IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17

- 1329 Filed December 6, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF M. J.H. T., M. G. T. , and M. D. T., Minor Children, C.T., Mother, Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Craig M.
Dreismeier , District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Anne M. Rohling of Rohling Law, P.L.L.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General , and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Roberta Jean Penning Megal of Public Defender’s Office, Council Bluffs, guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ

.2

DOYLE, Judge. A mother appeals the juvenile court decision terminating her paren tal rights. We hold the mother’ s parental rights were properly terminated under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(h) (2017) and that termination of the mother ’ s par ental rights is in the children’ s best interest s . We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings C.T. is the mother of M.J.H.T. (“the oldest child”) , born i n 2014, and M.G.T.
and M.D.T. (“the twins”), born in May 201 6

. At the time of the twins’ birth, the mother and the oldest child were living with the mother’s mother and step

- father. The twins tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana at their birth , and the mother tested positive for methamphetamin es and marijuana

. Shortly after the twins’ birth, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) received a child protective services referral alleging the mother used methamphetamine while pregnant with the twins. DHS representatives met with the mother and her mother. At the time, a n application for ex

- parte order of temporary removal was filed with the juvenile court , the oldest child was at home with a safety plan in place wherein the mother’s contact wi th the child was supervised by her maternal grandmother. The twins remained in intensive care at the hospital. A form ex

- parte order for the temporary removal of all three children was entered ordering the remov al of the children from their hom e and plac ing them in the temporary care, custody , and control of the DHS. A fter the order was entered, law enforcement removed the oldest child from her maternal grandparents’ home and transported her to a shelter , where she spent less than twenty

- four hours . She was then placed with a maternal aunt. M.D.T. was discharged from the hospital to a foster home. M.G.T.3

remained hospital ized to address feeding issues. After a temporary removal hearing, the juvenile court ordered “[t]hat the care, custody, and c ontrol of [ the oldest child ] remain with maternal aunt, subject to the supervision of the [ DHS ]

. ” The care, custody, and control of the twins was ordered to “ remain with the [ DHS ] for continued placement in hospital/shelter/foster care.”
T he three c hildren were later adjudicated child ren in need of assistance (CINA). It was ordered that th e care, custody, and control of oldest child be placed with her maternal grandparents. It was ordered that the care, custody, and control of the twins remain with the DHS for continued placement in f oster care. T his was the status quo at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing. Following the removal of her child ren, the mother attended a drug

- treatment
program. After an unsuccessful discharge, the mother twice attempted and twice failed to complete inpatient substance

- abuse treatment. When not residing in a treatment facility, the mother lived place to place with no permanent housing. A termination of parental rights hearing was held on July 11, 2017. Although the mother appeared in person at the hearing, she did not testify. Subsequent to the hearing , the juven ile court terminated the mother’ s parental rights u nder 232.116(1)(e), (h) and ( l ). 1
The mother no w appeals that ruling. II. Standard of Review

1 The parental rights of the father to M.G.T. and M.D.T. were terminated. The parental rights of the alleged father to M.J.H.T. were also terminated. Neither is a party to this appeal.4

We review termination

- of

- parental

- rights proceedings de novo. In re A.M. , 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We examine both the facts and law, and we adjudicate anew those issues properly preserved and prese nted. See In re L.G. , 532 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We will uphold an order terminating parental rights only if there is clear and convincing evidence establishing the statutory grounds for termination of the parent’s rights. See In re C.B. , 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence. Id. “ We are not bound by the juvenile court ’ s findings of fact, bu t we do give them weight, especially in assessin g the credibility of witnesses.” In re M.W. , 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016) (quoting In re D.W. , 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010)).
II. Discussion Termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a now familiar three

- step analysis. See In re P.L. , 778 N.W.2d 33, 40

– 41 (Iowa 2010). First, the court must determine if a ground authorizing the termination of parental rights under sect ion 232.116(1) has been established. See id. at 40. Second, if a ground for termination is established, the court must apply the framework set forth in section 232.116(2) to decide if proceeding with termination is in the best interests of the child. S e e id. Third, if the statutory best

- interests framework supports termination of parental rights, the court must consider if any statutory exceptions set forth in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination. See id. at 41. The exceptions set f orth in subsection three are permissive and not mandatory. See A.M. , 843 N.W.2d at 113.5 Before the court may affirm the terminat ion of parental rights, we must find clear and convincing evidence supporting one of the grounds for termination under 232.116(1). See In re A.B. , 81 5 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012) (“ When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory gr ound, we may affirm the juvenile court ’ s order on any ground w e find supported by the record.” ). We consider section 232.116(1)(h). Section 232.116(1)(h) provides a parent ’ s right may be terminated if: The court finds that all of the following have occurr ed: (1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from th e physical custody of the child’ s parents for at least six m onths of t he last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be retur ned to the custody of the child’ s parents as provided in se ction 232.102 at the present time. On appeal, t he mother makes a general statement that the State did not prove the elements for this ground. There can be no dispute that elements (1) and (2) were met since all three children were under the age of three at the time of the hearing, and all three had been adjudicated CINA

. T he mother states that

“ [t]echnically, the oldest child was never removed from her home , ” and when a relapse in substance abuse took place, she returned to t he help she needed

— thereby cl aiming evidence of “such a positive transfiguration for [the mother

means ] she deserves the right to have her children with h er and continue her sober life.” So, w e presume i t is the third (as to the oldest child only ) and fourth elements of paragraph (h) the mother challenges on appeal.6 Following the birth of the twins , the court ordered a temporary removal of all three children. At the t ime of removal, the oldest child lived with her mother and maternal grandparents. Contrary to the mother’ s assertions, the oldest child was indeed removed from the mother’s physical custody and the maternal grandparents’ home . After the court granted an ex - parte temporary r emoval order placing custody of the oldest child with the DHS , law enforcement removed the child from her maternal grandparent’s home and transported her to a shelter. After spending less than twenty

- four hours in the shelter, she was placed with a maternal aunt subject to the supervision of the DHS. 2 S he was then later placed in the custody of her maternal grandparents and was never returned to the custody of her mother.
I n June 2016, the mother entered a residential drug

- treatment program and the juvenile court ordered that the care, custody , and control of the twins be placed
with the mother

. B ut the order also provided that if she exited the program before successfully completing the program, the twins’ care, custody , and control would be immediately removed from her custody and placed in the care, custody, a nd control of the DHS for shelter care/foster care placement

. By July 5, the mother failed to comply with the rules of the facility and was prematurely discharged from

2 We are unable to find an order in the file placing the child’s care, custody, and control with the maternal aunt, but a later temporary order ordered “[t]hat the care, custody, and control of [the oldest child] remain with maternal aunt, subject to the supervision of the [DHS].” Although custody of the child was placed with the aunt, the child stayed primarily with her maternal grandparents. In any event, the record is clear that t he oldest child was in fact removed from the mother’s physical care and was removed from the grandparents’ home.7

the drug treatment program. 3 The physical custody of the twins was immediately transfe rred back to the DHS , and they were placed into foster care

. We agree with the juvenile court that the S tate proved by clear and convincing evidence the children had been removed from the physical custody of the mother

. Furthermore, we find the State es tablished that at the time of the termination hearing , the children had been out of the mother’s custody for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. We conclude the requirements of section 232.116(1) (h) (3) were met

. T he record also demonstrates clear and convincing evidence the children could not b e safely returned to the mother’ s care at the time of the termination hearing

. See Iowa Code § 232.116( 1)(h)(4). Since the removal of her children in 2016, the mother has struggled to maintain stable housing

— oft en living from place to place

. In addition to the lack of stability, the mother has failed to complete drug

treatment programs; she was discharged unsuccessfully on three separate occasions. The juvenile court noted at the time of termination: [The mother] was unsuccessfully discharged from treatment in July 2016. She did not reenter treatment until April 2017. Upon being discharged in June 2017, she relapsed one week later on methamphetamine use. She went back to inpatient treatment only to be unsuccessfully discharged two weeks later. [The mother] has unresolved issues with substance abuse. She has unresolved issues with her mental health. T his [c]ourt has seen very little evidence to support the idea that the children can be returned to the care of their mother in the near future

.

3 The treatment facility alleged the mother stole from staff members.8 Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree that clear and convincing evidence supports t ermination of the mother’ s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h).
T he mother ’ s petition on appeal implicates that termination of her parenta l rights is not in the children’ s best interest s

. Even though we determined statutory grounds for termination existed under section 232.116(1)(h), we must still ensure terminat ion is in the children’ s best interest s

. See In re A.B. , 815 N.W.2d at 776

. In considering the children’ s best interest s , we give primary consideration “ to the chi ld ’ s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long

- term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); P.L. , 778 N.W.2d at 40. The twins were born prematurel y — testing positive for amphetamine and marijuana. Throughout t he life of these proceedings, the mother was offered a plethora of services. Nevertheless, the mother ’s participation in services was inconsistent , and she was slow to progress. At the time o f the termination hearing she had not successfully completed substance

- abuse treatment and was not then participating in substance

- abuse treatment. T he mother was a no

- show for thirty of the past thirty

- four drug tests; at the time of termination, the mot her’s most recent drug test was positive for methamphetamines. She had not yet addressed her mental

- health issues. She had no stable employment or permanent living arrangements

. At the time of the termination hearing, the mother was not in a position to suc cessfully care for her children’ s needs. We therefore conclude,
t ermination of the mother’s rights is in the children’s best interest s

.9
The mother’s petition on appeal also implicates on e of the permissive exceptions under sectio n 232.116(3)

— at least as to the oldest child

— because she

was in the custody of her maternal grandparents

. Under section 232.116(3) (a) , the court need not ter minate the relationship between the parent and child if a relative has legal custody of the child. Here, t he juvenile court noted that at the time of the termination hearing, there was testimony that the grandparents were unable to continue caring for the child and had asked to be relieved of her care. The child had spent time with the twins’ foster family , and it was the DHS’s plan to place the child with the foster parents, who were willing to be a permanent placement for all three children. The juvenile court concluded, “Given the [un]expected change of events, this court does not believe the prov ision within the code related to relative placement applies.” We agree. 4 The mother’s petition on appeal also suggests she should be given more time. The juvenile court noted, “These children can’t continue to wait for
permanency.

. . . These children a re very young and vulnerable . Additional time will not alleviate this problem.” Again, we agree. “It is well

- settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping

s omeday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L. , 778 N.W.2d at 41. Children require permanency. See In re

4 In a placement order entered after the termination hearing, but befor e entry of the termination of parental rights order, t he juvenile court ordered custody of the oldest child be with the DHS for placement in family foster care. I n the termination of parental rights order, the juvenile court ordered that the children be p laced in the custody of the DHS for preadoptive placement.10

J.E ., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially) (noting the “defining elements in a child’s best interest” are the child’s safety and “need for a permanent home”). Delaying permanency any further is not in the children’s best interests. As we have stated numerous times, children are not equipped with pause buttons. “The c rucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.” In re A.C ., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987); see also In re D.J.R ., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990) (“We have long recognized that the best interests of a child are often not served by requiring the child to stay in ‘parentless limbo.’” (citation omitted)); In re Kester , 228 N.W.2d 107, 110

- 11 (Iowa 1975) (refusing to “gamble with the children’s future” or force the children to “await their [p arent]’s maturity” where the parent’s history shows “good intentions, but feeble resistance to temptation and wrongdoing”). While the law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this pa tience has been built into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C

. B ., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). Our supreme court has explained that “the legislature, in cases meeting the conditions of [the Iowa Code], has made a categorical determination
t hat the needs of a child are promoted by termination of parental rights.” In re
M

. W ., 458 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990) (discussing then Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e)). Consequently, “[t]ime is a critical element,” and parents simply “cannot wait until t he eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.” C

. B ., 611 N.W.2d at 495. At some point, as is the case here, the rights and needs of the children must rise above the rights and needs of the parent. See In re C

. S ., 77611

N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). The public policy of the state having been legislatively set, we are obligated to heed the statutory time periods for reunification. The mother has been given more than ample time to address her adult issues and demonstrate that she could provide a safe, stable, drug

- free home for the children, and she was not able to do so. Any additional time in limbo would not be in the children’s best interests. The mothe r’s petition on appeal also suggests the State failed to make reasonable efforts t o reunify the children with her because they were not placed with her at a residential treatment facility. The State must extend reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and c hild consistent with a child’s best interests. C.B ., 611 N.W.2d at 493. If a service has not been offered, it is the parent’s job to demand it. In re H.L.B.R ., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We find nothing in the record showing the mother m ade such a request. Even had she mad e a specific request that the children be placed with her at the treatment facility, the DHS had good reason to deny such a request. Due to payment issues, the mother was only going to be allowed to stay thirty to fort y - five days. The juvenile court noted the DHS “did not feel comfortable with the children being placed with [the mother] in treatment only for them to be discharge d very soon afterwards with no transition plan in place.” Upon the mother’s discharge, she entered a half

- way house where children were not allowed. She was at the half

- way house for a week before she relapsed and was kicked out. She ret urned to the treatment facility but left a short time later. Under our de novo review of the record, we con clude the State met its reasonable

- efforts obligation. IV. Conclusion12 We find the grounds for termination under Iowa Code 232.116(1)(h) have been established by clear and convincing evidence. The termination is in the best interest s of the children

. We decline to apply any exception under section
232.116 (3). Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.