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April 2, 2014

Mr. Richard Goorevich, Senior Policy Advisor 

Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, NA-24

National Nuclear Security Administration

Department of Energy (DOE)

1000 Independence Avenue SW

Washington, D.C. 20585

Via email: Part810.SNOPR@hq.doe.gov

Subject: RIN 1994-AA02

Dear Mr. Goorevich,

I am writing on behalf of the Association of University Export Control Officers (AUECO), a group of senior 

export practitioners at 46 accredited institutions of higher learning in the United States. AUECO 

members monitor proposed changes in laws and regulations affecting academic activities and advocate 

reforms that will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the United States export control system. 

AUECO fully supports the mission of protecting the nation’s most sensitive technologies, including 

nuclear technologies, and hopes that re-opening the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking 

(SNOPR) for additional comment will result in a regulatory environment that fully supports university 

research, scientific communication, and educational exchanges in the United States.

AUECO concurs with public comments that U.S. nuclear export control regulations are more complex, 

more restrictive, and less efficient than those of other Nuclear Suppliers Group countries. At a time 

when other countries are considering simpler and more open nuclear export controls, the proposed 

changes would place U.S. parties, including universities and research institutes that compete globally for 

the best and brightest students and faculty, at a distinct competitive disadvantage. 

In addition to our previous comments (attached), AUECO joins the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI), Nuclear Infrastructure Council, and others, offering the following comments:

1. There is insufficient basis in statute and/or international agreements to support the proposed 

changes. As AUECO noted in previous comments, the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty both clearly reflect a legislative intent to protect university research and 

scientific communication from regulation. The proposed changes are inconsistent with the 

legislative authority granted to the Department of Energy (DOE) and would subject scientific 

communication and university research to new requirements without a sound statutory basis. 
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Similarly, NEI’s comments call out the insufficient basis in statute or international agreement for 

many of the proposed regulatory changes in the SNOPR. Comments submitted by Minority 

Whip James E. Clyburn (D-SC) and Reps. Judy Biggert (R-IL), Jason Altmire (D-PA), and Mike 

Simpson (R-ID) note that the proposed rule attempts to codify the DOE’s overly broad 

interpretations, and expand the DOE’s authority “beyond its statutory mandate”.

2. As noted by NEI, the regulatory analysis performed has “fundamental flaws that mask the 

proposed rule’s significant and counterproductive impacts”. 

3. More than 70 additional countries would require specific authorization under the SNOPR. As 

noted in NEI’s comments, the DOE does not have unfettered discretion to make such sweeping 

changes; merely asserting that they are “based on U.S. nuclear and national security policies” is 

insufficient justification. To date, little appears to have been done to establish and document 

the legal basis DOE is invoking to justify the new specific authorization requirements under 

existing statutes or international agreements. This departure from the previous 810 rule 

represents a significant compliance burden that would unnecessarily inhibit academic exchanges

and scientific communication.

4. Treatment of China, India and Russia is inconsistent with other countries. AUECO agrees with 

NEI’s concerns that DOE “has failed to treat these three states in the same manner as other 

countries with nuclear cooperation agreements, and has not proposed even an intermediate 

approach to authorizing transfers to China, India and Russia, as requested by NEI”.

5. The proposed deemed export general authorization is limited and does not mitigate the burden 

on U.S. suppliers. Additionally, there is no explanation as to why DOE is not adopting the Export 

Administration Regulations approach to deemed exports and re-exports.

6. AUECO appreciates DOE’s changing of the term “basic scientific research” to “fundamental 

research”, which would more closely align 10 CFR 810 with other U.S. export control regulations. 

However, the proposed regulations still fail to protect development or applied research as 

stipulated in the AEA. Furthermore, AUECO remains concerned about the definition and use of 

the terms “technical services” and “nuclear reactor”, as well as DOE’s approach to “publicly 

available information”. 

7. AUECO takes issue with DOE’s continuing refusal to address the issue of dual nationals in the 

revised SNOPR. Both the Departments of State and Commerce offer specific guidance on dual 

national licensing and we urge DOE to do the same.
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In conclusion, AUECO urges the DOE to consider the unintended consequences that the SNOPR would

have on academic endeavors and the long-term impact that this would have on U.S. scientific and 

economic competitiveness. Due to the outstanding issues identified above, AUECO joins the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce in calling upon the DOE to withdraw the proposed rule. 

AUECO thanks the Department of Energy for the opportunity to comment on the SNOPR. 

Sincerely,

Elizabeth Peloso

Chair

Association of University Export Control Officers

Email: auecogroup@gmail.com

Website: http://aueco.org