* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-20173

Summary Calendar

ROYCE EUGENE MITCHELL, JR.

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MARC W. HOLDER

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-MC-45

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Royce Eugene Mitchell, Jr. is seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP)

to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to proceed IFP in the district

court based on a failure to state a claim. The district court relied on the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 in making its ruling. 

Mitchell seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the enforcement

of state court orders imposing a fine for a speeding ticket that Mitchell received.

He contends that the matter should have been reviewed by an agency and that

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 10, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-20173

2

the state municipal and county courts, and in particular, County Judge Holder,

did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. He also argues

that TEX. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 30.00027 should be declared unconstitutional

because it resulted in the denial of his rightto appealthe county court’s decision.

Mitchell argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint based

on the Anti-Injunction Act because it resulted in the denial of his constitutional

rights. 

Under the Anti-Injunction Act , “[a] court of the United States may not

grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to

protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (emphasis added). The

listed exceptions “are narrow and are ‘not [to] be enlarged by loose statutory

construction.’” Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988)

(citation omitted). 

Mitchell has not alleged that the state court action is subject to any

statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act or that the proceedings will have

any effect on the jurisdiction of the federal court or any of its judgments. Thus,

Mitchell has not shown that the district court erred in determining that his

complaint seeking injunctive relief failed to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted.

Mitchell has failed to raise a nonfrivolous issue on appeal. His motion to

proceed IFP on appeal is denied, and his appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See

5TH CIR. R. 42.2; Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Mitchell was previously cautioned that filing additional frivolous suits or

appeals could resultin the imposition of sanctions. See Mitchell v.Texas, No. 03-

20836 (5th Cir. June 30, 2004). It is ordered that a sanction of $150.00 is

imposed and that the clerk accept no further pleadings from Mitchell until the

sanction is paid. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 1988).
No. 07-20173

3

IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION IMPOSED;

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER DENIED.