## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

04-1373, -1374 NUCOR CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, and UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, and BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, STEEL DYNAMICS, INC., WEIRTON STEEL CORPORATION, and INDEPENDENT STEELWORKERS UNION, Plaintiffs,

v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee, and AB SANDVIK STEEL (now known as AB Sandvik Materials Technology) and SANDVIK STEEL COMPANY (now known as Sandvik Materials Technolgy), and ACERALIA CORPORACION SIDERURGICA, S.A., ARCELOR INTERNATIONAL AMERICA INC., ARCELOR PACKAGING INTERNATIONAL, SIDMAR, N.V., SOLLAC ATLANTIQUE, SOLLAC LORRAINE, and TRADEARBED, INC., and BHP STEEL AMERICAS, LTD. (now BlueScope Steel Americas LLC), BHP STEEL LLC. (now BlueScope Steel Limited), NEW ZEALAND STEEL, LTD., and ISCOR (PTY.) LTD., and CORUS STAAL BV and CORUS STEEL USA INC., and DONGBU STEEL CO., LTD. and POSCO, and- 2 -
NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, NISSHIN STEEL CO., LTD., KOBE STEEL LTD., JFE STEEL CORP. (formerly known as Kawasaki Steel Corp. and NKK Corporation),

THAI COLD ROLLED STEEL SHEET PUBLIC CO., LTD., and SUMITOMO METAL INDUSTRIES, LTD., and SIDERURGICA DEL ORINOCO, C.A. and SIDERAR S.A.I.C., and THYSSEN KRUPP STAHL AG and SALZGITTER AG, Defendants-Appellees, and COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA NACIONAL, COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA PAULISTA, USINAS SIDERURGICA DE MINAS GERIAS, S.A., and HYUNDAI HYSCO CO., LTD., and ASSOCIATION OF GERMAN SPECIALTY COLD ROLLED STEEL STRIP PRODUCERS, and BORCELIK CELIK SANAYII VE TICARET A.S., Defendants.

Charles Owen Verill, Jr. , Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant, Nucor Corporat ion. With him on the brief were Alan H. Price and Timothy C. Brightbill

. Stephen P. Vaughn , Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant, United States Steel Corporation. With him on the brief were Robert E. Lighthizer , John J. Mangan and James C. Hecht

. Charles A. St. Charles , Attorney, Office of the Gener al Counsel, United States International Trade Commission, of Wash ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee, United States. With him on the brief were James M. Lyons , Acting General Counsel, and Rhonda M. Hughes , Acting Assistant General Counsel for Litigation. Of counsel was Marc A. Bernstein , Attorney. Robert S. LaRussa , Shearman & Sterling LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees, Aceralia Co rporation Siderurgica, S.A., ET AL. With him on the brief was Christopher M. Ryan . Of counsel were Quentin M. Baird and Julie C. Mendoza , Kaye Scholer LLP, of Washington, DC. Lynn M. Fischer Fox , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees, BHP Steel Am ericas, Ltd. (now BlueScope Steel- 3 - Americas LLC), ET AL. Wi th her on the brief were John D. Greenwald , Robert C. Cassidy, Jr. , Gary N. Horlick and Leonard M. Shambon . Of counsel was Kristin H. Mowry

. Eric C. Emerson , Steptoe & Johnson LLP, of Wa shington, DC, for defendantsappellees, Corus Staal BV, ET AL. With him on the brief were Richard O. Cunningham and Tina Potuto Kimble

. Donald B. Cameron , Kaye Scholer LLP, of Wa shington, DC, for defendantsappellees, Dongbu Steel Co., Ltd., ET AL. With him on the brief were Juile C. Mendoza , R. Will Planert and Margaret S. Rudin

. Kenneth J. Pierce , Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees, Nippon Steel Co rporation, ET AL. With him on the brief were William H. Barringer and Robert E. DeFrancesco . Of counsel were Christopher Dunn , James P. Durling , Daniel L. Porter , Matthew R. Nicely and Carrie L. Owens

. David P. Houlihan , White & Case LLP, of Wa shington, DC, for defendantsappellees, Siderurgica Del Orinoco, C.A., ET AL. With him on the brief were Gregory J. Spak and Richard J. Burke . Of counsel was Frank H. Morgan

.

Gail T. Cumins , Sharretts Paley Carter and Bl auvelt, P.C., of New York, New York, for defendants-appellees, Thyssen Krupp Stahl AG, ET AL. Appeal from: United States C ourt of International Trade Judge Gregory W. Carman

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

04-1373,-1374 NUCOR CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, and UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, and BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, STEEL DYNAMICS, INC., WEIRTON STEEL CORPORATION, and INDEPENDENT STEELWORKERS UNION, Plaintiffs,

v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee, and AB SANDVIK STEEL (now known as AB Sandvik Materials Technology) and SANDVIK STEEL COMPANY (now known as Sandvik Materials Technology), and ACERALIA CORPORACION SIDERURGICA, S.A., ARCELOR INTERNATIONAL AMERICA INC., ARCELOR PACKAGING INTERNATIONAL, SIDMAR, N.V., SOLLAC ATLANTIQUE, SOLLAC LORRAINE, and TRADEARBED, INC., and BHP STEEL AMERICAS, LTD. (now Bl ueScope Steel Americas LLC), BHP STEEL LLC (now BlueScope Steel Limited), NEW ZEALAND STEEL, LTD., and ISCOR (PTY.) LTD., and CORUS STAAL BV and CORUS STEEL USA INC.,04-1373,-1374 2 and DONGBUSTEEL CO., LTD. and POSCO, and NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, NISSHIN STEEL CO., LTD., KOBE STEEL LTD., JFE STEEL CORP., (formerly known as Kawasaki Steel Corp. and NKK Corporation),

THAI COLD ROLLED STEEL SHEET PUBLIC CO., LTD., and SUMITOMO METAL INDUSTRIES, LTD., and SIDERURGICA DEL ORINOCO, C.A. and SIDERAR S.A.I.C., and THYSSEN KRUPP STAHL AG and SALZGITTER AG, Defendants-Appellees, and COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA NACIONAL, COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA PAULISTA, USINAS SIDERURGICA DE MINAS GERIAS, S.A., and HYUNDAI HYSCO CO., LTD., and ASSOCIATION OF GERMAN SPECIALTY COLD ROLLED STEEL STRIP PRODUCERS, and BORCELIK CELIK SANAYII VE TICARET A.S., Defendants.

___________________________ DECIDED: July 7, 2005

___________________________ Before RADER, BRYSON, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges

. BRYSON, Circuit Judge

. The appellants, United Stat es Steel Corporation and Nucor Corporation, are domestic steel producers. Along with other domestic producers, they petitioned the International Trade Commission to investigate imports of cold-rolled steel products to determine if those imports were causing material injury to the domestic steel industry. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(1), 1673d( b)(1). Upon completion of its investigations, the04-1373,-1374 3 Commission issued final determinations that the domestic steel industry was not materially injured by reason of the im ports. The appellants and other domestic producers filed an action in the Court of International Trade challenging the Commission’s negative material injury determinat ions. The Court of International Trade sustained the Commission’s determinations . Nucor Corp. v. United States , 318 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004). U.S. Steel and Nucor appeal. We affirm.
I Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a), authorizes the President to take appropriate action to pr otect domestic industries from substantial injury due to increased quantities of imports . In June 2001, the President requested that the Commission conduct a section 201 in vestigation of steel products imported between January 1997 and June 2001. Following its investigation, the Commission determined that cold-rolled steel products “were being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantia l cause of serious injury to the domestic industry” and recommended that safeguard ta riffs be imposed on steel products. Consequently, in March 2002 the President im posed safeguard tariffs on steel products, including cold-rolled steel products, of 30 perc ent for the first year, 24 percent for the second year, and 18 percent for the third year. In September 2001, a num ber of domestic steel producers petitioned the Commission to conduct the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations that gave rise to this case. The Commi ssion’s antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, which were directed to cert ain cold-rolled steel products, overlapped the04-1373,-1374 4 section 201 investigation and the subsequent imposition of tariffs on cold-rolled steel products. The Commission’s responsibility in an antidumping or c ountervailing duty investigation is to determine if a domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(1), 1673d(b)(1). Material injury is defined as “harm whic h is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.” Id. § 1677(7)(A). In order to make a material injury determination, the Commission must consider the volume of the imports, the effect on prices of domestic like products due to the im ports, and the impact of t he imports on the domestic industry’s production. Id. § 1677(7)(B)(i). When consideri ng the volume of the imports, the Commission must determine if t he volume is significant. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(i). When determining the effect on price, the Commissi on must consider whether there has been significant price underselling and whether the domestic prices are depressed or suppressed because of the imports. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii). The Commission issued final determinations on all of the subject investigations in September and November 2002. In those determinations, the Commission found that the “Section 201 investigation and the Presi dent’s remedy fundamentally altered the U.S. market for many steel products, in cluding cold-rolled steel.” The Commission found that imports of thos e products declined sharply and that domestic prices increased significantly in the period after the imposition of the section 201 tariffs. The Commission further reported that, according to purchasers, the reduction in imports due to the section 201 tariffs had led to “higher prices, supply shortages, and some broken or renegotiated contracts.” Ba sed on the results of its investigation, the Commission04-1373,-1374 5 concluded that the section 201 relief was the principal reason for the sharp decline in imports near the end of the investigation period. The Commission further found that, as of the conclusion of the antidumping and countervailing duty proc eedings, “the domestic cold-rolled steel products industry is neit her materially injured nor threatened with material injury by reason of subject impor ts.” Because the Commission determined that the domestic industry was not suffering present ma terial injury or a threat of material injury as a result of the subject imports , no antidumping or countervailing duties were imposed. In the Court of International Trade, the domestic produc ers argued that the Commission’s negative material injury dete rminations were flawed because, among other reasons, the Commission failed to consi der the effects of im ports in the early portion of the investigation period; it failed to make a determination regarding the significance of importers’ underselling of domestic producers; and it erred in its determinations regarding the volume of impor ts and their impact on domestic prices. In a detailed opinion, the trial court su stained the Commission’s determinations.
II U.S. Steel and Nucor argue that the Commi ssion erred by failing to consider the effects of products imported prior to the imposition of section 201 tariffs when it determined that the domestic industry was not suffering current material injury because of imports. In particular, they contend t hat the requirement in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(1) and 1673d(b)(1) that the Commission determine whether the domestic industry is suffering material injury “by reason of im ports” mandated that the Commission consider the effects of imports th roughout the period of invest igation and not confine its04-1373,-1374 6 consideration to the effects of current imports. Because, in the appellants’ view, the Commission based its material injury determi nations solely on current imports, the appellants argue that the Commission’s material injury determination was legally flawed. The trial court held that the Commi ssion had reasonably construed the phrase “by reason of imports” in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d( b)(1) and 1673d(b)(1) to allow it to focus its investigation on the most recent import data. The court explained that the Commission had investigated imports for the entir e period of investi gation. Although the Commission had focused mainly on current im ports, it had also considered imports during the early portion of that period in assessing the volume of imports, their effects on price, and the overall impac t of imports on the domestic industry. The Commission’s particular focus on current imports, according to the trial court, was “in accord with the remedial purpose of duties wh ich are intended merely to prevent future harm to the domestic industry by reason of unf air imports that are presently causing material injury.” The court also found that al though the Commission did not stat e explicitly that past imports were not causing present material injury, it implicitly made that determination. According to the court, the Commission properly assessed the effects of imports early in the investigation period in light of the evidence that there was a steep decline in imports near the end of the in vestigation period. Sections 1671d(b)(1) and 1673d(b)(1) state that the Commission must determine whether a domestic industry “is materially inju red . . . by reason of imports.” They do not specify how the Commission should we igh imports early in the period of investigation as compared to im ports closer to the date of dec ision, nor do they provide any guidance as to the consi derations that should influence the weight the Commission04-1373,-1374 7 assigns to data from different portions of the investigation per iod. Because the statutes are silent on those issues, and because t he Commission, together with the Commerce Department, is charged with t he responsibility of administering the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, the Commission’s cons truction of those statutes is entitled to deference under the principles of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Comm. for Fairly Traded V enezuelan Cement v. United States , 372 F.3d 1284, 1289 & n.2 (F ed. Cir. 2004); Tx. Crushed Stone Co. v. United States , 35 F.3d 1535, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sura merica de Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States , 966 F.2d 660, 665 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992). We agree with the trial c ourt that it was reasonable for the Commission to interpret the statutory language to permit it to accord different weight to imports during different portions of the period of investi gation depending on the facts of each case. In particular, the Commission acted reasonably in construing the st atutory language to permit it to focus on the most recent imports and pricing data. That construction is reasonable for several reasons. First, the purpose of antidumping and countervailing duty laws is remedial, not punitive or retaliatory, see Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States , 901 F.2d 1097, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir . 1990), and current data typically is the most pertinent in determining whether rem edial measures are necessary, see Chr. Bjelland Seafoods A/S v. United States , 19 Ct. Int’l Trade 35, 44 n. 22 (1995). Second, section 1677(7)(B)(i) provides that, in making the ma terial injury determination required by sections 1671d(b)(1) and 1673d(b)(1), the Commission shall consider, inter alia , the effects of the subject imports on domestic producers. Section 1677(7)(C)(iii) in turn requires the Commission, in determining the impact of the subject imports on domestic04-1373,-1374 8 producers, to “evaluate all re levant economic factors whic h have a bearing on the state of the industry in the United States.” As the trial c ourt explained, in most cases the most recent imports will have t he greatest relevance to the cu rrent state of the domestic industry. Third, the Commi ssion has broad discretion with respect to the period of investigation that it selects for purposes of making a material injury determination. As the Court of International Trade has explained, because the statute “does not expressly command the Commission to examine a particula r period of time . . . the Commission has discretion to examine a period that most reasonably allows it to determine whether a domestic industry is injured by [less than fair value] imports.” Kenda Rubber Indus. Co. v. United States , 630 F. Supp. 354, 359 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986). Since the Commission has broad discretion to choose the most appropriate period of time for its investigation, it would be nonsensical to hold that once the Commission has chosen an investigation period, it is required to give equal weight to imports throughout the period it has selected. For these reasons, both this court and the Court of International Trade have typically upheld the Commission’s exercise of its discretion to focus on imports during particular portions of the investigati on period, especially im ports during the most recent portion of that period. See Chaparral Steel , 901 F.2d at 1103; Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n v. United States , 93 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1294 n.13 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000), aff’d , 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Angus Chem. Co. v. United States , 944 F. Supp. 943, 947-48 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996), aff’d , 140 F.3d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In this case, the fact t hat section 201 tariffs were imposed during the period of investigation made the recent data far more probative than earlier data as to whether the industry was suffering present material injury as a result of imports. The04-1373,-1374 9 Commission found that the section 201 relief “w as having a major im pact in the U.S. market for cold-rolled steel and was the over whelming factor in the sharp decline in subject imports during the most recent peri od examined.” Substantial evidence in the record supports that finding, and the appe llants do not challenge the trial court’s determination in that regard. Because the imposition of section 201 tariffs had such a dramatic impact on the industr y, it was reasonable for the Commission to conclude that the most recent data was the most reliabl e indicator of whether the industry was suffering material injury as a result of t he subject imports and whet her the imposition of additional duties would be consistent with the remedial purposes of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. The appellants argue that the Commission did not simply assign greater weight to current imports, but that it improperly focused excl usively on current imports and failed to give any consideration to whether the domestic industry was suffering material injury by reason of past imports. They cont end that the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the Commission exami ned imports over the entire investigation period in making its determination that the subject imports were not causing present material injury. In making the statutory determination that the domestic cold-rolled steel industry was not suffering material injury by r eason of the subject imports, the Commission explained that it focused principally on “the current volume of s ubject imports and the increase in domestic prices in 2002.” The Commission concluded that the present condition of the domestic industry was not “attr ibutable in any material respect to the current subject imports” and t hat “subject imports are not adversely affecting domestic04-1373,-1374 10 prices to a significant degree.” Its ultimate finding was that there was no “material injury currently being experienced by the domestic i ndustry . . . by reason of the subject imports,” i.e., the imports during the period of investi gation. The Commission thus explained that its material injury determi nation, although focusing mainly on current imports, was not restricted solely to current imports but encompassed all “subject imports” during the in vestigation period. The appellants do not argue that past imports continued to cause material injury at the end of the investigati on period because of accumulat ed inventories. Nor could they, as the evidence showed that by the end of that period there were widespread supply shortages in the industry, and many producers had been placed on allocation. Instead, the appellants argue that the Commi ssion ignored the contin uing price effects of earlier imports resulting from the fact that the prices se t in contracts made earlier in the period of investigation were generally “locked in” at the time of contract formation and continued in effect throughout the later portions of the investigation period. Contrary to the appellants’ contention, howev er, the Commission took those facts into consideration; it simply did not find that they were suffici ently important to alter the ultimate material injury determination. Thus, the Commission not ed that past imports “continue[d] to have an effect on the industr y’s contract prices negotiated before the Section 201 relief was effective,” but it nonetheless concluded that imports were not adversely affecting domestic prices to a si gnificant degree “based on the current volume of subject imports and the increase in domes tic prices in 2002.” In light of that statement and other portions of the Commission’s opinion, t he trial court ruled that although the Commission did not explicitly stat e that earlier imports were not causing04-1373,-1374 11 present material injury, it was reasonable to infer that the Commission so concluded. In particular, the trial court rested its conclu sion with respect to that issue on what it referred to as the Commission’s “continued discu ssion of the effects that subject imports entered earlier in the [period of investigation] had on t he domestic industry and its ultimate conclusion that the domestic industry was not suffering present material injury.” We concur in the trial court’s analysi s. The Commission may not have stated explicitly that earlier imports were not causing material injury, but that conclusion was implicit in its analysis. The clear implication of the Commi ssion’s findings on that issue is that the prices fixed by contracts that were negotiated earlier in the investigation period may have suppressed the overall aver age price of domestic products throughout the period, but in light of the decrease in the current volume of imports and the increase in domestic prices in 2002, t he effect of those past imports was not significant. We therefore uphold the trial court’s decision with regard to the adequacy of the Commission’s treatment of the subject imports from early in the investigation period.
III Nucor argues that the Commission fail ed to make the statutorily required determination regarding the effect of underse lling of domestic products by importers. The statute requires that in consideri ng the effect of imports on prices, the Commission shall consider whether— (I) there has been signific ant price underselling by the imported merchandise as compared with the price of domestic like products of the United States, and (II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a significant degree or pr events price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.04-1373,-1374 12 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(ii). Nucor argues t hat in analyzing underselli ng by the subject imports, the Commission failed to satisfy it s statutory obligati on to analyze underselling and price suppression separately. The trial court held that the Commissi on had complied with the requirements of section 1677(7)(C)(ii). As the court noted, the Commission compared underselling margins in 1999 with underselling margins in 2002, and it found t hat “most of the underselling occurred earlier in t he period examined, prior to the imposition of Section 201 relief.” The court ruled that it wa s reasonable for the Commission to compare underselling margins in 1999 to those in 2002 and that the Commission had discretion to choose the method it used to make its determination as to the significance of underselling. Nucor contends that the Commission did not properly assess the significance of underselling because it “failed to provide either a concrete conclusion regarding the significance of underselling or any meaningf ul discussion of several key components required for such a conclusion.” In particu lar, Nucor objects that the Commission never made a determination as to whether the level of underselling during the period of investigation was significant and that it fa iled to make separate determinations as to underselling and the effect of imports in depressi ng prices or preventing price increases. Because the Commission did not make separat e findings with respect to those issues, Nucor argues that the decision cannot be sustained. The Commission complied with the statutory requirement that it consider whether there had been underselling during the inve stigation period and whether that underselling was significant. The Commissi on found that the underselling margins of04-1373,-1374 13 1999 had essentially disappeared by 2002. In particular, t he Commission found that the average margin of underselling went from 9.1 percent in 1999 to an average overselling margin of 4.0 percent in 2002, and that for sales to end users the average underselling went from 24.8 percent in 1999 to 1.5 percent in 2002. It is true, as Nucor contends, that the Commission did not state in so many words that the volume of underselling was an insignificant factor in evaluating whether the effect of imports on prices had led to present material injury to the domestic indus try. Nonetheless, the trial court found that to be the plain import of the Commission’ s analysis, and we agree. Where an agency has not made a particular determination exp licitly, the agency’s ruling nonetheless may be sustained as long as “the path of the agency may be reasonably discerned.” Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States , 810 F.2d 1137, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1987), quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark ansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. , 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974). In this case, the agency’s path is clear, even though it did not set forth its conclusion as to the issue of underselling explicitly. Nucor objects to the trial court’s reliance on Ceramica on the ground that Ceramica addressed an issue of methodology, ra ther than a mandatory statutory determination. However, Nucor cites no author ity for its conclusion that the court may not uphold an agency’s statutory determination “o f less than ideal clarity,” and nothing in Ceramica indicates that the principle is limited to issues of methodology. In Altx, Inc. v. United States , 167 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 13 65 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001), aff’d , 370 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the Court of International Tr ade held that the Commission was required to make two dist inct determinations, one for each prong of section 1677(7)(C)(ii), and that it could not “s imply refer to its conclusion regarding the04-1373,-1374 14 effect of underselling on price depression and/ or suppression as a basis for finding underselling not to be significant.” Nucor argues that the Commission violated that principle by conflating the two prongs of the price effects analysis. In fact, however, the Commission discussed underselling separately fr om its discussion of price depression and suppression. The Commission thus did not conflate the two prongs of section 1677(7)(C)(ii). Nucor next argues that in prior cases the Commission has explicitly addressed the significance of underselling and that its failure to do so in this case violates the principle that when an agency dev iates from a longstanding practice, it must explain why it has done so. See Sec’y of Agric. v. United States , 347 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1954); British Steel PLC v. United States , 127 F.3d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Nucor, however, has not established that the Commission deviated from a longstanding practice of addressing underselling in a parti cular way in its final determinations. Rather, as the trial court noted, the Co mmission “has recognized that each injury investigation is sui generis , involving a unique combinati on and interaction of many economic variables; and consequently, a particula r circumstance in a prior investigation cannot be regarded by the [Commission] as dispositive of the dete rmination in a later investigation.” We agree wit h the trial court that the Commission’s determinations in other 2002 investigations do not detract from the reasonableness of the Commission’s analysis of underselling in this case. Finally, Nucor contends that the Commissi on erred by ignoring the volume of current underselling, which in the first quar ter of 2002 increased to its highest level since the third quarter of 1999. As the tr ial court noted, howev er, the volume of04-1373,-1374 15 underselling in the second quarter of 2002 decreased to zero, and the Commission was not “obligated to conduct a price comparison analysis that accounts for variations in sales volumes.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States , 182 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1341 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001). There is no indication t hat the Commission failed to consider the volume of underselling during each quarter, and we agree with the trial court that the underselling data for the first quarter of 2002 does not undermine the Commission’s conclusion as to the absence of significant underselling.
IV Nucor next challenges the Commission’s det erminations regarding the volume and price effects of imports on the domestic industry. Nucor again asserts that the Commission impermissibly focused only on curr ent imports from the period after the section 201 remedy. We have already addre ssed the issue of the Commission’s focus on the most recent imports in making its ma terial injury determination, and we have upheld the Commission’s decision in that regard. As we noted in the course of that discussion, although the Commission focused princi pally on the most re cent imports, it considered all the subject im ports in making its material injury determination and concluded that “any material injury being experienced by the domestic industry [is not] by reason of the subject imports.” As not ed, the trial court hel d that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s finding that the subject imports did not suppress or depress domestic prices, even in light of the evidence that some existing contracts with lower pricing continued to be honored during the period of investigation, and we uphold the trial court’s decision in that regar d. Our resolution of that issue answers04-1373,-1374 16 Nucor’s contention that the Commission fail ed to determine whether past imports had caused present material injury to the domestic industry. Nucor further contends the Commission had a statutory obligation to distinguish between the effects of the section 201 relie f and the effects that the filing of the antidumping and countervailing dut y petitions had on the most recent import data. The relevant statutory provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(I), states: Consideration of post-petition informa tion. The Commission shall consider whether any change in the volume, price effects, or impact of imports of the subject merchandise since the filing of the petition in an investigation under [19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h and 1673- 1673h] is related to the pendency of the investigation and, if so, the Commission may reduce the weight accorded to the data for the peri od after the filing of the petition in making its determination of material inju ry, threat of material injury, or material retardation of the establis hment of an industr y in the United States. That provision requires the Commission to cons ider whether changes in the industry are related to the pendency of an antidumping or c ountervailing duty investigation, although it gives the Commission discretion in determining how to assess post-filing information. The Statement of Administrative Action i ssued in connection with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tr ade is to the same effect. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of Administrative Action , H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol. 1, at 853-54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4186. The Commission specifically adverted to the change in import volumes following the filing of the petitions and found that “both the pending inve stigations and the Section 201 investigation had an impact on subject im port volumes.” Based on its analysis of the data, however, the Commission concluded that the section 201 relief “fundamentally altered the U.S. market for cold-rolled steel and was the most significant factor in the04-1373,-1374 17 decline of subject imports.” The Commission t hus explicitly found that the section 201 remedy recommendations and the imposition of section 201 tariffs was more significant than the effect of the pendency of t he antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. The Commission’s analysis ther efore satisfied the st atutory requirement that it consider the e ffects of the subject anti dumping and countervailing duty investigations on the volume of imports, their price effects, and their impact on the domestic industry. In sum, the Commission’s findings on the st atutory issue of material injury by reason of imports and on the various subsidiary issues could have been more explicit, and the Commission’s analysis of the reasons for its findings could have been more detailed. Nonetheless, as the trial court correctly ruled, judicial review of an agency’s findings does not demand expansive discussion or rigid adherence to a specific formula, as long as the court can determine that the statutory requirements have been satisfied. Because we do not agree with the appellants’ contention that the Commission failed to comply with several essential requirement s of the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, we affirm the trial court’s ru ling upholding the Commission’s determination.
AFFIRMED

.