IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE RITZ HOTEL, LTD.

 v.

SHEN MANUFACTURING CO., INC.

:

:

:

:

:

CIVIL ACTION

05-4730

MEMORANDUM

NORMA L. SHAPIRO, S.J. JUNE 4, 2009

Plaintiff, The Ritz Hotel, Ltd. (“RHL”), filed for declaratory relief against Shen

Manufacturing Co., Inc. (“Shen”) for trademark infringement under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act

(“Lanham Act”). Shen filed counterclaims against RHL for trademark infringement and fraud

under the Lanham Act together with supplemental state-law claims for fraud and trademark

violations. Shen filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (paper no. 46) on Count I of its

amended counterclaim, under § 14 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064, for cancellation of

nineteen (19) of RHL’s United States trademark registrations as either abandoned or procured

through fraud. By Memorandum and Order of March 17, 2009 (paper no.79, “Memorandum”),

Shen’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I was denied. Pending is Shen’s Motion

for Reconsideration; it will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

 Count I of Shen’s amended counterclaim, under § 14 of the Lanham Trademark Act

(“Lanham Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1064, is for cancellation of nineteen (19) United States trademark

1

Section 14 provides: “A petition to cancel a registration of a mark . . . may . . . be filed . 1

. . by any person who believes he will be damaged . . . . (3) At any time if the registered mark . . .

has been abandoned, or its registration was obtained fraudulently . . . .” A mark becomes

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Case 2:05-cv-04730-NS Document 102 Filed 06/04/09 Page 1 of 9
registrations owned by RHL as either abandoned or fraudulently procured. Inter alia, Shen seeks

to have RHL’s registration nos. 2,669,712 (RITZ ESCOFFIER for specialty foods) (“the ‘712

mark”), 1,980,522 (RITZ for cutlery) (“the ‘522 mark”), and 2,728,529 (RITZ PARIS for fabrics)

(“the ‘529 mark”) cancelled for fraudulent procurement, and registration nos. 2,706,448 (RITZ

PARIS for games and toys) (“the ‘448 mark”), 2,726,595 (RITZ PARIS for clocks and watches)

(“the ‘595 mark”), 2,790,268 (RITZ PARIS for clothing) (“the ‘268 mark”), 2,788,043 (RITZ

PARIS for personal care products) (“the ‘043 mark”), 2,712,917 (RITZ PARIS for books) (“the

‘917 mark”), and 2,723,442 (RITZ PARIS for candles) (“the ‘442 mark”) cancelled as

abandoned. Shen’s motion for summary judgment on its amended counterclaim to have the

above-listed marks cancelled was denied by Order of March 17, 2009. Shen filed a timely

Motion for Reconsideration.. 

II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Reconsideration serves to correct manifest errors of law or fact. Harsco Corp. v.

Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906 (3 Cir. 1985). A court should grant a motion for reconsideration only if rd

there is: 1) newly available evidence; 2) an intervening change in controlling law; or 3) a need to

correct a clear error of fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Haymond v. Lundy, 205 F. Supp. 2d

390, 395 (E.D. Pa. 2002). “Motions for reconsideration are not to be used to reargue or relitigate

matters already decided.” Id. 

Shen asserts six errors by the court: 

1) the court should not have denied its motion for summary judgment on its claim to

abandoned under the Lanham Act “[w]hen its use has been discontinued with intent not to

resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances.” Lanham Act, § 45,

15 U.S.C. § 1127.

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cancel the ‘712 mark as fraudulently procured; 

2) the court erred when it stated that RHL submitted an (allegedly) false affidavit to

maintain the ‘712 registration, and not as part of the application for the registration itself; 

3) the court should not have denied its motion for summary judgment on its claim to

cancel the ‘522 mark as fraudulently procured; 

4) the court should not have denied as moot its motion for summary judgment on its

claim to have the ‘529 registration cancelled as fraudulently procured; 

5) the court should not have denied its motion for summary judgment to have the ‘448,

‘595, and ‘268 marks cancelled as abandoned since RHL failed to rebut the prima facie

presumption of abandonment after three years of demonstrated non-use; and 

6) the court should not have denied its motion for summary judgment to have the ‘043,

‘917, and ‘442 marks cancelled as abandoned, because their use in commerce was de

minimis.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ‘712 Mark

Shen asserts two errors in the Memorandum regarding this mark: 1) the court

mischaracterized RHL’s June, 2002 statement of use as a filing to maintain the ‘712 mark when

it was actually a statement of use to apply for the mark; and 2) the court should not have denied

Shen’s motion for summary judgment on its claim to cancel the ‘712 mark for fraudulent

procurement. 

RHL first applied for trademark registration no. 2,669,712 (RITZ ESCOFFIER for food

products) under § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051, on April 3, 2000; the PTO issued a notice of 2

allowance on October 23, 2000. RHL filed a statement in June 2002, that all of the goods

associated with the applied-for registration were in use as early as April, 2002; the PTO issued

the registration on December 31, 2002. The court mischaracterized RHL’s June, 2002 filing as a

filing “to maintain the registration” and not as a § 1(d) statement of use required before the PTO

All plain citations in this memorandum to a particular “§” or “section” refer to a 2

provision in the Lanham Act. 

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would issue a registration applied for on the basis of intent to introduce goods into United States

commerce. (Memorandum, p. 6.) 3

RHL licensed U.S. Foodservice, Inc. (“USF”) to market and sell goods associated with

the ‘712 mark in the United States. According to Shen, RHL’s president tasted and sampled all

of the licensed goods and that USF sold no licensed goods without his approval; therefore, RHL

had to have known goods actually in use, and goods not in use. (Shen’s Motion for

Reconsideration, Memorandum (Paper no. 81, attachment 1, “Moving Brief”), p. 9-10). RHL, in

response, states that RHL approved all the goods USF developed, but “U.S. Foodservice alone

decided what to sell or not sell under the RITZ ESCOFFIER trademark after approval was given.

. . .” (RHL’s Response to Shen’s Motion for Reconsideration (paper no. 90, “Response”), p. 5.) 

Shen and RHL also dispute whether RHL received royalty statements prior to June, 2002; such

statements, if accurate, would have reflected whether or not goods were in use. (Id. at 9.)

The court’s misstatement regarding the purpose of RHL’s June, 2002 statement of use to

obtain the ‘712 registration was not material to the denial of Shen’s motion for summary

An applicant for a trademark filing under § 1(b) or § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 or § 1126, on 3

the basis of an intent to introduce associated goods into commerce, will not be issued the

registration until the PTO is satisfied that the associated goods are actually in use. Instead

(assuming a lack of opposition to the application), the PTO will issue a “notice of allowance,” at

which point the registrant must then filed a § 1(d) statement of use within six months. The PTO

will not register the applied-for mark until the applicant can demonstrate use of the associated

goods in United States commerce sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an application under §

1(a). Section 1(c-d), 14 U.S.C. § 1051. 

RHL applied for the ‘712 mark in April, 2000 and was sent a notice of allowance in

October. RHL did not send in its § 1(d) affidavit in time, and was only able to finish its

application process after petitioning to revive the mark in April, 2002. RHL substantiated its use

of the mark in June, 2002, while waiting for the PTO to rule on its petition to revive the mark. 

The PTO granted RHL’s petition on September 23, 2002, and the mark was issued shortly

thereafter on December 31, 2002. The timeline of RHL’s application for the ‘712 mark can be

found at: http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser=serial&entry=76015754 .

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judgment on its amended counterclaim to cancel that registration. Whether the allegedly

fraudulent submission was to acquire rather than maintain the registration, Shen must prove that

RHL actually knew or believed its submission to the PTO was false. See Marshak v. Treadwell,

240 F.3d 184, 196 (3 Cir. 2001). 

rd 4

Determining whether the alleged fraud was committed with scienter depends on

evaluating the credibility of evidence; it is normally a question of fact for which resolution at

summary judgment is particularly inappropriate. See Justofin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 372

F.3d 517, 524 (3 Cir. 2004); Copelands' Enterprises, Inc. v. CNV, Inc., 945 F.2d 1563, 1567 rd

(Fed. Cir.1991). 

RHL does not admit that it knowingly filed false affidavits of use before the PTO as part

of its application for the ‘712 mark. The record before the court on summary judgment does not

prove beyond dispute that RHL knew, before it filed its statement of use in June, 2002, that USF

did not intend to produce all the ‘712 mark’s associated goods as part of its license. Whether

RHL’s application for the ‘712 registration was fraudulent remains a question of material fact to

be resolved at trial.5

Shen asserts that the standard for scienter in a claim to cancel a registration as 4

fraudulently procured is that the applicant “should have known” that its submissions were false.

See Medinol Ltd., v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1205 (T.T.A.B. 2003). Although

Marshak predates Medinol, it specifically disapproved of the “should have known” standard, and

required proof of a registrant’s actual knowledge of or belief in the falsity of a submission to the

PTO. Marshak, 240 F.3d at 196. As Judge Baylson observed in a similar case decided recently: 

1) “Medinol is not controlling in this action” because Marshak requires proof of actual

knowledge or belief; and 2) the registrant in Medinol (unlike RHL) admitted that its statement of

use as part of its application was false. Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. BCBG Max Azria Group, Inc.,

2007 WL 2463379 at *12, n.9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2007).

If, at trial, the ‘712 registration is found to have been procured through partially 5

fraudulent statements of use, the court will then address whether to follow Medinol and order the

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B. The ‘522 Mark

Shen asserts two errors in the Memorandum regarding this mark: 1) RHL’s § 8 and § 9

statements that the ‘522 mark was in use on all associated goods were both indisputably

fraudulent; and 2) those false submissions to the PTO regarding the ‘522 mark’s use were

material to the mark’s continued validity. 

The court finds no clear errors of fact in the Memorandum’s discussion of the ‘522 mark

and RHL’s statements of its use on associated goods. Shen alleged that RHL’s statements of use

considered pie servers and ladles as the “spatulas, and scoops” listed as goods associated with the

‘522 mark, even though it knew that the French terms for those items (sold from a French

language catalog) are quite distinct. It remains a material question of fact whether these terms

are non-interchangeable so that the PTO would clearly have denied RHL’s petitions to maintain

and renew the ‘522 marks were it aware of the alleged inaccuracies in RHL’s terminology. 

Roux Marquiand, the ‘522 mark’s licensee, “entered liquidation” in January, 2006, five

months before RHL filed a statement with the PTO that its mark was in use on all associated

goods. It is not established whether manufacture of the goods had ceased by January, 2006,

whether there was inventory waiting to be shipped from France to the United States, or whether

there were further sales of the goods within the United States after that time. On summary

judgment, it cannot be decided merely because the licensee entered liquidation that RHL’s claim,

in June, 2006, that the goods were still in use was not in good faith. See, e.g. EH Yacht, LLC v. 6

entire registration cancelled.. See Medinol, 67 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1205. 

What it means under French law when a retailer “enters liquidation” remains to be 6

determined at trial, by testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 44.1. 

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Egg Harbor, LLC, 84 F. Supp.2d 556 (D.N.J. 2000) (a boat manufacturer’s mark was in use as

long as boats bearing the mark were sold, even after the manufacturer entered bankruptcy and

ceased production). 

Shen’s motion to reconsider denial of summary judgment on its claim to cancel the ‘522

mark for fraudulent procurement will be denied.

C. The ‘529 Mark

The Memorandum held Shen’s claim to cancel the ‘529 mark was moot after RHL

voluntarily withdrew the registration. (Memorandum, p. 1, n. 1.) Shen asserts that RHL’s

withdrawal of the registration did not moot either its claim to cancel the registration as

fraudulently procured or its fraud claim against RHL in connection with the registration’s

procurement. 

Shen is correct that cancelling the ‘529 registration did not moot any claim for fraud in

connection with that registration. However, Count I of Shen’s amended counterclaim was not for

fraud, and no fraud claims were discussed in the Memorandum. The Memorandum was correct

in holding Shen’s claim to cancel the ‘529 mark was moot; the court’s failure to order the PTO to

cancel the four registrations voluntarily withdrawn by RHL will be corrected.

D. The ‘448, ‘595, and ‘268 Marks

Shen claims the court should not have denied its motion for summary judgment to cancel

these three marks as abandoned, because RHL failed to rebut the Lanham Act’s statutory

presumption of intent to abandon after three years of non-use. RHL avers that its continued

efforts to license goods bearing its marks for sale in the United States, combined with the steady

stream of boutique sales of other goods associated with its marks to United States customers

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visiting its hotel, proves that it never intended to abandon these marks. 

A party asserting a trademark’s abandonment must prove: 1) discontinuance of the

mark’s use; and 2) an intent not to resume use within a reasonably foreseeable time. Exxon

Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.1983). A mark is “in use” on an

associated good for purposes of the Lanham Act if the use was bona fide in the ordinary course

of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in the mark. Section 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Three

years of non-“use’ is prima facie evidence of abandonment; the registrant can rebut the presumed

abandonment by evidence of an intent to resume the mark’s use. Id.; 3 McCarthy on Trademarks

and Unfair Competition § 17:21 (4 ed., 1999). Intent to resume a mark’s use on an associated th

good can be inferred from circumstances. Section 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Abandonment, being in

the nature of a forfeiture, must be strictly proved. U.S. Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d

134, 139 (3 Cir. 1981). rd

RHL maintains a boutique in its Paris hotel to sell goods to visitors, including customers

from the United States; RHL has also made efforts to license goods bearing its marks for sale in

the United States. It might be reasonably inferred from the evidence of record that RHL had at

least some intent to maintain an ongoing presence for its marks in United States commerce, and

to resume the use of its marks on goods fallen into disuse. Whether RHL has a credible intent to

resume, in the foreseeable future use, of any of the goods associated with the ‘448, ‘595, and

‘268 marks to the extent they may have fallen into disuse remains a question of fact for trial. 

Shen’s motion was properly denied as to these marks.

E. The ‘043, ‘917, and ‘442 Marks.

Shen claims that RHL’s use of these marks in United States commerce was de minimis as

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a matter of law, and that the court should not have denied its motion for summary judgment to

cancel these marks as abandoned. Shen has constructed a table summarizing sales from 2004

through 2006 of individual goods associated with these marks, based on individual invoices of

sales at RHL’s Paris hotel boutique. (Moving Brief, p. 28.; Shen’s Brief for Summary Judgment,

Ex. 63.) RHL claims that this table is incomplete, as Shen has not used any RHL internal

documents beyond the individual invoices. (Response, p. 9); Shen responds that RHL has not

presented its own evidence in rebuttal. (Shen’s Motion for Reconsideration, Reply Brief (paper

no. 97), p. 11.) 

RHL’s assertion that it has no intent to abandon these marks raises a question of material

fact: whether RHL intends to resume using goods associated with these marks to they extent

they may have fallen into disuse. These marks can not be cancelled either entirely or in part at

the summary judgment stage. Shen’s motion to reconsider its denial of Shen’s motion for

summary judgment on its claims to have the ‘043, ‘917, and ‘442 marks cancelled will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Shen’s Motion for Reconsideration (paper no. 81) of the court’s order of March 17, 2009

(paper no. 79), will be granted in part and denied in part. The court mischaracterized the

procedural history of RHL’s application for and registration of the ‘712 mark with the United

States Patent and Trademark Office. In all other respects, Shen’s Motion for Reconsideration

will be denied. The list of claims remaining for trial in this matter remains unaltered.

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