Filed 1/31/22 In re O.M.-P CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re O.M.-P. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B311185

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

20LJJP00259D-F)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Robin R. Kesler, Judge Pro Tempore. Dismissed.

Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

T.M. (Father) and V.P. (Mother) have three children

together: O.M.-P., S.M.-P., and E.M.-P. The juvenile court 

assumed dependency jurisdiction over the children after finding

the parents engaged in violent altercations in the minors’

presence and Father sexually abused one of Mother’s children 

from another relationship by sending the child sexually explicit 

videos of Mother. Father noticed an appeal to challenge the 

sexual abuse jurisdiction finding and the disposition order 

requiring him to participate in sexual abuse counseling. While

Father’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its 

jurisdiction over the children with an order giving Mother sole 

legal and physical custody. We consider whether the 

unchallenged order terminating jurisdiction renders Father’s 

appeal of the jurisdiction finding and disposition order moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Dependency Investigation

In addition to O.M.-P. (born in 2014), S.M.-P. (born in 

2016), and E.M.-P. (born in 2019), Mother has three older minor 

children from previous relationships, including M.L.-P. (born in 

2007). In early 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (the Department) received 

information that Father physically abused Mother and that

Mother and some of the children were sleeping in a car.

Mother told a Department social worker that she and the 

three youngest children lived with Father for a few months at the 

end of 2019. Mother and Father were not in a relationship at the 

time, and she moved into the home on the understanding that

Father would be moving out. (A 10-year criminal protective 

order, issued in 2016, prohibited Father from having contact with 
3

Mother.) Father remained in the home, however, and their 

frequent arguments sometimes escalated to physical violence. 

Father denied living with Mother and the children in 2019 and 

he also denied any ongoing domestic violence.

The Department filed a dependency petition alleging all six 

children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm 

because, among other things, Mother and Father have a history 

of engaging in violent altercations in their presence, one of their 

arguments led to Mother and the three youngest children 

spending the night in a vehicle, and Father’s contact with Mother 

constituted a violation of a criminal protective order. At an 

initial hearing on the petition, the juvenile court ordered all six 

children detained from Mother, ordered Father’s three children 

detained from Father, and ordered Mother’s three older children 

released to their fathers.

During the Department’s ensuing investigation of the 

minors’ welfare, Mother said Father started abusing her by 

grabbing her arms after S.M.-P. was born, but he eventually 

started punching her. O.M.-P. and S.M.-P. corroborated Mother’s 

account of having suffered physical abuse at the hands of Father.

Over the next several months, Mother and others close to 

her reported threats and harassment by Father. Father also sent

sexually explicit photos and videos of Mother to her family and 

others. He posted an “intimate” video of Mother on Instagram 

that he recorded without her knowledge. He sent a video of 

Mother and Father having sex to Mother, her adult son, the 

children’s caregiver, and the father of one of Mother’s older

children. The children’s caregiver reported Father also sent a 

“revenge porn” “sex video” of Mother to Mother’s 15-year-old 

niece.
4

Father did not stop there. He also sent Mother’s oldest 

minor son, M.L.-P., sexually explicit videos of Mother along with 

crass and explicit text messages including the following (these 

are not the most explicit): “You’ll hear ur mom moaning so good”; 

“You liked the way your mom sounds”; and “Look at your hoe ass 

mom she’s not good that’s why she lost her kids.” Father also 

sent M.L.-P. several messages referring to M.L.-P. and his father 

as “snitches.” M.L.-P. blocked messages from Father’s phone 

number, but Father continued to send him messages from 

different numbers. Around the same time, Mother received text 

messages from Father threatening that if she did not agree to 

meet with him, M.L.-P. would “pay for it tomorrow.”

After learning of this post-petition conduct by Father, the

Department filed an amended dependency petition. The 

previously alleged count under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1)1 was amended to reference Father’s 

threats against M.L.-P. The petition also included a new count 

under section 300, subdivision (d), alleging Father sexually 

abused M.L.-P. by sending him “at least three explicit sexual 

videos . . . where [Father] and [M]other were engaged in sexual 

intercourse.”

B. Adjudication and Disposition

The juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing in March 2021. Mother pled no contest to the 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1) count. Father’s attorney contended 

the section 300, subdivision (d)(1) count should be dismissed 

because, among other things, “there is no risk of physical sexual 

1 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
5

abuse because there is no sexual intent by [Father]. If [Father] 

did indeed send these messages to the child, he did not send them 

in order to groom the child for sexual abuse. It’s clear that these 

messages were sent [with] the intent to harass and taunt, not to 

sexually abuse.” Counsel for Father’s children agreed with 

Father’s attorney’s assessment that Father’s text messages to 

M.L.-P. were “more in line with [Father’s] continued outrageous 

incidents of domestic violence, rather than a sexual act aimed at 

the child.”

The juvenile court sustained the allegations of domestic 

violence and sexual abuse under both sections 300, subdivisions 

(b)(1) and (d).2 As to the sexual abuse finding, the juvenile court 

explained “there’s lots of other things [Father] could have done 

that wasn’t sexual in nature. He had been quite threatening 

otherwise, but to this child he sent an actual sexual video of his 

mother involved in sexual intercourse.” The juvenile court 

ordered Father to participate in individual counseling, parenting 

education, a domestic violence course, and sexual abuse 

counseling for perpetrators because Father was “obviously not 

aware that his behavior is . . . sexual perpetrator type behavior.”

C. Appeal and Termination of Jurisdiction

Father appealed from the jurisdiction finding and 

disposition order, challenging the juvenile court’s decision to 

sustain the section 300, subdivision (d) sexual abuse allegation 

and the order that he participate in sexual abuse counseling. 

Father did not challenge the juvenile court’s finding of 

jurisdiction based on domestic violence.

2 The juvenile court granted the Department’s motion to 

strike the section 300, subdivision (a) count.
6

While Father’s appeal was pending, the Department 

submitted a letter attaching juvenile court minute orders dated 

September 7, 2021, and September 10, 2021, that granted Mother 

sole legal and physical custody of the children and terminated 

dependency jurisdiction over the children. The custody order

permittedFather to have one monitored visit per year, and, on a 

form used to list reasons for no or supervised visitation, the court 

stated Father had not completed court ordered programs, 

including sexual abuse counseling.

This court construed the Department’s letter as a motion 

for judicial notice and we granted the motion after permitting 

Father to file an opposition (which he did not). This court then 

ordered Father to show cause why his appeal should not be 

dismissed as moot.

In response, Father argued this court can still grant 

effective relief by directing the juvenile court to modify its 

custody order. Father sought to distinguish authority holding an 

appeal from the subsequent order terminating jurisdiction is a 

prerequisite for obtaining relief in this proceeding by 

emphasizing that the time to notice an appeal from the 

jurisdiction termination order had not by then expired.

On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the juvenile 

court’s docket that indicates that Father did not file a timely 

notice of appeal from the order terminating jurisdiction or the 

accompanying custody and visitation orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 

subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)

II. DISCUSSION

“‘An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the 

respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for 
7

the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. 

[Citations.]’ (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 

1054[-1055].)” (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.) 

“As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court 

jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the 

dependency proceedings moot.” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 

Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) “[D]ismissal for mootness in such 

circumstances is not automatic, [however,] but ‘must be decided 

on a case-by-case basis.’” (Ibid.; see also In re N.S. (2016) 245 

Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“[T]he critical factor in considering whether a 

dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can 

provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”].)

Father contends we can still provide effective relief by 

reversing the jurisdiction finding or the disposition order and 

directing the juvenile court to modify the custody order. Without

an appeal from the custody and jurisdiction termination order, 

however, there is no procedural mechanism for granting such 

relief. (See In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 

(Michelle M.) [holding “no direct relief can be granted even were 

we to find reversible error, because the juvenile court no longer 

has jurisdiction,” and explaining the appellant’s “remedy was to 

attack the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction”].) As 

the Court of Appeal recently explained in In re Rashad D. (2021) 

63 Cal.App.5th 156 (Rashad D.), “to the extent an appellant 

argues . . . that [a] challenged jurisdiction finding resulted in an 

adverse juvenile custody order and seeks to have that custody 

order set aside, in addition to the appeal from the jurisdiction 

finding, an appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and 

awarding custody is necessary for this court to be able to provide 

effective relief. Unless the appellate court reverses or vacates the 
8

order terminating dependency, the juvenile court has no 

jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in the now-closed case, 

including modification of its custody order. (See § 304 [juvenile 

court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear proceedings regarding 

custody ‘until the time that the petition is dismissed or 

dependency is terminated’]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.620(a) 

[same].)” (Id. at 164, fn. omitted.) Here, because Father did not 

appeal the order terminating its jurisdiction over the children or 

the accompanying custody and visitation orders, “a remand for 

further proceedings in the juvenile court would be meaningless.”3 

(Id. at 165.)

Father contends the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Rashad 

D. is flawed because “challenges to only one aspect of [a] final 

custody order—like to the visitation order—would need to be 

dismissed.” Even if this followed from Rashad D., the argument 

is irrelevant because Father has not challenged the visitation 

order in this case. Father also contends there is a split of 

authority as to whether a challenge to jurisdiction findings or a 

disposition order is mooted by an unchallenged order terminating 

dependency jurisdiction. Neither of the cases Father cites, 

however, discusses how an appellate court may provide effective 

3 Because Father does not challenge the section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1) basis on which the juvenile court assumed 

jurisdiction over the children, we would be justified in declining 

to review the correctness of the section 300, subdivision (d) 

finding (see, e.g., In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773) even if we 

did not hold that the lack of an appeal from the later custody and 

jurisdiction termination order warrants dismissal of this appeal.
9

relief in the form of a modified custody or visitation order when 

there is no challenge to these orders.

4

One final note. After Father filed his response to the order 

to show cause, our colleagues in Division One of this court 

published an opinion questioning “the ‘general rule’ that 

termination of juvenile court jurisdiction renders a pending 

dependency appeal moot . . . .” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 

654, 665 (S.G.).) The S.G. court held it could provide effective 

relief in an appeal from the juvenile court’s denial of a 

restraining order notwithstanding an unchallenged order 

terminating jurisdiction because “the remittitur issued as a 

result [of reversal] would grant the juvenile court the power to 

carry out our directions.” (Id. at 668.) Whatever the merits of 

the S.G. court’s analysis, its disagreement with the framing of 

Michelle M. and Rashad D. did not extend to the conclusion in 

those cases that a reviewing court cannot provide effective relief 

in the form of a modified custody or visitation order issued in 

conjunction with an order terminating jurisdiction—absent a 

4

In In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, the Court of 

Appeal declined to dismiss as moot an appeal challenging a 

jurisdiction finding notwithstanding an order terminating 

jurisdiction, but there was no need to identify the procedural 

mechanism by which effective relief could be granted because the 

jurisdiction finding was affirmed. (Id. at 1549.) In In re J.P.

(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, the Court of Appeal took judicial 

notice of an apparently unchallenged order terminating 

dependency jurisdiction and held this did not moot an appeal 

from a disposition order, but “le[ft] it to the sound discretion of 

the dependency court to determine what procedural steps [were]

appropriate” on remand because it “lack[ed] specific information 

as to the intervening factual and procedural developments.” (Id.

at 630.)
10

challenge to those orders. (Ibid.) That is precisely the situation 

in this case.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

I concur:

KIM, J.
LOS ANELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES v. T.M. - B311185

RUBIN, P. J. - Concurring

I concur in the judgment.

RUBIN, P. J.