NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 200437-U

Order filed June 30, 2022

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

CHRIST E. WALKER, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

Kankakee County, Illinois, 

Appeal Nos. 3-20-0437 and 3-20-0487 

Circuit No. 05-CF-176 

Honorable 

Clark E. Erickson, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Holdridge and Lytton concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant did not establish cause and prejudice to warrant leave to file his 

successive postconviction petition.

¶ 2 Defendant, Christ E. Walker, appeals from the Kankakee County circuit court’s denial of 

his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant argues the court 

erroneously denied his motion because it established sufficient cause and prejudice to permit the 

filing of a successive postconviction petition. We affirm.
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-

1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2004)), attempted first degree murder (id. § 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)), two counts of 

aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)), aggravated unlawful use of a weapon

(AUUW) (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)), and aggravated assault (id. § 12-2(a)(6)).

¶ 5 The evidence at trial established that on the night of March 26, 2005, defendant and 

Dwayne Cooks engaged in an argument at a bar. The next day, defendant and his friend Michael 

Johnson drove to Cooks’s apartment and saw Cooks standing outside. Defendant and Johnson 

fired their guns at Cooks. Officer Eddie Perez was patrolling the area and observed defendant 

firing his gun at Cooks. Perez activated his emergency lights, causing Johnson to turn in his 

direction. Johnson fired his gun toward Perez and fled the scene with defendant. Perez eventually 

apprehended defendant, Johnson, and another individual who was in the vehicle. Cooks died 

from his gunshot wound. Defendant was 23 years old at the time of the offense.

¶ 6 At sentencing, the court sentenced defendant to 49 years’ imprisonment for first degree 

murder, 20 years’ imprisonment for attempted murder, 10 years’ imprisonment for aggravated 

discharge of a firearm, and 5 years’ imprisonment for AUUW. Defendant’s sentence for first 

degree murder was ordered to run consecutive to attempted murder, and the remaining sentences 

were ordered to run concurrently to the murder sentence. The aggregate sentence was 69 years’ 

imprisonment.

¶ 7 On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. People v. 

Walker, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1025 (2008). Defendant filed several unsuccessful postconviction 

petitions that were also affirmed by this court. People v. Walker, No. 3-10-0077 (2010) 

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Walker, No. 3-11-0100 
3 

(2011) (unpublished minute order); People v. Walker, No. 3-11-0642 (2013) (unpublished 

dispositional order). Defendant also appealed the denial of his second motion for leave to file a 

successive postconviction petition, and this court ordered the circuit court to vacate defendant’s 

AUUW conviction and sentence. People v. Walker, No. 3-14-0022 (2016) (unpublished 

summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). Defendant also filed a petition under 

section 2-1401 in January 2015, that he voluntarily moved to dismiss on May 30, 2019. See 735 

ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014).

¶ 8 On June 28, 2019, defendant filed his third motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. In his motion and proposed petition, defendant alleged that the State 

failed to prove every element of attempted first degree murder under the accountability theory, 

the State committed a Brady violation by suppressing an audio recording he could have used to 

impeach Perez at trial, and the circuit court did not provide the jury with the proper jury 

instruction regarding the gun enhancement for the murder charge. In arguing that there was a 

Brady violation, defendant alleged that the State failed to disclose an audio recording of Perez in 

which he told dispatch “I think they are shooting at me.” At trial, Perez testified that Johnson 

shot at him. Defendant argued that the State failed to disclose the recording to him, and he could 

have used it to impeach Perez at trial. He further stated that he did not learn of the recording until 

speaking to his codefendant after trial.

¶ 9 On December 24, 2019, defendant filed “Motion to Request Leave to File Pro-Se

Supplemental Petition to Successive Post-Conviction Petition.” In defendant’s “supplement” to 

his petition, defendant claimed that his de facto life sentence was unconstitutional due to the 

recent decision in People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B. 
4 

¶ 10 On July 24, 2020, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion for leave to file a 

successive petition. In denying the motion, the court found that defendant’s motion was frivolous 

and was presented for no other purpose than to harass the court and cause needless litigation. The 

court assessed a $75 fee against defendant to cover the actual court costs in entertaining the 

motion. The court’s order did not mention defendant’s December 24, 2019, supplement. 

¶ 11 On August 4, 2020, the court received a letter from defendant stating that “there wasn’t 

any paperwork regarding ‘a notice of appeal’ however the defendant do [wish] to file for ‘a 

notice of appeal’ but there is another Part of that Petition that the Judge did not make a decision 

on, that Petition was File[d] in December of 2019.” Defendant filed a notice of appeal on 

October 8, 2020, when he noticed no activity in his case after his initial request to appeal. On 

October 23, the court entered the following minute order: 

“The court is [in] receipt of the defendant’s letter dated August 1, 2020 regarding 

his supplemental petition filed 12/24/19. The de facto life sentence applies to 

juveniles 17 and under. The defendant was 22 or 23 at the time of the offense, and 

therefore the motion is denied. Defendant’s motion to waive the court fees are 

also denied. The defendant[’s] motion to file a notice of appeal is granted as to the 

memorandum of decision filed July 24, 2020, the denied [sic] of his supplemental 

motion and denial of waiving court fees. Clerk to file a notice of appeal on behalf 

of the defendant. Appellate defender is appointed. Clerk to notify.”

¶ 12 The circuit clerk filed a notice of appeal the same day stating that defendant was 

appealing the July 24, 2020, and October 23, 2020, orders. 

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS 
5 

¶ 14 Defendant argues that the circuit court erroneously denied him leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition and supplemental petition. Specifically, defendant contends that his 

motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition sufficiently alleged cause and 

prejudice, because he did not learn of a possible Brady violation until after his trial and the case 

law regarding life sentences for juveniles and emerging adults is new law that did not emerge 

until after his conviction.

¶ 15 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 16 At the outset, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider this case as the 

notice of appeal was untimely. Defendant argues that we have jurisdiction because the late filing 

of the notice of appeal was the clerk’s fault and not his own. Defendant notes that he told the 

court through his letter that he wanted to appeal less than two weeks after his motion was denied, 

well before the deadline to file a notice of appeal in his case. 

¶ 17 A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days from the entry of final judgment. Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021). Although the notice of appeal in this case was not filed within 

30 days of the July 24, 2020, order, it is clear from the record that defendant sought to perfect an 

appeal within 30 days of that order. His August 2020 letter requesting an appeal and the notice of 

appeal form should have been treated as a petition for leave to appeal within the contemplation 

of Rule 606(c). The supreme court has held that “once a defendant in a criminal matter requests 

an appeal the duty of filing the notice of appeal is upon the clerk of the trial court.” People v. 

Sanders, 40 IL. 2d 458, 461 (1968). However, here the court did not order the clerk to file a 

notice of appeal or make any findings on defendant’s motion to supplement his petition, until 

nearly three months after receiving defendant’s request to appeal. It was reasonable for defendant 

to rely on the court to direct the filing of a timely notice of appeal. The failure of the court to 
6 

order the clerk to file a notice of appeal should not operate to preclude defendant’s appeal. 

Because we find that defendant asked to appeal within the time frame and the court failed to 

order the clerk to file the notice of appeal on time, we find that we have jurisdiction to consider 

this case.

¶ 18 B. Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 19 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) permits a criminal defendant to challenge the 

proceedings which resulted in his conviction by asserting that “there was a substantial denial of 

his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.” 

725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018). The Act contemplates the filing of a single postconviction 

petition, and the defendant must obtain leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition. 

People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶¶ 42-43; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). To obtain 

leave, the defendant must allege either: (1) “cause and prejudice for the failure to assert a 

postconviction claim in an earlier proceeding”; or (2) “a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

based on actual innocence.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42. “Cause” is defined as an “objective 

factor external to the defense that impeded counsel’s efforts to raise the claim in an earlier 

proceeding,” and “prejudice” exists where the petitioner can show that the alleged constitutional 

error so infected his trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. People v. Davis, 2014 

IL 115595, ¶ 14. A defendant has the burden to obtain leave of court and “must submit enough in 

the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.” People v. Tidwell, 

236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010). We review de novo the circuit court’s ruling on defendant’s motion 

for leave. People v. McDonald, 405 Ill. App. 3d 131, 135 (2010).

¶ 20 Defendant argues the court erred in denying his motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition because he established cause and prejudice. Specifically, he contends that 
7 

he established cause for failing to raise a claim under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), in 

a prior proceeding because the case law surrounding sentencing requirements for juveniles and 

emerging adults was still evolving. See People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 7-8 (holding Miller

extends to consider youth and attendant characteristics before imposing a de facto life sentence);

People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 (holding that sentences above 40 years were de facto life 

sentences). Defendant also argues that he established prejudice because he was 23 years old 

when he committed the offenses and was sentenced to a de facto life sentence. See Buffer, 2019 

IL 122327, ¶ 42. 

¶ 21 Defendant cites to the First District’s decision in House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, 

which extended the Miller protections to a young adult offender. Since defendant filed his brief, 

our supreme court has issued its own opinion in House. See People v. House, 2021 IL 125124. In 

House, the defendant, who was 19 years old at the time of his offense, argued in his 

postconviction petition that his mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties 

provision of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 7; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The defendant 

appealed after the circuit court dismissed his petition, and the appellate court vacated the life

sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, finding that the sentence violated the Illinois 

proportionate penalties provision. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 7. Our supreme court reversed the 

appellate court’s ruling, finding that “no evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court made 

no factual findings critical to determining whether the science concerning juvenile maturity and 

brain development applies equally to young adults, or to petitioner specifically.” Id. ¶ 29. The 

supreme court remanded the case to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction 

proceedings. Id. ¶ 32. 
8 

¶ 22 Here, defendant cites to various scientific studies on brain development, but has not 

provided any evidence regarding how the studies cited specifically apply to him and his own 

brain development at the time he committed the offenses. Although defendant cites House in

support for remand, there is a significant distinction regarding the instant case and House: the 

defendant in House was under the age of 21. Defendant has not cited any case law finding that a

23-year-old defendant has shown prejudice for filing a successive postconviction petition based 

on a Miller argument. As other courts have noted, there is no support for extending the juvenile 

protections set forth in Miller to young adults over the age of 21. See, e.g., People v. Suggs, 2020 

IL App (2d) 170632, ¶¶ 33-35; People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶¶ 33-34; 

People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, ¶ 1.

¶ 23 Several recent cases have addressed Miller claims made by defendants over 21 years old, 

specifically finding that the case law should not be extended. For instance, in Humphrey, the 

reviewing court observed that the defendant could not point to any case law where an Illinois 

court recognized that a de facto life sentence imposed on a young adult over 21 years old was 

unconstitutional as applied under the proportionate penalties clause. Humphrey, 2020 IL App 

(1st) 172837, ¶¶ 33-34. “While 21 is undoubtedly somewhat arbitrary, drawing a line there is in 

keeping with other aspects of criminal law and society’s current general recognition that 21 is 

considered the beginning of adulthood.” Id. ¶ 34. Further, “[w]hile it seems but a short step to 

extend the *** line of cases to an 18-year-old offender, it is a much greater leap to extend it to a 

21-year-old, and an even greater leap to apply it to a 23-year-old, such as defendant.” Suggs, 

2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35. We therefore find that defendant has failed to show prejudice, 

and the circuit court did not err in denying his successive postconviction petition. 
9 

¶ 24 Defendant next contends the circuit court erred in denying his petition because he 

established cause and prejudice to further his claim that the State committed a Brady violation by 

failing to disclose evidence that he could have used to impeach Perez at trial. The decision in 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) holds that a defendant’s due process rights are 

violated when the State fails to disclose evidence that could be favorable to the defendant and is 

material to guilt or punishment. To succeed on a Brady claim, defendant must establish that any 

undisclosed evidence was favorable to him because it was impeaching or exculpatory, the 

evidence was withheld by the State, and the defendant was prejudiced by the evidence being 

withheld because it was material to his guilt or punishment. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 

73-74 (2008). “Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.” People v. Jarrett, 399 

Ill. App. 3d 715, 728 (2010). A reasonable probability of a different result means a “probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 

(1985). 

¶ 25 In this case, it is apparent that defendant cannot establish prejudice from the State’s 

purported Brady violation, because his claim is clearly without merit. Here, defendant asserts 

that the State’s alleged failure to disclose an audio recording of Perez speaking to dispatch at the 

time of the offense prejudiced him, because defendant could have used the recording to impeach 

Perez at trial. Taking the allegation that the State failed to disclose this evidence as true, this 

evidence is not material under Brady. Specifically, defendant fails to show that, had the evidence 

of Perez’s statement to dispatch been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Defendant fails to establish how Perez’s statement to dispatch would have helped his 
10 

case or how the result of the proceedings would have been any different had this information 

been known and made available to defendant during trial. 

¶ 26 As the evidence purportedly withheld is not material, the Brady claim is without merit. In 

turn, defendant cannot show the requisite prejudice to bring a successive postconviction petition. 

Accordingly, the circuit court correctly denied defendant leave to file a successive petition.

¶ 27 C. Fee Assessment

¶ 28 Defendant also challenges the assessment of fees and costs by the court in the July 24, 

2020, order. The court assessed a $75 fee against defendant under section 22-105(a) of the Code 

of Civil Procedure for filing what the court believed to be a frivolous successive postconviction 

petition. See 735 ILCS 5/22-105(a) (West 2020). As we have determined defendant’s claims 

have no merit, we decline to reverse the circuit court’s order. 

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed. 

¶ 31 Affirmed.