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THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SERBIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 17, 2004

Serial No. 108–80

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable D. Kathleen Stephens, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................... 3

Daniel Serwer, Ph.D., Director, Balkans Initiative and Peace and Stability 

Operations, United States Institute of Peace .................................................... 21

Svetozar Stojanovic ́, Ph.D., President, Serbian–American Center, Belgrade, 

Serbia .................................................................................................................... 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable D. Kathleen Stephens: Prepared statement ................................ 7

Daniel Serwer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 24

Svetozar Stojanovic ́, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 30

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Maryland: Prepared statement ............................................................. 41

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, New Jersey, and Vice Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared statement ................................... 42

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 43

Responses from the Honorable D. Kathleen Stephens to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Dan Burton ..................................................... 44

Response from Daniel Serwer, Ph.D. to question submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Dan Burton ............................................................................. 48

(1)

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SERBIA 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter presiding. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today, the 

European Subcommittee is considering the current situation in Serbia, and we will hear first from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for European Affairs Kathleen Stephens, then Dr. Daniel Serwer of 

the United States Institute of Peace, and then Professor Dr. 

Svetozar Stojanovic ́ of the Serbian-American Center in Belgrade in 

two separate panels. 

Serbia is at a critical moment in its history. One year ago (as of 

last Friday, March 12th) Prime Minister Djindjic was assassinated. 

The United States Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution 

expressing its condolences and deepest sympathies to the people of 

Serbia, and pledged to assist Serbia in its efforts to fight organized 

crime and corruption. After an impressive initial crackdown on organized criminal groups by the subsequent government in response 

to this tragic event, the fate of bringing the perpetrators of the assassination to justice is uncertain today. Only five of the 13 indicted suspects in the case have been brought to trial, a trial that 

began 21⁄2 months ago. The rest remain at large. Recently, a key 

witness who was to testify at the trial was murdered, executionstyle, by an unidentified gunman in front of his home on March 

1st. 

In the first national parliamentary elections since Prime Minister Djindjic’s assassination, Serbia held elections on December 28, 

2003. While approximately 60 percent of the vote went to democratic and reform-oriented parties, the Serbian Radical Party, led 

by war crimes indictee, Vojislav Seselj, received the most votes of 

any single party, and the Socialist Party of Serbia, the party of 

Slobodan Milosevic, made a significant showing. 

Why is this? Is it because of the widespread frustration of the 

Serbian people with the Serbian economy, and prospects for economic development? Is it because of frustration and cynicism with 

regard to organized crime and corruption in many parts of Serbian 

society? Is it a reaction to the international community’s external 

pressure on Serbia to cooperate with the International Criminal 

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and Chief Prosecutor Carla 

2

Del Ponte’s perceived intervention in the Serbian election by 

issuing new indictments on October 20th of last year? 

The purpose of this hearing is to consider the results of the Serbian election and to assess the current situation in Serbia today. 

Where is Serbia headed? What are the policy priorities of the new 

government? What can be done to facilitate economic development 

in Serbia? To what extent is the Serbian economy key to the economic development of the Balkans region? What is the status of the 

criminal justice system within Serbia? How can the United States 

Government help the Serbian people to achieve important reforms 

and to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic institutions? Has the European Union reformulated its policy of assistance to Serbia by conditioning further political integration with Europe on prosecution of 

war criminals but proceeding with financial and development aid 

without conditions? How can Serbia become a partner and ally of 

the United States, both in the region and in the world? 

These are a few of the important questions for Serbia today. And 

the answers to these questions will have implications for the entire 

Balkans regions—and, I might add, for U.S. and NATO military 

forces in the region. 

One note. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ceased to exist in 

February 2003, when the Yugoslav Federal Parliament adopted a 

constitutional charter which created the new state union of ‘‘Serbia 

and Montenegro.’’ Because the recent Serbian elections raise fundamental questions about the direction of Serbia, this hearing will 

primarily focus on the current situation in the Republic of Serbia 

and not the union of Serbia and Montenegro. 

I encourage our witnesses to discuss the current situation in Serbia and to address any and all issues that are important to the Balkans region as a whole. This will help us better understand and 

more precisely define our foreign policy goals as they relate to Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the Balkans region, and Europe. 

I would like to close with one other area of thought. The important issues with respect to the current situation in Serbia and with 

respect to United States-Serbian relations are not easy issues. How 

can we help the Serbian people overcome the past decade, a tragic 

one, and begin working together with Europe and the United 

States in partnership? It is true, of course, that many people in 

Serbia today are skeptical of Euro-Atlantic institutions, particularly NATO. We have to try to change that. 

How can we help the Serbian people to continue to pursue democratic reforms? James Dobbins, the former senior adviser for the 

Balkans to the previous Administration and a former Assistant 

Secretary of State for Europe, made the following observation recently. It is controversial, so I welcome witnesses and Members to 

comment on it, if they care.

‘‘It is argued that the international prosecution of war crimes 

will advance the cause of both justice and reconciliation.’’

This is his statement.

‘‘Those most guilty would be punished while many followers 

would be educated and reformed. The highly publicized 

Milosevic trial does not seem to have had the latter effect, if 

3

rising support among Serb voters for ultranationalist parties is 

a guide.’’

He goes on to say:

‘‘At issue is not just the balance between justice and reconciliation in Serbia but between the carrots and sticks employed by 

the international community to promote reform there. The 

democratic regime that overthrew Mr. Milosevic 3 years ago 

found itself under immediate pressure to yield defendants for 

The Hague Tribunal. Having done so, Serbia has not received 

aid in the magnitude that the United States or Europe provided to Bosnia or Kosovo after their conflict, let alone the 

amounts lavished today on Iraq. It serves little purpose for the 

international community to impose justice in The Hague if it 

is not making a commensurate effort to promote democratic reform in Belgrade, and generous aid for post-conflict reconstruction should not be reserved for countries that must first be invaded in order to be transformed.’’

As I said, I invite witnesses and Members to comment on Former 

Assistant Secretary Dobbins’s comments, if they care to. It is a provocative observation but one, I think, that we cannot ignore. 

My Ranking Member, Mr. Wexler, the gentleman from Florida, 

is involved right now on the Floor on the Iraq resolution debate,—

I will be involved later—and he has indicated that he wanted me 

to go ahead. It may be that Mr. Chris Smith, not a Member of the 

Subcommittee but a Member of the Full Committee, and Mr. Ben 

Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, not a Member of the Committee, but both gentlemen being involved in the U.S. House delegation to the OSCE will ask to be involved in the discussion and 

perhaps to make an early statement. When, in fact, I have a Democratic Member, I will entertain a unanimous consent so that that 

is possible. 

But now we would like to move to the first witness, Deputy Assistant Secretary D. Kathleen Stephens. She is a career Foreign 

Service officer with the rank of Minister Counselor. She assumed 

her duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs on December 5, 2003. Among her assignments as a 

career Foreign Service officer, Ms. Stephens was Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council in 1994 and 1995 and 

a Political Officer at the U.S. Missions in Belgrade and Zagreb in 

1991 and 1992. 

Secretary Stephens, your entire statement will be made a part of 

the record. I understand your statement is approximately 8 minutes long. You take whatever time you need and proceed as you 

wish. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE D. KATHLEEN STEPHENS, 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN 

AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. STEPHENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for inviting me to testify before your Committee today. I am 

very pleased to have this opportunity to share with you some of the 

transformations that are taking place today in the Republic of Serbia, to talk about how far we have come in our relationship, to unVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:38 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092608 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031704\92608 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

derscore our continued commitment to a stable and prosperous Serbia, and to outline some very serious challenges that still lie before 

us, and you have outlined some of those already, and I thank you 

for that. 

As you know, I have submitted a written statement which addresses in some detail what we see as the most important issues 

for the United States and for our relationship with Serbia as we 

look both to where Serbia has been and where it is going. And, 

again, Mr. Chairman, I would thank you for already outlining some 

of those issues, which I would also say would include the important 

and central issue of reforming the economy and restructuring it; 

the progress that has been made in the key area of defense reform—much has been done, much remains to be done; Kosovo, 

where the United States is today perhaps, as we look at some disturbing events there, recommitting itself to working with the international community and the United Nations and with leaders in 

both Pristina and Belgrade toward a stable, democratic future for 

all of the citizens of Kosovo; and for the other issues which you 

mentioned, the future of the state union and so on. 

Some of these are addressed in some detail in my written statement, but in the interest of time, I thought I would open by focusing my initial remarks on, as you suggested, the recent election, 

the implications of that election, and where we think we are headed, and, in particular its impact on United States policy, notably, 

our assistance policy and the approach we take to the central question of cooperation with the International Tribunal in The Hague 

and the related issue for us of certification. 

You have already noted, Mr. Chairman, that it was just over a 

year ago that Serbia was rocked by the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic. Rather than crumble in the face of that violent attack on the republic’s very new democratic institution, Serbian 

leaders did stand firm and fought back by an extraordinary, sweeping crackdown on organized crime and official corruption. As you 

have already noted, the energy and optimism and the commitment 

in those initial months did dissipate over the course of the summer, 

and by November 2003, Prime Minister Zivkovic had called for 

early elections. 

The elections which were held on December 28th did provoke 

some rather alarming headlines that might have led some leaders 

to believe that Serbia had returned to the Milosevic era. As you 

have noted, it did not, but we shared the concern of many of Serbia’s friends. The Serbian Radical Party, as you noted, had received 

the largest number of votes, 28 percent, but still not enough to 

form a government. Milosevic’s Socialist Party received only 8 percent. And what the headlines did fail to capture, and I appreciate 

your highlighting it, Mr. Chairman, was that democratic parties 

did capture more than 60 percent of the ballots cast, indicating 

that a clear majority of the Serbian voters supported a democratic 

future for Serbia and not remnants of the past. 

But with the great split in the democratic vote made worse by 

a number of election laws which essentially discounted a significant 

percentage of that vote, it took 2 months of negotiation before a minority, three-party, coalition government could be formed. That was 

5

formed on March 3rd, led by Former Yugoslav President Vojislav 

Kostunica. 

The new government has presented a legislative program that focuses on domestic issues: Adopting a new constitution, harmonizing 

Serbia’s legal framework with EU standards, building state union 

institutions with Montenegro, fighting corruption. Parliamentary 

leaders have also called for new presidential elections in the late 

spring so that Serbia is envisioned to have both a new constitution 

and a new President by June 28th. 

It is a very ambitious agenda, and to go to your point, Mr. Chairman, about what led to some of the votes and what were the underlying discontents, many analysts do believe that much of the Radicals’ electoral success can be attributed to protest votes, that is, 

voters expressing their dissatisfaction with government scandals 

and little perceived improvement in the average citizen’s standard 

of living. 

There is a lot of polling data that confirms that economic 

issues—jobs, pensions, inflation—were and remain foremost in voters’ minds. A poll done after the formation of the government has 

indicated that when asked what the priorities of the new government should be, more than 70 percent of those polled indicated that 

they should be improving the standard of living, economic recovery, 

and reducing unemployment. All of the other issues seem to fade, 

at least at this moment, into almost nonexistence in the minds of 

the public. 

The economy has been stabilized over recent years, but growth 

remains anemic, and unemployment is unacceptably high. Overall 

unemployment—the figures are not very precise—is somewhere between 20 and 30 percent, but it is as high as 80 percent or even 

higher in some areas, clearly creating very fertile ground for the 

messages of nationalist and populist politicians, the ones that were 

responded to in the last election. 

But that underlying economic malaise and concern is one reason 

why this Administration feels so strongly about our commitment to 

economic reform and to cooperation in pursuing that as a part not 

only of our policy in Serbia and Montenegro but of our overall policy to stabilize the Balkans and hasten their journey toward EuroAtlantic integration. 

The United States has invested $622 million in supporting Serbia and Montenegro’s development, of which $123 million has been 

dedicated to facilitating economic reform. 

Last year, on December 4, 2003, after close consultation with 

Congress, Secretary Powell removed one of the last Milosevic-era 

sanctions by restoring normal trade relations to Serbia and Montenegro. With the restoration of NTR, trade will now depend on continuing progress on economic reforms. We want to increase opportunities and protection for United States business and to demonstrate to a clearly skeptical Serbian public the mutual benefits 

of economic cooperation. 

It is very notable that in 2003, despite sometimes all of the dark 

news that seems to come from Serbia to the United States press, 

it was thanks to investments by American firms, including U.S. 

Steel, Phillip Morris, IBM, that the United States was the largest 

source of new foreign investment in Serbia, investing approxiVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:38 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092608 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031704\92608 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

mately $900 million. We want to continue and increase United 

States investment in Serbia as it rebuilds and reforms its economy. 

I mentioned our bilateral assistance to Serbia. It is tailored more 

broadly to help Serbia build institutions necessary for foreign investors and also for an open democratic society to take root and to 

prosper. This assistance to Serbia, which is budgeted at $100 million, approximately, in this fiscal year, represents almost one-quarter of our State Department’s SEED budget. That reflects the critical role that a democratic Serbia and Montenegro plays in ensuring long-term peace and stability in the Balkans. In addition to economic reform, this assistance supports democratic governance, rule 

of law, independent media, and in addition to these funds, the 

State Department also provides assistance to strengthen Serbia’s 

export and border-control programs. 

So we think we can and we want to help Serbia in its transformation, but in order for Serbia to succeed, it must meet its international obligations. The most important unmet obligation, an unresolved legacy of the Milosevic era, is that of apprehending and 

transferring to The Hague those indicted for horrendous war 

crimes. To that end, for the past 4 years, Congress has conditioned 

SEED and other assistance to Serbia, requiring that assistance be 

suspended by a certain date unless the Secretary certifies that Serbia is cooperating with the International Tribunal. 

When Congress first included a certification provision for Serbia 

in the Fiscal Year 2001 SEED budget, cooperation with the tribunal was virtually nonexistent. Serbia has come a long way since 

then, and I would note this, I think, in partial comment on Ambassador Dobbins’s observations, which you quoted earlier. A total of 

23 indictees have gone from Belgrade to The Hague. This number 

includes, of course, Slobodan Milosevic, as well as another former 

President. And since the creation of the state union and the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic last March, Belgrade officials 

have increased their efforts to locate and arrest fugitive ICTY 

indictees. Forgive me for using an acronym. ‘‘ICTY,’’ I will say, instead of the ‘‘International Tribunal.’’

The Serbian Government has also created a special prosecutor 

and court dedicated to war crimes cases, and this is something, I 

think, which has not received a great deal of attention here in the 

United States. But an important test for this new court began on 

March 9th, with the opening of the trial of seven defendants accused of participating in the deaths of approximately 200 POWs 

and civilians at the Ovcara Farm near Vukovar in Croatia in 1991. 

And I learned just a couple of hours ago that, today, a Belgrade 

district court sentenced Sajha Sietan to the maximum penalty allowable, 20 years, for his part as a leader in the so-called 

‘‘Skorpion’’ paramilitary unit, convicted of the murder of 14 ethnic 

Albanians in Kosovo in 1999. 

Despite improved efforts by the Serbian Government in 2003 to 

locate and arrest the fugitive indictees still at large, we do believe, 

however, that there are as many as 16 indictees who spend a preponderance of their time in Serbia. This includes General Ratko 

Mladic, indicted, as you know, of course, in connection with the 

massacre at Srebrenica and other crimes, as well as three highVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:38 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092608 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031704\92608 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ranking generals whose indictments ICTY made public in October 

of last year and who are now living openly in Belgrade. 

The United States and the international community do speak 

with one voice on this. It is unacceptable that these individuals 

have thus far eluded justice. 

Without speaking to Secretary Powell’s upcoming decision, I can 

say, vis-a-vis certification, that the Administration is not presently 

satisfied with Belgrade’s level of cooperation. As a member of the 

United Nations, Serbia and Montenegro is obligated to cooperate 

fully with the tribunal, a U.N. institution. ‘‘Cooperation’’ means applying full effort to locate, arrest, and transfer fugitive indictees, as 

well as making witnesses and documentary evidence available to 

the tribunal. 

We are particularly focused on our effort to see Ratko Mladic 

brought to justice. We believe that this would be a transforming 

event for Serbia and Montenegro’s democratic development, and, as 

I have already emphasized, a key obligation of Serbia and Montenegro to the international community. 

In the past 2 months, Secretary Powell, Under Secretary Grossman, and Under Secretary Larson have all pressed home to Serbia’s new leadership the need to resolve Serbia’s outstanding tribunal obligations, especially including transferring Mladic to the 

tribunal. I delivered the same message when I met with Serbian 

leaders, including the new Prime Minister, in Belgrade on March 

4th. 

Cooperation with the tribunal is the key to Serbia and 

Montenegro’s future integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, 

including membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and 

progress toward a stabilization and association agreement with the 

EU. We will continue to press this obligation. 

Mr. Chairman, Slobodan Milosevic was once described as the 

first politician to realize that Tito was dead. What we now have is 

a policy that recognizes that Milosevic is behind bars, that his regime is over, and that Serbia is on a new path. Even though the 

challenges that Serbia faces are daunting, we have seen real 

progress in promoting economic reform and democratic values, but 

there is still work to do. The challenge now is to continue the hard 

work of consolidating democratic institutions, restructuring the 

economy, and honoring Serbia’s international obligations. 

We want Serbia to succeed. This is an essential part of our overall policy of promoting Balkan stability. We are watching the new 

government closely and will judge it on its actions. We now look 

to the new government to demonstrate its commitment to Serbia’s 

future. We will be there to assist Serbia if it chooses to continue 

along the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stephens follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE D. KATHLEEN STEPHENS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF STATE

Thank you for inviting me to testify before your committee today, Mr. Chairman. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to share with you some of the transformations 

that are taking place today in the Republic of Serbia—to share how far we have 

8

come in our relationship, to underscore our continued commitment to a stable and 

prosperous Serbia and to outline the serious challenges that remain before us. 

Just over a year ago, on March 12, 2003, Serbia was rocked by the assassination 

of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. Rather than crumble in the face of this violent 

attack on the republic’s democratic institutions, Serbian leaders stood firm and 

fought back by launching a sweeping crackdown on organized crime and official corruption. The investigation into the assassination revealed to the Serbian public a 

nexus between organized crime, corrupt government officials and networks opposed 

to cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY). The public was appalled by the assassination and welcomed the emergency 

measures instituted in its immediate aftermath, in the belief that Serbia’s leaders 

were serious about completing the reform process that started with the ouster of 

Slobodan Milosevic on October 5, 2000. 

Unfortunately, the energy and optimism that flourished in the spring of 2003 dissipated over the course of the summer. The Zivkovic government found itself caught 

up in a series of public controversies and political scandals that eroded public confidence and political support. In November 2003, Serbia’s third attempt to elect a 

republic president failed due to insufficient voter turnout; a candidate from the extremist Serbian Radical Party stunned observers by capturing almost half the votes 

cast. Parliament became bogged down in extended debate on confidence motions 

challenging the government’s leaders. In November 2003, Prime Minister Zivkovic 

called early elections. 

ELECTION RESULTS

Alarming headlines reporting the results of the December 28th parliamentary 

elections might have led readers to believe that Serbia had returned to the Milosevic 

era. It did not—but we were concerned. The ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party 

received the largest number of votes, 28 percent of the vote, but not enough seats 

to form a government. Milosevic’s Socialist Party received only 8 percent. What the 

headlines failed to highlight was that democratic parties captured more than 60 percent of the ballots cast. 

Our analysis shows that the Serbian electorate has remained remarkably stable 

in the three years since the end of the Milosevic regime. In fact, democratic parties 

received a larger percentage of the vote in December than they did when the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition ran against Milosevic in September 2000. 

The democratic bloc is fragmented, however: as a result, 9 percent of the pro-democratic, anti-nationalist vote (more than 450,000 votes) went to parties which failed 

to meet the 5 percent threshold necessary to win seats in parliament. Had these 

parties combined tickets with one of the larger democratic parties, the democratic 

bloc would have captured 23 additional seats.. Under Serbia’s Milosevic-era electoral 

rules, however, these ‘‘lost’’ seats went disproportionately to the party with the largest plurality—the Radicals. Thus, although the Radicals received approximately a 

quarter of the vote, it now has a third of the seats in Parliament. One of the first 

acts of the new Parliament was to correct this anti-democratic anachronism by lowering the parliamentary threshold. 

On March 10, 2004, after two months of negotiation, Parliament confirmed a minority three-party coalition government led by former Yugoslav President Vojislav 

Kostunica. The new government has presented a legislative program that focuses 

on domestic issues: adopting a new constitution, harmonizing Serbia’s legal framework with EU standards, building state union institutions with sister republic Montenegro, and fighting corruption. Parliamentary leaders have called for new presidential elections in the late spring, so that Serbia will have both a new Constitution 

and new president by June 28. 

THE ECONOMY

Many analysts believe that much of the Radicals’ electoral success can be attributed to protest votes—i.e., voters expressing their dissatisfaction with government 

scandals and little improvement in the average citizen’s standard of living. Polling 

data confirms that economic issues—jobs, pensions, inflation—are foremost in voters’ minds. Although the economy has been stabilized, growth is anemic and unemployment high. Overall unemployment is 20–30%, but it is as high as 80–100% in 

some areas—creating fertile ground for the messages of nationalist and populist 

politicians. Although price and currency stabilization halted a dramatic rise in poverty during the 1990s, 20% of Serbs live at or under the poverty line. 

Current economic data paint a picture of fragile macroeconomic stability, threatened by continued microeconomic weakness and a lack of growth. Key indicators are 

mixed. GDP may have grown by as little as 1.5% in 2003, somewhat slower than 

9

in the previous two years. Although the previous government worked closely with 

the IMF to successfully stabilize macroeconomic indicators and increase fiscal discipline, non-financial sectors of the economy remain dominated by loss-generating 

socially-owned enterprises. Lack of jobs is a key source of public dissatisfaction. 

And, as Serbia has yet to address restructuring of large enterprises, the situation 

is likely to get worse before it gets better. 

Economic reform is always difficult, but it has shown results. The average monthly wage in Serbia has increased from an equivalent of 50 Euros in October 2000 

to 164 Euros today. Real wages have risen by 123%. Per capita GDP has increased 

from less than $1000 in 2000 to about $1940 in 2003. Unfortunately, this is only 

half of the level it was in 1989. 

This Administration’s commitment to economic cooperation is an important part 

of our overall policy to stabilize the Balkans, including Serbia and Montenegro.. The 

United States has invested USD 622 million in supporting Serbia and Montenegro’s 

development, USD 123 million of which has been dedicated to facilitating economic 

reform. In FY2003, the United States Government provided over $31 million in economic-related assistance to Serbia. Our assistance focuses on strengthening those 

institutions that will promote and sustain economic reform and the transition to a 

market economy. Through USAID, we are providing assistance to enact macroeconomic reform, improve bank supervision, strengthen the central bank, prepare 

for WTO accession, restructure and privatize troubled enterprises, reform tax policies and enhance the business and investment environment. U.S. Treasury representatives advise their Serbian counterparts on rationalizing tax policy, controlling public debt, rehabilitating troubled banks and combating financial crime. We 

closely coordinate our economic assistance activities with other major donors. 

On December 4, 2003, Secretary Powell removed one of the last Milosevic-era 

sanctions by restoring Normal Trade Relations to Serbia and Montenegro. This created a new opportunity to promote positive economic cooperation as a key pillar of 

our bilateral relationship. With the restoration of NTR, trade will now depend on 

continuing progress on economic reforms. We want to increase opportunities and 

protection for U.S. business, and demonstrate to a skeptical Serbian public the mutual benefits of economic cooperation. In 2003, thanks to investments by American 

firms including U.S. Steel, Philip-Morris and IBM, the United States Was the largest source of new foreign investment in Serbia, investing approximately USD 900 

million. We want to continue and increase U.S. investment in Serbia as it rebuilds 

and reforms its economy. 

ASSISTANCE

Our bilateral assistance to Serbia is tailored to help Serbia build the institutions 

necessary for an open democratic society to take root and prosper. This assistance 

to Serbia—USD 100 million in FY04—represents almost a quarter of the State Department’s SEED budget, reflecting the critical role that a democratic Serbia and 

Montenegro plays in ensuring long-term peace and stability in the Balkans. In addition to economic reform, this assistance supports democratic governance, the ruleof-law, and independent media. In addition to SEED funds, the State Department 

also provides assistance to strengthen Serbia’s export and border control programs. 

We intend to continue to work closely with the Congress to ensure that our assistance package is targeted to support US interests in Serbia and Montenegro. 

CERTIFICATION/ICTY COOPERATION

In order for Serbia to succeed, it must meet its international obligations. The most 

important unmet obligation—an unresolved legacy of the Milosevic era—is that of 

apprehending and transferring to The Hague those indicted for horrendous war 

crimes. To that end, for the past four years, Congress has conditioned SEED and 

other assistance to Serbia, requiring that assistance be suspended by a certain date 

unless the Secretary of State certifies that Serbia is ‘‘cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia including . . . the surrender 

and transfer of indictees or assistance in their apprehension, including making all 

practicable efforts to apprehend and transfer Ratko Mladic.’’

When Congress first included a certification provision for Serbia in the FY01 

SEED budget, cooperation with the Tribunal was virtually non-existent. Serbia has 

come a long way since then. A total of 23 indictees have gone from Belgrade to The 

Hague. This number includes two presidents, including Slobodan Milosevic. Serbia 

and Montenegro has institutionalized procedures for cooperating with the Tribunal 

through legislation and through the National Council for Coordination with the 

ICTY, which reviews and responds to requests from the ICTY Prosecutor for access 

to witnesses and documents. Serbia’s amended Law on ICTY cooperation has made 

10

it much easier for government officials to receive national security waivers, allowing 

them to cooperate with ICTY investigators and testify in Tribunal proceedings. And, 

since the creation of the state union and the assassination of PM Djindjic in March 

2003, Belgrade officials have increased their efforts to locate and arrest fugitive 

ICTY indictees. 

The Serbian government has also created a special prosecutor and court dedicated 

to war crimes cases. An important test for this new court began on March 9, 2004, 

with the opening of the trial of seven defendants accused of participating in the 

deaths of approximately 200 POWs and civilians at the Ovcara Farm near Vukovar 

in Croatia in 1991. This is only the most recent domestic prosecution of war crimes 

charges in Serbian courts. Last September, the Belgrade District Court convicted 

and sentenced four defendants for the abduction and murder of seventeen Muslims 

in October 1992. The Special Prosecutor is also in midway through the case against 

a leader of the ‘‘Skorpion’’ paramilitary unit charged with the murder of nineteen 

ethnic Albanians in Podujevo, Kosovo in 1999. 

Despite improved efforts by the Serbian government in 2003 to locate and arrest 

these fugitive indictees, we believe that as many as 16 ICTY indictees spend a preponderance of their time in Serbia. This includes Gen. Ratko Mladic, indicted by 

ICTY in connection with the massacre at Srebrenica and other crimes, as well as 

three high-ranking generals whose indictments ICTY made public in October 2003 

and who are now living openly in Belgrade. The United States—and the international community—speak with one voice on this: it is unacceptable that these individuals have thus far eluded justice. 

Without speaking to Secretary Powell’s upcoming decision, I can say that the Administration is not presently satisfied with Belgrade’s level of cooperation. As a 

member of the United Nations, Serbia and Montenegro is obligated to cooperate 

fully with the Tribunal, a UN institution. Cooperation means applying full effort to 

locate, arrest and transfer fugitive indictees, as well as making witnesses and documentary evidence available to the Tribunal. We are particularly focused on our effort to see Ratko Mladic brought to justice. 

As noted earlier, the state union and republic governments have come a long way 

on ICTY cooperation in the past three and a half years. While we commend Serbia 

for establishing institutions to facilitate cooperation with the Tribunal, the international community also expects Serbia to render indictees to face justice before the 

Tribunal. Our expectations extend beyond establishing procedures for cooperation—

plainly stated, we are looking for results. With Ratko Mladic still at large, the three 

recently-indicted generals living freely in Belgrade and twelve other indictees unaccounted for, this Administration cannot be satisfied with the current level of cooperation with the Tribunal. 

In the past two months, Secretary Powell, Under Secretary Grossman and Under 

Secretary Larson have personally pressed home to Serbia’s new leadership the need 

to resolve Serbia’s outstanding ICTY obligations, including especially transferring 

Mladic to the Tribunal. I delivered the same message when I met with Serbian leaders in Belgrade on March 4. Cooperation with the Tribunal is the key to Serbia and 

Montenegro’s future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and progress toward a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. We will continue to press this obligation. 

KOSOVO

Overcoming a legacy of war crimes is not the only challenge that the current leaders of Serbia inherited from the Milosevic regime. Since the conclusion of the 1999 

NATO campaign, Kosovo has been administered by the UN Mission in Kosovo 

(UNMIK). UNSCR 1244 called for the establishment of an interim administration 

for overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions 

to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 

The United States government does not support any particular future status outcome for Kosovo. Instead, we are focused on achieving eight standards identified by 

the United Nations in 2002 as critical for Kosovo’s democratic development. These 

standards are the same we would expect any modern, European society to achieve. 

The standards address rule of law, functioning democratic institutions, freedom of 

movement, sustainable returns and the rights of minority communities, the economy, property rights, a dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protection Corps. 

The United States and our Contact Group partners (UK, France, Germany, Italy, 

Russia and the EU) have proposed setting a Review Date to evaluate Kosovo’s 

progress towards meeting the internationally-endorsed standards outlined by 

UNMIK. Under Secretary Marc Grossman rolled out the Review Date strategy with 

11

UN SRSG Harri Holkeri and the Contact Group during his visit to the Balkans in 

November 2003. 

The first comprehensive review will occur around mid-2005, and earlier if 

progress warrants it. If the review is positive, then the international community 

would be prepared to begin a process—as yet undefined—to determine Kosovo’s future status. If the review is negative, we will set a subsequent Review Date. The 

Review Date process gives shape and focus to the UN-endorsed policy of ‘‘standards 

before status.’’ Its timetable strengthens the will and the ability of the international 

community and Kosovo to build institutions in Kosovo consistent with international 

standards for democracy, tolerance and rule of law. 

We have not ruled out any future status outcome. But the outcome must be one 

that enhances regional stability. The leaders and people of Serbia play a major role 

in this process. A stable, democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo is in the interest of Serbia 

and Montenegro and the entire region. Belgrade’s playing a constructive role—for 

example, supporting the review date process and participating in the BelgradePristina dialogue—is the surest route to ensuring satisfactory resolutions for the 

issues of greatest concern to the Serbian public: the return of persons displaced from 

their homes, the security of Serbs living in Kosovo and protection of minority rights. 

These are also concerns for the UN and for the Contact Group, concern reflected 

in UNMIK’s Standards for Kosovo. 

Serbia hosts the largest number of displaced persons in the region—over 500,000 

refugees and IDPs within its borders. Approximately 225,000 of this number are 

ethnic Serbs who left homes in Kosovo. Although displaced persons have returned 

to Kosovo at a steadily increasing pace each year since 2000, the overall number 

of returns is very small. Fewer than 10,000 Serbs have returned to Kosovo. Violence 

against Serbs has declined dramatically since 1999, but the appalling murders of 

Serbs in Obilic and Gorazdevac in 2003 and in Lipljan in February are compelling 

evidence that much work remains to be done. We urge all the citizens of Kosovo 

to cooperate fully with UNMIK, KFOR and the Kosovo Police Service, so that the 

perpetrators of these crimes can be brought to justice and all residents of Kosovo 

can enjoy the right to live in a safe and secure environment. 

STATE UNION

Just over a year ago, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro redefined their relationship, transforming what had been the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the 

looser state union of ‘‘Serbia and Montenegro.’’ The state union is led by a president 

and a five-member Council of Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal and External Economic Relations and Human and Minority Rights. All other 

governmental authority has devolved to the republic governments. Despite the many 

compromises at the core of the state union structure, differing views about relations 

between the republics make the future of the joint state uncertain in the minds of 

many of its citizens. 

The republics do agree, however, that accession to the European Union is the key 

long-term goal of their joint foreign policy. Since the adoption of the state union’s 

Constitutional Charter in February 2003, both Belgrade and Podgorica have worked 

to harmonize laws in the two republics so that both are consistent with standards 

in the EU. Given that the two republics have developed increasingly divergent financial, economic and monetary systems, this has been an arduous process, one that 

will likely continue for many months. 

The European Commission is now conducting a feasibility study to evaluate Serbia and Montenegro’s readiness to negotiate the serious obligations contained in a 

Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the first step on the path to accession. If 

the outcome of the feasibility study is positive, the European Commission will initiate negotiation of this contract designed to help Serbia and Montenegro undergo 

the political and economic transition necessary for a closer relationship with the European Union. The EC has delayed completion of the feasibility study—originally expected in the spring of this year—for a variety of factors, one being Serbia’s record 

on ICTY cooperation. 

DEFENSE REFORM

Progress on defense reform has been one of the true success stories for the state 

union in the past year. Assuming the position of state union Defense Minister after 

the Djindjic assassination, Boris Tadic immediately undertook a military housecleaning. He pledged full cooperation with the ICTY, dismissed Milosevic-era generals and senior officers, disbanded the ‘‘Military Commission on Cooperation with 

The Hague’’ (which, contrary to its name, obstructed cooperation with the Tribunal), 

and signed an order placing all army and MOD personnel under the obligation to 

12

apprehend and/or report any information on fugitive war crimes indictees. Tadic has 

also implemented a sweeping agenda of defense and security reform, subordinating 

the military to civilian control for the first time in more than fifty years. Serbia and 

Montenegro is in the process of adopting new National Defense and Security Strategies, creating a framework to right-size and modernize the military services. These 

strategies identify NATO not as the enemy but as the objective. 

Implementation of these reforms is essential—and we want to help. On May 6, 

President Bush determined that a bilateral military relationship with Serbia and 

Montenegro serves the U.S. national interest. We are ready to initiate an International Military Education and Training program to support defense reform in Serbia and Montenegro, as soon as Belgrade signs an Article 98 agreement. We are preparing ourselves for an expanded bilateral military relationship by building up the 

Office of the Defense Attache at Embassy Belgrade and by engaging state union officials in discussions with our senior military leaders in the region. In November 

2003, Defense Minister Tadic and Army Chief of Staff Krga visited AF South. In 

December, Admiral Johnson returned the courtesy, presiding over the first visit of 

a U.S. naval vessel to Serbia and Montenegro with a call at the Port of Bar on December 16 and meetings with Defense Ministry and military officials in Belgrade 

the following day. 

On June 19, Serbia and Montenegro formally requested an invitation to join 

NATO’s Partnership for Peace in a letter to then Secretary General Robertson. Belgrade is aware that two outstanding issues must be resolved before it can be invited 

into Partnership for Peace: full cooperation with the ICTY and Belgrade’s claims 

against eight NATO allies in the International Court of Justice. Once these issues 

are resolved, the United States will support Serbia and Montenegro’s membership 

in the Partnership for Peace. 

Last July, state union Foreign Minister Svilanovic and then Serbian Prime Minister Zivkovic offered to contribute a military unit to an international military operation engaged in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Although discussions regarding 

a possible deployment were suspended once parliamentary elections were called in 

November 2003, we look forward to exploring this option now that the elections are 

over and republic and state union ministries are being filled. Serbia and Montenegro 

has also offered diplomatic support for the GWOT, welcoming the fall of Saddam 

Hussein and offering material support to the new government in Afghanistan. 

CONCLUSION

Milosevic was once described as the first politician to realize that Tito was dead. 

What we now have is a policy that recognizes that Milosevic is behind bars, that 

his regime is over and that Serbia is on a new path. Mr. Chairman, even though 

the challenges that Serbia faces are daunting, we have seen real progress in promoting economic reform and democratic values. There is still work to do. The challenge now is to continue the hard work of consolidating democratic institutions, restructuring the economy and honoring Serbia’s international obligations. We want 

Serbia to succeed. This is an essential part of our overall policy of promoting Balkan 

stability. We are watching the new government closely and will judge it on its actions. We now look to the new government to demonstrate its commitment to Serbia’s future. We will be there to assist Serbia if it chooses to continue along the path 

toward Euro-Atlantic integration.

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Stephens, thank you very much for 

your clear and very well-organized testimony. 

As I mentioned earlier, the Ranking Member, the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Wexler, was involved in a debate on the Floor, 

and I now recognize him for an opening statement. 

Mr. WEXLER. I very much appreciate the Chairman’s indulgence 

and want to thank him for holding today’s hearing. I have very 

much appreciated the Deputy Secretary’s testimony, and I thank 

you as well for being here with us. 

I am going to focus my opening statement predominantly on Serbia. While I know there are some Members of Congress and Americans who still view Serbia with a jaundiced eye because of the horrific atrocities that took place during the Balkan Wars, it is critical 

that the United States, European Union, and the international 

13

community assist the Serbian Government and people as they work 

toward building a lasting democracy with stability and freedom. 

It is self-evident that Serbia’s success as a democratic nation is 

critical to long-term stability and prosperity in the Balkans. These 

goals, including political and economic transformation and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, can only occur if the new government in Belgrade comes to a definitive conclusion that its future 

lies with the West, not with the sentimental past of ultranationalism. 

I join many of my colleagues who were deeply disappointed and 

taken aback that Prime Minister Kostunica chose to rely on Mr. 

Milosevic’s party to support the new government. For many here 

in Washington this is a step backwards after having taken significant steps forward since the fall of Mr. Milosevic. 

Domestically, Prime Minister Kostunica must deliver on his 

pledge to the Serbian people to crack down on rampant corruption, 

further strengthen democratic and civil institutions and the rule of 

law, as well as reform Serbia’s weak economy. Belgrade must also 

continue to support the successful transformation of the Serbian 

and Montenegrin military, as well as the sweeping defense and 

military reforms undertaken by Defense Minister Tadic. This was 

a true success story in Serbia, where, for the first time in 50 years, 

the defense ministry came under civilian control. Minister Tadic 

also managed to uproot and discard many of Milosevic’s generals 

and military officials and cooperated with The Hague. 

The Prime Minister has significant obligations to address before 

Serbia joins NATO’s Partnership for Peace and before it negotiates 

the EU’s Stabilization and Association Agreement. So far, the 

Prime Minister has sent mixed messages to Washington, Brussels, 

and The Hague. I was encouraged by his speech on March 2nd before the Serbian Parliament, where he stated, and I quote:

‘‘Membership of the European Union is something that has to 

be done. There is no alternative to the European road for Serbia and Montenegro.’’

However, I was deeply disturbed by his February 21 statement, 

where he said:

‘‘Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

Former Yugoslavia is not a priority for his government.’’

While the United States and the EU should assist Serbia and 

Montenegro on its path toward European integration, it must be 

made abundantly clear to the new government that the door to the 

EU and NATO will remain closed unless Belgrade fully cooperates 

with the ICTY and turns over General Mladic to the tribunal. 

Mr. Chairman, Serbia is at an historic crossroad, and we must 

be ready to offer both carrots and sticks as Belgrade makes difficult 

political and economic decisions. It is very much in America’s interest to ensure that Serbia’s path to democracy is not blocked or hindered by forces connected to the war and destruction of the 1990s. 

It is in this vein, I hope that Prime Minister Kostunica continues 

to build his country for a prosperous future while at the same time 

reconciling with the painful past. And, again, I thank you for giving me the time. 

14

If I could, Mr. Chairman, ask for unanimous consent to put in 

the record Representative Cardin’s statement as a member of the 

Helsinki Commission. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection. And I will ask that Congressman Chris Smith’s, also a member of the Commission, statement 

be made a part of the record. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection, that will be the order in both 

cases, and I thank the gentleman for his statement. We will now 

proceed with questions under the Subcommittee’s 5-minute rule. I 

will say to Mr. Wexler, I think, by the looks of things, we should 

be able to go to two rounds with the Secretary before we go to the 

second panel. And in light of one of the comments you made near 

the end of your opening statement, Mr. Wexler, I want to focus a 

little bit on the European Union in my first question. 

They recently postponed completion of a feasibility study on the 

drafting of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia 

and Montenegro until the new government’s policies become clear. 

So far, so good. If that is the case, why is the EU moving ahead 

with plans to approve approximately 300 million euros in economic 

aid to Serbia and Montenegro on March 25th? Does the EU not 

condition economic assistance on cooperation with the International 

War Crimes Tribunal? 

Ms. STEPHENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My understanding is 

the EU does not condition its economic assistance in the same way 

that the United States conditions our assistance. That said, we 

speak with one voice on the issue of cooperation with the tribunal 

and the issue of democratic and economic reform. I know that EU 

leaders have spoken, both publicly and privately, about this in recent weeks and, in particular, have pointed to the feasibility study, 

which is the path to the EU, as a path that can only be pursued 

once there is full cooperation with the ICTY. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Secretary, has the U.S. formally commented to the EU about the 300 million euro aid package? 

Ms. STEPHENS. We try to coordinate our policy in the Balkans 

and in Serbia and Montenegro very closely with the EU because we 

do share the joint objective of accelerating Serbia and Montenegro’s 

movement toward integration into Europe, and, yes, we have consulted closely with them about how we approach these issues and 

how we can best, as Congressman Wexler talked about, use carrots 

and sticks and encourage the best outcome. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Did we express a difference of opinion on this 

issue? 

Ms. STEPHENS. As I said, my understanding from the EU is that 

they approach their assistance and the issue of conditionality in a 

different way. They see the feasibility study and the kinds of things 

that they say publicly and politically as their means of reinforcing 

their concerns. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I understand that that is apparently the case, but 

I am really asking, have we officially commented and expressed 

any concerns about that differentiation that they are proceeding 

with? 

Ms. STEPHENS. I was actually in Brussels last week, and we discussed this, and we have had some other discussions as well, and 

15

I do not know exactly what their timetable is for their own assistance. What they did say to me is they feel that much of their assistance is aimed not at supporting the government but at developing the kinds of institutions that will be needed to join Europe. 

We are trying to coordinate as closely as we can, given that we 

have different rules, different ways of sometimes approaching it. 

Mr. BEREUTER. From that, I gather, we did not object or did not 

express our concerns. 

Although there has been some macroeconomic progress, and you 

pointed that out, perhaps more than the American public understands and maybe more than the public generally understands. 

Still I understand one of the challenges that we hear about from 

Serbians, but also from Americans who are interested in Serbia, is 

that the registration, pursuit of the various licenses to conduct a 

business as a small business entrepreneurial person or family, is 

very difficult today. Do you know if Serbia is attempting to effectively deal with this problem, and have they requested assistance 

from the European Union or the United States or any other entity? 

Ms. STEPHENS. My understanding is that our assistance programs—I do not know about the EU assistance programs, but we 

have assistance programs that are specifically aimed at promoting 

a better business environment for small businesses, addressing, as 

I mentioned in my testimony, the overriding issue of unemployment, and the way to do that may be by promoting small business 

development, cutting through the bureaucracy. That is a part of the 

overall economic institutional reforms that we are supporting. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I will come back and talk a bit about the International Criminal Tribunal and Serbia’s cooperation or noncooperation in a minute or 2. 

I would like to turn to the Ranking Member for his questions. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you again. I have somewhat of a conflict 

within my own thinking. On the one hand, it seems the reforms 

adopted within the Defense Ministry in Serbia are nothing less 

than profound in an extremely positive way, and I would think everyone in the United States, as well as everyone in the European 

Union, would both applaud it and want to pursue a path that encourages that kind of reform. 

So, on the one hand, if we talk about the need for the Government to cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal, 

and if we go beyond just simply saying cooperation and say that 

there is a nexus between cooperation and then entry into the European Union and entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, I am curious what effect a failure of an invitation to NATO’s Partnership 

for Peace at the Istanbul Summit would have on the reform effort? 

Would we be undermining it, in your view? Is that an appropriate 

equation of carrot and stick? Leave it at that for now. 

Ms. STEPHENS. Thank you. As I outlined in some detail in my 

written testimony—I did not mention it earlier, but I appreciate 

your mentioning and emphasizing this whole area of defense reform, the particular role that Defense Minister Tadic has played, 

in really some leading and some very courageous and transforming 

ways, the reform of this key institution in ways that would be hard 

for us to have imagined a couple of years ago. We want to support 

this and are supporting this in every way that we possibly can, 

16

and, again, in my written testimony, I do outline the way we have 

tried to deepen our military-to-military relationship and our support for those reforms. 

We feel, and I think that we are joined by our NATO allies in 

feeling, however, that in order for Serbia-Montenegro to join the 

Partnership for Peace, they do need to demonstrate cooperation 

with the ICTY, as well as drop some suits that they have brought 

in the ICJ, in order to, again, put the legacy of the Milosevic years 

behind them, and I think that is how I would characterize this 

issue of cooperation with the ICTY. 

Serbia has come very, very far, as I have outlined, in terms of 

doing some things that were politically very, very difficult and in 

some ways very dangerous to fulfill their obligations. It is time now 

to close the book on ICTY. It is time to close the door on the 

Milosevic years, and the way to do that is by coming to closure on 

these remaining indictees, notably, Ratko Mladic. 

If they fail to do that, if they fail to get into PFP in June. It is 

March. I believe there is still time for success, and this Administration and our efforts are devoted to working with this new government in every way we possibly can to make success the outcome 

because it is just too important to the region, and it is too important to us, and it is, most of all, too important to Serbia and Montenegro to fail. 

Mr. WEXLER. The thing that I would be most interested in hearing, at this point, which I think, is where the Chairman suggested 

he was going. I was in The Hague a couple of weeks ago and met 

with the prosecutor, and the prosecutor voiced her satisfaction with 

American participation and cooperation, and I applaud the State 

Department for that. I know what we are asking the Serbians to 

do. To date, can you give us the status as to what they actually 

have done? Is it just a blank slate where they have ignored 100 

percent of the requests? Is there 20 percent cooperation or 40 percent cooperation? What is the exact score card? 

Ms. STEPHENS. Well, I mentioned, in terms of indictees turned in 

and in terms of the growing ability and activity of domestic courts 

in trying persons accused of war crimes, which is the future, is to 

have the trials of those indicted in the future conducted in Serbia 

itself or in Bosnia or in Kosovo, wherever these crimes occurred 

rather than in The Hague. We want The Hague to complete its 

work. In terms of developing that kind of domestic capacity, in 

terms of turning in indictees, it is not a blank score card. There 

have been notable successes, as I have said. 

On the issue of locating and apprehending the remaining 

indictees, particularly the most high-level ones, this was an issue 

that was highlighted very strongly when Former Prime Minister 

Zivkovic and Foreign Minister Zavonovic came to Washington last 

summer, both here, in Congress, and in their meetings with the 

Administration, and following that, I think we did see an enhanced 

effort to cooperate to locate these remaining fugitives. We want to 

see these efforts continue and deepen, and as I mentioned earlier, 

Secretary Powell and Under Secretary Grossman have all been in 

touch with the new government to urge that we not lose time here, 

that we continue with these efforts to cooperate and bring this 

thing to closure. 

17

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman for the question. 

Madam Secretary, correct me if I am wrong, but I think you said 

earlier that they have turned over 23 indictees to The Hague. Sixteen seem to be living most of their time in Serbia, some living 

openly in Belgrade. Is that essentially correct? 

Ms. STEPHENS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I am pleased to recognize now the gentlelady 

from Virginia, Ms. Davis, who is the Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam 

Secretary. I am sorry I was not here for your opening statement, 

but I have had the opportunity to read it. 

Will the government’s dependence on the Socialist Party hinder 

reforms in Serbia and Serbia’s relations with the international 

community, number one? 

Number two: Do you think that the Democratic Party could join 

the government in the future and end the government’s reliance on 

the Socialists? 

And, lastly, what are the prospects that the Radical Party will 

come to power in Serbia if the current government fails? 

Ms. STEPHENS. Thank you for those questions. I am not sure my 

crystal ball is clear enough, but I will give it a try. 

Ms. DAVIS. Your opinion. 

Ms. STEPHENS. Thank you. In terms of the relationship of the Socialist Party with the Minority Coalition Party led by Prime Minister Kostunica, it was not something that we or, I think, most of 

Serbia’s democratic friends welcomed to see the Socialist Party play 

a role in this government. I think it is important to note that the 

Socialist Party has not been given positions in the government; 

however, the coalition does rely upon its support within the parliament in its parliamentary form to remain in power. 

So far, I think the record is too short since March 5th to say 

what the effect of that has been, and as I said earlier, I think it 

makes it all the more important that we judge the new government 

by its actions, and we need to see actions in a number of areas 

which may be controversial, but they need to make their decisions 

on what is most important and take action appropriately, so we 

will have to wait and see. 

On the future of the Democratic Party, which is led by Mr. Boris 

Tadic of late—it is hard to tell from day to day—the Minister of 

Defense in the Federation, the leader of the Democratic Party—I 

do not know. I suppose if one were to try to find the glass more 

half full, at least from the point of view of one of Serbia’s important 

democratic parties, is that there is a democratic party in opposition. Perhaps I am not the right person to say this in this setting, 

but that is, I think, never a bad thing in a democracy, a mature 

one or a developing one, and I do not know what Mr. Tadic and 

his colleagues will decide to do in terms of their own political future, but I hope whatever they do, it will be in support of Serbia’s 

democratization and leading in the kinds of areas where they have 

led so well in the past. 

The Radical Party’s future; I think that the next test will apparently come in the presidential election, which is scheduled to happen, I believe, sometime in June. The date is not yet set. This is 

18

an election which has failed three times because it never met the 

50 percent voter-participation rate that would allow it to be in 

force. When the new Parliament met, it got rid of that requirement, 

so it is probably a pretty safe assumption to say that when there 

is a presidential election, it will be successful in electing a President. The Radical Party candidate has declared for it. I do not 

think we know at this time who the other candidates will be. 

So we face some interesting political times ahead in Serbia, and 

one thing about Serbia is the press is always very interesting, and 

there are always, every day, a dozen different scenarios out there, 

and every day all of them sound more or less convincing to me, so 

I think we will just have to wait and see and hope that what does 

happen, obviously, advances Serbia’s vibrant democracy and makes 

it more vibrant and more resilient. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ms. Davis. 

I would like to begin a second round of questioning here. I think 

there are enough questions that we should try to push you on. 

You have mentioned that Secretary Powell, Grossman, Larson, 

and yourself, probably among others, have pressed the Serbians on 

their responsibilities under ICTY to transfer Mladic to the tribunal. 

They have not. We are continuing to press this obligation, as you 

pointed out very clearly in your statement. In your opinion, why 

haven’t they met that obligation? To what extent is there substantial intimidation that is being brought to bear on this government? 

Are the political costs seen as just too strong or too large? What, 

in your opinion, is the reason that they have not delivered on this 

obligation? 

And the second question I would ask is related to the previous 

government’s promise to send Serbian peacekeepers to Afghanistan. Is that likely to be also reiterated by the current government, 

and what is the United States Government’s position on Serbian 

peacekeepers in Afghanistan? Those two questions. 

Ms. STEPHENS. Yes, sir. Thank you. On the first question,——

Mr. BEREUTER. I am asking for your opinion. 

Ms. STEPHENS. I appreciate that, and I am afraid my answer will 

not be very satisfactory, but my honest opinion and answer is I do 

not know. I really do not know. We have been looking, we, writ 

large, for Ratko Mladic for a very long time. Time has probably not 

been on our side. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Is he one of the people who is living openly in 

Belgrade? 

Ms. STEPHENS. No, sir. No, sir. He has not been sited for at least 

several years, maybe more. I would have to find out. No. The three 

who are living openly were indicted last October in 2003, and everyone knows where they are and what they are doing. They could 

go to The Hague any day. In the case of Mladic, in the case of 

Karadzic, in the case of Mr. Gotovina, a former Croatian general, 

we do not know where they are. We, the United States, we do not 

know where they are. Our Serbian counterparts tell us that they 

do not know where they are, and we have been working together 

to see what we can do to find them. We do believe there is some 

evidence that, as I said earlier, that Mr. Mladic spends at least 

some time in Serbia. 

19

Again, I think we would have to look rather historically over the 

last 10 years to really talk about why at various times he could not 

be found or was not found or was not apprehended. Here and now, 

what the new government has said to us is that they do not know 

where he is, that the new Prime Minister has just come into office. 

He wants to assess the situation and move forward with this, and 

we want to take him at his word and continue our cooperation to 

see if we can work together to find him. 

On your second question, if that is all right, again, last July, 

under the previous government, when the Prime Minister visited, 

he proposed to Secretary Powell and to others with whom he met 

that Serbia-Montenegro participate in international peacekeeping 

operations, particularly in connection with the global war on terrorism. Secretary Powell welcomed that offer and welcomed the notion that we could begin consultations on whether or not it would 

be possible to help Serbia-Montenegro form a group of qualified, 

fully vetted, professional, suitable troops to perform a mission 

somewhere in the global war on terrorism. And in the course of 

these consultations, we identified a potential, joining the mission 

that NATO has taken responsibility for in Afghanistan, as a very 

likely one. 

Those discussions, those technical-level discussions, have continued, and, again, with the new government in office for only 2 weeks 

and still some adjustments being made in the various cabinet portfolios, we hope once the government is settled, once those portfolios 

are settled, that we can continue those discussions and actually 

have a deployment of troops. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Mr. Wexler, more questions? 

Mr. WEXLER. I am trying to think, if I were Serbian, what I 

would think of our policy with respect to demanding the finding 

and turnover of these alleged war criminals to the International 

Tribunal. I am not making any comparison between the United 

States and Serbia or anything like that. However, I think there are 

certain principles that it is fair to question. 

We, as a Government, as an Administration, at this point, do not 

submit ourselves or any of our soldiers or elected officials to the jurisdiction of international courts. I think there are justifiable reasons for taking that position. Yet, on the other hand, we appear to 

hold out as a criterion the turnover of alleged war criminals to an 

international tribunal when Serbia has set up its own court, admittedly, very new and untested, but has set up its own court to deal 

with war crimes. 

If we are going to have a policy that says Serbia needs to address 

its past and do so in a constructive and responsible way, and at the 

same time we are trying to encourage reform and democracy and 

an independent judiciary, why is it unreasonable for the Serbian 

elected Prime Minister to argue that Serbia’s courts should have 

jurisdiction, and it should satisfy the international community, to 

be tried in the country, or at least have an opportunity to do so, 

and then the international community can judge whether or not 

the effort was legitimate or not. 

I am not asking for an analysis of our policy as to whether we 

should submit our own citizens to these kinds of courts, but why 

is it okay for us to take that position and argue to Serbia that what 

20

is good for the United States is not good for Serbia, but, more importantly, if the Serbian court were to do a responsible job, isn’t 

there an argument to be made that that ultimately may allow Serbia and the Serbian people to move on in a more constructive fashion than having a verdict issued by an international court? 

Ms. STEPHENS. Thank you. As I described earlier, I do think that 

the development of a capacity domestically to try and deal effectively through the rule of law with the issue of war crimes is central to Serbia’s democratic development and to our own strategy 

there. We welcome the fact that great progress is being made in 

that regard. 

What I would say about Mladic and Karadzic, I think, is this. 

They fall into an entirely different category, and I think, bureaucratically, The Hague calls them ‘‘high-level indictees’’ or something 

like that. I do not think that begins to capture what we are talking 

about when we talk about the international community. It is not 

just the United States but the international community’s insistence 

that Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic be brought to international justice in The Hague. This is the demand of the international community because these are the two figures, who, along 

with Slobodan Milosevic, were responsible for some of the most serious crimes against humanity, and accused of that, since World 

War II. 

So that is what I mean by closing the book on ICTY, and I would 

say perhaps trying, as you were suggesting, to see from the point 

of view of a Serb sitting somewhere in Belgrade or somewhere else 

to look and say, ‘‘These people have brought nothing but shame 

and dishonor to our country, and they have nothing to do with us. 

They are not about our future. They are not about what our culture 

and our people and our history represent.’’ It is not about punishing Serbia. It is not about stopping Serbia. It is about freeing 

Serbia from the evil that has chained it to a past. 

I would hope it could be looked at in that light and that, in that 

light, we would be looking, to get back perhaps to the Chairman’s 

question, to full cooperation to finding these people, and we do not 

think we have seen what we would call full cooperation yet, but we 

want to see, more than anything, a success in reaching the goal. 

Mr. WEXLER. I have got 10 seconds, Mr. Chairman. I would not 

want the discussion left where anybody thought I was suggesting 

that the high-level indictees should not be tried at the International Court of Justice; I just think it is a legitimate question 

that Serbs could raise as to when is it appropriate, when is it not 

appropriate, for them to exercise their own jurisdiction at home. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Wexler. 

Secretary Stephens, thank you very much for helping the Subcommittee with your testimony today. We appreciate your testimony and your responses. 

Ms. STEPHENS. Thank you, sir. It was a privilege to be here. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I would ask unanimous consent that a statement 

from Mr. Burton and questions to various witnesses be made a part 

of the record. 

[No response.] 

Mr. BEREUTER. Hearing no objection, that will be the case. 

21

We will call the second panel, and as they proceed, I would like 

to introduce them. 

Dr. Daniel P. Serwer is Director of Peace and Stability Operations in the Balkans Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He 

has been deeply engaged in facilitating dialogue between Kosovo 

Serbs and Albanians. As State Department Director of European 

and Canadian analysis in 1996 and 1997, he supervised the analysts who tracked Bosnia and the Dayton Accords implementation, 

as well as the deterioration of the security situation in Albania and 

Kosovo. 

He served in 1994 and 1995 as the United States Special Envoy 

and Coordinator for the Bosnian Federation, mediating between 

Croats and Bosnians and negotiating the first agreement reached 

at the Dayton peace talks. Dr. Serwer is co-author of the Institute 

publication on Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. 

The other panelist is Dr. Svetozar Stojanovic ́. He is Founder and 

President of the Serbian-American Center in Belgrade. He is also 

the Professor and Director Emeritus of the Institute for Philosophy 

and Social Theory of Belgrade. He was one of Yugoslavia’s leading 

dissidents during the Tito regime, a long-time critic of Slobodan 

Milosevic, and one of the protagonists in the October 2000 Serbian 

democratic revolution. 

In addition to Professor Stojanovic ́’s long and distinguished career as a professor in Belgrade, he also was a visiting scholar at 

many American and European universities. Dr. Stojanovic ́, we 

think you are in a unique position to offer opinions on the development in Serbia, both as a distinguished academician and a confidant of the man who has just become Serbia’s Prime Minister. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing. Your entire statements 

will be made a part of the record, and I think we have allowed each 

of you 8 minutes, if you need it. Proceed as you wish. Dr. Serwer, 

we would be pleased to hear from you first. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, BALKANS 

INITIATIVE AND PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for once 

again giving me the opportunity to testify before you at an important moment. The moment is important both for Serbia, which is 

setting a new course, and for the United States, which needs to reexamine its policies toward a country crucial to the future of the 

Balkans. I am here to offer you my personal views—the Institute 

of Peace does not take positions on policy issues—on how Serbia 

got to its current unhappy situation and what the United States 

should do about it. 

Before beginning, I would like to note with great regret two important events in Serbia’s modern history. The more recent is the 

fire that has caused enormous damage to Serbia’s treasured 

Hilandar Monastery in Greece. While thankful no lives were lost, 

I join with other Americans in expressing sympathy for the damage 

to this holy site. The second is the assassination, 1 year ago, of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, an event that set Serbia back 

years in its effort to modernize and democratize. 

22

Mr. Chairman, in my view, the promise of October 2000, when 

Milosevic was overthrown in a peaceful revolution based on an electoral defeat, is still unfulfilled. There are many ways of interpreting the December 2003 Serbian election results, but this much 

is clear: pro-democratic forces, including Prime Minister 

Kostunica’s governing coalition and Zoran Djindjic’s party, declined, as did Milosevic’s Socialists. The Radical Party, which represents the worst excesses of Serbian nationalism, gained dramatically. 

Fed up with the half-hearted and halting reform that failed to 

produce results in the 3 years since the overthrow of Milosevic, reform that also generated its own share of corruption, Serbs turned 

back toward an aggressive, anti-Europe, and anti-reform political 

creed. They may even choose, later this year, a President of Serbia 

who leads an unreformed Radical Party still headed by a Hague indictee awaiting trial. 

Prime Minister Kostunica now leads a minority government supported by Milosevic’s Socialists. The only proven reformist face of 

this government is G–17 Plus, which will no doubt plow ahead on 

economic reform but will have little weight on political and diplomatic issues. 

The course Kostunica has set is clear. He continues to focus on 

national issues like Montenegro and Kosovo. He proposes dividing 

Kosovo along ethnic lines. Though he promises a crackdown on corruption, he has offered little in the way of reform of the security 

services, the police, and the judiciary. He seems inclined to reverse 

Djindjic’s lustration of the judiciary, and he has done more to purge 

Djindjic’s supporters from government than Milosevic’s. Even if he 

wanted, Kostunica cannot move on military police or secret service 

reform while supported by the Socialists, who will protect the remnants of the Milosevic regime still ensconced there. Likewise, he 

has pledged not to transfer the higher-level war criminals indicted 

by The Hague Tribunal for command responsibility. 

To summarize, Serbia has taken an unhappy turn. There is no 

immediate security threat to its neighbors, but the United States 

needs to recognize that Serbian democracy is in trouble, and that 

spells trouble for the whole region. 

Since the fall of Milosevic, the United States has taken a soft approach to Serbia. Except for the spring of 2001, when the United 

States played hardball and insisted on the transfer of Milosevic to 

The Hague, Washington has provided Belgrade with benefits without asking much in return in order to avoid undermining pro-democracy reformers. 

This has meant three successive certifications so that Serbia 

could continue to receive bilateral assistance. It has also meant reestablishment of normal bilateral trade relations, and reentry into 

both regional and global international organizations. While Serbs 

complain that not enough has been done for them since Milosevic’s 

fall, $1.3 billion from the IMF and hundreds of millions more in 

World Bank loans and private investment funds say differently, in 

addition to the Paris Club write-off of two-thirds of Yugoslavia’s official debt. 

This soft policy has failed. Annual certifications to allow United 

States assistance have encouraged Belgrade to delay, obfuscate, 

23

and hope eventually to escape its obligations. Serbia now finds 

itself with, we heard earlier, perhaps 15 or 16 indicted war criminals on its territory, an extensive parallel structure not only of social but also security services in Kosovo, and a lingering relationship with Bosnian extremists that protects important Hague 

indictees and delays drawdown of United States troops. 

The time has come for a more effective U.S. policy. We should 

judge Serbia not by its intentions or its promises or the declarations of its leaders but by its actions. Prime Minister Kostunica has 

impeccable nationalist credentials. He can use them to send indicted war criminals to The Hague, as Prime Minister Sanader is 

beginning to do in Croatia. The U.S. Administration has unfortunately signaled, through War Crimes Chief Prosper, that it will be 

sufficient if Serbia sends only Ratko Mladic to The Hague. This is 

a serious error. If they can send him, they can send them all. Dragging this process out one by one, as we have done for 3 years, is 

a mistake. But so, too, is trying to get it done on our own. United States bilateral assistance to Serbia of $100 million per 

year is too small to give us much leverage. Withholding it will enable those who resist The Hague to blame Serbia’s troubles on the 

United States and drive a wedge between the U.S. and the EU. We 

need EU support. It is the EU that is forcing Zagreb’s hand. It can 

also force Belgrade’s hand. Instead, the EU is planning to provide 

what I understand to be 200 million euros to Serbia on March 

25th, just days before the United States needs to make its own decision. 

International assistance is not a right but a privilege. When both 

the U.S. and EU agree to withhold assistance and block IMF loans, 

all of the war criminals in Serbia will go to The Hague. United 

States diplomacy needs to get busy making that day happen. 

Mr. Chairman, we should not be surprised that the broad coalition of democratic forces that overthrew Milosevic has broken up. 

It was from the first fragile and fractious and was not destined to 

last long. 

We need also to recognize that there is more to Serbia than political leaders and political parties. The courageous activists, the energetic vote counters, the tenacious human rights advocates, the 

dignified diplomats who resisted Milosevic are still there, spread 

through civil society and hoping for a better future. We abandoned 

this group after October 2000, imagining that their role had been 

played out, and we could rely on the government to institute reform. This was a mistake. Civil society is not just a force with 

which to overthrow dictators but also an essential watchdog over 

democracy. The decisions of Otpor and G–17 Plus to become political parties have left a giant hole in the center of Serbian civil society. It is time we shifted our assistance definitively to fill in this 

hole and reweave the fabric of reform-minded, nongovernmental organizations. 

Mr. Chairman, in concluding, let me summarize what I would 

suggest as United States policy toward Serbia for the immediate 

future. One, redouble assistance to reformist forces in Serbian civil 

society, shifting all United States assistance funds to democratization efforts, which are exempt from cut-off. Two, expect the Serbian 

Government’s full support for peace in Bosnia and Kosovo, includVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:38 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092608 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031704\92608 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
24

ing Serb participation in Kosovo’s efforts to meet international 

standards. Three, insist on transfer of all Hague indictees. Four, 

refuse to certify if the Congress’s conditions are not met. And, five, 

work with the EU to cut off its assistance, as well as IMF and 

World Bank aid. 

This more vigorous policy, Mr. Chairman, would begin to reverse 

the drift toward ineffectiveness of the last few years and help Serbia stay on course toward Europe, no matter what government is 

in power. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, BALKANS INITIATIVE

AND PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for once again giving me the opportunity to testify before you at an important moment. The moment is important both for Serbia, which 

is setting a new course, and for the U.S., which needs to re-examine its policies towards a country crucial to the future of the Balkans. I am here to offer you my personal views—the U.S. Institute of Peace does not take positions on policy issues—

on how Serbia got to its current unhappy situation and what the United States 

should do about it. 

Before beginning, I would like to note with great regret two important events in 

Serbia’s modern history. The more recent is the fire that has caused enormous damage to Serbia’s treasured Hilandar monastery in Greece. While thankful no lives 

were lost, I join with other Americans in expressing sympathy for the damage to 

this holy site. The second is the assassination one year ago of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, an event that set Serbia back years in its efforts to modernize 

and democratize. 

THE PROMISE OF OCTOBER 2000 IS UNFULFILLED

We can all recall with pleasure, Mr. Chairman, October 5, 2000, the day on which 

Serbian citizens flooded Belgrade’s streets to insist on recognition of the presidential 

election results. Slobodan Milosevic, master architect of the Balkan wars of the 

1990s, was swept from power. His successor as president of the Yugoslav Federation 

was Vojislav Kostunica, a legal scholar esteemed not only for resistance to Milosevic 

but also for personal integrity and probity. A few months later, elections in Serbia 

brought to power as Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, a pragmatic and forward-looking 

reformist. 

These two figures are emblematic of two poles in Serbian politics. Kostunica aims 

for continuity and upholds traditional values, including those embodied in the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian state. Djindjic was more secular, aiming to 

modernize Serbia and bring it into Europe and trans-Atlantic institutions. Together, 

they managed to convince the citizens of Serbia that it was time to jettison 

Milosevic and end a decade of war and impoverishment. 

They did not stay together long. The two men had different ideas about the pace 

and depth of reform. With the important exception of the police, Djindjic pressed 

ahead, supported on the economic front by G17 Plus. Supported by the military, 

Kostunica held back, giving priority to national issues—the relationship of Serbia 

with Montenegro and with UN-controlled Kosovo. Djindjic sent Milosevic to The 

Hague in June 2001 over Kostunica’s objections and began efforts to vet the judiciary, but by the time of the prime minister’s assassination reform had ground to a 

halt. 

There was a second wind of reform following the assassination. Serbia rounded 

up a large number of underworld figures who allegedly collaborated with remnants 

of Milosevic’s police and other security forces in killing Djindjic. A vigorous new defense minister, Boris Tadic (now leader of Djindjic’s Democratic Party), undertook 

the first serious military and defense ministry reforms. But rather than joining 

forces with his erstwhile reformist allies, Kostunica chose to precipitate new elections. The second wind of reform petered out and Serbia went to the polls. 

SERBIA HAS TAKEN AN UNHAPPY TURN

There are many ways of interpreting the December 2003 election results, but this 

much is clear: pro-democratic forces, including Kostunica’s governing coalition and 

Djindjic’s party, declined, as did Milosevic’s Socialists. The Radical Party, which represents the worst excesses of Serbian nationalism, gained dramatically. Fed up with 

25

half-hearted and halting reform that failed to produce results in the three years 

since the overthrow of Milosevic and generated its own share of corruption, Serbs 

turned back towards an aggressive, anti-Europe and anti-reform political creed. 

They may even choose, later this year, a President of Serbia who leads an 

unreformed Radical Party still headed by a Hague indictee awaiting trial. 

If Kostunica’s moderately nationalist party had joined forces with the more extreme nationalist Radical and Socialist parties, they could easily have formed a governing coalition with a coherent ideological basis: the refusal of Serbs to live as a 

minority in someone else’s country and their insistence on changing borders to consolidate Serb populations and the territory on which they live. European and American pressure has prevented this kind of ‘‘Greater Serbia’’ idea from emerging. But 

we should be under no illusions about the jury-rigged alternative. Kostunica now 

leads a minority government supported by Milosevic’s Socialists. The only proven reformist face of this government is G17 Plus, which will no doubt plow ahead on economic reform but will have little weight on political and diplomatic issues. 

The course Kostunica has set is clear: he continues to focus on national issues like 

Montenegro and Kosovo. He proposes dividing Kosovo along ethnic lines. Though he 

promises a crackdown on corruption, he has offered little in the way of reform of 

the security services, the police and the judiciary. He seems inclined to reverse the 

Djindjic’s lustration of the judiciary, and he has done more to purge Djindjic’s supporters from government than Milosevic’s. Even if he wanted, Kostunica cannot 

move on military, police or security service reform while supported by the Socialists, 

who will protect the remnants of the Milosevic regime still ensconced there. Likewise, he has pledged not to transfer war criminals indicted by the Hague Tribunal 

for command responsibility. 

Serbia’s current course in my view does not serve its interests, which require accountability for past crimes, establishment of the rule of law, and eventual entry 

into the EU. A Serbia that refuses cooperation with The Hague is a Serbia that cannot enter Partnership for Peace and cannot expect a Stabilization and Association 

Agreement with the EU. A Serbia that refuses to acknowledge UN authority over 

Serb-populated areas of Kosovo (as required by Security Council Resolution 1244), 

and tries to establish facts on the ground that will lead to partition, will have little 

sympathy when it complains about others proposing to alter borders. A Serbia that 

restrains Kosovo Serbs from participating in the process by which Kosovo seeks to 

meet the standards the international community has set is a Serbia that does not 

want to solve problems but instead creates them. A Serbia that promises to try war 

criminals but then concentrates its efforts on lower ranking perpetrators will not 

convince anyone of its sincerity. 

To summarize, Serbia has taken an unhappy turn. There is no immediate security 

threat to its neighbors, but the U. S. needs to recognize that Serbian democracy is 

in trouble, and that spells trouble for the whole region. 

THE U.S. NEEDS TO RESPOND

Since the fall of Milosevic, the U.S. has taken a soft approach to Serbia. Except 

for the spring of 2001, when the U.S. played hardball and insisted on the transfer 

of Milosevic to The Hague, Washington has provided Belgrade with benefits without 

asking much in return, in order to avoid undermining pro-democracy reformers. 

This has meant three successive certifications so that Serbia could continue to receive bilateral assistance. It has also meant re-establishment of normal bilateral 

trade relations and re-entry into both regional and global international organizations. While Serbs complain not enough has been done for them since Milosevic’s 

fall, $1.3 billion from the IMF and hundreds of millions more in World Bank loans 

and private investment funds say differently, in addition to the Paris Club writeoff of two thirds of Yugoslavia’s official debt. 

This soft policy has failed. Annual certifications to allow U.S. assistance have encouraged Belgrade to delay, obfuscate and hope eventually to escape its obligations. 

Serbia now finds itself with perhaps a dozen indicted war criminals on its territory, 

an extensive parallel structure not only of social but also security services in 

Kosovo, and a lingering relationship with Bosnian extremists that protects important Hague indictees and delays drawdown of U.S. troops. Instead of a Serbia governed by the rule of law and interested in protecting its vital interests and finding 

its rightful place in Europe and in trans-Atlantic institutions, we find a Serbia with 

doubts about Europe, territorial nostalgia and romantic notions of historical and 

ethnic rights. Serbia still regards itself as a victim, not a perpetrator, and therefore 

does little to make amends for Milosevic’s misdeeds. 

The time has come for a more effective U.S. policy. We should judge Serbia not 

by its intentions, or its promises, or the declarations of its leaders, but by its acVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:38 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092608 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031704\92608 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
26

tions. Prime Minister Kostunica has impeccable nationalist credentials—he can use 

them to send indicted war criminals to The Hague, as Prime Minister Sanader is 

beginning to do in Croatia. The Administration has unfortunately signaled, through 

war crimes chief Pierre-Richard Prosper, that it will be sufficient if Serbia sends 

only Ratko Mladic to The Hague. This is a serious error: if they can send him, they 

can send them all. Dragging this process out one by one, as we have done for three 

years, is a mistake. 

But so too is trying to get it done on our own. U.S. bilateral assistance to Serbia 

of $100 million per year is too small to give us much leverage. Withholding it will 

enable those who resist The Hague to blame Serbia’s troubles on the U.S. and drive 

a wedge between the U.S. and the EU. We need EU support. It is the EU that is 

forcing Zagreb’s hand. It can also force Belgrade’s hand. Instead, the EU is planning 

to provide 200 million euros to Serbia on March 25, just days before the U.S. needs 

to make its own decision. International assistance is not a right but a privilege. 

When both the U.S. and EU agree to withhold assistance and block IMF loans, all 

the war criminals in Serbia will go to The Hague. U.S. diplomacy needs to get busy 

making that day happen. 

That will also be the day that Kostunica’s government loses support from 

Milosevic’s Socialists—a day some would say is to be feared because new elections 

would strengthen further the Radical Party. I have little concern on this front. 

Kostunica always has the option of bringing the Democratic Party into his government. He has so far preferred Milosevic’s support to that of a bona fide reformer 

like Boris Tadic. I am also confident that if the Radicals were to come to power, 

both the U.S. and the EU would deal decisively with them—we would then have 

no reason at all to hold back. 

HELP THE PEOPLE, NOT THE GOVERNMENT

Mr. Chairman, we should not be surprised that the broad coalition of democratic 

forces that overthrew Milosevic has broken up. It was from the first fragile and fractious, torn between traditionalist and modernizing forces. Nor should we be too disappointed that in these recent elections Serbia has turned backwards—this has happened in other transitions, since reform is unable to produce tangible benefits in 

only a few years. We need to be patient, but we should not lower our expectations 

or move the goal posts. 

We need also to recognize that there is more to Serbia than political leaders and 

political parties. The courageous activists, the energetic vote-counters, the tenacious 

human rights advocates, the dignified diplomats who resisted Milosevic are still 

there, spread throughout civil society and hoping for a better future. We abandoned 

this group after October 2000, imagining that their role had been played out and 

we could rely on the government to institute reform. This was a mistake—civil society is not just a force with which to overthrow dictators, but also an essential watchdog over democracy. The decision of Otpor and G17 Plus to become political parties 

has left a giant hole in the center of Serbian civil society. It is time we shifted our 

assistance definitively to filling this hole and reweaving the fabric of reform-minded 

non-governmental organizations. 

Refocusing our efforts on civil society is likely to produce improved results, though 

it may take time. The Serbian government may not want to transfer indictees to 

The Hague, but there are human rights organizations and independent media outlets prepared to campaign in favor of doing so. Belgrade resists returns of Serbs to 

areas of Kosovo where they are not the majority, but there are displaced peoples’ 

associations who would explore the opportunity. The official Belgrade/Pristina dialogue may be unproductive, but there are student groups and youth organizations 

willing to engage constructively with their Kosovar counterparts. The justice system 

may still be mired in corruption, but there are professional associations prepared 

to do their part in cleaning up the remnants of the Milosevic regime. We need to 

turn back to the people and aspirations that made the October 2000 changes possible and pursue the opportunity to build the civic institutions that will ensure Serbia’s capacity to deal with its own problems over the long term. 

POLICY OPTIONS

Let me summarize what I would suggest as U.S. policy towards Serbia for the future:

1. Redouble assistance to reformist forces in Serbian civil society, shifting all 

U.S. assistance funds to democratization efforts, which are exempt from cutoff.

27

2. Expect the Serbian government’s full support for peace in Bosnia and 

Kosovo, including Serb participation in Kosovo’s effort to meet international 

standards.

3. Insist on transfer of all Hague indictees.

4. Refuse to certify if the Congress’ conditions are not met.

5. Work with the EU to cut off its assistance, as well as IMF and World Bank 

aid.

This more vigorous policy would begin to reverse the drift toward ineffectiveness 

of the last few years and help Serbia stay on course towards Europe, no matter 

what government is in power.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Serwer, thank you very much for your 

straightforward testimony, pulling no punches, very specific recommendations at the end. 

Dr. Stojanovic ́, welcome. We look forward to your testimony. As 

I indicated earlier, you may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF SVETOZAR STOJANOVIC ́ , Ph.D., PRESIDENT, 

SERBIAN–AMERICAN CENTER, BELGRADE, SERBIA 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. Thank you very much. I feel very honored to 

have been invited to speak before this venerable Subcommittee of 

the United States House of Representatives. You have my full 

statement. 

Mr. BEREUTER. It will be made a part of the record. 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. Thank you very much. 

Actually, today’s catastrophic developments in Kosovo and 

Metohija did not change a bit in terms of my statement, written 

statement. Which you got in advance. If anything, it added, I think, 

to my argument. What is going on there is, of course, a catastrophic tragedy. I feel sorry for every human life—it does not matter whether they are Serbs, Albanians, Roma, whoever, but it 

seems to me that what is going on is the attempt actually to complete the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo and Metohija, to make the territory completely ethnically homogenous (Albanien). I do not think 

that the international community can allow that to happen, and I 

think that it is time for the Security Council to act and react to 

that forcefully. 

But let me, then, summarize my written statement. First of all, 

in order for you to understand who is talking to you, let me just 

say that already 4 decades ago, I chose the United States as my 

second home. Ever since, I have taught, lectured, done research, 

and published books, five of them, to be precise, in this country. Altogether, I have spent almost half of 40 years in this country also 

trying to contribute as much as possible to the promotion of the relations between our two peoples and countries. 

You know already that I founded and am President of the Serbian-American Center in Belgrade, and now we are in the process 

of registering also in Washington, DC. The very name, of course, 

suggests what we want to contribute as much as possible to the improvement of the relationships between the two countries and two 

peoples. 

But one other, more personal thing. My late wife and I have two 

sons. They also came to the United States with us, received part 

of their education, found jobs, and got married here in this country. 

One of them gave us a beautiful grandson, Cole Alexander 

28

Stojanovic ́. So, by an analogy, to father or motherland, the United 

States is my son and grandson’s land. 

But let me, then, also say after this autobiographical statement, 

that it will, I hope, be understood all along that I speak only in my 

personal capacity. I am not in the government. You know my biography. I was a dissident. I do not want to sound presumptuous, but 

I put my life on the line against Milosevic. Although I support the 

democratic forces and democratic governments in Serbia, I am, to 

repeat, speaking only in my own personal capacity. 

Let me, then, concentrate just for a minute or 2 on the results 

of parliamentary elections in Serbia because you are justifiably interested in the interpretation of those results. The parliamentary 

elections in Serbia, held at the end of December 2003, were, by and 

large, I think, a protest vote of an ever greater number of the poor 

and indigent, the unemployed or fictitiously employed, the laid off 

or those about to be laid off, people living in the underdeveloped 

or neglected regions of Serbia, refugees from other parts of the 

former Yugoslavia, expelled Serbs and other non-Albanians from 

Kosovo and Metohija, and of those hardy but terrorized souls who 

decided to stay in their homes in this province, the vote of pensioners living below the subsistence level. It was also the protest 

of those worried for the future of the state because of the Montenegrin and Serbian separatism, and, not least, the attempt to rip off 

Kosovo and Metohija of Serbia, lock, stock, and barrel. Also, the results cannot be understood without understanding the fury over 

corruption and the political shenanigans of the ruling circles and 

the disproportionate participation of many minuscule parties in 

GOS’s power. No mistake should also be made of the ‘‘contribution’’ 

of the West that somehow overlooked the fact that, after all, elections were to be won in Serbia rather than in Washington, London, 

Paris, Berlin, or The Hague, for that matter. 

The results of the elections were also affected by the fact that 

most Serbs have a negative opinion of The Hague tribunal and 

very, very negative about its chief prosecutor, and I will not go into 

that. If you are interested in my arguments, I would be happy to 

try to present them to you. 

Notwithstanding the odds, the pro-Euro-Atlantic and, at the 

same time, patriotic parties won the majority of votes. The voters 

in Serbia, therefore, deserve praise rather than censure. But I do 

not want to be misunderstood. Rather than participating in the executive power, the Serbian Socialist Party and the Serbian Radical 

Party (once the pillars of the terrible regime of Slobodan Milosevic) 

did again enter Parliament at the last elections, should be given a 

chance to transform themselves—I do not think they have transformed themselves—and take part only in the legislative branch. In 

it, they should demonstrate whether they are really ready to play 

a constructive role in Serbia and Montenegro’s march toward EuroAtlantic structures and alliances. 

Because of all of these reasons and because new presidential, 

provincial, and local elections are soon to be held in Serbia, in the 

late spring, actually, the best thing, I think, would be if all of the 

patriotic and pro-Euro-Atlantic parties in Serbia, primarily the 

Democratic Party of Serbia, led by Vojislav Kostunica, and the 

Democratic Party, led by Boris Tadic, were to initiate and organize 

29

a broad Assembling for Democratic Serbia. I have started arguing 

for that there, and I shall fight for that. 

A few words on the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and 

Metohija. The western formula, ‘‘standards before status’’ for 

Kosovo and Metohija, is, unfortunately, too abstract to bring to 

public view and remove the massive threat to life that the local 

non-Albanian population is exposed to every passing day. Some Albanians also feel insecure, as well as some KFOR and UNMIK 

members, many of whom mark time, I think, trying to survive until 

it is time to pack their bags and go home. In promoting the ‘‘standards,’’ the West does not seem to bother to ask the decisive question: Do European and generally western ‘‘standards’’ make for the 

right of parts of sovereign states [by way of association, the Basque 

region, Northern Ireland, or Corsica also come to mind] to secede 

and even avail themselves in the process of foreign military intervention? 

On the Serbian side, I think, nobody with a modicum of political 

weight would question the need for reemphasizing the sovereignty 

of Serbia over Kosovo and Metohija in the new Constitution of Serbia and for providing, at the same time, a wide political and territorial autonomy for the Province. Let me repeat here one of my 

suggestions made a long time ago, and publicly so. Serbia should 

reorganize itself administratively, proceeding from the democratic 

right of the parts of Kosovo and Metohija where the Serbs and 

other non-Albanians won a majority to demand to be taken out of 

that Autonomy and incorporated directly in the government structure of the Republic of Serbia. As an internal, territorial-administrative reconfiguration is concerned rather than a state-border 

change, Serbia is fully entitled to it. 

The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija would then include only those territories where the ethnic Albanians were a majority before the NATO bombing. The Province itself would be 

smaller, while its government would have to be highly decentralized and obliged to provide credible protection also for non-Albanians and their property, their churches, cemeteries, and other 

sites of relevance for Serbian=European=World cultural heritage. 

The degree of autonomy should also be contingent on the return of 

all refugees, the rule of law, restitution of property, and the compensation for the budgetary, economic, and cultural assistance and 

investments of the other parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 

Province, repayment of debt, et cetera. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Stojanovic ́, excuse me. We need to ask you 

if you could take the two major parts of your remaining testimony, 

the one on Montenegro and also the attitudes of the United States 

and European Union, give us about a paragraph on each in summary, please. 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. Yes. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. I just wanted to add this sentence. The remit 

of the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina should, therefore, include kind of drawing up a clean sheet between the Republic 

and its Autonomous Province with respect to finances, property, 

and other matters. 

30

On Serbia and Montenegro, I do not want to go more extensively 

into that because I do not think that this is a very difficult problem, and I am pretty optimistic about the future of the State Union 

of Serbia and Montenegro. But when it comes, of course, to Montenegrin separatisms, I do not think that we non-Montenegrin citizens from Serbia should meddle into the internal affairs of Montenegro. If they want to organize a referendum, let them organize a 

referendum and then say what they want. 

And, finally, on the attitude of the United States and the European Union toward the Serbs: The bad state of our relations with 

the United States over the past decade was, indeed, an historic 

anomaly. From 1878, the year in which we became fully independent again, up to the last decade, relations between us were 

good, even excellent in times like during the period of our alliance 

in the two world wars and at the time when the United States 

helped us a great deal to maintain our independence from Stalin 

and the Warsaw Pact. 

Indeed, it is beyond doubt, I think, that now our relations with 

the United States matter the most to us. A small country like ours 

can hardly expect to be able to realize its interests and rights if it 

pursues a policy contrary to the vital interests of that global power. 

Let me proceed to the very end. I am convinced that our new 

government should soberly weigh which of the American and western conditions it can meet and how it can do that. What goes beyond its legal, political, and moral capabilities should be explained, 

including via special envoys to key countries with which the government wishes to maintain special friendly, allied even, relations. 

It should be made clear that the government must not violate the 

mandate given to it and that it has no intention of remaining in 

office at any price. In other words, if the West continues to blackmail, it will not escape political and moral responsibility for the 

probable anti-western turn of our electorate. After all, my country 

has already paid, and not only because of its own mistakes, by the 

death of the Prime Minister (by the way, my student and younger 

colleague) and the state of emergency. 

Western democracies should think long and hard where Serbia is 

concerned not so much about democratization and democracy, per 

se, but, rather, about a sustainable democratization and democracy. Much more can be achieved by unconditional and immediate 

support, partnership, alliance, integration of Serbia and Montenegro into Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security structures. Going tough all of the time alienates our people and provokes resistance. In whose interest is that? Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stojanovic ́ follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SVETOZAR STOJANOVIC ́, PH.D., PRESIDENT, SERBIAN–

AMERICAN CENTER, BELGRADE, SERBIA

I feel very honored to have been invited to speak before this venerable Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives. Already four decades ago 

I chose the United States as my second home. Ever since I have taught, lectured, 

done research and published books, five of them to be precise, in this country. All 

together, I have spent almost half of that time in it also trying to contribute as 

much as possible to the promotion of the relations between our two peoples and 

countries. To illustrate this, let me quote from an interview that I gave a long time 

ago: ‘‘In the autumn of 1992, in my capacity as Special Envoy of Dobrica C ́ osic ́, the 

then President of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I transmitted to the U.S. 

31

Government his assessment that relations with the United States were of primary 

importance for the future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and advised them 

of C ́ osic’s intention to improve mutual relations immediately. I did so through John 

Scanlon, former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade. What was said also concerned our 

links with NATO and the desire to join that organization. Upon his return to Belgrade, Scanlon conveyed the reply of the U.S. Administration to the effect that they 

had received C ́ osic ́’s message with satisfaction, including the part on NATO, but 

that, unfortunately, they considered that the time was not yet ripe. I replied that 

such a step was not so important as long as the U.S. Government bore C ́ osic ́’s policy 

constantly in mind.’’ (Newspaper NT PLUS, June 7, 1997, Belgrade) 

One other, more personal thing: my late wife and I have two sons; they also came 

to the United States with us, received part of their education, found jobs and got 

married here. One of them gave us a beautiful grandson, Cole Alexander Stojanovic ́. 

So, by an analogy to father- or motherland, the United States is my son- or 

grandson’s land. 

To continue the metaphor, Stojanovic ́, Alexander Cole (S.A.C.) has been an 

eponym for the S.A.C., Serbian American Center, the foundation that I, as a private 

individual, helped set up and that I now chair. I and my friends in the S.A.C. are 

working on the promotion of overall relations between the two peoples and countries. I believe you know that, alongside the French, the Russians and the British 

(to mention only the larger nations), the Americans occupy a special place in the 

hearts of many Serbs. I take the opportunity to invite you to visit us, to take part 

in the work of our Forum for Serbian-American Dialogue, either here or in Belgrade, 

and, why not, to even become members of our Center. 

Holding Americans dear by me and by so many of my countrymen is both a motivation and an obligation for me to speak to you as a friend, which means also quite 

frankly. It will, I hope, be understood all along that I speak only in my personal

capacity. 

RESULTS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SERBIA

The parliamentary elections in Serbia, held at the end of December 2003, were, 

by and large, a protest vote of an ever greater number of the poor and indigent, 

the unemployed or fictitiously employed, the laid-off or those about to be laid off, 

people living in the underdeveloped or neglected regions of Serbia, refugees from 

other parts of the former Yugoslavia, expelled Serbs, Roma and other non-Albanians 

from Kosovo and Metohija and of those hardy, but terrorized souls who decided to 

stay at their homes in this Province, the vote of pensioners living below the subsistence level. It was also the protest of those worried for the future of the State because of Montenegrin and Serbian separatisms and, not least, the attempts to rip 

off Kosovo and Metohija of Serbia, lock, stock and barrel. Also, the results cannot 

be understood without understanding the fury over corruption and the political shenanigans of the ruling circles and the disproportionate participation of many miniscule parties in DOS’s power. No mistake should also be made of the ‘‘contribution’’ 

of the West that somehow overlooked the fact that, after all; elections were to be 

won in Serbia rather than in Washington, London, Paris, Berlin or The Hague, for 

that matter. 

The results of the elections were also affected by the fact that most Serbs have 

a negative opinion about the Hague Tribunal and very negative about its Chief 

Prosecutor. This all the more so since the Prosecutor was so impatient and tactless, 

as is now recognized also in many influential quarters in the West, to issue a series 

of new indictments against the highest-ranking Serbian soldiers and policemen exactly at the time when it became apparent that early parliamentary elections in 

Serbia were inevitable. Her personal style was a factor, too: she behaved as though 

she were more important than even the Tribunal President; personally graded and 

even attacked the highest-ranking officials in Serbia; left an impression that she 

was after upgrading the level of the Tribunal to that of the famed Nuremberg Tribunal (The number of cases before this Tribunal is already much, much greater 

than the number tried in Nuremberg!); did nothing to dispel the impression that she 

was reluctant to indict high-ranking non-Serbs as their indictment might result in 

terror against Westerners, be they political representatives, soldiers, policemen, experts or journalists, the sitting ducks for the trigger-happy aficionados of the potential non-Serbian inductees; and unlike her predecessors, had her tenure extended 

for another term. For this, and many other important reasons that I cannot go into 

now, the best thing would be if the United Nations integrated The Hague Tribunal 

for former Yugoslavia and the high-profile cases before it into the newly-created 

International Criminal Court and handed over all other cases to national tribunals. 

32

Notwithstanding the odds, the pro-Euro-Atlantic and, at the same time, patriotic 

parties won the majority of votes. The voters in Serbia therefore deserve praise 

rather than censure. To make some comparisons and ask a question may be very 

pertinent in this regard: why is it so that many Western politicians, experts, NGOs 

and journalists are so concerned over the relative election success of the Serbian 

Radical Party in Serbia, while they are unconcerned over the nature and oblivious 

of the past of the present rulers in Kosovo and Metohija and Croatia? 

But, I do not want to be misunderstood: rather than participating in the executive

power, the Serbian Socialist Party and the Serbian Radical Party, once the pillars 

of the regime of Slobodan Milosˇevic ́, that did again enter Parliament at the last election, should be given a chance to transform themselves and take part only in the 

legislative branch. In it, they should demonstrate whether they are really ready to 

play a constructive role in Serbia and Montenegro’s march towards Euro-Atlantic 

structures and alliances. 

Those who uncritically use the language of ‘‘transition’’ and ‘‘reform’’ are probably 

not fully aware of the breadth and width of what has to be done. What is at stake 

is not some quick switch but a painful, long and profound historic transformation

of the communist command economy and closed society into the capitalist market 

economy and open society. 

Because of that and because new presidential, provincial and local elections are 

soon to be held in Serbia, the best thing would be if all the patriotic and pro-EuroAtlantic parties in Serbia, primarily the Democratic Party of Serbia, led by Vojislav 

Kosˇtunica, and the Democratic Party, led by Boris Tadic ́, were to initiate and organize a broad Assembling for Democratic Serbia (ADES). 

THE AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA

The Western formula ‘‘standards before the status’’ for Kosovo and Metohija is, 

unfortunately, too abstract to bring to public view and remove the massive threat 

to life that the local non-Albanian population is exposed to every passing day. Some 

Albanians also feel insecure, as well as some KFOR and UNMIK members, many 

of whom mark time, trying to survive till it’s time to pack their bags and go home. 

In promoting the ‘‘standards’’, the West does not seem to bother to ask the decisive 

question: Do European, and generally Western, ‘‘standards’’ make for the right of 

parts of sovereign states (by way of association the Basque Region, Northern Ireland 

or Corsica also come to mind) to secede and even avail themselves in the process 

of foreign military intervention? 

I believe that our authorities should dispatch Special Envoys for Kosovo and 

Metohija to the permanent members of the Security Council, members of the Contact Group and the Group of 8. The drama of that part of Serbia, as well as the 

potential threat to Serbian authority, cannot be addressed comprehensively through 

normal diplomatic channels. 

On the Serbian side, nobody with a modicum of political weight would question 

the need for emphasizing the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo and Metohija in the 

new Constitution of Serbia and for providing, at the same time, a wide political and 

territorial autonomy for the Province. Let me repeat here one of my suggestions 

made a long time ago: Serbia should reorganize itself administratively, proceeding 

from the democratic right of the parts of Kosovo and Metohija where the Serbs and 

other non-Albanians form a majority to demand to be taken out of that autonomy 

and incorporated directly in the government structure of the Republic of Serbia. As 

an internal territorial-administrative re-configuration is concerned, rather than a 

state border change, Serbia is fully entitled to it. 

The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija would then include only those 

territories where the ethnic Albanias were a majority before the NATO bombing. 

The Province itself would be smaller, while its government would be highly decentralized and provide credible protection also for non-Abanians and their property, 

their churches, cemeteries, and other sites of relevance for Serbian=European=

World cultural heritage. The degree of autonomy should also be contingent on the 

the return of all refuges, the rule of law, restitution of property and the compensation for the budgetary, economic and cultural assistance and investments of the 

other parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia in the Province, repayment of debt etc. The remit of the negotiations between Belgrade and Prisˇtina should therefore include kind of drawing 

up a clean sheet between the Republic and its autonomous Province with respect 

to finances, property and other matters. 

Let me say this as well: the offer of our government to renew participation of our 

armed forces in the United Nations peacekeeping operations should naturally include Kosovo and Metohija. It should reflect the numbers of our soldiers and policeVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:38 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092608 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031704\92608 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
33

men who should return, under UNSC resolution 1244 (1999), to Kosovo and 

Metohija anyway. Of course, Serbia and Montenegro should not dispatch its troops 

to Albanian majority areas in Kosovo and Metohija. 

THE STATE UNION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

I have been opposing Montenegrin and Serbian separatism and I cannot see any 

valid reason why the state union of Serbia and Montenegro should be washed hands 

of. 

‘‘Montenegrinness’’ is now a complex and internally divided collective identity, in 

which respect it is no exception in the world indeed. Some Montenegrins see themselves as a separate nation, some say that they are more Montenegrins than Serbs, 

others that they are as much Montenegrins as they are Serbs, the fourth that they 

are more Serbs than Montenegrins and, finally, quite a lot of them say that they 

are Serbs in or from Montenegro (One of them was my late mother). It would suffice 

to spend some time in Montenegro to realize the organic link between our collective 

identities, our societies and peoples. 

The best solution therefore for both Serbia and Montenegro is to stay together. 

Only if Montenegro remained in the union with Serbia would it be possible to avoid 

a sharp conflict among the Montenegrins themselves. A slim separatist majority at 

a referendum in Montenegro would only exacerbate the conflict. I doubt that even 

a greater separatist majority (by the way highly improbable) would prevent the catastrophic territorial fragmentation of the already tiny Montenegro. The regional 

consequences of the separation of Montenegro and Serbia would also be very serious. Here are some questions that are apt to ask. If Montenegrins and Serbians cannot pitch tent together, how is it possible to ask Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija 

to remain in Serbia; to ask their southern brethren in Macedonia to continue to be 

citizens of that state; why should Croats (in Herceg-Bosna) not separate from Bosnia 

and Herzegovina; and why should not the Republic of Srpska separate from Bosnia 

and Herzegovina? 

The contention that, due to the large disproportion in the size of its territory, population and might, in general, vis-a`-vis Serbia, Montenegro cannot be equal as long 

as it is in a state union with it is also based on clay feet. Do Montenegrin separatists seriously think that in collective EU decision-making, an independent Montenegro would be more equal vis-a`-vis Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy or Spain 

than it is with Serbia? 

The state union is not to be played with also for security reasons. I do not believe 

that Montenegrin separatists can realistically guarantee their co-nationals (a large 

number of whom live in Serbia) the same, let alone a higher, level of security if 

Montenegro were to separate from Serbia. Their rallying cry ‘‘Montenegro cannot be 

held hostage to Serbia over Kosovo and Metohija’’ is insensitive also towards the 

Montenegrins who were slain in, or had to flee, Kosovo and Metohija. 

Not to be misunderstood: I am only presenting some counter-arguments and not 

suggesting any pressure upon Montenegro to choose one way or another. It is only 

the citizens of Montenegro who should democratically decide the nature of their relations with Serbia. 

THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION TOWARDS THE SERBS

This year we Serbs mark the second centenary of our First Uprising against the 

Ottomans, and celebrate two hundred years since the birth of our modern State. 

Very few people know that the First Serbian Uprising was at the same time the 

third democratic revolution in the world (The American Revolution being the first). 

This provides us an opportunity to give a thought to the opportunities we seized and 

the opportunities we missed. To re-consider the dilemmas, true and false, and to retrace the ways, and alleyways, we traversed. 

In 1804, the Serbs could have risen to arms or could have failed to do so; in 1914, 

they could have refused or could have accepted the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary; 

and in 1941, they could have rejected or could have accepted to join the Pact with 

Nazi Germany. On October 5/6, 2000, we made the only possible progressive fundamental choice as we understood that the then anti-Euro-Atlantic road of the 

Milosˇevic ́ regime had led us into isolation, regress and hopelessness. Even if we 

wanted to change that fundamental choice now, which we don’t, that change would 

be impossible due to the world constellation of forces. 

Bad state of our relations with the United States over the past decade was indeed 

an historic anomaly. From 1878, the year in which we became independent again, 

up to the last decade, relations between us were good, even excellent at times like 

during the period of our alliance in the two World Wars and at the time when the 

34

United States helped us a great deal to maintain our independence from Stalin’s 

and the Warsaw Pact’s intended grip. 

It is beyond doubt that now our relations with the United States matter the most. A small country like ours can hardly expect to be able to realize its interests and 

rights if it pursues a policy contrary to the vital interests of that global power. However, extreme pragmatists back home constantly underestimate the dangers of a 

grass-root reaction to ‘‘accommodationism’’ or outright servility, especially if there 

are other realistic options. Majority public opinion in Serbia likes to see its decisionmakers try and exhaust all possibilities before they decide to make pragmatic concessions. No doubt, principlism (independence, dignity, self-respect, truthfulness, 

fairness) provides not only a powerful moral ground, but is also a strong cultural 

and political tool to safeguard national identity, interests and rights. That is why 

I have been supporting a foreign-policy pragmatism laced with a principlist approach. 

Americans will, I believe, be more appreciative of those in my country who have 

turned a new chapter in relations with their country and yet do not keep quiet 

about the vilification, penalization and bombing of their nation. Nor do they keep 

quiet about making deals with Slobodan Milosˇevic ́. It goes without saying that, rather than merely theorizing, in conceptualizing our 

relations with the United States, we should look at the experience of other smaller 

nations. In our case the most relevant and best role model is Greece. What is it that 

makes the Greeks—who by tradition, culture, religion and in many other respects 

are very close to us—so successful? This is the question for our leaders, politicians, 

diplomats, scientists, business people, the military and others to ask. Despite being 

loyal allies within the North Atlantic Alliance dominated by the United States, the 

Greeks have successfully realized their interests and preserved their identity. Important levers in that respect have been expatriate Greek communities worldwide. 

Now that October 5/6, 2000 is receding in the background and that the national 

and existential shock of September 11, 2001 shifted its focus, the interest of the 

United States in us will inevitably diminish. Nevertheless, I believe that this interest will not become marginal in the light of our cooperation in combating terrorism, 

Serbia’s strategic location and its pivotal role in keeping regional stability. Therefore, our most strategic move, let me repeat it once again, should be to accede to 

NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. 

In my judgment, taking a tough line towards Serbia by the United States and the 

European Union has become counterproductive, particularly among that section of 

the electorate that sees their social situation as hopeless. Applying the ‘‘stick’’ may 

only work with those who have something lose. In point of fact, the very mention 

of ‘‘carrot and stick’’ that Westerners are weary of using at home against animals, 

let alone the people, as it would cause an outcry of PETA activists, makes the Serbs 

boil. Moreover, are those Serbs waiting in long lines in cold or sweltering weather 

for visas outside Western consulates expected to vote pro-Western? Finally, how 

much longer do some influential Western circles intend to rely primarily on self-projected assessments and predictions of a tiny minority of well-off Serbs who have no 

national feeling and interest at heart? 

I am convinced that our new government should soberly weigh which of the American and Western conditions it can meet and how it can do that. What goes beyond 

its legal, political and moral capabilities should be explained, including via Special 

Envoys, to key countries with which the government wishes to maintain special 

friendly, allied even, relations. It should be made clear that the government must 

not violate the mandate given to it and that it has no intention of remaining in office at any price. In other words, if the West continues to blackmail, it will not escape political and moral responsibility for the probable anti-Western turn of our 

electorate. After all, my country has already paid, and not only because of its own 

mistakes, by the death of its Prime Minister and the state of emergency. 

Western democracies should think long and hard where Serbia is concerned, not 

so much about democratization and democracy per se, but rather about a sustainable

democratization and democracy. Much more can be achieved by unconditional and 

immediate support, partnership, alliance, integration of Serbia and Montenegro into 

Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security structures. Going tough all the time 

alienates our people and provokes resistance. In whose interest is that!

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank both of you very much for your excellent 

testimony. 

I would like to begin the 5-minute question period with two questions. The first question, to both of you gentlemen. What policy do 

you think the new government is likely to pursue with respect to 

35

its neighbors? Specifically, focus a little bit on efforts to help or 

hinder the integration efforts in Bosnia. 

And then, Dr. Stojanovic ́, the second question is for you only because I think Dr. Serwer has made his point very clear on this already: Will the government’s dependence on the Socialist Party 

hinder reforms in Serbia and Serbia’s relations with the international community? 

Go back to the first one, the impact of the new government on 

their neighbors, especially Bosnian integration. 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to wait and see what 

the new government does, but if we were to try to predict, based 

on Mr. Kostunica’s previous time in office, it is well known that he 

is very close to what you and I would regard as extremist forces 

in Bosnia. During his time as President of Yugoslavia ties between 

the secret services in Bosnia and in Serbia were maintained, probably in part in order to protect war criminals. But more importantly, during that period, even after the fall of Milosevic, there 

was an extensive network of exports of weapons to Iraq and other 

activities that are inimical to U.S. interests. Therefore, I am watching like a hawk to see what the relationship with Bosnia is going 

to be. 

I think it is quite clear that the proposals for division of Kosovo, 

if we can regard Kosovo as a neighbor, (as, de facto, it is) are going 

to make relations with that neighbor exceedingly difficult. So far 

as Croatia is concerned, I am not sure, but I do hope that Mr. 

Kostunica follows Mr. Sanader’s lead in sending indictees to The 

Hague. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Serwer. 

Now, Professor, if you could try to answer both of those questions, and I am directing to you. 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. Yes. Well, I do not recognize Kostunica in certain statements here. After all, Kostunica played a pivotal role in 

overthrowing Milosevic, put his life on the line ever since the beginning of the 1970s, so we are not talking about some ally of 

Milosevic or some extremist. Kostunica is a democratic patriot or 

patriotic democrat as much as you are, as you are entitled to be, 

of course. 

The second thing: The relationships with neighbors, and, of 

course, Kosovo and Metohija cannot be our neighbor. It is according 

to the Resolution 1244 part of Serbia, of Serbian sovereignty and 

territorial integrity. And after all, if it even were our neighbor, I 

do not see, actually, any harm we have been doing down there. Serbia has absolutely no control over Kosovo and Metohija in charges 

is UNMIK and it is NATO. 

As far as Mr. Sanader and Mr. Kostunica comparison, it seems 

to me that when it comes to the cooperation with The Hague tribunal, Mr. Sanader has to follow Kostunica’s example and not vice 

of course, we have sent a lot of people to The Hague. This is not 

complete as we all know. This is difficult. Sometimes it is extremely difficult. As a superpower, you cannot locate Osama bin 

Laden. We cannot locate even Legia who helped kill my friend, 

Djindjic. 

Mr. BEREUTER. But Dr. Stojanovic ́,——

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. The first question. 

36

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes. Bosnia, the relations on integrating Bosnia. 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. As far as I know, very good relationships. You 

see, there is a proviso in the Dayton agreement on the so-called 

‘‘parallel and special relationships.’’ That is allowed. I do not think 

that we have even come to that standard in terms of cooperation 

with the Serbs, with the Republica Srbska in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. Further, all Bosnian citizens are coming into Serbia 

simply with IDs. They do not need passports. Our people also go 

there without passports now. 

As far as the Socialists participants is concerned, I can assure 

you that there is no single concession made to them for their support. The reason that they are supporting our minority government 

is that they, those people who are now in the party in the leadership, are trying to improve their image and get another political 

chance. They are not in the government. They have not been given 

a single e-mail, small governmental position. I do not see any possibility for them to blackmail the government. After all, everybody 

has to remember Kostunica’s attitude toward Milosevic’s party and 

Sesely’s party. 

Well, I hated, actually, that we were in the position of having to 

form this minority government. I say ‘‘we’’ meaning Serbs. We had 

either to continue some chaos without any government with terrible consequences or to enter into this arrangement with the minority government. But you see, there is the Democratic Party also 

in our Parliament. Well, some people in the Democratic Party are 

criticizing the minority arrangement but they did not say, Socialists cannot vote for our vice presidents of the Parliament. On the 

contrary, all elections now in the Parliament for Vice Presidents, 

in addition to the President, were unanimous. 

So there is, of course, some small cooperation within the Parliament. I do not see anything wrong with that. As I have already 

said, I am going to argue for and press for the cooperation, very 

close cooperation, of the Democratic Party of Serbia led by Vojislav 

Kostunica and the Democratic Party, led by Boris Tadic, who, by 

the way, is also my student and a young friend and colleague. I am 

almost everybody’s teacher, since I am old. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. If you can just pull your students together and put a coalition together, we will be probably be all 

right. 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. We will try. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I am going to call on the gentleman from Florida, 

Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, and I want to compliment the Chairman for the invitations and, most especially, compliment both witnesses because I think this has been extremely valuable and worthwhile for us to hear both of your perspectives. I am trying to reconcile both of them together and figure out if they are reconcilable, 

but if I could maybe start with Dr. Stojanovic ́ in terms of responding to Dr. Serwer’s recommendations in terms of American policy, 

and, Doctor, please correct me if I am misstating your recommendation. 

But to sum it up, I think Dr. Serwer is suggesting that American 

policy has not been bold enough and that the way to ensure greater 

cooperation from the new government is to very directly condition 

37

funds and assistance on the cooperation with The Hague and so 

forth and a relative confidence that if Belgrade understood America’s resolve, that, in fact, we would be enabling Belgrade to positively respond and that by our less-than-bold action, we are enabling a state of nebulousness. 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Wexler, I would only add that the boldness 

needs to be on the part of not only the United States but Europe 

as well. 

Mr. WEXLER. Yes. Professor, if I understand your comments, you 

would suggest that that could lead to exactly the opposite results. 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. Exactly. 

Mr. WEXLER. So where is Dr. Serwer wrong? 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. Well, simply wrong because this policy has not 

worked well. If we continue along that path, and, as I said, I have 

an American grandson, so I feel half American. At the end of June 

we will get a radical President of Serbia. That would be a catastrophe, politically, for us. 

Mr. WEXLER. So it is your view——

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. If this policy does not work. Let me suggest 

something. 

Mr. WEXLER. But I think Dr. Serwer would say that is not our 

policy yet, that because America has been unclear in our willingness to back up what we are asking for, we are enabling, as Dr. 

Serwer said, along with Europe, enabling a nebulous or nonresponse from Serbia. And what Dr. Serwer is arguing, until we 

make ourselves clear and provide for obvious ramifications, that 

this will continue. 

So if you argue the current policy has failed, then why would we 

continue it? 

Mr. STOJANOVIC ́. Well, I do not know why you would continue. 

Let me just try to answer this indirectly. 

I think that it is high time for some creativity and for a positive 

approach, and my suggestion to you and to all American friends of 

mine is to try a positive approach to Serbia. In other words, try to 

integrate Serbia immediately, for instance, into Partnership for 

Peace, and then, within that framework, it is easier to cooperate 

on all of those concrete and very sensitive issues and even to put 

pressure on us because keeping us out of the door and not letting 

us inside, of course, helps only extremist forces in Serbia. 

After all, you keep the whole people outside. It is some kind of 

collective conditioning. I have always been against collective sanctions, collective measures against all peoples. It harms our people, 

collectively speaking. If you are dissatisfied with some minister, 

even Prime Minister, then do something about them and do not do 

it against the whole Serbian nation and all Serbia’s citizens because it is not simply Serbs. As you know, we have a lot of other 

people in Serbia. 

I know that one of the sticking points is General Mladic. I do not 

want to be misunderstood: All of those who are responsible for war 

crimes, no matter what nationality, ethnicity and religion, should 

be brought to justice. I want to be quite clear about that. But here 

we have an absurdity, you see. The relationships at this moment 

between the global power and small Serbia, an old ally, very loyal 

ally throughout history, is now a hostage to an individual. Now, 

38

you could not do a greater honor to someone’s grand demand here 

by putting him in the position that the relationship between the 

two countries depends on that fugitive. Do you understand what I 

am talking about? 

Please, try something constructive. Look at Kosovo and Metohija. 

Who is there in enclaves? Not Albanians. Small Serbian enclaves 

are there. How am I going to argue in Belgrade, and I indeed have 

patriotic and democratic credentials there, so I can argue for many 

things, but when I go back now to Belgrade, what to tell the people 

there? It is pretty obvious, it seems to me,—excuse my temperament, but I come from southeastern Europe. I speak with my whole 

body and soul—it is not that a minority is persecuting the majority 

in Kosovo and Metohija. It is the other way around because Serbs 

are a small group left. Do we want really a homogeneous, ethnic 

state there, and what would be the regional ramifications. Terrible 

regional ramifications if that happens. 

Look at the map. Look at Bosnia and Herzegovina. Look at Macedonia. Look at Albania. Look at Greece. Look at Romania. Look 

at Bulgaria. So this is a very difficult problem. 

Let me, then, mention our Prime Minister Kostunica’s statement 

that the cooperation with The Hague Tribunal is a two-way street. 

But, of course, cooperation is a two-way street; otherwise, the word 

would be ‘‘operation,’’ not ‘‘cooperation.’’ He also said that it is not 

his priority. When someone says—excuse me—I am a logician by 

profession—that something is not his/her priority, it does not mean 

that it is not important, obviously. Please think creatively about 

some positive approach. That is my whole point. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Professor. Mr. Wexler would like 

Serwer to respond, if he would care to. 

Mr. SERWER. We have had basically the open-door policy that Mr. 

Stojanovic ́ has been asking for. We have occasionally conditioned 

things, and when we condition things, we get a few indictees to The 

Hague. The pattern is clear over the last 3 years. Only when we 

have conditioned assistance and only just before we are about to 

make a negative decision, and in one case just afterwards, have we 

gotten results. Normal trade relations were given away without 

conditionality. Membership in the U.N. was given away without 

conditionality. None of those things brought us anything. 

So I think we have proven evidence over the last 3 years that 

the positive approach that Professor Stojanovic ́ is recommending 

simply does not work and that the other approach of conditionality 

does work. If you ask Professor Stojanovic ́ after this hearing what 

would happen if IMF loans were withheld and all EU assistance 

were withheld and all U.S. assistance were withheld, I am prepared to predict his answer. The indictees would all go to The 

Hague because there is no other option in that situation. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you very much for 

your testimony. We appreciate your help to the Subcommittee. 

And I am about to adjourn the hearing. We are about to move 

to a markup of two resolutions, so if our guests who do not wish 

to remain could leave quietly, we would very much appreciate it so 

we can expedite the business of the Subcommittee. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

39

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(41)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Although I am not a member of this subcommittee nor the full committee, I have 

a strong interest in the topic of today’s hearing and thank the Chairman for offering 

me the opportunity to participate. I serve as the Ranking Member of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki 

Commission. 

Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY), located in The Hague, has been a priority for many of us. To those in the 

Congress or in the Administration who may view it otherwise, I would recommend 

that they read what the indictments and other records of what actually happened 

in Vukovar and Srebrenica, Mostar and Sarajevo. While our memories of those distant events may be short, people in southeastern Europe still suffer the effects of 

the atrocities which the tribunal is trying to address by providing justice. 

Each year since Milosevic was ousted, we have been told to be patient as the people of Serbia themselves recover from this era, in which they, too, suffered. Truth 

commissions and others efforts were needed, so we were told, to pave the way for 

better cooperation. Each year, while some pressure was applied, Serbia was soon 

certified and assistance flowed. Usually, just after certification took place, Belgrade’s cooperation with The Hague would take a down turn. Still, relations have 

been normalized in the hope of encouraging reform. Now, those with more nationalist inclinations benefited from the December elections, Serbia’s new government 

leaders seem to want nothing to do with The Hague. 

This is extremely unfortunate. I frankly feel that Serbia’s democratic leadership 

could have taken a different course and made clear to the people from the beginning 

that cooperation with The Hague is not what the international community insists 

happen but what Serbia needs itself to see happen. Had they done so, they would 

not have given the criminals from the Milosevic era which still operate and weaken 

the republic any opportunity to regroup and claim a legitimate place in a Serbia 

that today should be quickly integrating into Europe. 

Frankly, I am concerned that U.S. policy to date has made people in Belgrade, 

Banja Luka and elsewhere feel they can wait the Tribunal out. 

The United States and the Congress have already made abundantly clear that we 

want Serbia to succeed. We have also made clear that we would like to see ICTY 

finalize its work, and for justice in other cases that come up to be found in the 

courts of the countries of he region. Last year, we had a very good briefing by the 

ICTY President, Judge Theodor Meron, on this very issue. 

I think that we now need to be equally clear that there is no more compromising 

on this issue. A continued lack of cooperation will have consequences. We want to 

see Mladic and Karadzic in The Hague, but also the four indicted for the Srebrenica 

massacre and others who are at large. We also want to see cooperation take the 

form of better access to archived information and potential witnesses. I urge Belgrade to assist the Tribunal in creating a complete and accurate historical record 

of the crimes committed in the region, which will help to deter future acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Until we see such cooperation, the 

United States and other countries should make clear their support for the tribunal 

and its work, so it will not go away until its work is actually finished. 

If there are specific challenges like locating and apprehending indictees, or protecting information not relevant to a case, we can and will deal with that. The Tribunal needs to ensure that its indictments have been carefully considered and that 

indictees can be assured their full rights as a defendant. We can, and will, work 

42

with Belgrade on these problems if there is otherwise a political will to cooperate. 

Given the rhetoric and lack of action coming from Belgrade in recent weeks, however, I fear that the question of political will still dominates, and we need an unambiguous policy response which includes withholding certification on assistance after 

March 31. We must withhold certification until Belgrade demonstrates concrete 

progress on meeting its international legal obligations to comply with the Tribunal. 

The United States should continue to strengthen its relationship with the people 

of Serbia and Montenegro. However, we cannot normalize our relationship until Belgrade fully cooperates with the Hague Tribunal to bring a close this chapter of the 

history of Serbia and Montenegro. Integration of Serbia and Montenegro into Europe and other regional and international organizations depends upon this progress. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY, 

AND VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The topic of today’s hearing—the current situation in Serbia—has been of deep 

concern to the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, for many years. Recent developments in that republic warrant continued concern and clear U.S. policy responses. 

Democratic trends in Serbia since the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic have been welcomed by the international community and the U.S. Congress. In fact, I was active 

in congressional efforts to make the United States more supportive of democratic 

opposition and independent groups in Serbia, including the introduction of the Serbia Democracy Act in 1999, when the State Department was instead still relying 

on Milosevic to implement the Dayton Agreement. Beginning in 2001 and continuing to the present, the Congress has agreed to Administration requests to normalize relations with Belgrade. The United States has become the leading foreign 

investor in Serbia today. Even in the context of the diminished level of bilateral assistance to the region as a whole, Serbia has consistently received a considerable 

portion of U.S. assistance. I don’t know of any attempt to cut this assistance, and 

there was one year when Congress actually increased what the Administration requested. 

In return for this assistance to help Serbia recover from the Milosevic period and 

deservedly rejoin Europe, we have a natural and justified expectation that the support would reflect political will in Belgrade. If that political will does not exist, then 

U.S. taxpayers’ money is wasted. Justifiably, each year the Congress has conditioned assistance to Serbia on specific and reasonable criteria, in particular cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, located in 

The Hague. The certification deadline this year is March 31—two weeks from today. 

Recalling the acts of genocide, the brutal atrocities against innocent civilians associated with the ethnic cleansing campaigns, we join those who still seek justice. 

What are we supposed to conclude, therefore, when we see persons indicted for 

war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, on Serbian election ballots? 

What are we supposed to conclude when we hear the new Serbian Prime Minister 

say that cooperation with The Hague is not a priority, and his supporters call our 

expectation that they do so ‘‘blackmail’’? I can only conclude that some senior officials in Belgrade do not have the political will to break fully from the past. 

This is unfortunate, because there are also those in Serbia, both in government 

and out of government, who are dedicated to human rights and the Helsinki principles. They know the horrible acts that were committed in their name during a nationalist frenzy, and they want to break any association with those acts. They know 

that Serbia must make that break also to rid itself from the criminal gangs that, 

even after last year’s state of emergency, hinder Serbia development and European 

integration. Just to mention one who comes to mind is the former speaker of the 

parliament of Serbia and Montenegro, Dragoljub Micunovic, with whom I have 

worked closely in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly over the years. Together, we 

drafted a resolution passed by the Assembly on Human Rights and Terrorism. 

I would like to assure Serbia—both the authorities and the people—that I am 

eager to see our bilateral relations develop. I share Serbian concerns about other 

issues, including the situation for the Serb, Roma and other minority groups in 

Kosovo, and the continued obstacles to the return of the displaced. Just a few weeks 

ago, I met with Bishop Artemije regarding attacks on churches in Kosovo. I have 

pressed on several occasions in the past year for greater attention to be paid to outstanding missing persons cases. 

It is my understanding that, just today in Kosovo, there has been an explosion 

of violence. Let me state emphatically my belief that attacks on innocent people cannot be tolerated by the international community, nor be allowed to justify any politVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:38 May 10, 2004 Jkt 092608 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031704\92608 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
43

ical ends. This is neither a Serb nor an Albanian tragedy, but a human tragedy, 

and I urge everyone in Kosovo to refrain from further violence. 

Trafficking in persons is something which all countries in southeastern Europe, 

including Serbia and Montenegro, have as a common concern, and I have pressed 

for greater assistance to these countries to combat this modern form of slavery. As 

the OSCE PA Special Representative on Human Trafficking, I will continue my efforts to encourage Serbia and Montenegro to improve its law enforcement capabilities, to develop its network for helping victims and to prosecute those trafficking 

human beings to the maximum extent of the law. 

On all these issues and more, I have engaged Serbian officials with enthusiasm. 

It is, therefore, with great dismay that I see reluctance if not obstruction in cooperation with The Hague. Until there is a ‘‘sea change’’ in Belgrade on this issue, I urge 

the State Department not to certify Serbia as having met the conditions placed on 

assistance after March 31. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing on the future 

of Serbia. 

Historically and geographically, Serbia has long been a conduit between two traditions, East and West. 

Today, the Serbian-Montenegro union is in a state of transition, and Serbia finds 

itself still confronted with a host of problems left over from the Communist era 

under Tito and Milosevic’s regime. 

After recent Serbian parliamentary elections (December 2003), a new governing 

coalition was formed. 

The new government was formed by Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, 

a member of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DOS) with several other minor proWestern parties. 

Just four years after the fall of Milosevic, Serbia showed every sign of emerging 

into a progressive country. A nation that showed every sign of being a democratic, 

Western-oriented country committed to sharing the responsibility of security and 

stability in Europe and around the world. 

Traditionally American allies in World War I and World War II, Serbia and Montenegro are now again serving as America’s ally against the clandestine network of 

terrorists operating in the Balkan region. As a Nation, we cannot win the war on 

terror alone. Serbia can assist us based on its geopolitical position. 

Therefore, Serbia can be an important U.S. partner and contribute to the vision 

of Europe as whole, free, secure and at-peace. However, Serbia cannot do this alone. 

They will need the assistance of the United States and the European Union to define what is in the best interest for the Serbian nation and its people. 

The U.S.-Serbian relationship has thus far been very productive, however, the 

real test of friendship between the U.S. and Serbia will be the ability to work 

through our disagreements and keep a mutually-beneficial relationship moving forward into the future. 

Furthermore, the U.S. and the E.U. must be more engaged in the region to ensure 

the safety and repatriation of ethnic minorities and end the destruction of religious 

monuments and homes. 

Based on this new and growing relationship with Serbia, I strongly encourage 

Prime Minister Kostunica and his government to:

1. Continue Serbia’s full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal 

for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

2. If at all possible, help provide any intelligence on the whereabouts of 

Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic and others indicted by The Hague.

3. Maintain and continue reforms in the Defense Ministry that Minister Boris 

Tadic initiated.

4. Work to gain acceptance into NATO’s Partnership for Progress, and agree to 

a Stabilization and Association agreement with the E.U.

5. Establish an apolitical and independent judiciary that upholds both majority 

and minority rights.

6. Promote the human rights of ethnic Serbians and Albanians in Southern 

Serbia and Kosovo.

7. Help relocate and assist displaced Serbs, Albanians, and Roma (Gypsies).

8. And, to eradicate corruption in the government, business and finance sectors.

44

I hope for the sake of the future of Serbia-Montenegro, and the entire Balkan region, that this conduit between East and West, looks toward the future with open 

eyes and great promise, and once-and-for-all rejects the nationalism and fanaticism 

that ruled it through the 1990s. 

In my opinion, there are a number of mutually-beneficial issues between the U.S. 

and Serbia that could be developed for the greater good of both countries, and I 

stand ready to work with Serbia to help her become a productive member of the 

community of nations. Only through proper bi-lateral relationships, multinational 

cooperation, and Serbia’s own determination not to repeat the sins of the past, can 

the United States and the world community accept a new and improved paradigm 

in this troubled region. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE D. KATHLEEN STEPHENS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DAN BUR- TON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Question: 

With Michael Polt taking over the U.S. ambassadorship to Serbia and Montenegro, 

what important issues will he stress with the new Serbian Prime Minister? 

Answer: 

If confirmed, Ambassador-designate Michael Polt’s first and foremost priority in 

working with the new government will be to protect the security and interests of 

the United States and its citizens, including those living and working in Serbia and 

Montenegro. He will also focus on four key policy goals: ICTY cooperation; Kosovo; 

human rights and rule of law; and economic reform and development. 

Mr. Polt will continue to press for Serbia and Montenegro’s full and unequivocal 

cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY) particularly the urgent need to render Radko Mladic to The Hague to face 

justice. 

On Kosovo, the new ambassador, if confirmed, will advocate Belgrade’s playing a 

constructive role in supporting the implementation of basic standards of good governance, security and human rights and participation in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. The recent violence in Kosovo shows that there is much work still to be done. 

It will be Mr. Polt’s responsibility to work with government leaders in Belgrade to 

continue on its path of responsible diplomatic engagement on behalf of its interests 

in the area. 

Mr. Polt will also work to ensure that Serbia and Montenegro continues to reform 

its judicial and law enforcement system to guarantee due process, fair treatment 

and justice to its citizens, its institutions and its business community. Only in this 

way will political and economic reform take hold in the country. Success in economic 

reform is essential in modernizing Serbia and Montenegro’s society. 

Mr. Polt has testified that, if confirmed, he will look to redirecting a greater 

amount of U.S. engagement with Serbia and Montenegro towards the number one 

problem identified by the people and governments of Serbia and Montenegro: developing a business environment that encourages job creation and investment in small 

and medium size enterprises. 

Question: 

What are the prospects of Serbia joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) since 

Defense Minister Boris Tadic started reforming sections of Serbia’s defense department? 

Answer: 

Serbia and Montenegro has made considerable progress to date under the leadership of Defense Minister Boris Tadic in reforming the defense sector. The Army of 

Serbia and Montenegro, once used as a political arm of Milosevic regime, has been 

subordinated to civilian control and the overall size of the army and ministry has 

been cut nearly in half. The country began the process of re-integrating into the European community through its readmission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 2000 and its admission to the Council of Europe 

in April 2003. Membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace is now one of the primary goals of Serbia and Montenegro’s foreign policy. 

To date, Belgrade has not satisfied NATO’s conditions for joining Partnership for 

Peace, including the detention and transfer of Ratko Mladic, and withdrawal of Belgrade’s claims in the International Court of Justice against eight NATO allies. Belgrade has known of and understood these conditions for several years. We retain 

45

hope that Belgrade will satisfy these conditions in the near future. Once these conditions are satisfied, the U.S. will support an invitation to Serbia and Montenegro 

to join PfP. Inviting a country to join PfP is an Alliance decision that would require 

the consensus of the twenty-six Allies. 

Question: 

Since the new Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica formed a minority governing coalition with former President Milosevic’s Serbian Socialist Party, what does 

that mean for the future of Serbia, both economically and internationally? The future 

of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia? And, the future 

of the peace process in the Balkans? 

Answer: 

Alarming headlines reporting the results of the December 28th parliamentary 

elections might have led readers to believe that Serbia had returned to the Milosevic 

era. It did not. What the headlines failed to highlight was that democratic parties 

captured more than 60 percent of the ballots cast. The ultra-nationalist Serbian 

Radical Party received the largest number of votes, 28 percent of the vote, but not 

enough seats to form a government. Milosevic’s Socialist Party received only 8 percent. 

On March 3, 2004, after two months of negotiation, Parliament confirmed a minority three-party coalition government led by former Yugoslav President Vojislav 

Kostunica. The new government has presented a legislative program that focuses 

on domestic issues: adopting a new constitution, harmonizing Serbia’s legal framework with EU standards, building state union institutions with sister republic Montenegro, and fighting corruption. Parliamentary leaders have called for new presidential elections in the late spring, and are working on a new Constitution. As a 

minority government, the coalition has announced that it will rely on the passive 

support of the Socialist Party: the Socialists will vote in favor of the government’s 

agenda, but will not be offered an active role in government. 

In order for Serbia to succeed, it must meet its international obligations. The most 

important unmet obligation—an unresolved legacy of the Milosevic era—is that of 

apprehending and transferring to The Hague those indicted for horrendous war 

crimes. 

In the past two months, Secretary Powell, Under Secretary Grossman, Under Secretary Larson, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephens have personally pressed 

home to Serbia’s new leadership the need to resolve Serbia’s outstanding ICTY obligations, including especially transferring Mladic to the Tribunal. Cooperation with 

the Tribunal is the key to Serbia and Montenegro’s future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and 

progress toward a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. We will 

continue to press this obligation. 

On March 31, 2004, Secretary Powell declined to certify, pursuant to Section 572 

of the Foreign Operations and Appropriations Act, that Serbia and Montenegro is 

cooperating fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). We look to the state union and republic governments to act immediately to improve the record on ICTY cooperation and create conditions that would 

allow the Secretary to review his decision. 

Question: 

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is now holding 

hearings and trials in Serbia (i.e. the Vukovar Three trial). What does that mean 

for the future of The Hague? 

Answer: 

Prime Minister Kostunica’s government has indicated that it wishes to cooperate 

with the ICTY, but expects cooperation from the ICTY in return. His government 

is seeking more flexibility in how it works with the Tribunal, e.g., through pre-trial 

release in Serbia and the transfer of cases from the ICTY for trial by Serbian courts. 

The U.S. encourages efforts to develop a better working relationship between the 

Serbian government and the ICTY, while holding Belgrade to its legal obligation to 

cooperate fully with the Tribunal. 

Enabling domestic courts to try persons indicted for war crimes, including those 

transferred from The Hague, is an important step forward for a region that has seen 

too much conflict. We continue to work closely with the Government of Serbia and 

Montenegro to help build the capacity to try war criminals domestically, including 

both cases opened at home and those transferred by the ICTY. While those indictees 

most responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law will be 

tried by the ICTY (most notably Karadzic, Mladic, and Gotovina), we expect that 

46

some cases will be transferred to Belgrade for domestic adjudication. This is consistent with the ICTY’s completion strategy, which envisions all work to be completed in 2010. A strategy of moving trials domestically will aid in ethnic reconciliation, bolstering rule of law, and helping the region move beyond the problems of 

the past. 

In recent years, the Serbian government has enhanced its domestic capacity for 

investigating and trying war crimes cases. An important test for this effort began 

on March 9, 2004, with the opening of the trial of seven defendants accused of participating in the deaths of approximately 200 POWs and civilians at the Ovcara 

Farm near Vukovar in Croatia in 1991. [Note: The Ovcara Farm defendants were 

not indicted by the ICTY. The ICTY-indicted Vukovar-3 defendants are currently in 

ICTY custody and will be prosecuted in The Hague.] 

This is only the most recent domestic prosecution of war crimes charges in Serbian courts. Last September, the Belgrade District Court convicted and sentenced 

four defendants for the abduction and murder of seventeen Muslims in October 

1992. On March 17, 2003, A Serbian judged imposed the maximum sentence (20 

years) on a leader of the ‘‘Skorpion’’ paramilitary unit who was convicted of the murders of fourteen ethnic Albanians in Podujevo, Kosovo in 1999. The United States, 

through our assistance program, has supported Serbia in establishing its own domestic court for war crimes and helped train the judges and prosecutors who address these cases. Recent prosecutions and convictions by the Serbian court have 

demonstrated the value of supporting this program. 

Question: 

What is the current situation with Slobodan Milosevic’s ICTY trial, since the prosecution rested its case? 

Answer: 

In late February the prosecution rested its case against Milosevic, more than two 

years, 300 witnesses, and 50,000 pages of transcripts after the trial opened in February 2002. Milosevic now has three months to prepare his defense. Once the defense begins, it is expected that it could take up to a year to complete, partly because of problems with Milosevic’s health. One of the three judges in the case has 

resigned, and a new judge has been appointed to the Tribunal. 

Question: 

With Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic still at-large from ICTY, with 

intelligence officials claiming they are in the Republic of Srpska or in Serbia proper, 

what does that mean for the prospects of sustained peace in Serbia? How is the international community putting pressure on the Republic of Srpska and/or Serbian officials in regard to their arrests and prosecutions? 

Answer: 

Despite improved efforts by the Serbian government in 2003 to locate and arrest 

fugitive indictees, we believe that as many as 16 ICTY indictees spend a preponderance of their time in Serbia. This includes Gen. Ratko Mladic, indicted by ICTY in 

connection with the massacre at Srebrenica and other crimes, as well as three highranking generals whose indictments ICTY made public in October 2003 and who are 

now living openly in Belgrade. The United States—and the international community—speak with one voice on this: it is unacceptable that these individuals have 

thus far eluded justice. 

In the past two months, Secretary Powell, Under Secretary Grossman, Under Secretary Larson, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephens have personally pressed 

home to Serbia’s new leadership the need to resolve Serbia’s outstanding ICTY obligations, including especially transferring Mladic to the Tribunal. Cooperation with 

the Tribunal is the key to Serbia and Montenegro’s future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and 

progress toward a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. We will 

continue to press this obligation. 

We also have repeatedly made clear to the Republika Srpska (RS) government 

that it must uphold its UN and Dayton obligations with regard to the ICTY. Full 

ICTY cooperation, in particular to detain and transfer persons indicted for war 

crimes to The Hague, is one of NATO’s conditions for Bosnia’s membership in the 

Partnership for Peace. It also is one of the EU’s conditions for Bosnia’s entering into 

Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations. We will continue to make 

clear that Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic must face justice in The Hague. 

47

Question: 

With Kosovar elections scheduled for October 23, 2004, as proposed by U.N. envoy 

Harri Holkeri, what are the prospects of proper redress for the Serbian minority in 

Kosovo? 

Answer: 

The 2004 elections will give all communities an opportunity to voice their opinions, participate in the political process and seek redress. We believe that Kosovo 

Serb participation in the elections—as well as full participation in Kosovo’s governing institutions—is critical to ensuring that Kosovo Serb interests are reflected 

in the Kosovo government. We would strongly recommend against boycotting elections or government institutions. The Kosovo Serb political party coalition currently 

hold 22 out of 120 Assembly seats, including 10 seats that are specially set aside 

for members of the Serb community. If Serbs increase their electoral turnout in October, they will be able to increase these numbers. With greater representation in 

the Assembly, Serbs will improve their prospects of influencing Kosovo policy and 

advance their community’s interests. 

Question: 

With recent attacks against Kosovar government officials, (March 12th grenade attack on Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, and the Feb. 22nd attack on Kosovo’s Environment Minister), what are the prospects for peace in Kosovo? 

Answer: 

Although the two recent attacks on government officials were troubling, the ability of law enforcement in Kosovo to cope with political violence is being enhanced. 

In recent years, we have significantly increased the capacity of law enforcement and 

judicial institutions in Kosovo to investigate and prosecute these difficult cases. For 

example, we now have teams of International Judges and International Prosecutors 

who work on the most sensitive cases in Kosovo, including politically-motivated 

crime. We are also pressing the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 

(UNMIK) to stand up teams of specially-vetted of Kosovo Police Service (KPS) investigators to handle this kind of crime. Because political crime is uniquely destabilizing to a society, the United States will continue to press UNMIK to dedicate 

adequate resources to solving these incidents. 

The outbreak of violence in Kosovo on March 17 and 18 was a serious setback 

to rule of law and multi-ethnic coexistence. The NATO-led peacekeeping force, 

KFOR, intervened forcefully to stop the violence. UNMIK has committed its resources to identifying, arresting and prosecuting those responsible for the violence. 

The U.S. supports the process currently underway to help Kosovo achieve internationally-endorsed ‘‘standards,’’ including rule of law and minority rights. The 

achievement of these standards will increase security for all Kosovars and thus improve the prospects for peace in Kosovo. 

Question: 

Repayment of foreign debt is due to start this year. Is Serbia ready to address its 

debt situation, and how should the international community address the situation? 

Answer: 

Serbia and Montenegro has been regularly servicing its external public debt since 

concluding rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club, World Bank and other 

multilateral creditors in 2001. Serbia’s 2004 budget includes funding to meet domestic and external debt servicing requirements. The International Monetary Fund is 

closely monitoring Serbia and Montenegro’s external debt situation as part of a 

three-year Extended Arrangement program. Both the IMF and World Bank have 

provided debt sustainability analyses to guide Serbia and Montenegro in planning 

to meet its external obligations. Successful completion of the IMF Extended Arrangement is important to managing the debt burden, as it is a pre-condition for 

Paris Club forgiveness of an additional 15% of Serbia and Montenegro’s debt over 

the 51% immediately written-off in November 2001. Serbia and Montenegro is still 

in the process of negotiating an agreement with its London Club creditors for treatment of outstanding commercial debt. 

48

RESPONSE FROM DANIEL SERWER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, BALKANS INITIATIVE AND PEACE

AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Question: 

What is the United States Institute of Peace Balkan Initiative doing to promote democracy and minority rights in Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo? 

Answer: 

Since 1992, The United States Institute of Peace has been actively engaged in fostering peace and reconciliation in the Balkans, including democracy and human 

rights in Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo. As part of our Congressional mandate, 

the U.S. Institute of Peace, through its Balkans Initiative, has been instrumental 

in creating and disseminating new techniques and research in the field of conflict 

management, training current and emerging political and civil society leaders in negotiation and conflict resolution skills, providing numerous grants to international 

and local organizations to develop a democratic civil society, and providing a unique 

forum both in Washington and in the region for open dialogue. The following highlights activities to promote democracy and minority rights in Serbia and Montenegro 

and Kosovo. 

TRAINING

Through its Training Program, the Institute has helped to facilitate conflict management skills training for both government and nongovernmental personnel. 

Through presentations, case studies, group exercises, and role-playing simulations, 

participants build negotiating skills and are challenged to reexamine their perceptions of good governance, minority rights, and other key questions concerning the 

role of government and civil society. Some recent examples of Institute efforts include:

• Professional skills training with the Defense Ministry of Serbia and Montenegro (October 13–21, 2003)

• Professional skills training for the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (September 6–11, 2003)

• Professional skills training with the Foreign Ministry of Serbia and Montenegro (May 4–12, 2003)

• Professional skills building with the OSCE in Kosovo, Vienna, and Macedonia 

(March–April, 2003)

• Computer-based role playing simulation for young Serbian and Kosovar political and civic leaders (September 10–12, 2002)

• Professional skills training with the Foreign Ministry of Serbia and Montenegro (July 9–17, 2002)

• Workshop on developing good governance for Kosovo Assembly Members 

(June 12–16, 2002)

• Professional skills training for officials of the Republic of Serbia (December 

3–6, 2001)

• Conflict management and negotiation training for Kosovar political and civic 

leaders (June 20–24, 1998)

• Conflict management training for over 2,000 U.S. civilian police assigned to 

UN peacekeeping operations, mainly in the Balkans (1999–2002) 

FELLOWSHIPS

The Institute’s Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program allows scholars and practitioners from around the globe to come to Washington to conduct important research 

concerning international conflict and peace. We have been privileged to have a number of prominent scholars working on projects related to Serbia and Montenegro:

• Albert Cevallos, formerly with the U.S. Agency for International Development. (Senior Fellow, 2003–2004): ‘‘Steal This Revolution: Nonviolent Revolution and the Transition to Democracy in Serbia’’

• Michael Hartmann, International Public Prosecutor, United Nations Mission 

in Kosovo. (Senior Fellow, 2002–2003): ‘‘International Prosecutors and Judges 

in Post-Conflict Societies’’

49

• Sonja Biserko, head of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. 

(Senior Fellow, 2000–2001): ‘‘Serbia versus Yugoslavia: An Inside View of the 

Yugoslav Crisis’’

• Tone Bringa, Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, University of London. (Guest Scholar, 1999–2000): ‘‘Post-War Reintegration in the Balkans’’

• Stojan Cerovic, Columnist, Vreme, Belgrade. (Senior Fellow, 1999–2000): 

‘‘Yugoslavia after the Kosovo Conflict’’

• Daniel Serwer, U.S. Department of State Special Envoy for the Bosnian Federation (Senior Fellow, 1998–99): ‘‘Balkans Regional Security’’

• Ruzica Rosandic, Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade. (Senior 

Fellow, 1997–98): ‘‘The Goodwill Classroom: Conflict Resolution and Human 

Rights Training in Educational Policy’’

• John Menzies, U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Senior Fellow, 1997–

98): ‘‘Consequences of the Dayton Peace Agreements for Regional Security’’

• Dusko Doder, Former Moscow Correspondent, the Washington Post. (Senior 

Fellow, 1996–97): ‘‘Reconstructing the Balkans after Yugoslavia’s Dissolution 

and Civil War’’

• Vesna Pesic, Chairwoman of the Civil Alliance of Serbia. (Senior Fellow, 

1994–95): ‘‘Preparing the Ground for War in Serbia, 1987–1992’’

• Ted Robert Gurr, Distinguished University Professor, Department of Government and Politics, Center for International Development and Conflict University of Maryland. (Peace Fellow, 1988–89): ‘‘Minorities at Risk: A Global View 

of Ethnopolitical Conflicts’’

GRANTS

Twenty-five percent of the Institute’s budget goes to grants and contracts to nongovernmental organizations and academic institutions doing research or working to 

prevent conflict and to create or revitalize civil society following violent conflict. 

Below are some of our most recent grants to projects in Serbia and Montenegro and 

Kosovo:

• Center for Free Election and Democracy (Belgrade and Kragujevac, Serbia 

and Montenegro). An NGO that has specialized in the promotion of elections 

and democracy in Serbia. Two grants in 2002 focused on providing training 

for CESID trainers and activists in negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution skills. The purpose is to build bridges between political opponents, and 

to improve communication among the main actors involved in elections processes. The specific activities include an initial 16-day training workshop for 

CESID trainers, followed by eight three-day training workshops for CESID 

activists, and then by 20 one-day training workshops throughout Serbia.

• Management Center (Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro). A 2002 grant to support a training course for judges, prosecutors, police professionals and policy 

makers in a newly democratic Serbia on the challenges of, and strategies for, 

addressing the problem of organized crime.

• Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC). A training 

and seminar program to introduce conflict resolution skills to, and enhance 

dialogue among, a diverse group of religious and community leaders in 

Kosovo. The 2001 project also distributed a set of practical manuals for conflict resolution training and the strengthening of civil society.

• Center for Antiwar Action (Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro). A project designed to engage Serbian and American scholars and policy-makers in exploring the changing nature of contemporary conflicts, state sovereignty, and 

international intervention, and the related evolution of international law. A 

2000 grant resulted in a publication that examined the issues of conflict management, diplomacy, and military intervention on the political process and 

long-term stability with a particular attention on the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia. 

A FORUM FOR DIALOGUE

The Institute has long been the place in Washington for democratic leaders from 

the region to come and speak before a well-informed and inquisitive audience concerned with human rights. Some of recent speakers of note include:

• Branko Crvenkovski, Prime Minister of Macedonia

• Hashim Thaci, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Kosovo

50

• Bajram Rexhepi, Prime Minister of Kosovo

• Zoran Djindjic, Prime Minister of Serbia

• Goran Svilanovic, Foreign Minister of Serbia and Montenegro

As part of the Institute’s efforts to develop a greater understanding on the challenges of preventing conflict and maintaining peace in Serbia and Montenegro and 

Kosovo, the Balkans Initiative has sponsored a wide assortment of public and off 

the record briefings. Recent topics have included the impact of radical parties on 

elections, Kosovo’s final status, the future of the Serbia and Montenegro union, and 

building state institutions in Serbia and Kosovo. 

The Institute also provided an important outlet for the Serbian democratic opposition throughout the Milosevic period. USIP has provided assistance to opposition 

groups such as Otpor, and has collected their stories as part of a developing curriculum on the use of nonviolent political struggle to bring about regime change. 

In addition, the Institute has worked to create opportunities for dialogue within 

the region. Some examples are:

• In Gnjilane in April 2001, the Institute organized a workshop on ‘‘Meeting the 

Challenges of Reconstruction in a Multi-Ethnic Society’’ for area municipal 

leaders.

• Municipal leaders from across Kosovo participated in a workshop on developing good governance in Airlie, Virginia, in February and March 2001.

• Albanian and Serb leaders met in Airlie, Virginia, in July 2000 for a facilitated discussion on how to maintain coexistence through a multi-ethnic society.

• At the request of the U.S. Army, the Institute held a workshop on coexistence 

in a multi-ethnic society for Albanian and Serb leaders in Gnjilane in April 

2000.

• Leaders within the Kosovo Serb communities met in Sofia, Bulgaria in December 1999 to discuss ‘‘Options for Building Multi-Ethnic and Democratic Institutions in Kosovo.’’

• Kosovar Albanian political and civic leaders participated in a workshop on coalition building in Landsdowne, Virginia, in May 1999.

As briefly mentioned above, the Institute, through the efforts of current Senior 

Fellow Albert Cevallos, has been the focal point for the unique effort to bring young 

political and civic leaders from Serbia and Kosovo together in the hopes of reestablishing a dialogue lost to the war in Kosovo. Beginning with a small but dedicated 

core group, the Partnerships for Peace Project has grown considerably to include 

members from nearly every political party. Following a series of successful meetings 

in the region, and a training program in Washington, the project is now largely run 

by the participants themselves and has undertaken several initiatives aimed at fostering inter-ethnic reconciliation and democracy, including efforts to end the recent 

violence in Kosovo and to ensure that it does not happen again.

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