IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

 

:

JACLYN RHOADS and WILLIAM : CIVIL ACTION

RHOADS, JR., as Administrators of the :

Estate of ISABELLA RHOADS, a Minor, :

Deceased, and JACLYN RHOADS and :

WILLIAM RHOADS, JR., Individually :

and in Their Own Right, :

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. : NO. 05-5496

:

THE A.I. DUPONT HOSPITAL FOR :

CHILDREN OF THE NEMOURS :

FOUNDATION, THE NEMOURS :

FOUNDATION, WILLIAM I. :

NORWOOD, M.D., Ph.D., CHRISTIAN :

PIZARRO, M.D., JOHN MURPHY, M.D., :

KENNETH MURDISON, M.D., :

RUSSELL RAPHAELY, M.D., AND :

ELLEN SPURRIER, M.D., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT F. KELLY, Sr. J. MAY 22, 2006

Plaintiffs William Rhoads, Jr. and Jaclyn Rhoads (“Plaintiffs”) were the parents of

Isabella Rhoads. Isabella Rhoads was born with a serious heart condition and died less than a

year later. She was treated for her condition at the A.I. DuPont Hospital for Children (“DuPont

Hospital”). After her death, Plaintiffs filed suit against DuPont Hospital, the Nemours

Foundation, and various doctors (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges

various claims including fraud, conspiracy, wrongful death, and negligence. The Complaint also

includes a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005). Presently before

Case 2:05-cv-05496-RK Document 39 Filed 05/22/06 Page 1 of 7
2

this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim. 

For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ daughter, Isabella Rhoads, was born on May 18, 2003. She was diagnosed

prenatally with Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome (“HLHS”) and was referred to DuPont Hospital

for evaluation. DuPont Hospital diagnosed her with congenital heart defects and she was treated

at the Nemours Cardiac Center (“Cardiac Center”), which is a department within DuPont

Hospital that specializes in pediatric cardiothoracic surgery. As a result of the diagnosis,

Defendant Dr. William Norwood, Director of the Cardiac Center, performed surgery on her on

May 20, 2003, to correct these defects. On October 24, 2003, Dr. Norwood performed another

surgery. Isabella died on January 6, 2004.

On October 21, 2005, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants alleging that their conduct

resulted in Isabella’s death. Plaintiffs raise various state law claims against all Defendants.

Plaintiffs also raise a claim against all Defendants, except Dr. Kenneth Murdison, under the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs argue that the Rehabilitation Act was violated because

Defendants “did not take appropriate actions to protect and provide for the safety of the Cardiac

Center patients as they did for children in other areas of the Hospital” and that Defendants

“violated this child’s rights by subjecting [her] to a scheme of care and management which

existed only in the Cardiac Center.” (Rhoads’ Resp. to Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 3). 

Defendants DuPont Hospital and the Nemours Foundation filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim. The individual doctor defendants also filed

a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment joining and incorporating the motion filed by Dupont

Case 2:05-cv-05496-RK Document 39 Filed 05/22/06 Page 2 of 7
1

“A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit after applying the substantive law. 

Further, a dispute over a material fact must be ‘genuine,’ i.e., the evidence must be such ‘that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.’” Compton v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 995 F. Supp.

554, 561 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d, 172 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 1998)(citations omitted). 

3

Hospital and the Nemours Foundation. In Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, they agree to dismiss all claims under the Rehabilitation Act as to the

individual defendants except Dr. Norwood. Plaintiffs continue to pursue their Rehabilitation Act

claims only against DuPont Hospital, the Nemours Foundation, and Dr. Norwood.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate when, after considering the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute and ‘the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Hines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d

262, 267 (3d Cir. 1991)(citations omitted). The inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986). The moving party carries the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine

issues of material fact. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d

Cir. 1992).1 Once the moving party has produced evidence in support of summary judgment, the

non-moving party must go beyond the allegations set forth in its pleadings and counter with

evidence that demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. See id. at 1362-63. 

Summary judgment must be granted “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Case 2:05-cv-05496-RK Document 39 Filed 05/22/06 Page 3 of 7
4

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act because the scheme of

care and management at the Cardiac Center failed to properly protect its patients. This allegedly

deficient scheme of care and management only existed in the Cardiac Center and not in other

departments of the DuPont Hospital. Plaintiffs contend that this difference in standards between

the Cardiac Center and the rest of the hospital resulted in discrimination against those patients

with heart conditions, such as Isabella.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that support a claim

under the Rehabilitation Act and that Defendants are thus, entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on that claim. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Rehabilitation Act claim fails because

Isabella was not denied access to any treatment solely by reason of her disability; Isabella was not

excluded from any program for which she was “otherwise qualified,” and moreover, the

Rehabilitation Act does not apply to medical treatment decisions.

Section 504, of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, states that “[n]o

otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of

her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 

29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2005). To establish a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must

show that: (1) he or she is a “handicapped individual” under the Act; (2) he or she is “otherwise

qualified” for the position sought; (3) he or she was excluded from the position sought, denied

the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under the program or activity “solely by reason of

his handicap,” and (4) the program received federal financial assistance. Wagner v. Fair Acres

Case 2:05-cv-05496-RK Document 39 Filed 05/22/06 Page 4 of 7
5

Geriatric Center, 49 F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d. Cir. 1995); Nathanson v. Medical College of PA, 926

F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d. Cir. 1991). 

 To establish a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiffs must prove that their

disabled child, Isabella, was excluded from, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination

by the DuPont Hospital because of her disability. Wagner, 49 F.3d at 1009. Here, there is no

dispute that Isabella was a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act and that the

DuPont Hospital receives federal financial assistance. While there is no evidence of Isabella

being excluded from or denied access to the DuPont Hospital because she was duly admitted and

treated there, Plaintiffs rather base their Rehabilitation Act claim on discrimination. They argue

that Isabella was discriminated against because the scheme of care and management at the

Cardiac Center was not of the same standards as the rest of the DuPont Hospital. Their argument

follows that disabled patients with heart conditions who are placed in the Cardiac Center receive

treatment under lower standards than patients in other departments of the hospital and this

disparity amounts to discrimination based on the disability of having heart conditions. 

Whether the Cardiac Center’s policies, procedures, standards, and management were

deficient or negligent is irrelevant to Isabella’s discrimination claim. There is no evidence that

Isabella was discriminated against because of her disability. There is no evidence to indicate that

the Cardiac Center established its allegedly deficient standards instead of operating under the

standards of the rest of the hospital for the purpose of discriminating against those with heart

conditions. Rather, Plaintiffs themselves allege that the Cardiac Center’s policies and

management were set up for the purpose of avoiding oversight and control by DuPont. (Rhoads’

Resp. to Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 3). These objectives have nothing to do with

Case 2:05-cv-05496-RK Document 39 Filed 05/22/06 Page 5 of 7
2

It is unnecessary to address the legal and underlying factual issues pertaining to Defendant’s other

two arguments because Plaintiffs have failed to establish a Rehabilitation Act claim for the reasons stated above. 

Defendants argue that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply to medical treatment decisions. See U.S. v. Univ. Hosp.,

729 F.2d 144, 156-57 (2d. Cir. 1984) (stating that Congress never intended § 504 to apply to medical treatment

decisions). Defendants also argue that Isabella was not excluded from any program in which she was “otherwise

qualified” because the Cardiac Center was the only department at DuPont Hospital where she could be treated. 

According to Defendants, no other department of the hospital could treat complex congenital heart condition and

there is no reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to be treated in any other hospital department. 

See Strathie v. Dept. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d. Cir. 1993) (stating that accommodation of program is not

necessary if it would require “a modification of the essential nature of the program, or impose an undue burden on

the recipient of federal funds”). 

6

discrimination. 

Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence and failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Isabella was excluded from, denied the benefits of, or discriminated

by the DuPont Hospital because of her disability. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the Rehabilitation Act claim.2

An appropriate Order follows.

Case 2:05-cv-05496-RK Document 39 Filed 05/22/06 Page 6 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

 

:

JACLYN RHOADS and WILLIAM : CIVIL ACTION

RHOADS, JR., as Administrators of the :

Estate of ISABELLA RHOADS, a Minor, :

Deceased, and JACLYN RHOADS and :

WILLIAM RHOADS, JR., Individually :

and in Their Own Right, :

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. : NO. 05-5496

:

THE A.I. DUPONT HOSPITAL FOR :

CHILDREN OF THE NEMOURS :

FOUNDATION, THE NEMOURS :

FOUNDATION, WILLIAM I. :

NORWOOD, M.D., Ph.D., CHRISTIAN :

PIZARRO, M.D., JOHN MURPHY, M.D., :

KENNETH MURDISON, M.D., :

RUSSELL RAPHAELY, M.D., AND :

ELLEN SPURRIER, M.D., :

:

Defendants. :

 :

O R D E R

AND NOW this 22nd day of May, 2006, upon consideration of the Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment of Defendants, and the Responses and Replies thereto, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 25) is

GRANTED.

BY THE COURT:

 /s/ Robert F. Kelly 

ROBERT F. KELLY, Sr. J.

 

Case 2:05-cv-05496-RK Document 39 Filed 05/22/06 Page 7 of 7