GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2000 COMBATING 

TERRORISM

Federal Response 

Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities; 

Opportunities Remain 

to Improve 

Coordination

GAO-01-14

Page 1 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Compendium of Selected Federal Response Plans

and Authorities 34

Appendix II: Selected Information About Federal Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Consequence

Management Response Teams 37

Appendix III: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence

Management Response Teams in a Chemical Terrorist 

Incident 43

Appendix IV: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence

Management Response Teams in a Biological Terrorist 

Incident 48

Appendix V: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Radiological/

Nuclear Terrorist Incident 53

Appendix VI: Organizations and Locations Visited 60

Appendix VII: Comments From the Department of Defense 62

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Energy 63

Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Justice 64

Appendix X: Comments From the Department of Health and

Human Services 66

Appendix XI: Comments From the Department of Veterans

Affairs 67

Appendix XII: Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency 68

Appendix XIII: Comments From the Environmental Protection 

Agency 69

Appendix XIV: Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission 70

Appendix XV: Comments From the Office of Management and 

Budget 71

Appendix XVI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 74
Contents

Page 2 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Related GAO Products 75

Tables Table 1: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Chemical Terrorist

Incident 43

Table 2: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Biological Terrorist

Incident 48

Table 3: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Radiological/Nuclear 

Terrorist Incident 54

Figures Figure 1: Federal and Local Responders Participate in a Joint

Training Exercise in New York City 7

Figure 2: Federal Consequence Management Response Teams 9

Figure 3: Aerial Measuring System Aircraft With Detection

Equipment 14

Figure 4: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 

During the TOPOFF 2000 Exercise 25

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PPD Presidential Decision Directive
Page 3 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

November 30, 2000

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Democratic Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans

Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

A terrorist act involving a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

agent or weapon presents an array of complex issues to state and local 

responders. The responders, who may include firefighters, emergency 

medical service personnel, and hazardous materials technicians, must 

identify the agent used to rapidly decontaminate victims and apply 

appropriate medical treatments. They must determine whether the agent 

has spread beyond the incident site and what actions should be taken to 

protect other people. They must also be concerned about damage to the 

physical infrastructure and about coordinating efforts with law 

enforcement personnel as they conduct their investigation. If the incident 

overwhelms the capabilities of state and local responders, they may turn to 

the federal government for assistance. Federal agencies may provide 

assistance by deploying various response teams.

In response to your request, we reviewed federal agency teams that can 

respond to and help manage the consequences of a domestic terrorist 

incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or 

weapons. This report discusses (1) the characteristics of federal response 

teams, (2) whether duplication among teams belonging to different 

agencies exists, (3) the budget requirements process for teams and how the 

budgets are linked to a national strategy, and (4) initiatives to improve the 

operational coordination of federal response teams across agency lines. 

In our review, we defined response teams as groups of personnel and 

equipment that could deploy to or near an incident site to provide 

assistance. We focused on teams that assist with consequence management 

in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. Consequence 

management includes efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency 
Page 4 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government 

services. To identify the capabilities and characteristics of federal response 

teams, we reviewed our prior reports, conducted interviews with agency 

officials, and met with the teams at various locations nationwide. We also 

observed a national-level combating terrorism exercise, which allowed us 

to see the capabilities of several response teams in mock terrorist 

incidents. We also attended several conferences that addressed response 

teams and terrorism issues.

Results in Brief Eight agencies have 24 types of teams that can respond to a terrorist 

incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or 

weapons to assist state and local governments.1

 The characteristics of 

these teams vary. Specifically, teams vary in their size, composition of 

personnel, equipment, geographical coverage, transportation needs, and 

response time. Moreover, most federal teams are long-standing and have 

purposes other than combating terrorism, such as responding to natural 

disasters, hazardous material spills, and military crises. For example, 

Department of Defense teams can provide a wide variety of consequence 

management capabilities in response to a domestic terrorist incident. 

However, these teams have a primary military role and mission. Even in the 

absence of a terrorist threat, federal agencies would still need most of their 

response teams to carry out other missions.

Federal response teams do not duplicate one another. Each team has a 

unique combination of capabilities and functions when it is deployed to a 

terrorist incident. Moreover, several federal teams have expertise 

concerning certain types of agents and weapons that could be used in an 

attack. For example, Department of Energy teams specialize in responding 

to incidents involving radiological agents or weapons. Because of the 

differences in the capabilities and expertise of the teams, the type of 

incident would determine which individual team would be most 

appropriate to respond. 

Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate 

budget requirements for their response teams. We have noted previously 

that the federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource 

1

 The eight agencies are the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, 

Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the 

Environmental Protection Agency; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Page 5 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

investments for combating terrorism. The Attorney General’s interagency 

plan on counterterrorism and technology crime, in our view, is the current 

document that most closely resembles a national strategy. However, the 

plan does not establish or define clearly desired outcomes that the federal 

government is trying to achieve. Because most federal response teams have 

multiple missions, federal agencies do not track the resources for their 

teams based on their roles in combating terrorism. In 1999, the National 

Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget began a new 

interagency process for evaluating federal agencies’ programs for 

combating terrorism. The results of this evaluation provided a basis for 

new combating terrorism budget requests in the President’s Budget for 

fiscal year 2001. This effort gives decisionmakers in the administration and 

Congress a better picture of the resources federal agencies are devoting to 

their response capabilities. However, it does not serve as an effective 

mechanism for allocating funding to the highest priority areas because 

these areas have not been clearly defined. 

Two recent interagency activities could improve the operational 

coordination among federal response teams. First, the Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, is identifying the federal consequence management 

teams that could be called upon to respond to different terrorist scenarios. 

Prior to this group’s efforts, federal agencies did not engage in this type of 

planning for a terrorist incident. However, the steering group has not 

consulted with scientific experts or the intelligence community to assess 

the realism of the scenarios. According to a Federal Emergency 

Management Agency official, the scenarios were intended to be worst-case 

events that would stress the federal response system, and therefore 

assessing their realism was not a concern. As a result, it is uncertain 

whether the scenarios can provide a sound analytical basis for developing 

appropriate federal consequence management responses. Second, 

response teams continue to participate in various combating terrorism 

interagency exercises that provide agencies an opportunity to improve the 

operational coordination of their teams. In May 2000, the federal 

government sponsored a congressionally mandated national-level 

combating terrorism field exercise that tested the response and 

coordination of teams from federal, state, and local government agencies. 

The exercise represented considerable progress from past interagency 

exercises because it coordinated consequence as well as crisis 

management teams in a no-notice realistic field setting. However, no 

additional exercises of this nature are currently planned.
Page 6 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

We are recommending that the Attorney General modify the interagency 

plan on counterterrorism and technology crime to cite desired outcomes 

that could be used to develop and evaluate budget requirements for 

agencies and their respective response teams. Additionally, we are 

recommending that the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

take steps to require that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency 

Steering Group develop realistic scenarios involving chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear agents and weapons with experts in the scientific 

and intelligence communities. Lastly, we are recommending that the 

Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, sponsor periodic 

national-level consequence management field exercises involving federal, 

state, and local governments.

The Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human Services, 

Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission; and the Office of Management and Budget provided 

comments on a draft of this report. Their comments are presented and 

evaluated at the end of this letter following our recommendations.

Background In a domestic terrorist incident, states and local affected governments have 

the primary responsibility for consequence management. The federal 

government can help state and local authorities if they lack the capability 

to respond adequately. Figure 1 shows a federal response team supporting 

a local government in a training exercise.
Page 7 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Figure 1: Federal and Local Responders Participate in a Joint Training Exercise in New York City 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force.

Shortly after the April 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which 

enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in combating terrorism, 

including domestic incidents. In May 1998, the President issued 

Presidential Decision Directive 62 that further articulated responsibilities 

for specific agencies. Both directives call for robust, tailored, and rapidly 

deployable interagency teams to conduct well-coordinated and highly 

integrated operations.
Page 8 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

If a national emergency has been declared, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for managing the consequence 

management support provided by other federal agencies and coordinating 

response activities with state and local authorities. Federal agencies 

provide this support through their response teams or other assets. FEMA 

coordinates the federal response through a generic disaster contingency 

plan known as the Federal Response Plan. The plan, organized around

12 emergency support functions, is used to respond to incidents or 

situations requiring federal emergency disaster assistance and to facilitate 

the delivery of that assistance.2

 In 1997, FEMA issued a terrorism incident 

annex to the Federal Response Plan to implement Presidential Decision 

Directive 39. The annex was revised in April 1999. Other federal authorities 

and contingency plans, such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency Plan and the Federal Radiological Emergency 

Response Plan, may be activated in lieu of, prior to, or in conjunction with 

the Federal Response Plan.

Appendix I summarizes selected federal plans and authorities that may 

apply for consequence management response to a domestic terrorist 

incident.

Proposed spending to combat terrorism, as requested in the President’s 

fiscal year 2001 budget, is about $11.3 billion. The $11.3 billion is divided 

into two broad categories: combating terrorism ($9.3 billion, which 

includes $1.6 billion directly related to weapons of mass destruction) and 

critical infrastructure protection ($2 billion). The Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) tracks federal funding to combat terrorism and provides 

this information to Congress in an annual report.

Numerous Response 

Teams Can Provide 

Assistance 

Eight federal agencies have response teams that can deploy to or near the 

site of a terrorist incident involving a chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear agent or weapon (see fig. 2). The capabilities and characteristics of 

federal response teams vary in a number of ways. 

2

 The 12 emergency support functions are transportation, communications, public works 

and engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health 

and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy.
Page 9 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Figure 2: Federal Consequence Management Response Teams

Source: GAO’s analysis.

Appendix II provides information on the mission, cited authority, size, 

location, transportation mode, and expected response times for the 

24 types of federal teams discussed in this report.

Teams Vary in Size, 

Composition, and 

Equipment

Teams vary in size, with some teams having fewer than 10 personnel and 

others having almost 400 members. For example, a Department of Energy 

Radiological Assistance Program team has 7 members, a Department of 

Health and Human Services National Medical Response Team has 

36 members, and the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident 

Response Force has 373 personnel. Large teams such as the Department of 

Energy-led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, which 

Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and

Nuclear Terrorist

Incidents

Federal Emergency Management Agency

• Emergency Response Team

Federal Emergency Management Agency

• Emergency Response Team

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Regional Incident Response Teams

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Regional Incident Response Teams

Department of Veterans Affairs

• Medical Emergency Radiological

Response Team

Department of Veterans Affairs

• Medical Emergency Radiological

Response Team

Department of Health and Human Services

• Disaster Medical Assistance Teams

• Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams

• National Medical Response Teams

• National Pharmaceutical Stockpile

• Management Support Teams

Department of Health and Human Services

• Disaster Medical Assistance Teams

• Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams

• National Medical Response Teams

• National Pharmaceutical Stockpile

• Management Support Teams

Department of Energy

• Radiological Assistance Program Teams

• Aerial Measuring System

• Federal Radiological Monitoring and

Assessment Center

• Radiation Emergency Assistance

Center/Training Site

Department of Energy

• Radiological Assistance Program Teams

• Aerial Measuring System

• Federal Radiological Monitoring and

Assessment Center

• Radiation Emergency Assistance

Center/Training Site

Department of Defense

• Joint Task Force for Civil Support

• U.S. Marine Corps Chemical - Biological

Incident Response Force

• Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team

• U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team

• U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit

• U.S. Army Special Medical Augmentation

Response Team - Nuclear/Biological/Chemical

• U.S. Army Special Medical Augmentation

Response Team - Aero-Medical Isolation

Department of Defense

• Joint Task Force for Civil Support

• U.S. Marine Corps Chemical - Biological

Incident Response Force

• Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team

• U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team

• U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit

• U.S. Army Special Medical Augmentation

Response Team - Nuclear/Biological/Chemical

• U.S. Army Special Medical Augmentation

Response Team - Aero-Medical Isolation

Department of Transportation

• U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Teams

• U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinators

Department of Transportation

• U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Teams

• U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinators

Environmental Protection Agency

• On-Scene Coordinators

• Environmental Response Team

• Radiological Emergency Response Team

Environmental Protection Agency

• On-Scene Coordinators

• Environmental Response Team

• Radiological Emergency Response Team
Page 10 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

may have several hundred members detailed from numerous federal 

agencies for a major incident, may send out a relatively small advance team 

and then tailor the follow-on team based on the requirements of the 

specific incident.

Teams may be comprised of federal civilian employees, military personnel, 

contractor personnel, or federalized local personnel.3

 The U.S. Coast 

Guard’s National Strike Teams and many Department of Defense (DOD) 

teams are comprised of military personnel. The Department of Veterans 

Affairs’ Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team is comprised of 

federal civilian employees. Contractor personnel augment the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s and the Department of Energy’s teams. 

Medical response teams from the Department of Health and Human 

Services consist of medical personnel living in local communities who 

become federalized when the teams are activated and deployed to an 

incident.

Team members may be dedicated full-time or may serve on a team as a 

collateral duty. DOD’s teams such as the Joint Task Force for Civil Support 

and the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit have dedicated full-time 

personnel, even when the teams are not deployed. The Department of 

Energy’s teams, on the other hand, rely heavily on volunteers who have 

other jobs within the agency. Some teams, such as the Department of 

Veterans Affairs’ Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team, are 

inactive until they are activated for training, exercises, or an actual 

incident. Moreover, some teams have members who assemble from 

disparate locations nationwide. For example, the Environmental 

Protection Agency’s Radiological Emergency Response Team may draw 

staff from the agency’s radiation laboratories in Las Vegas, Nevada, and 

Montgomery, Alabama.

Teams have various amounts of equipment to perform their mission. The 

Department of Energy-led Federal Radiological Monitoring and 

Assessment Center brings an extensive array of communications and 

computer equipment as well as logistics support items such as generators. 

The U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force may 

3

 Federalized local personnel are not full-time, permanent federal employees but do become 

temporary federal employees and serve under government orders when their team is 

activated. For example, under the authority of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, P.L. 93-288, 

42 U.S.C. 243, as amended, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 

may federalize personnel.
Page 11 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

deploy with communications equipment, medical equipment and supplies, 

forklifts, generators, decontamination equipment, water purification 

equipment, and other supplies. In contrast, FEMA’s Emergency Response 

Team, which coordinates response activities, arrives with cellular phones, 

pagers, and laptop computers.

Teams’ Geographic 

Coverage and 

Transportation Needs Differ

Many teams are geared toward response in a specific geographic region, 

whereas others are intended for nationwide response. The Environmental 

Protection Agency’s On-Scene Coordinators are located in each of the 

agency’s 10 geographic regions and are responsible for response functions 

within their region. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s four Regional 

Incident Response Teams are also oriented toward a regional response. The 

Department of Energy-led Federal Radiological Monitoring and 

Assessment Center, the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident 

Response Force, and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Medical 

Emergency Radiological Response Team are examples of teams that are 

intended for nationwide response.

Expected response time varies by team, as does the mode of 

transportation. The Environmental Protection Agency’s Radiological 

Emergency Response Team prefers to deploy its mobile laboratories by 

ground transportation and is expected to arrive within 2 to 3 days after 

notification. The Department of Health and Human Services’ Disaster 

Medical Assistance Teams use commercial or military aircraft or ground 

transportation and are expected to arrive on site within 12 to 24 hours. 

Traveling by either air or ground transportation, a Department of Energy 

Radiological Assistance Program Team is expected to arrive within 2 to 

6 hours of being notified. The U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological 

Incident Response Force can deploy by ground transportation or on large 

military aircraft that can easily accommodate the large quantity and weight 

of equipment belonging to the team. An initial group can be ready to deploy 

in 6 hours, and the remainder of the team is expected to be ready to deploy 

within 24 hours.

Most Teams Are LongStanding and Have Other 

Missions

Most federal response teams are long-standing and were created for 

purposes other than combating terrorism such as responding to natural 

disasters, hazardous material spills, and military crises. Even in the 

absence of the threat of terrorism, the federal government would still need 

most of these response teams. The Department of Health and Human 

Services’ Disaster Medical Assistance Teams were created under the 
Page 12 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

National Disaster Medical System in the early 1980s to provide emergency 

medical care to victims of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other disasters. 

Since 1989, the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams have been activated on 

more than 19 occasions. Several examples include Hurricane Hugo in 1989, 

the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and numerous floods in 1997 and 1998.

The U.S. Coast Guard’s and the Environmental Protection Agency’s teams 

were created originally to respond to incidents where pollutants or 

contaminants have been released and pose a threat to public health or the 

environment. The U.S. Coast Guard created its three National Strike Teams 

under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 to respond to oil 

spills in waterways. The Environmental Protection Agency created its 

Environmental Response Team in 1978 under the Clean Water Act to 

provide scientific and technical expertise in response to the release of 

hazardous chemicals into the air, land, and water. Under the National Oil 

and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,4

 these teams were 

given the authority to respond to hazardous materials incidents, which 

include deliberate acts of releasing hazardous materials. The U.S. Coast 

Guard has the lead for incidents in the coastal zone, including major 

waterways, and the Environmental Protection Agency takes the leading 

role when incidents occur in the inland zone.5

DOD, compared to the other federal agencies, has the greatest breadth and 

depth of capabilities in its collective response teams. DOD and its response 

teams have capabilities relevant to all 12 of the emergency support 

functions in the Federal Response Plan. Nevertheless, the teams generally 

have missions in responding to military crises and may not be available to 

assist in a domestic terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear agents or weapons. For example, the U.S. Marine 

Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force would support 

deployed U.S. military forces when facing the threat of attack from 

chemical or biological weapons. The U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit 

renders items safe such as a device, packages the items, and escorts and 

transports the items. In 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, the unit 

packaged and escorted captured samples of potential chemical and 

biological weapons for examination. The U.S. Army Radiological Advisory 

4

 This plan is described in appendix I.

5

 These jurisdictional responsibilities are specifically defined in regional and area 

contingency plans.
Page 13 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Medical Team provides guidance on the potential health hazards from 

radiological contamination and radiation exposure. However, this Army 

team also has a military mission of responding to a radiological accident 

and may not be available to respond to a terrorist incident.

Agency Laboratories 

Augment Response by 

Federal Teams

A few agencies have fixed assets such as laboratories that may augment 

teams and the overall federal response in a chemical or biological terrorist 

incident. In some incidents, these laboratories may perform functions that 

enable deployed federal response teams to perform their role. For example, 

when a diagnosis is confirmed by one of the laboratories at the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention or the U.S. Army Medical Research 

Institute of Infectious Diseases, the National Medical Response Teams and 

the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams can begin to treat victims 

appropriately. The laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention can rapidly analyze and test samples of chemical and biological 

agents. The U.S. Army’s laboratory serves as a reference center for 

identification of biological agents and its primary mission is to protect 

military personnel against biological attack or endemic infectious diseases. 

According to officials at both agencies, their laboratories may be called 

upon to corroborate a diagnosis of an unusual biological agent.

Federal Teams Do Not 

Duplicate Each Other

Federal response teams do not duplicate one another for a number of 

reasons. Each team has a unique combination of capabilities and functions 

when deployed to or near the site of a terrorist incident. No single team or 

agency has all the capabilities and functions that might be required to 

respond to a terrorist incident. Some federal response teams have 

capabilities and functions that are clearly unique, such as the ability of the 

Department of Health and Human Services’ Disaster Mortuary Operational 

Response Teams to process, prepare, and dispose of contaminated 

fatalities. Several federal teams would be more likely to respond to certain 

types of incidents because they have expertise concerning the type of agent 

used in the attacks. For example, Department of Energy teams specialize in 

responding to incidents involving radiological agents or weapons. Other 

teams have similar capabilities and functions, but there are also 

distinctions among these teams that differentiate them. One distinction is 

that they perform a wide variety of functions. In general, these functions 

fall into one of three categories—performing hands-on response functions, 

providing technical advice to federal, state, and local authorities, or 

coordinating the response efforts and activities of other federal teams. 

Because of the differences in the capabilities and expertise of the teams, 
Page 14 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

the type of incident would determine which individual teams would be 

most appropriate to deploy.

Hands-On Functions Hands-on functions include detecting and evaluating the agent used in the 

incident; dismantling, transferring, disposing of, and/or decontaminating 

property; extracting and/or decontaminating victims; performing triage on 

victims; and providing medical treatment. Some teams perform hands-on 

functions that are unique from any other federal team. For example, the 

Department of Health and Human Services’ Disaster Mortuary Operational 

Response Teams are the only federal teams whose primary function is to 

recover, identify, and process fatalities. These teams can respond to any 

type of chemical, biological, or radiological/nuclear incident. The 

Department of Energy’s Aerial Measuring System is the only team that can 

fly aircraft over an incident site to rapidly survey large areas for 

radiological contamination (see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: Aerial Measuring System Aircraft With Detection Equipment

Source: Department of Energy.
Page 15 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

This team gathers information that is used by other responders and 

decisionmakers to conduct an initial response until further assessments are 

made. Unlike any other federal teams, the Department of Energy’s 

Radiological Assistance Program teams can respond quickly to a 

radiological incident, put on protective gear, enter a contaminated area, 

and take initial measurements of radioactivity. Another federal team with 

unique capabilities in a radiological incident is the Environmental 

Protection Agency’s Radiological Emergency Response Team. This team, 

through its two mobile laboratories, can prepare air, soil, and water 

samples and perform a field analysis on them to detect low levels of 

radioactivity. According to Environmental Protection Agency officials, 

these capabilities are unique among federal response teams.

Several teams perform hands-on medical functions. While some of their 

capabilities and functions are similar, some are different. For example, 

while the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Medical Emergency Radiological 

Response Team can decontaminate victims and provide medical care, its 

sole purpose is to respond to a radiological incident. The U.S. Marine Corps 

Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force and the Department of 

Health and Human Services’ National Medical Response Teams are 

intended to respond and treat victims in a chemical or biological incident. 

The U.S. Marine Corps’ team, however, can also search for and extract 

victims from a contaminated area. In contrast, the primary function of the 

National Medical Response Teams is to decontaminate and treat victims 

after they have been extracted. Each of the four National Medical Response 

Teams has a supply of antidotes to treat up to 5,000 people who have been 

exposed to chemical agents. The U.S. Marine Corps’ team also has a supply 

of antidotes, but the supply is smaller than a National Medical Response 

Team’s supply. Moreover, the U.S. Marine Corps’ supply is intended to treat 

team members and a limited number of victims. The Department of Health 

and Human Services also has numerous Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 

that can provide general medical treatment in various emergencies to 

augment the specialized care provided by other medical teams.

Technical Advice Functions Several teams offer specialized technical advice to federal, state, and local 

responders. These teams do not significantly duplicate one another 

because they have different areas of expertise. In some cases, the type of 

incident determines which teams are appropriate to provide technical 

advice. For example, four to six technical advisors from the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention accompany the Department of Health and 

Human Services’ National Pharmaceutical Stockpile when it is deployed in 
Page 16 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

response to a biological incident. The stockpile contains antibiotics and 

other medical supplies. The advisors assist state and local officials in 

organizing the bulk stockpile medications into individual doses and 

implementing plans to distribute and dispense the medications. The 

U.S. Army Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team offers technical 

assistance and advice to DOD’s Joint Task Force for Civil Support during a 

terrorist incident. The team offers links to Army experts in a variety of 

technical disciplines, such as detection, neutralization, containment, 

dismantlement, and disposal of chemical and biological agents or weapons. 

The Department of Energy’s Radiation Emergency Assistance 

Center/Training Site provides expert advice concerning the medical care of 

victims that have been exposed to radiation. The team has expertise in, 

among other things, triage, decontamination procedures, and radiation 

dose estimates. Two DOD teams—the U.S. Army Special Augmentation 

Response Team-Nuclear/Biological/Chemical and the U.S. Army 

Radiological Advisory Medical Team—can provide similar types of 

technical advice as the Department of Energy’s team. However, each team 

has fewer than 10 members. Furthermore, the DOD teams may not be 

available if they are deployed to a military crisis.
Page 17 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Coordinating Functions Many federal teams coordinate activities at an incident site. However, the 

scope of their coordination responsibilities varies widely, from the 

response activities of federal teams overall to activities performed by a 

single agency. FEMA’s Emergency Response Team coordinates overall 

federal response and recovery activities with a state government in the 

event of a disaster or an emergency declared by the President. DOD’s Joint 

Task Force for Civil Support deploys to an incident and commands and 

coordinates the activities of federal military forces. It would not be 

responsible for coordinating the activities of federal civilian teams. The 

Department of Health and Human Services’ Management Support Teams 

coordinate federal civilian medical teams. The Environmental Protection 

Agency’s On-Scene Coordinators focus their work on coordinating the 

containment, removal, and disposal of hazardous substances. They may 

direct the efforts of regionally based contractors to evaluate the size and 

nature of the released substance and its potential hazard and to 

decontaminate and clean up the incident site. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s Regional Incident Response Teams may be activated when 

an incident occurs at licensed facilities such as nuclear power plants. The 

teams are responsible for coordinating the technical response activities of 

federal entities, including hands-on response teams from the Department 

of Energy. The Department of Energy-led Federal Radiological Monitoring 

and Assessment Center acts as the control point for all federal assets 

involved in monitoring and assessing levels of radioactivity outside the 

immediate incident site.6

Appendixes III, IV, and V provide more details on the federal teams’ primary 

functions in response to a chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear 

incident.

6

 The Department of Energy has the lead responsibility for coordinating the early phases of 

the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. During later stages, the 

Environmental Protection Agency assumes control and other federal agencies participate.
Page 18 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Team Budgets Are Not 

Guided by a National 

Strategy

Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate 

budget requirements for their response teams. We have noted previously 

that the federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource 

investments for combating terrorism.7

 We have stated that there needs to 

be a federal or national strategy on combating terrorism that has a clear 

desired outcome. Such an outcome would provide a goal and allow 

measurement of progress toward that goal. In December 1998, the 

Department of Justice issued the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency 

Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. The plan was intended to 

serve as a baseline strategy for coordination of a national strategy and 

operational capabilities to combat terrorism. As part of its ongoing efforts, 

the Department of Justice updated the plan in March 2000. According to a 

Department of Justice official, both the original plan and its update were 

developed through an interagency process that included, among others, 

participants from the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. The 5-year plan, which is classified, lists specific combating 

terrorism tasks agencies are to perform.

In our view, the Attorney General’s 5-year plan is the current document that 

most resembles a national strategy. It represents an interagency effort that 

identifies which federal agencies will perform specific tasks. However, the 

plan is not useful for guiding resource investments in response teams 

because it does not link recommended actions to budget resources. The 

original plan indicated that updated versions would link recommended 

actions to budget resources. The March 2000 update, however, does not 

identify this linkage. A Department of Justice official who is responsible for 

the plan stated that the Attorney General does not believe that the 

Department of Justice should direct the budget resources of other 

agencies. Furthermore, the updated plan identifies needed actions without 

citing clear desired outcomes that the federal government is trying to 

achieve. 

As stated earlier, most federal consequence management teams are longstanding and fulfill roles other than combating terrorism. While agencies 

may be able to identify how much they invest in their teams, they cannot 

easily estimate what proportion of that investment is for combating 

7 Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000) and Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies 

and Resources (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 29, 2000).
Page 19 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

terrorism functions. For example, the Department of Energy tracks the 

operating, technical integration, and exercise costs for the Aerial 

Measuring System and other response teams. The Department, however, 

does not track combating terrorism costs separately. Other missions of the 

Aerial Measuring System aircraft are to respond to an accidental, as well as 

intentional, release of radioactive materials, and to conduct work for other 

agencies by providing baseline surveys of radiation levels. 

In 1999, the National Security Council and OMB began a new interagency 

process for evaluating combating terrorism programs governmentwide to 

help identify duplication and shortfalls as well as prioritize programs. As 

part of this process, federal agencies were asked to identify new combating 

terrorism funding specifically for weapons of mass destruction 

preparedness activities, including their response teams. Interagency 

working groups reviewed the agencies’ proposals and developed 

recommendations on whether they should be funded. The agencies were 

expected to integrate the working groups’ funding recommendations into 

their fiscal year 2001 President’s Budget submissions. Prior to this jointly 

sponsored process, agencies would make combating terrorism budget 

recommendations through the annual OMB budget submission. Decisions 

were made on an agency-by-agency basis rather than in a governmentwide 

context. 

According to OMB officials, Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 and 

the Attorney General’s 5-year plan serve as criteria for the program 

evaluations in the new interagency process.8

 On the basis of our discussion 

with OMB officials, it is unclear to us whether and to what extent the 

Presidential Decision Directives and the 5-year plan were used in the 

process. In the absence of a national strategy, it was also unclear to us how 

the National Security Council, OMB, and the agencies were developing and 

evaluating combating terrorism budget requirements for agency response 

teams. While the interagency process gives decisionmakers a better picture 

of the resources federal agencies are devoting to their response 

capabilities, it does not serve as an effective mechanism for allocating 

funding to the highest priority areas because these areas have not been 

clearly defined.

8

 In May 1998, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 to address protection 

of the Nation’s critical infrastructure.
Page 20 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

We found an instance where the new interagency process was 

circumvented. FEMA’s fiscal year 2001 budget submission to OMB 

requested $3.8 million to upgrade the capabilities of 6 of its 28 Urban 

Search and Rescue Task Force teams so that they can operate in a 

contaminated environment. OMB reviewed FEMA’s budget and, as a result, 

did not include the Urban Search and Rescue request. Nevertheless, FEMA 

requested that the National Security Council include this proposal as part 

of the fiscal year 2001 President’s Budget request.9

 Furthermore, according 

to a FEMA official, this budget proposal was not based on a national 

strategy, but rather was precipitated by congressional perception that the 

search and rescue teams already had this capability. A national strategy 

could provide the framework and criteria for determining whether such an 

enhanced capability—and others that federal agencies might propose—

represent progress toward meeting desired outcomes.

Interagency Activities 

Offer Opportunities for 

Better Coordination

Federal agencies participate in exercises and other interagency activities to 

coordinate how their individual response teams will operate together in a 

terrorist scenario. Two recent interagency activities have identified 

opportunities for improving the operational coordination of federal 

response teams. First, FEMA is leading an interagency steering group that 

is identifying groups of federal teams that could respond to different 

terrorist scenarios. Such planning can be useful; however, the steering 

group has not consulted with scientific experts and the intelligence 

community to assess the realism of its scenarios. Second, federal, state, 

and local agencies participated in a major field exercise in May 2000 that 

involved mock terrorist events in three U.S. metropolitan areas. The 

lessons learned from this exercise—the first of its kind—could improve 

operational coordination of response teams from all levels of government. 

However, no additional exercises of this nature are currently planned.

9

 This funding for the Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces was part of FEMA’s fiscal

year 2001 President Budget’s submission.
Page 21 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Interagency Group Plans 

Team Responses, but 

Realism of Scenarios Has 

Not Been Assessed

In 1998, FEMA formed the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency 

Steering Group to identify which consequence management teams could 

respond to specific terrorist scenarios.10 The steering group is identifying 

the functions of individual federal response teams and developing a 

database to include the size and composition of each team, its equipment, 

response time, and other data. The response teams that can respond 

together to a given scenario are referred to as a force package. As a basis 

for developing the force packages, the interagency steering group has 

created various terrorist scenarios, which include (1) release of a chemical 

agent, (2) release of a biological agent, (3) release of radiological material, 

and (4) detonation of a nuclear device. According to a FEMA official, if an 

incident occurs, a force package can be pared and tailored based on the 

specific requirements. The steering group has long-term plans to improve 

the database, develop further scenarios, refine its force packages, and 

incorporate observations from terrorism exercises. One long-term plan, for 

example, is to create smaller force packages of teams that would respond 

during the first 24 hours of different types of incidents. Prior to the group’s 

efforts, federal agencies did not engage in this type of interagency planning 

for a terrorist incident.

10 The federal agencies listed in figure 2 are members of the interagency steering group. 
Page 22 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

The FEMA-led interagency steering group’s efforts have been based upon 

worst-case scenarios rather than analysis of credible threats. Specifically, 

when developing the scenarios for the force packages, the group did not 

consult with scientific experts from the disciplines of chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear warfare to assess the scenarios’ realism. For 

example, the group’s biological scenario involved the dissemination of 

plague. According to various biological warfare and scientific experts we 

consulted for our prior work,11 it is difficult to obtain, produce, and 

disseminate plague, especially in sufficient quantities to produce mass 

casualties. The steering group also did not incorporate information about 

the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism from 

the intelligence community. According to a Federal Emergency 

Management Agency official who is leading the steering group’s efforts, the 

scenarios were intended to be worst-case events that would stress the 

federal response system, and therefore assessing the realism of the 

scenarios was not a concern. Because the realism of the scenarios was not 

assessed, it is uncertain whether they can provide a sound analytical basis 

for developing appropriate federal consequence management responses. 

We believe that consultation with experts in the scientific and intelligence 

communities is important for realistic consequence management planning. 

Moreover, we have previously reported that valid, current, and documented 

threat information is crucial to ensuring that countermeasures or programs 

are not based solely on worst-case scenarios and are therefore out of 

balance with the threat.12

Exercise Shows Progress in 

Response Team 

Coordination

Presidential Decision Directive 39 requires key federal agencies to maintain 

well-exercised combating terrorism capabilities. Exercises test and 

validate policies and procedures, test the effectiveness of response 

capabilities, increase the confidence and skill levels of personnel, and 

identify strengths and weaknesses in response before they arise in actual 

incidents. Furthermore, federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently 

interagency matters, and exercises allow agency personnel to become 

familiar with each other’s missions and procedures and learn to coordinate 

and operate together. 

11 Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical 

and Biological Attacks (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999). 

12 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Page 23 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

In 1999, a congressional mandate required that a national combating 

terrorism field exercise be conducted “without notice” and include “the 

participation of all key personnel.”13 The Department of Justice and FEMA 

sponsored such an exercise, TOPOFF 2000, in May 2000. The exercise 

included concurrent responses to a radiological terrorist incident in the 

Washington, D.C., area; a biological terrorist incident in the Denver, 

Colorado, area; and a chemical terrorist incident in Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire.14 Eighteen federal agencies participated in addition to state and 

local government agencies.15 The overall stated goals of the exercise were 

to 

• test federal, state, and local response to a challenging series of

no-notice, integrated, geographically dispersed terrorist acts;

• assess the Nation’s crisis and consequence management capacity under 

stressful conditions; and

• develop lessons learned to enhance domestic preparedness.

TOPOFF 2000 represented progress over previous combating terrorism 

exercises. We reported in 1999 that federal agencies had conducted 

201 combating terrorism exercises in the previous 3 years. We noted 

several shortcomings in these exercises that limited their effectiveness in 

preparing federal, state, and local agencies for response to a terrorist 

incident.16 For example, FEMA had not conducted consequence 

management field exercises. Of the 201 exercises, only 4 were considered 

no-notice exercises in which participants were not given advance 

notification. None of the four exercises included consequence management 

activities. TOPOFF 2000, which included participation by many of the 

response teams discussed in this report, addressed many earlier 

shortcomings.

13 This requirement is in House Report 105-825 (Oct. 19, 1998), Making Omnibus 

Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999.

14 The related concurrent exercise in the Washington, D.C., area, was referred to as National 

Capital Region 2000. For purposes of the report, we refer to all three venues as TOPOFF 

2000.

15 Private voluntary organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army 

also participated in TOPOFF 2000.

16 Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999) and Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal 

Counterterrorist Exercises (GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR, June 25, 1999).
Page 24 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

• TOPOFF 2000 included scenarios where crisis and consequence 

management activities occurred simultaneously. In a terrorist incident, 

crisis and consequence management activities would overlap, so it is 

important that federal teams exercise these activities together. 

• TOPOFF 2000 included transfers of authority among government 

agencies. For example, a local fire chief transferred authority over the 

incident site to Federal Bureau of Investigation officials to enable 

processing of the crime scene. Such transfers are important to practice 

because the response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

terrorist incident would likely require a response from multiple agencies 

at the federal, state, and local levels.

• TOPOFF 2000 was conducted as a field exercise rather than a tabletop 

exercise. Field exercises are more challenging because agency 

command and response teams actually deploy to practice their skills 

and coordination in a realistic field setting. Tabletop exercises, on the 

other hand, do not include the deployment of actual response teams and 

their equipment. 

• TOPOFF 2000 was designed and executed as a no-notice exercise.17 Nonotice exercises provide the highest degree of realism to federal 

response teams and can lead to improvements in deployment 

procedures to an incident site so that state and local first responders 

receive federal assistance as soon as possible. 

Final after-action reports for TOPOFF 2000 have not yet been completed. 

After-action reports typically identify both successful interagency actions 

and procedures and areas that need improvements and highlight 

shortcomings in the overall structure and management of the exercise. 

Based on our observations of TOPOFF 2000, we believe that it largely met 

the overall goals. We believe that large, periodic exercises like TOPOFF 

2000 provide valuable insight to the complex relationships necessary for a 

coordinated response to a domestic terrorist incident. For example, a 

simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile was delivered and distributed 

for the first time in TOPOFF 2000 to treat victims exposed to aerosolized 

plague. The delivery of the stockpile during an exercise provided an 

opportunity for federal, state, and local governments to coordinate their 

respective responses. Figure 4 shows the simulated National 

17 We consider TOPOFF 2000 to be a no-notice exercise because it was planned by a group of 

“trusted agents” who were not to disclose details of the exercise scenarios and timing to 

response teams and other participants. We recognize that response teams and participants 

were probably aware of the general timing of the exercise, and some may have inadvertently 

learned about some exercise details.
Page 25 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Pharmaceutical Stockpile after it has been delivered and unloaded at the 

Buckley Air National Guard Base, Denver, Colorado. The items in the 

simulated stockpile were subsequently distributed to hospitals and other 

points of distribution, such as makeshift medical treatment centers, so that 

victims could be appropriately treated.

Figure 4: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile During the TOPOFF 2000 Exercise

Source: GAO.

According to FEMA and Department of Justice officials, there are no 

agency plans or a congressional mandate to conduct another national-level 

combating terrorism exercise similar to TOPOFF 2000. In the past, the 

federal government sporadically held national-level exercises. In addition, 

the federal government did not conduct exercises that combined 

“participation by all key personnel” and the concurrence of crisis and 

consequence management in an interagency and intergovernmental field 

setting. Future exercises of this nature would allow the intergovernmental 

response teams to practice coordination in realistic settings. Also, 
Page 26 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

national-level exercises could allow federal consequence management 

teams to demonstrate their hands-on, technical, and coordinating response 

functions when assisting state and local governments. Lastly, periodic 

national-level exercises would allow federal agencies to maintain 

proficiency when “key personnel” change.

Conclusions Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate 

budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national 

strategy with clearly defined outcomes. In our view, the Attorney General’s 

5-year plan is the current document that most resembles a national strategy. 

The plan represents an interagency effort that identifies which federal 

agencies will perform specific tasks. However, the plan does not link its 

recommended actions to budget resources. Further, the plan does not cite 

desired outcomes that the federal government is trying to achieve. Without 

a sound framework, agencies may not target programs and spending 

appropriately for their response teams.

The FEMA-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group 

has identified consequence management teams that could respond to 

specific terrorist scenarios. Prior to this effort, federal agencies did not 

engage in this type of interagency planning for a terrorist incident. 

However, the interagency steering group did not consult with scientific 

experts or the intelligence community to assess the realism of its scenarios. 

Thus, it is uncertain whether they can provide a sound analytical basis for 

developing appropriate federal consequence management responses.

In May 2000, the federal government sponsored a national-level combating 

terrorism field exercise that represented considerable progress from past 

interagency exercises, particularly for consequence management response 

teams. In the past, the federal government sporadically held national-level 

exercises. In addition, the federal government did not conduct exercises 

that combined “participation by all key personnel” and the concurrence of 

crisis and consequence management in an interagency and 

intergovernmental field setting. However, plans to continue national-level 

no-notice exercises similar to TOPOFF 2000 do not exist. The objectives of 

these types of exercises are to engage applicable responders and to identify 

strengths and shortfalls so that the needs of states and localities as well as 

future potential challenges can be met effectively. Exercises such as 

TOPOFF 2000 help ensure the seamless integration of federal, state, and 

local teams and related assets, which is critical to rapid and effective 

response. Without conducting exercises similar in nature to TOPOFF 2000, 
Page 27 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

federal, state, and local government agencies will not be able to realistically 

practice coordination of their response teams and therefore may not be 

well prepared to respond to terrorist incidents that may occur.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To guide resource investments for combating terrorism, we recommend 

that the Attorney General modify the Attorney General’s Five-Year 

Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to cite desired 

outcomes that could be used to develop budget requirements for agencies 

and their respective response teams. This process should be coordinated as 

an interagency effort. 

To provide a sound analytical basis for developing appropriate federal 

consequence management responses, we recommend that the Director, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, take steps to require that the 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group develop realistic 

scenarios involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents 

and weapons with experts in the scientific and intelligence communities. 

To build upon the experience and lessons learned by the federal response 

teams from the TOPOFF 2000 exercise, we recommend that the Director, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, sponsor periodic national-level 

consequence management field exercises involving federal, state, and local 

governments. Such exercises should be conducted together with 

national-level crisis management field exercises.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the 

Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human Services, and 

Veterans Affairs; FEMA; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission; and OMB. Comments from these agencies appear 

in appendixes VII to XV. The Department of Transportation provided oral 

comments. The agencies, with the exception of Justice and OMB, agreed 

with the report’s summary and its description of federal teams that can 

respond to terrorist incidents involving the use of chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear agents or weapons. Many of the agencies also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs concurred with our 

recommendation to modify the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency 

Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to cite desired outcomes that 
Page 28 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

could be used to evaluate budget requirements for agencies and their 

respective response teams. In contrast, Justice and OMB, while not directly 

addressing our recommendation, disagreed with our conclusion that the 

federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource investments 

for combating terrorism. According to Justice, the 5-year plan articulates 

high-level goals and contains specific objectives, priorities, and 

recommended actions that, if accomplished, would lead to the fulfillment 

of these goals. OMB believes that a number of documents taken together, 

including Justice’s 5-year plan, articulate the Nation’s strategy for 

combating terrorism and the resources needed for its successful 

implementation. While not in its official comments, the Environmental 

Protection Agency disagreed with our recommendation to modify the 

5-year plan. The Environmental Protection Agency stated that the major 

thrust of Justice’s 5-year plan was to develop a strategy for law 

enforcement agencies. The agency does not believe that Justice can be held 

accountable for developing budget requirements for response teams from 

all federal agencies. The agency stated that there should be two separate 

5-year plans, one developed by Justice for law enforcement agencies and 

one developed by FEMA for consequence management agencies.

We disagree with Justice and OMB that the 5-year plan, either alone or 

taken together with other documents, constitutes a fully developed 

national strategy. The 5-year plan does not cite desired outcomes the 

federal government is trying to achieve. For example, the plan includes a 

goal to improve state and local capabilities as well as actions to be taken 

related to federal and state response teams. However, it does not cite an 

outcome in terms of the level of preparedness to be achieved, nor does it 

cite specific capabilities that response teams should achieve. Moreover, the 

March 2000 update does not link its recommended actions to budget 

resources, and does not include prioritization of actions, performance 

indicators, or time frames that were included in the original December 1998 

plan. Further, we believe that using more than one document to articulate a 

national strategy, as OMB suggests, obscures the direction and priorities of 

federal programs to combat terrorism. We are concerned that the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s suggestion to have two agencies 

prepare separate national strategies would further fragment the federal 

government’s combating terrorism activities. Development of any national 

strategy should be coordinated as an interagency effort incorporating crisis 

and consequent management. For these reasons, we continue to believe 

our conclusions and recommendations have merit.
Page 29 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

FEMA and the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs concurred 

with our recommendation that the Director, FEMA, take steps to require 

that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group develop 

realistic scenarios involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 

agents and weapons with experts in the scientific and intelligence 

communities.

FEMA and the Departments of Defense and Veteran Affairs concurred with 

our recommendation that the Director, FEMA, sponsor periodic nationallevel consequence management field exercises. FEMA noted that its fiscal 

year 2001 budget request included funding to sponsor a consequence 

management exercise. Justice and Transportation officials stated that our 

recommendation does not adequately acknowledge the close linkage 

between crisis and consequence management in a terrorist incident. We 

have modified our recommendation to suggest that future national-level 

consequence management exercises be held together with national-level 

crisis management field exercises.

Scope and 

Methodology

To identify the capabilities and characteristics of federal consequence 

management response teams, we reviewed our prior reports and 

conducted in-depth interviews with officials from the Departments of 

Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Veterans 

Affairs, as well as FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We also reviewed Presidential Decision 

Directives, the Federal Response Plan and the Terrorism Incident Annex, 

the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 

and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. We attended 

several conferences that addressed consequence management response 

teams and issues related to combating terrorism. One conference 

demonstrated how health emergency response teams prepare for 

deployment and set up their equipment at an incident site.

To determine if duplication among teams belonging to different agencies 

existed, we analyzed information from documents provided by government 

officials concerning the scope, nature, and functions of the teams. 

Moreover, we interviewed various team members at locations nationwide 

to determine their teams’ specific functions and capabilities in a terrorist 

incident. When possible, during our visits we examined the teams’ 

equipment. We developed the report’s team-related appendixes as a tool to 

help determine whether duplication existed. We discussed federal response 
Page 30 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

teams with state and local officials in Colorado. Appendix VI provides a 

detailed list of the organizations and locations we visited.

To assess the budget requirements process for these teams and how their 

budgets are linked to a national strategy, we reviewed our prior work, met 

with OMB officials, and discussed the budget process with participating 

agency officials. We also reviewed OMB’s annual budget reports on 

combating terrorism to Congress and the Attorney General’s Five-Year 

Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan (the December 

1998 and the March 2000 updated versions).

To ascertain initiatives to improve the operational coordination of federal 

response teams across agency lines, we reviewed our prior work on 

counterrorism exercises and discussed current interagency coordinating 

efforts with FEMA, the lead federal agency for consequence management. 

We also discussed the scientific feasibility of the terrorist scenarios used by 

the FEMA-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group 

with a technical expert from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and a biological 

warfare consultant. Officials from individual intelligence agencies briefed 

us on the threat of chemical and biological terrorism. In addition, we 

reviewed pertinent intelligence analyses related to terrorism and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s assessment of the domestic-origin 

terrorist threat. We attended the three TOPOFF 2000 exercise venues in 

Washington, D.C.; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and Denver, Colorado, to 

assess federal teams’ consequence management capabilities in mock 

terrorist incidents. We obtained information about two additional exercises 

that involved federal teams and were conducted during our review.
Page 31 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

As agreed with your offices, because of the number of response teams 

involved, we limited our review to federal teams that assist with 

consequence management in a chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear terrorist incident and excluded crisis management teams. Crisis 

management includes measures to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat 

or act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, with 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation being assigned the lead federal role for 

domestic crisis response. Consequence management may follow crisis 

management, but these two activities usually occur simultaneously or 

overlap, depending on the nature of the terrorist incident. To understand 

the difference between crisis and consequence management, we reviewed 

our prior reports and other documents and discussed the Bureau’s crisis 

management teams with Bureau officials in Virginia. We recognize that 

teams other than those identified in this review could play a consequence 

management role because of their emergency response capabilities. 

However, the teams that we selected for our review were based on 

participating agency officials’ views about the teams’ roles as well as our 

analysis. Additionally, we recognize that a few teams have both crisis and 

consequence management functions, such as the Department of Defense’s 

U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit. However, information received from DOD 

suggests that this team could play a key role in a consequence management 

response. In contrast, elements that are part of the Department of Energy’s 

Nuclear Emergency Search Team have some consequence managementrelated functions. However, based on our analysis, in general, this team has 

functions related primarily to crisis management. In addition, we excluded 

the National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams—

formerly known as Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams—from 

our review. These teams are federally funded but are considered state 

assets. Moreover, based on our observations from TOPOFF 2000, these 

teams would remain as state assets when activated in response to a 

terrorist incident. We evaluated these teams’ roles and response in a prior 

report.18

In discussing our draft report, the Department of Transportation and the 

Environmental Protection Agency stated that more emphasis should be 

placed on preparing federal responders to integrate into the incident 

command system established at the incident site. According to the 

Environmental Protection Agency, the incident command system is the 

18 Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). 
Page 32 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

standard on-scene response management system used in metropolitan 

areas around the United States by state, local, and many federal responders 

to manage emergency response. Both agencies emphasized the need for 

more federal responders to receive incident command system training to 

ensure interoperability and safe coordination. The agencies believe that the 

incident command system should be the common command system for use 

by all responders. We agree that all responders from federal, state, and 

local governments should coordinate their activities at the incident site as 

seamlessly as possible. Although we observed efforts to integrate federal, 

state, and local response activities at the TOPOFF 2000 exercise, our 

primary focus on this assignment was to examine how federal teams 

improve operational coordination across federal agencies. Accordingly, a 

detailed examination of the on-site integration of federal teams with state 

and local responders was outside the scope of our review.

We did not independently verify agencies’ data about the teams; for 

example, the number of personnel on a team or the expected arrival time at 

a terrorist incident. However, we sent our analysis of the teams’ data to the 

participating agencies for their review and validation. 

Our review was conducted from January through September 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 

distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we 

will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional 

committees and the federal agencies discussed in this report. We will also 

make copies available to other interested parties upon request.
Page 33 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at

(202) 512-6020. Key contributors to this assignment are listed in 

appendix XVI.

Raymond J. Decker

Director, Defense

Capabilities and Management 
Page 34 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix I

Compendium of Selected Federal Response Apendxies

Plans and Authorities ApendxiI

Presidential Decision 

Directive 39

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) sets forth U.S. general policy to 

use all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist 

attacks against U.S. interests. More specifically, PDD-39 directs all federal 

departments and agencies to take various measures to (1) reduce 

vulnerabilities to terrorism (e.g., to assess the vulnerabilities of 

government facilities and critical national infrastructure); (2) deter and 

respond to terrorism (e.g., to pursue, arrest, and prosecute terrorists and to 

minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency assistance); and 

(3) develop effective capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences 

of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 

Presidential Decision 

Directive 62

This directive set up an integrated program to increase the federal 

government’s effectiveness in countering terrorism threats against 

U.S. targets. PDD-62 organizes and clarifies the roles and activities of many 

agencies responsible for combating a wide range of terrorism, including 

preventing terrorist acts, apprehending and prosecuting terrorists, 

increasing transportation security as well as protecting critical computerbased systems. The directive also provides for consequence management 

of terrorist incidents.

To carry out the integrated program, PDD-62 established the Office of the 

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism. Working within the National Security Council, the National 

Coordinator is responsible for overseeing the wide range of policies and 

programs covered by PDD-62 and is to take the lead in developing 

guidelines that might be needed for crisis management. 

Federal Response Plan 

With Terrorism 

Incident Annex

This plan lays out the manner in which the federal government, with the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinating the 

support/assistance efforts of other agencies, responds to domestic 

incidents or situations in which the President has declared an emergency 

requiring federal emergency disaster assistance. More specifically, the plan 

outlines the planning assumptions, policies, concept of operations, 

organizational structures, and specific assignment of responsibilities to 

lead departments and agencies in providing federal assistance. The plan 

also categorizes the types of federal assistance into specific emergency 

support functions such as transportation, communications, firefighting, 

and health and medical services.
Appendix I

Compendium of Selected Federal Response 

Plans and Authorities

Page 35 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

The Terrorism Incident Annex establishes a general concept of operations 

for the federal response to a terrorist incident, including the concurrent 

operation under other plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous 

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and the Federal Radiological 

Emergency Response Plan.

Authority The Federal Response Plan is authorized under the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et. seq., as 

amended, and 44 Code of Federal Regulations Subchapters D (Disaster 

Assistance) and E (Preparedness).

National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency 

Plan

This plan provides the organizational structure and procedures for 

preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous 

substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The plan lists the general 

responsibilities of federal agencies regarding such incidents, identifies the 

fundamental kinds of activities that are performed pursuant to the plan, 

and describes the specific responsibilities of the National Response Team, 

the Regional Response Teams, the National Response Center, and the 

U.S. Coast Guard’s National Strike Force Teams for planning and 

responding to such incidents. 

Federal agencies may conduct consequence management activities under 

the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 

because it provides authority and funding sources to respond to hazardous 

materials incidents regardless of the suspected cause. For example, a 

terrorist act may at first appear to be a routine hazardous materials 

incident, leading to the activation of a federal response under this plan. If 

the Federal Response Plan is activated, the response actions of the 

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan are 

conducted as one of the Federal Response Plan’s emergency support 

functions.

Authority The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan is 

authorized under section 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 9605, as 

amended; section 311(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(d), as 

amended; and 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 300. 
Appendix I

Compendium of Selected Federal Response 

Plans and Authorities

Page 36 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Federal Radiological 

Emergency Response 

Plan

This plan establishes an organizational and operational structure for 

coordinated responses by federal agencies to peacetime radiological 

emergencies, taking into consideration the specific statutory authorities 

and responsibilities of each agency. The plan provides guidance as to which 

agency will lead and coordinate the federal response to a radiological 

emergency (i.e., the lead federal agency), which depends on the type of 

emergency involved. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is 

the lead agency for an emergency that occurs at a nuclear facility or any 

activity licensed by the Commission. The plan also identifies the specific 

role and responsibility of a lead federal agency, such as responding to 

requests from state and local governments for technical information and 

assistance.

The plan may be used whenever any of the signatory agencies responds to a 

radiological emergency, which includes deliberate acts to spread 

radioactivity in the environment. The Federal Response Plan may be 

implemented concurrently with the Federal Radiological Emergency 

Response Plan. The functions and responsibilities of the Federal 

Radiological Emergency Response Plan do not change, except for the 

coordination that occurs between the lead federal agency and the Federal 

Coordinating Officer (usually a Federal Emergency Management Agency 

official). 

Authority The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan is authorized under 

section 304 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1980 (P.L. 96-295) and Executive Order 12241, 

September 29, 1980.
Page 37 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II

Selected Information About Federal Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

Consequence Management Response Teams ApendxiI

Response team Mission Cited authority

Number of team 

(dedicated/collateral) 

members and team's 

primary location

Transportation mode 

and response time 

Department of Defense

Joint Task Force for Civil 

Support 

Supports lead federal 

agency, establishes 

command and control of 

designated Department of 

Defense (DOD) forces, 

and provides military 

assistance to civil 

authorities to save lives, 

prevent human suffering, 

and provide temporary 

critical life support.

Established Oct. 1, 1999 

by Secretary of Defense 

directive.

Sixty dedicated personnel 

located at Fort Monroe, 

Va.

Travels by military aircraft 

or ground transportation. 

Initial team deploys within 

4 hours.

Chemical/Biological 

Rapid Response Team

Coordinates and 

integrates DOD's 

technical assistance for 

the neutralization, 

containment, 

dismantlement, and 

disposal of chemical or 

biological materials, and 

assists first responders in 

dealing with consequence 

management. 

Secretary of Defense 

directive based on the 

Defense Against 

Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Act of 1996 

and Fiscal Year 1997 

National Defense 

Authorization Act. 

Fourteen dedicated 

personnel located at 

Aberdeen Proving 

Grounds, Md.

Travels by commercial or 

military aircraft or ground 

transportation.

Initial team deploys within 

4 hours, and remainder of 

team deploys in 10 to 12 

hours.

U.S. Army Technical 

Escort Unit

Provides 

chemical/biological 

advice, assessment, 

sampling, detection, field 

verification, packaging, 

escort, and render safe for 

chemical/biological 

devices or hazards.

Chemical Warfare Service 

directive dated Jan. 20, 

1943.

One hundred ninety-three 

dedicated personnel 

located at Aberdeen 

Proving Grounds, Md.; 

Fort Belvoir, Va; Pine 

Bluff, Ark.; and Dugway, 

Ut.

Travels by military aircraft 

or ground transportation. 

Team deploys in 4 hours.

U.S. Army Special 

Medical Augmentation 

Response Team—

Nuclear/Biological/ 

Chemical

Provides technical advice 

in the detection, 

neutralization, and 

containment of chemical, 

biological, or radiological 

hazardous materials in a 

terrorist event.

Established in 1998 by 

U.S. Army Surgeon 

General directive. 

Six teams located at 

various sites with six 

collateral duty members 

per team.

Travels by military aircraft 

or ground transportation 

in 12 hours.
Appendix II

Selected Information About Federal 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

Consequence Management Response Teams

Page 38 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

U.S. Army Special 

Medical Augmentation 

Response Team—AeroMedical Isolation

Provides a rapid response 

evacuation unit to any 

area of the world to 

transport and provide 

patient care under 

conditions of biological 

containment to service 

members or U. S. civilians 

exposed to certain 

contagious and highly 

dangerous diseases. 

Established in 1977 by 

U.S. Army Surgeon 

General directive.

Approximately 20 

collateral duty personnel 

at Fort Detrick, Md.

Travels by military aircraft.

U.S. Marine Corps 

Chemical-Biological 

Incident Response 

Force

Provides force protection 

or mitigation in the event 

of a terrorist incident, 

domestically or overseas.

Established in Apr. 1996 

by the U.S. Marine Corps 

Commandant's planning 

guidance.

Three hundred seventythree dedicated personnel 

at Indian Head, Md.

Travels by military aircraft 

or ground transportation. 

Initial team deploys in 6 

hours, and remainder of 

team deploys in 24 hours.

U.S. Army Radiological 

Advisory Medical Team

Assists and furnishes 

radiological health hazard 

guidance to the on-scene 

commander or other 

responsible officials at an 

incident site and the 

installation medical 

authority.

Army Regulation 40-13, 

Feb. 1, 1985.

Eight to 10 collateral duty 

personnel located at 

Walter Reed Army 

Hospital, Washington, 

D.C. 

Travels by military 

transportation, 

commercial aircraft, or 

personal vehicles within 

8 hours. 

Department of Health and Human Services 

Management Support 

Teams 

Manage federal medical 

teams and assets that are 

deployed in response to 

an incident.

National Security 

Decision Directive 47, 

1982; Federal Response 

Plan; Presidential 

Decision Directives 39 

and 62.

Six to eight dedicated 

personnel located at 

Rockville, Md., 

supplemented by 18 to 

20 collateral duty 

Department of Veterans 

Affairs personnel.

Travels by commercial or 

military aircraft. Initial 

team (2 to 5 members) 

expected to be ready to 

deploy within 2 hours and 

arrive within 12 hours. Full 

team expected to arrive 

within 12 to 24 hours.

National Medical 

Response Teams 

Decontaminate casualties 

resulting from a 

hazardous materials 

incident, provide medical 

care, and deploy with 

pharmaceutical cache of 

antidotes and medical 

equipment.

Federal Response Plan; 

Presidential Decision 

Directives 39 and 62.

Four teams located at 

Washington, D.C. (nondeployable); WinstonSalem, N.C.; Denver, 

Colo.; and Los Angeles, 

Calif., with 36 collateral 

duty members per team. 

Travels by commercial or 

military aircraft or ground 

transportation. Expected 

to be ready to deploy 

within 3 hours and arrive 

within 12 hours.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response team Mission Cited authority

Number of team 

(dedicated/collateral) 

members and team's 

primary location

Transportation mode 

and response time 
Appendix II

Selected Information About Federal 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

Consequence Management Response Teams

Page 39 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Disaster Medical 

Assistance Teams 

Provide emergency 

medical care during a 

disaster or other event.

National Security 

Decision Directive 47; 

Public Health Service 

memorandum of 

understanding with each 

team and team sponsor; 

Federal Response Plan; 

Presidential Decision 

Directives 39 and 62.

Forty-four teams at 

various locations 

nationwide with

34 collateral duty 

members per team.

Travels by commercial or 

military aircraft or ground 

transportation. Expected 

to be ready to deploy 

within 3 to 4 hours and 

arrive within 12 to

24 hours.

Disaster Mortuary 

Operational Response 

Teams 

Provide identification and 

mortuary services to state 

and local health officials 

upon request in the event 

of major disasters and 

emergencies.

Federal Response Plan; 

Presidential Decision 

Directives 39 and 62; 

Public Health 

Service/National 

Association for Search 

and Rescue 

memorandum of 

understanding.

Ten teams at various 

locations nationwide with 

25 to 31 collateral duty 

members per team.

Travels by commercial 

aircraft or ground 

transportation. Expected 

to be ready to deploy 

within 4 hours and at the 

site within 6 to 12 hours. 

National Pharmaceutical 

Stockpile 

Resupplies state and local 

public health agencies 

with pharmaceuticals and 

other medical treatments 

in the event of a terrorist 

incident.

P.L. 105-277: Omnibus 

Consolidated and 

Emergency 

Appropriations Act of 

1999.

Four to six dedicated 

personnel located at 

Atlanta, Ga.

Travels by commercial, 

charter, or military aircraft. 

Expected to arrive within 

12 hours.

Department of Energy

Radiological Assistance 

Program Teams

Assist federal agencies, 

state and local 

governments, private 

business, or individuals in 

incidents involving 

radiological materials.

Established in the late 

1950s under the Atomic 

Energy Commission.

Twenty-six teams at 

various locations 

nationwide with seven 

collateral duty members 

per team.

Normally travels by 

ground transportation but 

can deploy by commercial 

aircraft. Expected to arrive 

within 2 to 6 hours.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response team Mission Cited authority

Number of team 

(dedicated/collateral) 

members and team's 

primary location

Transportation mode 

and response time 
Appendix II

Selected Information About Federal 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

Consequence Management Response Teams

Page 40 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Federal Radiological 

Monitoring and 

Assessment Centera

Collects, evaluates, 

interprets, and distributes 

off-site radiological data in 

support of the lead federal 

agency, state and local 

governments. 

Coordinates federal 

resources in responding 

to the off-site monitoring 

and assessment needs at 

the scene of a radiological 

emergency.

Federal Radiological 

Emergency Response 

Plan.

Team members deploy in 

phases. Phases I 

(15 members) and II

(45 members) consist of 

collateral duty 

Department of Energy 

personnel from Nellis Air 

Force Base, Nev., and 

other locations. Phase III 

(known as Full Federal 

Radiological Monitoring 

and Assessment Center) 

involves multiple federal 

agencies and may have 

150 or more personnel 

from various federal 

agencies.

Travels by military, 

commercial, or 

Department of Energyowned aircraft. Expected 

to arrive within 4 to 

8 hours (phase I),

11 hours (phase II), and 

24 to 36 hours (phase III).

Aerial Measuring 

System 

Detects, measures, and 

tracks ground and 

airborne radioactivity over 

large areas using fixedwing and rotary-wing 

aircraft.

Established in the early 

1950s as a U.S. 

Geological Survey 

program to support the 

Atomic Energy 

Commission.

Five to 10 dedicated and 

collateral duty personnel 

located at Nellis Air Force 

Base, Nev., and Andrews 

Air Force Base, Md.

Initial team travels in 

fixed-wing aircraft and is 

expected to arrive within 

4 to 8 hours.

Radiation Emergency 

Assistance 

Center/Training Site 

Provides medical advice 

and on-site assistance in 

triage, diagnosis, and 

treatment of all types of 

radiation exposure events.

Established in 1976 under 

an agreement between 

the Energy Research and 

Development 

Administration and a local 

hospital.

Four to eight dedicated 

personnel located in Oak 

Ridge, Tenn.

Travels by commercial or 

charter aircraft. Expected 

to be ready to deploy 

within 4 hours.

Department of Transportation

U.S. Coast Guard 

National Strike Teams

Respond to oil and 

hazardous substance 

pollution incidents in and 

around waterways to 

protect public health and 

the environment. Area of 

responsibility includes all 

Coast Guard Districts and 

Federal Response 

Regions. Support 

Environmental Protection 

Agency's On-Scene 

Coordinators for inland 

area incidents.

Federal Water Pollution 

Control Act of 1972; 

National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency 

Plan (40 C.F. R. 300); Oil 

Pollution Act of 1990.

Three teams located in 

Fort Dix, N.J.; Mobile, 

Ala.; and Novato, Calif., 

with 35 to 39 dedicated 

members per team. 

Travels by military aircraft 

or ground transportation. 

Expected to deploy within 

1 to 6 hours and arrive 

within 12 hours.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response team Mission Cited authority

Number of team 

(dedicated/collateral) 

members and team's 

primary location

Transportation mode 

and response time 
Appendix II

Selected Information About Federal 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

Consequence Management Response Teams

Page 41 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

U.S. Coast Guard OnScene CoordinatorsCoordinate all 

containment, removal and 

disposal efforts during a 

hazardous release 

incident in coastal or 

major navigational 

waterways.

National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency 

Plan (40 C.F.R. 300).

Approximately 

50 dedicated personnel in 

pre-designated Coast 

Guard regional zones at 

various locations 

nationwide.

Travels by ground 

transportation. On-call 

24 hours. Response time 

depends on location of 

incident site.

Department of Veterans Affairs

Medical Emergency 

Radiological Response 

Team 

Provides technical advice, 

radiological monitoring, 

decontamination 

expertise, and medical 

care as a supplement to 

an institutional health care 

provider.

Executive Order 12657: 

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

Assistance In Emergency 

Preparedness Planning at 

Commercial Nuclear 

Power Plants; Federal 

Radiological Emergency 

Response Plan.

Twenty-one to 

23 collateral duty 

personnel are located at 

various sites nationwide.

Travels by commercial 

aircraft. Expected to be 

ready to deploy within 

6 hours and arrive within 

12 to 24 hours.

Environmental Protection Agency

On-Scene Coordinators Direct response efforts 

and coordinate all other 

efforts at the scene of a 

hazardous materials 

discharge or release.

National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency 

Plan (40 C.F.R. 300).

Approximately 

200 dedicated personnel, 

plus contractor support, at 

various locations 

nationwide.

Travels by commercial 

aircraft or ground 

transportation. 

Coordinators and 

contractors are on-call

24 hours. Response time 

depends on location of 

incident site.

Environmental 

Response Team

Provides technical 

support for assessing, 

managing, and disposing 

of hazardous waste. 

National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency 

Plan (40 C.F.R. 300).

Twenty-two dedicated 

personnel, plus contractor 

support, located in 

Edison, N.J., and 

Cincinnati, Ohio.

Travels by commercial 

aircraft. Advance team 

expected to deploy within 

4 hours. Full team 

expected to arrive within 

24 to 48 hours.

Radiological Emergency 

Response Team

Provides mobile 

laboratories for field 

analysis of samples and 

technical expertise in 

radiation monitoring, 

radiation health physics, 

and risk assessment.

National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency 

Plan (40 C.F.R. 300)

As many as 60 collateral 

duty personnel located in 

Las Vegas, Nev., and 

Montgomery, Ala.

Travels by ground 

transportation or military 

air. Expected to arrive 

within 2 to 3 days.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response team Mission Cited authority

Number of team 

(dedicated/collateral) 

members and team's 

primary location

Transportation mode 

and response time 
Appendix II

Selected Information About Federal 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

Consequence Management Response Teams

Page 42 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

a

The Department of Energy has the lead responsibility for coordinating the Federal Radiological 

Monitoring Assessment Center during the early phase of an emergency. The Environmental Protection 

Agency assumes control during later phases.

Note: Agency officials define deployment time as the number of hours in which team members receive 

notification to leave for an incident and their arrival at their place of departure. They define arrival time 

as the number of hours in which the team is expected to reach the incident site after receiving 

notification. Department of Defense officials provided only deployment times for their teams.

Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Emergency Response 

Team 

Coordinates federal 

response and recovery 

activities within a state.

Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and 

Emergency Assistance 

Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et. 

seq.

Size is dependent on the 

severity and magnitude of 

the incident. Collateral 

duty team members are 

geographically dispersed 

at Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

headquarters and 

10 regional offices.

Travels by commercial, 

charter, or military aircraft, 

or ground transportation. 

Expected to arrive within 

24 hours.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regional Incident 

Response Teams 

Carry out the 

responsibilities and 

functions of the lead 

federal agency during 

incidents at licensed 

facilities such as nuclear 

power plants.

Public Law 96-295, dated 

June 30, 1980; Federal 

Radiological Emergency 

Response Plan.

Four teams located in 

Atlanta, Ga.; Lisle, Ill.; 

Arlington, Tex.; and King 

of Prussia, Penn., with 

25 to 30 collateral duty 

members per team.

Travels by commercial or 

charter aircraft or ground 

transportation. Initial team 

expected to arrive within 

6 to 12 hours.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response team Mission Cited authority

Number of team 

(dedicated/collateral) 

members and team's 

primary location

Transportation mode 

and response time 
Page 43 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix III

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Chemical 

Terrorist Incident ApendxiI

The primary functions federal response teams may perform in a terrorist 

incident involving a chemical agent or weapon vary (see table 1). Different 

types of chemical agents exist, and they can be dispersed as a gas, vapor, 

liquid, or aerosol. A chemical agent could be disseminated by explosive or 

mechanical delivery. Some chemicals disperse rapidly and others remain 

toxic for days or weeks and require decontamination and clean up. Rapid 

exposure to a highly concentrated agent would increase the number of 

casualties. Federal, state, and local officials generally agree that a chemical 

terrorist incident would look like a major hazardous material emergency. 

According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, over 600 local 

and state hazardous material teams will be the first to respond to an 

incident, whether it is a chemical agent, industrial chemical, or other 

material. If local responders are unable to manage the situation or are 

overwhelmed, the incident commander has access to state and federal 

assets.

Table 1: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 

Department of Defense

Joint Task 

Force for Civil 

Support

Commands all 

federal military 

forces on site 

for 

consequence 

management 

and 

coordinates 

these activities 

with the lead 

federal agency.
Appendix III

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Chemical 

Terrorist Incident

Page 44 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Chemical/ 

Biological 

Rapid 

Response 

Team

Provides 

specialized 

technical 

advice to the 

Joint Task 

Force for Civil 

Support. Offers 

links to 

U.S. Army 

experts in a 

variety of 

disciplines, 

such as agent 

detection and 

disposal and 

assistance 

from medical 

laboratories.

U.S. Army 

Technical 

Escort Unita

Samples, 

detects, and 

identifies 

chemical 

agents.

Renders safe, 

packages, and 

escorts chemical 

munitions or 

devices.

U.S. Army 

Special 

Medical 

Augmentation 

Response 

Team-Nuclear/ 

Biological/ 

Chemicala

Provides 

advice to

(1) medical 

treatment 

facilities on 

handling 

contaminated 

patients and

(2) authorities 

on determining 

follow-on 

medical 

resources, 

supplies, and 

equipment to 

resolve the 

incident.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix III

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Chemical 

Terrorist Incident

Page 45 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

U.S. Marine 

Corps 

ChemicalBiological 

Incident 

Response 

Forcea

Samples, 

detects, and 

identifies 

chemical 

agents.

Performs 

casualty search, 

extraction, and 

decontamination.

Performs 

triage and 

emergency 

medical 

treatment in 

a contaminated zone.

Performs first 

aid, advanced 

cardiac life 

support, and 

trauma support 

initially for 

250 patients. 

Administers 

1,500 nerve 

agent 

antidotes.

Department of Health and Human Services 

Management 

Support Teams 

Coordinate the 

activities of 

federal civilian 

medical teams.

National 

Medical 

Response 

Teams 

Collect and 

secure 

contaminated 

material, e.g. 

victims' clothing 

and any items 

that are 

circumspect after 

initial search for 

transition to 

crisis management 

responders.

Provide 

extensive 

decontamination capability.

Perform 

casualty 

triage.

Provide 

extensive 

medical care; 

stabilize 

patients; and 

administer 

antidotes and 

other 

medications. 

The teams 

each have a 

supply of 

pharmaceuticals to treat 

5,000 people.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix III

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Chemical 

Terrorist Incident

Page 46 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Disaster 

Medical 

Assistance 

Teams 

Perform 

casualty 

triage.

Provide 

emergency 

medical care 

and patient 

stabilization.

Can administer 

medical 

treatments. 

Assist in the 

transport of 

victims from 

incident site to 

medical 

facilities such 

as hospitals.

Disaster 

Mortuary 

Operational 

Response 

Teams 

Perform 

recovery, 

identification, 

and processing 

of fatalities. 

Provide advice 

on the effects of 

decomposing 

fatalities. 

Decontaminate 

fatalities.

Department of Transportation

U.S. Coast 

Guard National 

Strike Teams

Identify 

environmental 

contamination 

of waterways.

Decontaminate, 

collect, and 

secure 

contaminated 

material in 

waterways.

U.S. Coast 

Guard OnScene 

Coordinators

Coordinate 

federal containment, 

removal, and 

disposal efforts 

in and around 

coastal 

waterways.

Conduct initial 

site 

assessment, 

to include 

evaluating the 

size and nature 

of the released 

substance and 

its potential 

hazards.

Direct efforts to 

decontaminate 

and clean up the 

incident site. 

Activities can 

include control 

and stabilization 

of the agent,

on-site 

treatment, and 

off-site disposal.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix III

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Chemical 

Terrorist Incident

Page 47 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

a

These DOD teams have a military wartime mission and may be unavailable for a domestic terrorist 

incident.

Note: We identified the primary functions performed by a team when it responds to a chemical terrorist 

incident, even though the team has other capabilities.

Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.

Environmental Protection Agency

On-Scene 

Coordinators 

Coordinate 

federal 

containment, 

removal, and 

disposal 

efforts.

Conduct initial 

site 

assessment, 

to include 

evaluating the 

size and nature 

of the released 

substance and 

its potential 

hazards.

Direct efforts to 

decontaminate 

and clean up the 

incident site. 

Activities can 

include control 

and stabilization 

of the agent, onsite treatment, 

and off-site 

disposal.

Environmental 

Response 

Team 

Offers 

specialized 

technical 

assistance in 

areas such as 

air sampling 

and ecological 

risk 

assessment.

Offers 

specialized 

technical 

assistance in 

areas such as 

incineration and 

groundwater 

treatment.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Emergency 

Response 

Team 

Establishes 

field office if 

required. 

Provides 

disaster 

assessment 

coordination 

and expertise 

to states and 

the Federal 

Emergency 

Management 

Agency 

regions. 

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Page 48 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix IV

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Biological 

Terrorist Incident ApendxiIV

The primary functions federal response teams may perform in a terrorist 

incident involving a biological agent or weapon vary (see table 2). Based on 

our prior work, according to a wide range of experts in science, health, 

intelligence, and biological warfare and a technical report we reviewed, the 

most effective way to disseminate a biological agent is by aerosol. This 

method allows the simultaneous respiratory infection of a large number of 

people. A few biological agents (e.g., plague and smallpox) are 

communicable and can be spread beyond those directly affected by the 

weapon or dissemination device. Every biological agent, even those that 

are highly communicable, must be disseminated by some means that 

infects enough individuals to initiate a disease epidemic. The release of a 

biological agent or weapon may not be known for several days until victims 

present themselves to medical personnel in doctors’ offices, clinics, and 

emergency rooms where the symptoms might be easily confused with 

influenza or other less virulent illnesses. Accordingly, the critical detection 

of the biological agent begins with the public health infrastructure that 

detects outbreaks of illness, identifies the sources and modes of 

transmission, and performs rapid agent laboratory identification. Once 

diagnosis of a biological agent is confirmed, treating victims may require 

the use of federal consequence management teams and the need for items 

from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.

Table 2: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 

Department of Defense

Joint Task 

Force for Civil 

Support

Commands all 

federal military 

forces on site 

for consequence 

management 

and 

coordinates 

these activities 

with the lead 

federal agency.
Appendix IV

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Biological 

Terrorist Incident

Page 49 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Chemical/ 

Biological 

Rapid 

Response 

Team

Provides 

specialized 

technical 

advice to the 

Joint Task 

Force for Civil 

Support. Offers 

links to 

U.S. Army 

experts in a 

variety of 

disciplines, 

such as agent 

detection and 

disposal and 

assistance 

from medical 

laboratories.

U.S. Army 

Special 

Medical 

Augmentation 

Response 

Team-Nuclear/ 

Biological/ 

Chemicala

Provides 

advice to 

(1) medical 

treatment 

facilities on 

handling 

contaminated 

patients and 

(2) authorities 

on determining 

follow-on 

medical 

resources, 

supplies, and 

equipment to 

resolve the 

incident.

U.S. Army 

Special 

Medical 

Augmentation 

Response 

Team-AeroMedical 

Isolationa

Provides highly 

specialized 

patient care 

during 

evacuation to 

medical 

facilities. 

Provides 

limited patient 

care in isolation 

units.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix IV

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Biological 

Terrorist Incident

Page 50 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

U.S. Marine 

Corps 

ChemicalBiological 

Incident 

Response 

Forcea

Has capability 

to detect four 

biological 

agents.

Department of Health and Human Services

Management 

Support Teams 

Coordinate the 

activities of 

federal civilian 

medical teams.

National 

Medical 

Response 

Teams

. Perform 

casualty 

triage.

Provide 

extensive 

medical care, 

stabilize 

patients, and 

administer 

antibiotics and 

other 

medications.

Disaster 

Medical 

Assistance 

Teams 

Perform 

casualty 

triage.

Provide 

emergency 

medical care 

and patient 

stabilization.

Assist in the 

transport of 

victims from 

medical points 

of distribution 

to medical 

facilities such 

as area 

hospitals.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix IV

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Biological 

Terrorist Incident

Page 51 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Disaster 

Mortuary 

Operational 

Response 

Teams 

Perform 

recovery, 

identification, 

and processing 

of fatalities. 

Provide advice 

on the effects of 

decomposing 

fatalities. 

Decontaminate 

fatalities.

National 

Pharmaceutical Stockpile 

Personnel who 

accompany the 

stockpile 

advise and 

assist in the 

organization of 

bulk stockpile 

medications 

into individual 

doses. They 

also advise and 

assist in the 

implementation of plans 

to distribute 

and dispense 

stockpile 

medications.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Emergency 

Response 

Team 

Establishes 

field office if 

required. 

Provides 

disaster 

assessment 

coordination 

and expertise 

to states and 

the Federal 

Emergency 

Management 

Agency 

regions.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix IV

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a Biological 

Terrorist Incident

Page 52 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

a

These DOD teams have a military wartime mission and may be unavailable for a domestic incident.

Note: We identified the primary functions performed by a team when it responds to a biological terrorist 

incident, even though the team has other capabilities.

Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Page 53 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix V

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a 

Radiological/Nuclear Terrorist Incident ApendxiV

The primary functions federal response teams may perform in a terrorist 

incident involving a radiological agent or weapon vary (see table 3). A 

radiological terrorist incident could expose people at the incident site to 

dangerous levels of radioactive material and contaminate a geographic 

area. One possible delivery mechanism is an explosive device containing 

radioactive material such as cesium-137, iridium-192, and cobalt-60. The 

radioactive material could be removed from a stolen source, crushed into 

powder, and placed in the explosive device. In addition to the damage 

caused by the explosion itself, the disbursed radioactive material could 

irradiate people who come into contact with it, ingest it, or inhale it. If the 

exposure level is high enough, these people could become sick or die. The 

radioactive material could also contaminate the incident site and be 

disbursed in the smoke resulting from the blast.1

 Such an incident would 

warrant a quick response from local fire and rescue and law enforcement 

personnel. If these local responders are unable to manage the situation or 

are overwhelmed, the incident commander has access to federal assets. 

1

 This delivery mechanism is described in the December 15, 1999, report of the Advisory 

Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. Mock terrorists in the Washington, D.C., area also used explosive devices to 

disburse radioactive material during the May 2000 exercise that is discussed elsewhere in 

this report. Terrorists could also use a more passive system, such as aerosol, to deliver 

radiological agents.
Appendix V

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a 

Radiological/Nuclear Terrorist Incident

Page 54 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Table 3: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Radiological/Nuclear 

Terrorist Incident

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 

Department of Defense

Joint Task 

Force for Civil 

Support

Commands all 

federal military 

forces on site 

for 

consequence 

management 

and 

coordinates 

these activities 

with the lead 

federal agency.

U. S. Army 

Special 

Medical 

Augmentation 

Response 

Team-Nuclear/ 

Biological/

Chemicala

Provides 

advice to

(1) medical 

treatment 

facilities on 

handling 

contaminated 

patients and

(2) authorities 

on determining 

follow-on 

medical 

resources, 

supplies, and 

equipment to 

resolve the 

incident.

U.S. Army 

Radiological 

Advisory 

Medical Teama

Monitors 

contaminated 

medical 

facilities and 

equipment. 

Provides 

guidance about 

health hazards 

from 

radiological 

contamination. 

Provides 

advice for 

appropriate 

medical 

treatment. Can 

treat victims. 
Appendix V

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a 

Radiological/Nuclear Terrorist Incident

Page 55 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Department of Energy

Radiological 

Assistance 

Program 

Teams

Conduct initial 

site 

assessments. 

Small, 

regionally 

based teams 

provide quick 

response 

capability to 

calls for 

radiological 

assistance.

. Advise 

decisionmakers on 

steps that can 

be taken to 

evaluate and 

minimize the 

hazards of a 

radiological 

emergency.

Federal 

Radiological 

Monitoring and 

Assessment 

Center 

Acts as the 

control point for 

all federal 

assets that are 

monitoring and 

assessing 

off-site 

radiological 

conditions.

Gathers and 

assesses 

radiological 

data from 

multiple 

sources, 

including 

Radiological 

Assistance 

Program teams 

and the Aerial 

Measuring 

System. Also 

provides 

assessments 

to the state and 

the lead federal 

agency.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix V

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a 

Radiological/Nuclear Terrorist Incident

Page 56 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Aerial 

Measuring 

System 

Detects and 

surveys the 

location of 

radioactive 

material 

deposited on 

the ground or 

the path of a 

radioactive 

plume. Fixedwing aircraft 

provide quick 

surveys over a 

large area to 

determine the 

severity of the 

incident. 

Rotary-wing 

aircraft provide 

more detailed 

measurements.

Radiation 

Emergency 

Assistance 

Center/

Training Site 

Provides 

medical 

consultation 

and on-site 

assistance for 

the treatment 

of all types of 

radiation 

exposure 

incidents.

Department of Health and Human Services

Management 

Support Teams 

Coordinate the 

activities of 

federal civilian 

medical teams.

National 

Medical 

Response 

Teamsb

Extract and 

decontaminate 

victims from 

contaminated 

area.

Perform 

casualty 

triage.

Provide limited 

medical care.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix V

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a 

Radiological/Nuclear Terrorist Incident

Page 57 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Disaster 

Medical 

Assistance 

Teams

Perform 

casualty 

triage.

Provide 

emergency 

medical care 

and patient 

stabilization. 

Can administer 

medical 

treatments. 

Assist in the 

transport of 

victims from 

incident site to 

medical 

facilities such 

as hospitals. 

Disaster 

Mortuary 

Operational 

Response 

Teams 

Perform 

recovery, 

identification, 

and processing 

of fatalities. 

Provide advice 

on the effects of 

potential 

contamination 

resulting from 

fatalities. 

Decontaminate 

fatalities.

Department of Veterans Affairs

Medical 

Emergency 

Radiological 

Response 

Team 

Monitors for 

radioactivity 

beyond the 

contaminated 

site.

Provides 

capability to 

decontaminate 

victims.

Provides 

specialized 

medical care 

for radiation 

trauma. 

Environmental Protection Agency

On-Scene 

Coordinators 

Coordinate 

federal containment, 

removal, and 

disposal 

efforts.

Conduct initial 

site 

assessment, to 

include 

evaluating the 

size and nature 

of the released 

substance and 

its potential 

hazards.

Direct efforts to 

clean up the 

incident site. 

Activities can 

include control 

and stabilization 

of the agent, onsite treatment, 

and off-site 

disposal.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix V

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a 

Radiological/Nuclear Terrorist Incident

Page 58 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

a

These DOD teams have a military wartime mission and may be unavailable for a domestic terrorist 

incident.

b

These functions are performed by a special unit within one of the National Medical Response Teams.

Radiological 

Emergency 

Response 

Team 

Conducts 

sample 

preparation 

and analysis in 

mobile 

laboratories.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Emergency 

Response 

Team 

Establishes 

field office if 

required. 

Provides 

disaster 

assessment 

coordination 

and expertise 

to states and 

the Federal 

Emergency 

Management 

Agency 

regions.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regional 

Incident 

Response 

Teams 

Lead and 

coordinate 

federal actions 

related to the 

radiological 

technical 

response at 

incident site. 

Review actions 

the regulated 

entity is taking 

to correct 

problems. 

Provide 

analysis and 

consultation for 

actions taken 

to protect 

public health 

and safety.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Response 

team

Coordinate 

activities at 

incident site

Detect and 

evaluate agent

Dismantle, 

transfer, 

dispose of, 

and/or 

decontaminate 

property

Extract and/or 

decontaminate 

victims from 

the incident 

site

Triage 

victims

Provide 

medical 

treatment

Provide 

technical 

advice 
Appendix V

Selected Functions of Federal Consequence 

Management Response Teams in a 

Radiological/Nuclear Terrorist Incident

Page 59 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Note: We identified the primary functions performed by a team when it responds to a radiological or 

nuclear terrorist incident, even though the team has other capabilities. The magnitude of devastation 

caused by a nuclear weapon would overwhelm state and local assets quickly. The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation ranks use of nuclear weapons by domestic-origin terrorists on the low-end of the threat 

spectrum.

Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Page 60 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix VI

Organizations and Locations Visited ApendxiVI

During the course of our review, we met with officials from the following 

organizations:

Department of Defense • Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, 

Arlington, Va.

• Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Arlington, Va. 

• Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.

• U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 

Frederick, Md.

• U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, Aberdeen, Md.

• U.S. Army Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team, Aberdeen, Md.

Department of Health 

and Human Services

• Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Emergency Preparedness, Rockville, Md.

• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.

• National Center for Infectious Diseases

• National Center for Environmental Health

• National Medical Response Team, Arlington, Va.

Department of Energy • Office of Emergency Response, Germantown, Md. 

• Albuquerque Operations Office, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.

• Sandia National Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.

• Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, N.M.

• Remote Sensing Laboratory, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

Department of 

Transportation

• U.S. Coast Guard, Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Environmental 

Protection Agency

• Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

• Region VIII, Denver, Colo.

• Environmental Response Team, Edison, N.J.

• Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory, 

Las Vegas, Nev.
Appendix VI

Organizations and Locations Visited

Page 61 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

• Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

• Region VIII, Denver, Colo. 

Department of 

Veterans Affairs

• Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Management Strategic 

Healthcare Group, Martinsburg, W.Va.

Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission

• Headquarters, Rockville, Md. 

Office of Management 

and Budget

• Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
Page 62 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix VII

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiVI
Page 63 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix VIII

Comments From the Department of Energy ApendxiVI
Page 64 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix IX

Comments From the Department of Justice ApendxiIX
Appendix IX

Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 65 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism
Page 66 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix X

Comments From the Department of Health 

and Human Services ApendxiX
Page 67 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XI

Comments From the Department of Veterans 

Affairs ApendxiXI
Page 68 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XII

Comments From the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency ApendxiXI
Page 69 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XIII

Comments From the Environmental 

Protection Agency ApendxXiI
Page 70 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XIV

Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission ApendxXiIV
Page 71 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XV

Comments From the Office of Management 

and Budget ApendxiXV
Appendix XV

Comments From the Office of Management 

and Budget

Page 72 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XV

Comments From the Office of Management 

and Budget

Page 73 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism
Page 74 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XVI

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxXiVI

GAO Contact Stephen L. Caldwell (202) 512-9610

Acknowledgments Deborah Colantonio, James A. Driggins, Thomas W. Gosling, Harry L. 

Purdy, and Raymond J. Wyrsch made key contributions to this report. 
Page 75 GAO-01-14 Combating Terrorism

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