ELECTIONS 

Electronic Voting Offers 

Opportunities and Presents 

Challenges 

Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director 

Information Technology Architecture and Systems 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Testimony

Prepared for the Subcommittee on Technology, 

Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations 

and the Census, Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

Released at 2:30 p.m. EDT 

Wednesday, May 12, 2004 

GAO-04-766T 

The hearing for which this testimony 

was prepared was postponed after 

the testimony was released by the 

subcommittee. 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-766T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Randolph C. 

Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-766T, a testimony 

prepared for the Subcommittee on 

Technology, Information Policy, 

Intergovernmental Relations and the 

Census, Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

May 12, 2004

ELECTIONS

Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities 

and Presents Challenges 

An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can 

be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for 

security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For 

example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of use 

because they can have features that accommodate voters with various 

disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as 

overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a disadvantage 

of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an independent 

paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment (another type 

of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the enhanced security 

associated with having a paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease 

of use, such as their limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities. 

One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is 

designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the 

developed system performs as designed. In the design and development 

process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system requirements 

as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting technology, 

these voluntary standards have historically been problematic; the EAC has 

now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines, and it intends to 

update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the process for testing 

voting system hardware and software. A second determinant of performance 

is how the system is implemented. In implementing a system, it is critical to 

have people with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate it according 

to well-defined and understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on 

these people and process factors in its role of assisting in the administration 

of elections. 

In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges 

confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are similar 

to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both 

immediate and more long term challenges, as shown in the table. 

Challenges in Using Electronic Voting Systems 

Time frame Challenge 

• Performing those security, testing, and maintenance activities needed to 

adequately ensure that the system operates as intended. 

Near term 

• Managing the system, the people who interact with the system, and the 

processes that govern this interaction as interrelated and interdependent 

parts. 

• Having reliable measures and objective data to know whether the system is 

meeting the needs of the user community (both voters and those who 

administer the elections). 

Long term 

• Making choices about future system changes in light of whether a given 

system will provide benefits over its useful life that are commensurate with life 

cycle costs, and ensuring that these costs are affordable. 

Source: GAO. 

The technology used to cast and 

count votes is one aspect of the 

multifaceted U.S. election process. 

GAO examined voting technology, 

among other things, in a series of 

reports that it issued in 2001 

following the problems 

encountered in the 2000 election. 

In October 2002, the Congress 

enacted the Help America Vote Act, 

which, among other things, 

established the Election Assistance 

Commission (EAC) to assist in the 

administration of federal elections. 

The act also established a program 

to provide funds to states to 

replace older punch card and lever 

machine voting equipment. As this 

older voting equipment has been 

replaced with newer electronic 

voting systems over the last 2 

years, concerns have been raised 

about the vulnerabilities associated 

with certain electronic voting 

systems. 

Among other things, GAO’s 

testimony focuses on attributes on 

which electronic voting systems 

can be assessed, as well as design 

and implementation factors 

affecting their performance. GAO 

also describes the immediate and 

longer term challenges confronting 

local jurisdictions in using any type 

of voting equipment, particularly 

electronic voting systems. 
Page 1 GAO-04-766T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on 

electronic voting systems.1 In light of concerns associated with the 

voting systems used in the 2000 election, we produced a series of 

reports, issued in 2001,2

 in which we examined virtually every aspect 

of the election process, including types of voting technology. As we 

reported in 2001, the particular technology used to cast and count 

votes is a critical part of this process, but it is only one facet of a 

multifaceted election process. Other facets include the people who 

implement and use the technology and the processes that govern its 

implementation, among which are the standards used to define the 

characteristics and performance of the technology. Accordingly, we 

recognized that no voting technology, however well designed, can 

be a magic bullet that will solve all the problems that can arise in the 

election process. At the same time, we also recognized that if not 

properly managed, this one facet of the election process can 

significantly undermine the integrity of the whole. 

As requested, my testimony today will focus on electronic voting 

systems, and in doing so I will address (1) the role of these systems 

within the larger election process, (2) attributes that can be used to 

examine these systems’ capabilities, (3) the importance of both 

system design and implementation to the performance of these 

systems, and (4) the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in 

using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting 

systems. 

 1

 In this testimony, the term electronic voting system is used generically, to refer both to 

optical scan systems and direct recording electronic systems, both of which depend on 

electronic technology. Each type of system is described more fully in the Background 

section of this testimony. 

2

 For example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and 

Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001); Elections:

Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards, GAO-02-52 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 15, 2001); and Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals, GAO-02-90

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 
Page 2 GAO-04-766T

In preparing for this testimony, we drew extensively from our 

published work on the election process. We augmented this work 

with reviews of more recent studies of electronic voting systems

and other relevant documents. In addition, we interviewed 

commissioners of the newly appointed Election Assistance 

Commission (EAC) regarding its efforts to date and its plans, and 

we attended EAC and other commission hearings on electronic 

voting systems. Our follow-up work was performed from February 

2004 to May 2004 in Washington, D.C. All the work on which this 

testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief 

Electronic voting systems play a vital role in elections, but they are 

only one component in a multidimensional process. The people, 

processes, and technology that make up these various dimensions 

all contribute to the success of the overall election process. From a 

national perspective, this overall process involves many levels of 

government, including over 10,000 jurisdictions with widely varying 

characteristics and requirements. For example, the size of a 

jurisdiction and the languages spoken by voters are significant 

variables in local election processes, as is the performance of the 

particular voting system used. 

An electronic voting system, like any type of automated information 

system, can be judged on several bases, including how well its 

design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, 

as well as cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems 

have advantages in ease of use because they can have features that 

accommodate persons with various disabilities, and they provide 

features that protect against common voter errors; a disadvantage of 

such systems is their cost and their frequent lack of an independent 

paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment, 

which is another type of electronic voting system, include cost and 

the enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail; 

disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as their limited ability 

to accommodate voters with disabilities. 
Page 3 GAO-04-766T

Voting system performance is a function of two very important 

activities: system design and development—including the testing 

that determines whether the developed system performs as 

designed—and system implementation. One critical input to the 

design and development process is the quality of the specified 

system requirements as embodied in applicable standards. For 

voting technology, these standards have historically been 

problematic, and they are now a focus of the EAC. Critical inputs to 

the system implementation process are having people with the 

requisite knowledge and skills to operate and use the system, and 

having well-defined and understood processes governing this 

operation and use. Both are also areas of focus by the commission.

Looking toward to the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, 

the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic 

voting systems are not unlike those facing any technology user. 

These challenges include (1) performing those security, testing, and 

maintenance activities needed to adequately ensure that the system 

operates as intended; (2) managing the system, the people who 

interact with the system, and the processes that govern this 

interaction as interrelated and interdependent parts; (3) having 

reliable measures and objective data to know whether the system is 

meeting the needs of the jurisdiction’s user community (both the 

voters and the persons who administer the elections); and 

(4) making choices about future system changes in light of whether 

a given system will provide benefits over its useful life 

commensurate with life-cycle costs, and ensuring that these costs 

are affordable. 

Background 

Following the 2000 national elections, we performed a 

comprehensive series of reviews covering our nation’s election 

process, in which we identified a number of challenges. These 

reviews culminated in a capping report that summarized this work 

and provided the Congress with a framework for considering 
Page 4 GAO-04-766T

options for election administration reform.3 Our reports and 

framework were among the resources that the Congress drew on in 

enacting the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002,4 which 

provided guidance for fundamental election administration reform. 

Among other things, the act authorizes $3.86 billion in funding over 

several fiscal years for programs to replace punch card and 

mechanical lever voting equipment, improve election 

administration, improve accessibility, train poll workers, and 

perform research and pilot studies. It also created the EAC to 

oversee the election administration reform process. Since the act’s 

passage, a number of voting jurisdictions have replaced their older 

voting equipment with direct recording electronic systems. At the 

same time, concerns have been raised about the use of these 

systems; some critics have suggested, for example, that the security 

associated with the systems is not sufficient to ensure the integrity 

of the election process. In January 2004, the EAC began operations. 

On May 5, 2004, it held a public hearing to receive information on 

the use, security, and reliability of electronic voting devices. The 

hearing included panels of technology and standards experts, 

vendors of voting systems, state and local election administrators, 

and citizen advocacy groups. A major topic of the hearing was the 

security and reliability of touchscreen electronic voting systems.

GAO Work Following the 2000 Elections Provided a Framework for Election 

Administration Reform 

At the request of congressional leaders, committees, and members, 

we conducted an extensive body of work in the wake of the 2000 

elections, which culminated in seven reports addressing a range of 

election-related topics. 

First, we reviewed the constitutional framework for the 

administration of elections, as well as major federal statutes enacted 

 3

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform 

Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

4

 Pub. L. No. 107-252. 
Page 5 GAO-04-766T

in this area. 5 We reported that the constitutional framework for 

elections includes both state and federal roles. States are 

responsible for the administration of both their own elections and 

federal elections, but the Congress has enacted laws in several 

major areas of the voting process, including the timing of federal 

elections, voter registration, and absentee voting requirements. 

Congressional authority to legislate in this area derives from various 

constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election. For 

federal elections, the Congress has constitutional authority over 

both congressional and presidential elections. 

Second, we examined voting assistance for military and overseas 

voters.6

 We reported that although tools are available for such 

voters, many potential voters were unaware of them, and many 

military and overseas voters believed it was challenging to 

understand and comply with state requirements and local 

procedures for absentee voting. In addition, although information 

was not readily available on the precise number of military and 

overseas absentee votes that were disqualified in the 2000 general 

election and the reasons for disqualification, we found through a 

national telephone survey that almost two-thirds of the disqualified 

absentee ballots were rejected because of lateness or errors in 

completion of the envelope or form accompanying the ballot. We 

recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State improve 

(1) the clarity and completeness of service guidance, (2) voter 

education and outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of 

voting assistance efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices. The 

Departments of Defense and State agreed with our overall findings 

and recommendations, and as of May 2004, the recommendations 

had largely been implemented.

Third, we investigated whether minorities and disadvantaged voters 

were more likely to have their votes not counted because the voting 

method they used was less reliable than that of affluent white 

 5

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in 

Election Administration, GAO-01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2001). 

6

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas 

Citizens Should Be Improved, GAO-01-1026 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2001). 
Page 6 GAO-04-766T

voters.7 According to our results, the state in which counties were 

located had more effect on the number of uncounted presidential 

votes than did counties’ demographic characteristics or voting 

method. State differences accounted for 26 percent of the total 

variation in uncounted presidential votes across counties.8 County 

demographic characteristics accounted for 16 percent of the 

variation (counties with higher percentages of minority residents 

tended to have higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes, 

while counties with higher percentages of younger and more 

educated residents tended to have lower percentages of uncounted 

presidential votes), and voting equipment accounted for 2 percent of 

the variation. 

Fourth, in a review of voting accessibility for voters with 

disabilities,9

 we found that all states had provisions addressing 

voting by people with disabilities, but these provisions varied 

greatly. Federal law requires that voters with disabilities have 

access to polling places for federal elections, with some 

exceptions.10 All states provided for one or more alternative voting 

methods or accommodations intended to facilitate voting by people 

with disabilities. In addition, states and localities had made several 

efforts to improve voting accessibility for voters with disabilities, 

such as modifying polling places, acquiring new voting equipment, 

and expanding voting options, but state and county election officials 

surveyed cited various challenges to improving access. We 

concluded that given the limited availability of accessible polling 

places, other options that could allow more voters with disabilities 

to vote at a polling place on election day include reassigning them to 

 7

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors That Affected 

Uncounted Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election, GAO-02-122 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.

15, 2001). 

8

 State differences may have included such factors as statewide voter education efforts, 

state standards for determining what is a valid vote, the use of straight party ballots, the 

number of candidates on the ballot, the use of provisional ballots, and the extent to which 

absentee or early voting occurred. 

9

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and 

Alternative Voting Methods, GAO-02-107 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

10 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973ee-1. 
Page 7 GAO-04-766T

other, more accessible polling places or creating accessible 

superprecincts in which voters from more than one precinct could 

all vote in the same building. 

Fifth, we reported on the status and use of voting equipment 

standards developed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).11

These standards define minimum functional and performance 

requirements, as well as minimum life-cycle management processes 

for voting equipment developers to follow, such as quality 

assurance. At the time of our review, no federal agency had explicit 

statutory responsibility for developing the standards; however, the 

FEC developed voluntary standards for computer-based systems in 

1990,12 and the Congress provided funding for this effort. Similarly, 

no federal agency was responsible for testing voting systems against 

the federal standards. Instead, the National Association of State 

Election Directors accredited independent test authorities to test 

voting systems against the standards. We noted, however, that the 

FEC standards had not been updated since 1990 and were 

consequently out of date. We suggested that the Congress consider 

assigning explicit federal authority, responsibility, and 

accountability for the standards, including their proactive and 

continuous update and maintenance; we also suggested that the 

Congress consider what, if any, federal role is appropriate regarding 

implementation of the standards, including the accreditation of 

independent test authorities and the qualification of voting systems.

Both of these matters were addressed in the Help America Vote Act 

of 2002,13 which, among other things, set up the EAC to take 

responsibility for voluntary voting system guidelines. We also made 

recommendations to the FEC aimed at improving the guidelines. 

Before the EAC became operational, the FEC continued to update 

and maintain the guidelines, issuing a new version in 2002.

 11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment 

Standards, GAO-02-52 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

12 Performance and Test Standards for Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct Recording 

Electronic Voting Systems (January 1990). 

13 Pub. L. 107-252. 
Page 8 GAO-04-766T

Sixth, we issued a report on election activities and challenges across 

the nation.14 In this report, we described the operations and 

challenges associated with each stage of the election process, 

including voter registration; absentee and early voting; election day 

administration; and vote counts, certification, and recounts. The 

report also provided analyses on issues associated with voting 

systems that were used in the November 2000 elections and the 

potential use of the Internet for voting. Among other things, we 

pointed out that each of the major stages of an election depends on 

the effective interaction of people (the election officials and voters), 

processes (or internal controls), and technology (registration 

systems, election management systems, and voting systems). We 

also enumerated the challenges facing election officials at all stages 

of the election process. 

Finally, we issued a capping report that included a framework for 

evaluating election administration reform proposals.15 Among other 

things, we observed that the constitutional and operational division 

of federal and state authority to conduct elections had resulted in 

great variability in the ways that elections are administered in the 

United States. We concluded that given the diversity and 

decentralized nature of election administration, careful 

consideration needed to be given to the degree of flexibility and the 

planned time frames for implementing new initiatives. We also 

concluded that in order for election administration reform to be 

effective, reform proposals must address all major parts of our 

election system—its people, processes, and technology—which are 

interconnected and significantly affect the election process. And 

finally, we provided an analytical framework for the Congress to 

consider in deciding on changes to the overall election process. 

 14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges 

across the Nation, GAO-02-03 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001);

15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform 

Proposals, GAO-02-90 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
Page 9 GAO-04-766T

The Help America Vote Act Was Enacted to Strengthen the Overall Election Process 

Enacted by the Congress in October 2002, the Help America Vote 

Act of 2002 addressed a range of election issues, including the lack 

of explicit federal (statutory) responsibility for developing and 

maintaining standards for electronic voting systems and for testing 

voting systems against standards. 

With the far-reaching goal of improving the election process in every 

state, the act affects nearly every aspect of the voting process, from 

voting technology to provisional ballots, and from voter registration 

to poll worker training. In particular, the act established a program 

to provide funds to states to replace punch card and lever machine 

voting equipment,16 established the EAC to assist in the 

administration of federal elections and provide assistance with the 

administration of certain federal election laws and programs, and 

established minimum election administration standards for the 

states and units of local government that are responsible for the 

administration of federal elections. In January 2004, the 

Congressional Research Service reported that disbursements to 

states for the replacement of older equipment and election 

administration improvements totaled $649.5 million.17

The act specifically tasked the EAC to serve as a national 

clearinghouse and resource for compiling election information and 

reviewing election procedures; for example, it is to conduct periodic 

studies of election administration issues to promote methods of 

voting and administration that are most convenient, accessible, and 

easy to use for all voters. Other examples of EAC responsibilities 

include 

 16 The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for administering grants to the 

states to replace punch card systems and lever machines in qualifying states, including 

providing payments for general election administration improvements to states that apply 

for funds to replace voting equipment. 

17 Kevin J. Coleman and Eric A. Fischer, Elections Reform: Overview and Issues,

Congressional Research Service RS20898 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 21, 2004). 
Page 10 GAO-04-766T

● developing and adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and 

maintaining information on the experiences of states in 

implementing the guidelines and operating voting systems; 

● testing, certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting system 

hardware and software through accredited laboratories; 

● making payments to states to help them improve elections in the 

areas of voting systems standards, provisional voting and voting 

information requirements, and computerized statewide voter 

registration lists; and 

● making grants for research on voting technology improvements. 

According to the act, reporting to the EAC will be the Technical 

Guidelines Development Committee, which will make 

recommendations on voluntary voting system guidelines. The 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will provide 

technical support to the development committee, and the NIST 

Director will serve as its chairman. 

In December 2003, the EAC commissioners were appointed, and the 

EAC began operations in January 2004. According to the 

commission chairman, the EAC’s fiscal year 2004 budget is $1.2 

million, and its near-term plans focus on complying with 

requirements established in HAVA, including issuing a report to the 

Congress on the status of election administration reform. The 

commission’s longer term plans include a focus on developing best 

practices that can be shared across the election community, 

updating the voluntary voting system guidelines, and improving the 

process for independent testing of voting systems. Commissioners 

also told us that current operations are constrained by a lack of 

persons in key staff positions, including the Executive Director, 

General Counsel, and Inspector General. 

Electronic Voting Systems Fall into Two Primary Categories 

In the United States today, most votes are cast and counted by one 

of two types of electronic voting systems: optical scan and direct 

recording electronic (DRE). For a small minority of registered 

voters (about 1 percent in the 2000 elections), votes are cast and 

counted manually on paper ballots. Two older voting technologies 

were also used in the 2000 elections: punch card equipment (used by 
Page 11 GAO-04-766T

31 percent of registered voters in 2000) and mechanical lever voting 

machines (used by 17 percent of voters in 2000). These equipment 

types are being replaced as required by provisions established in 

HAVA.18

Optical Scan Systems 

Optical scan voting systems use electronic technology to tabulate 

paper ballots. Although optical scan technology has been in use for 

decades for such tasks as scoring standardized tests, it was not 

applied to voting until the 1980s. In 2000, about 31 percent of 

registered voters voted on optical scan systems. 

For voting, an optical scan system is made up of computer-readable 

ballots, appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a 

computerized tabulation device. The ballot, which can be of various 

sizes, lists the names of the candidates and the issues. Voters record 

their choices using an appropriate writing instrument to fill in boxes 

or ovals, or to complete an arrow next to the candidate’s name or 

the issue. The ballot includes a space for write-ins to be placed 

directly on the ballot. 

Optical scan ballots are tabulated by optical-mark-recognition 

equipment (see fig. 1), which counts the ballots by sensing or 

reading the marks on the ballot. Ballots can be counted at the 

polling place—this is referred to as precinct-count optical scan19—or 

at a central location. If ballots are counted at the polling place, 

voters or election officials put the ballots into the tabulation 

equipment, which tallies the votes; these tallies can be captured in 

 18 Pub. L. 107-252, Sec. 102, provides federal funds to states for the systematic removal and 

replacement of punch card voting systems and lever voting systems in time for the 

regularly scheduled general election for federal offices to be held in November 2004; states 

that receive a certified waiver may extend their replacement time frame until the first 

election for federal office after January 1, 2006. 

19 Precinct-count optical scan equipment sits on a ballot box with two compartments for 

scanned ballots—one for accepted ballots (i.e., those that are properly filled out) and one 

for rejected ballots (i.e., blank ballots, ballots with write-ins, or those accepted because of 

a forced override). In addition, an auxiliary compartment in the ballot box is used for 

storing ballots if an emergency arises (e.g., loss of power or machine failure) that prevents 

the ballots from being scanned. 
Page 12 GAO-04-766T

removable storage media that are transported to a central tally 

location, or they can be electronically transmitted from the polling 

place to the central tally location. If ballots are centrally counted, 

voters drop ballots into sealed boxes, and election officials transfer 

the sealed boxes to the central location after the polls close, where 

election officials run the ballots through the tabulation equipment. 

Figure 1: Precinct-Count Optical Scan Tabulator and Central-Count Optical Scan 

Tabulator 

Software instructs the tabulation equipment to assign each vote (i.e., 

to assign valid marks on the ballot to the proper candidate or issue). 

In addition to identifying the particular contests and candidates, the 

software can be configured to capture, for example, straight party 

voting and vote-for-no-more-than-N contests. Precinct-based optical 

scanners can also be programmed to detect overvotes (where the 

voter votes for two candidates for one office, for example, 

invalidating the vote) and undervotes (where the voter does not vote 

for all contests or issues on the ballot) and to take some action in 

response (rejecting the ballot, for instance). In addition, optical scan 
Page 13 GAO-04-766T

systems often use vote-tally software to tally the vote totals from 

one or more vote tabulation devices. 

If election officials program precinct-based optical scan systems to 

detect and reject overvotes and undervotes, voters can fix their 

mistakes before leaving the polling place. However, if voters are 

unwilling or unable to correct their ballots, a poll worker can 

manually override the program and accept the ballot, even though it 

has been overvoted or undervoted. If ballots are tabulated centrally, 

voters do not have the opportunity to correct mistakes that may 

have been made. 

Direct Recording Electronic Systems 

First introduced in the 1970s, DREs capture votes electronically, 

without the use of paper ballots. In the 2000 election, about 12 

percent of voters used this type of technology. 

DREs come in two basic types, pushbutton or touchscreen, the 

pushbutton being the older technology; during the 2000 elections, 

pushbutton DREs were the most prevalent of the two types. The two 

types vary considerably in appearance (see fig. 2). Pushbutton DREs 

are larger and heavier than touchscreens. 
Page 14 GAO-04-766T

Figure 2: DRE Pushbutton and DRE Touchscreen 

Pushbutton and touchscreen units also differ significantly in the way 

they present ballots to the voter. With the pushbutton, all ballot 

information is presented on a single “full-face” ballot. For example, 
Page 15 GAO-04-766T

a ballot may have 50 buttons on a 3 by 3 foot ballot, with a candidate 

or issue next to each button. In contrast, touchscreen DREs display 

the ballot information on an electronic display screen. For both 

pushbutton and touchscreen types, the ballot information is 

programmed onto an electronic storage medium, which is then 

uploaded to the machine. For touchscreens, ballot information can 

be displayed in color and can incorporate pictures of the candidates. 

Because the ballot space on a touchscreen is much smaller than on 

a pushbutton machine, voters who use touchscreens must page 

through the ballot information. Both touchscreen and pushbutton 

DREs can accommodate multilingual ballots. 

Despite the differences, the two types have some similarities, such 

as how the voter interacts with the voting equipment. For 

pushbuttons, voters press a button next to the candidate or issue, 

which then lights up to indicate the selection. Similarly, voters using 

touchscreens make their selections by touching the screen next to 

the candidate or issue, which is then highlighted. When voters are 

finished making their selections on a touchscreen or a pushbutton 

DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a final “vote” button or 

screen. Until they hit this final button or screen, voters can change 

their selections. Both types allow voters to write in candidates. 

While most DREs allow voters to type write-ins on a keyboard, some 

pushbutton types require voters to write the name on paper tape 

that is part of the device. 

Although DREs do not use paper ballots, they do retain permanent 

electronic images of all the ballots, which can be stored on various 

media, including internal hard disk drives, flash cards, or memory 

cartridges. According to vendors, these ballot images, which can be 

printed, can be used for auditing and recounts. 

Some of the newer DREs use smart card technology as a security 

feature. Smart cards are plastic devices—about the size of a credit 

card—that use integrated circuit chips to store and process data, 

much like a computer. Smart cards are generally used as a means to 

open polls and to authorize voter access to ballots. For instance, 

smart cards on some DREs store program data on the election and 

are used to help set up the equipment; during setup, election 

workers verify that the card received is for the proper election. 
Page 16 GAO-04-766T

Other DREs are programmed to automatically activate when the 

voter inserts a smart card; the card brings up the correct ballot onto 

the screen. In general, the interface with the voter is very similar to 

that of an automatic teller machine.

Like optical scan devices, DREs require the use of software to 

program the various ballot styles and tally the votes, which is 

generally done through the use of memory cartridges or other 

media. The software is used to generate ballots for each precinct 

within the voting jurisdiction, which includes defining the ballot 

layout, identifying the contests in each precinct, and assigning 

candidates to contests. The software is also used to configure any 

special options, such as straight party voting and vote-for-no-morethan-N contests. In addition, for pushbutton types, the software 

assigns the buttons to particular candidates and, for touchscreens, 

the software defines the size and location on the screen where the 

voter makes the selection. Vote-tally software is often used to tally 

the vote totals from one or more units. 

DREs offer various configurations for tallying the votes. Some 

contain removable storage media that can be taken from the voting 

device and transported to a central location to be tallied. Others can 

be configured to electronically transmit the vote totals from the 

polling place to a central tally location. 

DREs are designed not to allow overvotes; for example, if a voter 

selects a second choice in a two-way race, the first choice is 

deselected. In addition to this standard feature, different types offer 

a variety of options, including many aimed at voters with 

disabilities, that jurisdictions may choose to purchase. In our 2001 

work, we cited the following features as being offered in some 

models of DRE: 

● A “no-vote” option. This option helps avoid unintentional 

undervotes. This provides the voter with the option to select “no 

vote (or abstain)” on the display screen if the voter does not want to 

vote on a particular contest or issue. 

● A “review” feature. This feature requires voters to review each page 

of the ballot before pressing the button to cast the vote. 
Page 17 GAO-04-766T

● Visual enhancements. Visual enhancements include color 

highlighting of ballot choices, candidate pictures, etc. 

● Accommodations for voters with disabilities. Examples of options 

for voters who are blind include Braille keyboards and audio 

interfaces.20 At least one vendor reported that its DRE 

accommodates voters with neurological disabilities by offering head 

movement switches and “sip and puff” plug-ins.21 Another option is 

voice recognition capability, which allows voters to make selections 

orally. 

● An option to recover spoiled ballots. This feature allows voters to 

recast their votes after their original ballots are cast. For this option, 

every DRE at the poll site would be connected to a local area 

network. A poll official would void the original “spoiled” ballot 

through the administrative workstation that is also connected to the 

local area network. The voter could then cast another ballot. 

● An option to provide printed receipts. In this case, the voter would 

receive a paper printout or ballot when the vote is cast. This feature 

is intended to provide voters and/or election officials with an 

opportunity to check what is printed against what is recorded and 

displayed. It is envisioned that procedures would be in place to 

retrieve the paper receipts from the voters so that they could not be 

used for vote selling. Some DREs also have an infrared “presence 

sensor” that is used to control the receipt printer in the event the 

voter is allowed to keep the paper receipt; if the voter leaves 

without taking the receipt, the receipt is pulled back into the printer. 

Expanded Use of Electronic Voting Systems Has Raised Concerns 

As older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic 

voting systems over the last 2 years, the debate has shifted from 

hanging chads and butterfly ballots to vulnerabilities associated 

with DREs. Problems with these devices in recent elections have 

arisen in various states. For example: 

 20 According to spokespersons for national advocacy groups for people with disabilities, 

only a small percentage of blind people have the Braille proficiency needed to vote using a 

Braille ballot. 

21 Using a mouth-held straw, the voter issues switch commands—hard puff, hard sip, soft 

puff, and soft sip—to provide signals or instructions to the voting machine. 
Page 18 GAO-04-766T

● Six DRE units used in two North Carolina counties lost 436 ballots 

cast in early voting for the 2002 general election because of a 

software problem, according to a February 9, 2004, report in Wired 

News. The manufacturer said that problems with the firmware of its 

touchscreen machines led to the lost ballots. The state was trying 

out the machines in early voting to determine if it wanted to switch 

from the optical scan machines it already owned to the new 

touchscreen systems. 

● According to a January 2004 report in Wired News, blank ballots 

were recorded for 134 voters who signed in and cast ballots in 

Broward County, Florida. These votes represented about 1.3 percent 

of the more than 10,000 people who voted in the race for a state 

house representative. 

● USA Today reported that four California counties suffered from 

problems with DREs in a March 2004 election, including miscounted 

ballots, delayed polling place openings, and incorrect ballots. In San 

Diego County, about one-third of the county’s polling places did not 

open on time because of battery problems caused by a faulty power 

switch. 

Additionally, questions are being raised about the security of DREs. 

Critics suggest that their use could compromise the integrity of the 

election process and that these devices need auditing mechanisms, 

such as receipt printers that would provide a paper audit trail and 

allow voters to confirm their choices.22 Among these critics are 

computer scientists, citizens groups, and legislators. 

For example, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice 

Universities released a security analysis of software from a DRE of a 

major vendor, concluding that the code had serious security flaws 

that could permit tampering.23 Other computer scientists, while 

 22 Stanford University computer science professor David Dill was reported as saying “All of 

this just underscores the need for voting machines to have a paper trail.” Dill runs Verified 

Voting, a group that is urging election officials and legislators to mandate voter-verified 

paper ballots as audit tools. 

23 Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach, Analysis of an 

Electronic Voting System, Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute, TR2003-19 (July 2003). 
Page 19 GAO-04-766T

agreeing that the code contained security flaws, criticized the study 

for not recognizing how standard election procedures can mitigate 

these weaknesses. Following the Johns Hopkins and Rice study, 

Maryland contracted with both SAIC and RABA Technologies to 

study the same DRE equipment. The SAIC study found that the 

equipment, as implemented in Maryland, poses a security risk.24

Similarly, RABA identified vulnerabilities associated with the 

equipment.25 An earlier Caltech/MIT study26 noted that despite 

security strengths of the election process in the United States ,

27

current trends in electronic voting are weakening those strengths 

and introducing risks; according to this study, properly designed and 

implemented electronic voting systems could actually improve, 

rather than diminish, security. 

Citizen advocacy groups are also taking action. For example, 

according to an April 21, 2004, press release from the Campaign for 

Verifiable Voting in Maryland, the group filed a lawsuit against the 

Maryland State Board of Elections to force election officials to 

decertify the DRE machines used in Maryland until the 

manufacturer remedies security vulnerabilities and institutes a 

paper audit trail. 

Legislators and other officials are also responding to the issues. In at 

least 20 states, according to the Associated Press, legislation has 

been introduced requiring a paper record of every vote cast.28

Following the problems in California described above, the California 

 24 Science Applications International Corporation, Risk Assessment Report, SAIC-6099-

2003-261 (Sept. 2, 2003). 

25 RABA Technologies, LLC, Trusted Agent Report (Jan. 20, 2004). 

26 Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be (July 2001). 

(http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/2001report.html) 

27 These strengths include the openness of the election process, which permits observation 

of counting and other aspects of election procedure; the decentralization of elections and 

the division among different levels of government and groups of people; equipment that 

produces “redundant trusted recordings” of votes; and the public nature and control of the 

election process. 

28 Rachel Konrad, Legislators Wary of Electronic Voting, The Associated Press (Apr. 24, 

2004). 
Page 20 GAO-04-766T

Secretary of State banned the use of more than 14,000 touchscreen 

DREs and conditionally decertified 28,000 others.29 According to a 

New York Times article, he also recommended that the state 

Attorney General consider taking civil and criminal action against 

the manufacturer for “fraudulent actions.” The decision followed the 

recommendations of the state’s Voting Systems and Procedures 

Panel, which urged the Secretary of State to prohibit the four 

counties that experienced difficulties from using their touchscreen 

units in the November 2004 election, according to an Associated 

Press article. The panel reported that the manufacturer did not 

obtain federal approval of the model used in the four affected 

counties and installed software that had not been approved by the 

Secretary of State. It also noted that problems with the systems 

prevented an unspecified number of voters from casting ballots. In 

addition, two California state senators have drafted a bill to prohibit 

the use of any DRE voting system without a paper trail in the 2004 

general election; they planned to introduce the bill if the Secretary 

of State did not act.30

Despite Their Vital Role, Voting Systems Are Only One Aspect of the 

Larger Election Process 

Electronic voting systems represent one of many important 

components in the overall election process. This process is made up 

of several stages, with each stage consisting of key people, process, 

and technology variables. Many levels of government are involved, 

including over 10,000 jurisdictions with widely varying 

characteristics. 

In the U.S. election process, all levels of government share 

responsibility. At the federal level, the Congress has authority under 

 29 John Schwartz, “High-Tech Voting Is Banned in California,” New York Times (May 1, 

2004). 

30 Tim Reiterman, Stuart Pfeifer, and Jean O. Pasco, “State Is Urged to Ban Vote Machine,” 

Los Angeles Times (Apr. 24, 2004). 
Page 21 GAO-04-766T

the Constitution to regulate presidential and congressional elections 

and to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices 

in all elections—federal, state, and local.31 It has passed legislation 

affecting the administration of state elections that addresses voter 

registration,32 absentee voting,33 accessibility provisions for the 

elderly and handicapped,34 and prohibitions against discriminatory 

practices.35 The Congress does not have general constitutional 

authority over the administration of state and local elections. 

At the state level, the states are responsible for the administration of 

both their own elections and federal elections. States regulate the 

election process, including, for example, adoption of voluntary 

voting system guidelines, testing of voting systems, ballot access, 

registration procedures, absentee voting requirements, 

establishment of voting places, provision of election day workers, 

and counting and certification of the vote. In fact, the U.S. election 

process can be seen as an assemblage of 51 somewhat distinct 

election systems—those of the 50 states and the District of 

Columbia. 

Further, although election policy and procedures are legislated 

primarily at the state level, states typically have decentralized this 

process so that the details of administering elections are carried out 

at the city or county levels, and voting is done at the local level. As 

we reported in 2001, local election jurisdictions number more than 

10,000, and their size varies enormously—from a rural county with 

about 200 voters to a large urban county such as Los Angeles 

 31 For more information on the role of the federal government in the administration of 

elections, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Elections: The Scope of Congressional 

Authority in Election Administration, GAO- 01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2001). 

32 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, commonly known as the “Motor Voter” Act; 42 

U.S.C. 1973gg to 1973gg-10. 

33 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (1986); 42 U.S.C. 1973ff to 1973ff6. 

34 Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (1984); 42 U.S.C. 1973ee to 

1973ee-6. 

35 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 to 1973bb-1. 
Page 22 GAO-04-766T

County, where the total number of registered voters for the 2000

elections exceeded the registered voter totals in 41 states. 

The size of a voting jurisdiction significantly affects the complexity 

of planning and conducting the election, as well as the method used 

to cast and count votes. In our 2001 work, we quoted the chief 

election official in a very large voting jurisdiction: “the logistics of 

preparing and delivering voting supplies and equipment to the 

county’s 4,963 voting precincts, recruiting and training 25,000 

election day poll workers, preparing and mailing tens of thousands 

of absentee ballot packets daily and later signature verifying, 

opening and sorting 521,180 absentee ballots, and finally, counting 

2.7 million ballots is extremely challenging.” 

The specific nature of these challenges is affected by the voting 

technology that the jurisdiction uses. For example, jurisdictions 

using DRE systems may need to manage the electronic transmission 

of votes or vote counts; jurisdictions using optical scan technology 

need to manage the paper ballots that this technology reads and 

tabulates. Jurisdictions using optical scan technology may also need 

to manage electronic transmissions if votes are counted at various 

locations and totals are electronically transmitted to a central tally 

point. 

Another variable is the diversity of languages within a jurisdiction. 

In November 2000, Los Angeles County, for instance, provided 

ballots in Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, and 

Tagalog, as well as English. No matter what technology is used, 

jurisdictions may need to provide ballot translations; however, the 

logistics of printing paper materials in a range of languages, as 

would be required for optical scan technology, is different from the 

logistics of programming translations into DRE units. 

Some states do have statewide election systems so that every voting 

jurisdiction uses similar processes and equipment, but others do 

not. For instance, we reported in 2001 that in Pennsylvania, local 

election officials told us that there were 67 counties and 
Page 23 GAO-04-766T

consequently 67 different ways of handling elections.36 In some 

states, state law prescribes the use of common voting technology 

throughout the state, while in other states local election officials 

generally choose the voting technology to be used in their precincts, 

often from a list of state-certified options. 

Whatever the jurisdiction and its specific characteristics, 

administering an election is a year-round activity, involving varying 

sets of people to carry out processes at different stages. These 

stages generally consist of the following: 

● Voter registration. Among other things, local election officials 

register eligible voters and maintain voter registration lists, 

including updates to registrants’ information and deletions of the 

names of registrants who are no longer eligible to vote. 

● Absentee and early voting. This type of voting allows eligible 

persons to vote in person or by mail before election day. Election 

officials must design ballots and other systems to permit this type of 

voting, as well as educating voters on how to vote by these methods. 

● The conduct of an election. Election administration includes 

preparation before election day, such as local election officials 

arranging for polling places, recruiting and training poll workers, 

designing ballots, and preparing and testing voting equipment for 

use in casting and tabulating votes, as well as election day activities, 

such as opening and closing polling places and assisting voters to 

cast votes. 

● Vote counting. At this stage, election officials tabulate the cast 

ballots; determine whether and how to count ballots that cannot be 

read by the vote counting equipment; certify the final vote counts; 

and perform recounts, if required. 

As shown in figure 3, each stage of an election involves people, 

processes, and technology. 

 36 GAO-02-3.
Page 24 GAO-04-766T

Figure 3: Stages of Election Process 

Electronic voting systems are primarily involved in the last two 

stages, during which votes are cast and counted. However, the type 

of system that a jurisdiction uses may affect earlier stages. For 

example, in a jurisdiction that uses optical scan systems, paper 

ballots like those used on election day may be mailed in the 

absentee voting stage. On the other hand, a jurisdiction that uses 

DRE technology would have to make a different provision for 

absentee voting. 

Electronic Voting Systems’ Performance Can Be Judged on Several 

Attributes 

Although the current debate concerning electronic voting systems 

primarily relates to security, other factors affecting election 

administration are also relevant in evaluating these systems. 

Ensuring the security of elections is essential to public confidence 

and election integrity, but officials choosing a voting system must 

also consider other performance factors, such as accuracy, ease of 

use, and efficiency, as well as cost. Accuracy refers to how 

frequently the equipment completely and correctly records and 
Page 25 GAO-04-766T

counts votes; ease of use refers to how understandable and 

accessible the equipment is to a diverse group of voters and to 

election workers; and efficiency refers to how quickly a given vote 

can be cast and counted. Finally, equipment’s life-cycle cost versus 

benefits is an overriding practical consideration. 

Security 

In conducting elections, officials must be able to assure the public 

that the confidentiality of the ballot is maintained and fraud 

prevented. In providing this assurance, the people, processes, and 

technology involved in the election system all play a role: the 

security procedures and practices that jurisdictions implement, the 

security awareness and training of the election workers who 

execute them, and the security features provided by the systems. 

Election officials are responsible for establishing and managing 

privacy and security procedures to protect against threats to the 

integrity of elections.37 These security threats include potential 

modification or loss of electronic voting data; loss, theft, or 

modification of physical ballots; and unauthorized access to 

software and electronic equipment. Physical access controls are 

required for securing voting equipment, vote tabulation equipment, 

and ballots; software access controls (such as passwords and 

firewalls38) are required to limit the number of people who can 

access and operate voting devices, election management software, 

and vote tabulation software. In addition, election processes are 

designed to ensure privacy by protecting the confidentiality of the 

vote: physical screens are used around voting stations, and poll 

workers are present to prevent voters from being watched or 

coerced while voting. 

 37 We have described an effective security program as including, at a minimum, 

(1) assigning responsibility for security, (2) assessing security risks and vulnerabilities and 

implementing both manual and technology-based security measures to prevent or counter 

these risks, and (3) periodically reviewing the controls to ensure their appropriateness. For 

more information, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Information 

Security Management, GAO/AIMD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.: May 1998).

38 A firewall is a hardware or software component that protects computers or networks 

from attacks by outside network users by blocking and checking all incoming traffic. 
Page 26 GAO-04-766T

Examples of security controls that are embedded in the technology 

include the following: 

● Access controls. Election workers may have to enter user names and 

passwords to access voting systems and software, so that only 

authorized users can make modifications. On election day, voters 

may need to provide a smart card or token39 to DRE units. 

● Encryption. To protect the confidentiality of the vote, DREs use 

encryption technology to scramble the votes cast so that the votes 

are not stored in the same order in which they were cast. In 

addition, if vote totals are electronically transmitted, encryption is 

used to protect the vote count from compromise by scrambling it 

before it is transmitted over telephone wires and unscrambling it 

once it is received. 

● Physical controls. Hardware locks and seals protect against 

unauthorized access to the voting device once it has been prepared 

for the election (e.g., once the vote counter is reset, the unit is 

tested, and ballots are prepared). 

● Audit trails. Audit trails provide documentary evidence to recreate 

election day activity, such as the number of ballots cast (by each 

ballot configuration or type) and candidate vote totals for each 

contest. Audit trails are used for verification purposes, particularly 

in the event that a recount is demanded. With optical scan systems, 

the paper ballots provide an audit trail. Since not all DREs provide a 

paper record of the votes, election officials may rely on the 

information that is collected by the DRE’s electronic memory. Part 

of the debate over the assurance of integrity that DREs provide 

revolves around the reliability of this information. 

● Redundant storage. Redundant storage media in DREs provide 

backup storage of votes cast or vote counts to facilitate recovery of 

voter data in the event of power or system failure. 

The particular features offered by DRE and optical scan equipment 

differ by vendor make and model as well as the nature of the 

technology. DREs generally offer most of the features, but there is 

 39 In security systems, a token is small device that displays a constantly changing 

identification code; smart cards may perform a similar function. 
Page 27 GAO-04-766T

debate about the adequacy of the access controls and the audit trails 

that this technology provides. If DREs use tokens or smart cards to 

authenticate voters, these tokens must also be physically protected 

and may require software security protection. For optical scan 

systems, redundant storage media may not be required, but software 

and physical access controls may be associated with tabulation 

equipment and software, and if vote tallies are transmitted 

electronically, encryption may also be used. In addition, since these 

systems use paper ballots, the audit trail is clearer, but physical 

access to ballots after they are cast must be controlled. The physical 

and process controls used to protect paper ballots include ballot 

boxes as well as the procedures implemented to protect the boxes if 

they need to be transported, to tabulate ballots, and to store counted 

ballots for later auditing and possible recounts. 

Accuracy 

Ensuring that votes are accurately recorded and tallied is an 

essential attribute of any voting equipment. Without such assurance, 

both voter confidence in the election and the integrity and 

legitimacy of the outcome of the election are at risk. The importance 

of an accurate vote count increases with the closeness of the 

election. Both optical scan and DRE systems are claimed to be 

highly accurate. In 2001, our vendor survey showed virtually no 

differences in vendor representations of the accuracy of DRE and 

optical scan voting equipment, measured in terms of how accurately 

the equipment counted recorded votes.40 Vendors of optical scan 

equipment reported accuracy rates of between 99 and 100 percent, 

with vendors of DREs reporting 100 percent accuracy. 

As we reported in 2001, although 96 percent of local election 

jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their voting 

equipment during the 2000 election, according to our mail survey, 

only about 48 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on 

 40 GAO-02-3. 
Page 28 GAO-04-766T

the accuracy of their voting equipment for the election.41 Further, it 

was unclear whether jurisdictions actually had meaningful 

performance data. Of those local election jurisdictions that we 

visited that stated that their voting equipment was 100 percent 

accurate, none was able to provide actual data to substantiate these 

statements. Similarly, according to our mail survey, only about 51 

percent of jurisdictions collected data on undervotes, and about 47 

percent collected data on overvotes for the November 2000 

election.42 

Although voting equipment may be designed to count votes as 

recorded with 100 percent accuracy, how frequently the equipment 

counts votes as intended by voters is a function not only of 

equipment design, but also of the interaction of people and 

processes. These people and process factors include whether, for 

example, 

● technicians have followed proper procedures in testing and 

maintaining the system, 

● voters followed proper procedures when using the system, 

● election officials have provided voters with understandable 

procedures to follow, and 

● poll workers properly instructed and guided voters. 

As indicated earlier, various kinds of errors can lead to voter 

intentions not being captured when ballots are counted. Avoiding or 

compensating for these errors may involve solutions based on 

technology, processes, or both. For example, DREs are designed to 

prevent overvoting; however, overvoting can also be prevented by a 

procedure to check optical scan ballots for overvotes before the 

voter leaves the polls, which can be accomplished by a precinctbased tabulator or by other means. 

 41 GAO-02-3. Confidence intervals were calculated at the 95 percent confidence level. 

Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from GAO’s mail survey have a confidence interval of 

plus or minus 4 percentage points or less; all estimates from GAO’s telephone survey have 

a confidence interval of plus or minus 11 percentage points or less. 

42 DREs do not allow overvotes, so the figure for overvotes does not include jurisdictions 

that used DREs. 
Page 29 GAO-04-766T

Ease of Use 

Like accuracy, ease of use (or user friendliness) largely depends on 

how voters interact with the voting system, physically and 

intellectually. This interaction, commonly referred to as the 

human/machine interface, is a function of the system design, the 

processes established for its use, and user education and training. 

Among other things, how well jurisdictions design ballots and 

educate voters on the use of voting equipment affects how easy 

voters find the system to use. In the 2000 elections, for example, 

ballots for some optical scan systems were printed on both sides, so 

that some voters failed to vote one of the sides. This risk could be 

mitigated by clear ballot design and by explicit instructions, whether 

provided by poll workers or voter education materials. Thus, ease of 

use affects accuracy (i.e., whether the voter’s intent is captured), 

and it can also affect the efficiency of the voting process (confused 

voters take longer to vote). 

Accessibility to diverse types of voters, including those with 

disabilities, is a further aspect of ease of use. As described earlier, 

DREs offer more options for voters with disabilities, as they can be 

equipped with a number of aids to voters with disabilities. However, 

these options increase the expense of the units, and not all 

jurisdictions are likely to opt for them. Instead of technological 

solutions, jurisdictions may establish special processes for voters 

with disabilities, such as allowing them to be assisted to cast their 

votes; this workaround can, however, affect the confidentiality of 

the vote. 

Efficiency 

Efficiency—the speed of casting and tallying votes—is an important 

consideration for jurisdictions not only because it influences voter 

waiting time and thus potentially voter turnout, but also because it 

affects the number of voting systems that a jurisdiction needs to 

acquire and maintain, and thus the cost. 

Efficiency can be measured in terms of the number of people that 

the equipment can accommodate within a given time, how quickly 

the equipment can count votes, and the length of time that voters 

need to wait. With DREs, the vote casting and counting functions 
Page 30 GAO-04-766T

are virtually inseparable, because the ballot is embedded in the 

voting equipment. Accordingly, for DREs efficiency is generally 

measured in terms of the number of voters that each machine 

accommodates on election day. In 2001, vendors reported that the 

number of voters accommodated per DRE ranges from 200 to 1,000 

voters per system per election day. 

With optical scan systems, in contrast, vote casting and counting are 

separate activities, since the ballot is a separate medium—a sheet of 

paper or a computer card—which once completed is put into the 

vote tabulator. As a result, the efficiency of optical scan equipment 

is generally measured in terms of the speed of count (i.e., how 

quickly the equipment counts the votes on completed ballots). 

Complicating this measurement is the fact that efficiency differs 

depending on whether central-count or precinct-based tabulators 

are used. Central-count equipment generally counts more ballots per 

hour because it is used to count the ballots for an entire jurisdiction, 

rather than an individual polling site. For central-count optical scan 

equipment, 10 vendors reported speed of count ranges from 9,000 to 

24,000 ballots per hour. For precinct-count optical scan equipment, 

vendors generally did not provide specific speed of count data, but 

they stated that one machine is generally used per polling site. 

Generalizations about the effect of technology on wait times are 

difficult. In 2001, our mail survey found that 84 percent of 

jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with the amount of voter 

wait time at the polling place during the November 2000 election, 

but that 13 percent of jurisdictions considered long lines at the 

polling places to be a major problem.43 However, we estimated that 

only 10 percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected information on 

the average amount of time that it took voters to vote. We were told 

by some jurisdictions that the length of time voters must wait is 

affected by ballots that include many races and issues. Some 

jurisdictions reported that their ballots were so long that it took 

voters a long time in the voting booth to read them and vote. As a 

result, lines backed up, and some voters had to wait for over an hour 

 43 GAO-02-3. 
Page 31 GAO-04-766T

to cast their votes. Officials in one jurisdiction said that their voters 

experienced long wait times in part because redistricting caused 

confusion among voters, who often turned up at the wrong polling 

places. As these examples show, the voting system used is not 

always a major factor in voter wait times. However, processes that 

do depend on the system may affect the time that a voter must 

spend voting. For example, in precincts that use precinct-level 

counting technology for optical scan ballots, voters may place their 

ballots in the automatic feed slot of the tabulator. This process can 

add to voting time if the tabulator is designed to reject ballots that 

are undervoted, overvoted, or damaged, and the voter is given the 

opportunity to correct the ballot.

Cost 

Generally, buying DRE units is more expensive than buying optical 

scan systems. For a broad picture, consider the comparison that we 

made in 2001 of the costs of purchasing new voting equipment for 

local election jurisdictions based on three types of equipment: 

central-count optical scan equipment, precinct-count optical scan 

equipment, and touchscreen DRE units.44 Based on equipment cost 

information available in August 2001, we estimated that purchasing 

optical scan equipment that counted ballots at a central location 

would cost about $191 million.45 Purchasing an optical scan counter 

for each precinct that could notify voters of errors on their ballots 

would cost about $1.3 billion. Purchasing touchscreen DRE units for 

each precinct, including at least one unit per precinct that could 

accommodate blind, deaf, and paraplegic voters, would cost about 

$3 billion. 

For a given jurisdiction, the particular cost involved will depend on 

the requirements of the jurisdiction, as well as the particular 

equipment chosen. Voting equipment costs vary among types of 

voting equipment and among different manufacturers and models of 

the same type of equipment. For example, in 2001, DRE touchscreen 

 44 GAO-02-3.

45 Cost estimates include capital costs only. 
Page 32 GAO-04-766T

unit costs ranged from $575 to $4,500. Similarly, unit costs for 

precinct-count optical scan equipment ranged from $4,500 to $7,500. 

Among other things, these differences can be attributed to 

differences in what is included in the unit cost as well as differences 

in the characteristics of the equipment. 

In addition to the equipment unit cost, an additional cost for 

jurisdictions is the software that operates the equipment, prepares 

the ballots, and tallies the votes (and in some cases, prepares the 

election results reports). Our vendor survey showed that although 

some vendors included the software cost in the unit cost of the 

voting equipment, most priced the software separately. Software 

costs for DRE and optical scan equipment could run as high as 

$300,000 per jurisdiction. The higher costs were generally for the 

more sophisticated software associated with election management 

systems. Because the software generally supported numerous 

equipment units, the software unit cost varied depending on the 

number of units purchased or the size of the jurisdiction. 

Other factors affecting the acquisition cost of voting equipment are 

the number and types of peripherals required. In general, DREs 

require more peripherals than do optical scan systems, which adds 

to their expense. For example, some DREs require smart cards, 

smart card readers, memory cartridges and cartridge readers, 

administrative workstations, and plug-in devices (for increasing 

accessibility for voters with disabilities). Touchscreen DREs may 

also offer options that affect the cost of the equipment, such as 

color versus black and white screens. In addition, most DREs and all 

optical scan units require voting booths, and most DREs and some 

precinct-based optical scan tabulators offer options for modems. 

Precinct-based optical scan tabulators also require ballot boxes to 

capture the ballots after they are scanned. 

Once jurisdictions acquire the voting equipment, they must also 

incur the cost to operate and maintain it, which can vary 

considerably. For example, in 2001, jurisdictions that used DREs 

reported a range of costs from about $2,000 to $27,000. Similarly, 

most jurisdictions that used optical scan equipment reported that 

operations and maintenance costs ranged from about $1,300 to 

$90,000. The higher ends of these cost ranges generally related to 

the larger jurisdictions. In fact, one large jurisdiction that used 
Page 33 GAO-04-766T

optical scan equipment reported that its operating costs were 

$545,000. In addition, the jurisdictions reported that these costs 

generally included software licensing and upgrades, maintenance 

contracts with vendors, equipment replacement parts, and supply 

costs. 

For decisions on whether to invest in new voting equipment, both 

initial capital costs (i.e., cost to acquire the equipment) and longterm support costs (i.e., operation and maintenance costs) are 

relevant. Moreover, these collective costs (i.e., life-cycle costs) need 

to be viewed in the context of the benefits the equipment will 

provide over its useful life. It is advisable to link these benefits 

directly to the performance characteristics of the equipment and the 

needs of the jurisdiction. 

Electronic Voting System Performance Depends on System Design 

and Implementation 

The performance of any information technology system, including 

electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of 

factors, not the least of which is the quality of the system’s design 

and the effectiveness with which the system is implemented in an 

operational setting. System design and implementation, in turn, are 

a function of such things as how well the system’s requirements are 

defined, how well the system is tested, and how well the people that 

operate and use the system understand and follow the procedures 

that govern their interaction with it. Our work in 2001 raised 

concerns about the FEC’s voting system standards, and showed that 

practices relative to testing and implementation of voting systems 

varied across states and local jurisdictions. 

Voting Systems Should Be Designed, Built, and Tested against Well-Defined Standards 

Like that of any information technology product, the design of a 

voting system starts with the explicit definition of what the system 

is to do and how well it is to do it. These requirements are then 

translated into design specifications that are used to develop the 

system. Organizations such as the Department of Defense and the 
Page 34 GAO-04-766T

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers have developed 

guidelines for various types of systems requirements and for the 

processes that are important to managing the development of any 

system throughout its life cycle. These guidelines address types of 

product requirements (e.g., functional and performance), as well as 

documentation and process requirements governing the production 

of the system.

In the case of voting systems, the FEC had assumed responsibility 

for issuing standards that embodied these requirements, a 

responsibility that HAVA has since assigned to the EAC. The FEC 

standards are nevertheless still the operative standards until the 

EAC updates them. These FEC-issued standards apply to system 

hardware, software, firmware, and documentation,46 and they span 

prevoting, 47 voting,48 and postvoting activities.49 They also address, 

for example, requirements relating to system security; system 

accuracy and integrity; system auditability; system storage and 

maintenance; and data retention and transportation. In addition to 

these standards, some states and local jurisdictions have specified 

their own voting system requirements. 

In 2001, we cited a number of problems with the FEC-issued voting 

system standards, including missing elements of the standards. 

Accordingly, we made recommendations to improve the standards. 

Subsequently, the FEC approved the revised voting system 

standards on April 30, 2002. According to EAC commissioners with 

 46 Systems are all those intended for preparing the voting system for use in an election; 

producing the appropriate ballot formats; testing that the voting system and ballot 

materials have been properly prepared and are ready for use; recording and counting votes; 

consolidating and reporting results; displaying results on site or remotely; and maintaining 

and producing audit trail information. 

47 Prevoting operations include ballot preparation; the preparation of election-specific 

software or firmware; the production of ballots or ballot pages; the installation of ballots 

and ballot counting software or firmware; and system and equipment tests. 

48 Voting operations include all operations conducted at the polling place by voters and 

officials, including the generation of status messages. 

49 Postvoting operations include closing the polling place; obtaining reports by voting 

machine, polling place, and precinct (for central-count systems); obtaining consolidated 

reports; and obtaining reports of audit trails. 
Page 35 GAO-04-766T

whom we spoke, the commission has inherited the FEC standards, 

but it plans to work with NIST to revise and strengthen them. 

To ensure that systems are designed and built in conformance with 

applicable standards, our work in 2001 found that three levels of 

tests are generally performed: qualification tests, certification tests, 

and acceptance tests. For voting systems, the FEC-issued standards 

called for qualification testing to be performed by independent 

testing authorities. According to the standards, this testing is to 

ensure that voting systems comply with both the FEC standards and 

the systems’ own design specifications. State standards define 

certification tests, which the states generally perform to determine 

how well the systems conform to individual state laws, 

requirements, and practice.50 Finally, state and local standards define 

acceptance testing, performed by the local jurisdictions procuring 

the voting systems. This testing is to determine whether the 

equipment, as delivered and installed, satisfies all the jurisdiction’s 

functional and performance requirements. Beyond these levels of 

testing, jurisdictions also perform routine maintenance and 

diagnostic activities to further ensure proper system performance 

on election day. 

Our 2001 work found that the majority of states (38) had adopted 

the FEC standards then in place,51 and thus these states required that 

the voting systems used in their jurisdictions passed qualification 

testing.52 In addition, we reported that qualified voting equipment 

had been used in about 49 percent (±7 percentage points) of 

jurisdictions nationwide that used DREs and about 46 percent (±7 

 50 States and local jurisdictions may use the standards to baseline the minimum functional 

and performance requirements but may also impose other requirements to meet their 

needs (such as the type and number of languages that equipment should support, how a 

ballot needs to appear on a DRE screen, or options that allow persons with various types of 

disabilities to vote). 

51 As of April 2004, the District of Columbia and 42 out of 50 states have regulations that 

require voting systems to meet federal standards, according to the Election Reform 

Information Project of the University of Richmond. 

52 However, because the standards were not published until 1990 and the qualification 

testing program was not established until 1994, we judged in 2001 that many jurisdictions 

were probably using voting equipment that did not undergo qualification testing. 
Page 36 GAO-04-766T

percentage points) of jurisdictions nationwide that used optical scan 

technology. However, about 46 percent (±5 percentage points) 

reported that they did not know whether their equipment had been 

qualified. 

As we reported in 2001, 45 states and the District of Columbia told 

us that they had certification testing programs, and we estimate 

from our mail survey that about 90 percent of jurisdictions used 

state-certified voting equipment in the 2000 national election.53 In 

addition, we reported that most of the jurisdictions that had recently 

bought new voting equipment had conducted some form of 

acceptance testing. However, the processes and steps performed 

and the people who performed them varied. For example, in one 

jurisdiction that purchased DREs, election officials stated that 

testing consisted of a visual inspection, power-up, opening of polls, 

activation and verification of ballots, and closing of polls. In 

contrast, officials in another jurisdiction stated that they relied 

entirely on the vendor to test their DREs. In jurisdictions that used 

optical scan equipment, acceptance testing generally consisted of 

running decks of test cards. For example, officials from one 

jurisdiction stated that they tested each unit with the assistance of 

the vendor using a vendor-supplied test deck. 

Our 2001 work found that the processes and people involved in 

routine system maintenance, diagnostic, and pre-election day 

checkout activities varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For 

example, about 90 percent of jurisdictions nationwide using DRE 

and optical scan technology had performed routine or 

manufacturer-suggested maintenance and checkout before the 2000 

national election. However, our visits to 27 local election 

jurisdictions revealed variations in the frequency with which 

jurisdictions performed such routine maintenance. For example, 

some performed maintenance right before an election, while others 

performed maintenance regularly throughout the year. For example, 

officials in one jurisdiction that used DREs stated that they tested 

the batteries monthly. 

 53 GAO-02-3. 
Page 37 GAO-04-766T

Voting Systems Should Be Properly Implemented 

Proper implementation of voting systems is a matter of people 

knowing how to carry out appropriately designed processes to 

ensure that the technology performs as intended in an operational 

setting. According to the EAC commissioners, one of their areas of 

focus will be election administration processes and the people who 

carry out these processes. Examples include ballot preparation, 

voter education, recruiting and training poll workers, setting up the 

polls, running the election, and counting the votes. 

Ballot preparation. Whether ballots are electronic or paper, they 

need to be designed in a way that promotes voter understanding 

when they are actually used. Designing both optical scan and DRE 

ballots requires consideration of the different types of human 

interaction entailed and the application of some human factors 

expertise. For DREs, programming skills need to be applied to 

create the ballot and enter the ballot information onto an electronic 

storage medium, which is then uploaded to the unit. For optical scan 

systems, paper ballots need to be designed and printed in specified 

numbers for distribution to polling places; they may also be used for 

absentee balloting, usually in combination with printed mailing 

envelopes. Electronic “ballots” in DRE units do not require 

distribution separate from the distribution of the voting equipment 

itself; however, the use of DREs means that a separate technique is 

necessary for absentee ballots—generally paper ballots. Thus, the 

use of these units generally requires a mixed election system. 

Voter education. Implementation of any voting method requires that 

voters understand how to vote—that is, what conventions are 

followed. For optical scan systems, voters need to understand how 

to mark the ballots, they need to know what kinds of marker (type 

of pen or pencil) can be used, they need to be informed if a ballot 

must be marked on both sides, and so on. For DRE systems, voters 

need to understand how to select candidates or issues and 

understand that their votes are not cast until the cast vote button is 

pressed; for touchscreens, they need to know how to navigate the 

various screens presented to them. 

Voters also need to understand the procedure for write-in votes. In 

2001, one jurisdiction had an almost 5 percent overvote rate because 
Page 38 GAO-04-766T

voters did not understand the purpose of the ballot section 

permitting write-in votes. Voters selected a candidate on the ballot 

and then wrote the candidate’s name in the write-in section of the 

ballot, thus overvoting and spoiling the ballot. In addition to voter 

education, how the system is programmed to operate can also 

address this issue. For example, precinct-count optical scan 

equipment can be programmed to return a voter’s ballot if the ballot 

is overvoted or undervoted and allow the voter to make changes. 

Poll worker recruitment and training. Poll workers need 

implementation training. They need to be trained not only in how to 

assist voters to use the voting system, but also in how to use the 

technology for the tasks poll workers need to perform. These tasks 

can vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. When more 

sophisticated voting systems are used at polling sites, jurisdictions 

may find it challenging to find poll workers with the skills to 

implement and use newer technologies. In 2001, we quoted one 

election official who said that “it is increasingly difficult to find folks 

to work for $6 an hour. We are relying on older retired persons—

many who can’t/won’t keep up with changes in the technology or 

laws. Many of our workers are 70+.” 

Setting up the polls. Proper setup of polling places raises a number 

of implementation issues related to the people, processes, and 

technology involved. For DREs, the need for appropriate power 

outlets and possibly network connections limits the sites that can be 

used as polling places. In addition, setting up, initializing, and 

sometimes networking DRE units are technically challenging tasks. 

Technicians and vendor representatives may be needed to perform 

these tasks or to assist poll workers with them. In addition, with 

DREs, computer security issues come into play that are different 

from those associated with the paper and pencil tools that voters 

use in optical scan systems. Besides the units themselves, many 

DRE systems use cards or tokens that must be physically secured. 

With optical scan equipment, the ballots must be physically secured. 

Further, if precinct-based tabulation is used with an optical scan 

system, the tabulation equipment must be protected from 

tampering. 

Running the election. Many implementation issues associated with 

running the election are associated with the interaction of voters 
Page 39 GAO-04-766T

with the technology. Although both DREs and optical scan systems 

are based on technologies that most voters will have encountered 

before, general familiarity is not enough to avoid voter errors. With 

optical scan, voter errors are generally related to improperly marked 

ballots: the wrong marking device, stray marks, too many marks 

(overvotes), and so on. As described already, DRE equipment is 

designed to minimize voter error (by preventing overvotes, for 

example), but problems can also occur with this voting method. For 

example, many DREs require the voter to push a cast vote button to 

record the vote. However, some voters forget to push this button 

and leave the polling place without doing so. Similarly, after 

pressing the final cast vote button, voters cannot alter their votes. In 

some cases, this button may be pressed by mistake—for example, a 

small child being held by a parent may knock or kick the final vote 

button before the parent has completed the ballot. 

The technology is not the only factor determining the outcome in 

these situations, as different jurisdictions have different rules and 

processes concerning such problems. In 2001, we reported that 

when voters forgot to press the cast vote button, one jurisdiction 

required that an election official reach under the voting booth 

curtain and push the cast vote button without looking at the ballot. 

However, another jurisdiction required that an election official 

invalidate the ballot and reset the machine for a new voter. 

Counting the votes. Finally, implementation of the processes for 

counting votes is affected both by the technology used and by local 

requirements. With DREs, votes are collected within each unit. 

Some contain removable storage media that can be taken from the 

voting unit and transported to a central location to be tallied. Others 

can be configured to electronically transmit the vote totals from the 

polling place to a central tally location. As described earlier, optical 

scan systems also vary in the way votes are counted, depending on 

whether precinct-based or centralized tabulation equipment is used. 

For optical scan systems, officials follow state and local regulations 

and processes to determine whether and how to count ballots that 

cannot be read by the tabulation equipment. Counting such ballots 

may involve decisions on how to judge voter intent, which are also 

generally governed by state and local regulations and processes. 
Page 40 GAO-04-766T

In addition, depending on the type of voting technology used, ways 

to perform recounts may differ. For optical scan devices, recounts 

can be both automatic and manual; as in the original vote counting, 

officials make decisions on counting ballots that cannot be read by 

the tabulation equipment and on voter intent. With DREs there is no 

separate paper ballot or record of the voter’s intention, and 

therefore election officials rely on the information recorded in the 

machine’s memory: that is, permanent (read only) electronic images 

of each of the “marked” ballots. The assurance that these images are 

an accurate record of the vote depends on several things, including 

the proper implementation of the processes involved in designing, 

maintaining, setting up, and using the technology. 

Jurisdictions Face Immediate and Longer Term Challenges in 

Leveraging Voting Technologies 

In 2001, we identified four key challenges confronting local 

jurisdictions in effectively using and replacing voting technologies. 

These challenges are not dissimilar to those faced by any 

organization seeking to leverage modern technology to support 

mission operations. The first two challenges are particularly 

relevant in the near term, as jurisdictions look to position 

themselves for this year’s national elections. The latter two are more 

relevant to jurisdictions’ strategic acquisition and use of modern 

voting systems. 

Ensuring that Necessary Security, Testing, and Maintenance Activities Are Performed 

Maximizing the performance of the voting systems that jurisdictions 

have and plan to use in November 2004 means taking proactive 

steps between now and then to best ensure that systems perform as 

intended. These steps include activities aimed at securing, testing, 

and maintaining these systems. We reported in 2001 that although 

the vast majority of jurisdictions performed security, testing, and 

maintenance activities in one form or another, the extent and nature 

of these activities varied among jurisdictions and depended on the 

availability of resources (financial and human capital) committed to 
Page 41 GAO-04-766T

them. The challenge facing all voting jurisdictions will be to ensure 

that these activities are fully and properly performed.

Managing the People, Processes, and Technology as Components of the Overall Process 

As previously discussed in this testimony, jurisdictions need to 

manage the triad of people, processes, and technology as 

interrelated and interdependent parts of the total voting process. 

Given the amount of time that remains between now and the 

November 2004 elections, jurisdictions’ voting system performance 

is more likely to be influenced by improvements in poll worker 

system operation training, voter education about system use, and 

vote casting procedures than by changes to the systems 

themselves.54 The challenge for voting jurisdictions is thus to ensure 

that these people and process issues are dealt with effectively. 

Having Reliable System Performance Measures and Objective Data 

Reliable measures and objective data are needed for jurisdictions to 

know whether the technology being used is meeting the needs of the 

user communities (both the voters and the officials who administer 

the elections). In 2001, we reported that the vast majority of 

jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their respective 

technologies in the November 2000 elections. However, this 

satisfaction was mostly based not on objective data measuring 

performance, but rather on the subjective impressions of election 

officials. Although these impressions should not be discounted, 

informed decisionmaking on voting technology investment requires 

more objective data. The challenge for jurisdictions is to define 

measures and begin collecting data so that they can definitely know 

how their systems are performing.

Ensuring That Technology Cost Is Commensurate with Benefits 

Jurisdictions must be able to ensure that the technology will provide 

benefits over its useful life that are commensurate with life-cycle 

costs (acquisition as well as operations and maintenance) and that 

 54 Some system changes may be feasible, such as connecting DREs to printers. 
Page 42 GAO-04-766T

these collective costs are affordable and sustainable. In 2001, we 

reported that the technology type and configuration that 

jurisdictions employed varied depending on each jurisdiction’s 

unique circumstances, such as size and resource constraints, and 

that reliable data on life-cycle costs and benefits were not available. 

The challenge for jurisdictions is to view and treat voting systems as 

capital investments and to manage them as such, including basing 

decisions on technology investments on reliable analyses of 

quantitative and qualitative return on investment. 

In closing, I would like to say again that electronic voting systems 

are an undeniably critical link in the overall election chain. While 

this link alone cannot make an election, it can break one. The 

concerns being surfaced by electronic voting system experts and 

others highlight the potential for problems in the upcoming 2004 

national elections if the challenges that we cited in 2001 and 

reiterate in this testimony are not effectively addressed. Although 

the EAC only recently began operations and is not yet at full 

strength, it has no choice but to hit the ground running to ensure 

that jurisdictions and voters are educated and well-informed about 

the proper implementation and use of electronic voting systems, and 

to ensure that jurisdictions take the appropriate steps—related to 

people, process, and technology—that are needed regarding 

security, testing, and maintenance. More strategically, the EAC 

needs to consider strengthening the voluntary voting system 

guidelines and the testing associated with enforcing these 

guidelines. Critical to the commission’s ability to do this will be the 

adequacy of resources at its disposal and the degree of cooperation 

it receives from entities at all levels of government. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to 

answer any questions that you or other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have at this time. 
Page 43 GAO-04-766T

Contact and Acknowledgements 

For further information, please contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 

512-6256 or by e-mail at hiter@gao.gov. Other key contributors to 

this testimony were Barbara S. Collier, Richard B. Hung, John M. 

Ortiz, Jr., Maria J. Santos, and Linda R. Watson. 

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