* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50530

Summary Calendar

JESSICA SERAFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SCHOOL OF EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION; BRETT WILKINSON,

Individually and In His Official Capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 05-CV-62

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jessica Serafin attended the School of Excellence in Education (SEE), a

public charter school in San Antonio, Texas, during the 2003-2004 academic

year. On June 18, 2004, weeks after Serafin’s eighteenth birthday, Principal

Brett Wilkinson summoned her and two other students to his office after they

breached school rules and left campus during the school day. In accordance with

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 30, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-50530

1 While this appeal was pending, a suggestion of bankruptcy was filed by Appellee

Wilkinson, and as a result,this case was automatically placed in abeyance. The stay was lifted

regarding Appellee SEE only, and thus this panel does not address the claims Appellant raised

against Wilkinson.

2

It is undisputed that SEE is immune under Texas law from all of Appellant’s other

claims.

2

school procedures, and over Serafin’s protest, Wilkinson administered corporal

punishment to each with a wooden paddle. In attempting to block the paddle

with her hand, Serafin’s hand suffered minor, temporary injuries. 

Serafin brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against SEE and Wilkinson,

alleging that her due process and equal protection rights were violated. She also

raised several independent state law claims. The district court granted

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed all federal claims

against SEE and Wilkinson. The court declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the surviving state claims and dismissed those without

prejudice. Serafin now appeals the dismissal of her federal claims.1 Because

Serafin cannot prevail on her substantive due process or equal protection

claims,2 we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to

Appellee SEE.

It is well settled in this Circuit that corporal punishment of public school

students is only a deprivation of substantive due process rights “when it is

arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of

maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning.” Fee v. Hendon, 900 F.2d

804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). As a matter of law, punishment is not

arbitrary so long as the state affords local remedies for the alleged offensive

conduct. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874–75 (5th Cir. 2000).

This Court has already decided that Texas affords adequate remedies for

excessive corporal punishment claims such as this. Id. at 875–76. Because there
No. 06-50530

3

are adequate local remedies, Serafin’s substantive due process claims must fail

as a matter of law.

Serafin argues that this clear precedent should either (1) be revisited by

this court, or (2) be held inapplicable because Serafin was not a minor at the

time of the incident. As to the first suggestion, we generally refuse to revisit a

prior panel’s decision absent some compelling reason, and we find no such reason

here. See Free v. Abbott Labs., 164 F.3d 270, 272–73 (5th Cir. 1999). As for the

second, Serafin argues that adults are not compelled to be at school and

therefore, they maintain stronger due process rights than minors while there.

This argument relies on the false premise that Serafin was not required to

comply with SEE’s attendance policies on the day in question. Without doubt,

she did not need to attend school after her eighteenth birthday and was at

liberty to withdraw from SEE. However, having voluntarily chosen to attend

classes after her eighteenth birthday and remain enrolled, she was not free to

disregard school rules and attendance policies. 

In Texas, “[a] person who voluntarily enrolls in school or voluntarily

attends school after the person’s 18th birthday shall attend school each school

day for the entire period the program of instruction is offered.” TEX. EDUC. CODE

§ 25.085(e). Serafin was a student at SEE at the time of this incident. Nothing

in the caselaw exempts non-minors from the corporal punishment of students.

Furthermore, the Texas statute governing the use of corporal punishment in

schools, makes no differentiation between adults and minors, stating that all

students are eligible to receive corporal punishment. TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.62.

Because Serafin was obligated to comply with school rules and subject to its

disciplinary policies, we see no basis for affording her greater due process rights

than her co-students. As this Court explained in Fee: “we have avoided having

student discipline, a matter of public policy, shaped by the individual

predilections of federal jurists rather than by state lawmakers and local officials
No. 06-50530

4

. . . [especially when] states, like Texas, have taken affirmative steps to protect

their students from overzealous disciplinarians.” 900 F.2d at 809.

In the alternative, Serafin argues that the equal protection rights of adult

students are violated insofar as they are subject to corporal punishment while

other adults are not. There is no merit to this claim. The Equal Protection

Clause “does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be

treated in law as though they were the same.” Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

(1982) (citation omitted). Texas’ unique statutory treatment of students is

justified by the need to maintain a safe and secure educational atmosphere. See

id. Students are not a suspect class and no fundamental right is at stake. There

is a rational basis for allowing corporal punishment of students, and it is

sufficientto survive an equal protection challenge. Texas did not compel Serafin

to enroll in SEE or to attend after her eighteenth birthday, but once she chose

to do so she was treated as all other students, adult or otherwise. 

Finding no bases for due process or equal protection claims, we AFFIRM

the district court’s judgment on all counts in regards to Appellee SEE.