

Because the United States of America

is not an aggressor nation, the Armed

Forces may be initially forced to fight

defensively for a time. However, all

actions should be offensive in spirit,

exploiting the full leverage of all

available forces to confuse, demoralize,

and defeat the enemy. Taking calculated

risks to throw an opponent off balance

or achieve major military advantage

may be required. In any case, retaining

the initiative relies on the ability of

military people to think for themselves

and execute orders intelligently — the

ingenuity that has always been an

American trademark.
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• Agility, the ability to move quickly and

easily, should characterize US military

operations. Agility is relative; the aim is

to be more agile than the foe. Agility is

not primarily concerned with speed itself,

but about timeliness: thinking, planning,

communicating, and acting faster than the

enemy can effectively react. Operating

faster than and within the opponent’s

decision cycle can expand options while

denying options the opponent deems

important. Agility has different

perspectives based on the level of war

(strategic, operational, or tactical). At

each of these levels, operations on land

and sea, undersea, and in the air and

space must achieve a synchronized

timing and rapid tempo that overwhelm

the opponent.

•• Strategic agility requires properly

focused logistic support including

smoothly functioning defense

transportation and global distribution

systems, and a robust joint deployment

system. Forward-deployed forces, prepositioning, and the ability to deploy

forces rapidly from the United States and

redeploy them as necessary within and

between theaters, also enhance strategic

agility.

•• The interaction of air, land, and sea

forces contributes powerfully to

JOINT CAMPAIGNING IN THE SOLOMONS, 1942-1943

The struggle for control of the Solomon Islands was a critical turning point in

the war against Japan. These campaigns can best be appreciated as a

sequence of interacting naval, land, and air operations. Operations began

with the August 1942 amphibious landings at Guadalcanal, an audacious

stroke to eliminate the threat to the Allied air and sea lines of communication

with Australia posed by a potential Japanese air base on that island. During

the next several months, under the tenacious leadership of General Alexander

A. Vandegrift, USMC, Marine and later Army units fought a series of desperate

land battles to defend Henderson Field, the captured airfield on Guadalcanal.

During the same period US Navy and Allied naval forces fought six grueling

surface actions, finally thwarting the Japanese naval bombardment that had

so punished the land and air forces ashore. From Henderson Field flew a

unique air force: Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces planes under a single air

command, the “Cactus Air Force.” (CACTUS was the codeword for

Guadalcanal.) In the words of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, “If it had

wings it flew; if it flew it fought....”

In February 1943 the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. The Allies undertook

a sequence of actions to capture the remaining Solomons and isolate the huge

Japanese base at Rabaul. Local air superiority enabled naval surface forces

to shield amphibious landings from enemy surface ships and submarines;

once ashore, land forces seized and built airfields; from these airfields air

forces assisted in their defense and extended air cover to shield further naval

advance; and then the cycle repeated. The Cactus Air Force grew into Air

Solomons Command, a remarkably effective joint and combined air

organization led in turn by Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces commanders.

SOURCE: JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,

10 June 1995
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United States Military Power

operational agility, as shown by the

example of the Solomon Islands

campaigns. The ability to integrate and

exploit the various capabilities of a joint

force can disorient an enemy who is weak

in one or more of the dimensions of

warfare, helping to create a mismatch

between what the foe anticipates and

what actually occurs. This mismatch can

lead to shock, panic, and demoralization,

especially in the minds of the enemy

leadership.

• When militarily advantageous,

operations should be extended to the

fullest breadth and depth feasible given

political, force, and logistic constraints.

Requiring the enemy to disperse forces

over a broad area can render those forces

ineffective and complicate enemy

planning. At the operational level, joint

air, land, sea, special operations, and

space forces can enable operations to be

extended throughout a theater, denying

sanctuary to the enemy. At the strategic

level, for a country like the United States

with global responsibilities and

worldwide military capabilities, the use

of armed force anywhere can have

implications throughout the military

establishment. Commanders not

immediately affected may nonetheless

play critically important support roles,

while preparing their forces for the

possibility of more direct involvement

should the scope or site of conflict change

or expand.

• Maintaining freedom of action is vital.

There are many components to securing

the freedom to act. Effective diplomatic,

economic, military, and informational

instruments of power are needed to

provide the freedom to act at the national

level. Adequate robust logistic support

is essential, as is maintaining the security

of plans and gaining the fullest possible

surprise. Having a force structure that

provides insurance against unanticipated

developments or the underestimation of

enemy strengths is important as well.

•• Several aspects of modern warfare

tend to restrict freedom of action.

Sophisticated information technology

and the nature of modern news reporting,

for instance, make the tasks of ensuring

operations security and surprise more

difficult. But as Operations JUST

CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and

B-17 Flying Fortress making low-level attack on Japanese installations during

the Solomons campaign, October 1942.
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equipment interoperability where

practical) also enhances sustainment of

joint force operations.

• Because modern warfare is inherently

complex, plans and operations should be

kept as simple as possible. Clarity of

expression should predominate, using

common terms and procedures. This is

particularly important when operating

with allies or improvised coalitions.

Making sure that all speak the same

language and keeping that language clear

and concise are essential.

“Know the enemy and know yourself;

in a hundred battles you will never be

in peril.”

Sun Tzu

• Knowledge

•• Knowledge of self is required for

effective joint operations. The first

priority is to have a full and frank

appreciation for the capabilities and

limitations of all friendly forces. JFCs

must also have a clear appreciation of

friendly centers of gravity which are their

key sources of strength, so that operations

may assure their protection from

adversary attack. In joint matters,

reliance is first upon component

commanders and staffs as the true experts

on their forces. Service forces assigned

to a joint force provide an array of combat

power from which the JFC chooses.

Component commanders best know the

unique capabilities that their forces bring

to combat and how those capabilities can

help attain the JFC’s objectives.

Component commanders should also

know how these capabilities mesh with

the forces of the other components. They

can then assist JFCs, other component

commanders, and their staffs to integrate

the whole.

DESERT STORM showed, tight

operations and information security —

even at the expense of some staff

efficiency — can work to achieve

effective surprise. Joint forces should

understand that these sorts of very

demanding security precautions are a

likely part of future operations and should

accommodate stringent operations

security in exercises and training in order

to practice staff efficiency and public

affairs activities under realistic

conditions.

•• The role of deception in securing

freedom of action should never be

underestimated. Indeed, military thinkers

since Sun Tzu have stressed the central

nature of deception in successful warfare.

Deception can provide a highly leveraged

means to confuse US enemies and cause

them to miscalculate friendly intentions,

deploy their forces poorly, and

mistakenly estimate friendly strengths

and weaknesses, while helping to

preserve friendly freedom of action.

Deception at the joint force level requires

clear themes around which all

components can focus their efforts.

“The essence of flexibility is in the mind

of the commander; the substance of

flexibility is in logistics.”

RADM Henry Eccles, USN

• Sustaining operations at the strategic and

operational levels underwrites agility,

extension of operations, and freedom of

action. Strategic and theater logistics and

deployment concepts are integral to

combat success. These concepts are

driven by the plans and orders of JFCs

and supported by the Services, by other

supporting commands, and often by

support from allies and friends. Logistic

standardization (to include deployment

and redeployment procedures and
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United States Military Power

•• The requirement to plan and conduct

joint operations demands expanded

intellectual horizons and broadened

professional knowledge. Leaders who

aspire to joint command must not only

have mastered the essentials of their own

Service capabilities, but also must

understand the fundamentals of combat

power represented by the other Services.

Beyond that, they must have a clear sense

of how these capabilities are integrated

for the conduct of joint and multinational

operations. This individual professional

growth, reinforced by military education

and varied Service and joint assignments,

leads to a refined capability to command

joint forces in peace and war.

•• Knowledge of the enemy is a

preeminent but difficult responsibility.

Traditionally, emphasis has been on

understanding enemy capabilities; but

knowledge of enemy intentions can be

equally or even more important, to the

extent that light may be shed on enemy

plans, permitting timely and effective

action to blunt them. Joint intelligence

preparation of the battlespace is a

continuous process that enables the

commander to understand the total

battlespace environment. Key to this

process is understanding the adversary’s

critical vulnerabilities, capabilities,

limitations, COGs, and potential COAs.

The Armed Forces of the United States

and the national intelligence community

have harnessed the capability of modern

technology to provide intelligence to the

fighting forces. The challenge for JFCs

normally is not to amass more data but

to extract and organize the knowledge

most useful for overcoming the enemy.

A key concept that integrates intelligence

and operations is COGs, a term first

applied in the military context by

Clausewitz to describe “the hub of all

power and movement, on which

everything depends.” Joint doctrine

defines centers of gravity as: “Those

characteristics, capabilities, or localities

from which a military force derives its

freedom of action, physical strength, or

will to fight.”

•• Finding and attacking enemy COGs

is a singularly important concept. Rather

than attack peripheral enemy

vulnerabilities, attacking COGs means

concentrating against capabilities whose

destruction or overthrow will yield

Finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity is a singularly

important concept.
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success. Though providing an essential

focus for all efforts, attacking COGs is

often not easy because they are an

adversary’s sources of strength.

Progressively defeating enemy measures

undertaken to defend COGs may be

required to expose those centers to attack,

both at the strategic and operational

levels. Actions to extend offensive

efforts throughout the theater, including

deep penetrations of enemy territory, can

increase the vulnerability of enemy

COGs.

•• This concept of COGs helps JFCs

focus their intelligence requirements.

Intelligence should anticipate the needs

of the commander and be timely,

objective, usable, complete, accurate,

relevant, and available to all who need

it. It should aid the identification of

COGs and suggest how they might most

effectively be dealt with. Beyond that,

however, intelligence should provide the

capability to verify which desired

military effects have or have not been

achieved and generally support the

commander’s situational awareness in

what will often be a dynamic, fastmoving, and confusing (fog of war)

situation.

•• Knowing oneself and the enemy

allows employment of friendly

strength against the enemy’s key

vulnerabilities and avoids exposing

friendly vulnerabilities to the enemy

strengths. This fundamental and

familiar precept is designed to preserve

the competitive advantage for one’s own

forces. It suggests an indirect approach

— avoiding head-on attacks when

enveloping movements, for example, will

better capitalize on one’s strengths and

enemy vulnerabilities. The diversity and

flexibility of joint forces are particularly

well suited to provide the commander

with an expanded range of operational

or tactical options. The side with the most

effective integration of operations on land

and sea, undersea, and in the air and space

is best situated to exploit the diversity of

approaches that a joint force provides.

g. Range of Military Operations. The

United States employs military forces in a

variety of ways based on the characteristics

of the particular situation in the context of the

overall international security environment.

The range of military operations encompasses

war and operations other than war (Figure

III-5). In many circumstances, a mix of these

types of operations may be underway

worldwide or even in a particular theater. The

distinctions that follow assist commanders in

understanding the characteristics of each and

provide guidance for associated military

actions.

• War in this context refers to large-scale,

sustained combat operations. When

necessary to achieve national objectives

or protect national interests, the United

States may decide to conduct large-scale,

sustained combat operations in

conjunction with other instruments of

national power, placing the United States

in a wartime state. When US military

forces are committed to combat, their

purpose is to fight and win, concluding

hostilities on terms favorable to the United

States and its multinational partners.

• Military operations other than war

focus on deterring war and promoting

peace. These operations include two

general types, one in which force is used

and one in which it is not used. During

peacetime, combatant commanders

develop plans to focus their command’s

efforts at engaging allies and other

friendly countries in cooperative activity

to promote peace, deter war, and promote

US objectives. These plans must include
III-15

United States Military Power

provisions for both types of operations

other than war.

•• In spite of US efforts to promote

peace, conditions within a country or

region may result in armed conflict.

When other instruments of national

power are unable to influence a

deteriorating or potentially hostile

situation and US interests are at risk,

military force may be required. Such a

use of force would serve to demonstrate

US resolve and capability, support the

other instruments of national power, and

terminate the situation on terms favorable

to the United States. The general goals

of US military operations during such

periods are to support US objectives,

deter war, and return to a state of peace.

These operations involve a greater risk

that US forces could become involved

in combat rather than operations

conducted to promote peace. These

military operations other than war

include but are not limited to peace

operations, strikes, raids, shows of force,

combatting terrorism, evacuation of

noncombatants, and support to insurgency.

•• The second category of military

operations other than war does not

involve use or threat of force, but rather

employs military forces in peacetime to

continue to promote peace and alleviate

human suffering. This assists in keeping

the day-to-day tensions between nations

below the threshold of armed conflict and

maintains US influence in foreign lands.

These operations include, but are not

limited to, disaster relief, nation

assistance, foreign humanitarian

assistance, support to counterdrug

activities, assistance to civil authorities,

and support to diplomatic peace

activities. These operations do not

involve combat, but military forces must

always be prepared to protect themselves

and to adapt to a changing situation.

Figure III-5. Range of Military Operations

Peace Enforcement

Counterterrorism

Show of Force/Raid/Strike

Peacekeeping/Noncombatant

Evacuation Operations

Nation Assistance

Deter War

&

Resolve Conflict

Promote Peace

&

Support

US Civil

Authorities

Freedom of Navigation

Counterdrug

Humanitarian Assistance

Protection of Shipping

US Civil Support

Military

Operations

Other

Than

War

MILITARY

OPERATIONS

GENERAL

US GOALS

REPRESENTATIVE

EXAMPLES

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

War Fight & Win Large-scale Combat Operations:

Attack / Defend / Blockade

C

O

M

B

A

T

N

O

N

C

O

M

B

A

T

War Large-scale Combat Operations:

Attack / Defend / Blockade Fight & Win

MILITARY

OPERATIONS

GENERAL

US GOALS

REPRESENTATIVE

EXAMPLES
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h. Integration with Other Instruments

of National Power

• When the United States undertakes

military operations, the Armed Forces of

the United States are only one component

of a national-level effort involving all

instruments of national power. Instilling

unity of effort at the national level is

necessarily a cooperative endeavor

involving a number of Federal

departments and agencies. In certain

operations, agencies of states, localities,

or foreign countries may also be

involved. The President establishes

guidelines for civil-military integration

and normally disseminates decisions and

monitors execution through the NSC.

• Complex operations, such as peace

operations, may require a high order of

civil-military integration. Presidential

directives (such as Presidential Decision

Directive 56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations) guide

participation by all US civilian and

military agencies in such operations.

Military leaders must work with the other

members of the national security team in

the most skilled, tactful, and persistent

ways to promote unity of effort.

Operations of agencies representing the

diplomatic, economic, and informational

instruments of power are not under

command of the Armed Forces of the

United States or of any specific

combatant commander. In domestic US

situations, a civil agency such as the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or

the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) assumes overall control

of interagency operations including

military elements. Abroad, the US

ambassador and the country team may

be in control in operations other than war

not involving the use of force.

• Across the range of military operations,

military leaders play key roles in

cooperation with civilian governmental

and private agencies. These include

agencies of US federal, state, and local

governments; international organizations

such as the United Nations;

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);

private voluntary organizations (PVOs);

and various governmental and

nongovernmental agencies of host

nations and multinational partners.

Military commanders have responsibility

A complex set of military operations may be underway at any one time

across and within theaters.
III-17

United States Military Power

for the command and control of their

forces and are accountable for their

actions. They also are responsible for

timely and complete advice and

recommendations to the leaders of

nonmilitary organizations with whom

they are operating in order to ensure clear

understanding of military capabilities,

limitations, and consequences of military

action.

5. Conclusion

At any one time, joint forces may be

involved in a complex set of military

operations across and within theaters to

accomplish missions. For example, a combat

operation to contain a major conflict in one

part of the world or one part of a theater may

be taking place simultaneously with a number

of supporting and independent operations

other than war to reinforce peace, provide

foreign humanitarian assistance, and assist

civil authorities. The purpose of employing

military forces and military force — defending

and advancing US interests — may call for

any number of combinations of types of

operations. The Armed Forces of the United

States must be prepared to fulfill both their

fundamental purpose of winning the Nation’s

wars as well as providing unconditional

service in support of broad national objectives.
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER

IV-1

This chapter completes the description of

the relationship of fundamental national

security ends to military means. Chapter I,

“Fundamental Concepts,” and Chapter II,

“The Strategic Security Environment,”

outlined the primacy of national security

interests, the development of national security

policy and strategy to protect and advance

those interests, and the nature of the challenges

to those interests in the international security

environment. Chapter III, “United States

Military Power,” explained the purpose and

nature of the Armed Forces of the United

States and their unique responsibilities in

American society, and fundamental principles

that guide their employment. The paragraphs

that follow describe the use of force and

employment of forces as means to achieve US

strategic ends, with national military strategy

providing the link between the two.

1. Considerations for the Use of

Military Force

a. When the United States resorts to the

use of force, it adheres to its fundamental

societal values and moral precepts. The use

of military force is the most important military

decision that the United States can make. It

is a civilian decision, based on sound military

advice, ultimately made by the elected

political leaders on behalf of the American

people. There are no unbending rules to

“Allied effectiveness in World War II established for all time the feasibility of

developing and employing joint control machinery that can meet the sternest

tests of war. The key to the matter is a readiness, on highest levels, to

adjust all nationalistic differences that affect the strategic employment of

combined resources, and, in the war theater, to designate a single commander

who is supported to the limit. With these two things done, success rests in

the vision, the leadership, the skill, and the judgment of the professionals

making up command and staff groups; if these two things are not done, only

failure can result.”

GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA

handling the countless crises that confront

the United States. Each must be weighed

based on its own merit and in its own context.

However, there are clear parameters and

considerations, based on law, values, and

experience, which inform decisions about

managing crises and the use of force. Among

these are the legality, propriety, and likelihood

of success of the use of force; the commitment

to decisive yet proportional action; the

integration of the other instruments of national

power; and accountability to the American

people. In all cases, the use of force, unless

linked to discernible vital, important, or other

national interests, is not sustainable.

• Vital interests are those that directly

impact the survival and vitality of the

Republic and its way of life. Such issues

as the safety of American citizens at home

and abroad, the security of US territory

or that of US allies, and protection of US

economic well-being are examples.

When force is used in combat for

defending these interests, it must be both

overwhelming and decisive.

• The category of important national

interests includes those short of national

survival that affect national well-being and

the character of the world in which

Americans live. In these situations where

there is a threat to important interests, the
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use of military force is an option if the

costs and risks associated with their use

are commensurate with the threatened

interest. In these situations, use of force

must be selective, depending on the

circumstances at hand. Nevertheless, the

forces employed in pursuit of important

national interests must be of the size,

capabilities, training, and readiness to

accomplish the mission. When combat

is possible, the force employed must be

both overwhelming and decisive.

• The cases involving other interests,

including humanitarian concerns,

frequently require the use of military

organizational capabilities and resources

rather than their combat power and use

of force. While military forces are not

generally the best tools to solve

humanitarian crises, under certain

circumstances the appropriate use of the

Armed Forces of the United States can

bring about a solution to the problem at

hand. Such efforts should be limited in

duration. They should also have a clearly

defined end state, entail minimal risk to

the Armed Forces, and be designed to

give the affected country or region the

opportunity to restore its own basic

services. And, at the same time, these

efforts should not jeopardize the ability

of the Armed Forces to respond to direct

threats to vital and important national

security interests in other regions of the

world.

b. When the NCA consider the use of

force, military advice on the employment of

the Armed Forces of the United States seeks

to clearly define the contemplated mission,

and ensure understanding of the means needed

to accomplish it and the campaign plan that

establishes the path to success. The military

advice should address these and a number of

other important considerations summarized in

Figure IV-1. Among them are mission

measures of success and milestones,

alternative COAs, and termination conditions

and exit strategy. These considerations guide

civil-military interactions and support the

NCA’s decision making process. For

example, in the case of a threat to vital national

interests, although the support of multinational

Figure IV-1. Considerations for Use of Military Force

CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OF

MILITARY FORCE





















Advances National Interests

Clearly Defined and Achievable Mission

End State, Termination Conditions, and Exit Strategy Clear

Decisive Means Available

Campaign Plan Showing Path to Success

Milestones to Measure Success

Alternate Courses of Action if Military Unsuccessful

National and International Agencies Ready for Their Roles

Support of Allies, Friends, International Institutions

Support of American People
IV-3

The Application of Military Power

partners is clearly desired, the United States

is prepared to act alone. Sustaining

involvement in military operations, regardless

of the level of national interest, ultimately

requires support of the American people. To

ensure their support, military involvement

must clearly advance national interests. If it

does, then the use of force and employment

of forces must remain very clear in purpose

and very resolute in action.

2. National Military Strategy

The US NMS guides the Armed Forces in

employing their resources in the most effective

manner to achieve national security and

defense objectives. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other

members of the JCS and the combatant

commanders, periodically publishes the NMS

to implement the current US national security

strategy. The NMS expresses the relationships

between key US military objectives

worldwide and the capabilities available to

the Armed Forces of the United States in order

to achieve the objectives. The campaigns that

combatant commanders develop to support

national strategic objectives are heavily

influenced by the NMS.

Joint doctrine includes fundamental

principles concerning how best to employ

military power to achieve strategic ends.

Since joint doctrine provides insights and

wisdom gained from the collective experience

with warfare, it fundamentally shapes the way

the Armed Forces think about and train for

war. Joint doctrine, therefore, influences

professional military participation in the

development of military strategy and provides

authoritative guidance for its implementation.

a. Influencing the International Security

Environment. Throughout the history of the

Republic, the Armed Forces of the United

States have developed capabilities, maintained

readiness postures, and operated abroad as an

arm of the Nation to influence international

events. Guided by inherently defensive

national policies, the Armed Forces of the

United States have capabilities to influence

the international environment in ways that

advance and defend US interests and support

key US objectives abroad.

• Promoting Stability. The United States

internationally promotes democracy,

economic well-being, and peaceful

change. Where these policies enjoy

support, the United States actively seeks

to promote regional stability to deter

potential aggressors and to advance US

interests and objectives. The Armed

Forces of the United States typically

operate in conjunction with allies and

other friendly states to demonstrate the

military capability to defeat aggression

and thereby support the processes of

peaceful progress. Military activities that

promote stability include presence in the

region, assistance in the improvement of

indigenous military capabilities, and

peacetime engagement activities.

Peacetime engagement activities which

promote stability include military-tomilitary contacts, multinational exercises

which improve readiness and

interoperability, education and training

programs, foreign humanitarian

assistance, security assistance, and arms

control initiatives.

• Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and

Threats. Military forces can provide a

degree of security and deter or contain

violence in a region so that democratic

processes can address the root causes of

societal dysfunctions and conflict. The

Armed Forces may be directed to support

indigenous forces and civil authorities,

improve their capabilities, and provide

essential assistance with unique US

military operational and logistic

capabilities. The United States may also

participate in regional arms control

activities (such as inspections and
IV-4

Chapter IV

JP 1

monitoring) that may call for US military

expertise.

• Peacetime Deterrence. Successful

deterrence requires a conclusion by the

potential adversary that aggressive action

will not succeed, and that the certain

consequences of aggression outweigh

any potential benefit. Military forces

contribute significantly to deterrence by

presenting visible evidence of their

ability to defeat aggression, including the

ability to act globally, rapidly, and

decisively in conjunction with

indigenous military forces. In regions

of particular concern to the United States,

continuous US military engagement with

regional forces, frequent exercises and

exchanges, visible presence, and prepositioned equipment and supplies are

means that can significantly contribute

to peacetime deterrence.

• Action Across the Range of Military

Operations. The tumultuous

international security environment and

global diffusion of vital and important

US interests demand that the Armed

Forces of the United States maintain

ready capabilities to act across the range

of military operations. In those situations

where efforts to promote stability and

reduce conflict have been unsuccessful,

or where efforts to deter aggression have

failed, US ability to respond with ready

forces is critical. While the specific

manifestations of threats, crises, and

conflicts may vary from time to time, the

military capabilities upon which the

United States must rely take years to

develop and to achieve operational

capability. A credible US force-in-being

— capable of action across the range of

military operations — is the only reliable

guarantor of US vital interests.

Moreover, the simultaneous outbreak of

crises and conflicts in regions of US

interest dictate that US military forces be

capable of simultaneous operations in a

number of different theaters. The

challenge to senior military leaders in

planning for the application of military

power is to assess the risks associated

with simultaneous engagements and

provide relevant advice and

recommendations to the NCA. In

addition, the combatant commanders

should train their forces and include

appropriate branches and sequels in their

campaign and other operation plans in

order to adapt to unanticipated

circumstances as the threats to US

interests change.

• Deterring Aggression and Coercion in

Crises. In crisis situations, potential

adversaries may miscalculate US

capabilities and resolve. Therefore, a

vital element in containing a crisis and

deterring aggression is to communicate

clearly US commitment, resolve, and

intentions. Military options to emphasize

resolve and bolster deterrence that may

be considered include reinforcement of

regional forces, demonstrations of

military capabilities, rigorous and visible

enforcement of pre-existing sanctions,

and conduct of limited strikes. Senior

military leaders, particularly the

responsible combatant commander,

present their advice and recommendations

to the NCA for specific actions to

reinforce deterrence during crises.

• Fighting and Winning Major Wars.

Defense of US interests worldwide

entails the unambiguous ability of the

Armed Forces of the United States to

fight and win in large-scale, sustained

combat operations abroad. The

application of US military power in major

wars entails careful assessments of what

other military activities may be possible

while war is being prosecuted. The

United States may simultaneously face

aggression in multiple theaters. The
IV-5

The Application of Military Power

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

consultation with the other members of

the JCS and the combatant commanders,

has key responsibilities in this regard.

The Chairman must provide to the NCA

periodic assessments of the US ability to

support the national security and military

strategies with the forces available.

These assessments include the

possibility of simultaneous operations.

The corresponding advice and

recommendations focus on the military

options available to advance and defend

US interests.

• Conducting Multiple, Concurrent

Small-Scale Contingency Operations.

Simultaneous occurrence of challenges

and threats to US interests worldwide

often requires concurrent commitment of

US forces to a variety of relatively smallscale contingency operations. The key

challenge to US military capabilities

under these circumstances may be the

limitations on logistic support and limited

numbers of units with scarce or unique

capabilities that are in high demand. The

Armed Forces of the United States must

maintain the capability to support a

number of concurrent operations in the

United States and abroad. Senior military

leaders are responsible for timely and

complete advice and recommendations

to the NCA concerning the negative

impact on readiness for major war that

may result from commitment to multiple,

concurrent small-scale contingency

operations.

• Use of Flexible Deterrent Options. To

deter or defeat aggression and other

challenges to its interests, the United

States must be able to employ variable

combinations of the instruments of

national power. Therefore, the United

States maintains capabilities and plans to

exercise tailored mixes of diplomatic,

economic, informational, and military

instruments to reinforce deterrence and

cope with the outbreak of conflict. These

flexible deterrent options call for detailed

peacetime planning by the combatant

command and supporting agencies

involved. Many of these options are

under control of nonmilitary agencies.

Senior military leaders are responsible for

providing advice and recommendations

on the military aspects of flexible

deterrent options to the NCA. Combatant

commanders are responsible for

IMPORTANCE OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Nevertheless, Operation ALLIED FORCE could not have been conducted

without the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance and without

the infrastructure, transit and basing access, host-nation force contributions,

and most importantly, political and diplomatic support provided by the allies

and other members of the coalition. These immense contributions from our

allies and partners — particularly those nations near the theater of conflict

such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Bulgaria,

Romania, Albania and others — were in large part a dividend of sustained US

and NATO engagement with those nations over the last few years. This

engagement — including vigorous participation in Partnership for Peace

activities — helped to stabilize institutions in these nations so they were better

able to withstand the tremendous burden inflicted upon them by the

humanitarian crisis and the conduct of the operation itself.

SOURCE: “Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report,”

DOD Report to Congress, 31 January 2000
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preparing and employing trained, ready,

and exercised force elements when the

options are put into action.

b. Preparing Now for an Uncertain

Future. The Armed Forces of the United

States are living, learning institutions. While

responsible for delivering US military power

in the present, they also are responsible for

learning from the past and preparing for the

future. The role of senior military leaders in

shaping the future is twofold. The first aspect

is to provide advice and recommendations to

the NCA, the Congress, and other responsible

civil authorities on projected requirements for

future military capabilities. This will assist

the civilian leaders in providing needed policy

and resource guidance and decisions. The

second aspect is to establish a framework for

developing future joint and Service doctrine,

concepts, and assessments and from these to

develop future forces.

3. Enduring Concepts

The ability to commit US military power

depends on the posture and readiness of the

forces. The Armed Forces of the United States

apply a set of enduring concepts for conducting

key types of military operations. These concepts

provide guidelines to define and establish the

posture needed to accomplish contemporary

missions. In view of the current international

security environment, these concepts include

strategic agility, overseas presence, power

projection, and decisive force.

a. Strategic Agility. Strategic agility is the

ability to adapt, conceptually and physically,

to changes in the international security

environment in order to prevent an adversary

from successfully exploiting surprise and to

ensure the protection of US interests at risk.

This requires that the Armed Forces be able

to act effectively more rapidly than the

adversary, even in the absence of advance

warning. Military leaders and planners apply

this concept to ensure the ability of joint forces

to plan and operate in unanticipated

contingencies in accordance with the

principles of war or operations other than war

as well as the fundamentals of joint warfare.

b. Overseas Presence. Overseas presence

includes permanently stationed and

rotationally or temporarily deployed forces

forward in regions of particular importance

for advancing and defending US interests.

Overseas forces maintain visible capabilities

that support deterrence, are able to operate

Availability of low density, high demand units is a key challenge to

conducting concurrent contingency operations.
IV-7

The Application of Military Power

international security environment, US forces

must be prepared for deployment, and in some

cases employment, from the United States to

any theater, as well as from one theater to

another. Similarly, forces able to project their

effects directly to the desired area of

engagement without deployment must be

prepared for such contingencies as an inherent

element of US power projection. The

challenge to senior military leaders is to assess

and provide recommendations to the NCA on

the overseas presence and power projection

capabilities to maintain worldwide.

d. Decisive Force. The Armed Forces of

the United States employ decisive force —

force powerful enough to unequivocally and

rapidly defeat an opponent — to achieve the

military objectives assigned. Senior military

leaders must understand the likely demands

of an operation and provide advice and

recommendations to the NCA on the degree

of confidence and risk they associate with the

contemplated force.

“We use force as a last resort . . . when

the decision is made to use force, then

we need to go in with overwhelming

force, quite frankly, extraordinary

violence that the speed of it, the

lethality of it . . . the weight of it has to

make an incredible impression on the

adversary, to such a degree that he is

stunned and shocked . . . you take the

fight to the enemy. You go after the

head of the snake, put a dagger in the

heart of the adversary, and you bring

to bear all the force that you have at

your command.”

Lt Gen Mike Short, USAF

e. Other Concepts

• Forcible Entry. Adversary actions and

capabilities may require a forcible entry into

the theater of operations, with forces

prepared to fight immediately upon arrival.

Forcible entry entails seizing and holding

a military lodgment in the face of armed

opposition. While normally complex and

across the range of military operations should

deterrence fail in their regions of deployment,

and are able to project power to other regions

when necessary. The forward-positioning of

these forces helps shape the security

environment by promoting regional stability,

giving substance to US security commitments,

helping to prevent power vacuums,

contributing to deterrence, and ensuring

continuing access to the regions where US

national interests are most concentrated.

Forces deployed overseas should be

configured to provide combatant commanders

with a flexible array of immediately available

options for prompt response to aggression and

unanticipated military operations other than

war. In considering overall US defense

requirements, senior military leaders and

planners develop options for the proportion

of the force to commit to overseas presence,

assessments of the risks associated with the

options, and provide advice and

recommendations for decision to the NCA.

c. Power Projection. The Armed Forces

of the United States provide the military

dimension of US national power projection

and support, as appropriate, the projection of

the other instruments of national power.

Power projection is the ability of a nation to

apply all or some of its instruments of national

power — diplomatic, economic,

informational, or military — to rapidly and

effectively deploy and sustain forces in and

from multiple dispersed locations to respond

to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to

enhance regional stability. Force projection

is the ability to project the military instrument

of national power from the continental United

States (CONUS) or another theater, in

response to requirements for military

operations. Force projection operations

extend from mobilization and deployment of

forces to redeployment to CONUS or home

theater. Given the absence of military threats

on US borders, power projection is a concept

that defines the utility of American military

power. Due to the uncertainties in the
IV-8

Chapter IV

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risky, forcible entry is a required capability

for the Armed Forces of the United States.

Joint training, doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and procedures, assist combatant

commanders to prepare for and execute

forcible entry operations while containing

risks and providing the foundation for

success.

• Timeliness is a key challenge to military

leaders and planners. While US

capabilities permit rapid arrival of forces

in an objective area, it may take time to

assemble and commit a force sufficient

to achieve decisive results. Arriving first

with the most capability clearly remains

the objective. The art in planning military

operations is to sequence the concentration

in conjunction with application of other

instruments of national power. US military

campaigns should be designed to achieve

their objectives in the most rapid, effective

manner possible and at the lowest cost

feasible in terms of loss of life and unwanted

destruction.

“Time is the essence in war, and while

a defeat may be balanced by a battle

won, days and hours — even minutes

— frittered away, can never be

regained.”

BGen Samuel B. Griffith, II, USMC

• While not unique to American culture,

preserving human life is among its

highest imperatives. However, casualties

are inevitable in most violent applications

of military power. The guiding principle

for US military operations is to assure

mission accomplishment while making

every effort to ensure the combat

capability and survival of the force.

4. Enduring Enablers

The following aspects of the United States

and its military forces are of particular

importance in enabling the application of the

enduring concepts (Figure IV-2).

a. People. People are the most important

enabler of US military forces and are the key

to their success in peace and war. While

technology may assist Service men and

women, it is their innate courage, intellect,

motivation, skill, tenacity, and self-sacrifice

that makes the difference and assures victory.

In developing and fielding forces, the Armed

Forces of the United States keep foremost the

responsibility to provide the best leadership,

training, and equipment; to attend to the

welfare of Service members and families; and

to treat all individuals with dignity and respect.

b. Technology. The US commitment to

providing the best advanced technology to the

Armed Forces of the United States is an

important aspect of American military power.

While technology alone cannot assure success

in battle, when adapted to empower the

individual and integrated with doctrine,

training, and leader development, the result

can produce dominant capabilities against an

adversary. A discussion of harnessing

technology for the future is in Chapter VIII,

“Addressing the Future.”

c. Information Superiority. The United

States has the human and technological

capability to establish and maintain

information superiority. This entails a variety

of measures to provide complete, timely and

secure information to friendly users while

denying vital information to the adversary.

The objective of information superiority is to

make the most effective use of friendly forces

by assuring a timely, reliable, and secure

continuous flow of accurate key information

about the ongoing situation, and interfering

with the opponent’s information to the extent

that opposition becomes ineffective or

nonexistent. Of particular importance is

the timely availability, integrity, and

confidentiality of intelligence, and the
IV-9

The Application of Military Power

integration of intelligence functions with all

other functions across the range of military

operations. Information superiority cannot be

automatically assumed. Military leaders and

planners must continuously plan, execute,

assess, and adjust the means available to

achieve and maintain information superiority.

d. Global Command and Control. The

United States maintains global command and

control systems and processes to support the

range of military operations in peace, crisis,

and conflict. These systems and processes

enable the NCA and the Armed Forces to

establish and maintain unity of command and

unity of effort. The military requirements for

command and control in support of US

interests worldwide demand a robust global

system of communications and computers to

facilitate transmissions of data, decisions, and

orders. Military planners and specialized units

must plan for security and redundancy in order

to ensure effective global command and control.

e. Air, Land, Sea, and Space Control.

Maintaining US military freedom of action

and the ability to project power globally

demand assured access to air, land, sea, and

space lines of communications at a time and

place of US choice. Therefore, within the

limits allowed by law and national policy, the

Armed Forces of the United States must be

able to gain and maintain at minimum

superiority and, if feasible, dominance in these

mediums to assure the effectiveness of US

military power.

f. Strategic Mobility. The ability to

deploy, sustain, and redeploy US military

forces with their associated equipment

worldwide is essential to the effective

execution of US national security and military

strategies. The Armed Forces must maintain

the mix of military and immediately available

civilian contract capabilities to meet the most

challenging scenarios across the range of

military operations.

Figure IV-2. Enduring Concepts and Enablers

ENDURING CONCEPTS AND ENABLERS

ENDURING CONCEPTS

ENDURING ENABLERS

Strategic Agility

Overseas Presence

Power Projection

Decisive Force

People

Technology

Information Superiority

Global Command and Control

Air, Land, Sea, and Space Control

Strategic Mobility

Sustainment

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Assured Access to the Battlespace

National Will

Force Protection

Forcible Entry

Timeliness

Survivability
IV-10

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g. Sustainment. Logistic support of

military forces in the international security

environment places a special burden on the

Armed Forces of the United States. The

uncertainties and the likelihood of sudden

unforeseen challenges to US vital and

important interests demand that logistic

support and the underlying civilian industrial

base be immediately available to initiate,

prosecute, and terminate operations without

a prolonged period of mobilization and buildup. Logistic considerations are integral

elements of military planning for all types of

operations from the development of

requirements, options, and concepts through

the conclusion of operations.

h. Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance. A robust and secure system

of intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance that combines all sources —

US military, nonmilitary intelligence agencies,

commercial systems, and systems of allies and

other friendly countries — is essential. The

entire system and supporting networks and

processes should be integrated with global

command and control systems, synchronized

with current and planned military operations,

facilitate development and dissemination of

a common intelligence picture, and contribute

to assuring US information superiority.

i. Assured Access to the Battlespace.

Overseas presence and power projection are

possible only if US military forces have

assured access to the battlespace in which they

operate and to the shore-based infrastructure

from which they operate. Access may be

secured by the capabilities of the land, air,

maritime, special operation, and space forces

to be employed (including forcible entry) from

the United States or other locations, or from

international waters and airspace. Access may

also be secured by agreements reached by the

United States with other countries involved.

This places a requirement on the civilian and

military agencies of the USG to have prudent

peacetime agreements with other states around

the world to facilitate US entry, prosecution,

and conclusion of operations. In the absence

of permanently-stationed overseas forces,

rotationally or temporarily deployed forces

help maintain US access to regions of national

interest by deterring potential adversaries,

reassuring friends and allies of continuing US

commitment to regional security and stability,

and enabling the flow of follow-on forces in

the event of crisis. Their peacetime

engagement operations may be adapted to

spearhead access for contingency operations.

Their military-to-military contacts may

provide essential host nation access. Often

the initiative rests with the diplomatic

The Medal of Honor is Awarded to

Lieutenant Commander James Jonas Madison, United States Navy

Lieutenant Commander Madison was commanding officer of the U.S.S.

Ticonderoga, when, on 4 October 1918, that vessel was attacked by an enemy

submarine and was sunk after a prolonged and gallant resistance. The

submarine opened fire at a range of 500 yards, the first shots taking effect on

the bridge and forecastle, 1 of the 2 forward guns of the Ticonderoga being

disabled by the second shot. The fire was returned and the fight continued for

nearly 2 hours. Commander Madison was severely wounded early in the fight,

but caused himself to be placed in a chair on the bridge and continued to

direct the fire and to maneuver the ship. When the order was finally given to

abandon the sinking ship, he became unconscious from loss of blood, but

was lowered into a lifeboat and was saved, with 31 others, out of a total number

of 236 on board.
IV-11

The Application of Military Power

instrument, the Secretary of State, and US

ambassadors and their country teams abroad.

Military leaders have the responsibility to

clearly communicate their requirements for

access and to identify alternatives when a

particular locale becomes unavailable.

Despite all efforts, access may be

problematical, necessitating that the Armed

Forces of the United States maintain a forcible

entry capability.

j. National Will. National will is an

expression of the support and determination

of the American people for a particular

outcome or policy. National public cohesion

for objectives in war and other military

operations are visible to friend and foe and

can influence the outcome of the enterprise.

While in the US constitutional system the

President, appointed leaders, and

Congressional members bear the

responsibility for explaining the purpose and

obtaining the support from the public for any

particular COA including military action,

senior military leaders have important and

unique supporting responsibilities. Principal

among these responsibilities is maintaining a

trained and ready force in whose competence

the American people can be confident.

Supporting military responsibilities include

timely and accurate dissemination of

information to the public about ongoing

operations, and support of military men and

women and their families during periods of

operational stress.

k. Force Protection. It is essential for the

Armed Forces to provide the best feasible

protection for US forces, people, families, and

facilities worldwide from a variety of

predictable and inherently unforeseeable

threats. Protection should include military

capabilities and functions such as

information, intelligence, logistics and others

that are essential for mission

accomplishment. These threats include the

extension of a conflict beyond its original

region to US citizens, bases, facilities, and

interests, even into US territory. Of particular

concern is the capability of clandestine

military operations and terrorist

organizations to attack vulnerable, populated

areas and critical infrastructures with a

variety of lethal means. The threat includes

employment of nuclear, biological, and

chemical (NBC) and radiological weapons

and other highly destructive conventional

explosives and highly toxic chemicals and

materials against unprotected people and

facilities. Military considerations for force

protection therefore include not only military

elements in a region of conflict, but also

military and civilian potential targets of high

value to the United States wherever they may

be, including US territory. While not a standalone military mission, force protection is an

essential consideration for peacetime

readiness and military activities across the

range of military operations.

“Even in friendly territory a fortified

camp should be set up; a general

should never have to say: ‘I did not

expect it.’”

Emperor Maurice

The Strategikon, 600 A.D.
IV-12

Chapter IV

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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER V

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

V-1

The campaign is the central organizing

instrument for joint warfare. The JFC uses it

to arrange tactical, operational, and strategic

actions into a series of related major

operations, focused on accomplishing

strategic and operational objectives. The

campaign is planned and executed by applying

operational art. To establish the context for

campaign planning in combatant commands,

unified command and theater strategies

establish the relationships between national

security and military objectives and the forces

and other resources available to the command.

The use of unified action and clear command

relationships assist combatant and subordinate

commanders in employing forces across the

range of military operations.

1. Elements of Joint

Operational Art

The joint operational art encompasses the

translation of strategy into operational design

for the joint employment of forces at all levels

of war. It integrates all force capabilities into

a unified whole focused on the command’s

major objectives. It guides the development,

organization, integration, and execution of

strategies, campaigns, major operations, and

battles. The following discussion summarizes

the elements of joint operational art, which

are explained in more detail in Joint

Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations (see Figure V-1).

a. An important challenge in applying the

operational art is to achieve the greatest effect

“There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . .to be a one-handed puncher.

By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the

artilleryman to fire . . .To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support

each other. Team play wins.”

GEN George S. Patton, Jr., USA

from the combination of all relevant and

available force capabilities — synergy. The

synergy that results from the integration and

synchronization of the actions of air, land, sea,

space, and special operations forces over time

and space assists the JFC to assail important

adversary vulnerabilities while presenting no

friendly seams or vulnerabilities for the

adversary to exploit. The degree of synergy

achieved depends in large part on the friendly

forces’ shared understanding of friendly and

adversary situations — including friendly

commander’s intent and adversary intentions

— and on being able to exploit that situational

awareness to achieve leverage and advantage

over the adversary.

“We plan because synergy does not

happen by itself. Synchronization does

not happen by accident. For

synchronization, coordination, [and]

integration to take place, planning is

required.”

VADM Vern Clark, USN

b. Another fundamental aim in applying

the operational art is to bring the appropriate

elements of the force to bear simultaneously

against the opponent’s entire structure to the

depth of the theater in order to multiply the

combined effects and increase synergy. When

the friendly forces have an accurate and shared

awareness of the situation, understand the

opponent, and operate more rapidly than the

opponent can react, they can anticipate

events, achieve surprise, and seize

opportunities.
V-2

Chapter V

JP 1

c. To assure freedom of action and

maintain the initiative, the JFC should strive

to maintain balance in the force’s posture

(forces committed and in reserve, decisively

engaged and able to accept changes in

mission, in fixed positions and able to move

and maneuver at will, etc.). Balance will

permit rapidly adapting to a changing

situation. This will allow the JFC to tailor

the force mix and focus its capabilities,

exploit adversary vulnerabilities, and adapt

the nature and timing of its operations to most

effectively accomplish its mission. JFCs

designate priority efforts and establish

appropriate command relationships, and control

the timing and tempo of operations to assist in

maintaining balance. These efforts seek to

preserve the responsiveness of the total joint force

and its components’ capabilities, which is central

to operational art. The JFC seeks to maintain

friendly force balance while aggressively seeking

to disrupt the adversary’s balance by striking

with powerful blows from unexpected directions

or dimensions.

d. An appropriate mix of force capabilities

also contributes to achieving leverage against

the opponent. Attaining this advantage is

the centerpiece of the operational art. JFCs

achieve leverage by properly integrating and

employing their forces to gain, maintain, and

exploit advantages in combat power across

all its dimensions, employing to the

maximum all other elements of the

operational art.

• The JFC obtains leverage by

establishing appropriate command

relationships between components and

establishing a focus of effort, or main

effort, for each phase of an operation.

This allows the JFC to maintain unity

of effort and focus and integrate each

component’s unique capabilities while

arranging symmetric and asymmetric

actions to take advantage of friendly

strengths against important enemy

vulnerabilities.

Figure V-1. Elements of Operational Art

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART

OPERATIONAL

ART

ANTICIPATION

BALANCE

LEVERAGE

TIMING AND

TEMPO

OPERATIONAL

REACH

AND APPROACH

FORCES AND

FUNCTIONS

ARRANGING

OPERATIONS

TERMINATION

CENTERS OF

GRAVITY

DIRECT VERSUS

INDIRECT

DECISIVE POINTS

CULMINATION

SYNERGY

SIMULTANEITY AND

DEPTH

ANTICIPATION

BALANCE

LEVERAGE

TIMING AND

TEMPO

OPERATIONAL

REACH

AND APPROACH

FORCES AND

FUNCTIONS

ARRANGING

OPERATIONS

TERMINATION

CENTERS OF

GRAVITY

DIRECT VERSUS

INDIRECT

DECISIVE POINTS

CULMINATION

SYNERGY

SIMULTANEITY AND

DEPTH
V-3

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

“The Americans, with minimum losses,

attacked and seized a relatively weak

area, constructed airfields, and then

proceeded to cut the supply lines to

troops in that area. The Japanese army

preferred direct assault, after German

fashion, but the Americans flowed into

our weaker points and submerged us,

just as water seeks the weakest entry

to sink a ship. We respected this type

of strategy for its brilliance because it

gained the most while losing the least.”

Lieutenant Colonel Matsuichi Iino,

Japanese Eighth Area Army, WW II

• The JFC also shapes the nature of

interactions with the adversary to achieve

leverage. Engagements with the enemy

may be thought of as “symmetric” if

friendly and enemy forces have similar

types of forces and capabilities, or

“asymmetric” if forces and/or capabilities

are significantly dissimilar. Asymmetric

engagements with the enemy can create

decisive advantages and be extremely

lethal, especially if the force being

attacked is not prepared to defend itself.

Similarly, the joint force must be shielded

against an enemy’s asymmetric attack.

e. The posture of the forces and their

command relationships also facilitate

establishing the timing and tempo of

operations that best exploits friendly

capabilities and inhibits the adversary.

Control of timing and tempo allows the JFC

to remain unpredictable, operate beyond the

enemy’s ability to react, and achieve

dominance throughout the battlespace.

f. In applying the operational art, the JFC

needs a clear understanding of the operational

reach of friendly capabilities, including those

that may be in support from locations outside

the immediate theater of operations. This

understanding will facilitate establishing the

operational approach, proper lines of

operations, and sequencing operations.

g. An understanding of the types of

capabilities and forces available to the

opponent will assist the JFC to focus

campaign objectives, phasing, and timing.

Opponents that do not have full force

capabilities may have vulnerable key

functions that provide the most lucrative

targets for friendly attack. With an opponent

who has a full range of functions and types

of forces, friendly operations may be more

effective by simultaneously engaging them

all.

h. The JFC arranges elements of the

campaign in time and space to exploit key

friendly strengths and adversary

vulnerabilities. This may be accomplished

by a combination of simultaneous and

sequential actions to achieve campaign

objectives most effectively and rapidly. The

campaign is typically organized by phases.

Phasing assists commanders in thinking

through an entire campaign, defining

requirements in terms of forces, resources,

time, space, and manageable subordinate

objectives. Phasing also leads to an orderly

process of developing branches and sequels

(which are crucial for anticipation and

flexibility) and to help dissipate the fog of war.

Branches and sequels in campaigns facilitate

phasing a campaign and enable the JFC to

maintain freedom of action in rapidly

changing situations.

i. A central consideration in applying the

operational art is the location and nature of

adversary centers of gravity — those

characteristics, capabilities, or localities from

which a military force derives its freedom of

action, physical strength, or will to fight.

j. Accurate identification of these COGs

will assist in overall campaign planning and
V-4

Chapter V

JP 1

in decisions by the JFC on the relative merits

of simultaneous or sequential operations and

direct or indirect attack. During execution

of a campaign, COGs may change as the

opponents act and react in relation to each

other and cause changes in their relative

capabilities.

k. Supporting the assessment of COGs is

the identification of decisive points. These

points may be geographic in nature

(constrained sea lanes, hills, towns, and air

bases), key events (attainment of air and naval

superiority), and systemic conditions

(effective command and control systems,

adequate refueling and ammunition storage

capacity). Control, destruction, or

neutralization of decisive points by friendly

forces can yield a marked advantage over the

enemy and therefore influence the outcome

of battles, operations, and campaigns.

l. At the outset of campaign design, the

JFC and planners must consider culmination,

the point at which a force no longer has the

capability to continue its form of operation,

offense or defense. For the offense,

culmination is the point at which continuing

the attack is no longer possible and the force

must consider reverting to a defensive posture

or attempting an operational pause. For the

defense, culmination is the point at which

counteroffensive action is no longer possible.

An objective in campaign design is to compel

the adversary into unanticipated culmination,

avoid culmination for the friendly force, and

achieve campaign objectives as quickly as

possible.

m. Finally, termination is a component

of strategy and the operational art. The end

state envisioned for a campaign or major

operation defines termination, identifying the

point at which military operations may be

brought to an end. For the Armed Forces of

the United States, termination requires

conditions in place that will support the

desired US postconflict objectives and

interests.

2. The Campaign

The campaign is an inherently joint

instrument for planning the employment of

the Armed Forces of the United States in

military operations of all types. The campaign

is based on US national security and military

strategies as well as the mission assigned to

the JFC. Campaign plans are normally

comprehensive for all operations in a theater.

Subordinate campaign plans prepared by joint

task forces (JTFs) or subunified commands

Centers of gravity may be attacked directly or indirectly.
V-5

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

may be appropriate in complex situations.

Fundamental planning concepts underlie

campaign planning. The campaign is oriented

on a clear statement of the combatant

commander’s intent and the focus of

operations, taking into account the objectives

to be secured at national, strategic, and

operational levels. To guide the conduct of

operations, campaign planning identifies the

opponent’s COGs and related key areas of

vulnerability. Planning also includes

protection of friendly COGs and key areas of

vulnerability, including considerations at the

national and theater levels for the United States

and other participating countries in the case of

multinational operations. In complex situations

and when forces needed for the operation must

be deployed from other areas, joint planning

includes phasing with the commander’s intent

for each phase clearly defined.

The campaign is based on the

commander’s concept, a broad vision that

is the intellectual core of the campaign plan.

The commander’s concept begins by

presenting the commander’s intent, which

defines the desired end state, concisely

expresses the purpose of the operation, and

provides focus for subordinates. The

commander’s concept then describes how

operations will be integrated, sequenced, and

synchronized to achieve conflict termination

objectives (including postconflict measures).

The commander’s concept normally includes

four elements:

• The operational concept itself based on

the unified command or theater strategy,

which is the scheme for the entire

operation;

• The logistic concept, which provides an

overall description of how the joint force

will be supported;

• The deployment concept, which

describes the sequencing of operational

capabilities and logistic support into the

objective area; and

• The organizational concept, which

includes external and internal command

relationships and, when required,

organization for deployment.

The Medal of Honor is Awarded to

Major Charles J. Loring Jr, United States Air Force

Maj Loring was the leader of a flight of 4 F-80 type aircraft on a close support

mission near Sniper Ridge, North Korea, on 22 November 1952. Maj Loring

was briefed by a controller to dive-bomb enemy gun positions which were

harassing friendly ground troops. After verifying the location of the target,

Maj Loring rolled into his dive bomb run. Throughout the run, extremely

accurate ground fire was directed on his aircraft. Disregarding the accuracy

and intensity of the ground fire, Maj Loring aggressively continued to press

the attack until his aircraft was hit. At approximately 4,000 feet, he deliberately

altered his course and aimed his diving aircraft at active gun emplacements

concentrated on a ridge northwest of the briefed target, turned his aircraft 45

degrees to the left, pulled up in a deliberate, controlled maneuver, and elected

to sacrifice his life by diving his aircraft directly into the midst of the enemy

emplacements. His selfless and heroic action completely destroyed the enemy

gun emplacement and eliminated a dangerous threat to United Nations ground

forces.
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The campaign is explained in more

detail in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations, and JP 5-0, Doctrine for

Planning Joint Operations.

3. Unified Command and

Theater Strategies

As a precursor to theater planning,

combatant commands normally develop

strategic estimates, command or theater

strategies, and supporting peacetime plans

for their assigned responsibilities in order to

implement US national security and military

strategies. The connecting link between

combatant command and national planning

is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This

plan, developed under CJCS authority assigns

planning tasks, apportions major combat

forces and resources, and issues planning

guidance to the combatant commands. The

resulting unified command and theater

OPERATION OVERLORD

A CLASSIC JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATION; KEYSTONE TO A

SUCCESSFUL COMBINED THEATER CAMPAIGN

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

Force, used two years of preparation and team-building leadership to create

unity of effort for OVERLORD and the subsequent campaign to free Europe.

This effective joint and combined staff operation owed much to Allied

experiences in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and included a deputy of

another Service and nation and subordinate commands for air, land, and naval

forces. Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff provided the necessary but very elastic

strategic guidance, directing him only to “Enter the continent of Europe, and

... undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of

her armed forces.”

With the Combined Chiefs’ directive as guidance, General Eisenhower planned

and directed a seven phase campaign to recapture Western Europe. The single

guiding principle of this campaign was the destruction of the enemy’s forces.

Combined military deception operations reinforced this principle by causing

the Germans to disperse significant forces outside the planned invasion area.

Massive air bombardment interdicted railroads and bridges leading to the

invasion area. Other Allied forces screened the invasion flanks by neutralizing

enemy air and naval threats. During the night of 5 June airborne landings

blocked key causeways, road junctions, and bridges leading to the amphibious

assault area. Underwater demolition cleared paths through the obstacles

blocking the seaward approaches. On 6 June 1944 naval gunfire and tactical

air support proved indispensable in destroying German fortifications, troop

concentrations, and minefields.

Although Allied invasion troops faced locally stout German resistance, once

the bulk of the first wave was through the German beach defenses, the

operational issue was no longer in doubt. Logistic preparation to support the

invasion was so effective that by D+12, over 2,700 ships and 1,000 transport

aircraft had landed 692,000 troops, 95,000 vehicles, and 228,000 tons of

supplies. This build-up laid the foundations for the remaining phases of the

overall campaign that was to reach its successful conclusion in May 1945.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources
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Fundamentals of Joint Operations

strategies assist the combatant command and

its components in the pursuit of unity of effort.

These command and theater strategies provide

the basis for campaign and operation plans,

and for determining requirements for forces

and resources to execute those plans. The

strategies, plans, and resource requirements

support a collaborative and iterative set of

processes for joint strategic planning as well

as for resource planning, programming, and

resourcing.

4. Unified Action

Unified action describes the broad scope

of activities taking place within unified

commands, subordinate unified commands,

or JTFs under the overall direction of the

commanders of those commands for the

purpose of achieving unity of effort in mission

accomplishment. Unified action requires the

integration of effort across the command. This

includes joint, single-Service, special, and

supporting operations; as well as interagency,

NGOs, PVOs, and multinational participants

into a unified effort in the theater or joint

operations area. Military support of unified

action is facilitated by operations under a

single commander, in execution of a single

plan, that encompass all assigned and

supporting military and nonmilitary elements.

Unified action within the military instrument

of national power supports the national

strategic unity of effort through close

coordination with the other instruments of

national power.

a. Unified action requires unified direction.

The combatant command and theater

strategies, including their derivative campaign

and operation plans, provide that direction.

The principles and considerations for unified

action apply to US participation in

multinational and interagency operations.

Multinational operations may require unique

command relationships that maintain unity of

effort while not establishing a single

multinational force commander.

b. For interagency operations abroad,

including participation by NGOs and PVOs,

the combatant commander may designate a

JTF to conduct the military portion of

interagency operations. For example, in

counterdrug operations, combatant

commanders may establish joint interagency

task forces in their areas of responsibility. To

facilitate operations, the combatant or joint

task force commander may establish a civilmilitary operations center, other specialized

functional coordination centers, and liaison

teams to ensure unity of effort in the

interagency actions.

c. A primary consideration for combatant

command unified action is the primacy of the

theater military objectives that directly relate

to national security and military strategies. All

Armed Forces of the United States

participation in multinational and interagency

operations abroad adhere to this principle.

d. In operations within US territory, the

military instrument is normally subordinate

to the national or other civil governmental

agency with primary jurisdiction for the

function or area concerned. This may require

the provision of support from a standing task

force formed specifically for the purpose of

assisting civil authorities, or the formation of

a special task-oriented organization for unique

circumstances. In the defense of US territory,

the FBI has responsibility for countering

terrorism. For relief from natural and

manmade disasters, the responsible Federal

lead agency is the FEMA. To assure unity of

effort, military activities under these

circumstances should be conducted under

standing or tailored JTFs that specifically

support the lead Federal agency under terms

stipulated by the President.

5. Command Relationships

Command is central to all military action,

and unity of command (a principle of war)

is central to unity of effort (a fundamental
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of joint warfare). US military power is

employed under JFCs. Unified action begins

with unified direction. This is normally

accomplished by assigning a mission or

objective to a single commander, and

providing that commander sufficient forces,

other resources, and authority to accomplish

the assigned mission or objective. The

relationships between and among force

elements follow a set of principles to establish

a chain of command, facilitate the best

possible utilization of all available capabilities,

and ensure unified action in mission

accomplishment. Inherent in command is the

authority that a military commander lawfully

exercises over subordinates. Command

confers the authority to assign missions and

to demand accountability for their attainment.

The four command relationships are

combatant command (command authority),

that only combatant commanders can

exercise; operational control; tactical control;

and support. In addition, there are another

three authorities. They are administrative

control, which permits exercise of authority

over subordinate organizations for

administration and support; coordinating

authority; and direct liaison authorized.

Although commanders may delegate authority

to accomplish missions, they may not absolve

themselves of the responsibility for the

attainment of those missions. Authority is

never absolute. The extent of authority is

limited by the establishing instruction,

directives, and law.

See JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces

(UNAAF), for additional information.

a. Exercise of Command. The primary

emphasis in command relations should be to

keep the chain of command short and simple

so that it is clear who is in charge and of what.

Unity of command is the guiding principle of

war in the exercise of command. The systems

that support the exercise of command are

similarly guided by time-tested principles.

These systems — including command,

control, communications, computers, and

information systems and networks — should

be reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable,

timely, and secure.

• In the exercise of command and the

control of operations, commanders

should adhere to two key tenets: clarity

in the statement of the commander’s

intent, so that all subordinates understand

the conditions to be established by

successful operations and, therefore,

Military assistance to civil authorities calls for unity of effort in

support of the lead Federal agency.
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Fundamentals of Joint Operations

define the military criteria for

termination; and simplicity of orders.

JFCs should use their liaisons to assist

in directing the actions of the force in

anticipation of a developing situation

and in assuring shared understanding of

missions and situations.

• Continuity of command is essential for

continuity of operations. Commanders

are responsible for assuring continuity of

command in the event they or their

headquarters become incapacitated or

unavailable, therefore, JFCs must make

provisions for continuity of command,

control, and communications in a

severely degraded communications

environment. Continuity is assured by

defining the succession of command,

designating alternate headquarters, and

stipulating those circumstances under

which another will assume command and

the procedures for such assumption. The

command should strive for redundancy

of means and the reduction or elimination

of unique nodes.

• The components of a joint force may be

comprised of Service elements or

functional elements such as special

operations forces. JFCs may organize

their forces as necessary to accomplish

the command’s mission. Nevertheless,

subordinate units should be permitted to

function within the parameters of their

design and capabilities, mission and

circumstances permitting.

• The role of component commanders in a

joint force merits special attention.

Component commanders are first

expected to orchestrate the activity of

their own forces, branches, and warfare

communities. In addition, they must

understand how their own capabilities

best integrate into the overall design to

most effectively satisfy the JFC’s intent.

Component commanders are also the

primary sources of advice to the JFC and

their fellow component commanders on

their requirements for support from, and

their capabilities for support to, other

component commanders.

• The contributions of training, leader

development, and education are

indispensable to effective command.

Leaders acquire their joint skills in

sequential and progressive systems of

education, training, self-development,

and assignments of increasing Service

and joint responsibility. Leaders in the

Armed Forces of the United States should

understand and make every effort to avail

themselves of the opportunities for joint

professional development, education,

and training.

• The exercise of command takes place

against the backdrop of the adversary’s

command structure. The joint warfare

fundamental of knowledge of the enemy

is indispensable for effective command.

The JFC, supported by the analysis of

the command’s staff, must be able to

identify peculiarities and vulnerabilities

that will enable the joint force to destroy

the adversary’s command capability early

in the action. This will facilitate the

destruction, neutralization, or

degradation of the adversary force’s

capabilities.

b. Supported and Supporting

Relationships. Supported and supporting

relationships between commands facilitate

unified action in planning and conducting

operations. Support is a command authority

established by a superior commander between

subordinate commanders when an

organization should aid, protect, complement,

or sustain another force. It may be exercised

by commanders at any echelon at or below

the level of combatant command. This

includes the NCA designating a support

relationship between combatant commanders
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The Medal of Honor is Awarded to

Lieutenant Harvey C. Barnum Jr, United States Marine Corps

On 18 December 1965, near Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam,

1st Lt Barnum’s company was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremely

accurate enemy fire. The company was quickly separated from the remainder

of the battalion by over 500 meters of open and fire-swept ground, and

casualties mounted rapidly. Lt Barnum quickly made a hazardous

reconnaissance of the area, seeking targets for his artillery. Finding the rifle

company commander mortally wounded and the radio operator killed, he, with

complete disregard for his safety, gave aid to the dying commander, then

removed the radio from the dead operator and strapped it to himself. He

immediately assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at once into

the midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units,

reorganized them to replace the loss of key personnel and led their attack on

enemy positions from which deadly fire continued to come. His sound and

swift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimated

units and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point out

targets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with 2 armed helicopters, he

moved fearlessly through enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmly

entrenched enemy while skillfully directing 1 platoon in a successful

counterattack on the key enemy positions. Having thus cleared a small area,

he requested and directed the landing of 2 transport helicopters for the

evacuation of the dead and wounded. He then assisted in the mopping up and

final seizure of the battalion’s objective.

as well as within a combatant command.

Within a combatant command, JFCs may

designate one of their components or

subordinate joint forces as a supported activity

for a certain purpose and time. In fulfilling

that responsibility, the supported commanders

must coordinate, synchronize, and integrate

the activities of the supporting commands in

conjunction with their own forces under the

JFC’s overall supervision and authority. More

than one supported command may be

designated simultaneously and components

may simultaneously receive and provide

support in different mission areas, functions,

or operations. (These relationships are

further described in subordinate doctrine and

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.)

• The supported commander has authority

to exercise general direction of the

supporting effort, unless limited by a

specific directive. This includes

designating and establishing priorities

for targets or objectives, timing and

duration of the supporting action, effects

of the action, and other instructions

necessary for coordination and efficiency

of the operation for which the support is

provided.

• The supporting commander is

responsible for determining the forces,

tactics, methods, procedures, and

communications to employ in providing

support. The supporting commander is

also responsible for ascertaining the

needs of the supported force and taking

action to fulfill them within existing

capabilities, consistent with priorities and

requirements of other assigned tasks.

c. Integration of Service and Functional

Component Capabilities. Centralized

planning and direction, and decentralized
V-11

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

execution facilitate integration of all elements

of a joint force. That is, integration is

accomplished through the development of

command and theater strategies, campaign and

operation plans, operation orders and other

mission directives as well as forms of

organization that achieve the greatest synergy

and make the best use of the combined effects

of all available capabilities.

• The joint force’s organization for combat

should promote integration and may

include Service and functional

component commands. The combatant

commander has Service component

commands comprising the force elements

assigned from the particular Service.

Combatant commanders and subordinate

subunified and joint task force

commanders have the authority to

centralize selected functions and

establish functional component

commands to perform those functions.

The functional component commander

is normally a Service component

commander with the preponderance of

forces and the capability for performing

required command and control

functions.

• Regardless of the particular form of

organization, the principles of war and

military operations other than war, and

the fundamentals of joint warfare, apply

to the operations of the joint force and

its components, Service components, and

functional components in order to assure

unified action.
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER VI

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

VI-1

The purposes of joint doctrine for military

participation in interagency operations are to

guide the proper employment of the military

instrument and to assure unity of effort with

the diplomatic, economic, and informational

instruments of national power. Interagency

operations may be conducted in the United

States and abroad. Combatant commanders

and other JFCs must consider the potential

requirements for interagency operations as a

part of their activities across the range of

military operations. Early inclusion of

interagency considerations in assessments,

estimates, and plans will facilitate civilmilitary integration of effort, focus the

appropriate military participation, and assist

the military effort to obtain the best available

support from other interagency participants.

The guidance outlined in this chapter

supplements the authority of combatant

commanders to take immediate action in

response to incidents on their installations,

domestic and abroad, as well as in support of

a host country abroad.

1. The Interagency Process and

Participants

The interagency process facilitates unified

action by military and nonmilitary participants

conducting interagency operations in pursuit

of national objectives.

a. At the highest level the NSC is the lead

agency for national security civil-military

integration. Its responsibilities are focused

on integrating advice and recommendations

for consideration and decision by the President

“A Task Force Commander who creates a close knit interagency working

relationship can focus on getting the mission accomplished without the

distractions created by outside agencies or attempts to fulfill special agendas

that might be disruptive to the operation.”

RADM Michael D. Haskins, USN

as well as disseminating and monitoring

implementation of those decisions.

Interagency groups within the NSC system

permit task-organized participation at the

appropriate level by agencies (including

military representation) involved in any

particular interagency task. The Secretary of

Defense is a statutory member of the NSC,

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

is its statutory military advisor. Officials of

the Office of the Secretary of Defense

represent the Secretary in NSC interagency

groups. Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Staff,

represents the combatant commanders for

interagency matters in the NSC system.

b. Interagency organization for matters that

are primarily nonmilitary but may require

military participation are organized under

appropriate lead agencies abroad and in the

United States. Overseas, ordinarily the US

ambassador and the country team take the

lead. At the national level, for support of

overseas interagency operations, normally the

Department of State leads the effort, forming

task-oriented groups or availing itself of the

NSC system to organize the effort. For

domestic interagency operations that may

require military participation, the FEMA has

the lead for mitigating the consequences of

natural and manmade disasters and civil

defense, and the FBI for crises relating to

terrorism. The Secretary of Defense retains

the authority to approve use of combatant

command resources for assistance to civil

authorities. For military support in response

to natural and manmade disasters, the Army’s
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Director for Military Support (DOMS) is the

focal point and has the capabilities needed to

organize, integrate, and provide military

assistance for approved operations. The

United States Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) is responsible for providing

military assistance within CONUS for

managing and mitigating the consequences of,

the deliberate use of, or accidents involving,

NBC, radiological, and other high-yield

explosive weapons.

c. Operations abroad may involve a variety

of US Government agencies, international

organizations (such as the United Nations and

its subordinate agencies), regional

transnational organizations (such as the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, the

Organization for African Unity, and the

Organization of American States), NGOs

(such as Doctors Without Borders and Save

the Children Fund), and PVOs (such as the

American Red Cross and CARE (Cooperative

for Assistance and Relief Everywhere)). In

addition to US Government agencies,

domestic participants may include a number

of state and local government organizations

as well as the types of NGOs and PVOs that

operate internationally.

2. Interagency Coordination

a. The guidelines for interagency

coordination assure that all participating

agencies, under appropriate authority, focus

their efforts for domestic or foreign operations.

The Armed Forces of the United States have

unique capabilities to offer for interagency

operations. These include influence through

established military-to-military domestic and

international contacts; resources such as

logistics not available to nonmilitary agencies;

and responsiveness based on military training

and readiness. Additional unique military

capabilities include command and control

resources supported by worldwide

communications and intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance

infrastructures; robust organizational and

planning processes, training support for large

numbers of individuals on myriad skills, and

air and sea mobility support for intertheater

or intratheater requirements. Four general

considerations apply to civil-military

preparations for interagency activities.

• The Department of Defense must

develop consensus on and approval of

the desired scope, nature, and end state

of military participation.

Operations abroad may involve a variety of US and international agencies, such

as in this meeting of US Army, UN, Serb, and Croat officials on de-mining in

Bosnia-Herzegovina.
VI-3

Fundamentals of Interagency Operations

• Participating agencies must clearly

understand their respective missions,

capabilities, and methods of operation.

• The agencies must develop a shared

appreciation of their individual and

mutual needs, and develop the

fundamental rules to conduct operations

and to promote confidence in their

interdependence.

• Participating agencies should establish

their short-term objectives, both

individually and collectively, in the context

of the long term desired end state in order

to assure the value of the operation beyond

its immediate conclusion.

“The necessary first step in shaping

effective interagency groups is making

known what skills and resources one

brings to the table.”

ADM P. D. Miller, USN

b. Domestic Operations. Military

participation in operations inside the United

States and its territories may include assistance

for domestic emergencies that result from

natural or manmade causes, or assistance to

civilian law enforcement agencies. Military

assistance may be approved by the President

or the Secretary of Defense — depending on

the circumstances — for interagency actions

to cope with contingencies such as civil

disturbances, counterdrug operations, support

for combatting terrorism, and other events for

which the Armed Forces of the United States

may have unique and essential capabilities.

• In domestic situations, the Constitution,

law, and other governmental directives

limit the scope and nature of military

actions. The National Guard has unique

roles in domestic operations. Under

control of the respective states, National

Guard units provide a wide variety of

direct support to civil authorities, whereas

military forces under Federal control

must adhere to the provisions of the

Posse Comitatus Act. This act, together

with related DOD regulations, prohibits

the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and

Navy from participating in civilian law

enforcement activities within the United

States. In its maritime law enforcement

role, the US Coast Guard is a unique

branch of the Armed Forces with

jurisdiction in both US waters and on the

high seas and the only military Service

not constrained by the Posse Comitatus

Act. Domestic interagency operations are

conducted under the control of a lead

Federal or state agency. Early in the

planning phase and following approval

by the Secretary of Defense of a request

for assistance, the military and

nonmilitary participants must define the

appropriate scope of military

participation, consistent with applicable

law and policy.

• In the event of a domestic crisis or natural

or manmade disaster, the Armed Forces

of the United States may provide

assistance as approved by the Secretary

of Defense to the responsible

governmental agencies, normally the FBI

and FEMA. Military assistance may

include direct support for planning,

organizing, and employing military

capabilities under control of the

USJFCOM. USJFCOM is responsible

for providing military assistance to civil

authorities for a range of domestic

contingencies, and has unique mission

responsibilities for managing and

mitigating the consequences of deliberate

use of, or accidents involving, NBC,

radiological, and other high-yield

explosive weapons. USJFCOM may

provide approved support in such

circumstances, supplementing the efforts

of Federal, state, or local elements first

responding to the disaster.
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c. Foreign Operations

• Interagency operations in foreign areas

may arise as a result of risks to US

interests or those of US allies or other

friendly countries. Such operations may

involve preexisting bilateral and

multilateral military relationships,

treaties involving US defense interests,

initiatives concerning technology transfer

or armaments cooperation and control,

foreign humanitarian assistance, peace

operations, or other contingencies.

• Within a theater, the geographic

combatant commander is responsible for

planning and implementing military

strategies and operations that require

interagency coordination. Coordination

required outside the geographic region

may be supported by groups within the

NSC system or individual Departments,

with lead for such coordination falling

either to the combatant command or the

Federal agency depending on the

circumstances. In some operations, a

Special Representative of the President

or Special Envoy of the United Nations

Secretary-General may be involved.

• The formal US interagency structure in

foreign countries operates under the lead

of the US ambassador and the country

team, and may include US Information

Service and US embassy public affairs

representation. The US ambassador is

ordinarily the lead agent for interagency

operations abroad that are essentially

nonmilitary in nature but require military

participation, with representation and

control of the military operations

provided by the JFC.

3. Command Relationships

a. Command relationships in interagency

operations differ from joint and multinational

operations. In interagency operations,

command relationships preserve the primacy

of civil authorities in their spheres of

responsibility while facilitating the full

utilization of military forces as permitted by

the Constitution, law, and directives of the

President. Military commands normally

provide assistance in consonance with these

directives for activities conducted under the

control of civil authorities.

b. The NCA ordinarily establish supported

and supporting command relationships

between combatant commanders when

issuing the deployment and execution orders

for the particular interagency operation

requiring military involvement. The

geographic combatant commanders,

supported by functional combatant or other

joint force commands, provide the forces and

resources to accomplish the mission.

c. The relationship between NGOs and

PVOs and US military elements is an associate

or partnership relationship. These civilian

organizations do not operate in military or

governmental hierarchies and therefore cannot

have formal supporting or supported

relationships with US military forces.

4. Organizing for Interagency

Operations

a. The organizational guidelines for joint

and multinational action apply to organizing

for interagency operations with deference to

differences in command relationships, legal

strictures, and national policy. In all

interagency operations, foreign and domestic,

military commanders have inherent

responsibilities. These include the

requirements to clarify the mission; determine

the controlling legal and policy authorities;

task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the

organizations and personnel provided for the

interagency effort; and assure seamless

termination under conditions which assure

that identified national objectives are met and

can be sustained after the operation.
VI-5

Fundamentals of Interagency Operations

b. For interagency operations abroad,

combatant commands establish a process for

ensuring effective organization for and

conduct of the operation including a number

of specific tasks.

• Identification of all agencies and

organizations that are or should be

involved in the operation.

• Establishment of an interagency

hierarchy and definition of the objectives

of the response effort pertinent to the

operation as a whole and to each

participating agency.

• Definition of COAs for both theater

military operations and agency activities.

• Solicitation from each agency,

department, or organization of a clear

understanding of the role that each plays.

• Identification of potential obstacles to the

collective effort arising from conflicting

departmental or agency priorities.

• Identification of resources of each

participant in order to reduce duplication

and increase coherence in the collective

effort.

• Definition of the desired end state and

exit criteria.

• Sharing of relevant intelligence to those

with a need to know subject to US and

command security standards.

• Focus of the mission’s assets to support

the longer-term goals of the enterprise.

• Establishment of a liaison section,

interagency assessment teams, civilmilitary operations centers, humanitarian

assistance coordination centers, and

logistic operations centers as required.

c. For interagency operations (excluding

terrorism and the management of the

consequences of an incident involving

weapons of mass destruction) within the

United States and its territories, DOMS

INTEGRATING INTERAGENCY PLANNING

Our experiences in Kosovo and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessity

to ensure that all concerned government agencies conduct comprehensive

planning to encompass the full range of instruments available to decision

makers. We all must move forward with our efforts to achieve increased levels

of integrated interagency planning now. To better support other agencies,

DOD needs to give greater consideration to political, diplomatic, humanitarian,

economic, information, and other nonmilitary activities in defense planning.

In addition, the US Government must establish dedicated mechanisms and

integrated planning processes to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multiagency efforts in response to crises. Finally, we must continue to emphasize

that our senior officials routinely participate in rehearsals, gaming, exercises,

and simulations, as well as the CP IWG [Contingency Planning Interagency

Working Group] - which has become a genuine leap forward in the effort to

establish a sound system to incorporate crisis and deliberate planning across

the interagency.

SOURCE: CJCS Posture Statement before the 106th Congress Committee,

On Armed Services, United States Senate, 8 February 2000
VI-6

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organizes the military effort following

authorization by the Secretary of Defense and

acts directly with the JFC. In circumstances

involving domestic terrorism, the NCA must

specifically approve military assistance for the

interagency effort.

5. JTF Interagency Operations

a. There are specific policies and procedures

that guide JTF interagency operations. The

US Marines provide security for UN investigation

of war crimes. The JTF must remain aware of all

agencies involved in operations.

unique aspects of the interagency process require

the JTF headquarters to be especially flexible,

responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of

not only the JTF’s components, but other

agencies as well. When designating a JTF, the

combatant commander will select the JTF

commander, assign a joint operations area,

specify a mission, provide planning guidance,

allocate forces from the assigned Service and

functional component commands, ensure that

supporting commands understand assistance

required, and request forces as necessary from

the NCA.

b. In contrast to the established command

structure of a combatant command or JTF,

NGOs and PVOs in the operational area may

not have a defined structure for controlling

activities. Upon identifying organizational or

operational mismatches between

organizations, the staff of the combatant

command or JTF should designate points in

the NGOs and PVOs at which liaison and

coordinating mechanisms are appropriate.

c. In order to best coordinate military and

civilian operations, the JTF should establish

a civil-military operations center (CMOC)

near the JTF command center. The CMOC is

composed of representatives from military,

civilian, US, and multinational agencies

involved in the operation. An effective

CMOC contributes to meeting the objectives

of all represented agencies in a cooperative

and efficient manner.
CHAPTER VII

FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

VII-1

1. Overview

a. Since the Revolutionary War, American

military operations have benefited from

participation by other like-minded countries.

The United States has habitually conducted

military operations abroad, typically in

alliances and coalitions. The Armed Forces

of the United States must be prepared to

operate abroad within a multinational

framework, and should be prepared to operate

under other-than-US leadership.

b. All US force commanders participating

in multinational operations have key roles that

require acute political sensitivity in addition

to military leadership skills. They must build

the mutual confidence that is the basis for

effective multinational cooperative action.

Four tenets guide the Armed Forces of the

United States in multinational cooperative

activities: respect, rapport, knowledge of

partners, and patience.

• Respect. American military history

confirms the importance of genuine

partnership based on mutual respect

between the United States and its diverse

foreign comrades in arms. This includes

respect for each partner’s culture,

religion, customs, history, and values.

Each participant has unique capabilities

from which the entire multinational

operation can obtain maximum benefit

only on the basis of mutual respect.

• Rapport. Harmonious relations among

participants in multinational operations

facilitate teamwork and result in unity of

“In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes.

In working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of

their own.”

Sir Winston Churchill

effort. Rapport is a personal direct

relationship. Commanders must

establish the environment and set the

example for developing rapport among

subordinate commanders, staffs, and

individual members of US commands.

• Knowledge of Partners. The challenges

of interoperability and unity of effort

underscore the importance of mutual

knowledge of each other among the

multinational participants. US

commanders in multinational operations

must devote the time and resources to

know and understand their comrades in

arms. This effort is as important to

success as the effort to understand the

adversary.

• Patience. Developing mutual respect,

rapport, and mutual knowledge among

multinational partners takes time and the

concerted efforts of leaders. US

commanders at all levels must lead,

setting the example of untiring and evenhanded patience, focusing on eliciting the

best possible performance from the

integration of US and multinational

partners’ forces.

2. Definition and Types of

Multinational Operations

a. Multinational operations is a collective

term used to describe military actions

conducted by forces of two or more nations,

typically organized within the structure of an

alliance or coalition. An alliance is a result of

formal agreements between two or more
VII-2

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nations for broad, long-term objectives, such

as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A

coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between

two or more nations for common action;

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT

STORM in 1990-1991 were coalition

operations. Multinational operations

encompass activities across the range of

military operations.

b. Planning for multinational operations is

accomplished in national and international

channels. Collective security goals, strategies,

and plans are developed in accordance with

alliance, individual treaty, or special coalition

arrangements. Whether under alliance or

coalition auspices, peacetime preparations are

vital to ensure the most effective possible

performance in war. Therefore, peacetime

activities that stress the participation of all

multinational partners’ armed forces in

training, exercises, leader development,

education, and liaison and expert personnel

exchanges lay the groundwork for success in

crisis and war.

3. Strategic Context

The strategic context for multinational

operations includes a diversity of national

objectives and cultures, the challenges of

unified action with disparate force capabilities

and resources, and the requirements of public

information. Partners in multinational

operations will share areas in common

alongside unique areas for each partner. A

principal initial objective in multinational

operations is for the prospective partners to

ensure that the areas held in common are

sufficient to sustain the operation to a

commonly-agreed end state, and that the

unique areas are not sufficiently different to

threaten the common enterprise.

a. National objectives during

multinational operations, particularly those in

which the United States may be one of the

few participants from outside the theater of

operations, must be clarified and reconciled.

Preferably, this consensus should be reached

before the initial phases, during which

declarations of intent and policy as well as

brandishing of deterrent options by the

multinational partners take place for the

purpose of deterring the adversary. If this

agreement is delayed until after the first bullet

is fired, proper preparation and consultation

of publics and government agencies among

participants to assure support over the course

of the operation may not be possible.

b. Methods of operation and individual

behavior that respect the cultural and

religious differences among and between

partners are essential in multinational

operations, particularly in developing

teamwork based upon mutual trust and

respect. Similarly important is reaching early

agreement on roles and missions for each

Respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and

patience guide multinational cooperative activities.
VII-3

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

partner that respects their equality while

focusing on their best contributions to the

multinational effort (e.g., intratheater ground

transportation, human intelligence, specially

trained close combat units). Clear roles,

missions, and rules of engagement (ROE) are

essential for proper planning, training, and

rehearsals, and therefore are a cornerstone of

effective multinational unified action.

c. Military resource and capability

differences, particularly between partners of

modest means and the United States, present

serious challenges. Combatant commanders

must perform unbiased assessments of the

resource and capability needs and disparities

between US and other forces in order to

present unsatisfied requirements and

limitations to the NCA for consideration. For

instance, if not covered by a more capable

partner, lack of missile defense, offensive air

support, or individual NBC protective

clothing and equipment may seriously

constrain participation of a country’s forces

and constitute fatal vulnerabilities in the

multinational structure. Such deficiencies

would be significant enough to warrant

consideration of providing additional

resources from US sources or cross-leveling

resources in the theater. In any case, important

disparities should be resolved before plans are

completed and operations undertaken.

d. The global visibility of operations in

which the United States participates places

special responsibilities and burdens on US

commanders. This is all the more so in

multinational operations in which the

approach to information, media access, and

the role of the public may differ among

participating countries. While US forces must

respect the differences among partners, they

cannot fail to discharge their responsibilities

for timely and accurate information to the

public and all branches of the USG.

Therefore, it may be necessary for the

combatant commander to establish special

procedures so that media access and public

information activities required by US policy

can take place without directly conflicting

with the requirements of other partners in the

multinational operation. Similarly, combatant

commanders must ensure that they enforce the

standards of operations security while

providing needed information, intelligence,

and other access to multinational partners.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE — CONSENSUS IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization proved to be flexible, effective, and

ultimately successful during a uniquely challenging time in its history. Despite

domestic pressures in many NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] nations,

an enormous humanitarian crisis, and isolated instances of target

misidentification with incidental injury or collateral damage, the nations of the

alliance held firm and unified and saw the operation through to a successful

conclusion. . . . Admittedly, gaining consensus among 19 democratic nations

is not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise.

However, the NATO alliance is also our greatest strength. It is true that there

were differences of opinion within the alliance. This is to be expected in an

alliance of democracies, and building consensus generally leads to sounder

decisions.

SOURCE: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,

DOD Report to Congress, 31 January 2000
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e. Command and Control of US Forces

in Multinational Operations

• Unity of effort assuring unified action for

multinational operations requires clear

and effective command and control

structures for the entire endeavor focused

on common objectives, plans, desired end

states, and ROE. Multinational partners

must provide the multinational force

commander sufficient authority over their

national forces to achieve this unity. In

turn, multinational force commanders

and staffs exercise their authority to unify

the efforts of the multinational force

toward common objectives. Consensus

and compromise are vital in multinational

military operations characterized by

voluntary participation by the partners

who retain their sovereignty and national

interests.

• The President retains command authority

over US forces involved in multinational

operations. When prudent or

advantageous (for reasons such as

maximizing military effectiveness and

ensuring unity of effort) the President

may agree to place appropriate US forces

under the control of a foreign commander

in order to achieve specified military

objectives. To support a Presidential

decision on multinational command

relationships, senior military leaders are

responsible for providing information on

such factors as the mission, size of the

proposed US force, risks involved,

anticipated duration, and ROE. In

standing alliances such as the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, command

arrangements are established by

agreement of all members.

• In general, a foreign commander’s

authority over US forces will depend on

the nature and goals of the mission and

must be clearly defined for each

multinational operation. Within the

limits of this authority, a foreign

commander cannot change the mission

or deploy US forces outside the

operational area agreed to by the

President. A foreign commander cannot

separate US units, redistribute US

supplies, administer discipline, promote

US personnel, or change internal US

force organization unless agreed to by the

NCA. US commanders always maintain

the right and authority to report separately

and directly to higher US authorities,

regardless of the agreed authority of the

foreign commander over US forces. For

matters perceived as illegal under US or

international law, or outside the mandate

of the mission to which the United States

has agreed, US commanders will first

attempt resolution with the appropriate

foreign commanders. If issues remain

unresolved, the US commanders will

refer the matters to higher US authorities.

The chain of command from the

President to the lowest US commander

in the field remains inviolate. These same

considerations apply when foreign forces

are placed under the authority of a US

commander. Nations do not relinquish

their national interests by participating

in multinational operations. US

commanders must be prepared to deal

with these issues as they arise during an

operation.

f. Multinational Force Commander. The

commander of the multinational force may

be a serving commander of a military arm of

an alliance when the alliance conducts the

multinational operation, or a commander

nominated by the nation providing the

preponderance of forces and resources and

approved by the other partners. The extent of

the multinational force commander’s authority

is determined by agreement of the

multinational participants and is seldom

absolute. As in the case of a joint US

headquarters, a multinational force

headquarters and staff should reflect the
VII-5

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

general composition of the force as a whole.

This includes all the essential areas of joint

and multinational operations competence, as

well as the unique partnership of individual

experts and representatives. The objective of

the command team is to unify the various

participating force elements and assure

harmonious operations and effective unified

action.

g. Multinational Command Structures.

Formal alliances typically establish integrated

command structures, with participation

reflecting the composition of the alliance.

Alliances may also place their forces under

the command of one participant; the lead

nation with the preponderance of the force.

Temporary coalitions formed to pursue

specific, limited multinational operations

generally rely on three types of command

structures: parallel command, lead nation

command, and a combination of the two. In

terms of components, multinational

commands may be composed of national

commands with subordinate Service

components and functional components,

multinational functional component

commands with subordinate national

functional commands, or other combinations

tailored to the situation and capabilities of

partners.

• In a parallel command, participating

countries retain command and control of

their deployed forces. Unity of effort and

unified action are effected through

multinational coordinating councils at the

level of the national commanders, with

tactical control of individual national

components being assigned to other

national commanders under bilateral

agreements.

• In a lead nation command, participants

subordinate their forces to the

commander of the partner providing the

preponderance of forces and resources.

• Parallel and lead nation command

structures may exist simultaneously in a

multinational operation. This

combination may occur when two or

more partners control a number of

participants.

Typically, a multinational authority with

representatives of heads of state or

government (the NCA in the case of the

Multinational partners must provide the multinational force commander

sufficient authority to achieve unity of effort.
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operations is the effective integration and

employment of all assets provided toward

the achievement of common objectives.

Early in multinational operational

planning, efforts to achieve a level of

standardization and interoperability

should be made through the provision of

training assistance, liaison teams, sharing

of resources, and providing entire units

for support in functional areas of

deficiency (air defense, fire support, and

armor are examples). An important

concern of the commander is obtaining

the maximum effectiveness from the

multinational force in accomplishing the

mission. When forces have disparate

capabilities, mission assignments should

optimize force effectiveness. To the

extent possible, forces with greater

capabilities should not be constrained by

forces with lesser capabilities. To reduce

disparities among participating forces,

minimum capability standards should be

established and a certification process

developed. Identified shortcomings

should be satisfied by either bilateral or

multilateral support agreements.

• Multinational commanders must give

high priority to planning and conducting

training events and rehearsals for key

aspects of the planned operation in order

to assure requisite overall force readiness

and interoperability.

“ . . .we need an agreed way for doctrine

to capture how we deal with

multinational and interagency

operations. The EUCOM experiences

. . . have indicated that training and

shared ideas (about such issues as

operations, organization, and

commitment to civilian control of the

military) are paramount to multinational

and interagency operations. And the

key to the military aspects of

multinational operations is doctrine.”

GEN George A. Joulwan, USA

United States) provides common strategic

direction to the multinational military

command. For the United States, the NCA

retains its command relationship directly to

the combatant commander when acting as US

force commander.

4. Considerations

In addition to the strategic context, there

are considerations for multinational unity of

effort that are based on political, military,

legal, and civil-military aspects of the

participating countries and civilian

organizations operating in the theater. It is

important to take these considerations into

account in initial planning for the formation

of the multinational endeavor when it is not

conducted by an existing alliance that has

already shaped its procedures.

a. Political and Military Considerations.

International and domestic political

imperatives influence the behavior of national

political and military leaders and

organizations in multinational operations. It

is unrealistic to expect that strongly held

national perspectives and preferences would

be set aside entirely in favor of a common

multinational formula. Therefore, the forms

of participation, decision making, and

assignment of military tasks may have to be

adapted to accommodate important national

needs. Multinational force commanders must

be aware of the differences in political

constraints and military capabilities of the

forces under their direction and establish

procedures and assign tasks accordingly.

Commanders will routinely work directly with

political authorities in the theater of

operations. The commander’s role as

diplomat should not be underestimated.

• Among the most important military

considerations are the doctrine, level of

training, leadership style, and hardware

types and capabilities of the participants.

A basic challenge in multinational
VII-7

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

support military forces in peace and war. As

in the case of US interagency operations,

combatant commanders must be cognizant of

these organizations and their actions. To the

extent possible, commanders should assure

that these organizations’ efforts and the

military efforts are integrated, complementary,

or not in conflict; and establish coordination

and mutual support mechanisms as needed to

eliminate or mitigate conflict and support US

goals in the region. Since the NGOs and

PVOs in the operational area may not have a

defined structure for controlling activities, the

multinational command may establish liaison

sections, assessment teams, civil-military

operations centers, humanitarian assistance

coordination centers, and logistic operations

centers as required. Other civil affairs support

may also be required and should be provided,

as resources permit, by the United States and

other participating countries.

“Instead of thinking about warfighting

agencies like command and control,

you create a political committee, a civilmilitary operations center (CMOC) to

interface with volunteer organizations.

These become the heart of your

operations, as opposed to a combat or

fire-support operations center.”

Gen A.C. Zinni, USMC

• Of prime importance in multinational

operations is the integration of separate

command, control, communications, and

computer systems; intelligence; and

logistic systems. Normally, national

forces maintain separate intelligence and

logistic structures. Unless alliance

structures already exist to integrate these

vital functional areas, multinational

commanders must establish effective

coordination mechanisms, realizing that

US capabilities are likely to be more

capable and sophisticated than those of

most other participating forces. The US

combatant commander must understand

what US intelligence may be shared and

ensure that the process is in place to

provide that intelligence in a timely

manner to the level needed by other

participants. Similarly with logistics, the

US combatant commander must know

what US resources may be made

available, on routine or emergency basis,

to other forces with vital needs.

b. Integration of International

Organizations (IOs), NGOs, PVOs, and

Contractors. Many host country

governmental and civilian agencies, IOs,

NGOs, PVOs, and civilian contractors

routinely carry out activities to assist in nation

development, ameliorate suffering, and
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER VIII

ADDRESSING THE FUTURE

VIII-1

The Armed Forces of the United States

simultaneously participate in shaping the

strategic environment to prevent war, respond

when deterrence fails, and prepare for an

uncertain future. Mindful of the lessons of

the past, the Armed Forces maintain required

core competencies, identify future challenges,

and transform forces to meet those challenges.

An essential element in addressing the future

is the development of operational concepts

that focus on the challenges that joint forces

may encounter. These concepts should seek

to exploit US national advantages, enable

dominance against any adversary and

circumstance across the range of military

operations, and reduce the likelihood of

surprise. Concepts for the future should not

be constrained by current joint doctrine; rather,

joint doctrine provides the foundation and

point of departure for thinking about future

American military power.

The Services and USSOCOM have the

primary responsibility for future force

development, and the functional defense

agencies have the responsibility of providing

specified combat support services to

warfighting forces. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff — in consultation with the

other members of the JCS and the combatant

commanders — has a special responsibility

for identifying, providing assessments of, and

providing guidance for meeting the challenges

that may face joint forces in the future. To

guide joint initiatives focused on the future,

the Chairman periodically disseminates a joint

“If successful war-making depended upon masses of men, this country would

be at least fourth down the list of world powers. If it depended on worldgirdling colonies, possessions, and sea bases, we should definitely have to

take secondary position. But when it depends upon technological progress,

mass production and men capable of intelligent use of intricate machines,

we are in a field where America can be second to none.”

Gen Jimmy Doolittle, USAF

vision document. This document is the basis

for studies and analyses, including joint

concept development and experimentation

which identify plausible future operational

capabilities and explore the challenges across

the range of military operations that may

confront the Armed Forces of the United

States.

1. Identifying Future

Challenges

a. The joint process in place to assist in

shaping the future is focused on contemporary

projections of future challenges. These

challenges address many areas essential for

developing and fielding military forces for

joint operations, including concepts and

doctrine, organizational design, education and

training for individuals and units, leader

development, logistic support, personnel, and

facilities. The concepts for overcoming the

challenges should assume a range of

adversaries, from the most primitive to peer

competitors able to threaten US interests and

engage US forces directly and indirectly in

symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare.

b. Advanced technologies alone will not

win future wars. Properly led, trained, and

equipped people from all the Services will

remain the surest guarantor of success in war.

Therefore, in developing joint concepts for

the future, it is important to maintain a mix of

the scientific and technological, and the

human dimension.
VIII-2

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• The American experience has produced

global leadership in science and

technology. Technological innovation

has been an important catalyst for change

for the United States and has been a major

contributor to American military power.

To shape and harness future technology

for military use, joint and Service

programs should focus on three

fundamental requisites.

•• First, the Armed Forces must remain

abreast of the leading edge of American

and foreign science and technology so

that new developments and their promise

can be professionally incorporated into

military statements of future

requirements.

•• Second, identify those challenges that

may not be overcome in the future

without technological breakthroughs.

Since the civil sector will not necessarily

pursue challenges that are unique to

military operations, governmentsponsored research and development

must do so.

•• Third, the design of future capabilities

must avoid dependence on unique

systems whose malfunction may result

in mission failure.

• Perennial challenges for joint,

multinational, and interagency operations

are the interoperability of the elements

and the integration of their capabilities.

Concepts designed for future operations

should address these challenges along

two paths.

•• One would provide for common

development of capabilities for military

organizations across Services, agencies,

and commands so that their resulting

capabilities are inherently interoperable.

•• The second should allow for adapting

extant capabilities that were not

developed in common to assure

interoperability. Both approaches are

essential and should not be viewed as

being mutually exclusive. The United

States does not know now with whom it

may want to engage in cooperative

military operations in the future. While

the logic of maximum common

development clearly applies to the Armed

Forces of the United States, it cannot

apply to all potential interagency and

multinational partners with whom

operations may be necessary. As a

consequence, the Armed Forces of the

United States must remain abreast of

developments in the civilian sector so that

civil-military integration may be readily

achieved in the future. Continuous

liaison with civilian centers of

innovation, including educational and

research institutions, can take advantage

of the pace and scope of American

technological progress and offer the

promise of synergy and reduced costs.

Similarly, cooperation with foreign

pacesetters in the fields of military art and

civilian science and technology offer

similar benefits for future multinational

interoperability.

• In developing concepts and harnessing

technology for the future, the Armed

Forces of the United States must be aware

of the progress of potential adversaries

and multinational partners in order to

avoid circumstances in which the least

capable partner defines the combat

potential of the entire multinational force.

The requirements of future

interoperability may require the sharing

of technology, education, and training

programs with potential partners. In all

cases, the Armed Forces of the United

States must maintain the ability to operate
VIII-3

Addressing the Future

effectively unilaterally as well as with

multinational partners, regardless of their

capabilities.

• Interoperability cannot rely solely on

technology. Joint concepts must take into

account modes of operations and the

traditions of all military forces as well as

the human factor that is a dominant

characteristic of the culture. In future

joint and multinational operations, as in

the present, the simple exchange of

liaison elements may be the most

important guarantee of interoperability.

• American military men and women of

the future will reflect the characteristics

of the Nation’s citizenry: its values, ethnic

and cultural diversity, intellect and

initiative, and thirst for advancement

based on equality and respect for human

rights. Worldwide trends and

characteristics in civilian and military

demography, values, and infrastructures

will shape the environment and the

military organizations of potential

adversaries and partners. Joint concepts

for future operations must incorporate the

projected human dimensions.

“Well, the main thing — that I have

remembered all my life — is the

definition of esprit de corps. Now my

definition — the definition I was taught,

and I’ve always believed in — is that

esprit de corps means love for one’s

military legion, in my case the United

States Marine Corps. I also learned

that this loyalty to one’s Corps travels

both ways, up and down.”

LtGen Louis “Chesty” Puller,

USMC

• It will be American military personnel

who employ new technologies and fill

any gaps in interoperability. Future

concepts must account for people as the

most important national resource and

contribute to an environment in which

they can succeed and take pride in their

profession. Retention of trained

individuals will continue to be essential

to military effectiveness as technology

advances.

2. Preparing for Change and

the Future

Shaping the future in the present calls for a

blend of continuity and audacious innovation.

a. Analysis supported by modeling,

simulation, and experimentation has a vital

role in developing the future Armed Forces

of the United States. Modeling and simulation

are useful in representing conceptual systems

that do not yet exist and systems that cannot

be subjected to actual experimentation

because of safety requirements and the

limitations of resources and facilities.

Experimentation assists in illuminating areas

that theory alone cannot resolve. Some

uncertainties cannot be removed without

empirical evidence; experimentation coupled

with sound military judgment can help

provide that evidence.

b. The Services have been, and will

continue to be, actively involved in

experimentation to help define their futures.

At the same time, a vigorous joint

experimentation program is necessary to

support the requirements of joint,

multinational, and interagency operations.

The USJFCOM is the DOD executive agent,

and is responsible to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for joint warfighting

experimentation. Joint experimentation is a

concepts-based process focused on the

capabilities required by future JFCs. It should

keep in view developments in US and foreign

civilian and military centers of innovation.

While joint experimentation with all US
VIII-4

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JP 1

participants is clearly necessary, it should lay

the groundwork for future multinational

interoperability with potential partners.

c. Educational and research institutions,

military and civilian, have a significant role

in the preparation of the Armed Forces of the

United States for change and the future.

Civilian universities and military education

institutions have unique capabilities,

especially in concept development and

experimentation. With their resident expertise

in wide areas of knowledge, educational and

research institutions are sources of conceptual

proposals for transforming the future force and

may serve well as a sounding board for

proposed concepts and other initiatives

developed by the Armed Forces of the United

States. These institutions have extensive

capabilities for simulations, wargames,

seminars, symposia, experimentation, and

other thoughtful civil-military collaborative

efforts for concept and force developments.

d. Military interaction with civilian

institutions can also play an important role in

preparing the Armed Forces for the future by

maintaining links to the civilian sector, as well

as helping academicians better understand and

appreciate the role of the military instrument

in modern society. American educational

institutions are primary sources of cultural

assimilation, intellectual innovation, and

societal progress. Schools and colleges are

also the instruments that shape many of the

attitudes and much of the personal capability

of the men and women who constitute the

Armed Forces of the United States. American

educational and research institutions have a

vital and irreplaceable role in shaping the

future military capability of the United States.

3. Transforming the Force

a. Transforming the Armed Forces of the

United States for future action across the range

of military operations has evolutionary and

revolutionary dimensions. Organizations that

maintain readiness for current operations and

contingencies may be limited to

transformation at an evolutionary rate of

change. Organizations that can suspend

current activities may be able to sustain a

revolutionary high rate of change. An

approach that permits American military

power to maintain a required readiness level

while accepting rapid change is one that

differentiates between the organizations

charged with responsibilities for the present

and those responsible for innovating for the

Joint experimentation is a concepts-based process focused on the

capabilities required by future JFCs.
VIII-5

Addressing the Future

future. Transforming the Armed Forces of

the United States, then, requires a carefully

designed mix of current readiness and

experimentation for the future, of stability and

innovation. Organizations responsible for

instantaneous response to unforeseeable

threats cannot be experimental laboratories.

Experimental laboratories cannot be expected

to support ongoing military requirements of

the combatant commands or the Services.

Plans and programs for transformation

must simultaneously enhance the current

force, facilitate evolution of the projected

next force, and creatively invent the force

after next.

b. The products of analysis, modeling,

simulation, and joint experimentation support

the development of recommendations for

change by the Armed Forces of the United

States in the areas of concepts and doctrine,

organizational design, education, and training

for individuals and units, leader development,

materiel, personnel, and facilities. To harness

technology most effectively in the

development of future materiel, co-evolution

is essential among all these areas. In other

words, future force development calls for an

integrated system in which a change in any

area is reconciled with the others. Their

interrelationships must be addressed

simultaneously. Consequently, concepts for

future joint operations must not focus on any

one area to the exclusion of the others. Each

of the areas contains the potential for

significant enhancement of US military

capabilities.

c. Shaping the future of joint American

military power calls for the integration of

efforts across five groups of institutions that

can contribute to this outcome.

• The Services and USSOCOM that are

primarily responsible for future force

development, and the defense agencies

that are tasked to provide combat support

capabilities to US forces.

• The combatant commands and other joint

organizations whose responsibility it is to

ensure the interoperability and coherency

of the Armed Forces of the United States

across the range of military operations.

• Multinational partners.

• The nonmilitary agencies of government

and the civilian community, each with

unique roles in shaping and

complementing military power.

• Industry.

In conjunction with the co-evolution of all

force development areas, the integration of

these five groups is essential to a successful

transformation of the Armed Forces of the

United States. Together, they provide sources

of future concept and force development.

d. Addressing the future of American

military power, above all, calls for aggressive

pursuit of new ideas. Those individuals and

institutions charged with shaping the future

must be able to think freely, to exploit success

along the way and to be free to fail as well.

Joint concepts for future operations provide

a basis for the development of future joint

forces, and assist the Services in developing

their future forces for joint, multinational, and

interagency operations.

“We face challenges today not greatly

different from ancient warfighters, but

we have added some new wrinkles. As

technology has improved, distances

and time have shrunk. The tempo of

warfighting has increased over the last

several decades; and the range,

accuracy, and kinds of weaponry have

greatly improved. But some challenges

will never change. Commanders at all

levels need to understand the enemy,

to know their own forces, to establish

warfighting goals and objectives, and

to lead men and manage battles while

suffering the fog and friction of war.”

Gen Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., USAF
VIII-6

Chapter VIII

JP 1

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

A-1

1. General

The estimate process is central to

formulating and updating military options,

plans, and actions to meet the requirements

of any situation. Commanders and staffs at

all levels should use the estimate process.

Though its central framework for organizing

inquiry and decision is essentially the same

for any level of command, specific detailed

questions within each part of this framework

will vary depending on the level and type of

action or operation contemplated. This

framework is presented below. Specific

material appropriate to national-level strategic

activities has been added to flesh out the basic

framework for readers of this publication.

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

• Determine the NCA’s intent for the

Armed Forces of the United States.

Analyze presidential and other relevant

national-level statements, guidance,

policies, and strategies, including longand short-term objectives.

• Determine the President’s intent for

military and nonmilitary participants in

the contemplated action. Include other

instruments of national power

(diplomatic, economic, and

informational).

• Identify the requirements for support

between military and nonmilitary

participants in meeting the presidential

intent.

• Identify standing arrangements between

military and nonmilitary participants that

could facilitate accomplishing the

presidential intent.

• Determine specified and implied tasks,

and the priority that should be assigned

to the tasks.

b. Mission Statement

• Express in terms of who, what, when,

where (task parameters), and why

(purpose).

• Frame as a clear, concise statement of the

essential tasks to be accomplished and

the purpose to be achieved.

3. Situation and Courses of

Action

a. Situation Analysis

• Strategic Context

•• Domestic and international context:

political and diplomatic long-term and

short-term issues; international economic

issues; international informational issues;

international interests (reinforcing or

conflicting with US interests, including

positions of parties neutral to the

conflict); international law, positions of

international organizations; domestic

influences, including media access,

public information, competing demands

for resources, and national will; domestic

and international political, economic,

legal, and moral constraints; and other

competing or distracting domestic and

international situations.

•• Characteristics of the issue that affect

the battlespace, including: perspectives
A-2

Appendix A

JP 1

and interests of other participants and

opponents; unique military

characteristics; economics (organization,

industrial base, and mobilization

capacity); social conditions; and science

and technology factors affecting the

operational area.

• Analysis of the Adversary. Adversary

situation, including capabilities and

vulnerabilities (at the national level, the

intelligence community may have, or be

able to produce, a formal national

intelligence estimate). Analysis should

include the following:

•• Broad military COAs affecting the

issue that are currently being taken or

could be available in the future.

•• Political and military intentions and

objectives (to extent known).

•• Military national, strategic, and

operational advantages and limitations.

•• Possible domestic and international

military and nonmilitary support.

•• COGs (national, strategic, and

operational).

• Friendly Situation. Should follow the

same pattern used for the analysis of the

enemy. At the national level, this will

normally rely on supporting estimates

(including other participants’ situations)

and the relevant military personnel,

logistics, and command, control,

communications, and computer

estimates. Multinational and interagency

operations require specific analysis of

other partners’ objectives, capabilities,

and vulnerabilities.

• Restrictions. Those limitations to the

use or threat of use of the military

instrument of national power that are

imposed or necessary to support other

participants and other military worldwide

strategic requirements and associated

diplomatic, economic, and informational

efforts.

• Assumptions. Intrinsically important

factors on which the conduct of the

contemplated action is based. Their

articulation will facilitate periodic review,

validation, and modification, as lessons

learned from operations become

available.

• Deductions. Deductions from above

analysis should yield estimates of the

relative strength of the four

instruments of national power with

emphasis on the capabilities of the

military instrument in concerted action

with the other instruments, including

potential adversarial or other

capabilities that can detract from

mission accomplishment.

b. Courses of Action Analysis. COA

development is based on the above analysis

and a creative determination of how the

mission will be accomplished. Each COA

must be adequate, feasible, acceptable, and

contribute to the accomplishment of national

objectives. State all practical COAs open to

the Armed Forces of the United States that, if

successful, will accomplish the mission.

Generally, at the national level, each COA will

constitute a strategic concept and should

outline the following:

• Major national and strategic tasks to be

accomplished and the order in which they

are to be accomplished.

• Forces and other resources required.

• Support concept including military

logistic considerations.

• Force deployment concept, if required.
A-3

The Strategic Estimate

• Estimate of time required to achieve

presidential intent expressed as political

and military objectives.

• Concept for maintaining reserves, if

applicable.

• Consequences for other high priority

ongoing military activities.

4. Analysis of Opposing

Courses of Action

a. Determine the probable effect of possible

adversary COAs on the success of each

friendly COA.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly

manner: by nonmilitary participant, time

phasing, and functional event. Consider the

potential actions of subordinates two echelons

down.

c. Consider end state desired and

termination issues; think through own action,

adversary reaction, and friendly counteraction.

d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability,

adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional

requirements, if any; make required

modifications; list advantages and

disadvantages of each COA.

5. Comparison of Own Courses

of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages and

disadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governing

factors.

• Fixed values for military activities

(national policy and strategy, domestic

and international law, the principles of

war, and the fundamentals of joint

warfare).

• Other critical factors (for example, moral

and practical constraints).

• Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements of

different COAs into one.

6. Decision

Translate the selected COA into a concise

statement of what the Armed Forces of the

United States, as a whole, are to do and

explain, as may be appropriate, the

following elements: who, when, where,

how, and why.
A-4

Appendix A

JP 1

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

B-1

The principles of war guide warfighting at

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

They are the enduring bedrock of US military

doctrine.

1. Objective

a. The purpose of the objective is to direct

every military operation toward a clearly

defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

b. The objective of combat operations is

the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces’

capabilities or the enemy’s will to fight. The

objective of an operation other than war might

be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too

must be clear from the beginning. Objectives

must directly, quickly, and economically

contribute to the purpose of the operation.

Each operation must contribute to strategic

objectives. Avoid actions that do not

contribute directly to achieving the objective.

2. Offensive

a. The purpose of an offensive action is to

seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

b. Offensive action is the most effective and

decisive way to attain a clearly defined

objective. Offensive operations are the means

by which a military force seizes and holds the

initiative while maintaining freedom of action

and achieving decisive results. The

importance of offensive action is

fundamentally true across all levels of war.

c. Commanders adopt the defensive only

as a temporary expedient and must seek every

opportunity to seize or regain the initiative.

An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent

in the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate

the effects of combat power at the place and

time to achieve decisive results.

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and

integrate appropriate joint force capabilities

where they will have decisive effect in a short

period of time. Mass must often be sustained

to have the desired effect. Massing the effects

of combat power, rather than concentrating

forces, can enable even numerically inferior

forces to achieve decisive results and

minimize human losses and waste of

resources.

4. Economy of Force

a. The purpose of economy of force is to

allocate minimum essential combat power to

secondary efforts.

b. Economy of force is the judicious

employment and distribution of forces. It is

the measured allocation of available combat

power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense,

delays, deception, or even retrograde

operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere

at the decisive point and time.

5. Maneuver

a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the

enemy in a position of disadvantage through

the flexible application of combat power.

b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in

relation to the enemy to secure or retain

positional advantage, usually in order to

deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct

and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.
B-2

Appendix B

JP 1

Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off

balance and thus also protects the friendly

force. It contributes materially in exploiting

successes, preserving freedom of action, and

reducing vulnerability by continually posing

new problems for the enemy.

6. Unity of Command

a. The purpose of unity of command is to

ensure unity of effort under one responsible

commander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forces

operate under a single commander with the

requisite authority to direct all forces

employed in pursuit of a common purpose.

Unity of effort, however, requires

coordination and cooperation among all forces

toward a commonly recognized objective,

although they are not necessarily part of the

same command structure. In multinational

and interagency operations, unity of command

may not be possible, but the requirement for

unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of

effort — coordination through cooperation

and common interests — is an essential

complement to unity of command.

7. Security

a. The purpose of security is to never

permit the enemy to acquire unexpected

advantage.

b. Security enhances freedom of action by

reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts,

influence, or surprise. Security results from

the measures taken by commanders to protect

their forces. Staff planning and an

understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and

doctrine will enhance security. Risk is

inherent in military operations. Application

of this principle includes prudent risk

management, not undue caution. Protecting

the force increases friendly combat power and

preserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike the

enemy at a time or place or in a manner for

which it is unprepared.

b. Surprise can help the commander shift

the balance of combat power and thus achieve

success well out of proportion to the effort

expended. Factors contributing to surprise

include speed in decision making, information

sharing, and force movement; effective

intelligence; deception; application of

unexpected combat power; operations

security (OPSEC); and variations in tactics

and methods of operation.

9. Simplicity

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare

clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders

to ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successful

operations. Simple plans and clear, concise

orders minimize misunderstanding and

confusion. When other factors are equal, the

simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans

allows better understanding and execution

planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity

of expression greatly facilitate mission

execution by reducing the stress, fatigue, and

other complexities of modern combat and are

especially critical to success in combined

operations.
APPENDIX C

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

C-1

The principles of war, while principally

associated with combat operations, apply as

well to MOOTW. Given the range of

situations covered by MOOTW, the principles

of war require special interpretation. When

applied to MOOTW situations, the principles

of war and other relevant factors form the basis

for the principles of MOOTW. These are:

objective, unity of effort, security, restraint,

perseverance, and legitimacy.

1. Objective

a. Direct every military operation toward

a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable

objective.

b. Understand the strategic aims, set

appropriate objectives, and ensure that these

aims and objectives contribute to unity of

effort.

c. Define specific measures of mission

success.

d. Translate political guidance into

appropriate military objectives.

e. Maintain flexibility to adapt to changes

in political objectives.

2. Unity of Effort

a. Seek unity of effort in every operation.

b. Ensure that all means dedicated to the

MOOTW are directed to a common purpose.

c. Define command arrangements for

military and nonmilitary participants.

3. Security

a. Prevent hostile factions from acquiring

a military, political, or informational

advantage.

b. Focus on achieving and maintaining

freedom of action.

c. Maintain vigilance; all forces have an

inherent right of self-defense.

d. Maintain OPSEC.

e. Make provision for protection of

civilians and participating agencies and

organizations.

4. Restraint

a. Apply appropriate military capability

prudently.

b. Make judicious use of force, applying

the principle of proportionality.

c. Gain and maintain the initiative while

adhering to the ROE; ensure periodic review

of the ROE and recommend changes when

appropriate.

5. Perseverance

a. Prepare for the measured, protracted

application of military capability in support

of strategic aims.

b. Remain patient, resolute, and persistent

in pursuit of US and multinational objectives.
C-2

Appendix C

JP 1

c. Integrate military actions with

diplomatic, economic, and informational

efforts.

6. Legitimacy

a. Committed forces must sustain the

legitimacy of the operation and of the host

government, where applicable.

b. Legitimacy is based on the legality,

morality, and rightness of the actions

undertaken.

c. Adhere to objectives, ensuring actions

are appropriate to the situation, and exhibit

fairness in dealing with competing factions.

d. Attend to the perspectives of the

citizenry in the area of operations, particularly

their views of the legitimacy of their

government and of the MOOTW.
APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,

116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address

content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Directorate for

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 1, 10 January 1995, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces

of the United States.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint

Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC

20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested

to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in

this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________
D-2

Appendix D

JP 1

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication

centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint

publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,

Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned

administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,

Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL

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Attn: Joint Publications

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Commander

USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102

Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)

116 Lake View Parkway

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information

Security Program.
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and CINCs

Includes scope of

project, references,

milestones, and who will

develop drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, CINC, or Joint

Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

 The CINCs receive the JP and

begin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director, J-7,

will solicit a written report from

the combatant commands and

Services on the utility and

quality of each JP and the

need for any urgent changes or

earlier-than-scheduled

revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each JP is

revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision



ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff

to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

CINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive







STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as

shown in the chart above. is a joint doctrine capstone publication. The diagram

below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 1

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS C4 SYSTEMS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint

Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal

staffing for approval as a JP

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

 Lead Agent selects Primary Review

Authority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,

Services, and Joint Staff







STEP #3

Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINT

WARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF