1

 Donald Bealer’s wife, Marianne C. Bealer, was originally included as a plaintiff in this

action. However, this court dismissed her as a plaintiff in an earlier decision.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DONALD A. BEALER, individually and d/b/a BEALER

CONSULTING,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE and INLAND

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 04-5915

Memorandum and Order

YOHN, J. February ___, 2006

Defendants The Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Insurance Company; The Franklin

Homeowners Assurance Company; FHA Holding Company; Mike Petrelia; and Frank McCall

have filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that: 1) plaintiff’s claims regarding

breach of contract, except those claims concerning contracts allegedly breached in 2003, are

barred by the statute of limitations; and 2) plaintiff’s claims regarding intentional interference

with contractual relations are either barred by the statute of limitations or totally without merit. 

For the reasons that follow, I will grant defendants’ motion. 

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Pro se plaintiff1 Donald A. Bealer (“Bealer”) is an actuary whose business, Bealer

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Consulting, was engaged at various times from 1997 until 2003 to provide actuarial services for

defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff is a citizen of New Jersey. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendants

Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Insurance Company (“Mutual Fire”); Franklin Homeowners

Assurance Company (“FHA”); and FHA Holding Company are Pennsylvania corporations with

their principal places of business in Pennsylvania. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Defendants Mike Petrelia and

Frank McCall are corporate officers of Mutual Fire. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.)

The following account of events is derived from plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 

Bealer’s business relationship with Mutual Fire, FHA, and FHA Holding Company began with

an informal, oral agreement as to hours and rates for consulting work. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) This

informal agreement was later memorialized in a written consulting agreement, which was

executed on February 25, 1997. (Id. at Ex. 3(c)-3(m).) The terms of the written agreement,

which was drafted by defendants, were more restrictive than the terms of the oral agreement, and

less advantageous to plaintiff—for example, with respect to allowed billables. (Id. at ¶ 23.) This

was an initial point of contention between the parties, but Bealer signed the agreement

nevertheless and began work for Mutual Fire and FHA. (Id.)

The written agreement, which expired in June of 1997, was renewed by addendum for a

term to begin on December 1, 1997 and end on December 31, 1997. (Id. at Ex. 4(a)-4(b).) After

the renewal expired, Bealer performed additional work for defendants over the course of several

years, pursuant to the terms of project-specific engagement letters, which outlined the scope of

work, the rate of compensation, and the number of hours estimated to complete the work. (Id. at

Ex. 5a (letter dated September 9, 1998); Ex. 7(f) (letter dated October 27, 2000); Ex. 7(g) (letter

dated November 10, 1999); Ex. 8(a) (letter dated December 21, 2002); Ex. 9(b) (letter dated July

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3

10, 2003).)

At various points during plaintiff’s business relationship with defendants, disputes arose

over hours billed, payments due, and the contents of reports. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-32.) There

were disagreements over whether Bealer had met his contractual obligations and whether

defendants had met theirs. (Id.) Defendants delayed payment for reports, pending the

completion of revisions that plaintiff believed to be unreasonable, inaccurate, and wasteful of his

time and energy. (Id.) Some invoices were not paid in full. (Id.) Bealer threatened to delay or

withhold reports, pending payment for past work. (Id.) He spent considerable time trying to

resolve these disputes, causing him to neglect work for other clients. (Id.) He experienced stress

and stress-related health problems that he attributes to the protracted conflicts he had with

defendants. (Id.)

Over time, the relationship between Bealer and defendants deteriorated irretrievably,

resulting in plaintiff filing a pro se complaint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in

August 2004. Defendants filed preliminary objections, which were sustained, and the complaint

was dismissed on November 30, 2004 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, but without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to file an Amended Complaint pleading

cognizable causes of action within twenty days of the date of the order. In lieu of filing an

Amended Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, plaintiff filed suit in this court on December

20, 2004, basing subject matter jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. Bealer filed an Amended

Complaint on April 18, 2005. The Amended Complaint brought nine counts: (1) breach of

contract, (2) negligence, (3) slander, (4) libel, (5) negligent misrepresentation, (6) intentional

interference with contractual relations, (7) fraud, (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress,

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and (9) civil RICO. 

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 6, 2005, and this court partially granted

the motion, dismissing counts (2), (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), and (9). See Bealer v. Mutual Fire,

Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1819971 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2005). Additionally, the court

found that count (1) could not be maintained against individual defendants Mike Petrelia and

Frank McCall. Accordingly, only a breach of contract claim against the corporate defendants and

the intentional interference with contractual relations claim survived this stage.

On October 12, 2005, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The

defendants argue that Bealer’s breach of contract claim, except insofar as it concerns contracts

that were allegedly breached in 2003, is time barred. The defendants also argue that Bealer’s

intentional interference with contractual relations claims are either time barred or entirely without

merit. As described below, the court will grant the defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment. 

II. Legal Standard

A court may only grant a motion for summary judgement, “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). “Facts that could alter the outcome are ‘material,’

and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” Ideal Dairy

Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

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When a court evaluates a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the

non-movant is to be believed.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In

addition, “[a]ll justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the non-movant’s] favor.” Id.

“Summary judgment may not be granted . . . if there is a disagreement over what inferences can

be reasonably drawn from the facts even if the facts are undisputed.” Ideal Dairy, 90 F.3d at 744

(citation omitted). However, “an inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not

create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment.” Robertson v.

Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990). The non-movant must show more

than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” for elements on which she bears the burden

of production. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Thus, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations

omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Breach of Contract Claims

In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for contract actions is four years. 42 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 5525(8). The statute of limitations period begins to run from the time of the breach

of contract. Romeo & Sons, Inc. v. P.C. Yezbak & Son, Inc., 652 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1995)

(citations omitted). However, “[u]nder Pennsylvania’s discovery rule, the statute of limitations

will not begin to run until ‘the plaintiff reasonably knows, or reasonably should know: (1) that he

has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.’” In re

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 The statute of limitations can also be tolled through equitable tolling, which operates

“(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of

action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or

her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong

forum." In re Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 382 F.3d 325, 338-39 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Oshiver

v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994). However, plaintiff has

not asserted equitable tolling and it does not appear applicable to his case. 

6

Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 382 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106,

1116 (3d Cir. 1996). The discovery rule will only toll the statute of limitations in cases where

the plaintiff shows that he or she has exercised “‘reasonable diligence’ in ascertaining the

existence of the injury and its cause.” Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 925 (3d Cir. 1991). 

Bealer commenced this action on December 20, 2004. Accordingly, any claims that

concern contracts that were allegedly breached before December 20, 2000 will be time barred

under the applicable statute of limitations, unless Bealer can show that the statute of limitations

was tolled by the discovery rule.2

Three of Bealer’s breach of contract claims are time-barred. This includes: 1) any claim

relating to the contract Bealer executed with defendants in February of 1997, which he alleges

defendants breached by attempting to change terms and failing to pay him in a timely manner

(Am. Compl. ¶ 23; see also Am. Compl. Ex. 3c-3g); 2) any claim based on the actuarial opinion

and year-end report for 1997 that Bealer completed for defendants, which he alleges the

defendants breached by unnecessarily increasing his costs and then refusing to pay him for those

increases (Am. Compl. ¶ 24); and 3) any claim regarding Bealer’s 1999 project, which he alleges

the defendants breached by causing him to go over budget by being unresponsive to requests for

data and paying him $1,000 less than he deserved (Am. Compl. ¶ 26). Assuming that the

defendants did breach those three contracts, the statute of limitations began to run on the date of

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the breach. Bealer does not argue that he was unaware of his injuries or their causes; indeed, he

seems to have been constantly fighting with the defendants over the alleged breaches as they

occurred. Thus, since all of these alleged breaches took place before December 20, 2000

(according to Bealer himself) and the discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations, the

claims are time barred. 

Besides those three claims, Bealer’s only other breach of contract claims appear to

concern contracts that were allegedly breached in 2003. He has stated on several occasions that

he has not presented any claims alleging that a contract was breached in 2000, 2001, or 2002. In

Count 1 of Bealer’s Amended Complaint (entitled “breach of contract”) he only alleges

wrongdoing regarding 2003 contracts. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-34.) Additionally, in his deposition

testimony, he explained that he was not claiming any damages for breach of contract for the years

2000, 2001, or 2002. (Bealer Dep. 126:9, 127:2-3, 127:16-17.) Finally, in responding to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Bealer stated “It is important to note that there were

no contract claims in 2000, 2001, and 2002.” (Pl.’s Resp. 3 (emphasis in original).)

It appears that the only point of departure for the parties about the breach of contract

claim is a slight dispute as to how many contracts defendants allegedly breached in 2003. In

defendants’ summary judgment motion they state that the plaintiff alleged one contract was

breached (Defs’s Mot. Summ. J. 6); in his response, Bealer argues that two contracts were

breached in 2003 (Pl.’s Resp. 1). However, this distinction is not meaningful at this juncture. 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on this point pursuant only to the statute of

limitations, and the statute of limitations will not bar any contracts that were breached in 2003. 

Thus, this part of defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted, and all

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breach of contract claims besides the one or two concerning the 2003 contracts will be dismissed. 

B. Intentional Interference with Contract Claims

Pennsylvania courts have adopted § 766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which sets

out the elements of a claim for intentional interference with existing contractual relations. Adler,

Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1181-83 (Pa. 1978). This section of

the Restatement reads:

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract

(except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or

otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability

to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the third person’s failure

to perform the contract.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979); see also CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA

Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing standard). Hence, in order for

Bealer to establish that the defendants interfered with Bealer’s contracts with his clients, he must

prove that: (1) the defendants intended to harm Bealer’s contractual relations with his clients; (2)

the defendants acted improperly, i.e. they were not privileged to act the way they acted; (3) the

defendants induced or otherwise caused Bealer’s clients to not perform the contracts; and (4)

Bealer suffered pecuniary loss resulting from his clients’ failure to perform the contracts.

Pennsylvania courts apply a two-year statute of limitations to intentional interference with

contractual relations claims. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(3); see also CBD Occupational

Therapy, Inc., 357 F.3d at 383. The statute of limitations begins to run at the time that the cause

of action accrues. CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc., 357 F.3d at 383 (citing Bohus v. Beloff, 950

F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1991). “A claim under Pennsylvania law accrues at ‘the occurrence of the final

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 In his Amended Complaint, Bealer described his intentional interference with

contractual relations claim in six short paragraphs, none of which identified a specific contract

with which defendants were to have interfered. Because his Amended Complaint is so short on

detail, it is difficult to unravel the claims and determine the dates of each instance of alleged

interference. Indeed, in his deposition and exhibits, he has removed all information that would

serve to identify his clients because he fears that it would harm his business even further if the

defendants contacted those clients. Nonetheless, his deposition answers, which were in response

to pointed questions aimed to adduce specifics about the claim, remain the clearest explanation

of what exactly he is alleging. 

9

significant event necessary to make the claim suable.’” Id. at 384 (quoting Barnes v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 136 (3d Cir. 1998)). The discovery rule, as discussed above, also

applies. 

Bealer filed this action on December 20, 2004. Thus, any claims that accrued before

December 20, 2002 will be barred by the statute of limitations, unless the statute of limitations

was tolled by the discovery rule. 

Bealer’s most pronounced and well-defined claim of intentional interference is time

barred.3 He claims that he had a thriving practice during March and April of 2001, but his battles

with the defendants caused him to neglect his other clients and brought upon various health

problems, the combination of which eventually crippled his business. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64, 65;

Bealer Dep. 165:12-23.) He explained “I pretty much lost all these clients . . . most of them due

to events that started occurring after March of 2001.” (Bealer Dep. 65:18-23.) Thus, for this

claim, the statute of limitations began to run once the final event necessary to make the claim

suable occurred. CBD Occupational Therapy, Inc., 357 F.3d at 384. Evaluating the elements of

intentional interference, it seems that the final event will occur when the contractual relationship

between the plaintiff and the third party ceases. See id. at 383 (stating “the tort was not

consummated until the contract was terminated . . . and legal damage was sustained”). Here, the

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 Bealer also argues that the “[d]efendants filed this motion prior to completion of

discovery . . . knowing that I did not have a copy of the deposition and that I did not have proof

of contact with clients.” (Pl.’s Resp. 4.) However, the court issued a discovery order on October

20, 2005, and Bealer received all of the discovery documents before he filed his response. 

Additionally, his response attached pages of the deposition, so he also had access to that

information before he responded. Thus, it is not clear how he was harmed by the timing of the

filing. Bealer also seems to argue that he is still investigating his case. (Pl.’s Reply 1.) 

However, a Rule 56(f) motion is the appropriate manner in which to seek a delay. And, even if I

were to construe Bealer’s statement as a properly filed Rule 56(f) motion, he has failed to

provide any explanation for his laggard pace. The Third Circuit has explained that a party

seeking relief under Rule 56(f) must move beyond generalities and identify with specificity

“what particular information is sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment;

and why it has not been previously obtained.” Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir.

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tort was consummated when Bealer lost his clients, which he stated generally occurred in 2001. 

(Bealer Dep. 65:18-23.) In his deposition testimony, Bealer elaborated on these claims, and

described four clients that he lost during this time period: 1) a Pennsylvania insurance company,

which he lost in 2001 because his disability prevented him from completing work (Bealer Dep.

66:6-13); 2) a client from New Jersey, which he also lost in 2001 because he was late completing

work (Bealer Dep. 73:17-24); 3) the New Jersey Insurance Department, which he lost in 2001

(Bealer Dep. 80:19-25); and 4) an unnamed client, which he lost in 2000 (Bealer Dep. 75:16-23.)

Accordingly, based on Bealer’s own statements, the statute of limitations for all of these claims

began to run (at the latest) sometime in 2001. Also, since Bealer has presented no evidence

showing that he was unable to ascertain the existence or cause of these injuries, the discovery

rule does not toll the statute of limitations. Thus, any claims regarding these clients are time

barred. 

To the extent that Bealer presents intentional interference with contractual relations

claims that are not barred by the statute of limitations, he presents no evidence to support the

claims.4 Instead, his various arguments rest almost entirely on his own conjecture. Indeed, in the

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1989) (quoting Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 140 (3d. Cir. 1988)). Bealer has

offered none of those specifics; he continues to rely entirely on conjecture, and despite having

completed discovery, has shown no progress in adding layers of evidence to his speculative

complaint. Thus, I will rule upon his intentional interference with contractual relations claims at

this time. 

11

majority of Bealer’s claims of intentional interference, he does not allege that the defendants had

any interaction with his clients whatsoever, despite the Restatement’s requirement that the

defendant be guilty of “inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the

contract.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (emphasis added). 

For example, he argues that he was unable to complete work for an unnamed company

because the current lawsuit monopolized his time. (Bealer Dep. 140:23-24.) However, he has

presented no evidence whatsoever that the defendants somehow “induc[ed] or otherwise caus[ed]

the [unnamed company] not to perform the contract,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766,

rather Bealer himself was unable to perform. Further, Bealer is the plaintiff in this lawsuit and

presumably made the decision to represent himself; he cannot use his own tactical choices as

evidence of the defendants’ interference. Bealer also discussed a Florida self-insured company in

reference to this claim, but noted that he still has that company as a client. (Bealer Dep. 82:15.) 

There is no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of defendants as related to this company;

Bealer still has it as a client. Finally, Bealer claims that he did not get two other jobs because he

did not have the requisite recent experience. (Bealer Dep. 164:16-20, 165:3-7.) Again, Bealer

has offered no evidence at all that the defendants contacted these companies or somehow caused

the companies not to contract with him. Further, it is not enough that Bealer allege that he hoped

that he and these companies would contract, he must show “a reasonable likelihood or

probability that an anticipated business arrangement would have been consummated.” Advanced

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Power Systems, Inc. v. Hi-Tech Systems, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1450, 1459-60 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing

Cloverleaf Development, Inc. v. Horizon Financial F.A., 500 A.2d 163, 167 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1985)). Bealer has failed to present any evidence describing his likelihood of being chosen for

these jobs. Thus, a reasonable juror could not find that Bealer is correct on these issues and

summary judgment is appropriate. 

While Bealer has provided more information regarding his claim that defendants

interfered with his relationship with the Pennsylvania Insurance Department (“Department”),

even that claim is primarily “an inference based upon a speculation or conjecture [and thus] does

not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment.” Robertson,

914 F.2d at 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990). 

The Department, which regulates insurance firms, see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Insurance Department Mission Statement,

http://www.ins.state.pa.us/ins/lib/ins/whats_new/vision_mission_Poster.pdf (explaining that the

Department’s goal is to “provide a premier regulatory environment which promotes the best

insurance marketplace to serve consumers”), apparently also hired Bealer to examine certain

insurance companies (Bealer Dep. 39:3-6). The defendants have stated that they provided the

Department with a copy of Bealer’s Amended Complaint (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 3 n.2), and Bealer

claims that after that occurred, the Department’s attitude toward him changed (Bealer Dep. 35:8-

10). However, the defendants’ correspondence with the Department was entirely professional;

the Department regulates Pennsylvania insurance companies, so it was appropriate for the

defendants to alert the Department about nascent litigation. Further, the letters that the

defendants wrote to the Department about this topic were perfectly businesslike: they contained

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no derogatory statements about Bealer and evince no desire to harm Bealer. (See Pl.’s Resp. Ex.

B.) Indeed, in his deposition testimony, Bealer stated that it was not wrong of the defendants to

provide the Department with a copy of the complaint. (Bealer Dep. 150:12-13.) While Bealer

does appear certain that something untoward occurred during this correspondence, he presents no

evidence to support his suspicion. This fails to heed the Third Circuit’s warning that “[a]t

summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond

pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.” 

Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Further, even Bealer’s evidence of the Department’s purported change in attitude toward

him is based entirely on his own speculation and lacks a solid foundation of fact. Bealer alleges

that sometime after the Department received a copy of his complaint, it warned him that “if you

don’t have [the project completed] by this [date], we won’t be able to use you anymore.” (Bealer

Dep. 40:2-4.) Bealer alleges that this language was similar to that used by the defendants. 

(Bealer Dep. 40:2-5.) However, there is nothing unique or inappropriate about a company

emphasizing deadlines, so this does not demonstrate tampering on the part of defendants. 

Additionally, Bealer argues that of all his clients, only the Department and the defendants were

“overly concerned” about the narrative that he would write to explain his calculations. (Bealer

Dep. 41:7-10.) However, this does not show, in any way, that defendants “intentionally and

improperly interfere[d] with the performance of [the] contract” between Bealer and the

Department. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766. Moreover, in the email that Bealer provided

to illustrate this assertion, the Department’s discussion of the narrative seems completely

innocuous. The email states, “We need you to put your conversations and discussions into a

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written narrative format that we will be able to share with the Company. This is imperative so

we can explain our position to the Company and the rationale for our conclusions.” (Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. Ex. R7.) Accordingly, Bealer presents no evidence that his relationship with the

Department actually changed, let alone that it was damaged by the defendants. 

In sum, the statute of limitations bars Bealer’s primary intentional interference with

contractual relations claim. In presenting his other claims, he does no more than simply reassert

the factually unsupported allegations contained in his pleadings, see Jones, 214 F.3d at 402, and

fails to present any evidence to support his claim that the defendants were guilty of “inducing or

otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract,” Restatement (Second) of Torts §

766. Thus, his allegations could not support a reasonable jury’s finding that the defendants

intentionally interfered with his contractual relationships. Accordingly, defendants’ motion will

be granted and all of Bealer’s intentional interference with contractual relations claims will be

dismissed.

An appropriate order follows. 

Case 2:04-cv-05915-WY Document 50 Filed 02/02/06 Page 14 of 15
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DONALD A. BEALER, individually and d/b/a BEALER

CONSULTING,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE and INLAND

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 04-5915

Order

AND NOW, this _____ day of February, 2006, upon consideration of defendants’ motion

for partial summary judgment (Doc. No. 33), plaintiff’s response, defendants’ reply, and

plaintiff’s reply thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment is GRANTED and judgment is entered in favor of the defendants and against the

plaintiff on Count 6 of the amended complaint and on Count 1 of the amended complaint except

to the extent that it alleges a breach of a contract or contracts during 2003.

Trial on the remaining claim(s) in Count 1 is scheduled for May 15, 2006 at 10:00 a.m.

Defendants’ counsel shall call Magistrate Judge Charles B. Smith within 30 days of the

date of this order to arrange a settlement conference with Judge Smith sometime prior to the trial

date. 

__________________________

William H. Yohn, Jr., Judge

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