COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00445-CV

DANA PAIGE APPLEWHITE APPELLANT

V.

WILLIAM CARL APPLEWHITE, JR. APPELLEE 

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FROM THE 158TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Dana Paige Applewhite appeals from a final decree of divorce. 

We will affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. BACKGROUND

Dana and Appellee William Carl Applewhite, Jr. married in 1987. They had 

eleven kids during the marriage, seven of whom were under the age of eighteen 

when Dana sued William for divorce in July 2010. In her original petition, Dana

pleaded for child support, a disproportionate share of the community estate, and 

spousal maintenance, among other things. William filed a counterpetition for 

divorce.

The trial court signed a final divorce decree after a trial at which Dana, 

William, and one of the children testified. The decree named Dana and William 

joint managing conservators of the children and Dana the parent with the 

exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence; established a 

modified standard possession order; ordered William to pay Dana child support 

in the amount of $2,150.59 per month, an amount consistent with the statutory 

guidelines; and divided the marital estate. The trial court did not award Dana 

spousal maintenance. Neither party requested findings of fact.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to each of Dana’s 

issues, which implicate the trial court’s decisions regarding property division, 

child support, and the failure to award spousal maintenance. See Worford v. 

Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 

(Tex. 1981); Brooks v. Brooks, 257 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2008, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference 
3

to any guiding rules or principles, that is, if the act is arbitrary or unreasonable. 

Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 

835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).

In a trial to the court in which no findings of fact or conclusions of law are 

filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support it. 

Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq, 331 S.W.3d 764, 766–67 (Tex. 2011); Wood v. Tex. Dep’t 

of Pub. Safety, 331 S.W.3d 78, 79 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). When 

a reporter’s record is filed, these implied findings are not conclusive, and an 

appellant may challenge them by raising both legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence issues.2

IV. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AND DIVISION OF PROPERTY

In what we construe as her first and second issues, Dana argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion by not finding adultery as a fault ground for the 

divorce and by not awarding her a disproportionate share of the community 

property. She points out that William’s attorney stipulated at trial that William had 

two affairs during the marriage, and she contends that “every factor that should 

have been used by the Court as a guideline in dividing the couple’s community 

property was grossly skewed towards the awarding of a disproportionate amount 

of the marital estate to [her].”

 

2

Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error here, 

but they are relevant factors in deciding whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Halleman v. Halleman, 379 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2012, no pet.).
4

The family code provides that “the court may grant a divorce without 

regard to fault if the marriage has become insupportable because of discord or 

conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marital 

relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation.” See Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 6.001 (West 2006) (emphasis added). It also provides that 

“[t]he court may grant a divorce in favor of one spouse if the other spouse has 

committed adultery.” Id. § 6.003 (West 2006) (emphasis added). Here, the trial 

court granted the divorce only on the ground of insupportability. Although it was 

stipulated that William had two affairs, Dana pleaded insupportability as a ground 

for the divorce, and she does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the insupportability determination. Thus, in light of the record, and 

because the family code assigns the divorce-ground determination to the 

discretion of the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by not instead finding, or by not additionally finding, adultery as a ground for the 

divorce.

Regarding the property division, the trial court shall order a division of the 

parties’ estate in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard 

for the rights of each party. Id. § 7.001 (West 2006). The property division need 

not be equal, but it must be equitable, and a trial court may consider numerous 

factors when exercising its broad discretion to divide the marital property, 

including the relative earning capacity and business opportunities of the parties, 

the parties’ relative financial condition and obligations, the parties’ education, the 
5

size of the separate estates, and the probable need for future support. Murff,

615 S.W.2d at 699. A disproportionate division must be supported by some 

reasonable basis. Smith v. Smith, 143 S.W.3d 206, 214 (Tex. App.—Waco 

2004, no pet.).

The evidence demonstrates that Dana is the primary conservator for seven 

children. She is in her mid- to late forties, she works full time for Little Elm ISD,

her monthly net pay is $1,400, and she testified that her house rent is $1,400 per 

month, that her utilities cost at least $750 per month, that food costs at least

$1,400 per month, that her cable costs $200 a month, that her van costs $80 per

week to operate, and that she receives about $650 per month in food stamps. 

Dana explained that she did not have the ability to go back to school because 

she had to work and pay bills.

William is a logistics engineer for Raytheon. He makes approximately 

$92,000 per year and has a monthly net pay of approximately $5,300. His rent is 

approximately $1,075 per month, his other expenses run about $1,200 per 

month, he pays approximately $500 per month in health insurance for the 

children, and he pays Dana $2,100 in monthly child support. He testified that his 

monthly expenses exceed his monthly take-home pay and that he sometimes 

borrows money to make ends meet. William estimated that the value of the 

property contained in his home was worth about $1,000 and that the value of the 

property contained in Dana’s home was worth $4,000. William explained that he 

and Dana sold the family home during the pendency of the divorce, in November 
6

2011, and that they split a number of community assets, including cash and cars, 

when the divorce was initially filed. He regularly exercises his visitation with the 

children, and he said that he learned only two days before the final trial that Dana 

was using food stamps.

The trial court awarded William all of the property and cash in his control, 

half of the retirement benefits in his Raytheon Savings and Investment Plan, half 

of the retirement benefits in his Raytheon TI Systems Employees Pension Plan, 

half of Dana’s retirement benefits in her Texas Teachers Retirement Income from 

her employment at Little Elm ISD, airline travel miles, funds in a use-it-or-lose-it 

health expense account, and two “TI stocks” that fluctuate in value between $25 

and $50 each. The trial court awarded Dana all of the property and cash in her 

control, half of the retirement benefits in William’s Raytheon Savings and 

Investment Plan, half of the retirement benefits in William’s Raytheon TI Systems 

Employees Pension Plan, half of the retirement benefits in her Texas Teachers 

Retirement Income from her employment at Little Elm ISD, and 50% of William’s 

military retirement pay.

Regarding the division of community debt, in addition to the debt owed on 

the vehicle awarded to William, the trial court ordered William to pay a credit card 

debt in the amount of $2,039.11, additional credit card debt in the amount of 

$1,477.51, a debt owed to the Navy in the amount of $48,000, a debt owed to 

Raytheon in the amount of $1,210.00, and a debt owed to Wells Fargo Dealer 
7

Services in the amount of $13,843.00. The trial court ordered Dana to pay any 

debts in her name.

The record thus demonstrates that although the trial court appears to have 

divided the community assets equally between Dana and William, it ordered 

William to pay a significant portion of the community debt, perhaps to account for 

the disparity in income between the two. Considering the allocation of assets 

and debt, and contrary to Dana’s argument, the trial court awarded her a 

disproportionate division of the community estate. Further, in light of all the 

evidence, including the evidence detailed above, we hold that the 

disproportionate division has a reasonable basis, and we cannot conclude that 

the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding Dana an even greater share 

of the community estate than it did. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001; Murff, 

615 S.W.2d at 699. We overrule Dana’s first and second issues.

V. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

In her third and fourth issues, Dana argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by not awarding her spousal maintenance. She points out that she 

was married for over twenty-five years and only began working recently, that she 

is in her late forties and lacks work experience, that she does not have enough 

money to buy groceries for the children, and that she did not receive sufficient

funds from the community estate “to meet minimum reasonable needs.”

Under the applicable law, the trial court may order spousal maintenance if 

(1) the marriage lasted ten years or longer, (2) the spouse seeking maintenance 
8

lacks sufficient property, including the property distributed to the spouse in the 

divorce, to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs, and (3) the 

spouse seeking maintenance clearly lacks earning ability in the labor market to 

provide support for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 8.051(2)(C) (West Supp. 2013).

Here, Dana acknowledged at trial that William paid her spousal support 

($1,000 per month) for eighteen months during the pendency of the divorce suit. 

The evidence also shows that Dana is employed, that she rents a house, that 

she has a car, that she pays for utilities and food, and that the value of the 

possessions and property in her house is four times greater than the value of the 

possessions and property in William’s house. Further, as explained, the trial 

court disproportionately divided the community estate in Dana’s favor. Dana 

testified that she needs more money to fully cover the monthly expenses that we 

detailed above, but there was no evidence that those general expenses 

represent her minimum reasonable needs, and she did not identify what amount 

of income she would need to satisfy her minimum reasonable needs. See id.

(addressing only the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs); Petra v. Petra, No. 

04-09-00214-CV, 2010 WL 374388, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 3, 

2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reasoning similarly). Determining what the “minimum 

reasonable needs” are for a particular person is a fact-specific determination, 

which is made by the trial court on a case-by-case basis. Chafino v. Chafino, 

228 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). Based on this record, 
9

the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Dana does not lack sufficient 

property or sufficient earning ability to meet her minimum reasonable needs. 

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051(2)(C). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by not awarding Dana spousal support, and we 

overrule her third and fourth issues. See Chafino, 228 S.W.3d at 475 (affirming 

refusal to award spousal maintenance).

VI. CHILD SUPPORT

Citing family code section 154.126, Dana argues in her fifth issue that the 

trial court abused its discretion by not awarding her child support in excess of the 

statutory guidelines. She contends that the trial court should have deviated 

upward from the support guidelines because she receives assistance with child 

care costs, assistance from her church for electric bills and food, and food 

stamps.

“The amount of a periodic child support payment established by the child 

support guidelines in effect in this state at the time of the hearing is presumed to 

be reasonable, and an order of support conforming to the guidelines is presumed 

to be in the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 154.122(a) (West 

2008). Contrary to Dana’s argument, section 154.126(a) is inapplicable because 

William’s net resources do not exceed $7,500. See id. § 154.126 (West 2008).

Nonetheless, a trial court may “order periodic child support payments in an 

amount other than that established by the guidelines if the evidence rebuts the 

presumption that application of the guidelines is in the best interest of the 
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children and justifies a variance from the guidelines.” Id. § 154.123(a) (West 

2008). In determining whether application of the guidelines would be “unjust or 

inappropriate under the circumstances, the court shall consider evidence of all 

relevant factors,” including those listed in section 154.123(b). Id. § 154.123(b)

Consistent with the statutory guidelines, the trial court ordered William to 

pay Dana 40% of his monthly net resources, or $2,150.59. The record certainly 

demonstrates that Dana’s budget is tight and that she receives assistance from 

several sources to help make ends meet, but the record is equally clear that 

William’s budget is also tight and that he sometimes receives assistance to help 

make ends meet. In fact, William testified that his monthly expenses surpass his 

monthly net resources. Also, the record is undisputed that William regularly 

exercises slightly modified, extended visitation with the children. In light of this

evidence, and that William is responsible for paying the vast majority of the 

community debt, we hold that the trial court could have reasonably concluded 

that Dana failed to overcome the presumption that the guideline-conforming child 

support order is in the best interest of the children. We overrule Dana’s fifth 

issue.

VII. MILITARY RETIREMENT

In her sixth issue, Dana argues that the portion of the divorce decree that 

awards her half of William’s military retirement fails to comply with the Texas 

requirement that military retirement benefits be apportioned based upon the 

value of the community’s interest at the time of the divorce, not at the time of 
11

retirement. See Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 946–47 (Tex. 1983). The 

decree provides in relevant part as follows:

[Dana] is awarded a percent of [William’s] disposable military 

retired pay, to be computed by multiplying 50 percent times a 

fraction, the numerator of which is 4798 reserve retirement point[s] 

earned during the period of marriage, divided by [William’s] total 

number of reserve retirement point[s] earned as a result of [his] 

service in the United States US Navy . . . . [Emphasis added.]

Contrary to Dana’s argument, the decree does not run afoul of Berry because the

formula’s numerator, which establishes the reserve retirement points that William 

earned only during the marriage, is divided by the total number of reserve 

retirement points that William has earned, which is then multiplied by a constant 

50%. Thus, Dana is entitled to 50% of the retirement pay that William earned 

only during the marriage.

3

 We overrule Dana’s sixth issue.

VIII. INDIGENCE

Dana filed an affidavit of indigence in conjunction with this appeal, and the 

trial court sustained objections to the affidavit. Dana challenged the trial court’s 

ruling, and this court concluded, contrary to the trial court, that she is indigent. 

William subsequently filed a motion to reconsider our ruling, arguing that Dana is 

not indigent. We decline to alter our previous determination that Dana is 

indigent, and we deny his motion.

 

3We also observe that Dana failed to argue how she would be harmed in 

the event that the decree was worded erroneously. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).
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IX. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of Dana’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE 

PANEL: GARDNER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: February 27, 2014