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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

JAMES MCGUFFEY,

 Plaintiff.

v.

BRINK’S, INC.,

 Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 05-2840

JAMES MCGUFFEY,

 Plaintiff.

v.

BRINK’S, INC.

 Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 07-2299

August __ , 2009 Anita B. Brody, J.

MEMORANDUM

James McGuffey sued Brink’s Inc. (“Brinks”), for employment discrimination and

prevailed on several counts after a jury trial. He then filed a petition for attorney’s fees that I

granted. Now McGuffey has filed a supplemental motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. #103). His

attorney Carmen Matos seeks a fee award for her work replying to Brinks’s response to the

original fee petition and preparing the supplemental fee petition. Because I find her claimed

hours of work reasonable, I will grant the motion. 

The facts of this case and the law related to fee awards are extensively reviewed in my

prior opinion McGuffey v. Brink’s, Inc., 598 F.Supp.2d 659 (E.D.Pa. 2009). In brief, a

Case 2:05-cv-02840-AB Document 236 Filed 08/11/09 Page 1 of 5
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prevailing party is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 29

U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 626(b). A court calculates the proper amount by multiplying the number of

hours reasonably expended on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

In my previous opinion, I determined that $400 per hour was a reasonable rate for Matos,

given her experience and expertise. McGuffey, 598 F.Supp.2d at 670. Now, I must evaluate the

hours of work for which she now seeks compensation. See Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,

273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is necessary that the Court go line, by line, by line

through the billing records supporting the fee request.”). Here, the court should “review the time

charged, decide whether the hours set out were reasonably expended for each of the particular

purposes described and then exclude those that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary.” Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillian Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir.

1998) (internal quotations omitted).

Matos seeks a fee award for 45.10 hours. She spent 41.6 hours defending the original fee

petition and 3.5 hours preparing the supplemental fee petition and reply. Brinks does not

specifically contest these hours but only objects in general to any supplemental award. Matos

provided documentation (Pl.’s Ex. B) showing that she spent 8.5 hours doing research, 4.3 hours

reviewing depositions and Brinks’s response to the original fee petition, 27.2 hours drafting the

reply, 0.1 hours communicating with opposing counsel, 0.4 hours communicating with the court,

1.1 hours communicating with McGuffey, and 3.5 hours preparing the supplemental fee petition

and reply. I find these hours reasonable. Brinks’s response to the original petition was lengthy

and complex, requiring time and effort to address. Also, the dispute included numerous exhibits. 

Case 2:05-cv-02840-AB Document 236 Filed 08/11/09 Page 2 of 5
 Brinks also argues that it has been unfairly blamed by McGuffey for incurring hours and costs 1

spent in response to the defendant’s “zealous defense.” As I have determined the hours

expended to be reasonable, blame is not an issue. 

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Because this work was completed after the original fee petition was filed, Matos needed to

submit a supplemental fee petition. In response to McGuffey’s succint motion for additional

fees, Brinks filed another lengthy response, which required Matos’s time and effort to defend. 

For these reasons, I conclude that her claimed hours are reasonable. 

Brinks makes several arguments against awarding any supplemental fee. First, Brinks 1

contends that the supplemental fee petition is untimely under Rule 54(d)(2)(B), which provides

that “a party must file a motion for attorney’s fees no later than fourteen days after the judgment

is entered unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

54(d)(2)(B). Brinks maintains that the 14-day period began with the initial judgment on June 17,

2008, which established McGuffey as the prevailing party. For purposes of a petition for

supplemental fees, however, the relevant event is the “entry of the judgment that required the

prevailing party to incur the additional fees.” Bernback v. Greco, Nos. 05-4642, 05-4643, 2007

WL 108293, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 2007). Thus, the relevant judgment here was rendered on

February 10, 2009, when I ruled on the original fee petition (Doc. #200 in 05-2840; Doc. #79 in

07-2299). McGuffey filed the supplemental fee petition only two days later, thus falling well

within the 14-day period. Therefore, McGuffey did not violate Rule 54(d)(2)(B). 

Second, Brinks maintains that the amended fee petition should be denied on the grounds

that McGuffey failed to satisfy Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(iii), which provides that a claimant must

“include a specific amount sought or provide a fair estimate.” Because I previously determined a

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reasonable rate of $400 per hour for Matos and because McGuffey provided the number of hours

reasonably expended, the amount of fees requested could be determined by a simple calculation. 

Therefore, the defendant cannot reasonably claim that it did not know the amount sought by the

plaintiff. 

Third, Brinks argues that by granting the plaintiff’s supplemental fee petition, the court

creates a situation where a prevailing party may indefinitely claim “fees on fees on fees...,” thus

opening the door for endless litigation of fee petitions. However, a fee award encompasses all

aspects of civil litigation, including separate litigation over the availability and size of a fee

award. Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990). 

Furthermore, district courts are not only “obliged to award reasonable attorney’s fees under the

ADEA,” but are also obliged to award fees for time spent litigating the statutory right to fees. 

Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, North America LLC, 497 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2007). 

Failing to do so effectively decreases the attorney’s overall rate for hours expended on a case. 

See Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1979), aff’d, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (stating that

attorneys are to be compensated for time spent litigating attorney’s fees). Amended fee petitions

have consistently been granted where the court determines them reasonable in light of the course

of litigation. See David v. City of Scranton, 633 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the

district court’s refusal to award additional fees for time spent litigating an opposed fee

application is inconsistent with established precedent). See Steward v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 02-

8921, 2008 WL 1899995 (E.D. Pa. April 29, 2008) (holding that a fee award encompasses all

aspects of a party’s successful litigation, including the preparation and defense of a fee petition). 

Case 2:05-cv-02840-AB Document 236 Filed 08/11/09 Page 4 of 5
 McGuffey submitted receipts for binding and shipping supplies, copies, and postage. (Pl.’s 2

Ex. C). I find these costs reasonable.

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See Commissioner, 496 U.S. at 161 (holding that the time counsel spends preparing a fee petition

is compensable if the hours are not excessive).

Finally, Brinks contends that any fees awarded should be reduced by 11% to reflect the

limited success of the plaintiff’s original fee petition. “A fee award should not be reduced simply

because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised” in the course of litigation. 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Furthermore, “where a plaintiff has achieved excellent results, his

attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. In this case, the award of $389,000 in

original attorney’s fees was an excellent result, achieved through a competent and extensive

effort by Matos. Although McGuffey did not recover 100% of the fees requested in the original

fee petition, I see no reason to apply the same discount to his supplemental request merely

because he did not succeed on every contention. 

In conclusion, I found that the rate of $400 per hour is reasonable and that the hours

reasonably incurred are 45.1 hours. Thus, the proper amount is $18,040. Furthermore, I rejected

the defendant’s arguments against awarding this supplemental fee. I also award $234.18 in

costs. Therefore, the motion will be granted. 2

s/Anita B. Brody

_________________________

ANITA B. BRODY, J.

Copies VIA ECF on _________ to: Copies MAILED on _______ to:

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