24 February 1999

Joint Doctrine

for

Barriers, Obstacles,

and Mine Warfare

Joint Pub 3-15
PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication provides barrier, obstacle,

and mine warfare guidelines for the planning

and execution of theater strategy, campaigns,

and joint operations across the range of

military operations. It focuses on national

policy, international law, and operational and

logistic considerations peculiar to the

preparation and conduct of joint military

operations involving barriers, obstacles, and

mine warfare.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under

the direction of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern

the joint activities and performance of the

Armed Forces of the United States in joint

operations and provides the doctrinal basis for

US military involvement in multinational and

interagency operations. It provides military

guidance for the exercise of authority by

combatant commanders and other joint

force commanders and prescribes doctrine for

joint operations and training. It provides

military guidance for use by the Armed Forces

in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not

the intent of this publication to restrict the

authority of the joint force commander (JFC)

from organizing the force and executing the

mission in a manner the JFC deems most

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the

accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in

this publication apply to the commanders

of combatant commands, subunified

commands, joint task forces, and subordinate

components of these commands. These

principles and guidance also may apply when

significant forces of one Service are attached

to forces of another Service or when

significant forces of one Service support

forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)

will be followed except when, in the judgment

of the commander, exceptional circumstances

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between

the contents of this publication and the

contents of Service publications, this

publication will take precedence for the

activities of joint forces unless the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in

coordination with the other members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more

current and specific guidance.

Commanders of forces operating as part of

a multinational (alliance or coalition)

military command should follow

multinational doctrine and procedures

ratified by the United States. For doctrine

and procedures not ratified by the United

States, commanders should evaluate and

follow the multinational command’s doctrine

and procedures, where applicable.

V. E. CLARK

Vice Admiral, US Navy

Director, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ii

Preface

Joint Pub 3-15

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

• General ..................................................................................................................... I-1

• Barrier, Obstacle, and Mine Employment .................................................................. I-1

• Threat ....................................................................................................................... I-3

• International Law and US Policy ............................................................................... I-4

CHAPTER II

JOINT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND PLANNING

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1

• NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance ........................................ II-1

• Joint Force ............................................................................................................... II-1

• Coordination ............................................................................................................ II-1

• Planning Considerations........................................................................................... II-2

• General Planning Sequence ...................................................................................... II-7

• Planning Support ..................................................................................................... II-9

CHAPTER III

EMPLOYMENT

• General .................................................................................................................. III-1

• Employment Principles .......................................................................................... III-1

• Land Operations..................................................................................................... III-3

• Air Operations ....................................................................................................... III-9

• Maritime Operations ............................................................................................. III-11

CHAPTER IV

COUNTERING ENEMY EMPLOYMENT

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1

• Land Operations..................................................................................................... IV-1

• Maritime Mine Countermeasures ........................................................................... IV-8

APPENDIX

A Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports ........................................................ A-1

B References ......................................................................................................... B-1

C Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ C-1
iv

Table of Contents

Joint Pub 3-15

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Barrier, Obstacle, and Mine Employment ....................................................... I-2

I-2 The Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions ....................................................... I-6

II-1 Planning Considerations................................................................................ II-4

II-2 Intelligence Support Tasks........................................................................... II-10

III-1 Employment Principles for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines.......................... III-2

III-2 Land Operations Support Resources ............................................................ III-3

III-3 Air-Delivered Scatterable Mines ................................................................ III-10

III-4 Types of Maritime Minefields .................................................................... III-12

IV-1 Breaching Fundamentals ............................................................................. IV-3

IV-2 Breaching Operations .................................................................................. IV-6

IV-3 Maritime Mine Countermeasures ................................................................ IV-9

IV-4 Maritime Mine Countermeasure Mission Objectives ................................. IV-13
v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

Provides Basic Concepts Regarding Barriers, Obstacles, and

Mines

Covers Joint Command, Control, and Planning

Discusses Friendly Employment of Barriers, Obstacles, and

Mines

Covers Countering Enemy Employment of Barriers,

Obstacles, and Mines

General

Barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment can have

significant operational impact with minimal risk to friendly

forces. Minefields can attrit enemy forces and destroy or

neutralize their equipment. Use of barriers, obstacles, and

minefields can also be used as a psychological tool to discern

enemy intentions and create uncertainty for the enemy

commander. In the defense, barriers, obstacles, and minefields

can immobilize and canalize enemy forces by taking advantage

of terrain by adding strength and depth to the battlefield. The

major disadvantages of using barriers, obstacles, and minefields

are the time, personnel, equipment, and materiel required to

construct and eventually clear them. Additionally, they can

be bypassed or cleared and may cause casualties to friendly

forces and noncombatants, as well as limit friendly mobility.

Strategic employment can enhance deterrence without posing

an offensive threat. Operational employment can help protect

friendly ports, lines of communications, and key facilities and

free combat forces for offensive employment. Tactical

employment is normally done to achieve tactical offensive or

defensive objectives. Barrier, obstacle, and minefield

employment can be used in land, maritime, and air

operations. The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible

for ensuring that employment of barriers, obstacles, and mines

conforms with international law and US policy. To facilitate

Employment of barriers,

obstacles, and mine

warfare can enhance a

commander’s ability to

mass combat power,

sustain the force, conduct

offensive or defensive

operations, achieve

surprise, and use or

restrict key terrain,

airfields, or sea routes.

There are three levels of

employment of barriers,

obstacles and mines:

strategic, operational, and

tactical.

Levels of Employment
vi

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-15

Joint force commanders

are subject to definitive US

policy and guidance

promulgated by the

National Command

Authorities and the

Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

To achieve the maximum

effect from an operational

barrier, obstacle, or

minefield, certain factors

must be considered.

compliance, rules of engagement (ROE) for employment of

mines are normally included in operation plans and operation

orders.

The National Command Authorities (NCA) decision making

process evaluates the probable effects of strategic barrier,

obstacle, and mine warfare employment across the range of

military operations. The employment of mines in international

waters or foreign territories (including territorial seas) is

generally a hostile act, thus requiring NCA authorization. ROE

are directives that authorize and delineate the circumstances

and limitations on the use of force. ROE are generally missionoriented and action-specific. Coordination must be achieved

between political goals, multinational forces, and intertheater

support.

Barriers, obstacles, and minefields that have operational

significance are usually formed around an existing terrain

feature (e.g., mountain chain or a strait) or a manmade

structure (e.g., air base, canal, highway, or bridge). The

element of surprise is very important. In the offense, the

priority of barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment is to

enhance and protect the friendly force’s ability to

maneuver. This is achieved by controlling the movement of

enemy ground and naval forces and degrading the operability

of enemy air bases. In the defense, the priority for barrier,

obstacle, and minefield emplacement is directed toward

degrading the enemy’s ability to maneuver, destroying or

attriting the enemy force, supporting economy of force

measures, and retaining key terrain or areas of significant

political, strategic, operational, or tactical value — in other

words, adding depth and time to the battlespace. The

employment of air-delivered scatterable mines normally

requires close coordination between other components during

both the planning and employment of phases of the operation.

Denial operations, deception tactics, and political and

psychological considerations are also a large factor in using

barriers, obstacles, and minefields.

Command and Control Considerations

Planning Considerations
vii

Executive Summary

Barrier, obstacle, and

minefield planning is a

top-down procedure.

Barriers, obstacles, and

minefields should be

evaluated from both an

offensive and a defensive

posture.

General Planning Sequence

The commander’s intent, intelligence preparation of the

battlespace, concept of operations, and fire support plan at

each level is part of the planning process. Barrier, obstacle,

and mine warfare planning requires timely and reliable allsource counterintelligence and intelligence support.

Planning for the use of barriers, obstacles, and mines involves

the acquisition, storage, maintenance, distribution, and

security of the material as well as communication support

to facilitate command and control of joint and multinational

operations.

Barriers, obstacles, and minefields should directly support

the JFC’s plan. They should be carefully matched to the

terrain with a maneuver concept that focuses on enemy forces

as objectives. Coverage by observation and, if necessary,

fire is essential in order to restrict enemy breaching efforts,

maneuver, and massing of forces and to increase the

destruction of the enemy. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields

are more effective when employed in depth. The different

types of resources range from land mines (conventional or

scatterable), sea mines, demolition obstacles (created by the

detonation of explosives), constructed obstacles, or flame

field expedients. Offensive employment focuses on isolating

the battlefield, facilitating economy of force, enhancing overall

force security, and blocking or delaying an enemy’s

withdrawal. Defensive employment focuses on degrading

enemy capabilities by disrupting combat formations and

delaying their movement, interfering with command and

control, and confusing enemy commanders. Reporting,

recording, and marking barriers, obstacles, and minefields

is imperative to ensure the safety of friendly forces and

noncombatants.

Employment Principles
viii

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-15

In conjunction with other

maritime and air assets,

the aim of maritime

mining is control of the

sea.

The basic types of

minefields are

characterized as offensive,

defensive, or protective.

Successful land operations

depend on the freedom to

maneuver.

The NCA has tasked the geographic combatant

commanders with the responsibility for the conduct of

maritime mine warfare within their areas of responsibility

and in support of other combatant commanders’ maritime

mine warfare requirements. The geographic combatant

commanders have delegated the responsibility for planning

maritime mine warfare operations to their Navy component

commanders. Mining can be used at all levels of war and

across the range of military operations to achieve the

objectives of friendly forces. Mining can delay and attrit

enemy maritime forces and can deny them the unrestricted

use of sea areas of passage. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields

can also protect friendly harbors, channels, and seaways as

well as shorelines susceptible to enemy amphibious operations.

Offensive minefields (which include strategic fields) are those

planted in enemy-controlled waters. Defensive minefields

are those employed in contested waters to intercept the transit

of enemy combatant forces. Protective minefields are those

employed in friendly waters to protect friendly ports, harbors,

or inshore sea lines of communications. A minelaying

operation consists of planning the minefield, preparing the

material and personnel to conduct the laying, planning the

laying mission, laying the mines, conducting follow-on

surveillance and, if required, replenishing the minefield.

Terrain conditions, enemy tactics, and integrated fires, barriers,

obstacles, and minefields can limit friendly maneuver

capability. Operations to counter the use of natural and

manmade barriers, obstacles, and minefields by enemy

forces may involve the employment of conventional,

airmobile, airdropped, amphibious, or special operations

forces. These operations are normally supported by combat

engineer forces. Intelligence collection plans, an element of

deception, and logistic support are important factors for

planning and operational support. The following must be

considered in countering enemy employment of barriers,

obstacles, and minefields: preparation; detection of minefields;

reconnaissance of enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefields;

bypass considerations; and breaching (whether it be in-stride

breaching, deliberate breaching, assault breaching, or

clandestine breaching). Recording, reporting, and marking

must be sent immediately through appropriate channels and

incorporated in intelligence data.

Maritime Operations

Countering Enemy Employment on Land
ix

Executive Summary

Mine countermeasures (MCM) reduce the threat and

effects of enemy-laid sea mines on both friendly naval force

and seaborne logistic force access to, and transit of, selected

waterways. MCM are divided into two broad areas: proactive

MCM destroy enemy mine manufacturing and storage

facilities or mine laying platforms before the mines are laid;

enabling MCM are designed to counter mines once they have

been laid through passive or active MCM. Three primary

passive measures are practiced: localization of the threat,

detection and avoidance of the minefield, and risk reduction.

Active MCM entail either physical interference with the

explosive functioning of the mine or actually destroying it

through minehunting or minesweeping. Before maritime

MCM operations, intelligence may indicate the types,

quantities, or locations of mine storage sites. A key to

countering any mine is a detailed knowledge of the mine

sensor and targeting circuitries. The MCM planning process

begins with an estimate of the situation and a mission

statement and results ultimately in production of an MCM

tasking order.

This publication provides guidance for the planning and

execution of barriers, obstacles, and mine warfare operations

across the range of military operations. Barriers, obstacles,

and mines can be employed during both offensive and

defensive operations on land and at sea. The emplacement

and/or construction of barriers, obstacles, and minefields

requires extensive coordination within the joint force.

Countering Enemy Employment at Sea

Maritime mine

countermeasures include

all actions undertaken to

prevent enemy mines from

altering friendly forces’

maritime plans or

operations.

CONCLUSION
x

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-15

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I-1

1. General

Employment of barriers, obstacles, and

mine warfare can, in concert with other

capabilities, enhance a commander’s ability

to mass combat power, sustain the force,

conduct offensive or defensive operations,

achieve surprise, and use key terrain, airfields,

or sea routes. A joint force commander (JFC)

must consider both friendly and enemy

employment of these capabilities in preparing

plans and conducting operations.

2. Barrier, Obstacle, and Mine

Employment

a. Advantages and disadvantages of

barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment

are listed in Figure I-1.

b. Levels of Employment

• Strategic Employment. Before

hostilities, barriers, obstacles, and

minefields can enhance deterrence

without posing an offensive threat.

Defensive employment along a hostile

land border can demonstrate friendly

resolve. Maritime defensive and

protective mining can help protect

friendly ports and waters. Pre-hostility

employment would be as directed by the

National Command Authorities (NCA).

NCA determination would be based, in

part, on the political signals sent and on

concurrence by affected friendly nations.

Should deterrence fail, offensive

maritime mining of enemy ports and

waters can constrict enemy seaborne

economic war sustainment efforts and

“Everything that is shot or thrown at you or dropped on you in war is most

unpleasant but of all horrible devices, the most terrifying. . . is the land mine.”

Sir William Slim, Unofficial History, 1959

reduce enemy ability to safely deploy

maritime forces. Similarly, offensive

employment of air-delivered scatterable

mines can deny or restrict enemy strategic

mobility and sustainability efforts.

• Operational Employment. Defensive

barrier, obstacle, and minefield

employment can help protect friendly

ports, lines of communications

(LOCs), and key facilities and free

combat forces for offensive

employment. Offensive employment

can protect friendly maneuver while

disrupting enemy ability to concentrate

or maneuver forces. Barriers and

obstacles having operational

significance usually differ in scale from

those having tactical significance.

However, size alone does not make an

obstacle operationally significant. At the

operational level, their primary use is the

restriction of enemy maneuver options

or the creation of friendly maneuver

options. Major natural terrain

features and a focus on the enemy

provide the foundation for the

development of an obstacle or barrier

plan. Operational barriers and obstacles

may be created by the composite effect

of many closely coordinated tactical

obstacles or by the reinforcement of

natural obstacles to form large terrain or

massive obstacles. An example of a

massive obstacle is the temporary

flooding caused by the destruction of a

major dam on a river. This, however, is

only temporary in nature. Mines can

also contribute to gaining air

superiority. Mines can delay efforts to
I-2

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-15

repair damage to air bases caused by

immediate effects munitions, thus

degrading or denying the base’s

capability to launch or recover aircraft.

Mines can also restrict the deployment

of mobile, surface-based air defenses, as

well as surface-to-surface systems,

because rapid movement in a mined area

increases the risk of a mine encounter.

Mines can also disrupt logistic

sustainment operations being performed

in the enemy’s rear area.

• Tactical Employment. Employment at

the tactical level, such as the creation or

countering of barriers, obstacles, or

minefields, is normally done to achieve

tactical offensive or defensive

objectives.

Figure I-1. Barrier, Obstacle, and Mine Employment

Provide the capability to inflict significant equipment and

psychological damage and personnel casualties on the enemy

Extend, strengthen, and deepen other defensive and offensive

measures to support the concept of operations

Immobilize the enemy until barriers, obstacles, or minefields can be

bypassed, breached, or cleared

Exploit geographic features

Free forces for other employment

Discern enemy intentions -- commitment of breach assets into a

minefield is a detectable indication of intent

Create uncertainty for the enemy commander

BARRIER, OBSTACLE, AND MINE EMPLOYMENT

ADVANTAGES

Creation and removal can consume a significant amount of time,

materiel, equipment, and transportation and will be manpower intensive

and hazardous

Can be bypassed, breached, or cleared

Can cause casualties to friendly forces and noncombatants, as well as

limit friendly mobility

Defensive minefields must be rendered safe following their operational

usefulness

DISADVANTAGES
I-3

Introduction

3. Threat

a. Land. US forces may encounter

barriers, obstacles, and minefields across

the range of military operations. This is

especially true in areas with highly restrictive

terrain such as mountains or jungles. US

forces may be faced with highly mobile enemy

forces supported by lethal air and ground fires.

Enemy surveillance capabilities may

determine the effectiveness of employing

friendly barriers, obstacles, and minefields.

The timing and methods of emplacement may

be determined by the air situation. Enemy

forces may make extensive use of barriers,

obstacles, and minefields, including modern

as well as technologically obsolete mines and

booby traps, remotely scatterable mines, and

a variety of countermeasures to defeat friendly

barriers, obstacles, and minefields. Because

of the relatively low cost of mines and their

worldwide availability, US forces must be

prepared to counter their use throughout

the range of military operations. In

addition, enemy use of nuclear munitions and

chemical mines must be anticipated. The

threat of terrorist employment of mines,

explosives, and booby traps may necessitate

defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability

of US personnel, equipment, and facilities.

b. Maritime. Enemy mine laying

operations may be conducted against friendly

ports, harbors, and sea lines of

communications (SLOCs). Mines may also

be used in other areas vital to US and

multinational maritime forces such as

amphibious objective, fire support, and carrier

battle force operating areas. The relatively

low cost of mines makes them an ideal

weapon for all nations with access to them.

The application of technology by industrially

advanced countries has produced a

sophisticated, effective form of maritime mine

warfare. Nevertheless, older mine

technologies remain effective. The ease of

laying mines by ship, aircraft, or submarine

presents a valid threat to a commander who

must rely on naval support or on seaborne

reinforcement and resupply. Maritime power

projection and resupply forces originate from

friendly ports. During amphibious operations,

assault and assault follow-on shipping must

transit narrows and operate in shallow waters.

The enemy can place these forces at risk, with

little cost to its own forces, by laying only a

few mines.

c. Air. Control of airspace is essential to

effective surface operations. Enemy use of

mines could pose a major threat to the ability

to conduct effective air operations. The enemy

might employ sea mines in an area where

aircraft carriers would need to operate to be

within effective range of the enemy. The

enemy might also employ scatterable mines,

along with immediate effects munitions, in

attacks against friendly air bases ashore.

Scatterable mines could seriously disrupt and

US forces must be prepared to encounter

minefields throughout the range of military

operations.
I-4

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-15

THE MINING OF HAIPHONG

In a surprise operation at 0859 on 8 May 1972, Commander Roger Sheets led

three Marine A-6 intruder and six Navy A-7 Corsair attack planes from Coral

Sea (CVA 43) over the river approaches to Haiphong through which most of

North Vietnam’s imported war material and all of its fuel supply passed. The

American planes took only two minutes to lay their strings of thirty-six 1000-

pound, Mark 52 mines before heading back to their waiting carrier. In

succeeding days and months, other carrier aircraft laid thousands of mines

and 500-pound, Mark 36 Destructors in the seaways of secondary ports and

“reseeded” the Haiphong approaches.

The results were dramatic. For the remainder of 1972, twenty-seven SinoSoviet bloc merchant ships remained trapped in Haiphong. None of the nations

trading with Hanoi elected to risk steaming their merchant ships through the

activated American minefields. The mining campaign, in conjunction with US

air attacks on North Vietnam’s land lines of communication, severely curtailed

the supply of vital munitions to Communist forces mounting the “Easter

Offensive” in South Vietnam.

SOURCE: Dr. Edward J. Marolda, “Operation END SWEEP,”

Naval Historical Center, 1993

delay air base launch and recovery operations,

disrupt logistic sustainment operations to the

air base, and thereby limit friendly air

operations.

4. International Law and US

Policy

The JFC is responsible for ensuring that

employment of barriers, obstacles, and

mines conforms with international law and

US policy. To facilitate compliance, rules of

engagement (ROE) for employment of mines

are normally included in operation plans

(OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs).

Enemy or friendly employment of barriers,

obstacles, and mines that does not comply

with international law should be documented

and reported. The JFC staff judge advocate

and political advisor can assist by being

actively involved with the JFC staff during

the planning and execution of mine warfare.

a. International Law. International law

and practice regulate the use of the seas, each

nation’s rights regarding its national territory

and waters, the initiation and conduct of armed

conflict, and limitations regarding

employment and types of weapons.

• The law of armed conflict postulates two

counterbalancing principles: military

necessity and the avoidance of

unnecessary suffering. The principle

of military necessity authorizes the use

of force required to accomplish the

mission. It does not authorize acts

otherwise prohibited by the law of war.

The principle of avoiding unnecessary

suffering (also referred to as superfluous

injury) prohibits injury to persons or

damage to objects that may be considered

superfluous to achievement of the

intended objective. It limits injury to

combatants, collateral injury to civilians

not taking a direct part in hostilities, and

collateral damage to civilian objects if

wanton or excessive. The law of war

prohibition on unnecessary suffering

constitutes acknowledgment that, in war,

there is necessary suffering. A third

principle, proportionality, may be
I-5

Introduction

viewed as a fulcrum for balancing

military necessity and unnecessary

suffering. Finally, distinction is the

customary international law obligation of

parties to a conflict to engage only in

military operations in which the effects

distinguish between the civilian

population (or individual civilians not

taking a direct part in hostilities), and

combatant forces, directing the

application of force solely against the

latter. Each of these principles has been

considered in the development of treaties

relating to the employment of mines and

in US doctrine.

• The United Nations (UN) Charter

admonishes member states to refrain

from the threat or use of force against

the territorial integrity or political

independence of any state, except in two

situations: individual or collective self

defense, and as authorized by the Security

Council or other competent regional

agency. The employment of mines in

these situations must comply with all

relevant treaties and customary law.

• The Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907,

which addresses the use of sea mines, has

achieved almost universal acceptance

by nations. The relevant provisions of

this convention are summarized in Figure

I-2. No belligerent has as yet asserted

that the laying of mines developed since

1907 (magnetic, acoustic pressure) is not

governed by Hague VIII.

• The 1980 United Nations Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use

of Certain Conventional Weapons Which

May be Deemed to be Excessively

Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate

Effects, commonly referred to as the

Convention on Conventional Weapons

(CCW) is a law of war treaty governing

the use of certain conventional weapons

which may be deemed to be excessively

injurious or to have indiscriminate

effects. Restrictions include: (1)

requirements to record minefield

locations and disclosure of location at

conclusion of hostilities; (2) requirements

on use of mines or booby traps in areas

containing concentrations of civilians;

and (3) prohibition on types of booby

traps; and (4) requirements to mark

minefields.

Note: The CCW and its Protocols I and

II entered into force for the United States

on 24 September 1995. On 7 January

1997, the President transmitted an

amended Protocol II (mines, booby traps,

and other devices), as amended on 3 May

1996, 35 I.L.M. 1209 (1996), to the

Senate for advice and consent to

ratification. See 33 Weekly Comp. Pres.

Doc 14 (Jan. 13, 1997).

• The Convention on the Prohibition of the

Use, Stockpiling, Production and

Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on

their Destruction, among other things,

prohibits the use, stockpiling, and transfer

of all antipersonnel mines. It also

prohibits assisting, encouraging, or

inducing anyone else to do so. The

United States is not party to and has not

signed this treaty. However, many US

allies have, and this fact must be

considered in planning.

• There are two international agreements

that bear indirectly on maritime mine

warfare.

•• The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of

1971 prohibits placing any nuclear or

other weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) on the seabed or subsoil thereof

beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. WMD

other than nuclear weapons are not defined

in this or any other arms control treaty.
I-6

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-15

•• The navigation and overflight

provisions of the 1982 UN Law of the

Sea Convention reflect customary

international law and codify the rights

and duties of nations with respect to

various uses of the oceans. Mine-laying

operations must consider the applicability

of this Convention and the rights and

freedoms enjoyed by all nations.

b. US Policy. US policy on barrier,

obstacle, and mine employment is addressed

in Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, “Law of

Land Warfare,” Naval Warfare Publication

(NWP) 3-15.3, “Mining Operations,” and

Figure I-2. The Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions

THE HAGUE CONVENTION (VIII) PROVISIONS

The provisions of this convention forbid...

the laying of unanchored automatic contact mines that

do not become harmless within 1 hour after whoever lays

them loses control over them and of anchored automatic

contact mines that do not become harmless immediately

upon breaking free of their mooring

the mining of enemy waters and ports for the sole

purpose of intercepting commercial shipping

Moreover, the convention requires...

belligerents to do their utmost to render anchored

automatic contact mines harmless within a limited time

when a belligerent can no longer maintain surveillance

over such mines, it must notify other governments and

ship owners of minefield locations as soon as military

conditions permit

at the close of war, parties to the Convention must do

their utmost to remove mines they have laid and report

the position of anchored automatic contact mines they

laid off the coast of another

NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1, “Commander’s

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations”

(section 7.7 and 9.2). US forces do not use

non self-destructing antipersonnel landmines

except for demining training and countermine

operations in the defense of US and allied

forces in the Republic of Korea. US forces

fully comply with the Protocol on Prohibition

or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby

Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3

May 1996, annexed to the Convention on the

Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of

Certain Conventional Weapons Which May

be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to

Have Indiscriminate Effects.
CHAPTER II

JOINT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND PLANNING

II-1

1. General

There are no special command and control

(C2) arrangements for employing or

countering barriers, obstacles, and mines.

There are, however, certain factors that should

be considered during joint planning.

2. NCA and Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Guidance

JFCs are subject to definitive US policy

and guidance promulgated by the NCA

through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (CJCS). The NCA decision making

process evaluates the probable effects of

strategic barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare

employment across the range of military

operations.

3. Joint Force

a. Joint Force Commander. JFC

authority to perform those functions of

command that involve organizing, planning,

employing, directing, and coordinating are

discussed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action

Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and Joint Pub 3-0,

“Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

b. Mine Release Authority. The

employment of mines in international waters

or foreign territories (including territorial seas)

is generally a hostile act, thus requiring

NCA authorization. The laying of mines in

allied territory or waters is permissible during

peacetime with host nation (HN) permission

and NCA authorization. The JFC will ensure

that employment conforms with both

“The mine issues no official communiqués.”

Admiral William V. Pratt, USN

(In Newsweek magazine, 5 Oct 1942)

international law and guidance and policy

promulgated by the NCA.

c. Rules of Engagement. ROE are

directives issued by competent military

authority which delineate the circumstance

and limitations under which US forces will

initiate and/or continue combat engagement

with other forces encountered. ROE are

generally mission-oriented and actionspecific. ROE promulgated by the

geographic combatant commander are

based on guidance provided by the NCA

through CJCS Instruction 3121.01, “Standing

Rules of Engagement for US Forces.” This

guidance reflects political, legal, operational,

and diplomatic factors that may restrict

combat operations. ROE are required

throughout the range of military operations

to ensure compliance with the laws of war

and NCA guidance. Combatant commander

pre- and post-hostility ROE and OPLAN

ROE should address authority to emplace

barriers, obstacles, and mines, including

scatterable mines and self destructing

antipersonnel mines. Following NCA release

of these elements for operations, ROE should

address their employment by US forces and

the prevention, denial, or countering of their

employment by the enemy.

4. Coordination

a. Political. The US Ambassador to a

foreign country is responsible, through the

Department of State, to the President for

directing and coordinating the activities of

US Government personnel in that nation.

This authority does not apply to personnel

under the command of combatant
II-2

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-15

commanders whose responsibility is to the

NCA. Nevertheless, the combatant commands

and appropriate ambassadors’ Country Teams

are responsible for maintaining close

coordination throughout the range of military

operations. This is particularly true for

barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare

employment before a conflict on the

sovereign soil or in national waters of a

friendly nation. The US Ambassador’s

efforts can be invaluable in gaining a

cooperative country’s consent to such actions.

The combatant commander’s political advisor,

who serves as the point of contact with the

Department of State, may be used as the

conduit for these coordination efforts.

b. Multinational Forces. US forces may

conduct operations within the framework of

an alliance, coalition, or other international

arrangement. The coordination and planning

for joint operations is applicable for

multinational operations as well. Planning

for land and maritime barrier, obstacle,

and mine warfare should be coordinated

among multinational forces at all levels.

This will preclude limiting friendly operational

maneuver; conflicting, duplicative, or

divergent operations; and possible fratricide

among multinational forces. Furthermore,

information on both friendly and enemy

barriers, obstacles, and minefields in the joint

operations area must be exchanged in a timely

manner, consistent with established security

guidelines. Joint force commanders must

consider limitations that the Convention on

the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,

Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel

Mines and on Their Destruction may place

on US allies, since many of them may be

proscribed from activities associated with

mine warfare.

c. Intertheater. Planning will develop

locations, communications, and logistic

support requirements for potential strategic

and operational barriers, obstacles, and

minefields. Plans that could impact on

other theaters should be coordinated to

prevent potential mutual interference. This

is particularly important for maritime mine

laying that could affect strategic movement

to or from other theaters. Information

concerning the locations of enemy-laid

maritime minefields that could affect strategic

movement must also be exchanged among

theaters.

5. Planning Considerations

a. General. To achieve the maximum

effect from an operational barrier, obstacle,

or minefield, certain factors must be

considered.

• Barriers, obstacles, and minefields are

usually formed around an existing

terrain feature (e.g., mountain chain or

a strait) or a manmade structure (e.g., air

base, canal, highway, or bridge).

Although there is little flexibility

in positioning these large-scale

obstructions, flexibility exists in selecting

and designating those features that will

be enhanced or reinforced. Operational

barriers, obstacles, and minefields are

placed to manipulate the enemy in such

a way that supports the commander’s

intent and scheme of maneuver and

should be observed and/or covered by

fire.

• The effects that these operational

barriers, obstacles, and minefields will

have on both the friendly and enemy

forces’ ability to maneuver on land and

sea or to conduct effective air operations

must be analyzed. Operational barriers,

obstacles, and minefields do more than

just degrade the maneuver of enemy

forces. Because of their size and the

pattern of placement, they virtually

dictate the maneuver options of both

friendly and enemy forces.
II-3

Joint Command, Control, and Planning

• The element of surprise is achieved in

a different manner through the

employment of operational barriers,

obstacles, and minefields. Because of

their operational significance, both

friendly and enemy forces usually know

of their existence and location. Surprise

can result when a barrier, obstacle, or

minefield perceived by one force as

significant fails to effectively obstruct

their opponent. This implies that the

operational significance of a barrier,

obstacle, or minefield depends both on

its physical obstruction capability and the

way in which the opposing forces

perceive it. Joint forces can attain and

enhance surprise through the use of

rapid employment means such as airor artillery-delivered scatterable mines

that permit rapid mining anywhere in the

operational area. These can confront the

attacker with a completely new situation

almost instantly. The use of hard-todetect employment means such as

submarines is another way to achieve

surprise. Surprise can be further gained

through the use of lanes and gaps, phony

minefields and obstacles, and selfdestructing and/or self-deactivating

mines. Friendly forces should avoid

readily discernible or repetitive

employment and utilize deceptive

measures. By varying the type, location,

and design, the enemy’s understanding

and breaching of friendly barriers,

obstacles, and minefields is made more

difficult.

b. Offensive. In the offense, the priority

of barrier, obstacle, and minefield

employment (to include air-delivered

scatterable mines) is to canalize or delay the

enemy’s movements and enhance and

protect the friendly force’s ability to

maneuver. This is achieved by controlling

the movement of enemy ground and naval

forces and degrading the operability of enemy

air bases. The enemy’s ability to counterattack

or reinforce is restricted and the operational

area is isolated. Barriers, obstacles, and mines

have five main objectives in offensive

operations (See Figure II-1).

• Prevent Enemy Reinforcement or

Counterattack. To prevent the enemy

from reinforcing or counterattacking,

critical routes are interdicted to hinder

movement of reserves and logistics.

Speed and depth are vital.

• Facilitate Economy of Force. Barriers,

obstacles, and minefields allow fewer

forces to defend selected sectors,

allowing relieved maneuver units and

other combat resources to be

concentrated in other zones for attack.

Similarly, they become a combat

multiplier, amplifying the firepower

effectiveness of the friendly forces

defending them by creating optimum

fields of fire. Easily defended

chokepoints can be effectively reinforced

with obstacles, supported by on-call fire

support, and held by relatively small

forces.

• Provide Security. Barriers, obstacles,

and minefields can be used in critical

areas along the flanks of advancing forces

to restrict enemy attacks. At the

operational level, river systems,

mountain ranges, deserts, and snow- or

ice-covered areas are natural barriers and

obstacles that can enhance flank security.

Shallows, reefs, and other maritime

hazards can be used at sea. Existing

barriers and obstacles can be

strengthened with reinforcing obstacles

and minefields to counter an enemy

threat.

• Degrade Enemy Air Capability. Mines

can pose a significant obstacle to the

enemy’s ability to recover and resume

operations after an air base attack. Any

delays can provide friendly forces with
II-4

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-15

an important opportunity to further

suppress the enemy’s ability to defend

against follow-on attacks, leading to the

enemy’s loss of control of the air.

• Fix the Enemy. Air- and artillerydelivered scatterable mines and special

operations forces (SOF) emplaced mines

can disrupt and delay the enemy’s retreat

during pursuit and exploitation. They can

also be used to disrupt the commitment

of the enemy’s reserve and follow-up

forces.

c. Defensive. In the defense, the priority

for barrier, obstacle, and minefield

emplacement is directed toward degrading

the enemy’s ability to maneuver. A

secondary objective is to destroy or attrit the

enemy force. Other objectives include the

support of economy of force measures and

the retention of key terrain or areas of

significant political, strategic, operational, or

tactical value (See Figure II-1).

• Integrate Systems. Defensive

reinforcement is achieved by integrating

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Prevent enemy reinforcement or counterattack

Facilitate economy of force

Provide security

Degrade enemy air capabilities

Fix the enemy

Integrate systems of barriers, obstacles, minefields,

and fires

Identify reinforcing obstacles and minefields early

Identify assets to restore the integrity of a barrier,

obstacle, or minefield if breached by the enemy

Create massive obstacles in land operations

OFFENSIVE

Enhances and protects the friendly force's ability to maneuver

DEFENSIVE

Directed toward degrading the enemy's ability to maneuver

Figure II-1. Planning Considerations
II-5

Joint Command, Control, and Planning

systems of barriers, obstacles, minefields,

and fires. The objective is to degrade

enemy movement, assist counterattacks,

and facilitate future friendly offensive

operations.

• Identify Obstacles and Minefields.

Reinforcing obstacles and minefields are

identified as early as possible, because

the development of a barrier, obstacle,

or minefield system in depth requires

time, the commitment of engineer or

specialized resources, extensive logistic

support, and/or other forces such as

overwatching maneuver elements.

• Identify Assets. Plans include the

identification of assets to restore the

integrity of a barrier, obstacle, or

minefield if breached by the enemy. This

is especially important if the obstruction

is critical to operational success.

• Create Massive Obstacles. In

operations involving land forces, massive

obstacle creation should be considered

in situations where friendly forces control

a major dam on a river. Control of the

dam provides the option of limited,

controlled flooding or destruction of the

dam to create both a destructive flood

surge and flooded areas. However, the

effect on friendly maneuver and future

operations should be evaluated.

d. Air-Delivered Scatterable Mines. The

employment of air-delivered scatterable mines

requires close coordination between

components during both the planning and

employment phases of the operation. The

coordination for the employment of airdelivered scatterable mines is a combined

effort of the Joint Targeting Coordination

Board (JTCB), the joint force engineer, and

the joint force air component commander

(JFACC). The JFACC is responsible for

planning and delivery of the munition. The

planning and integration of minefields into

the barrier plan is the responsibility of the joint

force engineer. The JTCB is responsible for

facilitating joint forces targeting operations

by establishing a forum to ensure support and

synchronization of JFC objectives as well as

integrating and deconflicting all joint force

component operations. To ensure a

coordinated effort, a general concept of

operations is developed that includes such

issues as identification of objectives, timing,

minefield placement, and ingress or egress

routes. Coordination must be effected if mines

are deployed where friendly ground, SOF, or

combat search and rescue forces may be

A main priority in defense is the degradation of enemy ability to maneuver.
II-6

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-15

operating or in locations that lie within the

ground force’s boundaries. Once emplaced,

the mines remain active until detonated or

until the mines self-destruct or self-disarm

after a preset period of time. Required selfdestruct or self-disarm times depend upon the

operational or tactical situation and are not

necessarily related to the proximity of friendly

forces. US air-delivered scatterable mines are

all designed to self-destruct. Air-delivered

scatterable mines are selected when they are

the optimum means available to support the

JFC’s concept of operations.

• Employing air-delivered scatterable

mines requires prior coordination with

and approval from the commander

within whose boundaries the mines are

employed. Specific coordination

procedures should provide an optimum

balance between requirements for control

and flexibility in execution. In areas close

to friendly forces or where friendly forces

may operate before the mines selfdestruct, detailed coordination is

essential. Upon approval, the location of

employment will be reported by the

employing force to the appropriate

ground force commander.

• Air-delivered scatterable mines are most

effective when combined with other

weapons to delay, disrupt, destroy, or

turn enemy forces. They can

complement and extend mine

emplacement capabilities and effects

beyond the range of land or maritime

forces’ internal mine-delivery systems.

For example, air-delivered scatterable

mines can be used to secure flanks of

ground units, close breaches in

minefields and obstacles, or protect an

amphibious objective area (AOA).

• In early stages of contingency operations

or at extended ranges, air-deliverable

scatterable mines may be the only

available mining capability.

• Minefields employed in direct support of

ground forces have limited effectiveness

if unobserved and not covered by some

means of fire or fire support.

• If air-delivered scatterable mines are the

only type of ordnance that will satisfy

the ground force commander’s

requirements, their use should be

specified in the ground force

commander’s request. Similarly, if

employment of air-delivered scatterable

mines in a specified area is not acceptable

(i.e., the desired effect) this should also

be specified in the ground force plan.

e. Denial Considerations. A denial

measure prohibits or restricts the enemy use

of space, personnel, supplies, or facilities.

Denial operations may include destruction,

removal, or the erection of obstructions.

• The combatant commander

establishes the theater policies

governing denial operations in

coordination with allied or friendly

governments. Detailed planning and

execution are subsequently delegated to

subordinate commanders. In developing

denial policies, consideration must be

given to those facilities and areas

required to support life in the posthostility period regardless of the

outcome of the conflict. The long-range

social, economic, political, and

psychological effects of destruction of

civil properties and material must be

weighed against the military advantages

achieved. The purpose of the law of war

toward denial operations is to ensure

that the violence of hostilities is

directed toward the enemy’s forces and

is not used to cause purposeless,

unnecessary human misery and physical

destruction.

• Denial operations usually do not focus

upon immediate enemy destruction, but
II-7

Joint Command, Control, and Planning

rather on contributing to future

friendly operations. Denial operations

may have a major impact on the

civilian population. Denial targets

frequently involve civil facilities and

structures, such as electrical power

generation facilities and ports, and

require careful judgment regarding the

military importance versus the impact on

the civilian population.

f. Deception. Deception is defined as those

measures designed to mislead the enemy by

manipulation, distortion, or falsification of

evidence to induce the enemy to react in a

manner prejudicial to enemy interests. There

are two basic approaches to deception. The

first is to increase uncertainty in order to

forestall the enemy’s timely reaction. The

second is to misdirect the enemy toward a

line of action that favors friendly operations.

Barriers, obstacles, and minefields can

support the aims of both approaches. Time

and enemy surveillance techniques will

determine the best method of employing

barriers, obstacles, and minefields in support

of deception. Allowing the enemy to observe

units or vessels engaged or preparing to

engage in seemingly realistic employment or

breaching operations transmits a specific

message to the enemy. Operations must be

planned so that their execution will not

inadvertently reveal friendly plans. The

employment of phony obstacles and

minefields are deception techniques.

Allowing the enemy access to manipulated

or distorted friendly OPLANs that support

observations of friendly activity may

significantly enhance the believability of the

deception.

g. Political and Psychological. The

primary objective of employing barriers,

obstacles, and minefields may be deterrence

rather than physical destruction. Accordingly,

political and psychological considerations

are key aspects that have far-reaching

implications. From a political perspective,

such measures will signal friendly resolve to

take actions required to protect national

interests. Psychological deterrence is also

achieved. Although the degree of

psychological deterrence cannot be quantified,

the mere suspicion that mines have been laid

can adversely affect enemy planning and

operations in excess of the actual threat. The

psychological impact of mines can be

increased by news-media exposure of their

existence and lack of a ready capability to

implement countermeasures.

6. General Planning Sequence

Barrier, obstacle, and minefield planning

is integrated with operations and fire

support planning. It is integrated with the

commander’s intent, intelligence preparation

of the battlespace, concept of operations, and

fire support plans at each level. This provides

for the synchronization and focusing of

friendly forces’ efforts before the plan is

passed to the next subordinate level.

Continual coordination between all levels

of command ensures the best utilization of

natural barriers and obstacles and

minimizes requirements for reinforcing

obstacles and minefields.

a. The planning sequence begins with the

receipt of a mission or task and ends with the

completion of a campaign or major operation.

b. During the initiation phase, the JFC

may issue a warning order to subordinate

commanders and allocate barrier, obstacle,

and minefield employment and support

tasks for planning.

c. During the concept development

phase, the JFC conducts a detailed

intelligence analysis of missions, enemy

forces, friendly forces, terrain, and time

available. From this analysis, the JFC

expresses the overall intent and issues

planning guidance. This guidance normally

includes the identification of areas or zones
II-8

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-15

that require operational-level barriers,

obstacles, and/or minefields; critical targets

or enemy functions for attack; sequencing of

barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment

and desired effects; logistic priorities; ROE;

and the employment of obstacles and

minefields to support denial operations.

d. During the plan development phase,

the JFC’s staff initially assesses the terrain,

weather, and climate to identify existing

operational-level barriers, obstacles, and limits

imposed by expected weather. The need for

additional barriers, obstacles, and

minefields is identified. Areas suitable for

enhancement and reinforcement are identified.

Special attention is given to identifying areas

that could be reinforced to form massive area

obstacles. The terrain is evaluated from both

friendly and enemy perspectives. The

evaluation considers the enemy’s ability and

willingness to cross difficult terrain. Friendly

capabilities should not be assumed to be the

same as enemy capabilities. Both friendly and

enemy perspectives and capabilities are

evaluated to estimate options available to each

side. The terrain and climate assessments

during the initial stage of the plan

development phase will enhance the

integration of barriers, obstacles, and

minefields into the overall plan.

e. Once the JFC’s staff has determined what

operational barriers and obstacles exist within

the operational area, formulation of the

formal barrier and obstacle plan is

initiated. This may include the employment

of reinforcing barriers, obstacles, and

minefields. Emphasis is placed on

maximizing the effectiveness of existing

barriers and obstacles. Each barrier and

obstacle plan requires an estimate of possible

or probable enemy actions to identify

opportunities for offensive and defensive

action. When completed, the plan should

clearly delineate operational barriers,

obstacles, and minefields and their

intended effect on the campaign or

operation.

• The JFC and JFC staff must consider the

various component weapons systems

and delivery assets available to deliver

or emplace the selected reinforcing

barriers, obstacles, and minefields. The

delivery and/or emplacement assets must

be identified and allocated accordingly.

The JFC is also responsible for

integrating this support into the overall

campaign or operation.

• The barrier and obstacle plan formulation

should also identify areas that must

remain free of obstacles or minefields

to facilitate friendly maneuver. Such

areas are necessary to exploit the

advantages gained from enemy reactions

and vulnerabilities. At the tactical level

in ground operations, this is achieved

through the designation of obstacle zones

and belts.

• Although sustainment is a Service

component responsibility, the JFC

must consider the capabilities,

vulnerabilities, and limitations of

logistic systems in the planning and

execution of the operation. To achieve

flexibility, the JFC must anticipate

current and future requirements, the

potential for degradation by enemy

action, and the ability to sustain

operations throughout an entire operation

or campaign.

• The barrier, obstacle, and minefield

guidance contained in the OPLAN

should provide for the necessary control

of obstacle and/or minefield areas and

obstacle and/or minefield restricted

areas. It may designate critical obstacles

and reserve the execution of selected

obstacles. However, restrictions placed

on subordinate commanders should be
II-9

Joint Command, Control, and Planning

limited to those deemed necessary by the

JFC. At a minimum, guidance should

delineate any special reporting,

recording, and marking responsibilities.

• The development of the joint campaign

or OPLAN necessarily includes

estimates from the component

commanders as to how their assets and

capabilities can best support the JFC’s

objectives.

f. The JFC reviews and approves the

concept of employment for operational

barriers, obstacles, and minefields as well

as the denial plan. As part of this approval

process, the JFC verifies that the concept of

operations meets intent and guidance and

facilitates synchronization to produce the most

effective employment of operational barriers,

obstacles, and mines.

g. Once formal approval of the OPLAN is

obtained, subordinate and supporting

commanders develop their own plans. In

doing so, they can determine how existing and

reinforcing barriers, obstacles, and minefields

will affect maneuver, what conditions are

imposed on battle plans, and how to employ

supporting obstacles. Although this is

addressed as a separate step, subordinate and

supporting commanders develop plans

concurrently with those of the JFC.

h. The barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare

plan is published, if required, as an appendix

of an annex to the theater campaign plan,

OPLAN, or OPORD. In addition, the

reporting of execution or employment of

barriers, obstacles, and minefields should be

addressed in OPLAN or OPORD annexes and

appendixes (e.g., ROE and in unit standard

operation procedures).

i. Although employment is addressed

separately in this publication, planning and

employment are a continuous process. As

one operation is executed, the next one is

planned, coordinated, and executed. In

addition, planners must closely monitor

execution and be prepared to adapt the

plan, and future plans, in response to

changing circumstances. This may involve

reapportioning and reallocating assets and

reprioritizing support for barrier, obstacle, and

minefield emplacement.

j. Plans for the removal or deactivation of

mines, barriers, and obstacles may need to be

formulated and employed during or after

hostilities or other operations.

7. Planning Support

a. Intelligence. Planning for operations

involving barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare

requires timely, continuous, and reliable allsource counterintelligence and intelligence

support (See Figure II-2).

• Collection, production, and

dissemination of intelligence

information must start during

peacetime. Tasks include identifying

and evaluating worldwide mineproduction facilities and storage

capabilities (to include on-hand

quantities). For each potential operation,

analysts must evaluate types, quantities,

and capabilities of mines, barriers, and

obstacles available to the adversary. The

evaluation includes technical information

on each type of mine (characteristics,

description, capability, and vulnerabilities).

This information should be posted on

Intelink and Intelink-S and disseminated

(hardcopy and electronically) to planning

staffs.

• During campaign or operation

planning, Joint Intelligence Preparation

of the Battlespace is used to identify

enemy mine, barrier, and obstacle storage

locations; topographic, hydrographic,

and oceanographic information; actual

and potential locations for enemy mine,
II-10

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-15

barrier, and obstacle employment; the

adversary’s doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and procedures for countering and

employing them; fire support to support

mine, barriers, and obstacles (doctrine,

capabilities, unit locations); breaching

capabilities (assets, doctrine and tactics,

techniques, and procedures); and current

and future operational capabilities (See

Joint Pub 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Joint

Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlespace”). Intelligence should

provide and update this information

to the JFC and staff in time for the staff

to include it in the planning process.

• Once conflict begins, intelligence

collection (including reconnaissance

and combat units) must: locate enemy

barrier, mine, and obstacle locations;

identify and locate enemy fire support;

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTTASKS

Tasks include identifying and evaluating...

worldwide mine-production capabilities and facilities

types, quantities, and capabilities of mines, barriers, and

obstacles available

technical information on each type of mine

(characteristics, description, capability, and

vulnerabilities)

enemy mine, barrier, and obstacle storage locations

topographic, hydrographic, and oceanographic

information

actual and potential locations for enemy mine, barrier,

and obstacle employment

the enemy's doctrine, tactics, techniques, and

procedures for employing mines, barriers, and obstacles

enemy fire support for mines, barriers, and obstacles

(doctrine, capabilities, unit locations)

enemy breaching capabilities (assets, doctrine, and

tactics, techniques, and procedures)

the enemy's current and future operational capabilities

Figure II-2. Intelligence Support Tasks
II-11

Joint Command, Control, and Planning

identify remaining enemy employment

capabilities; and locate enemy breaching

assets. This information, particularly any

updates, must be pushed down to tactical

echelons. Given known enemy doctrine,

tactics, techniques, and procedures,

intelligence must advise the JFC as to

how the enemy will react to friendly

operations.

Doctrine and responsibilities for

intelligence support are addressed in JP 2-0,

“Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to

Operations.”

b. Logistics. Planning for the use of

barriers, obstacles, and mines involves the

acquisition, storage, maintenance,

distribution, and security of the materiel.

Logistic planners must be included early in

the planning process to ensure proper

coordination and timely acquisition of the

resources that will be needed to execute the

plan.

• Acquisition and Storage. Anticipation

is key to a sound acquisition and storage

plan. Planners must ensure that the

proper mix of mines and minefield,

obstacle, and barrier emplacing

materials and counterobstacle

equipment and materiel are made

available in time to meet the demands of

the OPLAN. Requirements at the

operational level must be anticipated to

prevent delays in delivery of the material

to a theater. Unless they are special

munitions, the storage of mines will

normally be handled like any other

munitions.

• Distribution. The execution of this

logistic function is crucial to the success

of the OPLAN. It helps transform the

OPLAN into tactical operations. Logistic

planners must ensure the availability of

sufficient resources to transport

barrier and/or obstacle material and

mines to the place of employment or

deployment.

• Legal Concerns. Because the use,

possession, transfer, and stockpiling of

landmines are highly regulated under

various international agreements,

international movement and storage of

mines must be fully coordinated to avoid

legal and political problems.

c. Communications. Planning for and

employment of barriers, obstacles, and mines

require communication and emplacement to

facilitate joint and multinational coordination

and information flow to inform friendly forces

(and, when necessary, civilians) of locations.

These activities require that secure,

interoperable command, control, and

communications systems are available to

support the mission. This includes

developing an architecture and coordinating

systems, personnel, automation, frequencies,

and cryptographic support. To facilitate

interoperability, ensure that the architecture

developed is compliant with the standards set

forth in Department of Defense Joint

Technical Architecture.
II-12

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-15

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER III

EMPLOYMENT

III-1

1. General

The objective of barrier, obstacle, and mine

warfare employment is to delay, disrupt, and

attrit enemy forces and protect friendly forces.

This employment is not an end in itself, but is

an adjunct to other military capabilities. This

chapter addresses responsibilities and

considerations used to canalize, delay, disrupt,

and/or attrit the enemy and protect friendly

forces relative to employment of barriers,

obstacles, and mines in support of land,

maritime, and air operations.

2. Employment Principles

Employment principles are listed in Figure

III-1 and described below:

a. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields

should be evaluated from both an offensive

and a defensive posture. Current doctrine

allows the JFC a range of offensive and

defensive options. Typically, the option

selected will combine elements of static and

dynamic types of defense or a combination

of defense along one sector and offense in

another sector.

b. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields

should directly support the JFC’s plan.

They should be carefully matched to the

terrain with a maneuver concept that focuses

on enemy forces as objectives.

c. Reinforcing obstacles should be

integrated with existing barriers and

obstacles to support the JFC’s intent and

“Gentlemen, I don’t know whether we will make history tomorrow, but we will

certainly change geography.”

Sir Herbert Plumer

(To press conference the day before the

blowing up of Messines Ridge, 6 June 1917)

operational concept. When possible, these

reinforcing obstacles are used to close gaps

or routes between existing barriers or

obstacles. Reinforcing obstacles may also be

employed on their own to support tactical

objectives. The locations selected for these

obstacles should be difficult to bypass, thereby

delaying the enemy or requiring the enemy

to change plans.

d. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields are

more effective when employed in depth. A

series of simple obstacles is often more

effective than one large elaborate obstacle.

Any barrier, obstacle, or minefield can be

breached if the enemy is willing to expend

the time, effort, and resources necessary.

When employed in depth, the cumulative

effect of successive barriers, obstacles, and/

or minefields exposes the enemy to friendly

fires and disrupts the enemy’s plan of action.

e. By varying the type, design, and

location of reinforcing obstacles, the

enemy’s breaching operation is made more

difficult. Scatterable mines permit rapid

mining anywhere in the battle area,

confronting the attacker with a completely

new situation almost instantly. The selfdestruct feature of the scatterable mine also

provides surprise by allowing unexpected

friendly movement through a recently mined

area where mines have just self-destructed.

However, the locations of these recently

mined areas must be furnished immediately

to affected friendly forces, because a very

small percentage of mines may not have selfdestructed as designed. Surprise is also
III-2

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

achieved by using phony obstacles that

deceive the enemy as to the extent, pattern,

and density of the barrier, obstacle, or

minefield system. Phony obstacles may

produce greater results once the enemy has

been sensitized to expect real obstacles and

minefields.

f. The effectiveness of barrier, obstacle,

and mine employment can be affected by

the air situation. Forces possessing air

superiority may undertake large-scale, timeconsuming barrier, obstacle, and/or minefield

emplacement and/or countermine operations

without extreme security measures. Forces

without air superiority may lose the

advantages of concealment and surprise

and either have their barriers, obstacles, and

minefields detected and exploited by the

enemy or have their breaching operations

impeded.

g. Coverage by observation and by fire

is essential in order to restrict enemy

breaching efforts, maneuver, and massing of

forces and to increase the destruction of the

enemy. Planned on-call fires are ideal for this

purpose. Land barriers, obstacles, and

minefields not covered by direct or indirect

fire provide only minimal delays or diversions,

Figure III-1. Employment Principles for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines

EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES FOR BARRIERS,

OBSTACLES, AND MINES

Should be evaluated from both an offensive and a

defensive posture

Should directly support the JFC's plan

Reinforcing obstacles should be integrated with existing

barriers and obstacles to support the JFC's intent and

operational concept

Should be employed in depth (a series of simple

obstacles is often more effective than one large

elaborate obstacle)

Reinforcing obstacles should vary in type, design, and

location (makes the enemy's breaching operation more

difficult)

Barrier, obstacle, and mine employment effectiveness

can be affected by the air situation

Should provide coverage by observation and, if

necessary, by fire
III-3

Employment

which may be all that is needed. An example

of where minimal delay or diversion would

support JFC objectives is the use of airdelivered scatterable mines in an interdiction

role.

3. Land Operations

Barriers, obstacles, and mine warfare

support the theater campaign or major

operation by assisting the JFC in

accomplishing assigned missions.

a. Resources. Most manmade barriers and

obstacles are designed to enhance friendly

fires or facilitate the maneuver of friendly

forces by extending or improving the

effectiveness of existing barriers and

obstacles. Predominant resources to

support ground operations are listed in

Figure III-2 and described below:

• Land Mines. Land mines are categorized

as conventional or scatterable. Both

categories provide antitank and

antipersonnel capabilities. With the

exception of the United States Forces,

Korea, US forces are limited to the use

of self-destructing antipersonnel mines.

•• Conventional mines are no longer

the most commonly used and are

normally emplaced before the battle

begins in friendly terrain to support the

main battle area. Many of these mines

are activated by pressure or contact.

These mines are laid by hand or

mechanical means, buried or surface laid,

and normally emplaced in a pattern to

aid in recording. Mechanical laying

may be restricted by terrain conditions.

The emplacement of conventional

minefields is normally time-, manpower-,

and logistic-intensive.

•• Scatterable mines are the most

commonly used and are emplaced

without regard to classical patterns.

Although locations of each individual

mine cannot be precisely recorded,

scatterable minefields can be accurately

recorded to within plus or minus 10

meters when emplaced. They are

emplaced by ground mine dispensing

systems, artillery, aircraft, or by hand.

They are designed to self-destruct after

a set period of time, ranging from 4 hours

to 15 days. Scatterable mines

significantly reduce manpower

requirements associated with mine

warfare. Smaller and lighter, these mines

offer a reduction in logistic requirements

because of their reduced bulk and weight.

Scatterable mines also make it possible

to emplace minefields quickly and,

importantly, to do so deep in the enemy’s

rear area such as at an air base, LOCs,

air defense site, or an assembly area. Airdelivered scatterable mines allow greater

flexibility to time-shift the available

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and

artillery to interdict mobile enemy forces

without the weapons system having to

acquire enemy forces, as is the case with

direct attack munitions. This makes it

LAND OPERATIONS

SUPPORT RESOURCES

LAND MINES

conventional

scatterable

DEMOLITION OBSTACLES

preliminary

reserved

CONSTRUCTED OBSTACLES

FLAME FIELD EXPEDIENTS

Figure III-2. Land Operations

Support Resources
III-4

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

possible to interdict enemy forces

moving during darkness or poor weather

without requiring sophisticated night

and/or weather target acquisition

capabilities. In certain circumstances,

air-delivered scatterable mines also make

it possible to attack enemy units

without the delivery aircraft or system

being exposed to the enemy’s point air

defenses, reducing the need for standoff

munitions. These capabilities greatly

enhance the ability to delay and confuse

enemy forces, thereby creating the

opportunity to destroy the enemy with

other fires. The main disadvantage of

scatterable mine employment is that the

most flexible and responsive means of

delivery — aircraft and artillery — have

additional and perhaps more critical

roles on the battlefield. Other

disadvantages include the time and high

number of artillery rounds or aircraft

sorties required to emplace a minefield

and increased exposure of emplacing

artillery to counter battery fires and

emplacing aircraft or helicopters to

enemy air defenses. Planning scatterable

mine obstacles must include detailed

integration of the employment method

with self-destruct times, observation of

“trigger points,” and counterattack

routes. Surface conditions also affect

employment; i.e., scatterable mines are

especially ineffective on snow cover.

Planners must consider the possibility of

unduly endangering civilians in the

employment of scatterable mines and

remain mindful of the commander’s legal

duty to prevent killing or injuring

civilians. All scatterable minefield

records are essential to assist in clearing

minefields after the termination of

hostilities.

• Demolition Obstacles. Demolition

obstacles are created by the detonation

of explosives. Demolition is generally

used to create tactical level obstacles.

However, it can also be used to create

operational obstacles such as the

destruction of major dams, bridges, and

railways as well as highways through

built-up areas or terrain chokepoints.

Demolition obstacles are classified as

preliminary or reserved obstacles.

Operational-level demolition obstacles

may require lengthy completion time and

large quantities of demolition materials

because of the size and characteristics of

the target.

Demolition obstacles can also be used to create operational

obstacles such as destruction of bridges.
III-5

Employment

•• Preliminary demolition obstacles

are those planned by subordinate

commanders, are not considered critical

to the JFC’s plan, and can be detonated

as soon as they are prepared or as the

situation dictates.

•• Reserved obstacles are those deemed

critical to the JFC’s or subordinate

commander’s plan and are detonated only

when directed by the commander who

designated them.

• Constructed Obstacles. Constructed

obstacles are manmade, usually

without the use of explosives. Typical

tactical examples are barbed wire

obstacles and tank ditches. Operational

and strategic barriers and obstacles may

also be constructed. Examples are

fortified areas and lines. These largescale obstructions generally require

extensive time, manpower, equipment,

and material. Constructed barriers and

obstacles should be emplaced before

hostilities or in areas not subject to

observed fires, because construction

personnel can be exposed to all types of

enemy fire.

• Flame Field Expedients (FFE). When

mines, barrier materials, or engineer

resources are not available or are in short

supply, the JFC may have to rely on

field-expedient flame explosives for

employment in place of obstacles and

minefields. FFE can be hastily

constructed from materials found on the

battlefield, such as containers, fuel, and

explosive devices. FFE can provide a

quick, effective means for providing a

limited offensive and defensive obstacle

capability, because the exploding

fireballs of flame can stun dismounted

troops and degrade armored vehicles.

b. Offensive Employment. In the offense

the JFC, through the JFC staff, identifies

priority locations and plans and

coordinates the joint emplacement of

barriers, obstacles, and minefields. Under

some circumstances, the JFC may designate

the systems that subordinate commanders

utilize for emplacement. These barriers,

obstacles, and minefields generally focus on

isolating the battlefield, facilitating economy

of force, enhancing overall force security, and

blocking or delaying an enemy’s withdrawal.

During planning and deployment, care must

be taken to ensure that the mobility of the

attacking force is not hindered. Key factors

for consideration in offensive employment

are:

• Current enemy situation, capabilities,

intent, and probable courses of action

(COAs);

• Accurate terrain analysis to determine

where friendly forces are vulnerable to

counterattack;

• Preplanning, deconfliction, and

coordination with other components;

• C2 of obstacle and mine emplacement;

and

• Information flow to inform friendly

forces of friendly and enemy barrier,

obstacle, and minefield locations using

the standard report formats.

c. Defensive Employment. As in the

offense, the JFC, through the JFC staff,

identifies priority locations and plans and

coordinates the joint emplacement of barriers,

obstacles, and minefields. Under some

circumstances, the JFC may designate the

systems that subordinate commanders use for

emplacement. The primary intent of

defensive barrier, obstacle, and mine

warfare employment is to degrade enemy

capabilities by disrupting combat formations

and delaying their movement, interfering with

C2, and confusing enemy commanders. The
III-6

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

secondary intent is to destroy or attrit enemy

forces. Key factors for consideration in

defensive employment are as follows:

• Current enemy situation, capabilities,

intent, and probable COAs.

• Accurate terrain analysis to determine

where friendly forces are vulnerable to

enemy attack.

• Preplanning, deconfliction, and

coordination with other components.

• C2 of obstacle and mine emplacement.

• Information flow to inform friendly

forces of friendly and enemy barrier,

obstacle, and minefield locations using

the standard report formats.

• Barrier, obstacle, and minefield

emplacement which must be integrated

to complement the plan for defense.

• Conventional minefields and other timeor labor-intensive obstacles that can be

emplaced before the beginning of

hostilities, reducing the exposure to

enemy fire. (This also increases the time

available to mass the large amount of

supplies needed to construct the barriers,

obstacles, and minefields.)

• Preplanned employment of scatterable

minefields throughout the battlefield.

The choice of scatterable systems is

mission-dependent. Ground emplaced

mine scattering systems are best for

rapidly emplacing large minefields in

friendly controlled areas. Artillery or

aircraft-delivered systems are employed

throughout the battlefield. The

appropriateness of artillery or aircraft

delivery systems varies depending on the

threat conditions and other mission

priorities; however, organic systems

should be employed whenever possible.

• Analysis of the effects of scatterable

mines in the defense with respect to selfdestruct times. The timetable for friendly

operations may be upset or cause

fratricide if the wrong self-destruct

settings are used.

• Smoke, used as a limited obstacle to

canalize or slow advancing enemy forces.

When combined with barriers, obstacles,

and/or minefields, smoke can enhance

the vulnerability of enemy forces by

limiting their visual, target-acquisition,

and intelligence-gathering capabilities.

d. Reporting, Recording, and Marking.

The immediate reporting of friendly and

enemy barriers, obstacles, unexploded

ordnance hazards, and minefield locations

to higher headquarters is essential.

Emplacing units are responsible for immediate

reporting of each obstacle and minefield,

intent (i.e., barrier or obstacle plan), initiation,

completion, and recording completion of the

obstacle. Positive control and a rapid flow of

information on mine emplacement are

necessary. Both friendly and enemy

minefields are reported and marked because

of their lethality to both friendly forces and

noncombatants. Records and reports are

critical to the immediate conflict and will

become vital in facilitating posthostilities

clearance. Reporting, recording, and

marking of all minefields must be

accomplished in accordance with accepted

procedures as listed below.

• Reports. Once emplaced, minefields and

unexploded ordnance hazards are lethal

and unable to distinguish between friend

and foe. For this reason, positive control

and a rapid and continuous flow of

information is necessary (See the

Variable Message Format [VMF]

Message Number K05.16, “Land

Minefield Laying Report” established in

the VMF “TIDP-TE, Volume III, Annex

A”).
III-7

Employment

•• Conventional Minefields. Three

reports are required of tactical units

emplacing conventional minefields:

Report of Intention, Report of

Initiation, and Report of Completion.

The report formats are listed in Appendix

A, “Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle

Reports.” These reports are transmitted

to the authorizing headquarters. Their

contents are integrated with terrain

intelligence and disseminated through

intelligence channels.

•• Scatterable Minefields. The speed

and responsiveness of scatterable-mine

employment require accurate, uniform,

and timely reports. All information on

scatterable-mine employment is

immediately reported by the emplacing

unit for dissemination to all affected

units. To facilitate reporting and

recording, a simple, uniform procedure

is used that combines the report and

record into one document. This is the

scatterable minefield record and

report listed in Appendix A, “Mine,

Countermine, and Obstacle Reports.” It

is applicable to all Service delivery

systems. In addition, if scatterable mines

are to be emplaced within a land force

commander’s boundaries, regardless of

fire support coordination line placement,

the emplacing unit immediately

disseminates a scatterable minefield

warning (SCATMINEWARN) to all

potentially affected units. The format for

this warning message is listed in

Appendix A, “Mine, Countermine, and

Obstacle Reports.” Timely warning is

essential because of the potential for

friendly fratricide and serious degradation

of mobility. This warning is given during

the planning phase of the operation and

followed up with another warning giving

the actual location immediately after

emplacement.

•• Enemy Minefields. As specified in

the OPLAN, any detection, encounter,

or knowledge of enemy minefields or

mining activities by tactical units is

reported to higher headquarters by the

fastest means available. The report

format used is listed in Appendix A,

“Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle

Reports.”

•• Unexploded Explosive Ordnance

(UXO). Immediate reporting is

essential. UXO hazard areas are lethal

and unable to distinguish between friend

and foe. Positive control and a rapid,

continuous flow of information are

necessary. Land forces units send a

UXO spot report (Appendix A, “Mine,

Countermine, and Obstacle Reports”)

relaying information on a confirmed

UXO location and reporting locations

where submunition ordnance has been

employed. The UXO Spot Report is a

detailed, swift, two-way reporting

system that makes clear where the UXO

hazard areas are, what the mission impact

is, and who the affected units are. UXO

hazard areas are treated as obstacles.

•• Joint Minelaying Operations

(MINEOPS). The MINEOPS report is

used to exchange information between

all components and joint headquarters.

It provides the location, characteristics,

and status of components’ minelaying

operations. It is also used to request,

task, modify, report, plan, and approve

minelaying operations, as appropriate.

The report format is specified by MILSTD-6040, “U.S. Message Text

Formatting Program,” and listed in

Appendix A, “Mine, Countermine, and

Obstacle Reports.”

•• Obstacles Other Than Minefields.

The sensitive information report is
III-8

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

used to provide information on

barriers and obstacles (other than

minefields) that may have a significant

impact on current planning or

operations. This report is used to

exchange information between all joint

force headquarters and components. The

report format is specified by

MIL-STD-6040, “U.S. Message Text

Formatting Program,” and as listed in

Appendix A, “Mine, Countermine, and

Obstacle Reports.”

• Records. Minefield records must be

prepared and include all known

information required in the specified

formats. The level of information will

vary based on friendly versus enemy

emplaced minefields and the type of

emplacing systems utilized. These

records facilitate troop safety, future

operations, and clearing operations when

the hostilities are concluded.

•• Conventional Minefields. As

specified in the OPLAN, minefield

records are prepared by the emplacing

unit for each conventional minefield and

forwarded to the appropriate staff

proponent designated to maintain the

records on file. All conventional

minefields, except those emplaced as part

of a unit’s defensive perimeter, are

recorded on Department of Army (DA)

Form 1355 (Minefield Record). Those

minefields that are part of a unit’s

defensive perimeter are recorded using

DA Form 1355-1-R (Hasty Protective

Minefield Record).

•• Scatterable Minefields. The record

of scatterable minefields is submitted as

part of the minefield report, as discussed

above.

•• Retention of Records. A final

repository for both friendly and enemy

minefield reports must be designated in

the appropriate OPLAN or OPORD

annex or appendix. If a Service

component commander is designated as

the joint force land component

commander, then that commander

becomes the command repository for all

minefield reports and records. This

becomes critical at cessation of hostilities,

as the battlefield must be cleared.

Clearance may be accomplished by

several means: friendly forces,

belligerent forces under the auspices of

the UN Security Council, contractors, or

any combination of these.

• Marking. The marking of minefields is

accomplished using methods found in

standardization agreement (STANAG)

203b, FM 20-32, and joint task force

established standing operating procedures.

•• Conventional minefields and

unexploded ordnance hazard areas are

marked as necessary to protect friendly

forces and civilians. The fencing of

minefields, both friendly and enemy, in

friendly controlled areas is required.

•• Scatterable Minefields. Minefields

are marked as soon as they are employed

or discovered to protect friendly troops

and noncombatants. Ground-emplaced

scatterable minefields are marked by land

forces, and require highly accurate

positioning or survey data from the

emplacing unit. However, it is unrealistic

to expect artillery- and aircraft-emplaced

minefields to be marked in the same

manner as ground-emplaced scatterable

mines. Scatterable minefield marking

may be unnecessary or impossible in

many cases. Scatterable mines placed in

enemy terrain are a prime example. For

this reason, units operating in the vicinity

of these scatterable minefields must

know the time of emplacement, selfdestruction duration period set, and aim

point or lateral boundaries of the safety
III-9

Employment

zones, and must also use extreme caution.

The unit that finds the minefield is

responsible for marking and reporting it.

Immediate warning is essential because

of the potential impact on friendly

mobility and potential fratricide.

•• Enemy Minefields. Minefields are

marked and reported immediately when

discovered to protect friendly troops and

civilians.

4. Air Operations

a. Air-delivered scatterable mines can be

used effectively in support of land

operations.

• Air-delivered scatterable mines can be

used as part of a synchronized and

integrated plan to support land

requirements.

Further guidance on air operations in

support of land operations may be obtained

from JP 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction

Operations,” and JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint

Fire Support.”

• Air-delivered scatterable mines can be

used for the purposes listed in Figure

III-3.

• Air-delivered scatterable mines may be

used to support friendly rear area

operations. They may be used to deny

enemy airborne drop zones, air assault

landing and pickup zones, or to augment

the defenses of friendly facilities and

LOCs.

• During the planning phase, coordination

is required at the JFC level among the

components to ensure that the use of

air-delivered scatterable mines will not

negatively impact or restrict current

or future ground operations. The land

force commander having the area of

operations in which air-delivered

scatterable mines are to be employed is

normally responsible for the coordination

of their use with the scheme of maneuver

to ensure unity of effort.

• During the execution phase, recording

and reporting of air-delivered

scatterable mines are essential at all

levels of command. During the

execution phase, the component

commander tasked with delivering mines

from aircraft is responsible to report the

specifics of each air emplaced minefield

to the JFC and other component

commanders. This report provides the

approving authority, target description,

unit emplacing the mines, method of

emplacement, actual (not the planned)

location of emplaced mines, date and

time of emplacement, self-destruct

duration period, aim point or lateral

boundaries of the safety zone, unit or title

of person submitting the report, remarks,

and date and time of the report.

Immediate reporting and warning

messages before emplacement are

essential. These reports and warnings

are necessary to warn friendly forces and

reduce the potential for fratricide and

serious degradation of ground force

mobility.

• All scatterable minefield records are

essential to assist in clearing minefields

after the termination of hostilities.

b. Air-delivered scatterable mines can be

used effectively for counterair missions, such

as airfield attacks, suppression of enemy air

defenses (SEAD), and theater missile defense

(TMD) attack operations.

• An objective of an attack on an enemy

airfield is to delay or disrupt

movements from that base. Airdelivered scatterable mines will extend

the effect of the air attack by restricting
III-10

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

ground movements on the base. The

initial impact will be to either stop or slow

aircraft movement until the taxiways and

runways are cleared or else force the

enemy to risk aircraft damage by

encountering the mines. Air-delivered

scatterable mines are also effective in

preventing or delaying repairs on the

damaged portions of the airfield.

• Similarly, the use of air-delivered

scatterable mines during SEAD

attacks will delay the repair and return

to operational status by elements of

enemy air defense systems. Actual

destruction of entire portions of air

defense systems may be difficult because

of system redundancy and dispersed

equipment. Use of mines will restrict

access to those undestroyed portions of

the system after an attack and prolong

the loss of use of those portions destroyed

and damaged. Mines will also cause

repair personnel to expose themselves to

AIR-DELIVERED SCATTERABLE MINES

Air-delivered scatterable mines can be used to...

disrupt and destroy enemy unit concentrations

(including armored units)

disrupt enemy field artillery (including surface-tosurface missiles) and air defense systems

movement and resupply

disrupt enemy helicopter forward operating bases

as well as fixed- and rotary-wing airfields

disrupt counterattacks and other enemy operations

protect the flanks of friendly exploiting forces

disrupt enemy logistic support

close breached friendly minefields or other

obstacles

disrupt enemy river crossing operations, coastal

landings, and beachhead operations

Figure III-3. Air-Delivered Scatterable Mines
III-11

Employment

additional attacks and risk essential

electronic test and repair personnel and

equipment.

• Air-delivered scatterable mines can

also contribute to TMD operations.

Such munitions can deny enemy forces

access to preferred launch areas, inhibit

movement, damage missile transporter,

erector, and launchers, and curtail reload

operations.

c. Interdiction attacks may include the

employment of air-delivered scatterable

mines. Scatterable mines not only delay

repairs to interdiction targets, but also will

damage any vehicles or personnel that attempt

to use or transit the interdiction target area.

Mines can deny and delay access to storage

and manufacturing facilities, holding areas,

transshipment points, and power generating

and transmission stations. Typically, the

major damage on interdiction targets will

come from weapons with an immediate

effect. However, mixing even a few mines

with other munitions will create uncertainty

and fear among the repair crews or users of

the target areas.

5. Maritime Operations

The NCA has tasked the Commander

in Chief, US Atlantic Command

(USCINCACOM), Commander in Chief,

US Central Command, Commander

in Chief, US Pacific Command

(USCINCPAC), Commander in Chief, US

Southern Command, and the US

Commander in Chief, Europe with the

responsibility for the conduct of maritime

mine warfare within their areas of

responsibility and in support of other

combatant commanders’ maritime mine

warfare requirements. These commanders

have delegated the responsibility for planning

maritime mine warfare operations to their

Navy component commanders. The Navy

component commander’s mine warfare plan

is integrated with the geographic combatant

commander’s concept of operations. The

geographic combatant commander’s intent

and planning guidance provide direction on

such matters as operational sequencing,

critical targets, desired effects, priorities, and

limitations. Using this information, the Navy

component commander determines how best

to use available assets and develops

appropriate COAs to support the theater plan.

When approved by the geographic combatant

commander, the maritime mine warfare plan

is implemented.

a. Planning.Navy component commanders

have three ways in which to execute

minefield planning. If time constraints are

critical, Navy component staffs may conduct

planning for quick-reaction minefields. If

the minefield plan has been developed in

advance and is appropriate for tasking, it may

be used. If sufficient time is available, a

minefield plan may be developed to meet a

specific need.

• Minefield plans are developed for

specific fields by the Navy’s

Commander, Mine Warfare

Command (COMINEWARCOM), in

response to Navy component commander

tasking. COMINEWARCOM planners

work with the tasking commander to

formulate mining scenarios consistent

with OPLANs and intelligence estimates

of anticipated enemy traffic and reaction

capabilities. For each intended

minefield, a detailed design is prepared

for specified primary and secondary

targets, using standardized formats, and

submitted to the tasking commander for

approval. Upon acceptance, all necessary

documentation is assembled into a

numbered minefield planning folder

(MFPF) that is distributed to fleet

users to be maintained for future

implementation.
III-12

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

• Once an MFPF is created,

COMINEWARCOM continually

evaluates and updates the plan as

necessary. Individual MFPFs include

minefield plans, mine requirements, and

mine settings. These MFPFs provide a

definitive basis for inventory planning,

stockpile pre-positioning, and logistic

support capabilities. In the event of

hostilities, the preplanned minefields can

be executed without further planning.

b. Objective. The aim of maritime

mining is, in conjunction with other maritime

and air assets, control of the sea. Mining

can be used at all levels of war and across

the range of military operations to achieve

the objectives of friendly forces. Mining

can delay and attrit enemy maritime forces

and can deny them the unrestricted use of sea

areas of passage. Barriers, obstacles, and

minefields can also protect friendly harbors,

channels, and seaways, as well as shorelines

susceptible to enemy amphibious operations.

For planning purposes, the minefield rather

than the mine should be regarded as the

weapon. The basic types of minefields are

characterized as offensive, defensive, or

protective (See Figure III-4).

• Offensive Mining. Offensive

minefields, which include strategic fields,

are those planted in enemy-controlled

waters. These minefields pose the most

direct threat to the enemy and, when

completed, pose little threat to friendly

forces. Offensive minefields are laid by

aircraft or submarines because these

minefields are usually in close proximity

to the enemy. Offensive and strategic

minefields consist of mines that have the

most countermeasure resistance to

complicate the enemy’s mine

countermeasures (MCM) problem. The

use of phony mines or mine-like objects

within a field can help this aim. Strategic

minefields are long-term fields laid to

deny enemy use of sea routes required to

support and execute the enemy war effort.

Strategic fields should be laid as soon as

possible after commencement of

hostilities and should be as heavily mined

as assets permit, because replenishment

may be extremely difficult.

TYPES OF MARITIME

MINEFIELDS

OFFENSIVE

DEFENSIVE

PROTECTIVE

Figure III-4. Types of Maritime Minefields

Offensive minefields are laid by aircraft or

submarines because of their close proximity to

the enemy.
III-13

Employment

• Defensive Mining. Defensive

minefields are those employed in

contested waters to intercept the

transit of enemy combatant forces.

Because of defensive minefield locations,

employment planning must consider

neutral and friendly force transits in

addition to those of the enemy. Minefield

lanes may be planned to facilitate friendly

force passage, but keep in mind that the

same waters may be mined by enemy

forces as well. For these reasons,

defensive minefields should be laid with

the utmost navigational accuracy.

• Protective Mining. Protective

minefields are those employed in

friendly waters to protect friendly

ports, harbors, or inshore SLOCs.

Protective minefields are the easiest to

plan and lay and can use almost any type

of maritime mine. Navigational accuracy

for laying the field is vital because

friendly forces will use the transit

channels on a regular basis. Protective

fields require that all users, including

neutrals, be aware of or be led through

the safe routes.

c. Resources

• Sea Mines. The sea mine is essentially

an explosive charge in a casing that is

laid underwater to destroy ships.

Mines can be positioned on the seabed,

moored at a predetermined case depth,

or floated. The bottom mine is laid on

the seabed and held in place by its own

weight. The moored sea mine has a

buoyant case and is held in place at a

predetermined depth by an anchor.

Floating sea mines are not held in place

and are subject to tides, currents, and

winds. Their use represents, in most

situations, a violation of international law.

Therefore, US doctrine does not provide

for employment of floating mines. The

three methods of activating mines are

contact, influence, and controlled.

Contact mines must be hit by a ship or

submarine to be activated. Influence

mines are activated by the acoustic,

magnetic, seismic, electric potential, or

pressure influences (singularly or in

combination) from a ship or submarine.

Controlled mines are activated from a

remote control station when the target is

within range.

• Allocation. Mines to support the mining

plans are allocated to the Navy

component commanders, who in turn

prescribe which mines go to specific

stockpiling sites. If the capacities of

stockpile sites are insufficient, the

residual mines are stocked in the

continental United States. The Chief of

Naval Operations has designated

COMINEWARCOM as the mine

warfare technical advisor to the

Navy component commanders.

COMINEWARCOM maintains and

monitors the mine stockpile and makes

recommendations concerning readiness.

When directed, the stored mines are

assembled and prepared for laying.

d. US Air Force (USAF) Maritime

Mining Support. USAF aircraft may be

employed for maritime mining.

Requirements are developed during the

deliberate planning process. Upon conflict

initiation, a geographic combatant

commander requiring USAF support above

that available through the Air Force

component commander will direct the request

through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to the NCA. After approving the request,

the NCA will task a geographic combatant

commander to provide appropriate forces to

the requesting combatant commander.

Command relationships over the

transferred forces will be as specified in the

establishing directive. The JFC will

apportion sorties to the mining role as required

to support the concept of operations. Planning
III-14

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

support for mining missions will be

coordinated by the supporting combatant

commander with the theater planning staff,

USAF and Navy component commanders,

and COMINEWARCOM. Logistic support

is provided in accordance with joint mining

agreements between the US Air Force, US

Navy, and the combatant commanders.

e. Operations. A minelaying operation

consists of planning the minefield, preparing

the material and personnel to conduct the

laying, planning the laying mission, laying the

mines, conducting follow-on surveillance and,

if required, replenishing the minefield. The

numbered fleet commanders coordinate

mission planning and conduct mining

operations as directed by the Navy

component commander or JFC.

COMINEWARCOM provides assistance to

the numbered fleet commanders by providing

planning, technical, and mine maintenance

support personnel as required.

• Platform Advantages and Disadvantages.

Aircraft, submarines, and ships are all

capable of laying mines if properly

equipped. Although US doctrine does

not provide for US surface ship laying

of mines, many allied surface ships

possess this capability.

•• Almost any aircraft capable of

carrying bombs can carry sea mines.

The advantages of using aircraft are

speed, flexibility, range, invulnerability

to enemy mines, and the ability to lay

mines in all water depths. Disadvantages

include less accurate mine laying and

vulnerability to enemy surface and air

defenses. This vulnerability requires

dedicated air combat and enemy

suppression assets to support mine-laying

mission ingress or egress. Loss of

surprise resulting from overt mine

delivery may also be a disadvantage.

However, this should be weighed against

the immediate and powerful

psychological impact that such an

operation would be likely to produce.

•• Submarines have the advantages of

being able to conduct covert mining.

Disadvantages include limited mine

capacity, vulnerability to enemy mines,

and the inability to operate in relatively

shallow water.

•• Surface ships have the advantages

of long-range, large mine capacity, and

accuracy in laying. Disadvantages are

slow movement and vulnerability to

enemy reaction. No surface ship in the

US Navy is currently equipped to lay

mines.

• Mine and Minelayer Availability. The

criteria for selecting the platform for a

mining operation are probability of

mission success, the importance of

time, availability, and expected

casualty rate. If heavy enemy

opposition is expected, the use of

submarine or aircraft layers might be

indicated. Distance from mine storage

to loading area and numbers and types

of mines required must also be

considered. All these factors will

influence the ability to meet operational

time lines and will determine the number

of laying platforms required.

• Escort Requirements. The expected

enemy reaction to the laying of a

minefield, and the platforms to be

used, will determine whether a

covering force will be required. The

covert laying of a field in an area out of

immediate enemy defense range may not

require cover. However, the laying of

minefields by aircraft or ship in all but

friendly waters will, in most cases,

require protective covering forces. As a

result, in addition to the usual minelaying

requirements, covering force

requirements must be addressed.
III-15

Employment

• Replenishment and Neutralization

Requirements. Consideration must be

given to the length of time a minefield

is required to remain effective. Enemy

MCM or natural causes may reduce mine

life expectancy and necessitate

replenishment of the minefield.

Conversely, operational needs may

require the passage of friendly forces

through a mined area at a given point in

time. In this case, the mines may be set

to neutralize themselves at a specific time

to permit the passage.

• Recording and Reporting

Requirements. Air-delivered minefield

records are essential to assist in clearing

minefields after the termination of

hostilities. For joint US missions, the

Joint MINEOPS report is used to

exchange information between all

components and joint headquarters. It

provides the location, characteristics, and

status of component minelaying

operations. It is also used to request, task,

modify, report, plan, and approve

minelaying operations, as appropriate.

The report format is specified by MILSTD-6040, “U.S. Message Text

Formatting Program” (See Appendix A,

“Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle

Reports”). NWP 1-03.1, “Operational

Reports,” may be consulted for more

specific information on required reports.
III-16

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-15

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

COUNTERING ENEMY EMPLOYMENT

IV-1

1. General

Enemy use of barriers, obstacles, and mines

can affect the timing and strength of friendly

operations. Success in countering enemy

efforts is attained when friendly forces can

maneuver with minimal damage or delay to

reach the original objective beyond the

obstruction. This chapter provides

information and guidance on countering

enemy barrier, obstacle, and mine

employment in land and maritime

environments.

2. Land Operations

a. General. Successful land operations

depend on the freedom to maneuver. Terrain

conditions, enemy tactics, integrated fires,

barriers, obstacles, and minefields can limit

friendly maneuver capability. Successful

enemy operations use fire, existing terrain,

manmade obstacles, and minefields to

restrict friendly freedom of maneuver. To

counter this, friendly forces must be able to

gain positional advantage and mass combat

power at a critical time and place and to

overcome any natural or manmade barriers,

obstacles, and minefields.

b. Resources. Operations to counter the

use of natural and manmade barriers,

obstacles, and minefields by enemy forces

may involve the employment of

conventional, airmobile, airdropped,

amphibious, or special operations forces.

“My first reaction was to notify someone else that we had struck a mine. We

had to keep the ship from sinking. Another immediate reaction was that this

was what we had been preparing for months. I had total confidence that my

crew would do the right thing — that they would do what they had been

trained to do.”

Commanding Officer, USS Princeton

(On striking an Iraqi mine in the Persian Gulf, 18 Feb 1991)

These operations are normally supported by

combat engineer forces. Military advisory

personnel or US units may also be employed

to assist a friendly nation to counter mines

and booby traps or to enhance the mobility of

HN forces. Specialized reduction assets

include mine detection equipment; explosive

devices and line charges; tank-mounted

rollers, rakes, and plows; combat engineer

vehicles; and various types of rafts and bridges

for dry or wet gaps.

c. Planning and Operational Support

• Intelligence. Operational success in

countering enemy use of barriers,

obstacles, and minefields depends largely

on the ability of the JFC to “see” the

operational area. Intelligence-collection

plans identify specifically tasked

priority intelligence requirements

(PIR). In any operation where enemy

barriers, obstacles, and minefields can

interfere with friendly maneuver,

information about them or areas expected

to contain them become PIR.

•• Intelligence collection by national

and theater reconnaissance and

surveillance assets becomes the

foundation for developing an analysis of

the enemy’s probable employment of

barrier, obstacle, and minefield systems

and fortifications. This information can

verify enemy intentions, plans, and

defensive strength and identify the mine
IV-2

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

types and fuses the enemy has employed.

The timely availability of national and

theater reconnaissance and surveillance

will help the commander determine the

best mix of reduction or clearing

techniques, forces, and equipment that

offer the best chances for success.

•• Obtaining intelligence on the

enemy’s use of barriers, obstacles, and

minefields requires all available

collection assets, ranging from national

collection assets down to tactical unit

information that locates and identifies

fortifications and obstacle emplacements.

When operations commence, intelligence

is continually verified and updated from

actual barrier, obstacle, and minefield

encounters.

• Deception. Deception is an important

element in the successful reduction or

bypassing of enemy barriers,

obstacles, and minefields. The use of

feints and raids, manipulation of

electronic signals, use of dummy

equipment, staging of engineer

equipment, and the employment of other

operations security measures will afford

the breaching forces an added measure

of security and enhance the probability

of surprise. However, deception plans

must be consistent with the theater

deception themes.

• Logistics. Any operations to counter the

enemy’s use of barriers, obstacles, and

minefields may result in equipment

damage or loss. Logistic support must

be provided for the replacement of

tactical bridging, combat engineer

equipment, line charges and explosives,

lane-marking materials, and any other

materials to conduct and maintain

breaching operations. In addition, stocks

of artillery delivered and air-delivered

scatterable mines must be maintained

to counter enemy attacks during friendly

breaching operations. Logistic support

must occur swiftly and not delay the

continuing movement of forces or critical

supplies. These conditions must be

thoroughly anticipated in the planning

phase.

d. Planning Considerations

• General. The JFC is concerned with

identifying large scale natural and

manmade barriers, obstacles, and

Logistic planning must provide for replacement of special equipment and

materials to support breaching operations.
IV-3

Countering Enemy Employment

minefields that provide the enemy with

a distinct operational advantage.

•• Breaching major barriers,

obstacles, and minefields requires

long-range planning well in advance

of encountering the obstruction. An

early decision on logistic support

requirements is important to ensure

availability of special equipment and

material.

•• Major barriers, obstacles, and

minefield systems can require a

significant expenditure of time if they

are to be reduced. Whenever it is

operationally sound, barriers, obstacles,

and minefields should be bypassed.

•• Continual emphasis is placed on early

detection and reporting of barriers,

obstacles, and minefields. It is also

important to determine the type and

quality of mines employed to ensure

that suitable countermine measures are

employed.

•• Successful breaching operations

require the conduct of special training

and rehearsals.

•• Suppress, obscure, secure, and

reduce are the breaching fundamentals

that must be applied to ensure success

when breaching against a defending

enemy (See Figure IV-1). Suppression

is the focus of all available fires on enemy

personnel, weapons, or equipment to

prevent effective fires on friendly

breaching, assault, and support forces.

Obscuration hampers enemy

observation and target acquisition and

conceals friendly activities and

movement. Friendly forces secure the

breaching site to prevent the enemy from

DESERT STORM BREACHING OPERATIONS

Coalition ground forces south of Kuwait faced a series of formidable defensive

positions that the Iraqis had built during the five months before Operation

DESERT STORM. Coalition air power was used in several ways to help disrupt

these defenses. B-52s bombed the minefields with 750-lb M-117 and 500-lb

MK-82 bombs; MC-130s dropped 15,000-lb BLU-82 bombs to create overpressure and detonate mines. A few days before G-day, USMC AV-8Bs dropped

napalm on the Iraqi forces trenches and also were used against minefields.

F-117s dropped 500-lb LGBs on oil pipes and distribution points in the fire

trenches. In addition to this extensive bombing to reduce the size of the Iraqi

minefields and obstacles, most ground units used their organic countermine

and counterobstacle equipment to breach enemy minefields and obstacles.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992

Figure IV-1. Breaching Fundamentals

BREACHING

FUNDAMENTALS

S

O

S

R

uppress

bscure

ecure

educe
IV-4

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

interfering with the breaching and

passage of the assault force through the

lanes created. Reduction means creating

lanes through or over the obstruction to

allow the attacking force to pass.

•• The JFC may designate the

selection of breaching zones for major

barriers, obstacles, and minefield

systems. This designation is based upon

defensibility, ability to maneuver and

deploy the force, and capability to

continue the operation.

•• Operational vulnerability may be

reduced through crossing on a wide front

(limited only by the terrain and quantities

of reduction assets available), crossing

in as many places as possible, crossing

by night or in poor visibility or using

obscurants, and employing a deception

plan.

• Offensive Planning Considerations

•• Continuous intelligence collection is

required to verify and update the

assessments provided by prior

intelligence.

•• Early identification of enemy and

natural obstructions may allow the JFC

to avoid or minimize the number and

severity of enemy barriers, obstacles, and

minefield systems and to limit the

number of friendly casualties.

•• Emphasis is placed on maintaining

the momentum of the attack through

freedom of movement and maneuver.

The obstruction is seldom the objective

but normally is an impediment to

securing the true operational objective.

Maintaining momentum requires the

attacking force to quickly pass through

or around barriers, obstacles, and

minefields. Emphasis is placed on the

capture of major roads, bridges, passes,

and other terrain features essential for

mobility to enhance future operations.

•• Advance planning is necessary to

coordinate the transfer of information

concerning barriers, obstacles, and

minefields to follow-on engineer units as

they are reduced. This planning is

necessary to widen and mark assault

force breaches and to clear and mark

additional routes for follow-on forces.

•• Planning must also address clearing

and reduction operations of friendly

and enemy barriers, obstacles, and

minefields to allow movement of combat

support and combat service support

elements.

•• Successful breaching of enemy

barriers, obstacles, and minefields

requires special planning and support.

When possible, the breach will be made

as a continuation of the attack, using

multiple lanes, across a broad front to

reduce congestion and vulnerability.

However, the availability of reduction

assets, crossing sites, and combat power

may dictate crossing on a narrow front.

If a deliberate breach is required, an early

decision is mandatory to obtain the

necessary logistic support and

concentration of combat power. Plans

should anticipate the need to breach

enemy barriers, obstacles, and

minefields employed in depth.

Deceptive and covering smoke provide

an added measure of security while

breaching by denying intelligence to the

enemy concerning where the breach will

occur and by impeding enemy target

acquisition.

•• Logistic support must facilitate both

the continuation of the offense and the

transition to the defense, if necessary.
IV-5

Countering Enemy Employment

• Defensive Planning Considerations. In

the defense, friendly counterattacks

and spoiling attacks must not be

impeded by barriers and obstacles

throughout the defensive area. Planning

must take into consideration the need to

maintain freedom of movement and

maneuver of friendly forces.

• Military Operations Other Than War.

In other military operations forces will

be impeded by barriers, mines, and

obstacles that are often controlled by

several different factions.

•• Advance planning and coordination

must be done with former warring

factions (FWF) to obtain detailed

information on known obstacles and

mines. In addition, friendly forces also

must coordinate movement and clearing

operations with representatives from

these factions.

•• Planning must take into

consideration the tremendous amount

of time involved in deliberate clearing

of large mined areas and the accuracy of

marking, recording, and disseminating

minefield data.

e. Planning Sequence. The planning

sequence begins with JFC’s detailed

analysis of missions, forces available,

terrain, enemy forces, and time.

Emphasis is placed on the integration of

barrier, obstacle, and minefield planning

with the development of OPLANs.

• Portions of the battlespace containing

natural operational level barriers and

obstacles suitable for reinforcement by

the enemy are identified through terrain

analysis.

• The terrain should be evaluated from both

friendly and enemy perspectives. The

results of the terrain analysis are

integrated into the development of the

concept of operations.

• The early analysis of operational

barriers and obstacles includes

estimates from the component

commanders on how best to support the

JFC’s concept of operations.

• The JFC issues planning guidance for

countering enemy barriers, obstacles, and

minefields. The guidance may include

priority of engineer support, fire support,

logistic support, C2 measures, and

sequencing of breaching operations.

Guidance provides the focus for

intelligence and targeting and forms the

basis for staff estimates and the

development of COAs.

• During plan formulation, emphasis is

placed on minimizing the effectiveness

of existing enemy barriers, obstacles,

and minefields. Emphasis is also placed

on maximizing opportunities to achieve

a bypass or an in-stride breach. For each

barrier, obstacle, and minefield, a

determination is made of the possible or

probable enemy actions when they are

encountered. This will assist in

identifying friendly options for offensive

action.

• Once the JFC plan is approved,

supporting and subordinate

commanders finalize their plans.

f. Operations

• Employment. Breaching a major

barrier, obstacle, or minefield is a

difficult and risky task. Forces must

execute breaching aggressively. Forces

and supporting fires are synchronized to

minimize losses and enhance rapid

passage through the obstruction.

Breaching operations are summarized in

Figure IV-2 and described below.
IV-6

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

•• Preparation. Before a major

counterobstacle operation, units will

require training and rehearsals in

counterobstacle operations. Breaching

operations require special equipment and

material that may require time to obtain

and prepare for employment.

•• Detection. Efforts must be made to

detect minefields and other major

obstacles using all available means.

Common indicators include mines,

minefield markers, locations of enemy

defensive positions, evidence of terrain

modification, major natural obstacles,

and other manmade obstacles.

•• Reconnaissance. After detection, the

characteristics and limitation of enemy

barriers, obstacles, and minefields must

Figure IV-2. Breaching Operations

BREACHING OPERATIONS

Reducing a major barrier,

obstacle, or minefield is a

difficult and risky task.

Forces must execute

breaching aggressively.

Forces and supporting

fires are synchronized to

minimize losses and

enhance rapid passage

through the obstruction.

PREPARATION

Obtain any special

equipment or

material required

DETECTION

Detect minefields

and other major

obstacles

RECONNAISSANCE

Determine the

characteristics and

limitation of enemy

barriers, obstacles,

and minefields

BYPASS

Apparent bypass

routes may be part of

the enemy's plan to

turn and disrupt

friendly forces

BREACHING

Training and

Rehearsals

Throughout
IV-7

Countering Enemy Employment

be determined using both ground and

aerial reconnaissance and remote

imagery.

•• Bypass. Although bypass is an

attractive option, apparent bypass

routes around major obstacles and

minefields may be part of the enemy’s

plan to turn and disrupt friendly forces.

•• Breaching. When the JFC decides

that it is necessary to reduce a major

obstacle or minefield, a combined arms

in-stride, deliberate, assault, or

clandestine breaching operation may be

directed. (1) In-Stride Breaching. Instride breaching is a very rapid technique

using standard actions on contact and

normal movement techniques. It consists

of preplanned, well-trained, and wellrehearsed breaching actions and

reduction procedures by pre-designated

combined arms elements. The in-stride

breach takes advantage of surprise and

initiative to get through the obstruction

with minimal loss of momentum. It

maintains the momentum of the attack

by denying the enemy time to mass forces

to cover the obstacle or minefield. A JFC

conducts an in-stride breach against a

weak defender; lightly defended or

very simple barriers, obstacles, and

minefields; or when an unclear situation

makes it necessary for subordinate units

to be capable of independent breaching

operations to accomplish the mission.

When conducting an in-stride breach, the

commander uses all the resources at hand

to maintain momentum through the

obstacle and to the objective. (2)

Deliberate Breaching. Deliberate

breaching is a scheme of maneuver

specifically designed to cross a heavily

defended, extensive, or complex enemy

barrier, obstacle, or minefield to continue

the mission. A deliberate breaching

operation may be required if an in-stride

breach is not feasible or has failed.

Deliberate breaching operations are

characterized by thorough reconnaissance,

detailed planning, extensive preparation,

and explicit rehearsal. C2, timing, and

deception are critical. (3) Assault

Breaching. Assault breaching is

specifically designed to penetrate an

enemy’s protective barriers, obstacles,

and minefields and destroy the defender

in detail. (4) Clandestine Breaching.

Clandestine breaching is used by

dismounted forces during limited

visibility. It is silently executed to

achieve surprise and minimize casualties.

It relies on stealth, manual reduction, and

dismounted maneuver.

• Recording and Reporting. Any

knowledge, detection, or encounter of

enemy barriers, obstacles, or minefields

is reported immediately through

appropriate channels and incorporated

in intelligence data.

•• Spot reports provide the tactical

commander the initial source of barrier,

obstacle, and minefield intelligence. This

information is reported to higher

headquarters by the fastest means

available.

•• As specified in the OPLAN, detailed

information on enemy minefields is

transmitted to the appropriate Service

component or joint force headquarters,

where they are maintained on file. The

format used for this information is listed

in Appendix A, “Mine, Countermine, and

Obstacle Reports.”

•• The Joint Mine Countermeasures

Operations (MCMOPS) report is used

to exchange tactical information

between all components and joint

headquarters. It provides the location

and status of component MCMOPS,

including breaching and clearing. It is

also used to request, task, plan, report,
IV-8

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

modify, and approve MCMOPS, as

appropriate. The report format is

specified in MIL-STD-6040, “U.S.

Message Text Formatting Program,” and

listed in Appendix A, “Mine,

Countermine, and Obstacle Reports.”

• Marking. Marking is necessary to

define the limits of the breached path,

lane, or gap and, eventually, the

boundaries of the mined area. Proper

marking is critical to the safe and swift

movement of units and to protect friendly

forces and civilians.

• Minefield Clearing. Minefield clearing

is the total elimination or

neutralization of mines from a defined

area.

•• Breaching operations are usually

conducted under enemy fires. However,

clearing operations are not generally

conducted under fire.

•• A limited clearing operation can be

conducted by follow-on engineers and

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

detachments after the force conducting

the breaching operation has reduced the

minefield and secured the area. It may

also be tasked to eliminate all mines in a

minefield previously identified, reported,

and marked in a friendly area of

operations that hinders mobility or is a

hazard to friendly forces or civilians.

•• Before clearing operations commence,

both theater records of friendly, enemy,

and FWF minefields installed in the area

and appropriate intelligence reports

should be provided to the clearing unit,

to include locations of suspected

minefields.

•• Minefields suspected of containing

chemical mines are marked and

bypassed, if possible. All use or

suspected use of chemical mines, whether

enemy or friendly, must be reported as a

suspected violation of international law

and the law of war.

•• Deliberate clearing operations

should be conducted during daylight

hours when dealing with uncertain areas.

Friendly forces should treat areas they

have cleared as not suspect.

•• Post-hostilities clearing operations

in non-US emplaced minefields are not

conducted by US units. US units clear

mines only as required for military

operations. Clearance after cessation of

hostilities may be provided by other

friendly forces, belligerent forces under

the auspices of the UN Security Council,

civilian contract workers, forces from the

country concerned, or a combination of

any of these. US forces may provide

technical advice, training, and other

assistance, as appropriate.

3. Maritime Mine

Countermeasures

Maritime MCM include all actions

undertaken to prevent enemy mines from

altering friendly forces’ maritime plans or

operations. MCM reduce the threat and

effects of enemy-laid sea mines on friendly

naval force and seaborne logistic force access

to and transit of selected waterways.

a. General. MCM are divided into two

broad areas: proactive and enabling MCM

(See Figure IV-3).

• Proactive MCM. The most effective

means of countering a mine threat is to

prevent the laying of mines. Proactive

MCM destroy enemy mine

manufacturing and storage facilities or

mine laying platforms before the

mines are laid. Although an adjunct of

mine warfare, proactive MCMOPS are
IV-9

Countering Enemy Employment

not normally conducted by mine warfare

forces. Therefore, staff MCM planners

must ensure that enemy mine layer, mine

storage and, ultimately, mine production

facilities and assets are considered for

inclusion on joint target lists.

• Enabling MCM. Enabling countermeasures

are designed to counter mines once

they have been laid. Some enabling

MCMOPS are undertaken following the

termination of conflict solely to eliminate

or reduce the threat to shipping posed by

residual sea mines. However, most

enabling MCMOPS are undertaken

during conflict to permit (enable) other

maritime operations, such as power

projection, to be conducted. Enabling

MCM includes passive and active

MCM.

•• Passive MCM reduce the threat

from emplaced mines without

physically attacking the mine itself.

Three primary passive measures are

practiced: localization of the threat,

detection and avoidance of the minefield,

and risk reduction. (1) Localization of

the threat involves the establishment of

a system of transit routes, referred to as

Q-routes, which will be used by all ships

in order to minimize exposure in

potentially mined waters. Establishment

of transit routes should be one of the first

steps taken by MCM planners, if the

routes have not been previously

designated, to minimize exposure of

shipping and permit concentration of

active MCM efforts. (2) Detection and

avoidance of minefields can be

accomplished by employing intelligence

information or organic MCM forces.

When the location has been established,

shipping may be routed around the area.

(3) Risk reduction is primarily practiced

by individual ships rather than planned

and executed by MCM forces. Risk may

be reduced by controlling the degree of

potential interaction with a mine sensor.

Against contact mines, a reduction in

MARITIME MINE COUNTERMEASURES

PROACTIVE

ENABLING

Prevent the laying of mines through...

Counter mines once they have been laid through...

destroying enemy mine manufacturing facilities

destroying enemy mine storage facilities

destroying enemy mine laying platforms

localization of threat utilizing Q-routes

Detection and avoidance of minefields

risk reduction

minehunting

minesweeping

Passive mine countermeasures

Active mine countermeasures

Figure IV-3. Maritime Mine Countermeasures
IV-10

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

draft and posting additional lookouts can

reduce the number of mines with which

the ship’s hull might make contact.

Influence mines can be denied the

required activation signals by controlling

the ship’s emissions. Using built-in

magnetic field reduction equipment,

silencing a ship to minimize radiated

noise, or using minimum speeds to

reduce the pressure signature of a ship

are examples of operational risk

reduction. Other types of risk reduction

involve the enhancement of ship

survivability in the event of mine

detonation. Such measures can involve

increased structural integrity and

improved damage-control capability.

•• Active MCM are applied when

passive measures alone cannot protect

traffic. This entails physical interference

with the explosive functioning of the

mine or actually destroying it.

Minehunting and minesweeping are

the primary techniques employed in

active MCM. Both require detailed

intelligence and extensive planning by

the MCM commander to counter the

threat effectively. (1) Minehunting.

Minehunting involves the use of mine

detection and neutralization systems

to counter individual sea mines.

Minehunting is preferred to

minesweeping if time permits. Highresolution sensors are used to locate

mines. When located, remotecontrolled vehicles or EOD divers

visually identify the mines and plant

charges to destroy them. Minehunting

poses less risk to MCM forces, covers

an area more thoroughly, and provides a

higher probability of mine detection than

minesweeping. (2) Minesweeping.

Minesweeping is conducted by either

surface craft or aircraft and involves

the towing of mechanical, influence, or

explosive sweep systems. Mechanical

sweeping employs specially equipped

cables to sever moored mine cables so

that the mines float to the surface. The

mines are then destroyed by explosive

charge upon approval of the local

commander. Influence sweeping

involves the use of towed or streamed

devices that emit acoustic, magnetic, or

combination acoustic-magnetic signals to

trigger influence-type mines. Explosive

sweeping causes sympathetic

A primary method of protecting shipping from enemy mines is in

detection and avoidance of minefields.
IV-11

Countering Enemy Employment

detonations in, damages, or displaces the

mine. At present, the only method

capable of activating a sophisticated

pressure mine is the use of an actual ship.

This is not a practical routine sweep

method.

b. Intelligence Support

• Intelligence Gathering. Before

maritime MCMOPS, intelligence may

indicate the types, quantities, or

locations of mine storage sites. This

COALITION MINE COUNTERMEASURE OPERATIONS

The US mine warfare concept [during DESERT STORM] was designed around

a European war scenario which relied on North Atlantic Treaty Organization

allies to participate substantially in mine warfare operations, especially in mine

countermeasures (MCM). The Navy’s MCM capabilities in the Persian Gulf

consisted of surface mine countermeasures (SMCM), aviation mine

countermeasures (AMCM), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.

SMCM capabilities included the newly commissioned USS Avenger (MCM1)

class MCM ship and two 30-year-old USS Aggressive and USS Acme (MSO

422 and 508) class minesweepers. The AMCM capability consisted of six MH53E AMCM helicopters. More than 20 US EOD teams and a 23-man Australian

team also were deployed to neutralize or destroy detected mines.

Before the start of Operation DESERT STORM, the US ability to gather

intelligence on Iraqi minefield locations, or observe and counter Iraqi

minelaying activity in international waters (generally considered a hostile act

under international law), was degraded by restrictions on naval and air

operations in the northern Persian Gulf. To avoid any possibility of provoking

Iraqi military action before Coalition defensive and later offensive preparations

were complete, CINCCENT restricted naval surface forces in the Gulf to

operating south of the 27°30’N parallel (approximately 72 miles south of the

Kuwaiti-Saudi border) until early January [1991]. Similar restrictions kept the

flight paths of aircraft south of 27°45’N (approximately 55 miles south of the

Kuwait-Saudi border) unless tactically required to exceed that limit. Those

restrictions precluded gathering intelligence on Iraqi mining activity and also

prevented NAVCENT from acting to deter or counter Iraqi forces from setting

mines adrift in the Gulf.

After the Royal Saudi Naval Force discovered the first drifting mine in December

[1990], the US Mine Countermeasures Group (USMCMG) found and destroyed

six drifting mines before Operation DESERT STORM started. On 24 January,

the USMCMG left Abu Dhabi and conducted training and maintenance while

en route to its designated MCM operating area in the northern Persian Gulf.

On 14 February, the oceanographic survey vessel HMS Herald and five Royal

Navy mine hunters joined the USMCMG. This task force started its MCM

operations on 16 February, 60 miles east of the Kuwaiti coast, working initially

to clear a 15-mile long, 1,000 yard wide path to a 10-mile by 3.5-mile FSA south

of Faylaka Island.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992
IV-12

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

information enables the surveillance of

mine storage sites with overhead sensor

systems and intelligence assets to detect

movement of mine assets. All sourcederived intelligence of mine movement

to minelaying platforms and the

subsequent movement of the minelaying

platforms can provide advance

information on the type, size, and

location of enemy minefields. Where

mining is a possible threat, particularly

in areas of military operations other than

war, tracking and dedicated

intelligence collection against this

threat must begin early and be regular

enough to provide confident estimates of

mine activity. A joint MCM tracking

team could be established to focus

collection efforts in this area.

• Mine Exploitation. A key to countering

any mine is a detailed knowledge of the

mine sensor and targeting circuitry. Allsource derived intelligence on the

enemy minelaying operation can aid

in determining the type of sensor and

style of target processing used.

However, more accurate data can be

acquired by actually exploiting a mine

recovered during MCMOPS. The mine

exploitation may provide information on

mine settings and mine modification

intelligence.

c. Planning Considerations. The MCM

planning process starts with an estimate of

the situation and a mission statement and

results ultimately in production of an MCM

tasking order. Some aspects of the mission

definition must be provided by the tasking

commander.

• Objectives. The mission statement

includes an objective for active MCM,

an acceptable risk factor, and a specific

operation area. In some cases, a

measure of the effectiveness of the

operation will be required. The MCM

commander must choose a specific

objective from the list in Figure IV-4 as

described below.

•• Exploratory. The objective of

exploration is to determine whether or

not mines are present. This is usually

the first objective when an enemy

minefield is suspected. If no mines are

found, the confidence level of search

Minesweeping is a method of active maritime countermeasure and is

conducted by either surface craft or aircraft.
IV-13

Countering Enemy Employment

accuracy is the measure of effectiveness.

If mines are found, the operation usually

transitions to a reconnaissance objective.

•• Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance

operations are designed to make a rapid

assessment of the limits of a mined area

and the estimated number and types

of mines present. The measure of

effectiveness is normally a value

judgment based on the degree of

coverage for a given area using an

established probability of detection.

•• Breakthrough. The breakthrough

objective is directed when a rapid

operation is required to open channels

and staging areas for an amphibious

operation or break-in and/or break-out of

a port. This objective would be selected

when there is insufficient time or forces

for high percentage clearance operations.

For breakthrough operations, the tasking

commander should indicate the amount

of time available for MCMOPS. The

MCM commander should respond with

the following estimates: (1) Initial

threat to traffic that will remain

following the MCMOPS that can be

conducted in the available time; and (2)

Additional reduction of the threat

achievable with additional time provided

for MCMOPS.

•• Attrition. Attrition operations call for

continuous or frequent MCM efforts

to keep the threat of mines to ship

traffic as low as possible when traffic

Figure IV-4. Maritime Mine Countermeasure Mission Objectives

MARITIME MINE COUNTERMEASURE MISSION

OBJECTIVES

EXPLORATORY

Determine whether or not mines are present

RECONNAISSANCE

Make a rapid assessment of mined area limits, types of

mines, and numbers

BREAKTHROUGH

Open channels and staging areas for amphibious operation

or break-in and/or break-out of a port

ATTRITION

Make continuous or frequent efforts to keep the threat of

mines to ship traffic low

CLEARANCE

Attempt to remove all mines from assigned areas
IV-14

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

must continue to transit the mined waters

for a comparatively long period of time.

Attrition is employed when mines cannot

be quickly cleared because of factors

such as enemy minefield replenishment

or use of mines with arming delay or high

ship counter settings. The tasking

commander should provide the MCM

commander with a desired initial threat

to shipping goal and require reporting of

estimated attainment of that goal.

•• Clearance. The objective of clearing

is to remove all the mine threat from

the assigned area. Because it is difficult

to ensure that all mines are cleared, a

percentage goal is assigned for mine

removal to permit the MCM commander

to measure and report progress. For a

clearing objective to be appropriate,

MCM forces must be adequate to do the

job in the time available, traffic through

the field must be delayed until the

clearance is completed, enemy

replenishment of the field must be

unlikely, and the majority of the mines

must be vulnerable to at least one form

of active MCM. Clearing assumes that

the mine types are known or can be

reasonably estimated. A special case of

the clearing objective is limited

clearing, in which a minefield is

cleared of only specified mine types.

Limited clearing may be directed if there

are inadequate MCM forces to conduct

clearing operations in the time available

or if available countermeasures are not

effective against all mine types in the

field. If the characteristics of the mines

in a field can only be assumed, partial

clearing can be tailored to the type of ship

that must transit the field.

• Risk Directives. Some MCM

techniques are inherently risky when

used against certain mine types. To

determine the proper MCM technique to

employ, the MCM commander must,

in addition to an objective, be given some

indication of the maximum acceptable

degree of risk to MCM forces. When

operations are constrained by time, a

somewhat greater degree of risk must be

accepted to accomplish the objective.

• MCM Asset Availability. MCM tactics

are determined by the time and assets

available. The time required to move

MCM units to the minefield area as

opposed to the time available for

completion of MCMOPS is a key

determination. A primary mission of

airborne MCM (AMCM) forces is to

provide short-notice, rapid response to

any mining threat. These forces sacrifice

some degree of effectiveness and stamina

to maximize response capability. On the

other hand, surface MCM (SMCM)

forces are more effective but, because of

relatively slow transit speeds, have long

response times. For long distances,

heavy lift ships can transport SMCM

units to the area of operations more

quickly than the MCM ships could transit

on their own. Whenever time and

circumstances permit, AMCM assets

should be used for precursory minefield

sweeping before operating SMCM

assets. This provides greater safety

margins for surface craft, which lack the

helicopter’s relative immunity to mines.

• Amphibious Operations. MCM and

amphibious breaching in support of

amphibious operations need to be

synchronized within the overall

amphibious task force (ATF) timeline.

Planning a successful MCM and/or

amphibious breaching operation requires

the combined efforts of the commander,

ATF (CATF), commander, landing force

(CLF), and MCM commander. Early

dialogue between CATF, CLF, and the

MCM commander will aid planners to
IV-15

Countering Enemy Employment

identify detailed mission requirements.

These considerations include:

•• Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance. A collection plan is a

joint effort of the ATF intelligence

organizations. Intelligence efforts should

concentrate on establishing the type and

location of the mine threat in the AOA,

AOA characteristics, enemy locations,

and intelligence on obstacles in the surf

zone and beyond.

•• Synchronization. MCM and

amphibious breaching operations require

precise synchronization to ensure

maximum effects of supporting arms and

to minimize the risk to friendly forces.

The determination of the ATF general

COA dictates the size and composition

of the landing force (LF) and the general

location and number of lanes required.

Lane requirements and enemy obstacle

construction will dictate size and

composition of the breach force. Reverse

planning should be used to ensure that

actions at the obstacles support action on

the objective.

•• Breaching Fundamentals. Suppression,

obscuration, security, and reduction are

applied to all amphibious breaching

operations to ensure success when

breaching against a defending enemy.

•• Organization. ATF forces must be

organized to quickly and effectively

reduce obstacles and expedite LF

movement to the objective. Forces

should be task-organized into support,

breach, and assault organizations.

•• Command and Control. Unity of

command is critical in MCM and/or

amphibious breaching operations. CATF,

with the assistance of a breach force

advisor from the CLF staff, executes the

clearance effort from the surf zone to the

high water mark (HWM) and/or craft

landing zone (CLZ) using task-organized

Navy, SOF, and LF elements. The MCM

commander mine clearance efforts begin

at the seaward edge of the mine threat

area to the surf zone, and the CLF taskorganizes breaching elements in the

assault waves to continue the breaching

effort at the HWM, CLZs, and landing

zones.

• Support Requirements. Deployed

MCM ships and helicopter and EOD

units are not self-sustaining.

Communications, ordnance,

recompression chamber, supply,

personnel support, and petroleum,

oils, and lubricants must be provided

for these units. In addition, ships will

require magnetic and acoustic calibration

range services and intermediate

maintenance support. Helicopter units

will require hangar space, maintenance,

and ground support equipment. Support

may be provided to ships and EOD units

by an assigned MCM support ship or an

adjacent shore facility. Helicopter

support may be provided by an adjacent

airfield or by an air-capable MCM

support ship. When operating near

hostile enemy areas, force protection

support requirements exist for all MCM

platforms.

d. Organizational Support

• Maritime Defense Zone Commands.

When activated, the maritime defense

zone commanders Atlantic and Pacific

are responsible to USCINCACOM and

USCINCPAC, respectively, for

integrated maritime defense

operations, including mining and

MCM, within their respective US coastal

and inland waterway regions.

Operational forces will be allocated by
IV-16

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

the fleet commanders and Coast Guard

area commanders.

• Commander, Mine Warfare

Command. COMINEWARCOM is

responsible to the Chief of Naval

Operations for oversight of Navy mine

warfare programs and, through

USCINCACOM, for the training and

readiness of mine warfare forces.

These forces, which include AMCM,

SMCM, and underwater mine

countermeasures units as well as MCM

commanders and staffs, are prepared to

deploy on short notice to support any

combatant command, as required.

COMINEWARCOM supports these

commanders in planning MCM exercises

and operations.

e. Operational Considerations. When an

enemy minefield is encountered, a number of

decisions must be made. If the minefield is

not on a primary SLOC or operational route,

the best action may be to warn and divert

shipping around the area. If the minefield is

in an essential area, the decision must be made

as to what type of MCM to employ. The

number and types of mines, availability of

MCM forces, and time available will

determine the type of MCM to employ. It

may also be possible to counter a minefield

in a critical area by sending forces over it (e.g.,

vertical assault or vertical resupply) rather

than through or around it.

• Integrated Operations. Integrated

MCMOPS make optimum use of all

available MCM assets and tactics to meet

the needs of the mission. Consideration

must be given to both mutual support

and mutual interference. The MCM

commander must consider the potential

reduction of risk that could be made

possible through the sequential

application of an integrated force.

Support from MCM helicopters may

significantly reduce the risk to SMCM

vessels if shallow moored mines and

sensitive influence mines are swept

before the SMCM employment.

However, if influence sweeping is

performed concurrent with EOD

operations, there may be a serious risk to

EOD divers in close proximity as a result

of sweep-generated mine detonations.

The MCM commander must plan

operations to exploit the strong

capabilities of each MCM element and

schedule events to accomplish the

mission in the fastest manner consistent

with the risk directive.

• Multinational Force Coordination.

Enemy mining frequently results in a

multinational MCM effort. It is possible

to have MCMOPS conducted by several

national forces in close proximity without

having a single command structure. To

conduct such operations safely and

efficiently, agreements to coordinate

operational areas and communications,

as a minimum, must be established to

prevent mutual interference.

• Q-Routes and Route Survey. A

Q-route is a preplanned system of

dormant shipping lanes that can be

activated partially or totally by the area

commander after it has been determined

that mining has occurred. The Q-route

minimizes the area an MCM

commander has to clear to provide safe

passage for shipping and reduces the

force required to conduct MCM. Route

survey operations are conducted along

Q-routes during peacetime for several

purposes. First, a survey is conducted to

determine if the route is favorable for

minehunting. If it is not, a change of route

will be recommended. Next, the

established route is surveyed to collect

environmental data with which to support

wartime operations. The route is then
IV-17

Countering Enemy Employment

periodically surveyed to locate, evaluate,

and catalog minelike objects. This data base

can be used in conflict to determine if mining

has occurred and, if it has, to reduce the time

required to clear the route.

• Reporting Requirements. The

MCMOPS report is used to exchange

MCM tactical information between all

components and joint headquarters. It

OPERATION END SWEEP

Concurrent with the formal signing of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War

and Restoring Peace in Vietnam on 27 January 1973, American and Vietnamese

officials signed a separate, but directly related protocol providing for the US

neutralization of mines in North Vietnam’s waters. The attendant US Navy

mineclearing operation was called Operation END SWEEP.

The significance of END SWEEP extended well beyond tactically clearing mines

from Haiphong harbor. Indeed, the operation proved to be one of the few

diplomatic tools remaining on the US side as the struggle in Indochina

continued even after the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

Seen in this context, the US pledge at Paris to neutralize the thousands of

mines American forces laid during the war assumed added significance. The

mine clearance protocol was one of the few tools that the US administration

possessed during 1973 to moderate Communist actions in Indochina. Indeed,

the END SWEEP task force to clear mines from North Vietnamese waters may

have been the most important factor that year in deterring large-scale

Communist offensives.

In addition to the diplomatic aspects, END SWEEP, which lasted from 6 February

to 18 July 1973, stands out as a unique US naval operation. Not since the

effort at Wonsan during the first year of the Korean War had the Navy carried

out such a major mine countermeasures mission. END SWEEP involved a total

of 10 ocean minesweepers, 9 amphibious ships, 6 fleet tugs, 3 salvage ships,

and 19 destroyers. Twenty-four CH-53D Sea Stallions from Marine helicopter

squadrons HMM 165 and HMH 463 and another thirteen CH-53Ds from the

Navy’s Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12 took part. With a

herculean mobilization effort—a testament to organizational flexibility and able

leadership—the Navy concentrated in the United States and the Western Pacific

the necessary mine countermeasures forces, ships, aircraft, and equipment,

trained the personnel for the task, and completed plans for its execution.

provides the location and status of

Service component MCMOPS, including

breaching and clearing. It is also used to

request, task, plan, report, modify, and

approve MCMOPS, as appropriate. The

report format is specified in MIL-STD6040, “U.S. Message Text Formatting

Program,” and listed in Appendix A,

“Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle

Reports.”
IV-18

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-15

END SWEEP witnessed the first major operational employment of aircraft in

support of mine clearance—airmobile mine countermeasures. Task Force 78

successfully tested new equipment, including the Mark 105 hydrofoil sled and

the Magnetic Orange Pipe that the specially configured CH-53s towed to detect

magnetic and acoustic mines. The Raydist “T” Precise Navigation System was

another innovative device that passed the test during END SWEEP. Finally,

the mine countermeasures warriors improved their tactics, techniques, and

procedures for handling the “weapons that wait.”

The Navy’s 1973 experience off North Vietnam proved invaluable in the 1974

minesweeping of the Suez Canal and during Persian Gulf operations in 1987-

88 and 1991. The Service gained a better understanding of how airborne

countermeasures fit into mine warfare. END SWEEP showed that aircraft units

were able to deploy quickly overseas, operate in relative safety from exploding

ordnance, and detect shallow-water magnetic and acoustic mines. The Navy

also learned that ocean minesweepers and other surface vessels were still

essential for all-weather, day-night activity and dealing with pressure mines

and deep-water moored mines.

Operation END SWEEP demonstrated persuasively that mine countermeasures

was a valuable component of naval warfare and a useful instrument of American

foreign policy.

SOURCE: Dr. Edward J. Marolda, “Operation END SWEEP,”

Naval Historical Center, 1993
APPENDIX A

MINE, COUNTERMINE, AND OBSTACLE REPORTS

A-1

1. Land Forces Reports

Once emplaced, minefields are lethal and unable to distinguish between friend and enemy.

For this reason, positive control and continuous flow of information is necessary. Reporting,

recording, and marking of minefields must be performed using methods that are consistent

and well understood. The basic differences between conventional and scatterable mines require

that they be treated differently with respect to reporting, recording, and marking.

a. Conventional Minefield Reporting. A minefield report is an oral, electronic, or written

communication concerning mining activities, friendly or enemy. These reports document

information on friendly and enemy minefields. The information is transmitted through

operation channels and furnished to intelligence staff officers. It is then processed, integrated

with terrain intelligence, and disseminated through intelligence channels to affected units.

Mandatory conventional minefield reports are:

• Report of Intention

• Report of Initiation

• Report of Completion

These reports will be submitted by the emplacing unit commanders through operations

channels to the operations officer (J-3 and/or G-3) of the authorizing headquarters. That

headquarters will integrate the reports with terrain intelligence and disseminate them through

tactical intelligence. The reports should be sent by secure means.

• Report of Intention. The Report of Intention is made as soon as it is decided to lay the

minefield. It doubles as a request when initiated at levels below those with authority to

emplace. This report, when required, includes the following required data (STANAG

2036) on the proposed minefield:

•• Tactical purpose;

•• Type of minefield;

•• Estimated number and types of mines;

•• Whether mines are surface laid or buried;

•• Whether antihandling devices are used;

•• Location of minefield;

•• Location and width of lanes and gaps; and

•• Proposed date and time for starting and completing.

Conventional minefields which are part of an operation or general defense plan that has

been approved by the authorizing commander do not require a Report of Intention.

Their inclusions in such a plan implies an intention to lay.
A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

• Report of Initiation. The Report of Initiation is a mandatory report made by the laying

unit when installation begins. It informs higher headquarters that emplacement has begun

and the area is no longer safe for friendly movement and maneuver.

• Report of Completion. The Report of Completion is usually an oral report to the

authorizing commander that the minefield is complete and functional. The Report of

Completion is followed as rapidly as possible by the completed DA Form 1355 (Minefield

Record) or DA Form 1355-1-R (Hasty Protective Minefield Record). Completion of the

minefield records is the responsibility of the laying unit.

b. Scatterable Minefield Reporting. Accurate, timely, and uniform reporting and

dissemination of scatterable minefield emplacement information is a must. Fluid and fastmoving tactical situations require that complete information on scatterable mine employment

be known and passed on in a simple, rapid manner to all units that could be affected. The

variety of emplacing systems and emplacing units preclude the use of locally devised reporting

and dissemination methods. Scatterable minefields must also be recorded to facilitate clearing.

They need not be recorded in the detail required when emplacing conventional mines, since

the locations of individual scatterable mines are unknown. Shown below is a relatively

simple reporting procedure that will be used for scatterable mines. It is applicable for all

delivery systems and can be sent in a voice, digital, or hard copy mode.

• Scatterable Minefield Report and Record Form (Front Side)

LINE # INFORMATION REQUIRED DATA - INST ON BACK

1 APPROVING AUTHORITY

2 TGT/ OBSTACLE #

3 TYPE EMPLACING SYSTEM

4 TYPE MINES

5 SELF-DESTRUCT PERIOD

6 AIM PT/CORNER PTS OF MINEFIELD

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 SIZE SAFETY ZONE FROM AIM PT

16 UNIT EMPLACING MINES/RPT #

17 PERSON COMPLETING RPT

18 DTG OF REPORT

19 REMARKS
A-3

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

• Scatterable Minefield Report and Record Form (back side)

LINE # INSTRUCTIONS

1 Approving Authority. Enter approving authority. CDR 3AD

2 Target/Obstacle Number. If the minefield is part of an obstacle plan, enter the obstacle

number 2XXX0157. This number represents 11 Corps, target number 157. If the minefield is

not a part of an obstacle plan or does not have a number, then leave blank or enter NA.

3 Type Emplacing System. Enter the type system that emplaced the minefield, such as

ARTY, Volcano.

4 Type Mines. Enter AP for antipersonnel mines, AT for antitank mines. If both, enter

AP/AT.

5 Self-Destruct Period. Enter the time period in which the minefield will self-destruct.

6-14 Aim Point/Corner Points of the Minefield. If the system used to emplace the

minefield uses a single aim point to deliver the mines, enter that aim point MB 10102935. If

the system has distinct corner points such as Volcano, enter those corner points MB 17954790,

MB 18604860, MB 18504890, MB 18054895, MB 17804850.

15 Size Safety Zone from Aim Point. If an aim point is given in Line 6, enter the size

safety zone from that aim point. Example: Artillery emplaces a minefield from aim point MB

10102935 and the safety zone is 1,OOOM x 1,OOOM, enter 500M so that personnel plotting

or receiving the information can plot the coordinate and go 500M in each direction from the

aim point and plot the safety zone.

16 Unit Emplacing Mines and Report Number. BCO 23ENGB BN 4. Reports should

be numbered consecutively. This would be the fourth minefield that B Company has emplaced.

17 Person Completing the Report. SFC Hollind

18 Date-Time Group of Report. 160735ZOCT96

19 Remarks. Any other items the reporting unit may feel are important.
A-4

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

• Scatterable Minefield Report and Record Form (Sample)

LINE # INFORMATION REQUIRED DATA - INST ON BACK

1 APPROVING AUTHORITY 2BDE3AD

2 TGT / OBSTACLE # NA

3 TYPE EMPLACING SYSTEM Volcano

4 TYPE MINES AT/AP

5 SELF-DESTRUCT PERIOD 101630Z-102130ZOCT96

6 AIM PT/CORNER PTS OF MINEFIELD

7 MB 17955490

8 MB 18604860

9 MB 18504890

10 MB 18054895

11 MB 17804850

12

13

14

15 SIZE SAFETY ZONE FROM AIM PT NA

16 UNIT EMPLACING MINES/RPT# BC023ENGR/4

17 PERSON COMPLETING RPT 1LT JENNINGS

18 DTG OF REPORT 051400ZOCT96

19 REMARKS MINEFIELD AROUND TANK DITCH
A-5

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

• SCATMINEWARN

Units which may be affected by the emplacement of scatterable mines will need to

receive a warning to alert them. This warning message may be disseminated prior to or

after the mines are emplaced. Only the very basic information should be included to

prevent tie up of communication systems. The following procedure is a convenient,

easily sent message which provides the necessary information.

Scatterable Minefield Warning Report

LINE MESSAGE

ALPHA Emplacing System.

BRAVO AT YES/NO

CHARLIEAP YES/NO

DELTA # aim points/corners points.

ECHO Grid coordinates of aim points and/or corner points and size safety zone.

FOXTROT DTG of self-destruct period

Examples of a warning message based upon the previous Scatterable Minefield Report

and Record are as follows:

SCATMINEWARN (Example 1) SCATMINEWARN (Example 2)

ALPHA ARTY ALPHA Volcano

BRAVO Yes BRAVO Yes

CHARLIE Yes CHARLIE Yes

DELTA One DELTA Five

ECHO MB 10102935 500M ECHO MB 17954790

FOXTROT 081610Z-081900ZOCT96 MB 18604860

MB 18504890

MB 18054895

MB 17804850

FOXTROT 101630Z-102130ZOCT96
A-6

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

• Enemy Minefield Reporting and Recording

Any detection, encounter, or knowledge of enemy minefields or mining activities must

be reported by the fastest reliable means. The report is made to the next higher commander,

and must include all known information about the minefield. The report is normally

made through operation channels. Specific information is outlined in STANAG 2096

and is as follows:

LINE INFORMATION

ALPHA Map sheet designation

BRAVO Date and time of collection of information

CHARLIE Type of minefield (AT, AP) (self-destructing)

DELTA Coordinates of minefield extremities

ECHO Depth of minefield

FOXTROT Enemy weapons or surveillance

GOLF Estimated time to breach minefield

HOTEL Estimated material and equipment needed to breach minefield

INDIA Routes for bypassing minefield (if any)

JULIET Coordinates of lane entry (if any)

KILO Coordinates of lane exit (if any)

LIMA Width of lanes, in meters (if any)

ZULU Other:
A-7

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

• UXO Spot Report

The UXO spot report is a detailed, swift, two-way reporting system that makes clear

where the UXO hazard areas are, what their priorities are, and which units are affected

by them. The report is used to request help in handling a UXO hazard that is beyond a

unit’s ability to handle and that affects the unit’s mission. This report helps commanders

set priorities based on the battlefield situation. The UXO spot report is the first-echelon

report that is sent when a UXO is encountered. The report consists of nine lines and is

sent by the fastest means available.

LINE # INFORMATION

1. Date-Time Group: DTG item was discovered

2. Reporting Activity: (Unit identification code) and location (grid of UXO).

3. Contact Method: Radio frequency, call sign, point of contact and telephone number.

4. Type of Ordnance: Dropped, projected, placed or thrown. If available, supply the

subgroup. Give the size of the hazard area.

5. NBC Contamination: Be as specific as possible.

6. Resources Threatened: Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that are

threatened.

7. Impact on Mission: Provide a short description of current tactical situation and

how the presence of UXO affects mission.

8. Protective Measures: Describe any measures you have taken to protect personnel

and equipment.

9. Recommended Priority: Recommend a priority for response by EOD or engineers.
A-8

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

• US Message Text Format Messages:

UNCLASSIFIED MIL-STD-6040

5.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATS

IMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C114 STATUS: AGREED DAT

MTF IDENTIFIER: SIREP

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: SENSITIVE INFORMATION REPORT

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE SIREP IS USED TO PROVIDE SENSITIVE

INFORMATION ON EVENTS OR CONDITIONS THAT MAY HAVE A

SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON CURRENT PLANNING OF AN OPERATION,

BUT OF LESS TIME CRITICALITY THAN A TACREP. THIS MESSAGE

PROVES A SENSITIVE FILE MAINTENANCE UPDATE MECHANISM.

SPONSORS: DIA

RELATED DOCUMENTS:

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT:

SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET FORMAT NAME

(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE

IDENTIFICATION

(0) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION

IDENTIFICATION DATA

(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O// SIREP

(0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE

(C) AMPN 5 M// AMPLIFICATION

(C) NARR 6 /M// NARRATIVE

INFORMATION

(0) COLLINFO 7 /O/O/O/O// COLLECTOR

INFORMATION

(C) HEADING 8 /M// GROUND ACTIVITY

(C) lEUNITEQ 9 /*M/M/M/M// ENEMY UNIT AND

EQUIPMENT

(0) lESTATUS 10 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY STATUS

AND ACTIVITY

INFORMATION

(0) lEEMTLOC 11 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// LAST KNOWN ENEMY

EMITTER LOCATION

(0) 2EDES TIN 12 /*M/M/M// ENEMY DESTINATION

INFORMATION

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
A-9

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

(C) GENTEXT 13 /M/M// GROUND ACTIVITY

SUMMARY

(C) HEADING 14 /M// AIR ACTIVITY

(C) 2EACSTAT 15 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY AIRCRAFT

STATUS

(0) 2EACLOC 16 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY AIRCRAFT

LOCATION AND

MOVEMENT INFO

(0) 2EACORD 17 /*M/M/M// ENEMY AIRCRAFT

ORDNANCE AND

DESTINATION

(0) 2EDESTIN 18 /*M/M/M// ENEMY DESTINATION

INFORMATION

(C) GENTEXT l9 /M/M// AIR ACTIVITY SUMMARY

(C) HEADING 20 /M// MARITIME ACTIVITY

(C) 3MTGTQNT21 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGETS,

QUANTITY AND TYPE

(0) 3MTGTDSG 22 /*M/M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGET

DESIGNATION

(0) 3MTGTLOC 23 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGET

LOCATION

INFORMATION

(0) 3MTGTINF 24 /*M/M/M/O/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGET

INFORMATION

(0) 3MTGTACT 25 /*M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGET

DESTINATION AND/OR

ACTIVITY

(C) GENTEXT 26 /M/M// MARITIME ACTIVITY

SUMMARY

(0) GENTEXT 27 /M/M// ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

ACTIVITY

(C) HEADING 28 /M// ENEMY LOSSES

(0) ENLOS 29 /M/M/M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY PERSONNEL

LOSS COUNT

(0) lCAPEQ 30 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

CAPTURED

(C) 4DESEQ 31 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

DESTROYED

(C) 4DAMEQ 32 *M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

DAMAGE

(C) 1ABANDEQ 33 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

ABANDONED

(C) GENTEXT 34 /M/M// ENEMY LOSS SUMMARY

(C) HEADING 35 /M// FRIENDLY LOSSES

(0) FRLOS 36 /M/M/M/M/M/M/M// FRIENDLY PERSONNEL

LOSS COUNT

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
A-10

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

(0) CAPEQ 37 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

CAPTURED

(C) 4DESEQ 38 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

DESTROYED

(C) 4DAMEQ 39 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

DAMAGE

(C) GENTEXT 40 /M/M// FRIENDLY LOSS

SUMMARY

(C) HEADING 41 /M// BARRIERS AND

OBSTACLES

(0) 1BARRIER 42 /*M/M/M// BARRIER OR OBSTACLE

INFORMATION

(C) HEADING 43 /M// INSTALLATION DATA

(0) 7TGTTYPE 44 /*M/M/M/M/M// TARGET TYPE, STATUS

AND/OR LOCATION INFO

(C) 7AREANAM 45 /*M/M// AREA NAME

(0) GENTEXT 46 /M/M// INSTALLATION ACTIVITY

(C) HEADING 47 /M// PERSONALITIES

(0) 8EPERDAT 48 /*M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY PERSONNEL

PERSONAL DATA

(0) DECL 49 /M// MESSAGE

DOWNGRADING OR

DECLASSIFICATION D.

STRUCTURAL NOTATION:

1. (1) P ([2] e )

2. (3)F1 A “SIREP”

3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) L ([4] Q= 1))

4. (6) M (([4] e> 1) ~ ( [4],NF2 = FF646-1))

5. (8) MP ([9] e )

6. (8)F1 A “GROUND ACTIVITY”

7. (9) M (([10] 8) / ([11] D) / ([12] 0))

8. (10)F1 = [9]F1,N

9. (11)F1 = [9]F1,N

10. (12)F1 = [9]F1,N

11. (13) M ([9] 8)

12. (13)F1 A “GROUND ACTIVITY SUMMARY”

13. (14) MP ([15] S)

14. (14)F1 A “AIR ACTIVITY”

15. (15) M (([16] 8) / ([17] @) / ([18] 8))

16. (16)F1 = [15]F1,N

17. (17)F1 = [15]F1,N
A-11

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MIL-STD-6040

5.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATS

IMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(OU) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C327 STATUS: AGREED D

MTF IDENTIFIER: MCMREP

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: MCM REPORT

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE MCMREP PROVIDES A SITUATION REPORT

ON MCM OPERATIONS AND THE AREA IMPACTED BY PRESENT

OR FUTURE MCM OPERATIONS.

SPONSORS:

RELATED DOCUMENTS: FOR FURTHER U.S. IMPLEMENTATION

GUIDANCE, SEE JIEO CIRCULAR 9152, ITEMS 42 AND 51.

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT:

SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET FORMAT NAME

(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE

IDENTIFICATION(0)

(O) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION

IDENTIFICATION

DATA

(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O/ / MCMREP

* (0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE

(C) AMPN 5 /M// AMPLIFICATION

(C) NARR 6 /M// NARRATIVE

INFORMATION

* (0) MXPN 7 /M/M/O/O/O/O/O// MINE EXPLOSION

(0) MDETDAT 8 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0// MINE DETECTION

DATA

* (0) MOPS 9 /M/O// MCM OPERATIONS IN

PROGRESS

(0) MTASK 10 /M/M/O/*O/O// MCM TASK

* (0) MINE 11 /M/O/O/O/O/O/O// MINE INFORMATION

* (0) MSUM 12 /M/O// SUMMARY OF

MINEFIELDS

* (0) MTYPE 13 /M/O// TYPE OF MINE

(0) PGRSS 14 /M/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/*O// PROGRESS OF MCM

TASK

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
A-12

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

* (0) NOOP 15 /M/O/O/O// SHIPS

NON-OPERATIONAL

* (0) UWCOND 16 /M/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O// UNDERWATER

CONDITIONS

(0) CONM~RK 17 /M/O/O/O// CONTACT MARKER

(0) MZONE 18 /M/M/M/*O/O// STATUS OF MINE

ZONE

(C) AMPN 19 /M// AMPLIFICATION

* (M) MBUOY 20 /M/O/O/O/O// MCM BUOY

(0) MAP 21 /M/O/*O/O/O// MAP DATA

INFORMATION

(0) LOGSIT 22 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0// LOGISTICS

SITUATION

(0) ASORT 23 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0// AIR SORTIE

(C) AMPN 24 /M// AMPLIFICATION

(0) ASUM 25 /0/0/0/0/0// AIR SUMMARY

(0) DIVDAT 26 /0/0/0/0/0/0// DIVER DATA

(0) ENVIRN 27 /0/0/0/0/0// ENVIRONMENT

(0) CHRON 28 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0// CHRONOLOGY

(0) NAV 29 /O/O/O// NAVIGATION

(C) AMPN 30 /M// AMPLIFICATION

(0) AKNLDG 31 /M/*O// ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REQUIREMENT

(0) DECL 32 /M// MESSAGE

DOWNGRADING OR

DECLASSIFICATION D.

STRUCTURAL NOTATION:

1. (1) P ([2] @)

2. (3)F1 A “MCMREP”

3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) & ([4] e= 1) )

4. (6) M (([4] e> 1) & ([4],NF2 = FF646-1))

5. (19) M ([18]F3 = “CLOSED”)

6. (24) M ([23]F2 = “99”)

7. (30) M ([29]F2 = “99”)

NATURAL LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT:

1. SET 1 (EXER) IS PROHIBITED, IF SET 2 (OPER) OCCURS.

2. SET 3 (MSGID) FIELD 1 MUST EQUAL “MCMREP.”

3. SET 5 (AMPN) IS MANDATORY, IF [SET 4 (REF) FIELD 2 EQUALS FFIRN/

FUD 646-1 AND THE NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF SET 4 (REF) EQUALS 1].

4. SET 6 (NARR) IS MANDATORY, IF [THE NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF

SET 4 (REF) IS GREATER THAN 1 AND FIELD 2 IN SOME OCCURRENCE OF

SET 4 (REF) EQUALS FFIRN/FUD 646-1].
A-13

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

5. SET 19 (AM~N) IS MANDATORY, IF SET 18 (MZONE) FIELD 3 EQUALS

“CLOSED.”

6. SET 24 (AMPN) IS MANDATORY, IF SET 23 (ASORT) FIELD 2 EQUALS “99.”

7. SET 30 (AMPN) IS MANDATORY, IF SET 29 (NAY) FIELD 2 EQUALS “99.”

REMARKS:

THE PAGE MARKINGS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELATED

DOCUMENT FOR THE AGGREGATE MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT.

REVISION DATE: 21 JUL 1995
A-14

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED MIL-STD- 6040

5.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATS

IMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C440 STATUS: AGREED DAT

MTF IDENTIFIER: MINEOPS

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: JOINT MINELAYING OPERATIONS

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE MINEOPS IS USED FOR THE JOINT EXCHANGE

OF INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, CHARACTERISTICS, AND

STATUS OF COMPONENT SERVICES’ MINELAYING OPERATIONS. IT IS

ALSO USED TO REQUEST, TASK, MODIFY, REPORT, PLAN, AND

APPROVE MINELAYING OPERATIONS.

SPONSORS: USN/USAF

RELATED DOCUMENTS:

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT:

SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET FORMAT NAME

(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE

 IDENTIFICATION

(0) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION

 IDENTIFICATION

DATA

(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O// MINEOPS

* (0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE

(C) AMPN 5 /M// AMPLIFICATION

(C) NARR 6 /M// NARRATIVE

 INFORMATION

M (M) MWACT 7 /M// MINE WARFARE

 OPERATIONS

 ACTIVITY

[O (M) MINEFLD 8 /M/M/M/M/M/*M// MINEFIELD

 INFORMATION

[[ * (0) MAP 9 /M/O/*O/O/O// MAP DATA

 INFORMATION

[[ (C) POMOE 10 /M/M/M/M/M/M/O/O/O/O/O// PLANNED OVERALL

 MEASURE OF

 EFFECTIVENESS

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
A-15

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

[[ (M) 5TIME 11 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/M/O/C// MINEFIELD TIME AND

STATUS INFORMATION

[[ (0) 5MFLD 12 /*M/M/M/O/O/O/C/O// MINEFIELD

 INFORMATION

[[ * (0) MDELTYP 13 /M/M/M/M// MINE DELIVERY AND

 TYPE

[[ * (0) UNITDES 14 /M/M/M/O// MINELAYING UNIT

DESIGNATOR

 INFORMATION

[[ (0) 5MLINE 15 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/ MINELINES

[[ (0) 5MLOC 16 /*M/M/M/O/C// MINE LOAD LOCATION

[[ * (C) MCPOS 17 /M/M/M/M/M/M/M/O// MINE CASE AND

 POSITION

[ END OF SEGMENT

END OF SEGMENT

(0) DECL 18 /M// MESSAGE

 DOWNGRADING OR

DECLASSIFICATION D.

STRUCTURAL NOTATION:

1. (1) P ([2] @ )

2. (3) F1 A “MINEOPS”

3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) & ([4] Q= 1))
A-16

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED MIL-STD-6040

5.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATS

IMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C441 STATUS: AGREED

MTF IDENTIFIER: MCMOPS

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: JOINT MINE COUNTERMEASURES

OPERATIONS

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE MCMOPS IS USED FOR THE JOINT EXCHANGE

OF INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND STATUS OF COMPONENT

SERVICES MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM) OPERATIONS. IT IS ALSO

USED TO REQUEST, TASK, PLAN, REPORT, MODIFY, AND APPROVE

MINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS.

SPONSORS: USN/USAF

RELATED DOCUMENTS:

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT:

SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET FORMAT NAME

(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE

 IDENTIFICATION

(0) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION

IDENTIFICATION

 DATA

(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O// MCMOPS

* (0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE

(C) AMPN 5 /M// AMPLIFICATION

(C) NARR 6 /M// NARRATIVE

 INFORMATION

M (M) MWACT 7 /M// MINE WARFARE

 OPERATIONS

 ACTIVITY

[M (M) MCMACT 8 /M/M/M/M/O/O/O/O/O/O/*O// MINE

 COUNTERMEASURES

 ACTIVITY

[[ * (0) MAP 9 /M/O/*O/O/O// MAP DATA

 INFORMATION

[[ * (C) VESVEH 10 /M/M/*M/M// VESSEL/VEHICLE

 IDENTIFICATION

[[ * (0) MDA 11 /0/*0/0// MINE DANGER AREA

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
A-17

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

[[ * (0) SAFELANE 12 /M/M/M/M/M/O/*M// LANE OF SAFE

 PASSAGE

[[ * (0) LDTHCORD 13 /M/M/M/*M// LEAD-THROUGH

 COORDINATION

[ END OF SEGMENT

[ END OF SEGMENT

(0) DECL 14 /M// MESSAGE

 DOWNGRADING OR

 DECLASSIFICATION D.

STRUCTURAL NOTATION:

1. (1) P ([2] @)

2. (3)F1 A “MCMOPS”

3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) & ([4] Q= 1))

4. (6) M (([4] @> 1) & ([4],NF2 = FF646-1))

5. (10) M ([12] @)

NATURAL LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT:

UNCLASSIFIED
A-18

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B

REFERENCES

B-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-15 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Joint Publications

a. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

b. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures Development Program.”

c. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

d. Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

e. Joint Pub 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlespace.”

f. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

g. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

h. Joint Pub 3-02.1, “Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations.”

i. Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.”

j. Joint Pub 3-04, “Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (AIR).”

k. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

l. Joint Pub 3-06, “Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations.”

m. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

n. Joint Pub 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance.”

o. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

p. Joint Pub 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.”

q. Joint Pub 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.”

r. Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”

s. Joint Pub 3-34, “Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-15

t. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

u. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

v. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

w. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

x. CJCS Instruction 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

y. CJCS Manual 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning

Formats and Guidance).”

2. Multi-Service

a. NWP 1-14M / MCWP 5-2.1, “The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval

Operations.”

b. NWP 3-06M/FMFM 7-5, “Doctrine for Navy/Marine Corps Joint Riverine Operations.”

c. NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 “Mine Warfare.”

d. TRADOC Pam 525-43/TAC Pam 50-27, “Military Operations: US Joint Operational

Concept and Procedures for Coordination of Employment of Air Delivered Mines (J Mine).”

e. Variable Message Format (VMF) Message Number K05.16, “Land Minefield Laying

Report,” TIDP-TE, Volume III, Annex A.

3. US Army

a. FM 3-100, “NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations.”

b. FM 5-10, “The Engineer Platoon.”

c. FM 5-34, “Engineer Field Data.”

d. FM 5-71-100, “Division Engineer Combat Operations.”

e. FM 5-71.2, “Armored Task Force Engineer Combat Operations.”

f. FM 5-71.3, “Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored).”

g. FM 5-100, “Engineer Combat Operations.”

h. FM 5-100-15, “Corps Engineer Operations.”

i. FM 5-103, “Survivability.”
B-3

References

j. FM 5-116, “Engineer Operations, Echelons Above Corps.”

k. FM 5-250, “Explosives and Demolitions.”

l. FM 6-20, “Fire Support in the Air Land Battle.”

m. FM 6-20-30, “Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations.”

n. FM 20-32, “Mine/Countermine Operations.”

o. FM 27-10, “Law of Land Warfare.”

p. FM 71-100, “Divisions Operations.”

q. FM 90-7, “Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.”

r. FM 90-13, “Combined Arms River Crossing Operations.”

s. FM 90-13-1, “Combined Arms Breaching Operations.”

t. FM 100-5, “Operations.”

u. FM 100-7 (Draft), “The Army in Theater Operations.”

v. FM 100-15, “Corps Operations.”

w. FM 101-5-1, “Operational Terms and Symbols.”

x. TC 5-250.1, “Modernized Demolition Initiator.”

y. TRADOC Pam 525-18, “Military Operations: US Army Operational Concepts for

Countermine Operations.”

z. TRADOC Pam 525-19, “USA Operational Concept for Land Mine Warfare.”

4. US Navy

a. NDP 1-14, “Naval Warfare.”

b. NWP 1-03.1, “Operational Reports.”

c. NWP 1-14M / MCWP 5-2.1, “Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval

Operations.”

d. NWP 3-02.4, “Explosive Ordnance Disposal.”

e. NWP 3-05, “Naval Special Warfare.”
B-4

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-15

f. NWP 3-10, “Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine.”

g. NWP 3-15, “Mine Warfare.”

h. NWP 3-15.2.1, “Mine Countermeasures Operations.”

i. NWP 3-15.2.2, “Airborne Mine Countermeasures Operations.”

j. NWP 3-15.3, “Mining Operations.”

k. NWP 3-15.4.1, “Mine Countermeasures Planning and Procedures.”

l. NWP 3-15.4.1, VOL I, “Mine Countermeasures Planning and Procedures (Data

Appendices).”

m. NWP 3-15.4.2, “Minefield Planning.”

n. NWP 3-56, “Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual.”

o. NWP 5-00.3M, “The Amphibious Task Force Plan.”

p. NWP 5-01, “Naval Operational Planning.”

5. US Air Force

a. AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine.”

b. AFDD 1-1, “Air Force Task List.”

c. AFDD 2, “Organization & Employment.”

d. AFDD 2-1.3, “Counterland.”

e. AFDD 2-1.4, “Countersea.”

f. AFDD 2-5, “Information Operations.”

6. US Marine Corps

a. MCDP 1, “Warfighting.”

b. MCDP 1-2, “Campaigning.”

c. MCDP 4, “Logistics.”

d. MCWP 3-1, “Ground Combat Operations.”
B-5

References

e. MCWP 3-16.2, “TTP for Fire Support Coordination.”

f. MCWP 3-17, “Engineer Operations.”

g. MCWP 5-1, “Marine Corps Planning.”

7. NATO

a. ATP 1(C), Vol I, “Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions.”

b. ATP 6A (Navy) (Air), Vol I, “Allied Doctrine of Mine Warfare, Policies, and Principles.”

c. ATP 8(A), “Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

d. ATP 24(A) (Navy), “Tactical Instructions and Procedures for the Conduct of Mine

Warfare Operations.”

e. ATP 37, “Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations.”

f. STANAG 1242, “Allied Doctrine of Mine Warfare Policy and Principles.”

g. STANAG 1257, “NATO Mine Delivery Systems.”

h. STANAG 1323, “NATO Minefield Planning Guidance.”

i. STANAG 1400, “Mining and Minelaying - Planning and Evaluation, Tactics, and

Execution.”

j. STANAG 2017, “Orders to the Demolition Commander and the Demolition Firing

Commander.”

k. STANAG 2036, “Land Minefield Laying, Marking, Recording and Reporting

Procedures.”

l. STANAG 2096, “Reporting Engineer Information in the Field.”

m. STANAG 2123, “Obstacle Folder.”

n. STANAG 2394, ATP 52, “Land Force Combat Engineer Doctrine.”

o. STANAG 2889, “Marking of Hazardous Areas and Routes Through Them.”

p. STANAG 2963, “Coordination of Field Artillery Delivered Scatterable Mines.”

q. STANAG 2990, “Principles and Procedures for the Employment in Land Warfare of

Scatterable Mines With a Limited Laid Life.”
B-6

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-15

r. STANAG 2991, “NATO Glossary of Combat Engineer Terms and Definitions-AAP-19.”

s. STANAG 2991, AAP 19, “NATO Combat Engineer Glossary.”
APPENDIX C

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

C-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the

United States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division,

Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address

content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for

this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-15, 30 June 93, “Joint Doctrine for Barriers,

Obstacles, and Mine Warfare.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and

Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested

to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in

this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________
C-2

Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-15

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication

centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign

governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense

Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,

Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned

administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,

“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL

1655 Woodson Road

Attn: Joint Publications

St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point

700 Robbins Avenue

Bldg 1, Customer Service

Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base

Albany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AMCM airborne mine countermeasures

AOA amphibious objective area

ATF amphibious task force

C2 command and control

CATF commander, amphibious task force

CCW 1980 United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CLF commander, landing force

CLZ craft landing zone

COA course of action

COMINEWARCOM Commander, Mine Warfare Command

DA Department of Army

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

FFE flame field expedients

FM field manual

FWF former warring factions

HN host nation

HWM high water mark

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board

LF landing force

LOC line of communications

MCM mine countermeasures

MCMOPS mine countermeasures operations

MFPF minefield planning folder

MINEOPS joint minelaying operations

NCA National Command Authorities

NWP naval warfare publication

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

PIR priority intelligence requirements
ROE rules of engagement

SCATMINEWARN scatterable minefield warning

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SLOC sea line of communication

SMCM surface mine countermeasures

SOF special operations forces

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO)

TMD theater missile defense

UN United Nations

USAF United States Air Force

USCINCACOM Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command

USCINCPAC Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command

UXO unexploded explosive ordnance

VMF variable message format

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-15
acoustic mine. A mine with an acoustic

circuit which responds to the acoustic field

of a ship or sweep. (Joint Pub 1-02)

attrition sweeping. The continuous

sweeping of minefields to keep the risk of

mines to all ships as low as possible. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

barrier. A coordinated series of obstacles

designed or employed to channel, direct,

restrict, delay, or stop the movement of an

opposing force and to impose additional

losses in personnel, time, and equipment

on the opposing force. Barriers can exist

naturally, be manmade, or a combination

of both. (Joint Pub 1-02)

barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare plan.

A comprehensive, coordinated plan that

includes responsibilities, general location

of unspecified and specific barriers,

obstacles, and minefields, special

instructions, limitations, coordination, and

completion times. The plan may designate

locations of obstacle zones or belts. It is

normally prepared as an annex to a

campaign plan, operation plan, or operation

order. (Joint Pub 1-02)

bottom mine. A mine with negative

buoyancy which remains on the seabed.

Also called ground mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

clearing operation. An operation designed

to clear or neutralize all mines and obstacles

from a route or area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

controllable mine. A mine which after laying

can be controlled by the user, to the extent

of making the mine safe or live, or to fire

the mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

conventional mines. Land mines, other than

nuclear or chemical, which are not designed

to self-destruct. They are designed to be

emplaced by hand or mechanical means.

Conventional mines can be buried or

surface laid and are normally emplaced in

a pattern to aid in recording. (Joint Pub

1-02)

defensive minefield. 1. In naval mine

warfare, a minefield laid in international

waters or international straits with the

declared intention of controlling shipping

in defense of sea communications. 2. In

land mine warfare, a minefield laid in

accordance with an established plan to

prevent a penetration between positions and

to strengthen the defense of the positions

themselves. (Joint Pub 1-02)

denial measure. An action to hinder or deny

the enemy the use of space, personnel, or

facilities. It may include destruction,

removal, contamination, or erection of

obstructions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

enabling mine countermeasures.

Countermeasures designed to counter

mines once they have been laid. This

includes both passive and active mine

countermeasures. (Joint Pub 1-02)

exploratory hunting. In naval mine warfare,

a parallel operation to search sweeping, in

which a sample of the route or area is

subjected to minehunting procedures to

determine the presence or absence of mines.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

flame field expedients. Simple, handmade

devices used to produce flame or

illumination. Also called FFE. (This term

and its definition modify the existing term

and its definition and are approved for

inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-

02.)

floating mine. In naval mine warfare, a mine

visible on the surface. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-3

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-15

influence mine. A mine actuated by the effect

of a target on some physical condition in

the vicinity of the mine or on radiations

emanating from the mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

magnetic mine. A mine which responds to

the magnetic field of a target. (Joint Pub

1-02)

mine. 1. In land mine warfare, an explosive

or other material, normally encased,

designed to destroy or damage ground

vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to

wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate

personnel. It is designed to be detonated

by the action of its victim, by the passage

of time, or by controlled means. 2. In naval

mine warfare, an explosive device laid in

the water with the intention of damaging

or sinking ships or of deterring shipping

from entering an area. The term does not

include devices attached to the bottoms of

ships or to harbor installations by personnel

operating underwater, nor does it include

devices which explode immediately on

expiration of a predetermined time after

laying. (This term and its definition modify

the existing term and its definition and are

approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02.)

mine countermeasures. All methods for

preventing or reducing damage or danger

from mines. Also called MCM. (This term

and its definition modify the existing term

and its definition and are approved for

inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-

02.)

minefield. 1. In land warfare, an area of

ground containing mines emplaced with or

without a pattern. 2. In naval warfare, an

area of water containing mines laid with or

without a pattern. (This term and its

definition modify the existing term and its

definition and are approved for inclusion

in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

minefield density. In land mine warfare, the

average number of mines per meter of

minefield front, or the average number of

mines per square meter of minefield. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

minefield lane. A marked lane, unmined, or

cleared of mines, leading through a

minefield. (Joint Pub 1-02)

minefield marking. Visible marking of all

points required in laying a minefield and

indicating the extent of such minefields.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

minefield record. A complete written record

of all pertinent information concerned on a

minefield, submitted on a standard form by

the officer in charge of the laying

operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

minefield report. An oral, electronic, or

written communication concerning mining

activities, friendly or enemy, submitted in

a standard format by the fastest secure

means available. (Joint Pub 1-02)

minehunting. Employment of sensor and

neutralization systems, whether air, surface,

or subsurface, to locate and dispose of

individual mines. Minehunting is

conducted to eliminate mines in a known

field when sweeping is not feasible or

desirable, or to verify the presence or

absence of mines in a given area. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

minesweeping. The technique of clearing

mines using either mechanical, explosive,

or influence sweep equipment. Mechanical

sweeping removes, disturbs, or otherwise

neutralizes the mine; explosive sweeping

causes sympathetic detonations in,

damages, or displaces the mine; and

influence sweeping produces either the

acoustic and/or magnetic influence required

to detonate the mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)
GL-5

Glossary

mine warfare. The strategic, operational, and

tactical use of mines and mine

countermeasures. Mine warfare is divided

into two basic subdivisions: the laying of

mines to degrade the enemy’s capabilities

to wage land, air, and maritime warfare; and

the countering of enemy-laid mines to

permit friendly maneuver or use of selected

land or sea areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mine weapons. The collective term for all

weapons which may be used in mine

warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

moored mine. A contact or influenceoperated mine of positive buoyancy held

below the surface by a mooring attached to

a sinker or anchor on the bottom. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

numbered fleet. A major tactical unit of the

Navy immediately subordinate to a major

fleet command and comprising various task

forces, elements, groups, and units for the

purpose of prosecuting specific naval

operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

obstacle. Any obstruction designed or

employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the

movement of an opposing force, and to

impose additional losses in personnel, time,

and equipment on the opposing force.

Obstacles can exist naturally or can be

manmade, or can be a combination of both.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

obstacle belt. A brigade-level command and

control measure, normally given

graphically, to show where within an

obstacle zone the ground tactical

commander plans to limit friendly obstacle

employment and focus the defense. It

assigns an intent to the obstacle plan and

provides the necessary guidance on the

overall effect of obstacles within a belt.

(Joint Pub1-02)

obstacle restricted areas. A command and

control measure used to limit the type or

number of obstacles within an area. (Joint

Pub 1-02 )

obstacle zone. A division-level command

and control measure, normally done

graphically, to designate specific land areas

where lower echelons are allowed to

employ tactical obstacles. (Joint Pub 1-02)

offensive minefield. In naval mine warfare,

a minefield laid in enemy territorial water

or waters under enemy control. (Joint Pub

1-02)

phoney minefield. An area free of live mines

used to simulate a minefield, or section of

a minefield, with the object of deceiving

the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

pressure mine. 1. In land mine warfare, a

mine whose fuse responds to the direct

pressure of a target. 2. In naval mine

warfare, a mine whose circuit responds to

the hydrodynamic pressure field of a target.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

proactive mine countermeasures. Measures

intended to prevent the enemy from

successfully laying mines. (Joint Pub 1-02)

protective minefield. 1. In land mine

warfare, a minefield employed to assist a

unit in its local, close-in protection. 2. In

naval mine warfare, a minefield laid in

friendly territorial waters to protect ports,

harbors, anchorages, coasts and coastal

routes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Q-route. A system of preplanned shipping

lanes in mined or potentially mined waters

used to minimize the area the mine

countermeasures commander has to keep

clear of mines to provide safe passage for

friendly shipping. (Joint Pub 1-02)
GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-15

reduction. The creation of lanes through a

minefield or obstacle to allow passage of

the attacking ground force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reinforcing obstacles. Those obstacles

specifically constructed, emplaced, or

detonated through military effort and

designed to strengthen existing terrain to

disrupt, fix, turn, or block enemy

movement. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reserved obstacles. Those demolition

obstacles that are deemed critical to the

plan for which the authority to detonate

is reserved by the designating

commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

scatterable mine. In land mine warfare, a

mine laid without regard to classical

pattern and which is designed to be

delivered by aircraft, artillery, missile,

ground dispenser, or by hand. Once laid,

it normally has a limited life. (Joint Pub

1-02)

search sweeping. In naval mine warfare,

the operation of sweeping a sample of

route or area to determine whether poised

mines are present. (Joint Pub 1-02)

ship counter. In naval mine warfare, a device

in a mine which prevents the mine from

detonating until a preset number of

actuations has taken place. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic mining. A long-term mining

operation designed to deny the enemy the

use of specific sea routes or sea areas. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

tactical obstacles. Those obstacles employed

to disrupt enemy formations, to turn them

into a desired area, to fix them in position

under direct and indirect fires, and to block

enemy penetrations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unexploded explosive ordnance. Explosive

ordnance which has been primed, fused,

armed or otherwise prepared for action, and

which has been fired, dropped, launched,

projected, or placed in such a manner as to

constitute a hazard to operations,

installations, personnel or material and

remains unexploded either by malfunction

or design or for any other cause. Also called

UXO. (This term and its definition modify

the existing term and its definition and are

approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02.)
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and CINCS

Includes scope of

project, references,

milestones, and who will

develop drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, CINC, or Joint

Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

!

!

!

The CINCS receive the pub

and begin to assess it during

use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7,

will solicit a written report from

the combatant commands and

Services on the utility and

quality of each pub and the

need for any urgent changes or

earlier-than-scheduled

revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each pub is

revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision

!

!

!

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff

to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

CINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

!

!

!

STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as

shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The

diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-15 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 3-0

PERSONNEL

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS C4 SYSTEMS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint

Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formal

staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

!

!

!

Lead Agent selects Primary Review

Authority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS,

Services, and Joint Staff

!

!

!

STEP #3

Two Drafts

JOINT PUB 1

JOINT

WARFARE

JOINT PUB 0-2

UNAAF