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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

27 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Jaquez S. Sherrod, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed July 30, 2019. No. A-18-593.

1. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal 

conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence 

is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the 

same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass 

on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters 

are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an appellate court 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Appellate review of a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law 

and fact.

3. ____: ____. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court reviews the factual findings of the lower court for 

clear error.

4. Controlled Substances. A person possesses a controlled substance 

when he or she knows of the nature or character of the substance and of 

its presence and has dominion or control over it.

5. Controlled Substances: Evidence: Circumstantial Evidence: Proof.

Possession can be either actual or constructive, and constructive possession of an illegal substance may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.

6. Controlled Substances. Mere presence at a place where a controlled 

substance is found is not sufficient to show constructive possession.

7. Evidence. The holder of a key, be it to a dwelling, vehicle, or motel 

room, has constructive possession of the contents therein.

8. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. When a defendant’s 

trial counsel is different from his or her counsel on direct appeal, the 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

08/13/2019 12:05 AM CDT
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STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is known to the defendant or is apparent 

from the record. Otherwise, the issue will be procedurally barred.

9. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To prevail on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that his or her counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually 

prejudiced the defendant’s defense.

10. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. A claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel need not be dismissed merely because 

it is made on direct appeal. The determining factor is whether the record 

is sufficient to adequately review the question.

11. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised in a direct appeal, the appellant 

is not required to allege prejudice; however, an appellant must make 

specific allegations of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes deficient performance by trial counsel.

12. ____: ____: ____. General allegations that trial counsel performed deficiently or that trial counsel was ineffective are insufficient to raise an 

ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal and thereby preserve the 

issue for later review.

13. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim made on direct appeal can be found 

to be without merit if the record establishes that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient or that the appellant could not establish 

prejudice.

14. Trial: Attorneys at Law. Trial counsel is afforded due deference to 

formulate trial strategy and tactics.

15. Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. There 

is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an appellate 

court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Peter

C. Bataillon, Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and 

Abbi R. Romshek for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Siobhan E. 

Duffy for appellee.

Riedmann, Arterburn, and Welch, Judges.
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STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

Riedmann, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Jaquez S. Sherrod was convicted in the district court for 

Douglas County of manufacturing, distributing, or possession 

with intent to distribute 10 to 28 grams of crack cocaine with 

a firearm and possession of a deadly weapon (firearm) by a 

prohibited person. On appeal, he alleges that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the convictions and that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel in four respects. We conclude 

that the record on direct appeal is sufficient to address only 

one of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We find the 

evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2017, Sherrod was charged with manufacturing, distributing, or possession with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance (crack cocaine) with a firearm, a Class IC 

felony, and possession of a deadly weapon (firearm) by a prohibited person, a Class ID felony. At trial, the evidence revealed 

that on September 13, the Omaha Police Department SWAT 

team executed a “no-knock search warrant” at a residence 

located on North 18th Street in Omaha, Nebraska. Sherrod was 

the subject of the search warrant. The SWAT team broke down 

the front door to the residence, looked inside, and observed 

Sherrod at the opposite end of the residence. The SWAT team 

then deployed a “flash bang” distraction device before entering the home. Sherrod and another male were located in an 

upstairs bedroom.

The residence was searched, and officers located a set of 

keys in the bedroom on the first floor. The keyring had two 

keys on it. One was a key to a vehicle that was registered to 

Sherrod and parked about a block away from the 18th Street 

residence. The other key was described as an “older style skeleton key” and “a pretty antique or old looking key.” That key 

fit into the lock on the door to the first floor bedroom.
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STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

There was a closet and bathroom inside the first floor bedroom. Officers found a “hollowed out” area on the top of the 

doors to the closet and bathroom, and each hollowed-out area 

held two plastic baggies containing crack cocaine. Officers 

also found a baggie of crack cocaine on the floor in the kitchen 

at the base of the stairs going upstairs. The parties stipulated 

that each of the five baggies contained approximately 3 grams 

of crack cocaine, and testing concluded that the substance was, 

in fact, crack cocaine and that the total weight of all five baggies combined was approximately 13.452 grams.

Using the key found in the first floor bedroom, officers 

searched Sherrod’s vehicle and found sandwich baggies in the 

center console. Inside the residence, police found digital scales 

and glass plates with razor blades. When Sherrod was arrested 

at the scene, he was carrying $833 in cash on his person in a 

combination of bills no larger than a $20 bill.

An Omaha police officer with special training in the field of 

narcotics testified that “street level” crack cocaine dealers sell 

drugs for cash and commonly use weapons, such as firearms, 

to protect their business. He explained that crack cocaine is 

cut with a razor or knife and normally packaged in small sandwich baggies. A dose of crack cocaine is .2 grams, which sells 

for $20. Thus, an amount between 10 and 15 grams of crack 

cocaine is an amount consistent with distribution.

Officers also found a firearm in the dresser drawer in the 

first floor bedroom. The parties stipulated that Sherrod was 

prohibited from possessing a weapon because he had previously been convicted of a felony. Testing revealed that there 

was DNA from at least three people on the firearm. A DNA 

analyst explained that Sherrod could not be excluded as a 

partial profile contributor to the DNA found on the firearm. 

The probability of a random individual’s matching the partial 

DNA profile within the mixture, given that Sherrod expresses 

such a profile, is approximately 1 in 5.76 million. There 

are currently approximately 1.9 million people in the State 

of Nebraska.
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STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

Although Sherrod could not be excluded as a contributor to 

the DNA found on the firearm, the DNA analyst explained that 

it is possible for DNA to be transferred onto an item that someone did not touch. For example, if someone owns a hammer 

and shakes someone else’s hand and then touches their own 

hammer, the DNA of the person whose hand they shook could 

be transferred onto the hammer. Generally, however, the most 

DNA found on the item touched would come from the person 

who actually touched the item.

As a result of the execution of the search warrant and location of the crack cocaine and firearm, Sherrod was arrested. 

The following day, he made a telephone call from jail which 

was recorded. In the call, he asked the male to whom he 

was speaking if he had “been back to the house.” The recipient of the call said that he had, but that he did not want to 

talk because he knew the call was being recorded. Sherrod 

then asked whether he “check[ed] the door” when he went to 

the house.

During its case in chief, the State made an oral motion in 

limine because the defense had indicated a desire to inquire 

into how Sherrod became the subject of the search warrant. 

The State explained that Sherrod became the target for the 

warrant because police had completed a controlled buy of 

crack cocaine 2 days before executing the search warrant and 

that the confidential informant had identified Sherrod as the 

person who sold the drugs from the 18th Street residence. 

The State indicated that it had not charged Sherrod with any 

crimes related to the controlled buy because it did not want 

to disclose the identity of the informant. The controlled buy 

was audio and video recorded, and thus, in order to protect the 

identity of the informant, the district court granted the motion 

in limine except to the extent the video could be manipulated 

to remove any identifying features of the informant.

During the defense’s case, several law enforcement officers 

were recalled to the stand, and the defense elicited testimony as 

to why Sherrod was named as a suspect in the search warrant, 
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STATE v. SHERROD

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which led to an explanation of the controlled buy. The video 

recording of the controlled buy was marked as an exhibit, 

and Sherrod offered it into evidence. The State objected and 

invoked its privilege under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-510 (Reissue 

2016) to protect the identity of the informant. The court sustained the objection.

The officers then testified that after the controlled buy 

was completed, the informant provided them with a physical description of the person who sold the crack cocaine 

and a “street name.” The police department keeps a file of 

street names, and the only person in the file who matched 

the street name provided by the informant is Sherrod. The 

officers showed the informant a photograph of Sherrod, and 

the informant identified him as the person who sold the drugs 

during the controlled buy. The informant used in the controlled 

buy has previously provided reliable information to police on 

approximately 15 to 20 occasions.

The defense reoffered the video into evidence, and the 

State objected or, in the alternative, requested that the video 

be played for the jury without its audio. The court received 

the video into evidence, and it was played for the jury without audio.

The defense also called to testify the man who lived at the 

18th Street residence. He testified that Sherrod is his friend, 

but that Sherrod does not live at that residence, nor does he 

have any clothing or property at the residence.

After the conclusion of trial and deliberation, the jury found 

Sherrod guilty of both charges. Sherrod was sentenced to 7 to 

9 years for the drug conviction and a concurrent term of 3 to 

3 years and 1 day for the weapons conviction. Sherrod timely 

appeals to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Sherrod assigns that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and (2) he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel.
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STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of 

the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: 

An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, 

pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; 

such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question 

for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McCurdy, 301 Neb. 343, 

918 N.W.2d 292 (2018).

[2,3] Appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Sundquist, 

301 Neb. 1006, 921 N.W.2d 131 (2019). When reviewing a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court 

reviews the factual findings of the lower court for clear error. 

Id. With regard to the questions of counsel’s performance 

or prejudice to the defendant as part of the two-pronged test 

articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), an appellate court reviews 

such legal determinations independently of the lower court’s 

decision. State v. Sundquist, supra.

ANALYSIS

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Sherrod argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

his convictions. We disagree.

It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally 

manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(1) (Cum. Supp. 

2018). Any person who violates § 28-416(1) with respect to 

crack cocaine in a quantity of at least 10 grams but less than 

28 grams is guilty of a Class ID felony. § 28-416(8). The 

penalty is enhanced for a person knowingly or intentionally 

possessing a firearm while in violation of § 28-416(1), and 
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thus, an offense under § 28-416(1) that would be a Class ID 

felony without a firearm becomes a Class IC felony. See 

§ 28-416(16).

Sherrod concedes that the amount of crack cocaine found 

during the execution of the search warrant is consistent with 

an amount used in distribution as opposed to a personal use 

amount, and the parties stipulated at trial that the total amount 

of crack cocaine found during the search was approximately 

13.452 grams. Sherrod argues, however, that the evidence was 

not sufficient to identify him as the person selling the drugs. 

He claims that he did not live at the residence, and the only 

evidence connecting him to the first floor bedroom was the 

key that unlocked the bedroom door which was found on the 

same keyring as the key to Sherrod’s vehicle.

[4,5] A person possesses a controlled substance when he or 

she knows of the nature or character of the substance and of its 

presence and has dominion or control over it. State v. Howard, 

282 Neb. 352, 803 N.W.2d 450 (2011). Possession can be 

either actual or constructive, and constructive possession of 

an illegal substance may be proved by direct or circumstantial 

evidence. Id.

[6] Because Sherrod was not found to be in actual possession of the crack cocaine, the question before us is whether 

there is sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could 

reasonably infer that he was in constructive possession, i.e., 

that he was aware of the presence of the crack cocaine and had 

dominion or control over it. See id. Mere presence at a place 

where a controlled substance is found is not sufficient to show 

constructive possession. Id. Instead, the evidence must show 

facts and circumstances which affirmatively link Sherrod to the 

crack cocaine so as to suggest that he knew of it and exercised 

control over it. See id.

[7] In the present case, the majority of the crack cocaine 

was found in the first floor bedroom where officers also found 

a key to a vehicle registered to Sherrod on the same keyring 

as a key that unlocked the door to the bedroom. The Eighth 
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STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

Circuit Court of Appeals has joined every other circuit in ruling that the holder of a key, be it to a dwelling, vehicle, or 

motel room in question, has constructive possession of the 

contents therein. U.S. v. Timlick, 481 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Thus, because Sherrod had a key to the first floor bedroom, a 

reasonable jury could have inferred that he had dominion or 

control over its contents. See id.

Additional circumstantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Sherrod had constructive possession over the contents of the first floor bedroom, including the crack cocaine. 

There was DNA on the firearm found in the bedroom, and 

Sherrod could not be excluded as a contributor to that DNA. 

In a recorded telephone call made from jail, Sherrod asked 

whether the recipient of the call had “been back to the 

house” and whether he had “check[ed] the door.” This gives 

rise to a reasonable inference that Sherrod knew there was 

crack cocaine located in hollowed-out portions of doors in 

the bedroom.

In addition, officers found small plastic baggies in a vehicle 

registered to Sherrod, which are consistent with the packaging for crack cocaine. And when Sherrod was arrested, he was 

carrying a large amount of cash. Moreover, an informant had 

purchased crack cocaine from a person at the residence 2 days 

before the search warrant was executed and identified Sherrod 

as the person who sold the drugs. We therefore find that the 

evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that 

Sherrod had constructive possession of the crack cocaine.

Sherrod raises a similar argument with respect to the firearm. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish 

that he possessed the firearm at the time he manufactured, distributed, or possessed with intent to distribute crack cocaine. 

He notes that DNA from at least three different people was 

found on the firearm, and he argues that his DNA could have 

been transferred onto the firearm by someone else.

As we addressed above, the circumstantial evidence was 

sufficient for the jury to find that Sherrod had dominion and 
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STATE v. SHERROD

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control over the contents of the first floor bedroom, the location where the firearm was found. In addition, Sherrod could 

not be excluded as a contributor to DNA found on the firearm, 

and the probability of an unrelated individual matching the 

DNA profile was approximately 1 in 5.76 million. From this 

evidence, the jury could conclude that Sherrod possessed the 

firearm while manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with 

intent to distribute crack cocaine.

Sherrod argues that his DNA could have been transferred 

onto the firearm by someone who had handled an item that 

Sherrod also handled. While this possibility exists according to 

the DNA analyst, it is clear from the jury’s verdict that it did 

not believe that is how Sherrod’s DNA got on the firearm. To 

accept Sherrod’s argument would require us to reweigh the evidence, which an appellate court cannot do on appeal. See State 

v. McCurdy, 301 Neb. 343, 912 N.W.2d 292 (2018) (appellate 

court does not resolve conflicts in evidence, pass on credibility 

of witnesses, or reweigh evidence; such matters are for finder 

of fact). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the evidence 

was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Sherrod was also convicted of possession of a deadly 

weapon (firearm) by a prohibited person. As applicable here, a 

person commits the offense of possession of a deadly weapon 

by a prohibited person if he or she possesses a firearm and 

has previously been convicted of a felony. See Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 28-1206(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018). The parties stipulated at trial 

that Sherrod was prohibited from possessing a weapon because 

he had previously been convicted of a felony.

With respect to this offense, Sherrod raises the same argument as he raised for the drug offense: He argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the firearm 

found at the residence. We find no merit to this argument.

This court has extended the doctrine of constructive possession to the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon 
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under § 28-1206. See State v. Long, 8 Neb. App. 353, 594 

N.W.2d 310 (1999). As stated above, constructive possession 

means the possessor did not have actual possession but was 

aware of the presence of the contraband and had dominion 

or control over it. See State v. Howard, 282 Neb. 352, 803 

N.W.2d 450 (2011).

We incorporate our analysis from above where we determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude 

that Sherrod had constructive possession of the firearm found 

in the first floor bedroom. A key to the bedroom was found 

alongside the key to a vehicle registered to Sherrod. DNA was 

located on the firearm, and Sherrod could not be excluded as 

a contributor to that DNA. As a result, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for possession of a firearm by 

a prohibited person.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

[8] Sherrod is represented in this direct appeal by different counsel than the counsel who represented him at the trial 

level. When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his 

or her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on 

direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the 

record. Otherwise the issue will be procedurally barred. State v. 

Casares, 291 Neb. 150, 864 N.W.2d 667 (2015).

[9-12] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show 

that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that 

this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s 

defense. State v. Sundquist, 301 Neb. 1006, 921 N.W.2d 131 

(2019). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel need not 

be dismissed merely because it is made on direct appeal. The 

determining factor is whether the record is sufficient to adequately review the question. Id. When the claim is raised in a 

direct appeal, the appellant is not required to allege prejudice; 
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STATE v. SHERROD

Cite as 27 Neb. App. 435

however, an appellant must make specific allegations of the 

conduct that he or she claims constitutes deficient performance 

by trial counsel. Id. General allegations that trial counsel performed deficiently or that trial counsel was ineffective are 

insufficient to raise an ineffective assistance claim on direct 

appeal and thereby preserve the issue for later review. Id.

[13] Appellate courts have generally reached ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal only in those 

instances where it was clear from the record that such claims 

were without merit, or in the rare case where trial counsel’s 

error was so egregious and resulted in such a high level of 

prejudice that no tactic or strategy could overcome the effect of 

the error, which effect was a fundamentally unfair trial. Id. An 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim made on direct appeal 

can be found to be without merit if the record establishes that 

trial counsel’s performance was not deficient or that the appellant could not establish prejudice. Id.

Sherrod asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in four 

respects. First, he claims that trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to object to prejudicial and irrelevant evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts. He specifically argues that trial 

counsel should have objected to testimony that Sherrod was the 

subject of the search warrant because such evidence allowed 

the jury to infer that Sherrod had committed prior crimes. He 

also contends that trial counsel’s performance was deficient 

because he elicited evidence of the controlled buy and the 

informant’s identification of Sherrod as the person who sold 

the drugs.

[14,15] The decision whether or not to object has long been 

held to be part of trial strategy. State v. Huston, 285 Neb. 11, 

824 N.W.2d 724 (2013). When reviewing claims of alleged 

ineffective assistance of counsel, trial counsel is afforded due 

deference to formulate trial strategy and tactics. Id. There is 

a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an 

appellate court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions. Id. Because of this deference, the question whether the 
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failure to object was part of counsel’s trial strategy is essential 

to a resolution of Sherrod’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. See id. There is no evidence in the record regarding 

trial counsel’s trial strategy, including why he did not object 

to testimony that Sherrod was the subject of the warrant or 

why he elicited testimony regarding the controlled buy and 

the informant’s identification of Sherrod. We therefore conclude that the record on direct appeal is insufficient to address 

this claim.

Sherrod additionally asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit more specific testimony regarding the 

skeleton key to the first floor bedroom. He claims that the 

evidence is unclear as to whether the key was a traditional 

skeleton key in the sense that it could be used to unlock many 

different doors or whether the term was used to describe the 

key simply because of its antique appearance. He alleges that 

as a result of trial counsel’s deficient performance, the jury 

was permitted to erroneously assume that the key, like most 

keys, unlocked only the door to the first floor bedroom and 

that thus, Sherrod resided or had control over the bedroom and 

its contents.

The State argues that Sherrod is unable to show he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to elicit specific testimony 

regarding the key, because the key opened the door to this 

bedroom, and that given the other evidence, there is not a 

reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.

We find the record insufficient to address this claim. Because 

trial counsel did not inquire into what the officer meant by the 

term “skeleton key,” it was unclear for the jury exactly how 

the key worked, other than the fact that it opened the bedroom 

door. And if the key was, in fact, a traditional skeleton key 

that opened multiple doors, that fact may have been relevant 

to the jury. Because we do not know why trial counsel did not 

elicit testimony regarding the key from the officer, the record 

is insufficient to address this argument.
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Sherrod further asserts that trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to properly investigate defenses and advise him by 

offering the video into evidence at trial without personally 

reviewing it or reviewing it with Sherrod. He claims that if 

counsel had reviewed the video prior to trial, he would have 

realized that the video had no probative value and that offering 

it into evidence at trial would open the door to evidence of his 

prior bad acts.

The record makes clear that trial counsel had attempted to 

get a copy of the video “since day one,” but the State, claiming 

its privilege to protect the identity of the informant, would not 

release a copy. Thus, the fact that trial counsel was unable to 

review the video prior to trial was not for lack of trying. We 

therefore interpret this claim as an argument that trial counsel 

should not have offered the video into evidence without having 

first reviewed it. Sherrod concedes that the record is insufficient to address this claim, and we agree. The record before 

us does not contain any information as to why trial counsel 

offered the video into evidence, a decision which was part of 

counsel’s trial strategy. We are therefore unable to address this 

claim on direct appeal.

Finally, Sherrod argues that trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a 

result of the search of the 18th Street residence and Sherrod’s 

vehicle. He asserts that there is no evidence the search occurred 

with consent or was based on probable cause and that because 

the search warrant is not part of the record, the record is insufficient to address this claim.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on 

direct appeal when the claim alleges deficient performance 

with enough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make a 

determination of whether the claim can be decided upon the 

trial record and (2) a district court later reviewing a petition 

for postconviction relief to recognize whether the claim was 

brought before the appellate court. State v. Ash, 293 Neb. 583, 

878 N.W.2d 569 (2016).
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Sherrod asserts only that the record does not contain evidence of consent or probable cause; he does not assert that 

there was no consent or probable cause for the execution of the 

search warrant. Furthermore, to the extent he contends probable cause was lacking, he does not specify upon what facts 

he bases that conclusion. We determine that he has not alleged 

deficient performance with sufficient particularity, and therefore, this claim is not properly raised in this appeal. See id.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the record before us is sufficient to address 

only one of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and we 

reject that claim. We additionally conclude that the evidence is 

sufficient to support the convictions and therefore affirm.

Affirmed.