U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

92–500PDF 2004

SUDAN: PEACE AGREEMENT AROUND THE

CORNER?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 11, 2004

Serial No. 108–79

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota 

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Charles R. Snyder, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 7

The Honorable Roger P. Winter, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................................................................................... 11

J. Stephen Morrison, Ph.D., Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies ................................................................................... 28

Eric Reeves, Professor, Smith College ................................................................... 33

Pastor Gary Kusunoki, Founder/Chairman, Safe Harbor International Relief .. 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Charles R. Snyder: Prepared statement ...................................... 9

The Honorable Roger P. Winter: Prepared statement .......................................... 15

J. Stephen Morrison, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................. 30

Eric Reeves: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 35

Pastor Gary Kusunoki: Prepared statement ......................................................... 40

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 49

(1)

SUDAN: PEACE AGREEMENT AROUND THE 

CORNER? 

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m. In Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

The subject of today’s hearing is ‘‘Sudan: Peace Agreement 

Around the Corner?’’ I want to thank all of you for attending this 

hearing. 

Let me begin by saying that, as we examine the peace negotiations, we should all keep in mind what is at stake. The human toll 

has been staggering in Sudan. I think we all know there have been 

over 2 million dead in the conflict in Sudan. Millions have been displaced. We will never know how many victims there were of slavery, of persecution. We will never have an accounting of all of the 

atrocities. 

Let me also say there is no doubt where the responsibility for 

this calamity lies. This Congress is on record condemning the National Islamic Front Government of Sudan for genocide. It does not 

get clearer in my mind or starker than that. 

President Bush and his Administration deserve great credit in 

my view for energetically promoting the peace process. I think 

peace could be at hand. The Administration, frankly, has been bold 

and creative. The agreements that have been reached to stop the 

fighting and hold a referendum on unity are truly historic. 

The Administration realizes, though, that this progress is imperiled by the holdups in finalizing an agreement. Last May at our 

Subcommittee’s hearing on the Sudan Peace Act, I said that perpetual negotiations are not in the cards. Unfortunately, the window 

for peace is closing and is closing fast. 

Congress has played an important role in promoting peace negotiations, most prominently through the bipartisan Sudan Peace 

Act. I am certain that Congress will remain attentive to developments in Sudan, whether we see good news or bad news come out 

of the final negotiations that are under way in Kenya. There 

should be no mistaking on the part of anybody the strong and enduring congressional commitment that this institution has to the 

cause of peace in Sudan. 

2

The Sudan Peace Act demands accountability of the two negotiating parties. So far, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM have 

been judged to be negotiating in good faith. We eagerly await the 

Administration’s third Sudan Peace Act report next month. 

There is no doubt about who is responsible for the carnage in the 

western region of Darfur. The government has been rightly condemned for its attacks on the people of this isolated region which 

we will hear about today. Darfur is an ominous cloud over the 

peace process. It jeopardizes the negotiations, while underscoring 

the great complexities of moving ahead. 

We should have no illusions that successful peace negotiations 

are the end game. Africa is littered with broken peace treaties. 

Even good people can be corrupted by power. Building a peaceful 

and stable Sudan will be a hugely difficult task. The Sudanese people bear this responsibility. But the U.S. and others have a strong 

interest in continuing to support their efforts. 

Peacemakers far outnumber warmakers in Sudan. The people 

who desire peace there far outnumber those who are in opposition. 

The key is whether the very small minority of Sudanese who profit 

from their country’s destruction will control its future. Many envision a brighter day for Sudan—one in which Sudanese and Americans of all faiths work together in productive and unprecedented 

ways. For this to happen, the warmakers must be defeated. I know 

that the Administration and Congress will continue to oppose them 

every step of the way. 

With that said, I want to introduce a man who has devoted much 

of his career in Congress to trying to see stability and peace in 

Sudan. That is Mr. Don Payne of New Jersey, who is the Ranking 

Member of this Committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA–40) at this afternoon’s hearing on the peace 

process in Sudan: 

Today we will examine the Sudan peace negotiations. The extent of human suffering in Sudan cannot be said enough. The figures are staggering: over two million 

dead Sudanese in twenty years. Millions more have been displaced. Who knows how 

many victims of slavery, persecution and atrocities? 

There is no doubt where the responsibility for this calamity lies. This Congress 

is on record condemning the National Islamic Front Government of Sudan for genocide. It does not get clearer, or starker, than that. 

President Bush and his Administration deserve great credit for energetically promoting the peace process. The Administration has been bold and creative. The 

agreements that have been reached to stop the fighting and hold a referendum on 

unity are truly historic. 

The Administration realizes though that this progress is imperiled by the holdups in finalizing an agreement. Last May, at our Subcommittee’s hearing on the 

Sudan Peace Act, I said that perpetual negotiations are not in the cards. Unfortunately, the window for peace is closing—fast. 

Congress has played an important role in promoting peace negotiations, most 

prominently through the bipartisan Sudan Peace Act. I am certain that Congress 

will remain attentive to developments in Sudan, whether we see good news or bad 

news come out of Naivasha, Kenya. There should be no mistaking the strong and 

enduring congressional commitment to Sudan. 

The Sudan Peace Act demands accountability of the two negotiating parties. So 

far, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement have 

3

been judged to be negotiating in good faith. We eagerly await the Administration’s 

third Sudan Peace Act report next month. 

There is no doubt about who is responsible for the carnage in the western region 

of Darfur. The Government has been rightly condemned for its attacks on the people 

of this isolated region, which we’ll hear about today. Darfur is an ominous cloud 

over the peace process. It jeopardizes the negotiations, while underscoring the great 

complexities of moving ahead. 

We should have no illusions that successful peace negotiations are the end game. 

Africa is littered with broken peace treaties. Even good people can be corrupted by 

power. Building a peaceful and stable Sudan will be a hugely difficult task. The Sudanese people bear this responsibility. But the U.S. and others have a strong interest in continuing to support their efforts. 

Peace-makers far outnumber war-makers in Sudan. The key is whether the very 

small minority of Sudanese who profit from their country’s destruction will control 

its future. Many envision a brighter day for Sudan—one in which Sudanese and 

Americans of all faiths work together in productive and unprecedented ways. For 

this to happen, the war-makers must be defeated. I know that the Administration 

and Congress will continue to oppose them every step of the way.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me express my appreciation for your continued work as Chairman of the Subcommittee. It has been a pleasure to work with you. 

Let me thank you for calling this important hearing today. Perhaps no other African country has received as much attention in 

recent years in Washington as has Sudan. That is thanks in large 

part because of your tireless efforts and many others. 

Sudan is important because of the magnitude of the problem, because of the untold suffering the people of Sudan continue to endure and because the situation in Sudan is heart wrenching, from 

slavery to genocidal war. The Sudan tragedy is unmatched in its 

harshness and brutality. 

I thank my colleagues, Mr. Tancredo and Congressman Wolf, 

who for many years, though not a Member of this Subcommittee, 

has fought diligently on the whole question. I didn’t realize he was 

here. But I certainly commend him, also. 

At our last Sudan hearing, I said I cannot argue against southern leaders who choose to negotiate with this regime, a brutal regime responsible for the deaths of many innocent civilians. I said 

then it is their future, their country and their people. I just hope 

that we are not and they are not being taken for a long ride by the 

charm architects of the National Islamic Front. Indeed, several 

agreements have been signed by the SPLM and the Government of 

Sudan. But once again we are witnessing the cunning duplicity of 

this regime. It is the way it has been many times. They say that 

leopards don’t change their spots. They are frustrating the peace 

process by their intransigence on an issue many believe should not 

be a major issue and that could be easily resolved. 

For anyone with little knowledge of what has happened in 

Sudan, everyone knows historically that Abyei, the land of the 

Ngok Dinka, a territory placed under British administration in the 

north in 1905—not just overnight, 100 years ago—and even the 

1972 Addis agreement provides the people of Abyei the right to a 

referendum and a special status under the supervision of the presidency. There is no doubt to whom this area belongs and the people 

who are in that land. We have in the audience the grandson of a 

former chief of the Ngok Dinka, our friend Francis Deng, many 

friends. 

4

Unless the extremist government in Khartoum is using this issue 

to delay and to force a collapse of the talks, this issue is a 

nonissue. This is not something new. It is not something that we 

feel should create a delay, but we know that this is the continued 

ugly tactics of the NIF. 

Let me put this in perspective. I am sure you have heard the 

numbers many times before. Out of an estimated population of 9 

million people in southern Sudan, more than 2 million have died 

as a result of this conflict, 4 million have been displaced, and 

500,000 have been made refugees in neighboring countries. These 

numbers are equal in proportion to 64 million Americans killed, 

128 million Americans displaced and 15 million American refugees 

if we took the same population and extrapolated it up. 

Let me also remind people as to who is largely and principally 

responsible for these heinous crimes against humanity, the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum. Lest we forget, this 

is the same government that ousted a democratically elected civilian government in 1989, that provided safe haven for Osama bin 

Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization for 5 years as they 

planned attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing many Americans and African friends. This is the same government that has 

maimed, killed and engaged in modern day slavery. 

Not surprisingly, the people responsible for all these atrocities 

are still in power. Are these people going to be accountable for the 

mayhem they have caused over the past decades? Or are we going 

to simply forgive and forget just because the NIF said they have 

changed? All of a sudden they are peace-loving, gentle people? 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Tancredo and myself wrote a letter 

to President Bush last month asking for an explanation about the 

role of the current government in international terrorism. We 

urged the President that as we fight terror groups and terrorist 

sponsors in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world, we must 

also ensure that those individuals involved in terrorism in the past 

or present must not be allowed to escape justice, for far too many 

Americans have died in part due to the support given by Sudanese 

officials to international terrorist organizations. 

It is appalling that not a single senior official has been removed 

from power or has gone to jail because of involvement in or support 

of terrorist activities. We should actually be banning the officials 

of Sudan from even traveling to our country with this blood on 

their hands. 

Mr. Chairman, we have said to President Bush that our war on 

terrorism cannot succeed if we allow well-known terrorists to escape justice. I do not want to prejudge people, but we want justice. 

Because justice delayed is justice denied. 

Mr. Chairman, the National Islamic Front government is good at 

lies and deceit. I am afraid, as is our core constituency here in the 

United States, that they continue to do this. Over the past 2 years, 

the NIF agents have been actively charming some of our friends, 

telling people that they have changed, that peace is right around 

the corner and that they can have access to senior officials of this 

brutal regime. Unfortunately, some of our friends have been 

swayed by these lies. 

5

I remember friends coming to me in the late 1990s saying that 

they had been assured by the government that the bombing of civilians will stop. Of course, they did not then, and they still drop 

bombs today. Let us remind our friends that this is the same regime currently engaged in the scorched earth policy in Darfur. 

Words mean nothing. Why don’t we take a look at one of the 

photos of a poor child being held up by one of our interns. This is 

recent. This is just the other day. 

This is the government that said that they have changed. This 

is a government that can be trusted? It is a rhetorical question. I 

ask you that. What good is it to sign a peace agreement with the 

South and engage in ethnic cleansing in Darfur? 

Let us not lose sight and let us remain united. It is our unity 

and resolve that has gotten us where we are today. Divided we 

lose. Let us not forget the victims. As we speak here today, many 

will lose their lives. 

I really also would like to thank the panelists who have for so 

many years been involved in this issue, Assistant Administrator 

Winter in particular, who currently, even though there is a family 

crisis, he felt it was important for him to come here. I appreciate 

that, Mr. Winter. 

Mr. ROYCE. At this time we would like to recognize Mr. Tancredo 

of Colorado. He is the author of the Sudan Peace Act. He will be 

recognized for a statement. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and especially thanks 

to you for holding this hearing and for being such a stalwart supporter of our efforts to bring peace to this troubled land we call 

Sudan. 

Thanks also to my colleagues both to my right and my left who 

have been laboring in this vineyard far longer than I have and 

have done far more than I will ever be able to do to advance the 

cause of peace and justice in Sudan, Congressman Wolf and Congressman Payne. 

I think it is extremely important for the Government of Sudan 

to understand something clearly. Sudan is on our radar screen, and 

it will not get off. It doesn’t matter what happens in elections in 

this year or 2 years from now or 10 years from now. The country 

and the situation in that country is something we will continue to 

address until peace comes. 

There are reports that are due, as you know, as a result of the 

Sudan Peace Act. The report is to come to Congress on the 21st of 

April. It, among other things, is to tell us whether or not the parties in Sudan have been negotiating in good faith. I, for one, will 

be very interested to hear how the report will explain and characterize what is happening right now, for instance, in Darfur. 

The scale of human catastrophe comes into clearer view with 

each passing day. The United Nations now claims that over a million civilians are internally displaced in Darfur, with an estimated 

110,000 fleeing to Chad. 

This is a letter from Dr. Kapila, the U.S. resident humanitarian 

coordinator, about the situation. This was written March 8, 2004, 

about the situation in Darfur in particular. He provides quite a 

lengthy list of incidents that are like the following: 

6

On February 6, Janjaweed militia and associated forces attacked 

Miha, El Syah, Medo, Sendi, Medoud, and Ushara, north of Darfur, 

killed 30 civilians, and a total of 100 cattle were stolen. On February 7, several women were killed in an air bombardment fleeing 

from Tabra. On February 10, Janjaweed military attacked an administration unit in Shataya and killed 88 civilians. On February 

11, militia reportedly attacked 5 villages and 74 civilians killed. On 

February 11, a passenger bus was blown up. It goes on and on and 

on. 

So we will be, as I say, very interested to see how these incidents 

are depicted when the report is delivered to us that is to describe 

how well both sides are cooperating and negotiating. 

We have also a problem with access to Darfur. This is another 

thing that was specifically cited in the Sudan Peace Act as a condition that had to be met. They had to provide humanitarian access, 

unfettered humanitarian access. This is not happening. From all 

reports we have received, it is impossible to get the aid where it 

is needed in Darfur. When you combine this with everything that 

has been stated and when we know also what is happening in 

Abyei, it does not make me feel in any way as though there is a 

bright light that I can see at the end of the tunnel. There may be 

something out there, but it is pretty dim, even though we have, I 

know, accomplished a great deal. 

I know that there are people, thousands perhaps, perhaps hundreds of thousands of people alive today in Sudan because of the 

efforts of the Congress and the efforts of folks in the Administration, including the President of the United States. That is not to 

be treated lightly. It is not to be skimmed over. It is in my heart 

anyway something about which I can be very, very glad. I certainly 

am. 

But I also know that the history of this country, as Don Payne 

has laid out for us, is one in which we have sort of been here before. It is deja vu, a period of time when negotiations go on, where 

peace actually breaks out for a while, if you will, only to be followed at a more appropriate time with an even bloodier assault on 

the south. 

Mr. Chairman, once again I just want to say how much I appreciate your efforts to bring this to the attention again of our colleagues. I am looking very much forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Mr. ROYCE. With that, we are going to go to our first panel. 

Charles Snyder is currently the Acting Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs. Previously, he served as Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary. He has been closely involved with the Sudan 

peace initiative for several years. He is a career Africanist, former 

Director of the Office of Regional Affairs in the African Bureau. He 

served in the Senior Intelligence Service at the Central Intelligence 

Agency as a national intelligence officer for Africa. 

Roger Winter was sworn in as Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance of AID in January, 

2002. Before his appointment, he directed the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at AID, and he served as Executive Director of the 

U.S. Committee for Refugees. He has far-reaching experience in AfVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
7

rica, Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union and Central America 

on the subject of dealing with refugees and displaced people. 

I know that both of these gentlemen have been deeply involved 

and have been working overtime in order to try to get a peace 

agreement. I would personally like to express my appreciation to 

you both for your work. 

Mr. Snyder, if you would like to begin. I will ask one last favor 

since we have read your testimony and we are going to put it in 

the record. We would like you to summarize it in 5 minutes’ time. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES R. SNYDER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Royce. I appreciate the opportunity 

to bring you up to date on where we are in the Sudan peace process. 

I will try and take the novel approach, since you have my testimony for the record, of answering your questions directly in my 5 

minutes in a nugget form, letting you get into details in your questions. 

Where are we? Is peace really around the corner? Absolutely, it 

is around the corner. We can see it. We can almost touch it. We 

can feel it. The Sudanese people know that. The problem I think 

at the end of the day is I am not sure if the Government of Sudan 

can see it and touch it yet. That is a question in my mind, and it 

is a question at the end of a long process. 

The state of these talks, to be brief, is sound, but we are in a 

moment of crisis. I think this is a defining moment for these talks. 

I agree with what I take to be the gist of the Members’ comments 

that we cannot continue to allow this to go on in the current context. This has to be a time-limited enterprise. I think the timing 

of the Sudan Peace Act report on April 21 has actually set a useful 

limit in this case. 

We have gone a long way, which is why I say these talks are 

sound. The parties have made real decisions: The 61⁄2 year transition period; the possibility to vote for self-determination if that is 

necessary; the humanitarian access in the south, though not 

Darfur; the agreement on security issues that they have made; the 

agreements on wealth sharing, including two currencies and a 

banking system. These are real, tangible agreements that say to 

me that men of good will could finish this and they could finish it 

relatively quickly. They know what the possibilities are. 

They seem to have floundered, as Congressman Payne pointed 

out, over this issue of Abyei. I do not believe after 20 years and 

2 million dead that a small space of 7,000 square miles whose inhabitants, even after people are repatriated, won’t amount to more 

than 80,000 people can be allowed in any reasonable sense to block 

this process. There are formulas. The problem is to get the parties 

to accept them, to prove that they are willing to go that last mile. 

That is, frankly, where we are in these negotiations. 

The Secretary, as you know, has been personally engaged, the 

President has been engaged, the Administrator of AID has been enVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
8

gaged, Roger Winter and I were just out there, all pushing them 

to define these last issues. 

Earlier in this process, I thought we had more time. We have 

more time when there are not people dying, and in Darfur people 

are dying now in large numbers. Therefore, we do not have any 

more time to let these parties engage in a leisurely negotiating 

process. 

What effect does Darfur have on the negotiations? It makes them 

urgent. Darfur in itself is being taken on separately. We are preparing to drag them in front of the United Nations if this doesn’t 

stop. We are preparing to take a look at what we can do in terms 

of sanctions if this doesn’t stop beyond what we are already doing; 

and we are working with our European partners, who heretofore 

have been relatively quiescent on this but are not quiescent at all 

on Darfur and in fact are leading the charge in Geneva in the 

Human Rights Commission to do something about this. So we are 

aware of what is going on in Darfur. 

Roger Winter will have a great deal more to say about it. He has 

been more closely engaged in this. 

This is a serious humanitarian crisis, as your picture demonstrates. We are pushing them on it. It goes to the issue of good 

faith at the end of the day. Has this government really changed its 

mind? Is it really going to move to peace? We don’t have the answer. We won’t have the answer until we finish this negotiation 

quickly over Abyei. 

There are some other issues outstanding, the so-called power 

sharing block, but both sides have assured us there is nothing serious in there to block it. The history of this negotiation says we 

would have some problems when we got there, too, but I think we 

can push for this quickly. 

That is my assessment of the current state of affairs. 

I have already explained how I think Darfur is impacting the negotiations. What steps have we taken to prepare for peace? As you know, AID has added almost $187 million in its budget, 

anticipating having to do extraordinary things in the south beyond 

what they are already doing which is already a $200 million plus 

program. If we get this peace and depending on the circumstances 

and the exact details of the peace, we are probably going to need 

more money. We can’t tell you now what that is because we haven’t 

finished this process. We will be open and transparent with you as 

we get closer to this. 

The other question you have asked here is what are we going to 

do if this fails. We have contingency plans, and we have developed 

them to a considerable extent. I don’t want to get into that because 

I don’t intend to let this fail. But I can assure you that we have 

a laundry list of things that we are going to do because we do take 

seriously our policy on Sudan. This policy goes beyond these talks. 

There are three legs to this policy: Cooperation on terrorism, and 

they have checked that block fairly well. Cooperation in terms of 

regional stability. What is going on in Darfur is spilling over into 

Chad. That grade was passing. It is now failing. And cooperation 

on a just peace. A just peace includes respect for human rights and 

humanitarian access throughout the country, among other things; 

and the government is now failing that grade right now. 

9

They can still redeem themselves. I think one of the reasons Vice 

President Taha just left these talks is he was at the end of his instructions and he has gone back to engage in a serious discussion 

from everything I am seeing on the side. We are hoping the result 

of that discussion is sufficient to help us close this gap. We don’t 

know and we won’t know till Friday or Saturday when he returns. 

That is where we are in these talks in a nutshell. I think I have 

tried to be honest on the questions. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Secretary Snyder, we thank you very much. You 

have been very forthright. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Snyder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES R. SNYDER, ACTING ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I am honored to have the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our government’s efforts to achieve a just and 

lasting comprehensive peace in Sudan and to share with you our thoughts on the 

likely answer to the question you pose in the hearing title. We have been supportive 

of the Sudan peace talks because we wanted to advance U.S. interests to promote 

human rights, counter-terrorism, and regional stability. From the outset of these negotiations we have made clear that our policy is based on three pillars, all of which 

must be achieved in order to begin the process of normalization of relations with 

the Government of Sudan. These are: achievement of a just and comprehensive 

peace settlement; unrestricted humanitarian access and respect for human rights in 

all areas; and full cooperation against terrorism. I would also like to address our 

shared concerns about the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur in western 

Sudan. 

The road to peace in Sudan has been long and hard. With the support of the Congress, we have made substantial progress. The framework on security issues and accord on wealth sharing are major accomplishments that have given the process momentum. The parties are close to a final peace agreement, but the issue of Abyei 

poses a large challenge and significant power-sharing issues remain to be resolved. 

Over the last year, international monitors, funded and supported by the United 

States, confirm that there has been a measure of peace in much of the south unprecedented in recent decades. People have begun to live rather than simply trying to 

survive. Tens of thousands of displaced persons have returned to their homes in the 

Nuba Mountains as a result of the ceasefire there brokered by the United States 

and Switzerland. 

Implementation of any peace agreement reached between the parties will pose 

major challenges. U.S. leadership will be essential to mobilize international support 

for next steps including international monitoring in close cooperation with the 

United Nations, assistance for reconstruction and development, and continuation of 

critical humanitarian assistance programs. 

Achieving peace in Sudan is one of the Administration’s highest priorities in Africa. Accomplishing this requires a set of comprehensive accords that address the legitimate grievances of southerners while establishing a national democratic framework leading to fundamental change. As we near the April 21 determination on the 

Sudan Peace Act, I would like to update the Committee on the current state of play 

in the negotiations between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement and the Sudanese government. First I would like to take this opportunity to commend the efforts 

of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for its leadership of the 

peace process. I want particularly to express our appreciation for the tireless, dedicated mediation by General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. 

Our objective is to achieve a Framework on the Outstanding Issues by the end 

of the current round of negotiations March 16. Since the current round began February 17, the parties have been engaged in difficult discussions regarding the three 

marginalized areas: The Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and Abyei. They 

have resolved most of the issues related to the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue 

Nile, and both sides believe that the remaining questions on those two areas will 

be satisfactorily addressed. Abyei poses a larger challenge. The central issue is 

whether the traditional Ngoc Dinka inhabitants of Abyei will be allowed to determine their political future. The Sudanese government continues to resist a commitment to popular consultation for the Ngoc Dinka and has expressed concerns about 

the impact a solution in Abyei could have on northern stability. The United States 

10

has made clear its position that such popular consultation is necessary, and we have 

been working with the parties to urge resolution of this issue. Our Troika partners, 

the UK and Norway, and we have all explored creative ideas with the two sides, 

but, so far, they frankly remain unable to resolve the Abyei issue. The two sides 

have also discussed the nature of a possible political partnership to ensure full implementation of the peace accords and to promote unity. Both sides realize the people of the south must see real benefits from the peace accord if there is to be any 

hope of achieving unity—a goal both sides support. 

We have underscored to both sides the need to conclude the negotiations on an 

urgent basis. If the parties fail to resolve the Abyei issue during this round, much 

of the momentum achieved thus far will be lost. That might well lead to a rise in 

tensions on the ground. Aware of the critical stage of these talks at this time, we 

have strengthened our team of facilitators in Navaisha. I was recently in Navaisha 

to talk with Vice President Taha and Chairman Garang, and plan to return to push 

for agreement. Special Envoy Danforth remains closely involved, and Secretary Powell and National Security Adviser Rice are directly engaged in the talks. We have 

sent the parties a clear message on the need to move forward quickly. Should they 

prove unable to do so, it may become necessary—as a last resort—for the United 

States, in concert with the Troika and IGAD, to table ideas to break the impasse. 

In short, the parties know that the time for agreement is now, or the peace process 

could well unravel. The next days and weeks will prove decisive.

• If the parties reach agreement on the three areas, they will move on to the 

power-sharing issues. While the power-sharing issues are complex, both sides 

have told us that they do not expect major problems to resolve them. We intend to hold them to that.

• If the parties resolve the outstanding issues by March 16, they will take a 

short break and reconvene to work out details of security arrangements, 

international guarantees, and modalities to implement the peace accord. Once 

these are worked out, a comprehensive peace accord will be signed. The 

United States has offered to send a senior team to assist General Sumbeiywo 

with the security arrangements talks.

In Secretary Powell’s statement to the House Appropriations Committee on March 

3, he called the situation in Darfur a ‘‘catastrophe’’. Clearly the conflict and the humanitarian crisis there are a matter of urgent and grave concern for the Administration, as they are to many in Congress. The violence and suffering in Darfur have 

made it one of the worst humanitarian crises in Africa. Fighting between Sudanese 

government forces and the rebels is continuing. Of particular concern are the activities of the largely Arab Jingaweit militias. They are systematically burning African 

villages, killing and abusing civilians. We have rejected the government’s claim that, 

while it may have originally supported the Jingaweit, they are now out of its control. These militias are proxies for the government and Khartoum bears responsibility for their conduct, whether they say they have control or not. 

We have spoken out forcefully on Darfur. We are pressing the Sudanese government, at the highest levels, to negotiate a humanitarian ceasefire with the rebel 

groups so that humanitarian relief can reach all needy populations. The GOS is considering a U.S. offer to facilitate such talks. At the same time, we insist that the 

GOS take immediate steps to stop the Jingaweit militias. Meanwhile, the situation 

continues to deteriorate. The GOS is not providing sufficient protection to all displaced persons, and the Sudanese army has not mounted systematic efforts to stop 

the Jingaweit. Our own sources and the press daily report new atrocities by the 

Jingaweit and document the fear in which the population lives, particularly those 

who have been displaced. 

We have told the GOS that this is not acceptable, and that we are taking the necessary steps to intensify actions by the international community. We are considering 

a range of actions at the UN in New York, and we will raise Darfur at the upcoming 

UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) session. We have also made clear that 

the situation in Darfur would slow the process of normalization of relations, which 

we have said that we would pursue were there a peace settlement between the GOS 

and the SPLM. USAID Assistant Administrator Roger Winter will address the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur in more detail. 

The situation in Darfur raises another important issue. Although we have made 

some progress with the Sudanese government, their overall human rights record remains very poor. Improvements in some practices were offset—as noted in detail in 

our annual Human Rights Report—by continuing abuses in others. The government 

continued to restrict most basic freedoms and to abuse its citizens, sometimes violently, with its security forces and allied groups of irregulars. As we described in 

the International Religious Freedom report, we remain deeply concerned about the 

11

Government’s restrictions on religious practice. On a positive note, there have been 

few, if any, slave raids over the past year. We will work to promote family reunification once a peace accord is signed. 

In the United Nations and other fora we have worked hard to maintain the international spotlight on human rights violations and other serious abuses in Sudan. 

The United States continues to support important monitoring efforts to reduce 

abuses. In 2003, we provided four and a half million dollars for the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT), established by the United States as one of Special 

Envoy Danforth’s four tests for peace. The CPMT’s objective documentation of 

abuses by security forces has drastically reduced such incidents in the south since 

monitoring began in 2002. In addition, we have provided a grant of one million dollars for the now operational Verification Monitoring Team, set up pursuant to the 

cessation of hostilities agreed to by the GOS and SPLM in 2002. The 12-nation Joint 

Military Commission to monitor a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains was established 

through the efforts of the Special Envoy John Danforth and supported by a seven 

million dollar U.S. grant last year. 

We have used every opportunity to make known that any future relationship with 

the Sudanese government will depend on achieving a just and comprehensive peace 

with the south. I believe Khartoum understands clearly that observing basic rights 

and freedoms and an end to the conflict in Darfur will significantly improve prospects for our relations. The pace of our normalization and review of sanctions on 

trade and assistance following a peace agreement will be determined by Khartoum’s 

level of effort to reform and correct human rights policies and practices. 

Another of our principal goals in engaging with the Sudanese government has 

been cooperation in the war against terrorism. I am pleased to report to you that 

while we remain concerned about certain Palestinian rejectionist groups, which 

maintain offices in Sudan, we have continued to make progress in our counter-terrorism dialogue with Khartoum. The GOS has proactively responded to some specific requests we have made to combat terrorism. In addition, Sudan has played an 

increasing role in working with regional governments to combat terrorism and has 

both signed and ratified all twelve international counter-terrorism agreements. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, there are enormous challenges 

ahead as we push for successful conclusion of the peace talks and continue the process of bringing Sudan into the community of democratic nations that respect human 

rights. We continue to enjoy the advantage of an unprecedented international engagement with the parties. The United States has provided strong support to this 

African-led peace process. For the Sudanese government, we have continued to 

make clear that normalization of our relationship will be contingent not only on the 

signing of a peace agreement, but also on full implementation in good faith as well 

as allowing unrestricted humanitarian access to suffering populations, continuing 

cooperation to combat terrorism, and respect for human rights. 

As I have noted here, we have made progress on all these fronts, but we will not 

be satisfied until these goals are fully realized. This will require much hard work 

and a willingness to assist in building the peace but the goal is historic change in 

Sudan. That process will address the legitimate grievances of the southerners who 

have suffered so enormously, will enhance regional stability, and will send a very 

positive message to the Middle East and other conflict areas. The vision of a unified, 

democratic Sudan that fully respects human rights would have been unthinkable 

until very recently. The principal responsibility to achieve and implement the peace 

rests with the parties themselves. But the leadership of both sides and the longsuffering people of Sudan will need our engagement and our help in rebuilding the 

war-ravaged south while holding out a hand of friendship to the north.

Mr. ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Winter. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER P. WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. WINTER. This is a key moment. I must say I am very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and this Committee for its almost perpetual vigilance and activism on Sudan because it has made a 

huge, huge difference. May I say what I said in the last hearing, 

that there have been dramatic humanitarian access improvements 

in the south. But today’s hearing really isn’t about the south. I am 

12

going to focus my comments on Darfur. We have continuing problems elsewhere. We have them on the eastern front, we have them 

in Southern Blue Nile, we have them in terms of the continuing 

problems we have with our commodities that are shipped to Sudan, 

and we have problems when it comes to the Lord’s Resistance 

Army operating in the southern part of Sudan and its connections 

with the government in Khartoum. 

However, I will now focus on Darfur, because arguably this is the 

worst humanitarian emergency in Africa and perhaps in the world 

at this moment. I think despite the assertions of the President of 

Sudan, I think that the government finds itself in a quagmire that 

is not going to go away any time soon. This could turn out to be 

the major miscalculation that undermines the Sudan peace process, 

which I see as being on a precipice right now. 

Personally, I have been to Darfur at least a half dozen times in 

the last 6 months. This is a major issue for us. We have topnotch 

personnel, the best that we have in disaster response, who are out 

there working this issue now. We have excellent commentators, 

like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who, in detail, are specifying what the issues are and what is happening in 

local situations. But our perspective is based on our seeing and 

hearing and our judgments and we are making up our own mind. 

By the way, it is quite easy to do it right now. You don’t even have 

to go to Darfur. There are truckloads of thousands of people beginning to show up in Khartoum right now. 

So we can just go out and we can ask them their individual stories and find out exactly what is going on. I will come back and 

I will tell you a couple of them in a moment. The pattern we are 

seeing, as one of you indicated, I am sorry, I forget which one, is 

all too familiar. Yes, there is a war. The parties have a war to 

fight. But what we are seeing goes far beyond the fighting of war. 

We are seeing attacks on civilian targets in Darfur as we saw them 

in the south before. The pattern is very, very similar. You have 

aerial bombardments going on. They are coordinated with the militias that are operating on the ground, and sometimes it is not just 

the militias, it is actually the Sudan government’s military. 

The name that these militias go by that are doing most of this 

violence is the Janjaweed. This is an Arab-based population, and 

the people that they are attacking are African. It is a pattern we 

also saw in the south that we are seeing again. These attacks are 

accompanied by massive patterns of rape. The reports are really 

quite staggering in terms of the numbers affected. Overall, Darfur 

has basically had its humanitarian assistance shut off since last 

November and yes, it is the case that there have been some marginal improvements in the last little while. 

Those marginal improvements actually are providing us additional documentation as to what has been going on. As I say, I will 

mention some of that. What is going on is population clearance. I 

have used publicly the term ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ because I frankly 

believe that is what is going on. I am not a lawyer. I am not a 

human rights lawyer. I am an old guy, in some senses of the word, 

and I go back to the old school. That is, if it looks like a duck and 

it quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck. What is happening is 

ethnic cleansing. You have an African population that is being drivVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
13

en from their homes in a very systematic, widespread and calculated, knowledgeable way in my judgment. 

You can see it. You can frankly see it from the air. If you fly over 

the locations, you can see the villages burning underneath you. You 

get the World Food Program fellows, the pilots to circle their plane 

and go down and take a close look, you can see them down there. 

Now that we have a bit of access in some locations, we actually 

have WFP and other U.N. personnel on the ground. 

Mr. Tancredo, one of the stories you didn’t read in that report 

from Mukesh Kapila, a recent one, I would just like to tell you. On 

February 27, humanitarian staff, that is U.N. personnel, traveling 

through Tawila, 62 kilometers west of El Fasher, had observed 

Janjaweed militia looting and burning a village. Local residents 

and internally displaced persons indicated the following: (A) 17 

people had been killed in the town and an additional 68 in the surroundings of Tawila town; (B) all houses as well as the market and 

the health center have been completely looted and the market 

burned; (C) over 100 women had been raped, six in front of their 

fathers who later were killed; (D) about 150 women and 200 children had been abducted; and (E) in all of the Tawila administrative 

unit, 30 villages had been burned, more than 200 people killed, and 

more than 200 women raped. This is a familiar pattern to us. 

I think what we are seeing in announcements from the government are spin control. The President has announced that the war 

is over. He has announced that it is time to rebuild the social fabric 

of Darfur. He has announced that refugees can return from Chad 

and that IDPs can return to their homes. It just isn’t so. When any 

of us go on the ground out there, there are stark limitations to 

what we can actually do and who we can actually talk to. 

And although Abyei isn’t in Darfur, let me just tell you, when we 

were in Abyei about 10 days ago, we were supposed to meet with 

an entire group of community leaders. What we found at Abyei 

which Congressman Payne mentioned as a Ngok Dinka traditional 

area, a homeland almost devoid of people at the moment, but what 

we found was a great crowd of people. But they all had been 

trucked in by the government from Muglad, which is 100 miles 

away, and not a single one of them was Dinka. We are confronted 

consistently with this kind of spin control. 

I left that place thinking to myself, this is a place where the tensions are running so high that we could be faced with a massacre. 

I don’t say that lightly. I have seen massacres. I have lived through 

them. What I am suggesting to you is what is possible with the 

tensions running high in some of these locations. When we talk to 

people about their individual displacement even, what is it they tell 

us? When we get to talk to people as I have, let me tell you what 

they say. I can remember very well one woman near the capital of 

southern Darfur, Nyala. I forget the name of her village. She said,

‘‘They came, perhaps three to 400 of them. They came on camels and they came on horses. They began to shoot. They began 

to raid the village. Our men came out. They tried to protect the 

village. After about six of our men were killed, we ran away.’’

They ran to basically the capital of the state of southern Darfur. 

This is a common thing. What we are now finding with humaniVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

tarian workers where they do have some access is you can actually 

go and you can see attacks on the ground in progress. 

You can actually see African-based villages that are destroyed. 

You can actually see other villages that are entirely not destroyed 

and not hampered in any way, shape or form. You ask these people 

when the attack occurred, were there any rebels around anywhere, 

that is, the rebels, the political opposition that the government’s 

military is fighting. To one person they have said there were no 

rebels whatsoever anywhere in the vicinity. They even say that 

with government security people present and listening to everything that is being said. These kind of situations, that is, the burning villages that you can see from the air and these kind of attacks, 

are continuing to today. 

What I read to you from Tawila is happening today. Beyond public statements of which the State Department and USAID have had 

many, beyond calls from the Secretary and the White House, what 

are we doing? Frankly not enough. We are trying to change the 

gear. We have offered to deploy the civilian protection and monitoring unit. USAID has been tasked by the National Security 

Council to lead an initiative, so the Administration is seeking to be 

in the lead in terms of arranging for a humanitarian ceasefire, and 

we will be participating in the planned talks that will be scheduled 

either next week or the following week in Chad. We have been 

talking to the rebels for the last 6 weeks to assure their participation and to make sure that the standards they find necessary to be 

involved in these talks are actually met. But when all is said and 

done, the central issue for us, and I think the central issue as it 

relates to the Sudan Peace Act is how is the Government of Sudan 

behaving? How are they actually behaving? Are they part of the solution or are they part of the problem? The reports we receive from 

our workers on the ground are that the military of the Government 

of Sudan stands by or participates in some of these deprivations. 

When we ask people who exactly were these people that did the attacking, they say, ‘‘Janjaweed, the government, it’s the same.’’ It 

may not be exactly, precisely the same, but this is the way the victims see it. Further, the government, which brands the rebels, that 

is, the political opposition forces, and the Janjaweed both as criminals and outlaws, takes no enforcement actions whatsoever against 

the Janjaweed. There is no example of any enforcement action 

being taken against them. It is these people that the victims cite 

as the ones who are attacking them. 

The great humanitarian need now is not just for food. It is for 

protection. People need protection. We actually have people who 

are in displaced persons camps right now telling us, ‘‘Please don’t 

give us the food, don’t deliver the food, because with the assistance 

comes the attackers.’’ I have never had this kind of thing happen 

before, when people in the circumstance say, don’t bring us the 

food. Whatever the solution is that we hope comes out of the Chad 

meeting, there must be a robust international presence. It is the 

only way I think that we can assure the level of protection that 

these people need. 

The real tragedy beyond Darfur itself is the impact that Darfur 

is having on the overall southern peace process. Almost all Sudanese want this just peace to come through this peace process. 

15

Frankly, most of the people I know in the Government of Sudan 

want this peace process to succeed. I can say, in my view, clearly, 

the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) wants this 

peace process to succeed. Where we are right now is that the White 

House will not take no for an answer. 

So we are beefing up our capacities. We are with the State Department and USAID and the National Security Council assigning 

additional personnel, trying to achieve a level of engagement with 

the parties that tries to assure that this peace process does not fail. 

Why? It is only this peace process that can produce the democratic 

transformation in Sudan which will change the character of the 

country so that the kind of thing that is happening in Darfur today 

does not continue to happen. We need this peace process very 

badly. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Winter. We thank you for your compelling testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER P. WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY

FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, Committee Members, thank you for allowing me to come and 

share my thoughts and insights on Sudan with you. Congressional attention on 

Sudan will be critical in how the events of the next few years unfold. As you know, 

the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/

Army (SPLM/A) have made significant progress in negotiating a North-South peace 

agreement, although they have not yet been able to bring it to a successful conclusion. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is poised to assist the 

Sudanese in their economic recovery and prevention of future conflict once an agreement is reached. However, it is also critical to point out the concerns we have, particularly with humanitarian access, one of the three pillars of U.S. foreign policy in 

Sudan. 

I. HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND CHALLENGES

From 1989, the year Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) began, to January 2003, the 

international community wrestled with the Government of Sudan (GOS) for denying 

humanitarian assistance to war and famine affected populations in southern Sudan. 

This lack of access exacerbated the suffering of the people of South Sudan, and 

many died when relief failed to reach them. Since the GOS and the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU) on October 15, 2002, agreeing to a cessation of hostilities and unhindered 

access to all of southern Sudan during the peace negotiations, humanitarian access 

to southern Sudan has improved dramatically. Further progress was made in January 2003, when the GOS agreed to a process of notification for humanitarian relief 

flights, rather than requiring the UN to seek permission each month. Most recently, 

the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access agreement was extended until 

the end of March 2004. 

As a result of these changes, there is a new measure of stability in some areas 

of southern Sudan where access was previously denied. More families are able to 

meet their own food needs, begin agricultural activities, send their children to 

school, and plan for the future. In areas where bombs once fell on civilian targets, 

people still take note of the airplanes overhead, but now it is with a sense of curiosity rather than fear. These are some of the changes that have come with a cessation of hostilities and unhindered access. For the short-term, this new access, 

along with the anticipated return of several million internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) from areas in the North as well as hundreds of thousands of refugees from 

neighboring countries, will increase the need for humanitarian assistance in the 

South in the short term, but if southern Sudan continues down the path of peace 

and stability, within a few years the need for our humanitarian funding will significantly decrease. 

16

a. Denial of Humanitarian Access in Darfur 

Unfortunately, we cannot give a similarly positive report for the humanitarian situation in western Sudan. The war in Darfur is arguably the most serious humanitarian crisis on the African continent right now. The Government of Sudan has 

mounted nothing less than a scorched earth strategy to crush armed insurgents representing nascent opposition movements called the Sudan Liberation Movement/

Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The movements 

themselves were born out of frustration with the marginalization of the Darfur region by the Khartoum government. The SLA and JEM have scored a number of successful attacks against government forces. But rather than negotiating with these 

forces, the Government has chosen to respond with brutal force against the civilian 

population, even when there is no evidence of contact with opposition groups. While 

we understand the right of a sovereign government to counter an insurgency within 

its borders, the manner in which the GOS has responded in this case has been disproportional, brutal, and disregards protections against civilians, indeed it has targeted them. 

The Government is using aerial bombardment to terrorize civilians who they say 

are harboring rebels and has armed and unleashed a militia called the jenjaweed

whose ‘‘modus operandi’’ is to rape, loot and burn villages with total impunity. The 

UN estimates there are over 700,000 displaced out of a population of six million and 

some three million affected by the fighting. The Government labels both the rebels 

and the janjaweed as criminals and outlaws. The GOS has publicly denounced the 

jinjaweed, yet, it only takes enforcement actions against the rebels. By design, the 

janjaweed is, therefore, left to continue attacking African civilians. The GOS claims 

that it does not have control of these militias. We believe that they do. Regardless, 

the Government is accountable for the actions of these militias and, as the responsible party, must take much stronger measures to stop them. Without a strong hand 

by the Government to reign in the janjaweed, the atrocities against civilians will 

continue. 

Mr. Chairman, the extent of the violence and terror being inflicted on the population is frightening. I led a delegation to the area in February and as we flew from 

West to North Darfur saw some 14 villages burning. Humanitarian workers have 

witnessed the looting and burning of villages by the jenjaweed militia and have seen 

that the government police and military forces in the area do nothing to stop the 

violence. We have heard consistent and highly disturbing accounts of rape, including 

an gang rape of the students at a girls school in a town called Tawila in North 

Darfur—and then followed by a local official’s denial of medical assistance to the 

rape victims. 

The Government of Sudan has obstructed access to the conflict areas by humanitarian workers for many months. Since February 13 access to the capital cities for 

the three states of Darfur has been permitted for most organizations but humanitarian workers must still obtain permits for each visit outside these capitals. Delays 

in issuing permits are a well-honed technique that limits international presence; I 

believe this is a deliberate strategy of the GOS. One well-reputed humanitarian organization is having to close its presence in Sudan as it has been unable to get permits to travel to Darfur. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which 

should be present in such a conflict, is unable to gain agreement from the GOS on 

basic operating principles for their work. 

Mr. Chairman, we are seeing a very disturbing trend in the humanitarian response. Populations we are reaching who are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, whether food or non-food items, are pleading with the UN and NGOs NOT 

to provide assistance as it is only looted by the jenjaweed militia immediately afterwards. Requests by the humanitarian community that the GOS provide security at 

least at the IDP sites (let alone rein in the jenjaweed operations) have not yielded 

positive results. In fact there is evidence that the GOS military and security forces 

have also victimized the populations in Darfur. Thus we are facing a traumatic situation—one where the victims of the conflict are enduring their suffering because to 

receive relief would further risk their lives. 

We are disturbed that despite these reports from the field, the Government of 

Sudan has declared military victory in Darfur, asserted that all routes are open for 

humanitarian assistance and that refugees and IDPs can return to their home 

areas. This premature and misleading declaration provided to the international 

community seriously endangers those humanitarians who are risking their own security to try to organize relief operations in Darfur and shows blatant disregard for 

the protection and concern that the GOS as a government should extend to all its 

people. Sudanese who are informed about the Darfur crisis fear to speak out because of the threat of arrest. At present several individuals are jailed for reporting 

on the crisis, and several individuals who spoke with my delegation were subseVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
17

quently detained by security forces. In recent days, internally displaced people from 

Darfur have begun arriving in the capital of Khartoum seeking safety. Even those 

who have mobilized assistance to help them have been threatened by GOS officials 

and told not to report the ‘‘untrue’’ stories they hear from the displaced. 

The point is, this conflict is not just an internal disturbance, or local tribal conflict 

over land and water to be contained by a stern Khartoum government, as it is billed 

locally. Why would a government respond to insurgent activity with such force to 

depopulate an entire region, when dialogue not violence could have yielded more 

positive results? The results of the decisions made by the GOS have resulted in a 

major humanitarian emergency and large-scale human rights abuses, with severe 

ramifications for Sudan and the immediate region. 

Mr. Chairman, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur cannot be ignored. The sheer 

scale of the displacement that is occurring is rendering the entire area at risk of 

severe food shortages and famine. If farmers are not back safely on their land by 

April for this year’s planting, the world community will be facing a human crisis 

of vast proportions for at least the next year. The trauma suffered by the population 

including the separation of families will take a long time to heal. 

The parties must agree to a cease-fire now so that critical humanitarian assistance can be delivered to save lives and avoid a humanitarian catastrophe of even 

greater proportions as we go into the traditional ‘‘hunger gap’’ period. USAID has 

been leading a USG effort to bring the Government of Sudan and opposition parties 

together to negotiate such a humanitarian ceasefire. We are hoping that all sides 

will agree to meet soon. Beyond the cease-fire we believe the longer-term solution 

is in dialogue, not violence and we will continue to pass this message to all parties 

in the conflict. 

b. Other Obstacles to Humanitarian Assistance Due to Insecurity 

In prior years, attacks on humanitarian distribution centers were one of the worst 

atrocities in southern Sudan. The cessation of hostilities has put a stop to nearly 

all such attacks and humanitarian relief has proceeded almost unhindered, until 

February 27, just a few weeks ago. In Nimnim, Western Upper Nile, eight UN and 

NGO staff came under rifle, machine-gun, rocket-propelled grenade and mortar fire 

from militia likely-aligned with the GOS. Aid activities in the area were suspended, 

affecting 30,000 people, according to the UN. This incident, while seemingly isolated, highlights the volatility of the transitional zone as militias formerly aligned 

with the GOS and the SPLA realign their interests. Shifting alliances in the lead 

up to a permanent ceasefire are likely to increase insecurity, hampering humanitarian operations in these areas as a result. It is incumbent upon both parties to 

ensure militias aligned with their respective armed forces do not jeopardize the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 

The remaining insecurity in southern Sudan can largely be attributed to the 

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda, operating in Eastern Equatoria. Their 

ongoing presence in Sudan limits the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the 

ability to move freely. We are particularly concerned that LRA activities will continue to cause instability in southern Sudan after a peace agreement is signed if 

its presence is not removed. Additionally, we are gravely concerned by the humanitarian tragedy resulting from LRA attacks in northern Uganda and are working 

with all parties concerned to seek a solution to this situation that ends the suffering 

of civilians in both northern Uganda and southern Sudan at the hands of the LRA. 

It should be noted that the SPLA is reportedly engaged in serious military confrontation with the LRA. 

c. Procedural Obstacles to Humanitarian Access 

It is important to highlight the importance of ‘‘moving back and forth across the 

line,’’ especially in the transition zones. For decades, civilians and humanitarian 

agencies have not been able to cross from GOS-held territory to SPLM-held territory. Those who crossed this line were considered to be suspicious or affiliated with 

the other side, and were often subject to arrest. In an environment of peace, we consider freedom of movement critical to the delivery of humanitarian access. As such, 

when free movement is hampered, this severely impedes humanitarian logistics. 

Humanitarian access in Abyei, one of the three disputed areas in the peace negotiations (and part of the transitional zone between northern and southern Sudan) 

is frequently impeded. A recent assessment there found, on the positive side, that 

there has been free movement of civilians back and forth across the Kiir River between GOS and SPLM zones. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), however, 

have not been able to access the checkpoints at the Kiir River. As well, GOS security agents continually monitor conversations between the NGOs and their beneficiaries, which obstruct transparent communication. Overall, we are very concerned 

18

that the restriction on freedom of movement will hamper the return of internally 

displaced persons (IDPs) to Abyei after a peace agreement. 

During my own delegation’s visit to Abyei last month, I was deeply troubled by 

the tense atmosphere between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities. To 

avoid having these tensions boil over into violence, we must ensure a positive outcome of the political discussions on the fate of Abyei taking place in Naivasha. Acting Assistant Secretary Snyder has already spoken to the significance of this issue 

for bringing the peace talks to closure; the stakes on the ground could not be any 

higher. 

On the Eastern Front, near the border with Eritrea, the UN submitted a proposal 

in January 2003 to both the SPLM/A and the GOS for a cross-border needs assessment to be followed by a cross-line relief operation serving war-affected groups in 

the Hamesh Khorib area. However, neither the GOS nor the SPLM/A have agreed 

to specifics. Currently, minimal aid is reaching the area, but without a sustained 

cross-line, cross-border program, populations will remain highly vulnerable. Samaritan’s Purse conducted a nutritional survey of children within the opposition-controlled area of the Eastern Front in October, 2003, which revealed alarming rates 

of malnutrition. This survey, conducted in partnership with the Center of International Emergency, Disaster, and Refugee Studies of the Johns Hopkins University 

found that 27.4% of children sampled were severely or moderately malnourished. 

This rate is among the highest rates of malnutrition in Sudan. We urgently need 

free access to this area to further verify these rates and respond appropriately. 

In the conflict area of Southern Blue Nile, unlike in southern Sudan, the Government has required the UN to ask its permission, rather than simply notify the GOS 

of its intentions to deliver assistance. Since the signing of the MOU on cessation 

of hostilities, this process has gone more or less smoothly, up until last month. The 

GOS has significantly delayed UN flights to the area and since mid-February 2004, 

has completely denied the UN flight clearances for Southern Blue Nile. As a result, 

WFP has not been able to deliver food aid to the area for more than one month, 

and a UNICEF flight carrying a USAID—funded drilling rig for a hospital was denied access into Southern Blue Nile. As of right now, there is no formal resolution 

to this problem, although the United Nations has submitted all the required paperwork. We are dismayed by this reversal of access by the GOS for Southern Blue Nile 

and are seeking a speedy resolution to restore access to this area. 

Finally, I must inform you that as of March 7, 2004, USAID has ceased all further 

food aid shipments to Port Sudan due to the GOS’ insistence that US commodities 

be certified free of genetically modified organisms (‘‘GMO’’). When this issue first 

arose in May, 2003, we informed the GOS that the United States does not provide 

such certifications. We did, however, send a team of scientists to Khartoum to explain the extensive regulatory standards that all food commodities in the United 

States must meet, whether for domestic or foreign consumption, and to discuss the 

Government’s health and scientific concerns. The United States is the major donor 

of food aid to Sudan, providing some 70% of the World Food Program’s total pipeline 

for the country. The majority of US-donated food aid enters the country through 

Port Sudan, including 40% of all food aid intended for southern Sudan. 

In October, 2003, the Government of Sudan issued an extension of the waiver on 

their earlier decree requiring certification that food aid brought into Sudan be free 

from bio-engineering, thus enabling USAID to continue food aid shipments to the 

country. This extension comes to a close on July 8, 2004, but because the normal 

time for U.S. Title II humanitarian food assistance to be procured and transported 

to Sudan is four months, we are now past the point at which we can be sure that 

US commodities arriving in Port Sudan will be allowed to clear customs and move 

swiftly to the populations in need. USAID policy since the GOS issuance of this policy has been to continue shipment of humanitarian food assistance as long as food 

aid would arrive and clear customs for distribution to beneficiaries prior to the 

deadline date on this extension. The US is prepared to make additional food commitments to the humanitarian crises in Sudan, but we cannot do so as long as this 

issue is outstanding. We are informed by the United Nations that food stocks for 

relief operations will be exhausted by April/May of this year. Mr. Chairman, the potential humanitarian consequences of this pipeline break for the needy in Sudan 

cannot be over emphasized. 

II. LOOKING TOWARD PEACE

a. Ongoing Program 

USAID’s 3-year strategic plan for assistance to Sudan was designed to promote 

a flexible approach, depending on the outcome of the peace negotiations—stalemate, 

deterioration, or peace. USAID’s approved program of $220 million in FY 2004 was 

19

planned for the ‘‘stalemate’’ scenario of no peace and no war, and increases resources for sudan by approximately $40 million over FY 2003. The Administration’s 

request for FY 2005 includes $336 million for Sudan, and assumes the comprehensive peace settlement will be concluded. USAID has planned a package of special 

programs in FY 2005. This program will underpin the peace agreement through 

support for five key program elements—‘‘quick start’’ programs; demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; democratic governance, and infrastructure. It will also 

meet humanitarian needs which will dramatically increase in the short term as access is gained to regions in the South long isolated by conflict. 

We have identified five priority areas for the ‘‘stalemate’’ scenario: Expanded support to the Sudan peace process; more responsive and participatory government; improved equitable access to quality education; increased use of health, water and 

sanitation services and practices; and a foundation established for economic recovery. 

i. Expanded Support to the Sudan Peace Process 

USAID will promote peace building initiatives that foster consensus on resource 

management in conflict-prone and transition areas in southern Sudan. The purpose 

of these programs is to demonstrate tangible benefits of participation in the peace 

process. USAID programs will benefit people returning to their homes, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), ex-combatants, former abductees, and will coordinate with the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration 

on assistance to returning refugees. Using emergency sources of funding, USAID 

will provide short-term assistance to returnees with transportation, shelter, and kits 

with basic household utensils and supplies, as well as support their engagement in 

employment and small income generation, using development funds. 

It is also vitally important that grassroots and political level peace processes be 

supported visibly and firmly by the United States. Therefore this objective will prepare the ground for quick impact projects to demonstrate tangible benefits in southern and transition zone communities of participation in the peace process. These 

programs will jumpstart activities so that they are available immediately after a 

peace agreement is reached. Confidence building efforts will focus on generating 

trust among communities in formerly contested areas. 

ii. More Responsive and Participatory Governance 

In the coming years, it will be critical to support both Parties to the negotiations 

with good governance activities, so as to prevent further conflict in Sudan. USAID 

will provide technical assistance including anti-corruption activities, training, equipment, supplies and other commodities for local authorities in the South. As well, 

USAID will strengthen civil society institutions, networks and professional associations through consultations with southern peace agreement signatories on governance frameworks, training and technical assistance to judges and court administration, independent media and information dissemination. In particular, USAID will 

focus on civic education seminars and radio spots about issues and outcomes of the 

peace process. Improved democratic governance and respect for human rights will 

be promoted by establishing a civil society network capable of advocating for legal 

protection of civil liberties, as well as strengthening other civil society networks. 

iii. Improved Equitable Access to Quality Education 

Anyone who has traveled to Sudan has heard Sudanese say that their number one 

priority is education. More than two generations have been without it in southern 

Sudan. USAID’s program will emphasize regional teacher training institutes, professional development for teachers, and teaching materials for teacher education, nonformal education, and education management training. Our programs will also focus 

on school rehabilitation and encouraging women and girls to enroll in primary, secondary and adult education programs. Programs like this are absolutely vital to the 

development and stability of southern Sudan. 

iv. Increased Use of Health, Water and Sanitation Services and Practices 

USAID’s primary health care and water/sanitation program emphasizes improving 

the capacities of southern Sudanese to manage and deliver their own requirements 

for health care, especially among women. At the same time, the program provides 

funding for critically-needed essential medicines, training, physical rehabilitation of 

training institutes and communication and logistical support. USAID’s program also 

seeks to help transform the health system in southern Sudan to reduce dependency 

on the international community and to introduce strategies to increase HIV/AIDS 

awareness, prevention and care activities. 

20

v. Foundation Established for Economic Recovery 

USAID’s new programs in economic growth represent a step beyond past objectives of USG food security programs. The country context has changed in the last 

three years, especially in southern Sudan, where the nascent recovery of markets, 

the four continuous years of surplus crop production in western Equatoria, the survival of producers’ and marketers’ associations and other institutions in the difficult 

wartime environment, and the growth of a southern Sudanese capacity for research 

and policy analysis, have all given hope that a rapid recovery is achievable. 

USAID’s economic recovery program seeks to establish the foundation for marketbased economic recovery in southern Sudan. It will promote the delivery of market 

support services (credit, business skills, improved agricultural practices, export promotion, market information, and road rehabilitation) to entrepreneurs and the market support institutions that deliver those services (including a microfinance institution, agribusiness training centers, business associations, a statistical analysis center, and local road maintenance departments). USAID will also support improved 

economic policies in southern Sudan through technical and logistical assistance. At 

the same time, USAID will continue humanitarian assistance to those communities 

who are most vulnerable to disaster and conflict, including food aid, seeds and tools, 

and training. 

b. Peace Dividend 

The peace process in Sudan has brought the GOS and the SPLM to the brink of 

an historic agreement to end the long civil war in southern Sudan. Should the Parties sign an agreement, peace will be fragile, especially during the first year, because of Sudan’s decades of war and lack of equitable access to resources. Peace will 

trigger a massive return of refugees and internally displaced people to their home 

areas, straining services and infrastructure that are woefully inadequate for existing 

populations. 

Just as U.S. leadership since 2001 has reinvigorated the peace process and improved humanitarian access, U.S. leadership through an expanded assistance program will be required to ensure that peace endures in the South, and extends 

throughout the country. USAID is in a position of unique influence as Southern Sudanese confront the most fundamental issues in their transition from war and survival to peace, governance and development. Lasting peace in Sudan will be a great 

positive influence in the volatile Horn of Africa, a vast zone of conflict and terrorism. 

When a peace agreement is achieved, Sudan, and in particular southern Sudan, 

will need increased support in a number of areas, including:

• ‘‘Quick-start’’ projects that will provide visible benefits to communities soon 

after an agreement is signed.

• Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of formal armed forces, militias, and other armed groups into peacetime activities.

• Infrastructure development, particularly in the South, including transportation, water and sanitation, electrification, and communications.

• Expansion of basic services, in particular health and education.

• Support for the development of democratic institutions and processes.

USAID is planning how it can most effectively contribute to a ‘‘peace dividend’’ 

in these areas, and the increased funding requested in FY 2005 will help to fund 

new USAID activities. In the event of a peace agreement, the U.S. will work with 

other donors on a comprehensive peace dividend program of assistance to support 

the agreement. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the United States is anxious to move forward with the 

rebuilding of the war-devastated areas of Sudan. Overwhelmingly, the Sudanese 

people, North, South, East, and West are desperate for peace and development. The 

time for an agreement on a just peace is now.

Mr. ROYCE. I think we are very fortunate to have someone on the 

ground who has your years of experience dealing with victims of 

conflict. There are two questions that I wanted to ask. The first 

goes right to the heart of the issue of the peace dividend itself that 

should propel both sides to the table. They created this National 

Petroleum Commission. This is something that I, over a year ago, 

talked to Senator, or our Special Envoy Danforth about, the idea 

21

of creating something that could be audited, where you knew that 

there was a reason to come to the table because of the advantage. 

Yet we look at this resource-sharing agreement that was signed 

in January, and it seems to be free of all outside monitoring. I 

think that since Sudan is going to be the beneficiary from large 

amounts of development aid, from debt relief, from a concerted effort among all the international institutions to assist, that it 

wouldn’t be unreasonable to ask that the international community, 

which will contribute so much, would be able to monitor the distribution of billions of oil revenues in the north and the south. So 

let me begin with that question as to why this is not in the agreement. 

Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Royce. I think we need to remember where we are in this agreement is the framework agreement, 

so this national petroleum resource-sharing is far from final. Clearly, when we get into fleshing this out in full detail, we are going 

to be pushing for the transparency initiatives that are present elsewhere, the kind you see in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. We have 

talked to them about this. It is interesting. They are both a little 

reluctant. I think they see this——

Mr. ROYCE. I hear they are both reluctant. 

Mr. SNYDER. I think at the end when we are squeezing them, 

this is one we will get. It is not there yet but it is a framework 

agreement. Give us a chance to perform in the final agreement. 

Which, by the way, just to give you an idea of the flow if we manage to succeed, my guess is we are going to be in for 90 days of 

fleshing out all these agreements, not just this oil agreement, but 

the security agreement and some of the others in much more 

minute detail. So there will be a time period before the comprehensive agreement is ready for signature. 

Mr. ROYCE. The other similar subject would be why both sides 

are resistant to the idea of a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Let me 

just ask you, are there conversations taking place within the U.N. 

concerning a peacekeeping operation that might follow this and 

would it be a Chapter 6, would it be a peacekeeping operation or 

a peacemaker operation, a Chapter 7 operation if it were to be 

given as a mandate? And what would be the Administration’s position? I guess the most important issue to me personally is just why 

the resistance on the part of the SPLM and Khartoum to the idea 

of having a U.N. peacekeeping force on the ground. 

Mr. SNYDER. I think the resistance on the government’s part is 

typical of the sovereign party in any of these arrangements anywhere we have had this problem. They don’t like the U.N. coming 

into their turf and dictating. The truth of the matter is it is obvious 

to us all and the U.N. is already engaged, that there will have to 

be to be a U.N. presence of some significant size. I think the Secretary alluded to 8 to 10,000. These are very early stages of negotiation. A lot of it will depend literally on how we finally set up the 

security arrangement in particular which will go to troop flows, 

and whether or not they go to intermediate bases and how many 

men we need to monitor that and so on. I think there will be a robust presence. 

Again, the issue of Chapter 6, Chinese Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 

will be debated at the end. The truth is this particular force will 

22

have to be able to protect the human rights groups that have been 

threatened on the ground. In fact, to do some of the things that the 

CPMT will do in the interim period in a much more robust fashion, 

providing the kind of literal visual guarantee to these people that 

have been so traumatized over the years, means that we have 

begun to change the psychology. I think it is less important whether it is chapter 6, Chinese 6 or 7 than the actual mandate to say 

that, that these people are there to protect the citizens, and their 

human rights. 

When we get into the actual negotiation in the U.N., we certainly 

will be pressing hard for that. It is a little premature to go beyond 

that because we are not there yet, and we don’t know the details, 

but that is what our thinking is. 

Mr. ROYCE. I thank you for clarifying that, Secretary Snyder. We 

are going to go to Mr. Payne. We have got another panel, so we 

are going to try to rapidly go through the questions here. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I will try to be brief. Let me 

ask you, Assistant Secretary Snyder, the Government of Sudan still 

remains on the State Department’s state sponsor of terrorism list. 

Correct me if I am wrong that the government has refused to disassociate itself from terror groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, 

which openly maintains offices in Khartoum and which the government pointedly refuses to close. 

Congressman Tancredo and I sent a letter to Secretary Powell 

last month seeking answers to several of the questions. I wonder 

if you know, one, what the status of our letter to the Secretary is, 

and what is your assessment of the connections with terrorism? As 

you know, there are allegations that Sudanese officials played a 

role in the first World Trade bombing, the attempted assassination 

of President Mubarak, the bombings of the United States missions 

in Kenya and Tanzania. I wonder if any of these persons who were 

in office then have been removed, whether any have been jailed, 

have any of them been chastised from the Government of Sudan to 

your knowledge? 

Mr. SNYDER. On the generic issue of terrorism, they are about 90 

percent of the way there. The two pieces that are in question, beyond individuals and what they have done in the past, are Hamas 

and the Palestinian Islamic jihad. I checked on the status, on the 

Palestinian Islamic jihad. We are less concerned about that. That 

may be an anomaly. Hamas concerns us, and the President’s relatively recent embrace of a new Hamas representative resulted in 

a demarche, another action I just signed off on this morning. Depending on their response, you will get a different answer to the 

letter you sent. I literally just sent it out this morning. 

On the question of the broader culpability over time, your letter 

has clearly prompted us to take a hard look at that kind of thing. 

In an open hearing like this, I can’t get into details, but I can answer your question, has anybody on that list been punished, reprimanded or otherwise for that? Clearly not. The only one that has 

really suffered, or not the only one, but the major figure that suffered any consequences for this was Turabi, and he was expelled 

for internal political squabbles as opposed to his role as a terrorist 

sympathizer. 

23

It is an open question and one that we will pursue when we feel 

the time is appropriate with due vigor, and we will try and get you 

an answer on the letter you sent us. But I suspect for now and 

given the sensitivity, it will have to come in a closed forum. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I would appreciate more information at a closed forum. The question of power sharing and the 

sharing of the resources, where does that stand right now in the 

negotiations? 

Mr. SNYDER. There have been side discussions by the secondary 

figures, people like Pagan Amum and Nhial Deng and others for 

the SPLM and General Yaya and some others, now State Minister 

Yaya. They have danced in a preliminary fashion. They have got 

bracketed text, for instance, on the parliament that will be set up, 

what is a fair percentage for the SPLM. I think they are in the 30s 

somewhere separated by a couple of points. I think the government’s offer is on the order of 32 and the SPLM ask is on the order 

of 40 percent, 38 percent. That is clearly a bridgeable kind of difference, once Taha and Garang actually engage on this. The other 

concern is how they make more concrete their agreement that the 

national capital should reflect the national character. There will be 

a great deal of devil in those details. 

But again, if we can get these talks to end on the right note, in 

which they literally take a leap of faith for peace and do become 

partners, one of the side discussions that is going on is, in fact, a 

partnership discussion between the SPLM and the national Congress party of a political nature, how do they, in the new Sudan, 

stand behind this deal to see that politically it moves forward. That 

may turn out to really be the ultimate answer to your question as 

to how they resolve the power sharing. Those talks have been 

rightly fairly closed to us, but from the tone and output that Roger 

Winter, I, and others have gotten in side conversations, they both 

tell us they are serious, productive and fairly direct and they have 

been lengthy. These are serious conversations. It is hard to speculate what is in that box until they actually get to it but I think 

since they both reassured us, we intend to hold them to the idea 

that this will not delay these talks. 

Mr. PAYNE. Just the last quick question to Mr. Winter about the refugee situation in Chad. They say they need about $20 million. 

About $1 million has been appropriated by USAID. Chad of course 

is going through perhaps a little problem with the attempt to 

change the constitution and attempt to have a President for life, I 

guess, now that they have found oil. What is the situation there 

in Chad with the Sudanese refugees, about 110,000 who are there? 

Mr. WINTER. When I was actually in Chad up on the border in 

January, it was difficult. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees operation had not yet been fully deployed there. It is now. The 

U.S. has made available to UNHCR about $10.5 million so far to 

empower them. It is not all on line yet. I think that is why you 

get some of the indications like in the press today. But the money 

has been made available. UNHCR is now fully deployed. I haven’t 

been back since January, but things ought to be steadily improving. I actually do expect to be there in another 2 weeks now to give 

you a follow-up report from my personal experience there. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Tancredo. 

24

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What does the government in Khartoum think anybody in the whole world is thinking about what is happening? What I mean by that is how can they 

assume for a moment that everything that is going on would not 

be observed and would not be reacted to? How can we possibly 

think about them being even remotely concerned or interested in 

bringing this to a true successful and peaceful conclusion? Look at 

what we are facing here. I just am fascinated by what you think 

they think about how all this is going to be perceived, what is happening in Darfur and Abyei. That nobody would notice it? That nobody would respond to it? 

Mr. WINTER. I don’t know how to answer that, frankly. I don’t 

mean to oversimplify. I do think that they thought, for a variety 

of reasons, that we were primarily interested in the south, I think 

perhaps because some of the church connections and that kind of 

thing. Perhaps they thought that somehow they could react violently to the political opposition there and that somehow by rolling 

up the civilian population and almost dealing with them as if those 

civilians were themselves the opposition because of their tribal affiliations and so forth that a non-understanding West, which didn’t 

know much about Darfur and didn’t have much in the way of religious connection to the population there just wouldn’t care. 

Frankly, I have had a couple of people say to me, why do you 

care about Darfur? That is sort of the same kind of question that 

you are getting at. We have tried exceedingly strongly to convey to 

them that unfettered humanitarian access has been for all Sudanese, and that from the beginning of this United States initiative 

to promote peace in Sudan, access has always been one of our top 

three goals. It has been counterterrorism and it has been ending 

the war in the south, but it has also been humanitarian access to 

all vulnerable populations. Frankly, they don’t fully understand 

that, I guess. There is just a different perspective. I don’t know 

how to say much more than that. 

Mr. TANCREDO. A different perspective. That is certainly undeniably true. Charlie, any guess as to what they really think we think 

about this? 

Mr. SNYDER. I wouldn’t attempt to be an apologist for what is unspeakable action but I think one of their motivations was the political presence of Turabi, who is politically connected to the JEM faction, the smaller of the rebel factions, in Darfur. For the Government of Sudan, Turabi is the ultimate bete noire. I think they 

would have reacted—the fact that they have reacted the way they 

have is insane, but the political motivation goes into that Turabi 

connection to JEM. 

It is totally disproportionate. I am not saying differently. But it 

is one of the pieces and it goes to the fact of why we are going to 

have to be very rigorous in any kind of safeguard package, U.N. 

presence, international guarantees in all of this at the end of the 

day because of this kind of pattern. I just think anything short of 

it would be not due diligence. 

Mr. TANCREDO. We just received some reports that Chinese oil 

workers and Government of Sudan soldiers have penetrated 8 

hours and 40 kilometers into SPLA territory in eastern upper Nile, 

in Wudeir, actually even some indications that there may be ChiVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
25

nese military involved. If this is accurate, what is your estimation 

of the possibilities that could accrue from this if there is some sort 

of confrontation with SPLA forces? How do you think this would affect the peace process? 

Mr. SNYDER. We will have to look into that report. I haven’t seen 

that one before. But clearly, the CPMT and somebody else would 

issue us an official report. Depending on what we find, we will take 

appropriate action. To my knowledge, there are no Chinese troops 

in the country. There could be Chinese security people around the 

oil field, but it wouldn’t be the large numbers. I certainly will check 

on that, but that is my understanding. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo. We are going to go to Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia. If you should have any questions, 

Frank. 

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one or two. I want 

to thank you for having the hearing and thank both of the witnesses for their good work. Just listening to you just very quickly, 

since I don’t serve on the Committee and don’t want to take much 

time, one, are you hopeful, both of you, are you hopeful? 

Mr. SNYDER. I think the short answer is yes, because we are 

going to bring everything we have got to bear on this in the end 

game. And as the Secretary said the other day, we are not going 

to accept failure in this regard. Success is the only answer. A just 

peace is what we are going to get. How we are going to get there 

may change depending on what happens in the next few days, but 

that is what we are after and we are not backing off it. 

Mr. WINTER. I am hopeful, but lately a little less hopeful than 

I have been for the last few months. I think the Darfur situation 

has a possibility of contributing to the unraveling of this process. 

I think, that hasn’t fully happened yet. And Charlie is right. We 

are upscaling in every possible way to make sure there isn’t a failure. So I am not devoid of hope at this point. 

Mr. WOLF. What is the final day that you are saying on the calendar that you believe that you would just say—because this has 

moved obviously from last summer, from last fall, from Christmas, 

you bought the cow that you were going to slaughter in honor of, 

and now we are into March. Is there a day? Is there a time? Is 

there a time? Is it like when you say to your children, one more 

time you do it, and then next time comes and you don’t. One more 

time you do it. Is there a time that you would say, I think we 

would know success if we saw it? Is there a time that you would 

say it is not going to happen? Or do you not have a timetable? 

Mr. SNYDER. For one, I think the cow is on ice, it is not in the 

refrigerator. But there are internal deadlines in these talks. One 

of them is coming up in terms of what the Kenyans—they are running the process—have said. The 16th of March was supposed to 

end the discussion on the so-called three areas. My guess is that 

they are not going to make it. Slipping 4 or 5 days because of 

Taha’s absence would be acceptable. 

I think in our own mind, and I obviously don’t want to set a 

marker down that I then have to eat, but I personally don’t see 

how we get past the next Sudan Peace Act report without a major 

26

breakthrough. We can’t be where we are today on April 21st. That 

is my personal view. 

Mr. WOLF. The last two questions. I won’t put you on the spot. 

Just the last one. Should it fail, and we hope and pray, because 

there a lot of people that are praying that it will not fail, that it 

would be a success, but should it fail, and maybe you don’t want 

to say publicly, but what then? Should 20 years go by, slavery go 

by, bombing go by, Darfur go by, 2 million people go by, Osama bin 

Laden, as the Chairman said, go by, and, as Mr. Payne said, assassination—what then? Or would you rather do that in closed session 

and tell us? 

But I hope you have a plan, because should it fail, what then? 

Do you want to say publicly, or do you want to wait and do that 

privately? 

Mr. SNYDER. I think we would say that, to get into any kind of 

details, privately. Again, the key thing is to realize that we are not 

going to accept this failure. If we wind up being confronted with 

it, because of the history you have described, we will take a very 

hard look at some tough choices. We are not there yet, but we are 

obviously taking a look at various contingencies, et cetera. 

It somewhat would depend on how it fails. In other words, if this 

breaks down over Abyei, and we are take making progress, for instance, on Darfur so that I can with a straight conscience say to 

myself, well, we have got that one back under control, and the 

ceasefire doesn’t break down, then our reaction is different than if 

Darfur is aflame, they violate the ceasefire in the south. So I don’t 

want to publicly get into it until we know the facts. 

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Wolf. 

I think Congressman Nick Smith from Michigan might have had 

a question. 

Mr. SMITH. If I may, Mr. Chairman. I just returned from Libya 

and a meeting with Ghadafi. Do you see any kind of consequences 

or influence, what is happening in Libya, as far as its effect in the 

Sudan? 

Mr. SNYDER. Fortunately Libya is in another bureau, but as an 

example of potential regime transformation may be instructive in 

Sudan. Clearly we have been trying to say that if somebody like 

Ghadafi can walk back, you can count on us to do what we can in 

your case, if you think that we are misleading you. 

One of the accusations that the government makes to us, to be 

frank, is that we are leading them down the gilded path, that we 

are promising them these changes. So there is a mirror image problem. That is where the Ghadafi ‘‘rehabilitation’’ really comes into 

play a little bit. They are looking at that. And I think some of the 

peace action at least looks at that as a hopeful sign. Here was 

someone that was on the top of the list, but once he did the right 

thing, there is some hope for him, and therefore there is hope for 

us ultimately. But there is not a direct correlation between the two. 

It is more an example of possibilities. 

Mr. SMITH. I have an interest in GMOs, the technology to develop food products that can grow in arid soils, that can grow in 

climates where food production traditionally has been more difficult. Some countries have been resistant to using that technology 

27

because of their customers, such as Europe, which refuses to purchase genetically modified products. To me, this is nothing short of 

a decision that is resulting in the starvation and death of a lot of 

people throughout Africa and the Sudan. 

Can you give me any ideas or thoughts about the attitudes as far 

as accepting this new technology for producing the food and feed 

that is needed? 

Mr. WINTER. There is a significant problem. We have been confronted quite surprisingly about a year or so ago with a directive 

from an office that reports to the President of the country, which 

flat out would bar genetically modified products from importation 

to Sudan. That is a problem for the humanitarian programs because the United States provides 70 to 80 percent of all of the food 

aid to Sudan that is required for the humanitarian programs, and 

some of our commodities are genetically modified. But the way our 

program works is we buy our commodities on the open market, and 

then we ship them. 

What we have done is we have held endless number of meetings 

with the government. We have sent a team of scientists over to 

meet with their scientific community to talk about whatever their 

concerns are that we might be able to satisfy. We have provided 

a variety of technical materials and so forth so that they would understand what our commodities are all about. 

They have twice delayed the implementation of their very restrictive policy. Over the last 2 weeks meeting with the Foreign Minister and a variety of other officials, I have told them that we 

would cut off food delivery—new food procurement as of March the 

7th, because we won’t be able to deliver it before the restrictive 

rule goes into effect again. 

And just before this hearing—which shows you the value of these 

hearings—I got a call from the Ambassador of Sudan saying that—

we haven’t seen it in writing yet, but they are going to postpone 

the implementation of that regulation for another 6 months. That 

only applies to the food aid humanitarian programs. It doesn’t 

apply to general imports, however. That is the story. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Let me ask you one quick question. 

Mr. ROYCE. Your time has expired, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I can say it quickly. 

Mr. ROYCE. Okay. Let us see how quickly. 

Mr. SMITH. What role can the American faith-based organizations play in promoting the Christian-Muslim dialogue in the 

Sudan? 

Mr. SNYDER. I think this is something that has been near and 

dear to Senator Danforth’s heart all along. I think there is a major 

role there. And I think the fact that we are now standing up to the 

Muslim population in Darfur and making the point that this isn’t 

just about protecting the Christians gives us an opportunity to 

walk down that door. 

I would encourage them to be in contact with Senator Danforth, 

who is personally interested in this, and he has some ideas on the 

subject for private initiatives and other things that might actually 

result in some significant binding up of wounds here. 

28

Mr. ROYCE. Well, we want to thank our witnesses for their candid responses today, and we thank you gentlemen very much for 

your efforts on this challenge. 

We are going to ask our next panel to come up at this time. Let 

me introduce our three witnesses here. Dr. J. Stephen Morrison directs the CSIS Africa Program. He co-chaired the reassessment of 

the U.S. Policy to Sudan in 2000, and in the summer of 2002, he 

organized an energy expert mission to the Sudan peace negotiations in Kenya. Prior to joining CSIS he worked for the Secretary 

of State’s policy planning staff, the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa. 

Next we have Dr. Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College. He 

has written and published extensively on Sudan, served as a researcher and consultant in numerous human rights and humanitarian organizations. His work is published in a variety of southern 

Sudanese magazines and newspapers and Web sites. He provides 

commentary on Sudan to international news services. He is presently at work on a book-linked study of Sudan’s civil war and 

American policy responses to Sudan over the last decade. 

And Pastor Gary Kusunoki is the founder and Chairman of Safe 

Harbor International Relief, a church-based relief and development 

agency. Since 1994, Safe Harbor has worked in more than 20 different nations, bringing physical, spiritual and emotional aid to 

those in need. Pastor Gary has worked in war-torn areas such as 

Rwanda and Sudan. Since 1996, he has made more than 25 trips 

to South Sudan. Now, that is a commitment, 25 trips to Sudan, 

which I would like to thank him for making. In November 2002, 

Pastor Gary accepted an invitation to travel to Khartoum to meet 

with the President of Sudan, General Bashir. 

So we are going to hear from each of our witnesses. We are going 

to start with Dr. Morrison. 

And before we do that, before proceeding, I would like to recognize one of the many distinguished guests that we have in the audience, Reverend Francis Campbell Gray. If I can ask you to stand. 

The Reverend Gray serves as assistant bishop in the Episcopal 

Diocese of Virginia. And Bishop Gray has served on the House of 

Bishops Committee on World Missions for the past 14 years and on 

the Standing Commission on World Mission for 6 years. In 1999, 

he was elected President of the Compass Rose Society, an organization supporting worldwide Anglican mission efforts. 

Reverend Gray recently returned from Sudan. The Episcopal 

Church is doing very good work throughout all of Africa. 

So I would like to thank you, Reverend, for again joining us 

today and monitoring our work here. 

Dr. Morrison, if you would proceed. Again, summarize your testimony, please, in 5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you, Chairman Royce, and thank you, 

Congressman Payne and Congressman Tancredo, for the chance to 

be here today. I also want to acknowledge the prodigious effort 

29

made by Malik Chaka, Tom Sheehy and Greg Galvin in putting 

this hearing together. 

Many of my remarks will be drawn from a report that the CSIS 

Post Conflict Reconstruction Project produced in January looking at 

what the challenges in the post-peace accord period will be. That 

report came about because of the initiative taken by Congressman 

Wolf. For that we are grateful. We’ve brought plenty of copies of 

that report along today. 

I have five key points. First, we need to reemphasize that peace, 

a successful negotiated peace accord in Sudan, is very much in 

United States national interests—the discussions oftentimes assume that but don’t state that explicitly—and that a failed peace 

accord will be very detrimental to U.S. interests, be it promotion 

of democracy and human rights, humanitarian access, regional security or counterterrorism. 

We need to keep our eye on the prize, the peace accord that is 

close but at risk. And without that peace accord—I think Roger 

Winter made this point quite eloquently—without that peace accord, it will not be possible for Sudan to begin to move forward on 

many of these other major challenges. 

I also wish to comment on the time invested in the peace process. 

It is not fully yet 2 years that the IGAD negotiations have been 

under way. They have had three major agreements in that period. 

A ceasefire has held for over a year. In comparative terms, if you 

were to look at the Cambodian peace process, the Salvadoran peace 

process, or the Mozambican peace process, the time line and 

achievements of the Sudan Peace Process compare pretty favorably. 

That doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be bringing intensified pressure to bear on the parties to close this deal, and I agree with the 

remarks from Charlie Snyder and Roger Winter in that regard. But 

I think we need to give very serious consideration as to whether 

we deliver ultimata that leave us with no options in a premature 

fashion. That is a call that I am not clear on how to make. We are 

approaching the point where that difficult call is before us. 

Third, we need to remind ourselves that sustained high-level 

U.S. leadership has been essential to the progress that we have 

seen thus far. If United States leadership wanes or is withdrawn, 

or eclipsed for some reason, the other members of the troika, the 

U.K. and the Norwegians, and our regional partners in East Africa 

will not be able to carry this process forward. 

To close the deal requires more innovative high-level U.S. diplomacy. President Bush at important points has intervened quite 

positively. More calls, I believe, in coming weeks are warranted. As 

well we should be pressing Blair, the Presidents of Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan to begin to vocalize very 

publicly the need for the parties to come forward and close the 

deal. 

We have talked at length about Darfur. I don’t think I have in 

my comments much to add to those comments provided by earlier 

witnesses. I think there has been a very extensive discussion. Finally, we need to prepare, as we have attempted to do in this document, for what comes after peace negotiations. 

Three quick points in this area. One is the threat to peace that 

will persist in Sudan, and that will require a large and robust U.N. 

30

peacekeeping force. Secretary Powell speaks about 8- to 10,000 

troops. It will require a Chapter 7 mandate, a quick reaction force, 

and possess strong leadership, strong intelligence capacities, and 

should be led from a core force from an industrial power. None of 

those pieces are in place today. If we were to get what we want 

this month or next month, we would not be prepared today to bring 

forward these essential pieces. 

The second formidable challenge will be normalizing Sudan’s status with international financial institutions, with other bilateral 

donors, and with ourselves. We have a complex mix of arrears, of 

debt and of sanctions that are going to have to be sorted through. 

On an interagency basis much work recently, I understand, has 

gone forward in trying to think through what the road map would 

look like, but it has not been signed off or finalized at high levels, 

and we cannot afford delay in moving that forward. 

Third, it has been made clear by the Administration that there 

will not be a supplemental this year, in 2004. That means on 

peacekeeping, on debt relief, on ample additional reconstruction assistance, three key items that the U.S. will need to bring to the 

table to support a peace, that it is really going to be incumbent 

upon Congress to take the initiative at this moment. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Morrison. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA

PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Chairman Royce and ranking minority member Congressman Payne, I commend 

you for calling this timely hearing on a subject of such importance to U.S. foreign 

policy in Africa, namely, what are the near-term prospects for concluding a durable 

and just negotiated settlement to Sudan’s protracted civil war. Your leadership has 

been, and remains, essential in informing debate here in Washington on what is 

happening in the Sudan peace process, and more important, what is possible and 

what more needs to happen to achieve peace in Sudan. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to these deliberations, both on personal grounds, and on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

which has in the past four years become significantly invested in Sudan and intends 

to remain intensively engaged into the future. 

We are proud of the Center’s record on Sudan. 

In late January, the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, headed by Rick 

Barton and Sheba Crocker, with substantial input from Dina Esposito and myself, 

issued a detailed analysis of the critical challenges that will lie ahead, should a 

peace agreement be concluded in Sudan. It is titled ‘‘To Guarantee the Peace: An 

Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Sudan’’ and is available on the CSIS web site. 

In my comments here today, I will draw upon the major findings of this excellent 

work. 

In early October of last year, CSIS brought to Washington senior health officials 

of both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM to discuss the challenges they confront, especially in terms of infectious diseases, and how they intend to collaborate 

in post-war Sudan. A little over a year earlier, CSIS fielded an expert team to the 

Machakos negotiations to present an analysis of the present and future of Sudan’s 

energy sector, along with models for wealth sharing. Finally, as the Bush Administration was just settling into office in early 2001, CSIS issued its Sudan Task Force 

report, ‘‘U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War,’’ which laid out a strategy by which sustained, high-level U.S. leadership might bring Sudan’s war to a just, negotiated conclusion. 

I will confine myself to brief comments here today. I can elaborate, as needed, 

during the question and answer period. 

First, we need to remind ourselves that vital U.S. national interests are at stake 

in Sudan. 

31

U.S. interests are concentrated in humanitarian values, religious and cultural tolerance, democratic norms, counter-terrorism, regional stability and economic 

growth. The U.S. engagement in pursuit of peace in Sudan is neither a charitable 

nor an ill-conceived act. It is a clear-eyed pursuit of results that can benefit the 

United States. 

A failed peace effort that reignites Sudan’s devastating war between the North 

and South will hurt the Sudanese people profoundly, set back its neighborhood, encourage a radicalization in north and south, and damage U.S. interests. A successful 

peace effort holds the promise of changing the history of Sudan, restabilizing the 

Horn, and advancing U.S. interests. It could test the viability of a unified, liberalized Sudan, facilitate the reconstruction of society in north and south, demonstrate 

multilateral success in ending a chronic war that has pitted Muslim and Christian, 

Arab and African, populations against one another, remove Sudan from the list of 

state sponsors of terrorism, and normalize Sudan’s international status. If successful, it would be the Bush administration’s signature diplomatic achievement in Africa. Such a peace, and only such a peace, can create an environment in which it becomes possible to tackle Sudan’s other formidable governance problems—and they 

are many and severe. 

Stated otherwise, we need to keep our eye on the prize—the successful conclusion 

of a Sudanese peace accord between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA. 

Will a negotiated settlement between the SPLM/SPLA and the Government of 

Sudan resolve all Sudan’s ills? No, but it is an absolutely critical first step and we 

cannot afford to become distracted, nor squander the important progress made so 

far in realizing this first step. 

Second, we need to remind ourselves that the Sudanese parties are indeed very 

close to a final framework agreement. 

They have completed three major agreements: the breakthrough Machakos framework, which separated church from state and granted the south the right of a referendum after six years; the security accord of late September 2003; and the wealthsharing agreement of early January 2004. 

While the issues surrounding Abyei are complex and highly contentious, and 

power-sharing arrangements still have to be concluded, I don’t believe these remaining hurdles are insurmountable, certainly not if the consequence of failure is a return to war and the collapse of the peace process. With sufficient will on both sides, 

and concerted pressure applied to both sides by key external partners, there can be 

closure on these issues. 

Third, we need to remind ourselves that sustained, high-level U.S. leadership is 

essential. 

U.S. leadership has been, from the very beginning of the Sudan peace process, essential to achieving the results seen thus far, and remains essential to closing a 

deal. 

Without President Bush’s direct engagement, that of Secretary Powell, and that 

of Special Envoy Senator Danforth, the Sudan peace process would not be at the 

advanced point it is today. And that progress has been secured through the perseverance of a very committed interagency team, led by Acting Assistant Secretary 

Charles Snyder, and including USAID Assistant Administrator Roger Winter, Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, former Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner, and 

former Ambassador Johnnie Carson. 

Congress, advocacy groups, and others should insist upon high-level U.S. engagement and carefully avoid any steps that might weaken it. If U.S. high-level leadership were to slacken or be withdrawn at this delicate moment, the Sudan peace 

process would likely collapse. Neither the other troika members, the UK and Norway, nor regional partners will be able to sustain the peace process, without U.S. 

leadership. 

To close a peace deal will require additional innovative, high-level U.S. diplomacy. 

Secretary Powell has repeatedly been in direct communication with Sudanese 

President Bashir and Dr. John Garang, head of the SPLM, and we commend him 

for his tireless engagement. 

President Bush too has at important moments communicated his views to the parties. In the near term, well-timed telephone calls from President Bush to President 

Bashir and Dr. Garang may prove essential as a peace deal approaches. 

At the same time, the United States should aggressively encourage other key 

partners—British Prime Minister Blair, heads of state of Ethiopia, Uganda, and 

Kenya, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan—to publicly and privately communicate to the Sudanese government and the SPLM that the time has come for them 

to reach a workable compromise on Abyei, finalize power-sharing arrangements, and 

expedite a final framework document. Their common message: we have entered a 

32

phase in which the longer the stalemate in the Naivasha peace talks persists, the 

higher the probability that the will and coherence of the two sides will fray and the 

process break down. 

Fourth, the United States needs to continue confronting the recent, steep escalation 

of horrific violence against civilians in Western Sudan. 

U.S. leadership should emphasize sustained action to quell violence, open humanitarian access, encourage political dialogue, and consciously ensure that events in 

Darfur do not destabilize the Sudan peace process. 

It is not altogether surprising that Sudan should experience an upsurge of violence as the possible endgame to the peace process approaches. In many other similar situations, that has been the pattern. Spoilers come forward in hopes of destabilizing the process. Aggrieved parties left out of the process come forward suddenly, 

seeking to win a place at the negotiating table through armed violence. 

In the case of Darfur, government-backed militias are behind most of the 

scorched-earth violence. The government has allowed only limited humanitarian access and resisted genuine political talks. Armed rebel movements reflect multiple 

factors: the brutal disenfranchisement and neglect of Western Sudan’s citizens by 

the government in Khartoum; longstanding local ethnic rivalries; and a meddling by 

neighbors and by the radical Islamist Hassan Turabi, each of whose actions has significantly stoked the violence. 

The situation in Darfur is fluid, murky, and dangerous. It hangs over the 

Naivasha talks, and has contributed directly to the stall seen there. It has the potential to rapidly escalate, to destabilize neighboring Chad, and to create dramatic 

new space for radical Islamic influence. 

We should resist facile characterizations, and instead focus aggressively on expanding humanitarian access, curbing weapons flows, improving intelligence, and 

pressuring the parties to enter renewed political talks. In concert with UN Special 

Envoy Amb. Vraalsen, the EU, and neighboring states, the United States, to its 

credit, recently dispatched a senior U.S. interagency team to Khartoum and Western Sudan. Follow-on investigative missions and further innovative diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral, will be essential. 

Fifth, the United States needs to prepare more systematically now for the peace implementation phase in Sudan, especially with regard to security, normalizing Sudan’s relations with international and donor institution, and ensuring a balanced, 

dynamic reconstruction effort. 

Insecurity will be the gravest immediate threat to a peace accord: from Sudan’s 

multiple armed militias; from breakaway military elements within either party; 

from rebel or proxy forces supported by Sudan’s neighbors; or internal spoilers such 

as Hassan Turabi. 

It is not inconceivable that outside terrorist groups will be attracted to assault 

the UN operation and expanded Western donor programs. 

We will invite disaster—and risk repeating the initial UN peacekeeping failures 

in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—if we assume the Sudanese parties themselves will have the will or capacity to police themselves adequately, or that a light UN peacekeeping force with a Chapter VI mandate simply 

to monitor events will be adequate. 

A large UN peacekeeping force will be required—Secretary Powell has spoken of 

8–10,000 troops—with a robust Chapter VII mandate. That force should include a 

small, quick-reaction force, possess strong intelligence capacities, and should be led 

by a core force from an industrial power. It will need careful forward planning, sufficient funding, a strong focus on advising and training the joint/integrated units of 

Sudan’s armed forces, and an international civilian police element with sufficient 

means to train Sudanese police. 

None of these pieces are in place today. Further, what is proposed here will be 

a tough sell: with the Sudanese parties themselves, internally within the Administration, within Congress, and within the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, there 

are no good, credible alternatives. 

The administration should move expeditiously to lead on these issues: it should 

work with Congress to line up adequate funding; press within the UN Security 

Council for a robust mandate; enlist a lead troop-contributing country, and offer extensive logistical, intelligence, and other forms of support. 

A second formidable challenge will be normalizing Sudan’s status with the United 

States, international financial institutions (e.g. IMF, World Bank, Africa Development Bank) and other major bilateral donors. That will involve clearing accumulated arrears (in excess of $1 billion), concluding multilateral agreement on a debt 

relief/debt forgiveness package (Sudan’s debt is estimated at $21 billion, of which 

it can be reasonably expected to afford payback on $3 billion), and lifting U.S. sanctions. 

33

This process promises to be highly complicated and contentious, will require intensive, protracted multilateral negotiations—for which U.S. leadership will be essential—and will carry substantial financial costs for the United States and other 

bilateral and multilateral donors. Each step will require extensive consultations 

with Congress. 

Though some promising interagency work on these issues has accelerated in recent months within the administration, the administration has not settled upon a 

clear road map detailing how it intends to manage arrearages, treatment of debt, 

and sanctions. The administration has made clear it has no plans for a supplemental appropriation in 2004; hence, if a peace agreement is concluded soon in 

Sudan, and arrearages and debt become urgent priorities, it will be incumbent upon 

Congress to lead. 

Finally, the United States will need to lead on the diplomatic and reconstruction 

fronts. 

It will be important that the high-level, multilateral engagement that helped 

drive the negotiations forward be sustained during the peace implementation phase. 

That will require a strong, and well-staffed U.S. embassy in Khartoum, the appointment of a prominent, respected personality to be the Secretary General’s Special 

Representative, and the structuring of an international implementation body, linked 

to external powers, key international bodies such as the World Bank, and the Sudanese parties themselves. 

It will be critically important that the United States be able to act quickly to support reconstruction in both the north and south alike. Substantial U.S. emergency, 

transitional and development funds are already flowing to southern Sudan (some 

emergency relief also goes to the north.) In FY04, USAID is intending to allocate 

$210 million to Sudan; that figure could rise if the situation in Darfur worsens. The 

request for FY05 is $386 million. The administration has yet to present a reconstruction strategy and budget to Congress that spells out how it would enlarge its 

programs in the north and south alike. At present, no monies for postwar reconstruction are in the FY05 request and, as indicated earlier, the administration has 

no plans for a supplemental in 2004. Hence, should a peace be concluded soon, a 

U.S. reconstruction package will become an immediate, urgent priority, which will 

require proactive Congressional initiative. 

In closing, I wish to reiterate that through the leadership of President Bush, Secretary Powell, and others the United States has made a substantial investment in 

the pursuit of a just, negotiated peace in Sudan. This commitment attests to the 

vital stakes—both humanitarian and strategic—that the United States has in a stable, peaceful, well-governed Sudan. U.S. leadership has been the key pivot to achieving the three breakthrough agreements concluded thus far. Now we are at a delicate 

moment, when a final framework accord is within reach, but when break down is 

also quite possible. Again, careful use of U.S. leadership will be essential. And if 

an accord between the SPLM and the government of Sudan is realized, continued 

U.S. leadership will be needed to guarantee security, normalize Sudan’s relations 

with international donors and financial institutions, and bring quick reconstruction 

benefits to all Sudanese. 

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Reeves. 

STATEMENT OF ERIC REEVES, PROFESSOR, SMITH COLLEGE 

Mr. REEVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. The question of the hearing title could not 

be more urgent, for I believe if a just peace agreement for Sudan 

is not reached very soon in Naivasha, Kenya, it will not be reached 

at all. 

The main outstanding issue, Abyei, one of three contested areas 

along the historic north-south border, is a diplomatic placeholder 

for Khartoum, a device for stalling these historic talks. 

Why is the regime so intransigent, knowing that historical and 

moral equities dictate that the Dinka district at Abyei should be 

part of the south; why, with the peace agreement clearly within 

reach, is the regime failing to take the last steps? 

For an answer we must look again to Darfur, in far western 

Sudan, where the regime is conducting a vast new military camVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
34

paign directed primarily against civilians, among the African tribal 

groups of the region. This conflict emerging out of longstanding 

grievances is marked by unspeakable savagery on Khartoum’s part, 

has precipitated perhaps the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis. 

Darfur demands urgent preparations for humanitarian intervention. Without such, we will likely be helpless witnesses to incalculable human destruction. Believing that the world will not respond 

with an appropriate urgency to the catastrophe in Darfur so long 

as an agreement in Naivasha can be made to seem imminent, 

Khartoum hopes first to resolve the crisis in Darfur militarily. 

Reports from U.N. officials and human rights organizations 

clearly suggest that what is occurring in Darfur is genocide; that 

the military actions of Khartoum and its Arab militias amount to 

the destruction of these various African peoples because of who 

they are. 

Amnesty International has recently reported on the deep racial 

animus and the civilian destruction. Among the many chillingly 

similar interviews with persons displaced into Chad, we hear a 

farmer from the village of Kishkish, reporting the words of his militia attackers, and I quote: ‘‘You are black, and you are opponents. 

You are our slaves. The Darfur region is in our hands.’’

A civilian from Jafal was told by Arab militia, you are opponents 

of the regime. We must crush you. As you are black, you are like 

slaves. The government plan is on our side to give us ammunition 

and food. 

In this context, I would remind the Committee of the key finding 

of the Sudan Peace Act, passed virtually unanimously by the Congress. The acts of the Government of Sudan constitute genocide as 

defined by the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 

of the Crime of Genocide. 

A formal peace agreement may be right around the corner, if 

Khartoum finds it expedient, but we will be still far from seeing 

such an agreement translated into a just and sustainable peace. Indeed Khartoum’s characteristic brutality and cynicism should make 

clear that the necessary planning for internal peacekeeping is far 

behind schedule. 

Nor is there meaningful U.S. funding for emergency transitional 

aid. The State Department’s promise of a large peace dividend for 

Sudan following the peace agreement has so far proved empty. 

There is no U.S. commitment to provide critical resources for transitional aid in the south. Perhaps one million internally displaced 

persons will attempt to return to this war-ravaged region in the 

first 6 months following an agreement. This will overwhelm available food and medical relief efforts. 

There is another key obstacle in making and sustaining a just 

peace: The assertion of moral equivalence between the southern opposition and the Khartoum regime both in the conduct of war and 

in diplomatic commitment to peace. Let us be decisively clear here. 

Though the SPLA has been guilty of serious human rights abuses, 

there is nothing that compares with Khartoum’s genocidal conduct 

of war. 

Whether there is agreement in Naivasha or not, United States 

policy must not be guided by a presence of moral equivalence, for 

only one party in Sudan’s conflict has relentlessly bombed civilian 

35

and humanitarian targets in southern Sudan for many years. Only 

one party has precipitously denied humanitarian access to many 

hundreds of thousands of civilians with many tens of thousands of 

attendant casualties. Only one party has deployed, as a barbaric 

weapon of war, the enslavement of human beings. We must keep 

this in mind if Naivasha fails, for failure will surely derive from 

Khartoum’s intransigence. There must be no subsequent assertion 

of equivalent diplomatic responsibility or Khartoum will rightly feel 

that it has prevailed. 

Largely unchanged since coming to power by military coup in 

1989 and derailing the peace process, the Khartoum regime has 

long been deeply complicit in international terrorism, is guilty of 

genocide, and every day thwarts the ghastly realities of Darfur. 

Khartoum’s cynical lies about massive human destruction in 

Darfur signal how difficult it will be to make anything meaningful 

of a mere signature in Naivasha. If an agreement is indeed around 

the corner, this marks only a beginning in a real job of building a 

just and sustainable peace. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Reeves. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reeves follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC REEVES, PROFESSOR, SMITH COLLEGE

Mr. Chair and distinguished members of the committee. 

The timing of this hearing could not be more auspicious—the question posed in 

its title could not be more urgent. For there can be no mistaking that this is Sudan’s 

moment of historical truth. If a just and comprehensive peace agreement is not 

reached in the very near term at talks in Naivasha (Kenya), it will not be reached 

at all. 

The main outstanding issue of Abyei—one of three contested areas along the historic north/south border—is little more than a diplomatic place-holder for 

Khartoum’s National Islamic Front regime in these historic peace talks, a device for 

stalling negotiations. This is hardly surprising, since such stalling continues a pattern of diplomatic evasion, foot-dragging, and bad faith that goes back many years—

certainly over the past decade of efforts by the East African Intergovernmental Authority for Development to negotiate an end to the Sudan’s catastrophic civil war. 

Khartoum knows full well that all historical and moral equities dictate that the 

Ngok Dinka district of Abyei should be part of the south. Yet the regime refuses 

to acknowledge these realities, preferring instead to use the issue of Abyei as a 

means of retarding further progress on a comprehensive peace agreement. For 

Khartoum also knows the critical significance of Abyei to the southern cause, and 

the impossibly unjust nature of an agreement that simply abandons Abyei to northern Sudan. 

But why is Khartoum remaining so intransigent? Why with a peace agreement 

so clearly within reach is the regime failing to take the last steps? 

For an answer we must look to Darfur, in far western Sudan, where the regime 

is presently conducting a vast military campaign directed primarily against civilians 

among the African tribal groups of the region—the Fur, Zaghawa, Massaleit, and 

others. War in Darfur has escalated rapidly over the last year, and especially the 

last four months. Militarily, Khartoum has been badly surprised and only now feels 

that it is making progress. The present pursuit of a military solution has come even 

as the regime has repeatedly refused to entertain the possibility of a negotiated political settlement to what are finally longstanding political problems, and has refused meaningful international auspices for the negotiation of a humanitarian ceasefire. 

Believing that the international community will not respond with appropriate 

force or urgency to the catastrophe in Darfur so long as an agreement in Naivasha 

can be made to seem ‘‘imminent,’’ Khartoum now hopes to resolve the crisis in 

Darfur militarily prior to any final peace agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. Tragically, the international community has given Khartoum 

all too much reason to believe that the costs of an intransigent pursuit of military 

victory in Darfur will not be excessive. 

36

This is so despite reports from many UN officials, human rights organizations, 

and journalists—reports clearly suggesting that what is occurring in Darfur is genocide, that the military actions of Khartoum and its Arab militia allies (the 

‘‘janjaweed’’) amount to the destruction of these various African peoples because of 

who they are—‘‘as such,’’ to borrow the key phrase from the 1948 UN Convention 

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 

The current phrase of choice among diplomats and UN officials is ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’; but given the nature and scale of human destruction, and the clear racism animating attacks systematically directed against civilians from the African tribal 

groups, the appropriate term is genocide. Amnesty International has recently reported authoritatively on this ghastly reality. Among the many chillingly similar 

interviews from persons displaced from Darfur into Chad, we hear: 

‘‘A refugee farmer from the village of Kishkish reported . . . the words used by 

the militia: ‘You are Black and you are opponents. You are our slaves, the Darfur 

region is in our hands and you are our herders.’ ’’(Amnesty International Report, 

page 28) 

‘‘A civilian from Jafal confirmed [he was] told by the Janjawid: ‘You are opponents 

to the regime, we must crush you. As you are Black, you are like slaves. Then all 

the Darfur region will be in our hands. The government is on our side. The government plane is on our side to give us ammunition and food.’ ’’ (Amnesty International 

Report, page 28) 

There is a terrible prescience in comments made by an African tribal leader to 

a UN news service several months ago: 

‘‘ ‘I believe this is an elimination of the black race,’ one tribal leader told IRIN’’ 

(UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, al-Geneina [Darfur], December 11, 

2003) 

It is in this context that I would remind the subcommittee of a key finding from 

Section 2 of the Sudan Peace Act, passed virtually unanimously by both houses of 

Congress: 

‘‘The acts of the Government of Sudan . . . constitute genocide as defined by the 

[UN] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (78 

U.N.T.S 277)’’ (Sudan Peace Act, Section 2. Findings. Number 10. October 2002) 

The Sudan Peace Act was of course signed into law several months before the conflict in Darfur began to accelerate into the massive human catastrophe that is now 

all too fully in view. But this only makes it more urgent that we face the disturbing 

reality before us: the Khartoum regime, one of the negotiating parties in the 

Naivasha peace talks, has already been condemned for genocide in southern Sudan, 

the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile—and now it stands clearly guilty of 

the same monstrous crime in Darfur. We must assess, soberly and realistically, the 

value of a signature from a regime guilty of such unspeakable crimes. 

We must also remember that Khartoum’s actions in interfering with humanitarian access to Darfur, actions that have been castigated by many international humanitarian organizations—most recently the International Committee of the Red 

Cross—contravene obligations spelled out in the Sudan Peace Act. The Act requires 

the President to certify that ‘‘the Government of Sudan . . . has not unreasonably 

interfered with humanitarian efforts’’ (Section 6 [b]). Under present circumstances 

in Darfur, such certification cannot possibly be made in good faith. 

To be sure a formal peace agreement may well be right around the corner, if 

Khartoum finds it expedient to reach such agreement. But even if we have a signing 

ceremony tomorrow, we will still be far from seeing that such an agreement is 

translated into a just and sustainable peace. Khartoum’s brutality and cynicism 

should make clear to all that the urgent planning and deployment of an international peace support mission is far behind schedule. Indeed, to date such planning 

seems to have been undertaken without a clear understanding of how much will be 

required—logistically, materially, organizationally, and perhaps militarily. Nor has 

the international community begun to respond to the urgent task of funding the redeployment and demobilizing of Khartoum’s military forces in southern Sudan—a 

critical task if the terms of the breakthrough agreement on security arrangements 

(September 25, 2003) are to be realized in timely fashion. 

On another critical front, there is no meaningful US funding commitment to provide transitional aid following an agreement. The State Department committed to 

a ‘‘large peace dividend’’ for Sudan following a peace agreement; these critical resources were promised in testimony by then-Assistant Secretary of State for African 

Affairs Walter Kansteiner on May 13, 2003, in a hearing very much like this one. 

So far, the promise has proved thoroughly empty. 

There is nothing that begins to approach an adequate US commitment to the urgently needed resources for emergency transitional aid in southern Sudan following 

a peace agreement. Reliable estimates suggest, for example, that as many as 1 milVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
37

lion internally displaced persons will be attempting to return to the war-ravaged 

south in the first six months following a peace agreement. The consequences of such 

massive migration may well be catastrophic, perhaps violent, and may even serve 

as a pretext for resumed war, especially in the oil regions of Western Upper Nile. 

Additional resources are also needed for further efforts at encouraging south/south 

dialogue and in providing incentives for armed militias of Upper Nile to own the 

peace. 

We must recognize that there is yet another major obstacle to a sustainable peace. 

It is the same obstacle that has heretofore made securing peace so difficult: the assertion, direct and implicit, that there is somehow a ‘‘moral equivalence’’ between 

the southern opposition in the form of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/

Army and the Khartoum regime of the National Islamic Front, both in conduct of 

war and in diplomatic commitment to peace. 

Let us be decisively clear here: there is no equivalence. Yet repeated suggestions 

to the contrary appeared in last April’s woefully inadequate State Department certification per the terms of the Sudan Peace Act. Troublingly, even the most recent 

State Department interim report on the peace process (February 2004) suggests a 

continuation of this intellectual, finally moral failure in assessing events. Though 

the SPLA has been guilty of serious human rights abuses, including the diversion 

of food aid for military use and forced conscription, there is nothing that compares 

with the relentless, brutal, finally genocidal conduct of war by Khartoum. 

Whether there is peace or war, an agreement in Naivasha or not, US policy simply must not be guided by a premise of moral equivalence. For only one party in 

Sudan’s conflict has deliberately, relentlessly bombed civilian and humanitarian targets in southern Sudan and other parts of Sudan for many years; only one party 

has deliberately, repeatedly, and precipitously denied humanitarian access to many 

hundreds of thousand of civilians, with many tens of thousands of attendant casualties; only one party has conducted massive scorched-earth warfare in the oil regions 

of Upper Nile; only one party has deployed as a barbaric weapon of war the enslavement of human beings. 

We must keep all this in mind if talks at Naivasha fail. For failure will surely 

have derived from Khartoum’s intransigence—from the deliberate collapse of the 

peace process by means of a contrived and wholly unjustified assertion of control 

over the Ngok Dinka district of Abyei. Here, by way of explanation, we may speculate about political divisions within the National Islamic Front, greed for Abyei’s oil 

reserves, or pressures coming from the Misseriya tribal leaders in the larger Abyei 

area—but we will know in any event where responsibility for failure lies and we 

must respond accordingly. The first opportunity for such response will come in 

April, with the next reporting requirement stipulated by the Sudan Peace Act. 

There must be no assertion of equivalent responsibility for the collapse of the 

Naivasha talks, should this occur. For such equivalence is, in the minds of the National Islamic Front regime, the necessary diplomatic victory. 

Further, if there should be a final peace agreement, it is critically important that 

the immense tasks of construction/reconstruction and peacekeeping in the south and 

the contested areas be shouldered immediately. They are daunting in the extreme, 

and the danger of renewed fighting will be present for years. Here again we must 

not succumb to the fiction of moral equivalence: for it is the south that has endured 

catastrophic human destruction and suffering over the past 20 years of war, indeed 

over the past half century of Sudanese independence and central rule in Khartoum. 

This has been overwhelmingly the responsibility of successive governments in Khartoum—and none bears greater responsibility than the present National Islamic 

Front regime. US policy toward and assistance to Sudan should be informed by this 

fundamental asymmetry in responsibility for human suffering and destruction. 

To this end, current US sanctions against the Government of Sudan should be lifted gradually, and should be tied to clearly articulated benchmarks—in the implementing of a peace agreement, in expediting military redeployments, in disarming 

allied militia, and in upholding provisions for revenue- and power-sharing. Thorough 

scrutiny of Khartoum’s long record of supporting terrorism should continue even if 

there is a decision later this spring to remove the regime from the State Department 

list of supporters of international terrorism. And finally, members of the Khartoum’s 

National Islamic Front regime must be held accountable for their actions over these 

many years. 

For history obliges us to keep clearly in mind the character of this regime, largely 

unchanged since it came to power by military coup in 1989 and deliberately aborted 

a nascent peace process. Khartoum has been deeply complicit in international terrorism, indeed hosted Osama bin Laden during the formative years for al-Qaeda, 

and continued to provide very substantial support to al-Qaeda years after bin Laden 

left Khartoum in 1996. The regime is guilty of genocide, as the Sudan Peace Act 

38

has unambiguously found. The regime is now, every day, lying repeatedly, egregiously, shamelessly about the realities of Darfur, about the nature of the military 

conflict, and about the extremity of the humanitarian crisis. This is so even as 

Khartoum’s cynical assurances are fully confounded by reports from Doctors Without Borders, Amnesty International, a wide range of UN officials, Roger Winter of 

USAID, a recent European Union assessment mission, and all too many horrific accounts from within Darfur and along the Chad-Sudan border. 

I believe that this latter crisis must be considered immediately, urgently, and outside the context of negotiations at Naivasha. For we may be all too certain that 

without an international willingness to begin the most urgent preparations for humanitarian intervention in Darfur, we will be forced to witness helplessly a disastrous increase in what Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres recently 

described (February 17, 2004 press release) as ‘‘catastrophic mortality rates’’ in 

Darfur. 

Khartoum’s ongoing, cynically cruel willingness to lie about so much human suffering and destruction should remind us how difficult it will be to make anything 

meaningful of the regime’s signature on an agreement in Naivasha. If a comprehensive agreement is indeed ‘‘around the corner,’’ we must fully accept that this marks 

only a beginning in the real job of building a just and sustainable peace.

Mr. ROYCE. We now go to Pastor Gary Kusunoki. 

STATEMENT OF PASTOR GARY KUSUNOKI, FOUNDER/

CHAIRMAN, SAFE HARBOR INTERNATIONAL RELIEF 

Pastor KUSUNOKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

Members of the Committee. Your assistance in this current situation in Sudan is critical. Three years ago I appeared before you 

asking for your help for the helpless men, women and children who 

were suffering and dying because of the fighting, food shortages, 

water shortages and diseases. 

Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount said blessed are the peacemakers. That is certainly what this Committee has been, our current Administration and President Bush in particular. The response of this Committee and the Bush Administration to the 

plight of the suffering in my view has been exceptional. 

I come here today with four perspectives. As a realist, I have 

great concerns and doubts and have in the past said that constructive engagement cannot work. As a pastor, I am an eternal optimist who must believe that anyone is redeemable. As a Christian, 

I am called to have love and forgiveness for all, regardless of faith, 

and desire to see transformation in personal lives and then, 

through that, in the leadership structures of government. As a father, my heart is breaking. As I look over at the pictures that are 

being displayed here, I think back on my own two adopted children 

who are from Sudan and the horrors that they have been through, 

and even holding my own daughter in my hands at 9 months old 

when she weighed just 6 pounds after her mother had been brutally murdered by the militia in the region. 

Since my last appearance here, I have met many times with Dr. 

John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and twice with President Omar Bashir. While I have seen 

movement on the part of the government in the area of religious 

freedom, there is much work to be done. There is a need for even 

greater freedom and greater communication between the Christians and Muslims of Sudan. 

Since the cessation of hostilities was signed, the humanitarian 

situation on the ground in much of South Sudan has changed dramatically. I say that, but I don’t mean that there is no longer a 

39

need for humanitarian assistance. Really from what I have seen, 

the need has grown even larger. 

Dr. Reeves has already indicated that there will be a problem 

when the returnees come back to their home areas. In the areas 

that we are working in, in Bahr al-Ghazal and the oil fields of the 

western Upper Nile and other regions that we have influence in, 

we are already seeing a large number of returnees coming back to 

the areas. The areas are already depleted in their resources and 

cannot respond to the needs or to the influx of people that are coming in at the current time. This is already a critical situation, and 

it is already a problem that is being faced with the aid workers 

that are working on the ground. 

As I prepared for this hearing, I had the opportunity to speak 

personally to Dr. John Garang as well as officials very close to 

President Bashir. I received assurances that both parties remain 

committed to the process and still hope for an agreement on all of 

the issues in the near future. I would not expect them to say anything less. And I do believe that much ground has been gained in 

the negotiations, with agreements being reached in the area of security arrangements during the 6-year interim period, wealth sharing and other ideas, I previously thought might have been impossible to even get. 

However, my assessment of the current situation is that the 

talks are in a very precarious position, and in great need of immediate outside encouragement and intervention. We currently have 

a team in the oil fields of the western Upper Nile, and we are 

working on implementing a grant with World Relief to establish 

primary health care centers and provide extensive medical training 

for medical workers in that region. We are already beginning in the 

hopes and the prayer of a peace to shift toward development while 

still understanding that relief is a necessity. 

I have four recommendations. I recommend, first of all, that a 

delegation of U.S. Congressmen and Senators proceed as soon as 

possible to both North and South Sudan as well as the site of the 

peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya, to give encouragement to the people on both sides of the conflict and reassure them of our commitment and desire to assist in the peace process. I also recommend 

that a follow-up hearing be scheduled in the near future to determine what milestones have been achieved in these areas. 

I recommend that Secretary of State Colin Powell return to the 

peace talks as soon as possible to spend extended time encouraging 

the participants to come to a swift and comprehensive agreement. 

I believe we need to make it clear to both sides that the United 

States is committed to helping in the peace process long after the 

agreement is signed. 

I also recommend that extensive funding be immediately appropriated by Congress for the recovery of North and South Sudan to 

be granted by USAID immediately upon the signing of a peace 

agreement, and emergency funding be provided for aiding in the 

growing humanitarian disaster in Darfur. 

This is a crucial time in the peace process. My oldest daughter 

Rebecca prays continually for peace to come to her nation and for 

her brother and sister to be able to live unafraid and free. I pray, 

as well as many as millions of Americans pray, that God will give 

40

you the courage, wisdom and discernment necessary to help to 

make those prayers a reality. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Pastor Kusunoki follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PASTOR GARY KUSUNOKI, FOUNDER/CHAIRMAN, SAFE

HARBOR INTERNATIONAL RELIEF

Mr. Chairman, and Distinguished members of the committee. Three years ago I 

appeared before you asking for your help in caring for the helpless men, women and 

children who were suffering and dying because of the fighting, food shortages, water 

shortages and disease in Sudan. 

In my testimony I asked Congress and President Bush in particular to intervene 

in this critical situation. I added my voice to those calling for President Bush to appoint a special envoy to Sudan, which he did by appointing former Senator Danforth 

on September 6, 2001. I also asked for the United States government to step up its 

humanitarian assistance to South Sudan and specifically to non-OLS NGO’s operating in some of the worst effected areas. Your response was swift as funding for 

USAID’s work in Sudan has increased from $93.7 million in fiscal year 2000 to 

$162.9 million as of November of 2003, that is a 73.8% increase. I recommended increased pressure on the government of Sudan (GOS) to bring about a just peace. 

The response was the Sudan Peace Act which came out of this committee and was 

signed into law by President Bush on October 21, 2002. President Bush and Secretary Powell have also spoken repeatedly on this and made personal contact with 

the main parties in the conflict. In the last four years I have seen more constructive 

attention being given to the suffering of Sudan than in the previous five years that 

I had been engaged on this issue. I pray that this will not stop. 

Since my last appearance here I have met many times with John Garang, leader 

of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). I have also made two trips to 

Northern Sudan where I have met at length with President Omar Beshir to discuss 

the issues of peace and the grievances in the south. On those trips I received an 

extensive hearing and continue to be engaged with them on various levels. I have 

seen encouraging movement in the area of religious freedom as the government has 

aired a documentary that we produced on their national satellite television. This 

documentary, which talks about what we as evangelical Christians in America believe and why we are helping in Sudan, was aired in all of Sudan, the entire Middle 

East, Western Europe, North, East and West Africa. In addition to this, upon our 

request, the government facilitated the release of a pastor who had been imprisoned 

indefinitely in Sudan for refusing to tear down his church in a peace camp. They 

allowed me unprecedented personal access to the pastor at the prison and his release was secured the following day. We also sent a professional Christian soccer 

team to Sudan in October of 2003, they were welcomed with open arms and allowed 

access to national media. While I praise the Government of Sudan for this progress, 

there is still much work to be done in this area as well. 

Since the cessation of hostilities was signed in October 2002 the humanitarian situation on the ground in much of South Sudan, has changed dramatically. It is not 

because there is no longer a need, in fact the need for humanitarian assistance is 

in some ways greater now with peace looming. The need for humanitarian aid during the transition period will be tremendous and must be prepared for immediately. 

There is a new sense of hope among the peoples of both the north and the south 

that a just peace can be achieved in the near future. As I have spoken with the 

average person, I see an intense desire to end the war and the suffering and begin 

to develop their country. The people want to see oil revenues being used to develop 

Sudan rather than just fuel the war effort. 

In preparation for this hearing I have spoken personally to John Garang as well 

as officials very close to President Beshir. I have received assurances that both parties remain committed to the process and still hope for an agreement on all the 

issues in the near future. I would not expect them to say anything less. Much 

ground has been gained in the negotiations with agreements being reached regarding security arrangements during the six year interim period, wealth sharing and 

other issues. Currently they are stalled over three disputed areas, the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile and Abiyei. Most of the details regarding the Nuba Mountains 

and the Blue Nile have reportedly been agreed upon. The most contentious area 

seems to be Abiyei an oil rich area that was given to the North in 1905 by the British. The 1972 Addis Ababa agreement provided that Abiyei be given a right to a 

referendum to determine their political future. Current negotiations has suggested 

an Administrative Order returning Abiyei back to Bahr El Ghazal. If agreement can 

41

be reached on the three areas, the question of power sharing and the national capital are the last major hurdles. 

In the last six months, fighting in the region of Darfur in Western Sudan has 

flared up. A humanitarian disaster of tremendous proportions is already underway. 

This situation also threatens to destabilize the current round of talks. My assessment of the current situation is that the talks are in a very precarious position and 

in great need of immediate outside encouragement and intervention. 

We currently have a team in the Western Upper Nile where we are working as 

implementing partners with World Relief on an OFDA grant to establish primary 

healthcare centers and provide extensive medical training for medical workers in 

that area. We are beginning to shift from a primarily emergency relief type of response, to development. Having said that, it is important to point out that even with 

the signing of a peace agreement it will take some time to bring many areas of the 

south out of crisis. They suffered for so long and infrastructure is non-existent. If 

they encounter natural disasters such as drought, or heavy rains, it will continue 

to stress their survival abilities. In addition tribal conflicts that have existed for decades if not centuries must be addressed. The current situation in Darfur, while not 

a part of the negotiations between the GOS and SPLM, must also be concurrently 

dealt with by the international community. 

While I believe that current U.S. policy toward Sudan has been very effective even 

more is required.

1. I recommend that a delegation of U.S. congressmen and senators proceed as 

soon as possible to both North and South Sudan, as well as the sight of the 

peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya, to give encouragement to both sides of the 

conflict and reassure them of our desire to assist in the peace process. I am 

confident that John Garang would welcome such a delegation and I have also 

received assurances from President Beshir that he would personally meet 

with any such delegation.

2. I recommend that Secretary of State Colin Powell return to the peace talks 

in Naivasha, Kenya to spend extended time encouraging the participants to 

come to a swift and comprehensive agreement. I believe he needs to make 

it clear to both sides that the United States is committed to helping in the 

peace process long after the agreement is signed. Both the Government of 

Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement have acknowledged that 

a considerable amount of foreign aid will be required after the peace to ensure a swift recovery from 50 years of war. Both sides have indicated an 

openness to such a visit from Secretary Powell.

3. I recommend that extensive funding be immediately appropriated by congress for the recovery of North and South Sudan, to be granted by USAID 

as a peace incentive immediately upon the signing of a peace agreement.

4. Emergency funding must also be immediately appropriated for aiding in the 

growing humanitarian disaster in Darfur.

This is a crucial time in the peace process. I believe they are at a crossroad, with 

one road leading to a just and lasting peace and the other to even further destruction and death. The United States government stands in a unique position to help 

bring a peaceful end to one of the longest running and most costly civil wars in recent history. As some of you know, I have two adopted daughters from Sudan and 

consequently have members of their families still in harms way in South Sudan. My 

oldest adopted daughter, Rebecca prays continually for peace to come to her nation, 

for her brother and sister to be able to live unafraid. I pray that God will give you 

the courage, wisdom and discernment necessary to help make those prayers a reality.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me begin by asking Pastor Gary Kusunoki, you 

did a film on Muslim-Christian relations in the United States, 

which you had shown on the Khartoum channel or on Sudan television, and I wondered if that had led to any expressions of religious tolerance in the national media; what feedback after your 

film was shown on Sudanese television, what feedback you received. Do you think religious tolerance is improving with respect 

to government-controlled areas in the country? 

Pastor KUSUNOKI. From what I see, there is some movement in 

that area among certain people. And I would say that there is a 

move among certain people toward moderation. And so what I 

42

would have to say is, yes, that is a definite possibility. And we have 

received feedback on two areas, one official feedback from the government, that they were pleased with the film; and the response 

from the nation, and then feedback from our people on the ground, 

and from our pastors in Northern Sudan, that it has made a tremendous difference. And really the documentary was focused on 

the average person. 

Mr. ROYCE. You have spent more time in consultation with people in Sudan than anyone I know outside of some of my Sudanese 

friends. Could you tell me what impact—what immediate impact 

this peace negotiations is having on the lives of everyday Sudanese? Let’s talk about in Khartoum, and let’s talk about in the 

South. 

Pastor KUSUNOKI. Well, both in Khartoum and in the South, we 

have had the opportunity to basically wander the streets or the 

trails, so to speak, depending on where we are, and where we have 

seen the greatest difference is that there is now hope. Even in 

areas where they have no food, they have no clothing, they have 

no medicine, they know that there are peace negotiations going on, 

that there is a chance for a peaceful settlement of this war, that 

the suffering has stopped, and they also know that the U.S. is engaged, and that has given them just a tremendous sense of hope. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Pastor. 

I was going to ask Dr. Reeves a question about the negotiations 

themselves with respect to the Khartoum government. Is there one 

government in Khartoum, or are there factions involved in this negotiation? 

Mr. REEVES. It is a very good question. I don’t think there is any 

entirely clear answer. The National Islamic Front Regime, that is 

the Government of Sudan, is essentially unchanged, with the exception of the sidelining of Hassan al-Tarabi, this is the same regime that came to power deposing an elected government in 1989, 

came to power by military coup and in the process aborted the 

most promising chance for peace prior to the present one. 

Mr. ROYCE. We understand that. But are there people that favor, 

in your view, in this Administration in Khartoum negotiations at 

this point? 

Mr. REEVES. Let me frame my answer a little differently. I believe all of the people in the National Islamic Front are 

survivalists. There are different calculations about what is required 

to survive with so much U.S. and international scrutiny. I believe 

that the calculations are of those who want the peace, that we will 

in 61⁄2 years be able to undermine this peace. It will be the task 

of the U.S. to say to those who have agreed to a peace, you will 

be proved wrong. We will show you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Okay. Then how does the international community 

empower those who are farthest out on the limb of seeing it in Sudan’s interest long term to have this new relationship with the 

United States and/or the international community? 

Mr. REEVES. I agree with Steve. I think one of the most important things is that we don’t trust at all a regime that has shown 

itself utterly untrustworthy, that we have a robust peace support 

operation of a sort that is not presently being contemplated. 

43

I think we need to look at those security arrangements and make 

sure that, among other things, we provide for the rapid redeployment and demobilization of Khartoum’s troops in the South. The 

present security agreement lasts for 21⁄2 years. That is too long. 

Mr. ROYCE. I see. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask Dr. Morrison a question about who would be the 

beneficiary political, militarily, economically, if the talks remain in 

limbo? Is the government or is the SPLM building its military right 

now? Who are the beneficiaries if this does not come to closure 

soon? 

Mr. MORRISON. Well, within both movements you have skeptics, 

and you have spoilers. A stall will fray the will, unity and determination of the two sides that have driven this process forward. A 

stall weakens their position and leaves them open to further criticism and erosion of their position. With Darfur hanging over the 

situation as well, that further raises the risk of the situation collapsing. 

The other thing I would say is that we are seeing the possibility, 

certainly in Darfur, of a reopening of political space for radical Islamic influence. What Charlie Snyder was referencing in terms of 

the linkages between the JEM armed movement in the West, and 

Turabi, is a dangerous development, one that fits into a spoiler 

mode, where the more the conflict in Darfur goes on, the more 

Turabi is able to demonstrate his ability to shape events in a fairly 

pernicious fashion. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think it calls into question one of the assumptions 

that you have in your report, that assumption which I hope is true, 

which is that this is going to earn the United States goodwill in 

the Arab world if we negotiate out this peace. But I think that we 

have been somewhat chagrined in the past in trying to anticipate 

Arab public opinion. 

So I guess I would ask, given these circumstances, is that really 

the case that as we force this negotiation for peace, that that necessarily will translate into support in the Arab world? I would just 

like to hear what the response is in North Africa and in the Middle 

East right now to our efforts on pressuring Khartoum to come to 

the table with the South. What is the response, just to play devil’s 

advocate for a moment here, Dr. Morrison. 

Mr. MORRISON. The response to a durable, fair negotiated peace 

settlement driven by the United States will be mixed, both within 

East and North Africa. And what is said publicly and what is said 

privately will at times differ. 

A peace settlement that restabilizes the Horn will be much appreciated. You have many governments in East Africa and across 

West Africa that are struggling with mixed populations of Muslims 

and Christians, which are unsteady, which face many similar problems, and this will register in a very positive way. 

Will this type of achievement overcome or surmount the animosity against the United States borne of Iraq and other such things? 

Not in the short term. 

Mr. ROYCE. But that is not my question. My question is simply 

how is this processed in terms of our engagement in this peace 

process in the Arab world, on the Arab street? And I was just going 

through an assertion that you had made in your report, which I 

44

found interesting. Time will tell whether your assessment is correct 

or not. 

We are going to go to Mr. Payne for his questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Just on the last statement, answering the question that the 

Chairman asked, Dr. Morrison, you said that I think that both 

sides have people who would like to see the process stalled. Since 

oil is being pumped, since we have seen the difference in the military armament over the past 3 or 4 years, now that the Government of Sudan has more cash, they have replaced old Antanovs 

that they used to just simply push bombs out, and very inaccurate 

when they would do their bombing, to new maneuverable, latemodel aircraft that are accurate and deadly. 

I am kind of confused. What would be the advantage of the—

since both sides have people that want to stall the process, what 

is the advantage of the SPLM? I mean, they are not getting stronger. They don’t have the resources. As a matter of fact, they are getting more weary. It would be more advantageous, it seems to me, 

for the North to stall, because that is why they are stalling. How 

do we equate equally people on both sides trying to stall the process? 

Mr. MORRISON. I agree with you that the losers in the North, 

those who will lose from a peace accord, are those who have control 

over military assets right now, who might see their position diminish, and those that have control of the oil wealth, and those who 

have political power which might be eclipsed or now have to be 

shared. And I think if you look in those directions, that is the 

where you will see much of the resistance. And that is where many 

of the battles are fought out. 

As to the South, I think those who are—I think there are smart 

observers within the South who look at the situation vis-a-vis 

Darfur and argue that this phenomenon reflects a weakening of the 

North and is exposing their vulnerabilities, and to compromise now 

would be short-sighted. If, in fact, this escalates, it might lead to 

the South being in a stronger negotiating position in 3 or 6 months. 

That is not a spoiler logic, that is simply someone looking tactical 

at a situation on the ground and arguing in favor of slowing the 

process rather than accelerating. 

I think the SPLM, in my discussions with them, I think they 

project a certain amount of confidence in themselves. I don’t think 

they are weary of war. They don’t want to see the breakdown of 

this process. They don’t want to see a return to war. They want to 

see the best deal that they can secure. The question is a matter of 

timing and tactics. 

Mr. PAYNE. Of course, in the past the SPLM has had victories 

also. They have been at this for a long time. But at the end of the 

day, the North with its resources have been able to recapture what 

was won by the SPLA, the Army. So, it is hard for me to see their 

being equal interests, even though there are some short-term victories at this time. 

I think there is no question that the long haul is definitely—the 

longer it is stalled in the North is a big advantage. 

Let me, though, just ask the pastor a quick question, and time 

is running out. You have been to Khartoum. I have refused to go, 

45

and someone has to go. Maybe the negotiators have to go, but I 

think it is a government that does not exist, and so I personally 

do not feel that it is to dignify the so-called government in even acknowledging that they exist. 

But, Khartoum, and Sharia, it currently is, is still the capital of 

the country. And you are a Christian, a man of God. How do you 

see—if this solution ever came about, an accord, do you see that 

the extremists also allow Khartoum to simply be a non-Sharia, 

open, free religious capital? 

Pastor KUSUNOKI. I would foresee a lot of problems in that area, 

in just some of the discussions that we have had with them concerning religious freedom and whether by our definitions it even 

exists. And that—I don’t know that the extremists would be happy 

at all with either a partitioning of the capital or any reduction in 

how Sharia is applied or where it is applied. I think they would 

have a major problem with that. 

We have had very frank discussions about Sharia law and what 

would happen if there was a peace. And we have communicated to 

them that we don’t see that the two can be compatible with the 

South coming up to basically operate in the same area. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I think my time has expired, 

but I might squeeze in another one, if I can. 

Dr. Reeves, you have been involved so long. How do you, just in 

a nutshell, see the future, the immediate future? And are the people, in your opinion, in the North for real? 

Mr. REEVES. I do believe we will know very shortly. I do believe 

that if Abyei is not solved as an issue in the very near term, as 

in this session of peace negotiations in Naivasha, that it is exceedingly unlikely that there will be peace. 

The regime has made calculations all along about what happens 

if the peace process collapses. These have been political, international, and military calculations, and certainly in the time that 

the ceasefire has been in place since October 2002, it has been repeatedly violated by the redeployment of offensive military assets. 

The regime has grown much, much stronger. There is a much 

larger domestic armaments capacity. The ability to import weapons 

has steadily increased as oil revenues push toward a $2-billion-ayear rate. I think all of the military advantage that has accumulated over the last year and a half has gone to Khartoum, and I 

think they very well may have decided that that this peace process 

has gone as far as they will let it go. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, that in a way answers the question I had, 

because I was going to pose the same question to you as I did the 

last panel, and the last question. That is, you know, essentially 

what could they be thinking? The reality is that, I mean, could it 

possibly be that they have calculated, as was suggested, I guess it 

was, by Mr. Winter, that we would not respond to something like 

Darfur because it is a primarily Muslim community, because the 

attacks are on Muslims as opposed to Christians? I mean, could 

that matter to them? Could they think that we would actually just 

ignore that? Maybe just answer that question. 

Mr. REEVES. That is a question to me? 

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. 

46

Mr. REEVES. I think Darfur badly surprised Khartoum. I believe 

that they didn’t realize how much military resistance they would 

encounter. And let’s remember that the Darfur catastrophe has 

flown under the radar screen for many, many, many months. In 

that sense Khartoum calculated correctly. 

Whether or not they believed that they could close out Darfur 

and then go back to Naivasha, they clearly now would very much 

want us to believe that a peace agreement is imminent so as to 

complete the military business in Darfur, which continues on a 

daily basis, and all of the intelligence I receive from within Darfur 

and from human rights organizations and from humanitarian organizations suggests that the war is not decelerating at all, but rather is accelerating. 

And we have yet to see the full effects of the denial of food, humanitarian aid and the full consequences of exposure and disease 

resulting from the brutal treatment of the last 13, 14 months. 

When that happens, we will see what is presently being described 

by Doctors Without Borders as catastrophic mortality rates, move 

to a metacatastropic rate. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Could it be that the government—well, how does 

the rest of the Muslim community in the North react to the fact 

that the government is making war on Muslims? 

Mr. REEVES. I personally have seen not nearly enough commitment on the part of Muslims in this country, or in the Middle East 

or anywhere else for the plight of people who are in Darfur, all 

Muslims. We are talking about Arab militia Janjaweed attacks on 

African tribal groups, who are themselves overwhelmingly Muslim. 

I have seen no outcry over this. 

Mr. TANCREDO. So maybe we can draw a conclusion that it is 

simply because they are black that this is happening? 

Mr. REEVES. I believe that is the inescapable conclusion. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. And where—the outcry from the world community, I mean what—it is just—it is deafening by its silence in 

a way. 

Mr. REEVES. I have been writing steadily myself about Darfur for 

a very long time now, and have felt a great deal of futility until 

fairly recently. I think only in December when the U.N. began to 

find its voice, as the international community began to respond 

with appropriate urgency to what is indeed the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis. 

Mr. TANCREDO. No other questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very, very much. Certainly I thank the panel. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me end by thanking all three of you not only for 

your trip out here, but I want to just commend your very thoughtful CSIS report, Dr. Morrison. 

And you know, Dr. Reeves, you mentioned that the aggression 

had flown under the radar. Thanks to your good work, the aggression in Darfur is exposed today, and you continue to dedicate your 

career to trying to organize the international community, and try 

to encourage us to adopt policies which will put an end to that aggression. 

I want to end by thanking Pastor Gary Kusunoki not only for his 

extraordinary commitment to try to bring closer ties between 

Christians and Muslims, but to repeatedly go not only in country 

47

and meet with leadership on both sides and try to build these 

bridges, but on top of it do the work on the ground, and then to 

adopt the orphans of slave raids there in South Sudan and take 

them on his shoulders, him and his wife, raising these children. It 

says something about his commitment to humanity. 

I think all three of you really deserve to be thanked for the longstanding commitment you have made for peace in southern Sudan. 

This hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

I rise today to commend the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) for agreeing to a process that demonstrates that the needs 

of the people of the Sudan are greater than their own political aspirations. While 

the situation in the Sudan is often characterized as a religious or race war, we all 

know that it has to more to do with the remnants of colonialism and a fight to control the great wealth and power the country has to offer. 

I’ve been told that if the great minds and wealth of the Sudan were allowed to 

focus on development instead of war, that the Sudan would have the resources to 

feed not only the Sudan, but the entire continent of Africa. The leaders of the Sudan 

have a responsibility to offer food instead of famine to their people. 

Throughout the world we are continuing to see death and destruction because 

leaders continue to choose violent over diplomatic solutions and personal gain over 

the needs of their people. What is now taking place in the Sudan with the aid of 

the international community can change that cycle, but time is running out. 

None of us here today is interested in seeing the Sudan backslide into a history 

of war where an estimated 2 million people have died and some 3 to 4 million Sudanese have been displaced from their homes. 

So I ask today what the international community can do to ensure that all parties 

remain at the table until the agreement is signed? The involvement of international 

players such as IGAD, Kenya, the African Union, the United Nations and others in 

reaching a diplomatic solution must be commended and noted, as we have been 

known to have a go it alone policy. Kenya should also be especially thanked for 

agreeing to host the peace talks. 

Until an agreement is signed and implemented however, we and our government 

especially, as it has been a great leader in this effort, must all remain diligent. 

And, even as we are at the negotiating table, we cannot ignore what is going on 

in Darfur. In Darfur as many as 1 million lives are in danger from armed militia. 

Thousands are fleeing into Chad where famine awaits them. I urge militia there 

and their supporters to look to the talks in Kenya as an example of how to resolve 

the conflict. I say leave your arms and come to the negotiating table. True leaders 

put the needs and the lives of their people first. Humanitarians workers must be 

allowed in the region and the violence must stop! 

Because I am confident that the Sudanese leaders will honor the needs of their 

people and complete the peace process soon and help end the violence in Darfur, 

it is important that considerations for our assistance plans to the Sudan help in the 

building of strong and transparent institutions and economic stability. 

For this reason it is important that we consider what assistance we can provide 

to ensure that Sudanese leaders will be able to refunnel oil money from military 

ventures into viable economic ventures that will lead to development and stability, 

especially in the south. 

We must consider what a total aid package to Sudan will look like given that it 

has oil, and unlike some other African countries can likely support much of its development with its natural resources over time. Will a package include technical 

and other assistance that will promote transparency in the oil industry during the 

power sharing transition and beyond? Will microenterprise programs figure significantly given the wealth of resources in addition to oil that the Sudan possesses? To 

what degree will US investment in the oil sector create business opportunities for 

Sudanese in ancillary industries that will allow for the creation of a small and meVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:21 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092500 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\031104\92500 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
50

dium size business sector? Will OPIC and EXIM resources be available for Americans interested in partnering with Sudanese citizens to create businesses there? 

These are all questions that must realistically be considered if peace is to be 

reached and maintained in the Sudan. 

Thank you.

Æ