~

and terrorize many areas of the countryside." The enemy also could mass

troops, as he had in 1967 just south

of the demilitarized zone, in numbers

that were "formidable in a local sense."

These concentrations were by no means

decisive, and they offered opportunities for "careful exploitation of the

enemy's vulnerability and application

of our superior firepower and mobility." So declared the official Military

Assistance Command year-end review

of the war, which predicted that "our

gains in 1967 in South Vietnam" ought

to be increased many-fold in 1968." 2

Vei, Khe Sanh, and Cam Lo to meet

Highway 1, South Vietnam's main

north-south artery, near the town of

Dong Ha at the conflux of the Cua

Viet and Quang Tri Rivers. Khe Sanh

was one of several major bases along

Highway 9 south of the demilitarized

zone. Two of the others; the Rock

Pile-named for a jagged hill nearby

-and Camp Carroll, lay to the northeast, some 20 to 25 kilometers from

the combat base at Khe Sanh, and

figured in its defense. North of the

village of Lang Vei, which lay astride

Highway 9 roughly half the road distance from Khe Sanh to the Laotian

frontier, U.S. Army Special Forces had

established a camp for a Civilian Irregular Defense Group composed

mainly of mountain tribesmen native

to the region. The highway, however,

followed a circuitous route that for a

long stretch paralleled the border, so

that straight line distances were about

3.3 kilometers from Lang Vei to the

The Battleground

The North Vietnamese buildup detected by U .S. intelligence seemed

directed at the Khe Sanh combat base

located roughly halfway between the

16th and 17th parallels, north latitude,

in northwestern South Vietnam. (See

Map, p. 6). The base lay within

striking distance of not one but two

enemy sanctuaries-or partial sanctuaries since American bombs had

fallen on both-Laos, just 16 kilometers* due west, and the demilitarized

zone, within 25 kilometers to the north

at its nearest point. Geographically,

Khe Sanh lay in Quang Tri, northernmost of South Vietnam's provinces.

Militarily and administratively, it was

within I Corps which encompassed the

five northern provinces of Quang Tri,

Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin,

and Quang Ngai.3

The Khe Sanh combat base, some

450 meters above sea level, stood on a

plateau due north of a village that

bore the same name. A road linked

the base to Highway 9 which extended

eastward from beyond the Laotian

border through the villages of Lang

4
u.s. Marines patrol a hill near the Rock

Pile (in background), November 1966

Laotian boundary and 8 kilometers

from Lang Vei to Khe Sanh.

North of Khe Sanh flowed the

Rao Quan River, a tributary of the

Quang Tri, which provided water for

the base but was scarcely a defensive

barrier. South of this stream and west

of the plateau on which the combat

base stood were five important hills.

Identified by their height in meters,

they were from east to west Hills 558,

861A, 861, 881 North, and 881 South.

Across the river and directly north of

the base loomed Hills 950 and 1015.*

Beyond them was a succession of hills

and valleys that were forested or covered by dense undergrowth and which

offered excellent concealment for North

Vietnamese troops and supply convoys

moving into South Vietnam by way of

either Laos or the demilitarized zone.

It was to impede this infiltration

that U .S. troops first moved into the

Khe Sanh area. In 1962, Army Special

Forces, the Green Berets, began using

the plateau between the Rao Quan and

Highway 9 as a camp for a Civilian

Irregular Defense Group. Khe Sanh

was one of a network of border camps

that served primarily to gather intelligence for operations in the remote

areas of South Vietnam. For some 50

months, Khe Sanh remained a preserve

of the Green Berets whose activities

sufficiently annoyed the enemy to gring

down a 120-mm mortar barrage in

January 1966. Some 9 months later, in

October 1966, a Marine battalion dug

in on the plateau; in January 1967 the * For detailed map, see page 24.

s



the runway seemed responsible, channeling warm moist air from the lowlands onto the plateau where it encountered cooler air, became chilled,

and created fog.8

Principal Commands and

Commanders

Such was the Khe Sanh battlefield upon which tens of thousands of

Americans, South Vietnamese, and

North Vietnamese were destined to

fight. Operational control of the American forces committed there, and of all

United States forces engaged in the

Vietnam war, originated with President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commander

in Chief of the nation's armed forces.

He exercised his authority through

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander

in Chief, Pacific Command, and General Westmoreland, head of the Military

Assistance Command in Vietnam.

placements that would require a minimum of lumber-which had to be

delivered by air-for shoring. The

consistency of the earth proved an

advantage to the Leathernecks, even

though it also would simplify North

Vietnamese efforts at tunneling, a favorite enemy technique in previous

sieges. Conditions within the main

perimeter were not duplicated on the

nearby hills which had shallow layers

of a more porous soil.7

Before long, the runway was again

able to accommodate C-123's and C130's, but nevertheless pilots bound

for Khe Sanh frequently found the

field unusable, primarily because of

bad weather. During the early months

of the year, clouds and fog were prevalent throughout the northwestern corner of Quang Tri province. The airfield, however, seemed particularly

bedeviled by fog. On many a morning

when visibility was excellent from the

hilltops surrounding the base, the runway remained shrouded in mist until

sun and breeze combined to disperse

it. A deep ravine at the east end of

President Johnson and Secretary McNamara were briefed on Khe Sanh, 29 January

1968, by General Wheeler (standing). Also present (I. to r.): Gen. H. K. Johnson, USAj

Adm. i. H. Moorer, USN; Gen. J. P. McConnell, USAF; and Gen. L. F. Chapman,

USMC
In January 1968 the individual

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

were Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Army

Chief of Staff, Adm. Thomas H.

Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations,

Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., commandant of the Marine Corps, and

Gen. John P. McConnell, Air Force

Chief of Staff.

As the principal commander in

the Pacific at the time of the siege

of Khe Sanh, Admiral Sharp was responsible for the planning and execution of operations in sppport of the

Republic of Vietnam. His responsibility

encompassed selective attacks against

targets in North Vietnam as well as

operations against hostile forces in the

South. The ultimate American goals

were to protect the people of South

Vietnam, eliminate the threat to governmental stability posed by Viet Cong

guerrillas and North Vietnamese

regulars, and prepare South Vietnamese forces to assume the burden of

their own national defense.

In carrying out his responsibilities,

Admiral Sharp worked through his

service component commanders and

subordinate unified commanders. The

former were: Gen. John D. Ryan,

Commander in Chief, Pacific Air

Forces; Gen. Dwight E. Beach, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces,

Pacific; and Adm. John J. Hyland,

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

General Westmoreland headed the unified, or multiservice, command in

South Vietnam, which functioned as

an operational headquarters despite the

word " Assistance" in its title.o

Besides serving as the senior

American commander in Vietnam,

Westmore1and had to work closely with

the head of the American diplomatic

mission in Saigon. That is, military

decisions could not be made without

taking into account U.S political,

economic, and social progr .tms, which

10
Admiral Hyland (I.) was Commander in

Chief, Pacific Fleet. General Beach (r.)

commanded U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

were under the aegis of the U.S. Ambassador. Because of the close relationship of civil and military matters,

frequent consultation between soldier

and diplomat was essential. "That this

arrangement worked smoothly" was, in

Westmoreland's opinion, "a tribute to

the succession of prominent and talented ambassadors" appointed to the

post. During 1968 the incumbent was

Ellsworth Bunker .10

Initially, the embassy had been

directly responsible for American support of Saigon's pacification campaign

to extend its authority throughout

South Vietnam. General Westmoreland

was given increasing authority over

this aspect of the war until, in May

1967, the embassy's pacification office

and the equivalent section of Westmorel and's staff combined to form a

single agency within the assistance

command. Robert W. Komer, a former

member of President Johnson's staff,

assumed the rank of Ambassador and

became Westmoreland's Deputy for

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The American

contribution to the pacification effort

thus became an exclusively military

responsibility. "We are," wrote General Westmoreland, "now organized to

pursue a 'one war' strategy ." 11

The U .S. Military Assistance

Command embraced several subordinate organizations, among them Seventh Air Force, Westmoreland's Air

Force component command. Gen.

William W. Momyer headed the Seventh Air Force and also served as

Westmoreland's Deputy for Air Operations. From his headquarters at Tan

Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon, Momyer directed Air Force operations over

the southernmost portion of North

Vietnam and all of South Vietnam, in

accordance with Westmoreland's directives. Targets deeper in North Vietnam were attacked by Air Force planes

based in Thailand or Navy aircraft

assigned to carriers of Task Force 77.

11
General Westmoreland (I.) and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker (r.) greet General

Wheeler at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, upon

his arrival in February 1968

cally, the C-130 squadrons returned to

their home bases to be replaced by

other aircraft on temporary assignment.

There were several reasons for this

policy. Bases in Vietnam were crowded

and could not easily accommodate the

C-130 ground crews, administrators,

and equipment that would have been

part of a permanent change of station. Since the C-130's flew missions

throughout the western Pacific, Air

Force planners preferred to adjust the

number of aircraft in Southeast Asia

according to existing needs rather than

risk the possibility that planes permanently assigned there might be idle

at a time when other C-130's were

being overworked in, for example,

South Korea. Another possible motive

for temporary assignment was to avoid

having to transfer housekeeping units

to an area where a troop ceiling was in

effect.13

Operational control of the Air Force

fighter-bombers in Thailand was

vested in Momyer, who employed

them as directed by Admiral Sharp

through General Ryan's headquarters

in Hawaii. Admiral Sharp directed

Task Force 77's strikes against the

North, operating through his Navy

component commander, Admiral Hyland.12

A component of Seventh Air

Force of vital importance to Khe

Sanh's defenders was the 834th Air

Division, commanded by Brig. Gen.

Burl W. McLaughlin. When he assumed command of the air division in

N ovember 1967, he found himself confronted by one of those organizational

peculiarities so common to the war in

Southeast Asia. Although the C-7 and

C-123 squadrons serving in South

Vietnam were assigned to the 834th

Air Division, the C-130's that did

most of the heavy hauling were on

temporary duty from the 315th Air

Division and based in the Philippines,

Okinawa, Taiwan, or Japan. PeriodiAmong the Vietnam war's deadliest weapons was the Boeing B-52

Stratofortress, a massive 8-engine jet

designed originally for dropping nuclear

bombs from high altitudes. Assigned to

the 3d Air Division with headquarters

at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam,

the planes operated from that island,

from U Tapao Air Base in Thailand,

and occasionally from Kadena Air Base

on Okinawa. Maj. Gen. Selmon W.

Wells commanded the air division during the siege of Khe Sanh.

12
Generals Ryan (I.) and Momyer are shown

in a C-130 airborne battlefield command

and control center, monitoring a 1967

tactical strike. Momyer pinned on his

fourth star at year's end.

Khe Sanh campaign was Vo Nguyen

Giap, a one-time school teacher in

Hanoi. Beginning in 1944 with 34

men, two revolvers, 17 modern rifles,

14 flintlocks, and a machine gun, he

built the Viet Minh army and a decade later led it to victory over the

French at Dien Bien Phu. Whether

Giap was physically present and actively in command of North vietnamese forces at Khe Sanh is unknown.

Some U .S. officials, General Momyer

among them, believed he had entrusted

the attack to a subordinate. Whichever

the case, as Defense Minister in the

Hanoi government, Giap exercised the

ultimate authority over North Vietnamese operations at Khe Sanh and

elsewhere.1G

The Enemy Masses

General Westmoreland believed

the North Vietnamese would attack

Khe Sanh. Its nearness to enemy sanctuaries and infiltration routes made it

an inviting target, and American inte1ligence was able to verify a hostile

The Strategic Air Command was

responsible for providing B-52 strikes

as requested by General Westmoreland.

Besides the bombers themselves, B-52

operations required the deployment of

Hoeing KC-135 aerial tankers and

ground radio relay stations. The command also assigned liaison officers to

Seventh Air Force headquarters to

coordinate the bombings with other

operations. "During the Khe Sahn

emergency," reported General Westmoreland, "1 slept in my headquarters

next to the combat operations center"

and, after consulting intelligence and

operations officers, "personally decided

where the B-52's would strike" 14

Despite an influx of Army units

into I Corps during 1967, operational

responsibility rested with Lieutenant

General Cushman, commander of the

III Marine Amphibious Force. The

equivalent of a corps commander uilder General Westmoreland, he had at

his disposal the Ist and 3d Marine

Divisions and the I st Marine Aircraft

Wing. Maj. Gen. Rathvon McCall

Tompkins commanded the 3d Marine

Division and provided the reinforced

regiment, the 26th Marines led by CoI.

David E. Lownds, that defended Khe

Sanh. All three officers had fought the

Japanese in the Pacific in World War

II, and Lownds had also seen action in

Korea.15

The North Vietnamese general believed to be in personal charge of the

13


~

mounted 90-mm guns, 10 Ontos antitank vehicles--each consisting of six

106-mm recoilless rifles mounted on a

tracked chassis-and four "dusters"

mounting either two 40-mm cannon or

four .50-caliber machine guns. These

last, designed almost a generation before as antiaircraft weapons, were

prized for their murderous effect

against ground troops.27

The burden of keeping the President informed about what the enemy

could do was carried by W. W. Rostow,

Mr. Johnson's Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs. To accomplish this, Dr. Rostow, a well-known

economic historian, set up an informal

intelligence evaluation section consisting

of himself, an Air Force general, and

two civilians. The officer was Brig. Gen.

Robert N. Ginsburgh, a World War II

Army artillery officer and Harvard

Ph.D. who had transferred to the Air

Force in 1949 and was serving as

liaison agent between the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and the White House. One of

the civilians was Art McCafferty, chief

of the White House situation room;

the other was a secretary, Mary Lee

Chaternuck, who screened the available translations of captured documents.

President Johnson Takes a Hand

The mounting threat to Khe Sanh

caught the eye of President Johnson.

As early as mid-December 1967, he

had become aware that an enemy offensive was in the making and that

a likely objective was Khe Sanh. Thereafter, he took a personal interest in

the adequacy of American measures to

protect the endangered base.28


Massing his forces against Khe Sanh,

General Giap (r.) tried unsuccessfully to

repeat his Dien Bien Phu victory

The Viet Minh buildup was completed by 13 March 1954, when General Giap inaugurated the siege with a

sudden and devastating artillery barrage. After 2 days, the Viet Minh held

both outposts that were to have protected the airfield.

French headquarters at Hanoi

responded by scraping together as

many transports as it could-including

twin-engine Fairchild Flying Boxcars

flown by American civilians-and

trying to parachute supplies, equipment,

and reinforcements* to sustain the garrison. Air strikes, however, failed to

suppress murderous fire from Communist antiaircraft guns that were appearing all around the besieged valley.

These weapons prevented the transports from flying straight, level, and

low to parachute their loads into the

gradually contracting drop zone. The

French fought valiantly but the Viet

Minh tightened the noose around the

garrison. On 7 May 1954, having expended their last ammunition, the

French were overrun by the enemy

force. Incomplete records indicate that

French casualties during the battle

totaled about 5,000 dead, with some

10,000 troops, half of them wounded,

taken prisoner. Giap's losses were an

estimated 23,000.

Comparison with Khe Sanh

The decision to defend Khe Sanh

was made with Dien Bien Phu in mind

and the defenses of the Marine base

were strengthened accordingly. comparisons of the status of the Marines

at Khe Sanh and the plight of the

French at Dien Bien Phu revealed that

the Americans enjoyed a marked superiority in two essential r:ategories-firepower and logistic support.

To augment the firepower of the

Dien Bien Phu garrison, the French

were able to muster fewer than 200

planes on a daily basis. These included

such diverse types as Morane 500

light observation planes, compact

Grumman F8F fighters, and 4-engine

Consolidated Privateer patrol craft

that had evolved from the wartime

Liberator bomber .

In defense of Khe Sanh, the

Americans could draw upon a Southeast Asia armada of 2,000 planes and

3,300 helicopters. These aircraft,

moreover, benefited from reliable communications, and many of them had

the ability to destroy a target con-

* A cumulative total of 16,500 defenders served at Dien Bien Phu during

the siege.

19
Ab",.""m,"f21USAFC4J',fi"w"

t, Nh, T,,"g A;";,ld m D"Omb', '952

t, b"""' F,,",h '"'"t ,p",",",

Aft" th, f,'1 ,t D"" B"" Ph". ,;,

t,",", V;ot Mmh t",p,~,,'mp'""d

b, F,,",h ,ffi""-",,, th, D'"m"

B"dg. mt, H,",; (b"'w ,)

cealed by fog or darkness using internal equipment-as in the case of the

Marine and Navy Grumman A-6'sor by relying on radar direction provided by control facilities on the

ground. The ability of Army gunners

at the Rock Pile and Camp Carroll to

support the Marines with 175-mm

barrages promised the Khe Sanh garrison a source of assistance that could

not be affected by bombardments of the

Marine base itself.

The Marine advantage in logistical matters was even more striking

than the difference in firepower. Radar

enabled transports to parachute cargo

accurately in any weather, a kind of

versatility unknown at Dien Bien Phu.

Cargo extraction equipment developed

by the U .S. Air Force also permitted

the delivery of items too bulky to drop

by parachute. In addition, the transports flying to Khe Sanh in 1968 were

vastly improved over those of 14 years

earlier. The most efficient of the Air

Force transports was the C-130,

credited with a maximum payload in

excess of 20 tons, which actually delivered an average of some 13 tons

per sortie during the battle. Also available were Fairchild C-123's, considered

capable of carrying almost 8 tons, and

de Havilland C- 7 A's built to deliver

3 tons of cargo. Like the C-130, both

of these types operated at about 60

percent of rated capacity. By comparison, in 1954 the French flew a

small number of Fairchild Packets,

twin-engine transports with a 7-ton

maximum payload. They had relied

primarily, however, upon old Douglas

C-47's originally designed to carry 3

tons, the same maximum load as the

smallest and least used of the Air

Force transports available to the Khe

Sanh garrison.

These advantages seemed to outweigh by far the problems the Americans could expect to encounter. Like

the French, they would have difficulty

silencing the cleverly camouflaged

antiaircraft guns certain to be encountered at Khe Sanh. These weapons

could take a heavy toll of transports

making deliveries to the Marine base.

In addition, the weather would definitely be a handicap.5

20
Why Khe Sanh?

Khe Sanh was a valuable base

for allied ground operations against

infiltration routes entering South Vietnam and, as events would prove, for

attacks on North Vietnamese supply

dumps located across the Loatian

border. By January 1968, the base

had evolved into a well organized

defensive position with a runway

that could accommodate the largest

American tactical transports. Moreover, the base had become a symbol

of U.S. determination to see the war

through. Intelligence officers were convinced that the enemy, aware of this

symbolism, would lay siege to the base

and attempt to overwhelm its defenders in the same way he had crushed

the French and their auxiliaries at

Dien Bien Phu. Westmoreland's staff

recognized that an attack on Khe Sanh

might be part of some even more

ambitious scheme-combined perhaps

with a thrust from Laos through the A

Shau Valley toward Hue or Da Nang

to isolate a portion of I Corps-but

they were certain that Giap, whether

directing operations from Hanoi or

actually in command on the battlefield,

fully intended to repeat along Highway

9 the kind of triumph he won 14 years

before in the wilderness far to the

north.6

Yet the possibility existed that by

massing troops against Khe Sanh,

General Giap or his field commander

might be putting a pistol to his head.

Ever since 1966, General Westmoreland had been fighting what amounted

to a war of attrition. He used his remarkably mobile forces to strike suddenly, attempting to engage the enemy

so that America's awesome firepower,

everything from M-16 rifles to 8-52

bombers, could be brought to bear.

His objective was not to capture

hill or ridge line, but to destroy

enemy soldiers and hostile units.7

Since Giap would have to concentrate large numbers of troops in northwestern South Vietnam, where there
agreement that had ended the war between the French and Viet Minh, and

finally "to limit the flow or substantially increase the cost of infiltrating

men and supplies into South Vietnam."

The goal of the United States in

fighting in the South, bombing the

N orth, and pursuing other military

measures was the negotiation of an

honorable peace that would enable the

nations of Southeast Asia to concentrate upon economic and social needs.

The President believed that successful

military operations in Southeast Asia

would convince Ho Chi Minh, the

leader of North Vietnam, that peace

was preferable to fighting. Mr. Johnson

also maintained that American success

would serve as "a concrete demonstration that aggression across intemational frontiers or demarcation lines

is no longer an acceptable means of

political change." 9

were comparatively few civilians to

inhibit the use of American air and

artillery, Westmoreland felt free to

make unstinting use of bombs and

shells. Once this firepower had shattered the North Vietnamese divisions

the highly mobile U.S. ground troops

could exploit the situation. The Americans, it seemed, might well be able to

do at Khe Sanh what the French had

tried and failed to do at Dien Bien

Phu.8

The war in South Vietnam, where

intensive firepower was used against

enemy forces, was but one part of a

U.S. strategy that included bombing of

selected targets in North Vietnam. In

March 1967, in a speech before the

Tennessee legislature, President Johnson listed three objectives of the bombing campaign. They were "to back our

fighting men by denying the enemy a

sanctuary," to "exact a penalty" for

North Vietnam's violations of the 1954

Ho Chi Minh, North

Vietnamese leader

22




(Above) Fuel dump hit by one of numerous North Vietnamese mortar attacks on Khe Sanh

(Below) Refugees being evacuated from Khe Sanh

Can Tho, one of many cities struck by

the Viet Cong during the Tet offensive

the Perfume River--except for the

South Vietnamese 1st Division's headquarters. South of the river, the advisory compound of the U.S. Military

Assistance Command held out as did

a few other pockets of resistance.

Help soon arrived: Elements of

two U.S. Marine battalions reached

the city on the 31st, punched through

to the assistance command compound,

and crossed the river, only to fall back

when they could not breach the Citadel's massive walls. The Americans,

reinforced to regimental strength, concentrated on clearing the area south of

the river. In carrying out this task,

which they completed on 9 February,

the Marines sought to minimize civilian casualties and destruction of property by using tear gas and employing

direct fire weapons that could be aimed

precisely. The fighting south of the

river, the Marines reported, resulted

in 1,053 enemy dead.

In the old city, Vietnamese forces

did most of the fighting, though a

Marine battalion assisted for a time. On

24 February, the flag of the Republic

of Vietnam was raised over the battered Citadel. Mopping up-killing or

capturing the North Vietnamese troops

who held out among the rubblelasted until 2 March.

Recapturing Hue required 13 Vietnamese and three Marine battalions.

Five U.S. Army battalions assisted by

disrupting the enemy's routes of supply

and reinforcement. Clouds and rain

prevented air power from being of

much assistance during the fighting.16

The extent of the enemy's Tet offensive-that it was carried out on so

vast a scale-had not been anticipated.

According to General Ginsburgh, who

was working with Dr. Rostow in the

White House situation room, "We

probably did not pay sufficient credence to. ..the element of their

campaign which talked about an uprising in the cities. We paid less attention ...than we should have probably

because it didn't look like such a campaign would be effective."17

29
~

republic's cities, reporter Robert Shaplen found destruction and despair

worse than he had encountered during

World War II or the Korean conflict.

Nearly 4,000 civilians had perished in

the fighting there, 2,800 of them executed by the North Vietnamese and

Viet Cong, and 90,000 persons required food or shelter. The Communists, moreover, had looted the city

treasury, sabotaged public utilities, and

made away with important records.

"Not only is Hue's spirit broken,"

Shaplen wrote, .'it is a bureaucratic

mess."

The administrative tangle was soon

unsnarled, however, and the destitute

Precisely what the enemy had in

mind as the goal of the Tet offensive

was not clear. The general uprising in

which the North Vietnamese seem to

have placed their hopes, proved more

myth than reality. However, the notion that a society or social class can

be maneuvered into a situation where

revolution is inevitable has been common to both European and Asian

Communism. After their successful

revolution in 1917, the victorious Bolsheviks had also expected a spontanf';-

ous and successful uprising of the

German proletariat. Similarly, the Vietnamese Communists may have really

believed the South Vietnamese people

were on the verge of revolt.18

Whatever Hanoi's actual hopes and

beliefs. the Tet Offensive failed to trigger a general uprising. It did, however,

disrupt South Vietnamese society, destroying thousands of homes, and

creating 470,000 frightened refugees

whose needs for food and shelter

threatened to inundate the Saigon government. At Hue, hardest hit of the

Aerial view of Hue shows the six"squareki lometer Citadel surrounded by threemeter-thick walls. Shiny aluminum roofs

show where dwellings were repaired or

replaced after the Tet offensive

Lt. Cot. H. M. Dallman, USAF, landed at

Khe Sanh with a load of ammunition

while the base was under enemy fire

Maj. Gerold 0. Johnson, set a course

for Da Nang where the plane landed

safely.23

Although the shelling of Khe Sanh

and its outposts continued, 3 days

elapsed before the enemy again probed

Marine defenses. During the interim,

he struck for a second time at the Lang

Vei Special Forces camp. Some 10

months earlier, in May 1967, enemy

soldiers disguised as South vietnamese irregulars had managed to enter

the camp. Though they failed to capture it. the episode did persuade the

Green Berets that the existing campsite was ill chosen. To obtain better

fields of observation and fire, Special

Forces headquarters at Da Nang decided to rebuild the camp on Highway

9 about 1,000 meters west of the old

site. From this new location, South

Vietnamese and Montagnards could

continue to patrol the Laos-South vietnam border.24

Actually patrols were few during

the late months of 1967. Reports of

extensive infiltration across the Xe

Pone River, which here separates Laos

from South Vietnam, convinced Capt.

Frank C. Willoughby, commander of

the Lang Vei Special Forces detachment, that first priority should go to

improving the camp's defenses. The

wisdom of this decision was confirmed

when refugees from the Laotian battalion driven from Ban Houaysan came

straggling into Lang Vei.

At the beginning of February, the

camp boasted excellent defenses against

infantry attack and some protection

against armor, which the enemy had

used at Ban Houaysan. The camp consisted of five mutually supporting positions, each protected by barbed wire,

trip flares, and claymore mines-the

last being electrically fired weapons,

mounted on standards, which spewed

fragments horizontally when triggered

by the defenders. The camp had its

own 4.2-inch, 81-mm, and 60-mm

mortars and could call for fire support

from Marine batteries at Khe Sanh

and from Army artillery farther to the

east. Antitank defenses consisted of

two 106-mm recoilless rifles, four 57-

mm recoilless weapons which were of

little value against stoutly armored vehicles, and 100 M-72 light antitank

assault weapons-disposable, preloaded

rocket launchers that in effect were

I-shot bazookas-which proved less

than reliable in combat.

During the enemy buildup that

preceded the siege of Khe Sanh, General Westmoreland's headquarters

asked III Marine Amphibious Force

and the 5th Special Forces Group to

review their plans for both fire support

and reinforcement of Lang Vei. At

Khe Sanh Colonel Lownds ke'pt two

rifle companies in readiness to move

westward to the Special Forces camp

32.


A Nayy A-1 Skyraider is positioned for

launch from the attack carrier USS Coral

Sea to fly combat missions oyer Vietnam

made a normal landing, but before

worried onlookers could relax, the rolling Lockheed burst into flame and

veered from the runway. Pilot and copilot escaped through an overhead

hatch, suffering only minor burns, and

firefighters rescued at least six passengers or crewmen who were more seriously hurt. Six others burned to

death.32

some 500 meters west of the battalion's

main position. Despite inroads by

North Vietnamese foot soldiers, the

Marines clung to part of the outpost,

and a counterattack after sunrise on 9

February routed the enemy. In this

action, the last major ground attack

for some 2 week:;, the Marines lost 21

killed but claimed at least 124 North

Vietnamese dead.31

Besides continuing to pummel Khe

Sanh's ground forces with mortars,

rockets, and artillery, the enemy made

life exceedingly dangerous for the

crews of cargo planes bringing in

supplies. On 11 February, a Marine

KC-130F, loaded with flexible bladders containing jet fuel for use in

turbine-powered Marine helicopters,

was hit by enemy fire as it approached

the runway. Fuel appeared to be

streaming from the plane as the pilot

This was the most spectacular and

deadliest in a series of incidents in

which transports, either landing or unloading, were hit by gunfire or shell

fragments, Through 10 February, seven

Air Force C-130's had thus been

damaged, though none were destroyed.3:1

The first of the two Hercules

transports hit on 11 February was immobilized but escaped destruction because of the bravery and skill displayed

by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Jenks, his

crew, a detachment of airmen stationed at Khe Sanh, and a mechanic

flown to the Marine base from Da

Nang. Captain Jenks' aircraft came

35
Jenks realized that he could not wait

for a second hydraulic component to be

shipped to Khe Sanh, since each hour

spent on the ground multiplied the

chances that the $2.5 million aircraft

would be destroyed. The pilot therefore decided to try flying the C-130 to

Da N ang, after the mechanic had

made emergency repairs using tools

and materials available at Khe Sanh.

The flight to Da Nang would be a

dangerous task since a loss of fluid

from the patched hydraulic system at a

critical moment could mean death for

all on board. Near noon on 13 February the repairs were finished. Jenks

and his crew boarded the plane for a

takeoff attempt. They succeeded in

coaxing the craft into the air, taking

advantage of wretched w~ather--a 50-

foot ceiling and horizontal visibility

limited to 1,000 feet-to frustrate

enemy gun crews. When the C-130 was

safely on the ground at Da Nang,

mechanics counted 242 holes in the

battered transport.34

By this time General Momyer

had become concerned about the danger to which the C-130's were being

exposed in landing at Khe Sanh. The

rugged, powerful Lockheeds were, as

he later termed them, a "make or break

resource" too valuable to risk unnecessarily. From 12 February through the

end of March, Air Force C-130's

landed at the Marine base on only four

days, though they continued to deliver

cargo by parachute or by means of

extraction systems. Fairchild C-123K's,

under fire as soon as it had begun

unloading. Shell fragments severed a

hydraulic line in the tail section, and

the leaking fluid caught fire. Captain

Jenks and his crewmen escaped from

the crippled plane and, acting on the

instructions of Lt. Col. William R.

Smith, senior Air Force officer at the

base, took cover from the shells that

continued to fall within the Marine

perimeter .

SSgt. Robert Mahaffy, a member

of Lieutenant Colonel Smith's Air Force

detachment, aided by another airman,

used a fire extinguisher .to put out the

flames. However, the airman holding

the nozzle was overcome by the chemical fumes and let it slip from his grasp.

The hose flopped about, spraying

chemicals in the sergeant's face and

blinding him. Smith led Mahaffy to

the nearby Marine aid station where a

member of the Navy medical corps

washed out his eyes. Neither of the two

men suffered permanent injury.

Once the flames were out and the

injured cared for, Lieutenant Colonel

Smith moved Captain Jenks and the

others from the C-130 to an underground bunker where he distributed

among them the detachment's last few

cans of beer.

Next, Smith radioed Da Nang for

an experienced mechanic and a "rudder package" to replace the damaged

portion of the transport's hydraulic

system. The mechanic arrived but the

parts somehow went astray. Captain

Lt. Col. w. R. Smith,

USAF, in front of

Khe Sanh's base

operations and

control tower


mentators to compare, somewhat belatedly, the situation at Khe Sanh with

conditions at Dien Bien Phu. Life

magazine, for example, listed three

events that had "cast doubt on the usefulness of our military might as an

instrument of our Asian policies. "

They were North Korea's capture of

the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo on 23

January 1968, the Tet offensive, and

the "looming bloodbath at Khe

Sanb." ~o

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., historian

and onetime member of President John

F. Kennedy's staff, wrote an open letter urging that: "Whatever we do, we

must not re-enact Dien Bien Phu." Mr.

Schlesinger's letter, printed in the

Washington Post on 22 March, dismissed as folly the notion that an

American-held Khe S!'oh could have

any effect on infiltration as long as the

Marines were immobilized there. After

noting that air power had thus far

View of Khe Sanh from the cockpit of a C-130 transport delivering supplies to U.S.

Marines



feet, or skimmed low over the airstrip

to use a cargo extraction system.

Enemy gunners would even fire through

smokescreens into the flight path they

thought an approaching cargo craft

might follow. American strike aircraft

helped reduce the volume and accuracy of flak but could not silence the

guns completely. One C-130 navigator,

who served for more than a year in

South Vietnam, stated that the "groundto-air fire was. ..heavier and closer

to the aircraft during a landing approach at Khe Sanh than at any other

time and place" during his tour.4

Even before the North Vietnamese encirclement, landing a C-130 at

Khe Sanh was no easy task. In good

weather pilots sometimes found it difficult to judge distance when their final

approach carried them over the deep

ravine at the east end of the runway.

In bad weather, Khe Sanh became surprisingly hard to locate. As late as

December 1967, airborne radar had

picked up a fairly good return from

structures built on the surface of the

plateau, but as the likelihood of a

prolonged b~ttle increased, the Marines burrowed into the soil, and the

echo became progressively poorer.5

Fortunately, pilots could rely for

assistance on a ground controlled ape

proach radar installed at Khe Sanh,

operated by a MariQe air traffic control

unit. Another Marine radar, a TPQ-IO

set, was available in case of emergency.

An air support radar team normally

used the TPQ-10 to direct air strikes.

Landing under Fire

When the fight for Khe Sanh began, Air Force transports and Marine

aerial tankers were able to land to

unload their passengers and cargo. For

a short time after destruction of the

ammunition dump on 21 January, damage to the runway closed the field to

planes larger than C-123's, but the Cl30's soon were back on the job. As

the tempo of combat picked up, landings became increasingly hazardous

until the Marines were calling the

transports "mortar magnets" and

"rocket bait" because they unfailingly

attracted hostile fire as they taxied to

the unloading area.6

Even after the aircraft had landed

safely, men and planes remained vulnerable to small arms and shell fire.

Crews of C-123K's enjoyed a slight

advantage over those who flew the

larger C-130's. The lighter Fairchild

could lose enough momentum within

1,400 feet of touching down near the

eastern threshold of the runway to permit a 90-degree turn. Seldom did one

of these planes miss the first of two

turnoffs that led to the unloading area,

General McLaughlin, commander, 834th

Air Division. He won his second star in

August 1968

43
a narrow metal-surfaced lane parallel

to the main runway and located near its

western terminus.

The Lockheeds, however, required

a roll of almost 2,000 feet which

meant that these Hercules transports

frequently screeched past both turnotIs, had to continue to the west end

of the runway, risk hits from enemy

small arms while turning around, and

taxi back to one of the exits. Thus, the

enemy had repeated opportunities to

destroy the C-130's.7

The transport crews used a technique called "speed otIloading" to reduce the time they spent on the ground

at Khe Sanh. The key piece of equipment was a pair of 7-foot metal runners fitted to the ramp at the rear of

the cargo compartment. Within that

compartment, the individually bundled

loads were attached to pallets, measuring 108 by 88 inches, which rested

upon metal rollers built into the floor.

Two parallel guide rails kept the platforms centered and, on C-130's, contained a locking system that held the

loads firmly in place. The C-123's had

no such locking device; its pallets were

secured by chains.

After a transport landed, the

load master could attach the metal runners and lower the ramp as the pilot

taxied toward the unloading area. At

Khe Sanh, however, the procedure was

different. Usually a member of the Air

Force detachment at the base selected

a pair of runners stored beside the

taxiway and attached them to the plane.

This was necessary because the runners were in short supply and might

not be carried by every transport landing at the base.

In the unloading area. the loadmaster unlocked the pallets or released

the chains so that the forward motion

of the aircraft-aided if necessary by

a vigorous shove-sent the pallets to

the rear of the cargo compartment out

the open hatch, and down the ramp to

the ground. Unloading a transport with

forklifts could take between 5 and 10

44
Being struck by a bullet or shell

fragment was not the only hazard

awaiting aircraft landing at Khe Sanh.

Shells bursting on the runway left

shards from their casings and jagged

chunks of metal planking that could

pierce the tires of taxiing planes.

Among the most important work done

by Air Force personnel at Khe Sanh

was changing tires, often at considerable risk, so that the transports could

get back into the air before shells or

rockets converted them to junk. Some

indication of the rigors of landing at

the base may be gleaned from the fact

that during the 10-week siege the life

expectancy of C-130 tires in use

throughout Vietnam declined from 30

sorties to 18}0

The dangers encountered on the

ground by the C-130's, the newest and

largest Air Force tactical transports,

persuaded General Momyer to forbid

landing the valuable planes at Khe

Sanh, a ban that remained in force

from 12 through 25 February. During

this period, 58 C-123K sorties landed

almost 300 tons of cargo, and C- 7 A's

landed eight times to deliver 13 tons.

On 25 February, the C-130's resumed

landing, but only until the end of the

month. This 4-day burst of activity

consisted of 14 C-130 landings which

deposited slightly more than 160 tons

in the Khe Sanh unloading area. During March, C-123K's were the only

cargo craft to touch down at the Marine base. The C-130's, however, continued to deliver cargo either by parachute or using an extraction system.11

minutes; speed offloading could be

finished in as little as half a minute.

Both C-123's and C-130's used the

same pallets, made of aluminum and

plywood for a standard cargo handling

system. The cargo hold in the C-123

was too narrow to accommodate the

108-inch width of the pauel. Since the

plane could handle a width of 88

inches, the platforms were simply

turned and loaded sideways.8

Khe Sanh Marines found the light

and sturdy platforms ideal for use in

roofing bunkers. Because incoming

planes seldom had time to reclaim the

empty pallets, a large number of the

expensive platforms, worth roughly

$350 each, accumulated near the taxiway. The Air Force contingent at the

base tried, with the help of Marine

guards, to prevent their loss but the

prevailing fog made this extremely difficult. Visibility often was so limited

that individuals could spirit away the

platforms with practically no likelihood

of being detected.9

45






loads extracted from the C-130's. Lt.

Col. William R. Smith, USAF, mission commander at this time, went to

the heart of the matter when he asked :

Why save the runway and lose Khe

Sanh? The defenders agreed to use

the extraction system and, as they

had feared, within 4 weeks the heavilyloaded pallets were playing havoc with

the runway. Nearly every load gouged

out portions of the surface planking

and bent the surviving metal so badly

that it could not be straightened. The

damage was confined, however, to a

single 700-foot section at the far western end of the runway and did not

pose a threat to the use of the airstrip.32

The Air Force employed a low altitude

parachute extraction system (above) and

a ground proximity extraction system

(lower r.) to resupply Khe Sanh

Low altitude parachute extractions

continued throughout the siege, with

the last two sorties being flown on 2

April. By that time, however, the 834th

Air Division had introduced a supplementary method of cargo extraction. The change was necessary because of a lack of equipment for low

altitude parachute extractions. The electrical gear used to fire the squib that

released the reefing line was critically

scarce and there was a less acute shortage of the special steel pallets.3:1

To supplement or, if necessary, replace the parachute extraction system,

General McLaughlin and his advisers

recommended the ground proximity extraction system, in which cargo was

yanked from a rolling aircraft when

a hook extending from the cargo compartment engaged an arrester cable

rigged across the runway .34

In 1966, the Air Force and Army

had retired an experimental ground

proximity extraction system and ordered replacement equipment that had

been redesigned to eliminate the defects

that had appeared during testing. Because the low altitude parachute extraction system seemed more versatile, the

S2
~

of the plane. As soon as the pallet was

gone, the pilot accelerated and took

Off.37

However, an unexpected problem

arose on this first mission. The Marines who installed the arrester mechanism had drawn fire and were driven

to cover before finishing the job. As a

result, the load-though probably

weighing less than the usual 25,000

pounds-uprooted the moorings that

held the cable in place. Luckily, the

extraction equipment did its job prior

to being itself extracted.38

new gear was never used. Fortunately,

10 sets were located, including one in

the hands of the manufacturer, and

flown to the western Pacific.35

The Army logistic specialists who

would rig the loads to be extracted

were less than enthusiastic about the

assignment. No manuals existed on how

the system should function but the

Army agreed to do what it could using

standard pallets and following whatever rigging procedures might emanate

from General McLaughlin's headquarters. A message from the Office of the

Commanding General. U.S. Army.

Vietnam, warned the 834th Air Division that "the U .S. Army cannot

assume/share responsibility for the performance of the system to include damage to aircraft, ground personnel and

facilities, or delivered materiel."36

After a brief training session at

Naha Air Base, Okinawa, the C-130

crews were ready to try the extraction

equipment just installed at Khe Sanh.

On 30 March, a C-130 approached the

airstrip, touched down, and rolled

swiftly along the runway. A boom, to

which a hook was attached, extended

from a loaded pallet through the opening at the rear of the cargo compartment. The huge transport rolled across

an arresting cable which then rose to

engage the hook and pull the load out

In a congested area like the main

base, the ground proximity extraction

system had definite advantages over

low altitude parachute extraction. With

the hook and cable arrangement, the

load was always under control. The pallet could not escape from the cargo

compartment unless the hook was engaged, and once the load was on the

ground the arrester equipment checked

its movement. This method, then, was

safer than parachute extraction because

there was no way to release the pallet

too late or too soon, and no parachute

to malfunction. Also, the cargo came

to rest each time in almost the same

place, thus eliminating even the remote

possibility of widespread damage to

the runway surface.39

An airman of the

combat control

team at Khe Sanh

catches 40 winks

between duties

at the beleaguered

outpost

platforms used in the container delivery system. Marine helicopters then

flew the parachutes out of Khe Sanh,

but until space was available in outbound transports, the platforms had

to be stored near the taxiway. According to an Air Force officer, these plywood pallets were fairly safe from the

larcenous impulses of Khe Sanh's defenders. Like the platforms used with

parachute extraction gear, they were

awkward to carry Off.46

Even though they were not responsible for clearing the drop zone,

airmen frequently ventured into it in

quest of what Lieutenant Colonel Davis

called "supplemental rations or 'goodies' " that were attached to bundles

delivered by parachute. If no airman

was present to remove these packages,

the contents went to the Marines instead of to the intended recipients.

Rather than have his men continue to

risk death or injury in the drop zone,

he recommended that luxuries of this

kind be delivered by the C-123K's that

landed atop the plateau and were unloaded by the aerial port mobility

team.47

units had gathered supplies dumped

along the beach and moved them to

storage areas. The airmen, who were

commanded by an officer, were members of an aerial port mobility team

consisting of 7 to 14 enlisted men.

The mobility team helped plan outbound loads, prepared manifests for

cargo and passengers departing from

Khe Sanh, and assisted in unloading

and recovering cargo.44

On 11 March, North Vietnamese

forward observers began directing fire

into the drop zone whenever Marine

retrieval teams moved onto it. Lieutenant Colonel Davis, who assumed the

post of mission commander shortly

after the enemy adopted these tactics,

declared that the drop zone had become "probably the most hazardous

area at Khe Sanh." 45

Nevertheless, members of Company A, 3d Shore Party Battalion, did

most of their work on that dangerous

ground. These Marines employed forklifts and mechanical mules to recover

supplies that landed in the drop zone.

They also retrieved the parachutes and

55

2-seat trainer version of the Skyhawk,

was in charge. He checked the weather

around Khe Sanh and reported if the

ceiling permitted effective flak suppression. If the report was favorable,

a dozen A-4's took off from Chu Lai,

while 12 to 16 twin-rotor CH-46 helicopters and their escort of UH-l gunships left Quang Tri City for Dong Ha

where the larger helicopters loaded

the cargo destined for the outposts.

The helicopters left Dortg Ha on

a schedule that would bring them over

their destination just about the time

the A-4 's had hit known and suspected

antiaircraft emplacements with bombs,

napalm, and tear gas. Two A-4's laid a

smoke screen to conceal the final approach of the helicopters, during which

four other Skyhawks again battered the

North Vietnamese with cannon, bombs,

and rockets. As the CH-46's, their loads

stowed in nets that swayed beneath

the fuselage, approached and departed,

the helicopter gunships stood ready to

rescue the crew of any that might

fall victim to enemy fire. Seldom was

this necessary. for adequate escort drastically reduced CH-46 losses.52

At times. the weather had completely isolated the outposts. Early in

February. Marines on Hill 881S went

without food for 3 days until the fog

dissipated. Similarly Hill 950 was

swathed in clouds for 9 days during

which no helicopter could land. The

men exhausted their supply of water

and a patrol had to probe the enemyinfested wilderness to fill canteens at a

stream. Fortunately. the weather began improving as the Super Gaggle

commenced operating.53

A Marine helicopter heads for outposts

on a resupply mission
Although they made their greatest

contribution to the supply effort in

sustaining the outposts, Marine helicopter pilots flew in and out of Khe

Sanh throughout the battle. They

brought in reinfofcements during the

buildup, delivered fragile items that

could not be parachuted, and carried

away the wounded, sometimes flying

them to a hospital ship off the coast.54

Tour of duty over, U.S. Marines prepare

to board an Air Force C-130 at Khe Sanh

The Task Completed

The magnitude of the Khe Sanh

airlift was staggering. The number of

supply drops made there by 15 March

exceeded the total for all of Vietnam

before that time. Between 21 January

and 8 April. 8.120 tons of cargo were

parachuted to the defenders in 601 individual sorties by C-123's and C-130's.

Lockheed C-130's landed 273 times,

C-123's 179 times, and C-7's eight

times to unload a grand total of 4,310

tons of cargo and 2,676 passengers.

Flown out of the base were 1,574 persons, at least 306 of them wounded.

Air Force C-130's took part in 15

ground proximity extractions and 52

low altitude parachute extractions.55

The men who planned and executed this impressive effort paid a price

both in lives and in planes destroyed.

Forty-four passengers and an Air Force

crew of four perished in the 6 March

crash of the C-123 hit by ground fire

as it neared Khe Sanh. Two other

C-123's fell victim to mortar fire

while on the ground at the combat

base, and eight planes of this type

sustained varying degrees of battle

damage during supply missions. There

was, however, no further loss of life

among C-123 crews or passengers.

None of the jealously-hoarded C-130's

was destroyed, but at least 18 incurred

danlage and two passengers were killed

as they left their plane. The few C- 7's

that participated emerged unscathed as

did their crews.56

During the action, Marine helicopters transported 14,562 passengers and

58
~

4,661 tons of cargo to the main base

and its satellite outposts. Losses among

helicopters bound for the outpost line

numbered as many as three in a single

day until a deadlier escort was provided. After the introduction of the

Super Gaggle, only two cargo-carrying

helicopters succumbed to hostile gunners. The most serious accident suffered

by Marine aviation at Khe Sanh was

the lO February crash of a KC-13O

which killed six men.57

These statistics, fragmentary

though they are, support two conclusions. First, Air Force cargo planes

sustained the main base until troops

were available to open Highway 9.

Second, Khe Sanh's outposts could not

have survived except for Marine helicopters.

59

T-28 (above) and Marine Corps A-6 (below) strike aircraft joined the fight at

Khe Sanh

inland. Unfortunately, the weather was

so bad that visual strikes were possible

only on an average of 3 days per

month during the first 3 months of the

year. Of the three, February was the

most dismal, offering weather that Admiral Sharp characterized as the worst

since systematic bombing of North vietnam began back in 1965.6

Naval aviators managed, however,

to conduct successful strikes during February. One target was a radio and radar

installation that controlled the Russianbuilt interceptors defending Haiphong

and Hanoi. Carrier-based Grumman

A-6's, with all-weather bombing equipment, shattered this link in the enemy's defenses.7

Despite attacks such as this one,

the storms that shrouded the North

forced a reduction in the number of

Navy sorties dispatched there and released planes and munitions for use in

defense of Khe Sanh. As a result, during February Task Force 77 was able

to divert some 2,800 of its 3,672

planned sorties-about 77 percentagainst enemy targets in northern South

riant. But the Leatherneck system had

two main advantages: it engaged the

plane after a comparatively short roll,

thus reducing the chance of skidding

off the wet pavement; and it could be

reset in half a minute, rather than the

10 minutes it was taking to disengage

one aircraft and ready the Air Force

equipment to receive another. The M21, therefore, was much better suited

to handling formations of F-4's when

the planes had to land in rapid succession.5

The Navy's air contribution at

Khe Sanh reflected developments in

North Vietnam. In January 1968 carrier planes and Air. Force fighterbombers were engaged in a campaign

to isolate the port of Haiphong by severing the transportation lines leading

Khe Sanh in any but the worst

weather.16

In preparing to escort a supply

mission into Khe Sanh, planners first

drew on their maps a line indicating

the ground track of a cargo plane fro1t1

the time that it dropped below 3,500

feet above ground level until it regained

that altitude after takeoff. On the basis of this line, they then calculated

the potential danger area, the terrain

from which a 37-mm gun could hit a

plane performing a particular missioneither landing, parachuting cargo, or

using an extraction system.

A typical escort mission began

when the transpprt made rendezvous

with fighters and observation craft some

18 miles from Khe Sanh. All the planes

checked in with an Air Force airborne

command and control center which issued last-minute instructions. In theory,

transports could proceed unescorted

only when clouds or fog denied the enemy visual observation Qf the approaches

to the airfield. If visibility was good,

they were to receive an escort even

though it was necessary to wait for

fighter protection. In actual practice,

however, the senior Air Force officer on

the ground at Khe Sanh and the pilot

of the incoming plane evaluated the

probable intensity of hostile fire and

decided whether or not to await an

escort if none was on hand. Seldom

did the cargo planes postpone their

approach.

If an escort was both necessary

and available, forward air controllers

took positions on each side of the

transport. Their job was to locate previously uncharted gun positions, direct

fighter-bombers against them, and also

to prevent the fighter escort from accidentally bombing the Marines. The

fighters, which flew a racetrack pattern

around the cargo craft, responded to

instructions radioed from the two forward air controllers and also attacked

known antiaircraft sites within range

of the transport's flightpath. These

strikes, made with 20-mm cannon and

fragmentation bombs, usually began

when the plane being escorted was

about 1,500 feet above the ground}7

If neither fog nor clouds offered

concealment, two fighters put down

smokescreens on both sides of the incoming transport thrQughout the last

3 miles of its approach. Flying at 480

knots no more than 300 feet above the

earth, each fighter carried four smoke

dispensers. This number provided a

margin in case of malfunction, since

three dispensers would create an adequate screeri.18

The approach of a transport was

not the only occasion when antiaircraft

sites came under attack. During the

siege of Khe Sanh, every identified 37-

mm emplacement was repeatedly hit

until intelligence showed the gun to

be destroyed or abandoned. Weapons

of lesser size were attacked whenever

An A-4 Skyhawk

aboard the

USS Coral Sea

63
A USAF F-4 Phantom

enroute to target

namese MiG's by bombing those airfields that the short range enemy fighters would have had to use.21

The Falconers

Air Force forward air controllers

-tactical air controllers ( airborne) in

Marine parlance-played a role similar to that of the medieval huntsman

who sighted his prey, removed the hood

from his trained falcon, and launched

it to make the kill. These controllers

were essential to the successful defense

of Khe Sanh. In general, tactical aircraft sent to assist the Marines reported initially to the airborne battlefield command and control center

which then assigned them to forward

air controllers on station over the base.

Although more than one controller was

usually on hand, the volume of aerial

traffic WIlS such that flights of fighters

often had to wait their turn to attack.

In these circumstances, the planes entered a holding pattern-which on occasion could extend as high as 35,000

feet-and gradually descended as plane

after plane dropped its bombs.22

When the fight fQr Khe Sanh began, four Air Force light observation

planes, were operating from the base

airfield. One was a Cessna 0-1, a single-engine, high-wing monoplane used

by both the Air Force and M,arine

they posed a threat to American aircraft. In all, more than 300 antiaircraft

positions were reported destroyed.19

The introduction of radar-directed

surface-to-air missiles could have greatly complicated the task of defending

Khe Sanh, but none of these weapons

appeared in the immediate vicinity of

the base. In mid-January, four such missiles proved ineffectual against B-52's

flying over the demilitarized zone. There

were no similar incidents around Khe

Sanh, and no further missiles were

spotted near the demarcation line until

late in May.20

Enemy fighters might have intervened with deadly effect against the

vital but vulnerable transports, a possibility that American commanders kept

always in mind. When considered necessary, cannon-equipped Air Force

F-4's that had bombed targets near

Khe Sanh remained in the area to

provide combat air patrol against any

incursion from the North. A fighter

unit commander, who took part in these

missions, claimed that the F-4's burned

so much fuel prior to dropping their

ordnance that only one flight in seven

could furnish effective fighter cover.

The practice of designating a combat

air patrol, with no bombing assignment, was preferable. Carrier planes

helped meet the threat of North Viet64
troops, and from which direction attacking aircraft should make their runs.

He then used a white phosphorous

rocket or perhaps a smoke grenade to

mark the target, and the strike commenced.24

In addition to bad weather and

hostile fire, forward air controllers also

had to worry about friendly artillery.

Careful coordination was necessary to

avoid straying into the path of shells

fired from Camp Carroll, the Rockpile,

or the Marine base itself.25

Because of the Tet offensive and

the siege of Khe Sanh, air operations

beyond South Vietnam's borders declined in relative importance. Pilots

who had been flying interdiction missions outside the country were diverted

to attack targets only a short distance

from friendly positions.26

When all went well, an air strike

directed by a forward air controller

could achieve spectacular destruction.

One controller reported the existence

west of Khe Sanh of what appeared

to be an ammuniti~n supply point for

enemy artillery. He summoned fighters beneath an over~astto strafe, launch

rockets, and drop napalm. and was

rewarded by the sight of hundreds of

secondary explosions as crate4 rounds

detonated.21

Corps. The others were 0-2A's, also

high-wing monoplanes but constructed

with twin booms extending rearward

from the wings to the horizontal stabilizer. This planform, vaguely reminiscent of the World War II Lockheed

P-38, permitted the mounting of two

engines, tractor and pusher, fore and

aft of a stubby fuselage. All four

planes sustained damage during the

initial bombardment but were flown

to safety. Despite the departure of the

light aircraft, two Air Force officers,

Majors Milton Hartenbower and Richard Keskinen, remained behind to

serve as air liaison officers in Colonel

Lownds' headquarters.23

In the best of weather, the forward air controller's job was difficult

and dangerous. Flying through the

clouds which had prevailed during the

flight at Lang Vei, the controller had

to penetrate the overcast, which might

be concealing a hilltop or ridge line,

identify a target that could well be

shooting at him, climb above the cloud

cover, and lead the waiting fighters

downward through the murk.

Beneath the overcast, the controller radioed instructions to the attacking planes. He told them what the target was-a bunker, perhaps, or

trenches-whether it was defended,

where it lay in relation to friendly

Soviet-built

37-mm anti.

aircraft

gun used

against

tactical aircraft at

Khe Sanh
situation dictated ap attack to prevent

the movement of supplies.28

On the morning of 8 February,

a forward air controller was responsible

for stopping a proposed bombardment

that would surely have killed innocent

civilians. Word had reached Khe Sanh

that several hundred people were moving westward along Highway 9 from

the vicinity of the Marine base toward

the ruins of the Special Forces camp

at Lang Vei. The fact that they were

bucking the normal tide of refugees

aroused suspicion and gave rise to talk

of shelling the column. Luckily, Air

Force Captain Charles Rushforth "went

down and made a good low pass to see

who they were." Skimming just above

the treetops, he determined that these

were actual refugees, "mostly old men

and women and children," who evidently "figured they could go back to

Lang Vei village or maybe even back

into Laos."

Unfortunately, the enemy used

war victims such as these for his own

purposes, so that a forward air controller might find himself in a situation

where his best instincts had to yield

to military necessity. Such was the case

on 10 February when a second column

of refugees appeared on Highway 9.

Aerial reconnaissance revealed North

Vietnamese soldiers among the noncombatants forcing them to act as supply porters. The immediate military

Radar Control

Two types of radar were used to

control strikes in defense of Khe Sanh:

the Ma(ine TPQ-10 located at the base,

and the Air Force Combat Skyspot system for which there were several stations in Southeast Asia. The Marine

radar operated 20 hours per day. Major

Hartenbower, an Air Force Liaison

officer at Khe Sanh, was generous in his

praise of the Marine operators who routinely directed strikes as close as 500

meters from friendly troops. These

skilled specialists, he believed, could

bring the strikes to within 50 meters

of Marine positions in an emergency.

The major maintained that without this

radar, close-in strikes would have been

impossible in bad weather.29

The other radar was the Air Force

MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot which had

been operating in Southeast Asia for

almost 2 years. Back in 1966, the Viet

Cong had taken advantage of impossible flying weather to overrun a Special Forces camp in the A Shau Valley.

During the fight for the important patrol base, the only assistance available

to fighter-bomber pilots was that provided by forward air controllers flying
0-1's. A ceiling of 300 to 500 feet

complicated the controllers' task of

guiding strike aircraft to worthwhile

targets and also restricted the jets to

shallow approaches in which the pilots

could not bomb with the required accuracy. The failure of tactical aviation

in this action led to the adoption of

Combat Skyspot as a means of putting

bombs on target regardless of the weather.

the computer furnished the heading, altitude, and airspeed that the plane

should maintain. As the craft approached that point in the sky at which

its bombs would have to be released

in order to hit the target, the operator

on the ground began a countdown.

Course corrections and the actual signal to release bombs were broadcast

from the Skyspot van.3o

In the defense of Khe Sanh, Combat Skyspot provided remote control

for attack planes, fighter-bombers, and

B-52's. Because of the complexity in

operating a large number of planes in

the immediate vicinity of the base, delays and some confusion were inevitable. On 24 February, for example, an

F-4 flight commander realized just in

time that he was being directed into an

area where Skyspot-controlled B-52's

were dropping their bombs from high

altitude. Other incidents had less potential for disaster, but the Skyspot system

did at times acquire control of more

aircraft than it could handle. A pilot

might be directed to a succession of

holding points only to end up, after

burning a great deal of fuel, exactly

where he had started and with his full

load of ordnance st~ll on board. Sometimes. an aviator Tan low on fuel before

his. turn came and had to jettison his

bombs and return to base. These failings, however, were outweighed a

thousandfold by the successful strikes

that Combat Skyspot made possible.31

Progenitor of Combat Skyspot was

a radar bomb scoring unit used by the

Strategic Air Command to test the

proficiency of bomber crews in mock

raids staged against cities in the United

States. Even before the A Shau defeat,

tests conducted in Texas had sho~n

that the scoring unit could also control strikes by fighters or bombers. A

van-mounted computer accepted such

factors as altitude, wind velocity and

direction, aircraft speed, temperature,

and ballistic traits of the ordnance carried. On the basis of this information,

The 0-1 (I.) was used by Forward Air

Control!ers to mark targets. Below is a

Combat Skyspot facility, used to direct

strike aircraft to targets in Vietnam

Lt. Gen. R. E. Cushman commanded the

III Marine Amphibious Force from his

headquarters at Da Nang

with foreboding. Lt. Gen. Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC, a onetime director

of Marine aviation who later commanded III Marine Amphibious Force

in Vietnam, stated that opposition to the

appointment of an Air Force general as

a single manager for tactical combat

aviation was based to a great extent

on concern that "it would recreate the

Korean War situation." Whereas General Momyer endorsed the command

relationship set up in Korea, Marine

leaders remembered it as depriving the

I st Marine Division, only Marine

ground force in actual combat, of control over the aviation units organized,

equipped, and trained to support it.

Some Marines saw unified management as a threat to the future as

well as a retreat into an unsatisfactory

past. They feared that any shift of

operational control for the Vietnam

war could serve as a precedent for

breaking up the air-ground team. Since

Leatherneck ground commanders relied

upon Marine aviation much as they did

upon artillery, loss of the air arm would

require extensive changes in tactics,

organization, and armament. Furthermore, a breakup of the air-ground team

would definitely affect the mission of

the Marine Corps.6

On 18 January, Admiral Sharp

received word of General Westmoreland's intention to meet the emergency

in I Corps by imposing closer control

over Marine air power. The admiral

replied almost immediately, cautioning

the general against any change that

might violate existing doctrine and trigger an interservice debate over roles

destroying the integrity of the Marine

air-ground team. The Marines believed,

however, that the close relationship between air and ground could not exist

unless the unified team was controlled

by Marines. The Air Force sought

efficiency by bringi.lg Marine squadrons under centralized direction; the

Marine Corps worked for the same goal

by avoiding centralization under Air

Force control. General Westmoreland,

it appeared, was trying to reconcile the

irreconcilable.4

The extent to which the Marine

Corps and Air Force differed on centralized control was reflected in their

contrasting attitudes toward the exercise of command during the Korean

War. In Korea, the Fifth Air Force had

exercised operational control over Marine air units. To General Momyer this

arrangement seemed logical and desirable. "If the battle for Khe Sanh develops," he dectared, "it may be the

event to get the air responsibilities

straightened out as we had them in

Korea and WWIl." 5

Centralized operational control

was a prospect that Marines viewed

69


and missions. He declined to approve a

radical alteration in the status of Marine aviation in Vietnam and suggested

further discussion with General Cushman and his staff. He did not, however,

rule out future consideration of a formal proposal affecting operational control of the Ist Marine Aircraft Wing.7

governed Marine-Air Force relations

throughout most of the Khe Sanh

battle. In essence, the conferees agreed

to link the Seventh Air Force and Marine control networks, using an Air

Force airborne battlefield command

and control center to achieve coordination.

The 22 January Agreement

Rather than insist on an immediate transfer of operational control,

General Westmoreland went ahead with

an arrangement designed to improve

cordination between Seventh Air Force

and the Marine wing. On 22 January,

representatives of General Momyer's

headquarters conferred with General

Cushman and his staff and fashioned

an agreement that, whatever its failings,

This airborne battlefield command

and control center consisted of a C130 whose cargo compartment had

been fitted with an air conditioned capsule containing electronic equipment

capable of storing information, displaying data for controllers, and furnishing

reliable communication with ground

stations and other aircraft. The gear

crammed into the airborne command

and control center constituted a "central nervous system providing data for

on-the-spot decisions in fluid tactical

situations." 8

The Air Force conferees had

maintained that this control center, besides ensuring the orderly and effective

application of air power, could also

coordinate aerial attacks with artillery

bombardment and make certain that

Interior of a C-130 airborne battlefield

command and control center
Maj Gen. No J. Anderson commanded the

1st Marine Aircraft Wing during the defense of Khe Sanh

Anderson, commander of the Ist Marine Aircraft Wing during the defense

of Khe Sanh, later described the compact as an acknowledgement that "close

air support of Marine ground forces

was a job to be accomplished by the

specialized members of the Marine airground team, while other air resources

took on more distant targets.'. The

location of the target did playa role

in the 22 January agreement, with the

Marines insisting on concentrating their

aerial firepower against the targets

closest to Khe Sanh, but geography

was not the only concern in assigning

targets}l

Another key consideration was

control. The agreement represented a

plan, however imperfect in practice, to

exert the firmest control in those areas

where the danger of accidentally bombing friendly units was greatest. For this

reason, all strikes in the sector closest

to Marine positions were to be cleared

through the Khe Sanh fire support coordination center and directed by

either a Marine airborne tactical air

controller or an Air Force forward air

controller. Procedures also required

that the fire support cordination center

friendly bombs did not endanger the

Marines below. To do all these jobs,

however, the airborne command and

control center would have to be incorporated in the control network that

originated in the Khe Sanh fire support

coordination center .9

The fire support coordination center, which resembled in purpose the

installation housed in the converted

C-130's operating above the base, was

headed by Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly of the 1stBattalion, 13th Marines.

Located within the fire support coordination center were the fire direction

center, which with the aid of a computer converted requests for artillery

support into fire commands, and a direct air support center through which

requests for air strikes reached the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing's tactical air direction center. Planes from this wing

normally flew the missions requested

by Marine units in the field. But when

it was fully committed, liaison teams

at the direct air support center could

call upon Air Force or Navy aircraft to

deliver the necessary attacks. The demands of Operation Niagara were such

that before the battle ended, the Khe

Sanh direct air support center, in conjunction with the airborne battlefield

command and control center, had obtained the assistance of planes from all

services, Army aviation included.l°

The 22 Ianuary agreement also

established rules for the coordination

of air strikes. Maj. Gen. Norman I.

73




similar interservice organization was

established at General Rosson's corps.

The Marine divisions retained their

direct air support centers as did the reinforced regiment holding Khe Sanh.

Planning for scheduled air strikes

began at rifle battalion headquarters and

moved up the chain of command, with

consolidated target lists being prepared

at regiment and division. Rosson's headquarters submitted to III Marine Amphibious Force a consolidated request

covering its assigned Army and Marine

units, and Cushman's staff combined

this list with ones prepared by units

under the direct control of the Da Nang

headquarters. The combined requests

then went to Tan Son Nhut for approval by the tactical air support element, which now included Marines in

its operations and intelligence sections.

FiQal stop for the combined I Corps

target list was the Seventh Air Force

tactical air control center, where Marine

representatives also were stationed. This

agency matched available units and ordnance with selected targets and issued

appropriate operation orders, called

"frag orders" because a rigid format

permitted very sparse or fragmentary

wording with no loss of meaning.21

The lst Marine Aircraft Wing no

General Momyer, Seventh Air Force commander, was appointed single commander for tactical combat aviation in

all of South Vietnam. Above he is being

checked out in the cockpit of an A-37

at Tan Son Nhut

longer merely advised the Seventh Air

Force tactical air control center of any

excess sorties. It now reported its total

capacity calculated on the basis of one

sortie per day by each jet aircraft. Da

Nang forwarded this data to Tan Son

Nhut along with the compilation of requests for air sUpport.22

Single management had to provide

for immediate strikes to meet battlefield emergencies (see Chart p. 79).

When a division or one of its components needed air support in an emergency, its can for help went to a Marine

or Air Force direct air support center which could divert any aircraft under orders to hit a target

within the division zone of action. If

nothing was available, division turned

to corps which had similar authority in

its area of operation. Should nothing be

available in the five provinces that

78


COMUSMACV for Air should constitute a precedent for centralized control of air operations under other combat conditions, or need pose a threat

to the integrity of the Marine air/

ground team." He observed that unique

circumstances had spawned unified

management and declared that General

Westmoreland should .'revert to normal command arrangements for III

MAP when the tactical situation permits." 28

The Air Force and Marine Corps

had differed over the issue of unified

management but, when General Westmoreland imposed his solution, they

cooperated in carrying out his wishes.

"The system worked," declared General

McCutcheon. "Both the Air Force and

the Marines saw to that. But the way it

was made to work evolved over a

period of time, and a lot of it was due

to gentlemen's agreements between onthe-scene commanders." 30

Once the future of their air-ground

team seemed secure, some Marines

tended to modify the harsh initial judgment of centralized management that

had been based upon operations at

Khe Sanh. Writing in 1970, General

McCutcheon conceded that "when

three Army divisions were assigned to

I Corps and interspersed between the

two Marine divisions, a higher order

of coordination and cooperation was

required than before." Single management provided this and, in his opinion,

was ,can overall improvement as far as

MACV as a whole was concerned.'. 29

Khe Sanh radar equipment and the

control tower played a vital role during

the battle for Khe Sanh

Lt. Gen. Selmon W. Wells, USAF, commander of 3d Air Division based on

Guam

cells, The interval could be an hour,

90 minutes, or 2 hours.,4

The arrival by 7 February of 26

additional B-52's-a detachment sent

to the far Pacific in reaction to North

Korea's capture of the intelligence ship

Pueblo off Wonsan harbor-simplified

the task of providing a grand total of

48 sorties per day. Fifteen of the bombers landed at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa and brought to three-Guam,

Thailand, and Okinawa-the areas

from which Stratofortress strikes might

originate. On 12 February, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff advised Admiral Sharp

that bombing missions against targets

in Southeast Asia could originate at

Kadena,5

After only a day's Bugle Note

operation, General Wells' headquarters proposed a major change, to provide six B-52's every 3 hours rather

than three every 90 minutes, Adoption

of this proposal would permit even

more devastating target coverage. Also,

fewer 'launches would mean greater

ease in scheduling maintenance, a less

hectic pace for mechanics, and a better

oppol'tunity to photograph and analyze

bombing results, The change went into

effect on 25 February.6

Close Support

A routine B-52 mission flown

from U Tapao, Thailand, on 12 November 1967 contributed quite by accident to an important tactical innovation. Nine B-52's took off from U

Tapao to hit troop concentrations and

rocket batteries in the vicinity of Con

Thien, but one of the planes failed to

observe the 3-kilometer safety zone

established to keep bombs from falling

accidentally among friendly troops.

This particular plane-there is doubt

as to which one-dropped i,ts explosives within the safety zone about 1.4

kilometers from Marine lines.

Neither the men defending Con

Thien nor their fortifications suffered

harm from this error. Indeed, the results from the misdirected bomb load

verged on the astonishing, as secondary

explosions blossomed near the defensive perimeter. The enemy was clearly

taking advantage of the safety zone

imposed on the Stratofortresses, a fact

that lent greater urgency to an idea

discussed the previous summer, the use

of B-52's in what amounted to close

air support.7

The successful, though accidental,

close-in bombing at Con Thien served

as an example of what the B-52's could

do in defense of a combat base such

as Khe Sanh. As early as 8 J anuary

1968, the topic arose during a meeting

of representatives of the Strategic Air

Command's advance echelon in Viet83
nam and officers from III Marine

Amphibious Force. Air Force conferees

were reluctant to encourage B-52

strikes within the customary safety

zone except in emergencies. The Marines then suggested a series of tests that,

if successful, would gradually bring the

B-52 salvos to a distance of only 1,000

meters from friendly forces. To reduce

to a minimum the risks involved, General Cushman's headquarters urged the

installation of new radar beacons at

both Con Thien and Khe Sanh to help

guide the planes to targets within the

3-kilometer safety zone surrounding

the latter base.8

The 3d Air Division for a time

endorsed the installation of this equipment as a further aid to B-52 accuracy. Additional study, however, led

General Wells to reverse his stand. The

Intensive 8-52 bombardment of enemy

forces at Khe Sanh is seen in this aerial

shot. White dots indicate where bombs

fell (white areas on right show cloud

cover). The heavy saturation of Hill 881

North (enemy-held) and the sparse pock

marks on Hill 881 South (occupied by

U.S. Marines) show the remarkable accuracy of the 8-52. This montage was

pieced together from reconnaissance

photos.

84







Two kinds of planes were available

to drop the sensors. One was the

Navy's Lockheed OP-2E, a conventionally powered patrol craft that had

been fitted with auxiliary jet engines.

The other was the Air Force's Sikorsky

CH-3, a turbine-engine helicopter. During sensor drops, both types were

shepherded by forward air con.trollers

who could call for flak suppression

strikes if ground fire menaced their

charges. Because they were very vulnerable to antiaircraft fire, the Lockheeds were later retired in favor of

F-4's.9

The helicopters had originally

been fitted with launchers designed to

shoot into the ground a special seismic

device called a helosid-contraction

for helicopter delivered seismic intrusion detector-thus enabling the craft

to hover above the sensor, plot its

exact location, and obtain radio verification from Dutch Mill that the device

was actually broadcasting. During tests,

crews of the CH-3's seldom received

this verification, for the shock of

smashing into the earth was more than

the sensor could endure. The squadron

commander continued experimenting,

however, but soon gave up entirely on

using the helosids. He proposed instead to position a crewman in the

door holding an acoustic device which

he would toss overboard as the helicopter hovered over the desired location. This method, as effective as it was

simple, proved invaluable in meeting

General Tompkin's deadline.1°

Using Sensor Data

Completion of the Khe Sanh sensor field was just a beginning. Successful use of the data it generated would

depend on reliable communication and

a full understanding of how sensor information should be interpreted to

prQvide targets for artillery and air.

A break in communication occurred early in the fight. On 2 February, a 122-mm rocket plunged

through the entrance of a bunker being

used by an Army signal detachment.

The blast killed four and wounded one,

but communication was quickly restored. The tragedy caused the 37th

Signal Battalion to insist on blast walls

and other protective features in bunkers

occupied by its men,11

Making intelligent use of the socalled "spotlight reports"-map coordinates radioed from Dutch Millwas difficult. Despite instructions to

the contrary, many officers, Air Force

as well as Marine, tended to think of

the grid coord,inates as a target to be

92

craters left by the nighttime firing, and

an alert aerial observer located among

these shell holes several freshly dug pits

about 10 feet square. After sunset, the

signals resumed, and shells once again

burst along the highway. Another early

morning reconnaissance flight discovered six 37-mm antiaircraft guns,

some of them shorn of camouflage by

the latest shelling. A mini-Arc Light

soon burst upon the area, and the

newly dug emplacements were abandoned before the guns had fired a

shot.16

ment into areas covered by sensors and

would also make enough noise to activate acoustic devices.

In actual practice, however, gravel

was little more than a nuisance to the

North Vietnamese massing before Khe

Sanh. The enemy found that by using

oxen pulling logs he could easily clear a

gravel minefield, though at some cost in

oxen if he was dealing with the casualtyproducing kind. The mines, moreover,

tended to become inert after a short

time.17

Gravel unfortunately could not distinguish friend from foe. Those planning the minefields had to avoid impeding patrols or sorties either by troops at

Khe Sanh or by a relief column advancing toward the base. Also, pilots whose

propeller-driven A-lE Skyraiders were

dropping gravel had to be careful of

hitting friendly units. This kind of accident happened only once, on 10 February, when gravel fell on the forward

slope of a position manned by Colonel

Wilkinson's lst Battalion, 26th Marines.

Gravel Munitions

Task Force Alpha had planned to

use a special kind of ordnance in conjunction with the sensors. This was

gravel, a tiny explosive mine that could

be sown by the thousands from lowflying aircraft. Gravel came in two

types, one a mere noisemaker and another powerful enough to wound a man

or puncture a truck tire. The designers

of the anti-infiltration system believed

that gravel would channel enemy move94
apply sensor data. "Prior to the coming

of sensors," he recalled, "it was command doctrine to shoot numerous harassment and interdiction artillery missions each night. ..usually based on

map inspection, suspect areas, and yesterday's intelligence." Once the Marines

learned how to put sensor information

to work, "the words harassment and

interdiction"-again according to Major

Hudson-"were removed from the 3d

Marine Division vocabulary." 19

At Khe Sanh, both seismic sensors

-other than the too fragile helosidsand the acoustic type demonstrated their

worth to air and ground commanders.

These devices had so dramatic an impact that the value of other sources of

intelligence has sometimes been forgotten. Yet the usefulness of data obtained electronically depended to a

large degree on other information.

Aerial photography, in particular,

enabled the Marines to locate the network of trails and trenches, the bunkers,

the supply points and assembly areas

upon which the enemy relied. With this

sort of intelligence and a knowledge of

how the North Vietnamese had conducted previous sieges, Khe Sanh's defenders were able to make effective use

of the information sent them from

Nakhon Phanom.2o

One Marine suffered wounds serious

enough to require his evacuation by

air.18

Summing Up the

Sensor Operation

Despite this misdirected load of

gravel munitions and the initial confusion in using sensor data, the Marines

were delighted with the work of Task

Force Alpha. By Marine estimate, 40

percent of the raw intelligence available

to the Khe Sanh fire support coordination center came from the sensors by

way of Dutch Mill.

Maj. Jerry E. Hudson, intelligence

officer of the 26th Marines, illustrated

the importance of sensors by contrasting

how artillery performed at night before

and after the Marines learned to

A helicopter crewman (I.) prepares to

drop a seismic sensor. CH-3's (below)

were used to sow sensor fields

Marines would attack along the highway in conjunction with aerial assaults

by General Tolson's airmobile division

and an advance by a South Vietnamese

task force. The oral agreement was confirmed by a Cushman message that requested General Rosson to continue

preparing for a 1 April attack. "Such

preparations," the message continued,

"should include construction on a C7A/C-123 strip at Ca Lu and the opening of Route 9 to Ca Lu." 3

Selection of Ca Lu as a supply

base for the relief of Khe Sanh was the

most recent in a series of actions undertaken to ensure a steady flow of supplies

to Army units in the five northern provinces. When the first Army troops, men

of Task Force Oregon which became

the Americal Division, entered I Corps,

the U.S. Army Support Command at

Qui Nhon supervised their logistical

support, working through the 80th General Support Group and 34th Supply

and Service Battalion, both at Da Nang.

Late in February 1968, a U .S. Army

Support Command began functioning at

Da N ang, taking over the two logistical

units already there. A third such unit,

the 26th General Support Group from

Cam Ranh Bay, moved to Da Nang

and became a component of the newlyactivated support command.4

Logistic support of Operation Pegasus was a cooperative venture coordinated by General Cushman's headquarters and involving the Naval

Support Activity at Da Nang as well as

the recently organized U .S. Army Support Command. All items not unique to

the Marine Corps were provided

through the Ca Lu forward support

facility, where enough supplies had

been stockpiled to see the Pegasus force

through 5 days' operation. The Force

Logistics Command, which sent both

men and cargo handling equipment to

Ca Lu, remained responsible for articles

used exclusively by Marines.5

Highway 9 was the main supply

artery for Pegasus. Because of the possibility of interdiction by hostile artillery,

an airfield was built at Ca Lu capable of

accommodating C-7A's and C-123's.

Experience at Khe Sanh had convinced

General Cushman that preparations

AC-47 gunships flew night missions over

Khe Sanh to suppress enemy shelling
should be made to set up at Ca Lu the

kind of radar that would enable Air

Force transports to parachute cargo

regardless of the weather. A lack of

enemy resistance, however, made this

precaution unnecessary .6

Marine engineers and engineers

from the Ist Cavalry Division cooperated with a detachment from Naval

Mobile Construction Battalion 5 to

complete the Ca Lu airstrip in time for

Pegasus. To build the required 2,600-

foot runway, the Seabees had to level

two hills and gouge away part of a

mountainside. Despite the enormity of

the job, which began on 16 March, the

field was open to C- 7 A 's on 29 March

and to the larger C-123's on 7 April.

Called Landing Zone Stud by the air

cavalry, this field was the principal base

for Army helicopters taking part in

Pegasus.7

launched operations preliminary to

Pegasus itself. Helicopters of the lst

Cavalry Division darted low over the

bomb-scarred terrain to locate enemy

weapon emplacements and defensive

strongpoints. The weather abetted this

reconnaissance, for rain seldom continued after dawn, and cloud cover

tended to break up by noon.8

On the morning of 30 March, the

26th Marines struck a final blow before

American forces in northwestern I

Corps went over to the offensive. Company B of that regiment's Ist Battalion

took advantage of fog and carefully

coordinated artillery barrages and air

strikes to raid a North Vietnam position.

The bursting shells and bombs cleared

the way for the advancing Marines but

failed to alert the enemy, who occupied

an area that had frequently been battered in similar fashion. The assault

force erupted from the rising fog and

stormed the works with flame throwers,

satchel charges, grenades, rifles, and

machine guns. The North Vietnamese,

caught by surprise, took refuge in their

bunkers, but the Marines methodically

destroyed these structures, killing an

estimated 150 of the enemy. Resistance

was largely ineffectual except for the

lone mortar round that scored a direct

hit on the company command post,

killed three, and wounded Capt. Kenneth Pipes, USMC, the company commander.9

The Attack Westward

As the logistic preparations neared

completion, both General Tolson's air

cavalry and Colonel Lownds' garrison

98
Colonel Lownds (center), commander

26th Marines, Chaplain J. W. McElroy

{I.), and Lt. Gen. V. J. Krulak, Command.

ing General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

(r.), discuss situation at Khe Sanh

This raid coincided with a diversionary push in the northeastern corner

of Quang Tri province. Soldiers and

Marines, along with South Vietnamese

troops, launched sweeps through the

region bounded by Highway I, the

demilitarized zone, the Cua Viet river,

and the seacoast. On the following day,

operation control of Colonel Lownds'

reinforced regiment passed to General

Tolson. All was now in readiness for

Pegasus.l0

As the relief force knifed forward,

intelligence verified that only the 304th

North Vietnamese Division remained in

the area. Some of the prisoners taken

along Highway 9 were members of the

325C Division, but interrogation revealed that they had remained behind

as replacements for casualties suffered

by the 304th.12

The Khe Sanh Marines also took

the offensive on 1 April. Lt. Col. John

J. H. Cahill, who had just assumed

command of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, attacked hostile positions some

2,500 meters south of the Khe Sanh airstrip. The objective was a hill, 471 meters high, that dominated a stretch of

Highway 9. A thunderous bombardment

killed or demoralized many of the

North Vietnamese defenders, and opposition was characterized as light. Unfortunately, enemy mortars scored the

same sort of deadly hit that had

wounded Captain Pipes a short time

before. A shell burst among the command group of Company A, killing

two and wounding three. One of the

wounded was the new battalion commander, but his injuries were not serious

enough to force him to relinquesli command. Later in the day, an enemy counterattack collapsed on the battalion's

defenses}3

On 1 April, General Tolson set his

troops in motion toward Khe Sanh. Two

Marine battalions advanced along Highway 9, screening a group of engineers

who repaired the cratered roadway as

they moved westward. Acting in concert with this column, air cavalry units

seized landing zones selected during the

earlier reconnaissance, flew in artillery,

and set up fire bases to support the

continuing advance.1l

99
1,304, with 21 taken prisoner. Equipment left behind by the retreating

enemy included 557 rifles, 206 crewserved weapons, 4 trucks, 1 anti-aircraft

gun, 1 tank, 1 large artillery piece,

and 1 armored personnel carrier }5

After the Siege

Once the combat base was securely

in American hands, the work of salvage

began, as the Air Force mission commander supervised the retrieval of such

equipment as ground proximity extraction gear, parachutes, and other salvageable articles used in the supply

effort.

Precisely w,hen the siege ended is

open to interpretation. An air cavalry

battalion relieved Lieutenant Colonel

Cahill's men on the morning of 6 April,

and later in the day South Vietnamese

troops arrived at Khe Sanh by helicopter to relieve the Ranger battalion that

had manned the eastern part of the

main perimeter. The official relief took

place 2 days later when 2d Battalion,

7th Cavalry, reached the Marine base

and the 3d Brigade of General Tolson's

division assumed responsibility for its

defense.14

The relief of Khe Sanh did not

mark the end of Operation Pegasus. It

continued until 15 April, by which time

the Americans and their Sou,th Vietnamese allies had regained control of

northwestern Quang Tri province. The

road to Khe Sanh had been reopened

and the site of the Lang Vei Special

Forces camp recaptured. The price of

these accomplishments was 41 soldiers,

51 Marines, and 33 South Vietnamese

killed, 207 soldiers, 459 Marines, and

187 South Vietnamese wounded, and

5 Army men missing in action. No

Air Force casualties were attributed to

this operation. North Vietnamese

deaths during Pegasus were placed at
The siege broken, the Marines were re.

lieved by 1st Cavalry Division troops,

shown taking up positions along the

trench lines of one of the outposts

Though the siege was broken,

danger continued to stalk the Khe

Sanh plateau. On 13 April, for instance,

an Air Force C-130 swerved off the

runway, rolled over some extraction

equipment, and in dizzying succession

smashed into six recently extracted pallets still loaded with cargo, a truck,

and a forklift, before grinding to a

stop and bursting into flame. The deadly blaze was just beginning to consume

the transport when six members of

the Air Force detachment reached the

wreckage. They were Lt. Col. Zane G.

Brewer, Staff Sergeants Kenneth G.

Berg and Joe Hogan, Sergeants J. P.

Sink and G. A. Kargis, and AlC S. R.

Brown. Working together they rescued

five military passengers, none of them

hurt in the crash, and one civilian

whose injuries proved fatal. The crew

came through unscathed and escaped

unaided from the plane.

The big Lockheed was a total loss.

In an attempt to discover what had

caused the accident, propellers number

3 and 4 were salvaged for examination

by an investigation team. The props

were placed in a cargo sling suspended

beneath a Marine helicopter for shipment to Dong Ha, first stop on their

journey to Tan Son Nhut. Unfortunately, the load began oscillating wildly

shortly after takeoff, and the crew had

to cut loose the sling in order to save

101