Task Force Report on 

Care for Victims of 

Sexual Assault 

April 2004
 Task Force Composition and Acknowledgments 

 

Task Force Members 

Ms. Ellen P. Embrey, Director 

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth A. Arnold 

Ms. Cynthia Bingham 

Lieutenant Colonel James Cockerill 

Lieutenant Colonel Susan G. Dunlow 

Dr. Terri J. Rau 

Ms. Jenice Staniford 

Major Jayme M. Sutton 

Task Force Administrative Staff 

Colonel Ray Cunningham 

Ms. Barbara Goodno 

Ms. Tracy Sutton 

Ms. Elizabeth Welton 

Ms. Jennifer Barchok 

Ms. Sarah Fanning 

Task Force Support 

The Task Force would like to thank the following organizations for their support 

and advice: 

Combatant Commanders 

Joint Staff 

Department of the Army 

Department of the Navy 

Department of the Air Force 

Department of Defense, General Counsel 

Department of Defense, Inspector General 

The Department of Justice 

The Department of Veterans Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Legislative Affairs 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness 

Deployment Health Support Directorate 

Florida State University, School of Social Work, The Honorable Kathleen A. Kearney 

Center for Military Readiness, Ms. Elaine Donnelly 

The American Prosecutors’ Research Institute 

The Miles Foundation 

Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network 

ii DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Table of Contents

 

Task Force Composition and Acknowledgments ............................................... ii

Preface ........................................................................................................ v

Executive Summary .....................................................................................vii

Task Force Charter...............................................................................................................vii

Review Methodology ...........................................................................................................vii

Findings and Recommendations.......................................................................................viii

Care for Victims of Sexual Assault .....................................................................................ix

Sexual Assault Investigation and Prosecution....................................................................x

Recommendations.................................................................................................................xi

Summary ................................................................................................................................xii

1. Introduction ............................................................................................. 1

Reviewing Sexual Assault in the Military ............................................................................1

Review Plan.............................................................................................................................1

Task Force Approach ............................................................................................................2

2. The Military Environment........................................................................... 4

Mission of the Armed Forces...............................................................................................4

Military Values and Leadership ............................................................................................4

Military Justice System...........................................................................................................5

Options available under the UCMJ......................................................................................6

3. Where We Are Today—Current Policies and Procedures ............................... 9

Prevention ...............................................................................................................................9

Reporting ...............................................................................................................................10

Response................................................................................................................................13

System Accountability..........................................................................................................16

4. Task Force Findings ................................................................................ 18

Sexual Assault Data and Definition...................................................................................18

Prevention .............................................................................................................................23

Reporting ...............................................................................................................................28

Response—Safety and Protection......................................................................................32

Response—Care for Victims..............................................................................................34

Response—Investigation and Prosecution.......................................................................38

System Accountability for Sexual Assault.........................................................................44

5. Task Force Recommendations.................................................................. 46

Recommendations for Immediate Action ........................................................................46

Recommendations for Near-Term Action .......................................................................50

Recommendations for Longer-Term Action ...................................................................55

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report iii
6. Literature Review.................................................................................... 56

Definition...............................................................................................................................56

Prevalence..............................................................................................................................56

Risk Factors for Sexual Assault..........................................................................................59

Prevention .............................................................................................................................62

Reporting ...............................................................................................................................63

Response................................................................................................................................65

Bibliography ............................................................................................... 70

Acronyms................................................................................................... 74

List of Appendices

A. Data Call: Services and Combatant Commands.......................................... 77

B. Focus Group Questions............................................................................ 82

C. Chronology of Surveys, Reports, and Hearings 1988–2004 ......................... 92

D. A Matrix of DoD and Service Guidance for Response to Sexual Assault........ 97

iv DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
 Preface 

 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report v
vi DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Executive Summary 

 

The Department of Defense is unequivocal in its commitment to ensure that victims of

sexual assault be protected, treated with dignity and respect, provided proper medical and

psychological care, and that the perpetrators of such assaults be held accountable. 

Task Force Charter 

On February 5, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Under Secretary

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S.C. Chu, to undertake a 90-day review 

of all sexual assault policies and programs among the Services and DoD, and recommend

changes necessary to increase prevention, promote reporting, enhance the quality and 

support provided to victims, especially within combat theaters, and improve accountability 

for offender actions. 

Review Methodology 

On February 13, 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

established an eight member Department of Defense Care for Victims of Sexual Assaults 

Task Force. The Task Force formulated a review plan, which included the following:

 Request and analyze sexual assault incidence and demographic data from the Services. 

 Request and assess current DoD-wide, Service-wide and Combatant Command-wide 

sexual assault policies and programs. 

 Perform literature review on sexual assault, including review of prior studies and reports 

on DoD sexual assault and related programs. 

 Discuss sexual assault prevention, reporting, response, and disposition issues with 

commanders, non-commissioned officers, junior enlisted personnel, service providers 

(medical, mental health, victim advocate, victim witness advocate, chaplains, law 

enforcement, investigative agencies, and legal personnel), and victims. 

 Consult with subject matter experts within the Department of Defense, other federal 

agencies, civilian experts, and sexual assault support organizations about matters that 

should inform our review with respect to prevention, reporting, response, and 

disposition of sexual assault cases. 

For the purposes of the Task Force review, sexual assault was defined as including the 

alleged offenses of rape, forcible sodomy, assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy, 

indecent assault or an attempt to commit any of these offenses. 

The Task Force conducted visits with 21 military locations in the Continental United States 

(CONUS), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM) to evaluate 

DoD and Service policies and programs for prevention of sexual assault, supportive care for 

sexual assault victims, and how well these programs transition to combat theater. The 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report vii
structure and composition of the focus groups is discussed in Chapter 1. In all, the Task 

Force had personal contact with more than 1,300 individuals. 

Working from scripted questions used at every site, the focus groups discussed issues such as 

command climate, barriers to reporting, prevention and support policies and practices, 

feedback mechanisms, best practices, and recommendations for improvements. Comments 

from focus group participants were obtained with the assurance that their individual 

comments would not be attributed to them or their organizations. 

The Task Force reviewed Department of Defense, Service, and Combatant Commander 

policies and education and training requirements relative to sexual assault. The Task Force 

also reviewed selected 2002 and 2003 case and care reports at the sites visited where the 

identified victim was a uniformed service member. 

The Task Force also consulted with other principal staff elements within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, outside experts from the Departments of Justice and the Department 

of Veterans Affairs, as well as respected experts from academia and rape crisis support 

organizations. 

Findings and Recommendations 

This report contains the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense Care 

for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force. Throughout this review, the Task Force sought to 

understand the culture, command structures, and resource limitations when evaluating 

appropriate courses of action needed to fill gaps in policies and procedures, particularly as 

they pertain to in-theater care. The findings are intended to provide a high level, 

comprehensive assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in current DoD and 

Service policies regarding care for sexual assault victims. 

Findings 

The Task Force identified 35 key findings relevant to current sexual assault policies and 

programs among the Services and DoD, and proposed 9 broad recommendations for 

immediate, near-term, and long-term corrective action. 

Sexual Assault Data and Definition

DoD-wide, data systems and records on reports of sexual assault are incomplete and not 

integrated. Records are best when criminal investigations were performed, but significant 

gaps in the documentation of victim care and treatment, victim choices in the disposition 

process, and command disposition were identified. The implications of this are discussed 

further in Finding 1. 

The number of alleged sexual assault cases reported across the Department of Defense for 

2002 and 2003 are discussed in Finding 2. Cases reported to have occurred in the 

CENTCOM Area of Responsibility are reported as well. The rates of reported alleged sexual 

assault were 69.1 and 70.0 per 100,000 uniformed service members in 2002 and 2003, 

respectively. Due to substantial differences in the definition of sexual assault, these rates are 

not directly comparable to rates reported by the Department of Justice. 

viii DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
There is considerable inconsistency in the legal and behavioral definitions of terms like 

sexual assault, sexual harassment, and sexual trauma, as discussed in Finding 3. This creates 

significant challenges for the Department when evaluating sexual assault trends, both within 

and outside DoD, and ensuring effective program execution. 

Despite these challenges, sexual assault risk factors in the military do not appear to be 

significantly different from those reported in civilian literature. These commonalities and 

associated data are discussed in Finding 4. Currently, these identified risks are not being 

systematically communicated to military members as part of any prevention education 

efforts that are either directly or indirectly related to sexual assault. 

Sexual Assault Prevention

Existing policies and programs aimed at preventing sexual assault are inconsistent and 

incomplete, principally because there is no Defense-wide policy requiring them, as discussed 

further in Findings 5 and 9. All services have robust programs aimed at prevention of sexual 

harassment that tangentially discuss sexual assault. The Task Force found pockets of 

excellence in each of the Services to address sexual assault prevention, response, and 

support. Examples are provided in Finding 6. Overall, the lack of Department-wide policy 

and program emphasis is particularly problematic in joint combat environments. Findings 7 

and 8 provide specific examples and challenges with respect to this. 

Sexual Assault Reporting 

Many of the barriers to reporting incidents identified during this review are similar to those 

reported in the civilian community, while others are unique to the military setting. Identified 

barriers and concerns expressed by focus group participants are discussed in Finding 12. 

Generally, junior enlisted personnel are not aware of the full range of reporting options 

available to them. They identified a critical need for education and training on where to 

report, how to support a victim, and what to do in the event of sexual assault. Further 

discussion of these issues can be found in Finding 13. 

The Task Force found that privacy needs of sexual assault victims must be positively 

assured. Focus group participants identified examples and recommended possible actions to 

increase privacy that are discussed in Finding 14. 

The perceived lack of privacy and confidentiality within the Department of Defense is 

thought by many to be one of the most significant barriers to reporting by military sexual 

assault victims. While many individuals the Task Force spoke to recognized that lack of

confidentiality within the DoD serves as a barrier to reporting, there was equal concern that 

affording victims with avenues for confidential disclosure may impede a commanders’ 

solemn responsibility to hold offenders accountable and to ensure community safety. More 

detailed discussion of this very complicated issue is found in Finding 15. 

Care for Victims of Sexual Assault 

Focus group leaders, providers, and enlisted personnel suggested that Department-wide 

guidelines are needed to ensure consistent and timely command response to victim safety 

and protection needs, particularly in making decisions to segregate the alleged victim and 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report ix
alleged offender. These issues are discussed further in Findings 16 and 17. Finding 18 

provides further discussion of unique challenges in the operational theatre. 

DoD has no mandated requirement to provide advocacy for sexual assault victims. As a 

result, there is no one person or office across the Department of Defense mandated to 

principally and exclusively serve the needs of sexual assault victims. Associated findings and 

implications are discussed in Findings 20 through 22. 

Focus group discussions suggested that integration of services for victims were lacking at 

most installations. Several of the Services were noted to have policies designed to ensure 

better coordination of care for sexual assault victims; however, implementation appeared 

inconsistent. While aggregate data provided by the Services suggested that care to victims is

being provided within military facilities, it was very difficult to validate this when individual 

records were reviewed at the sites visited. These issues are discussed further in Finding 23. 

The resources required to deliver integrated case management support for victims at small, 

isolated CONUS installations, at OCONUS installations where expert host nation resources 

have not been developed, and in the deployed environment, is not currently a consideration 

in force planning. For example, Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners (SANE) exist in the active 

and reserve components, but they are not being strategically developed or implemented for 

utilization in OCONUS and remote CONUS locations. Finding 24 provides further 

discussion. Uniform Department-wide training for providers and optimal standards of care 

for victims of sexual assault have not been developed and are needed, as discussed in 

Finding 25. 

Sexual Assault Investigation and Prosecution 

The environment in the combat theater has a detrimental effect on the ability to timely and 

effectively investigate and prosecute cases, due primarily to heavy investigative workloads 

and insufficient on-the-ground resources to respond. As a consequence, at least initially, 

some investigations were conducted by the command, which may have unintentionally 

compromised some of those cases of sexual assault. Findings 27 and 28 provide further 

discussion of these issues.

When victims of sexual assault have been engaged in minor misconduct prior to the sexual 

assault (e.g., underage drinking, breaking curfew, etc.), it presents challenges for commanders 

that are unique to the military. Addressing a victim’s minor misconduct prior to resolution of 

the sexual assault allegation is perceived by many as unfair. These issues are discussed further 

in Finding 29. 

Understanding the nature and extent of intentionally false allegations is important to better 

serve the needs of those who have been sexually assaulted, those whose lives and careers

have been impacted by false allegations, and the military as a whole. While the Task Force 

recognizes that addressing false allegations may be polarizing, it was a concern expressed by 

many individuals within the military. These challenges and the need for better, more reliable 

information about this issue are discussed in Finding 30. 

x DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Another challenge for the military is the lack of transparency with respect to the 

investigation of sexual assault cases and the decision-making process for individual cases. 

This lack of transparency impacts the military’s ability to demonstrate to the ranks that there 

is offender accountability. The need to increase transparency, while adhering to Privacy Act 

protections, is discussed in Finding 32. 

Sexual assault cases are often very difficult to investigate and to successfully prosecute, but 

available data shows commanders are taking action. Analysis of data provided by the services 

with respect to this issue is provided in Finding 33. 

System Accountability for Sexual Assault 

The lack of focus and assigned responsibility for sexual assault issues within the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense has resulted in a lack of policy, development and implementation, 

as well as inconsistent oversight and inattention to developing and ensuring adherence to 

performance standards. The implications of this are discussed in Findings 34 and 35. 

Recommendations

For Immediate Action: 

 Establish a single point of accountability for all sexual assault policy matters within the 

Department of Defense. 

 During the upcoming Combatant Commanders Conference, allocate time on the agenda

to discern the how the findings and recommendations of this report should apply to 

their areas of responsibility. 

 Ensure broadest dissemination of sexual assault information regarding DoD’s policies, 

programs and resources available for sexual assault prevention, reporting, response, 

protection and accountability through DoD-wide communication outlets. 

 Within the next three months, convene a summit of DoD leaders (military and civilian) 

and recognized experts on sexual assault, to develop strategic courses of action to: 

 Develop better operational definitions and delineation of distinctions between terms 

like sexual harassment, sexual misconduct, and sexual assault, and how those 

definitions relate to crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

 Establish avenues within DoD to increase privacy and provide confidential 

disclosure for sexual assault victims. 

 Establish ways to increase transparency of the reasons for the handling and 

disposition of reported sexual assault cases.

 Develop and maintain an expert, full-spectrum sexual assault response capability in 

OCONUS, CONUS remote, and operational environments, such as through the use 

of deployable Sexual Assault Response Teams (SARTs).

 Establish flexible templates for diplomatic and/or military-to-military agreements 

with coalition partners that address the jurisdiction and responsibility for crimes 

committed by a citizen of one nation against the citizen of another nation.

For Near-Term Action: 

 Establish an Armed Forces Sexual Assault Advisory Council, composed of key DoD 

officials and officials of other federal agencies with recognized expertise in dealing with 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report xi
issues surrounding sexual assault, with authority to seek input from other nationally 

recognized sexual assault experts, as needed. 

 Develop policies, guidelines and standards for sexual assault prevention, reporting, 

response, and accountability. This includes efforts to: 

 Develop standardized requirements, guidelines, protocols, and instructional materials 

that are focused on prevention across the total force. 

 Encourage reporting through well-established, publicized, and unobstructed 

reporting channels. 

 Develop DoD-wide standards and guidelines for sexual assault response to assure 

that all victims are afforded safety and protection, receive the best care possible, and 

have a coordinated, timely response to and resolution of their cases. 

y Develop sexual assault “force protection” guidelines for installation and 

operational use focused on identification and mitigation of risk factors. 

y Develop DoD-wide medical standards of care and clinical practice guidelines 

for treatment and care of victims of sexual assault. 

y Establish performance metrics for the United States Army Criminal 

Investigative Lab to ensure more timely forensic evidence processing. 

 Establish DoD-wide policy requiring victim advocates be provided to victims of sexual 

assault and create a mechanism for providing victim advocates in deployed 

environments. 

 Establish uniform guidelines for commanders’ use in responding to victims of sexual 

assault, including guidelines for: 

 Assuring that a sexual assault victim’s safety and protection needs are met. 

 Positively assuring a victim’s privacy and review the process 

 How and when reports of sexual assault are forwarded up the chain of command, as 

well as what information is included in those reports. 

 Addressing a victim’s misconduct that occurs in association with a sexual assault. 

 Assure manpower and fiscal resources are authorized and allocated, especially in the near 

years, to implement required policies and standards. 

 Develop an integrated strategy for sexual assault data collection to aid commanders, 

service providers, legal, staff, and law enforcement in evaluating response effectiveness 

and system accountability. 

For Longer-Term Action: 

 Establish institutional sexual assault program evaluation and oversight mechanisms. 

Summary 

If the Department of Defense is to provide a responsive system to address sexual assault, it 

must be a top-down program with emphasis placed at the highest levels within the 

Department down to the lowest levels of command leadership. It must develop performance 

metrics and establish an evaluative framework for regular review and quality improvement. 

Further the Department must ensure that Commanders and leaders have the appropriate 

tools (education, training, resources and support) to ensure that:

 our service members understand the risks and actively engage in preventive measures 

xii DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
 all responders treat victims with dignity and respect 

 support personnel ensure high quality care and treatment, no matter where the sexual

 and/or punishment occurs

exu

sk Force met with more than 1,300 individuals across the 

critical to the

assault occurs 

swift resolution

S al assaults are a challenge to our nation, and the military is not immune to this challenge. 

In the short timeframe available to plan and execute the review and summarize our findings 

and recommendations, we focused on critical factors that need to be addressed in dealing 

with sexual assault in the military. 

In the course of this review, the Ta

spectrum of leadership, line, support, and policymaking personnel. We were consistently 

humbled by the professionalism, dedication, and commitment to duty demonstrated across

all ranks, military, and civilian, here at home, and in the combat environment. 

The Task Force recognizes that this issue is very complex, and its resolution is

well-being of military service members. Within the limited time available to the Task Force, 

the recommendations are intended to be a starting point for increased DoD attention to the 

policy development, command emphasis, and resourcing necessary to resolve sexual assault 

concerns. DoD policies, programs, and procedures are necessary, but will not be sufficient 

to resolve the sexual assault problems found by this Task Force Review, without renewed 

emphasis and the clear, immutable commitment of unit commanders. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report xiii

1 Introduction 

 

The Department of Defense is unequivocal in its commitment that victims of sexual assault 

be protected, treated with dignity and respect, provided proper medical and psychological 

care, and that the perpetrators of such assaults be held accountable in accordance with 

recognized principles of due process and the rules of law. 

This report contains the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense Care 

for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force. The findings are intended to provide a high level, 

comprehensive assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in current DoD and 

Service policies regarding care of sexual assault victims. 

The goals of this Task Force were to be honest in our approach to our task and openminded about opportunities to make a difference. In the course of the review, we sought to 

understand culture, command structures, and resource limitations when evaluating 

appropriate courses of action needed to fill gaps in policies and procedures, particularly as 

they pertain to in-theater care. 

Sexual assaults are a challenge to our nation, and the military is not immune to this challenge. 

In the short timeframe available to plan and execute this review, and summarize our findings 

and recommendations, we tried to focus on the critical factors that need to be addressed in

dealing with sexual assault in the military. 

Reviewing Sexual Assault in the Military 

“Sexual assault will not be tolerated in the Department of Defense.” 

—Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld 

To this end, on February 5, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S. C. Chu, to undertake a 90-

day review of all sexual assault policies and programs among the Services and DoD and 

recommend changes necessary to increase prevention, promote reporting of sexual assaults, 

enhance the quality and support provided to victims of sexual assault, especially within 

combat theaters, and improve accountability for offender actions. 

Review Plan 

On February 13, 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

established the Department of Defense Care for Victims of Sexual Assaults Task Force. Its 

first task was to formulate a review plan, which included the following: 

 Request sexual assault incidence and demographic data from the Services 

 Request and review current DoD-wide, Service-wide and Combatant Command-wide 

sexual assault policies and programs 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 1
 Examine research literature on sexual assault 

 Discuss sexual assault prevention, reporting, response, and disposition issues with 

commanders, non-commissioned officers, junior enlisted personnel, service providers 

(medical, mental health, victim advocate, victim’s witness assistance, chaplains, law 

enforcement, investigative agent, and legal personnel), and victims 

 Consult with subject matter experts within the Department of Defense, other federal 

agencies, civilian experts, and sexual assault support organizations about matters with 

respect to prevention, reporting, response, and disposition of sexual assault cases. 

Task Force Approach 

Data Call 

The Task Force requested Service-specific data on their programs and policies for 

preventing, responding to, and prosecuting sexual assault incidents, as well as incidence data 

for cases reported during calendar years 2002–2003, where the identified victim was a 

uniformed service member at the time of the incident. It should be noted that there is no 

specific offense of “sexual assault” under the punitive articles of the UCMJ. Depending 

upon what is being evaluated and the circumstances involved, DoD and the Services have 

consolidated a number of separate UCMJ offenses into the term “sexual assault” when 

reviewing cases or trends. For the purposes of this report, the Task Force worked from the 

following definition: 

“Sexual assault cases include the alleged offenses of rape, forcible sodomy, 

assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy, indecent assault, or an attempt

to commit any of these offenses.” 1

Additional information requested included: gender, age, and location demographics of 

victims and offenders, as well as data on the timeframes between incident and report, 

medical care provided to victim(s), the case’s beginning, initial and final investigational and 

command disposition. Also requested were all sexual assault studies, reports, and training 

materials. The Services were asked to report on victim advocacy services and describe 

mechanisms for reporting sexual assault. In a separate request, the Task Force asked each 

Unified Combatant Command to provide any studies, reports, policies, training, and best 

practices they had in place that would enhance reporting, responding, and prosecuting cases 

arising in joint operational environments. Combatant Commanders were specifically asked to 

address availability and accessibility of medical and mental health care, and victim’s rights 

information. (See Appendix A, Data Call, Services and Combatant Commands.) 

Focus Group Discussions 

To evaluate the effectiveness of DoD and Service policies and programs for prevention of 

sexual assault, supportive care for sexual assault victims, and how well these programs 

transition to a combat theater, the Task Force conducted site visits at military bases in the 

Continental United States (CONUS) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). 

Additionally, the Task Force met via video teleconference with U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM) focus groups in Korea. In these sessions at 21 locations, we heard the first-hand 

accounts of local command and noncommissioned officer leaders, junior enlisted, care 

 

1As these offenses are defined in Articles 120, 125, and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

2 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
providers, victim advocates, legal and investigative personnel. Victims were also given an 

opportunity to meet with the Task Force individually, anonymously via telephone, or within 

groups. In all, we had personal contact with more than 1,300 individuals. 

Working from scripted questions (see Appendix B, Focus Group Questions), the focus groups 

discussed issues such as command climate, barriers to reporting, prevention and support 

policies and practices, feedback mechanisms, best practices, and recommendations for 

improvements. Comments from focus group participants were obtained with the assurance 

that their individual comments would not be attributed to them or their organizations. 

Literature Review 

The Task Force conducted a thorough literature review on sexual assault to examine current 

knowledge, civilian sexual assault protocols, and best practices. (See Chapter 6, Literature 

Review.) Additionally, the Task Force identified and reviewed previous studies, reports, and 

other public proceedings on matters involving sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and 

sexual misconduct in DoD to better inform them on issues of longstanding concern and 

relevance to the charter of this review. (See Appendix C, Chronology of Surveys, Reports, and 

Hearings 1988–2004). 

Consultation with Experts on Issues Relating to Sexual Assault 

The Task Force met with other principal staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

outside experts from the Departments of Justice and the Department of Veterans Affairs, as 

well as respected experts from academia and rape crisis support organizations. 

Hotline 

On March 3, 2004, the Task Force established a Sexual Assault Hotline to allow victims and 

other individuals to have an opportunity to share their experiences and thoughts with the 

Task Force. The hotline was established so the Task Force would have the fullest accounting 

of the problem to better serve victims and affect policies regarding victim support and care. 

From March 3, 2004 through April 28, 2004 the call center received a total of 143 calls. Of 

those calls, 71 calls were for general information and to verify the phone numbers. The 

remaining 72 calls were from individuals who wanted to share insights directly related to our 

review objectives. The composition of these callers spanned from victims, family members 

of victims, other service members, or those with an opinion they wished to share with the 

Task Force. The information we received from the hotline calls is integrated into the 

findings of the report, along with the information we received from our data call and from 

the focus groups. 

Conclusion

The Task Force recognizes that this issue is very complex, and its resolution is critical to the 

well-being of military service members. Within the limited time available to the Task Force, 

the recommendations are intended to be a starting point for increased DoD attention to the 

policy development, command emphasis, and resourcing necessary to resolve sexual assault 

concerns. DoD policies, programs, and procedures are necessary, but will not be sufficient 

to resolve the sexual assault problems found by this Task Force Review, without renewed 

emphasis and the clear, immutable commitment of unit commanders. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 3
2 The Military Environment 

 

This chapter sets the context for the report by discussing important characteristics of the 

military environment and culture. 

The Department of Defense has responsibility for approximately 3.2 million military and 

civilian employees who operate from or are deployed to more than 6,000 locations in the 

United States and more than 146 countries around the globe. Military operations can make it 

necessary for members of the Armed Forces to face long separations from friends and 

family and experience close living and working conditions that are often austere, and 

characterized by minimum accommodations for privacy. 

Mission of the Armed Forces 

The Department of Defenses provides the military forces needed to deter war and protect 

the security of the United States.2 When deployed, leaders of our Armed Forces place our 

Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen in harm’s way knowing that they may give their lives 

in service to our Nation. 

Often we project our military forces from permanent basing platforms to areas where 

infrastructure and support services may not be readily available. The availability of these 

support assets is dependent on the intensity of conflict, the austerity of the local 

environment, and whether support assets were deployed as part of the force package. 

Deployment of these resources is based on the expediency of the mission and types of 

forces used, planning documents required to provide structure to that response, and the 

execution orders, which are approved by both civilian and military leadership., to achieve 

tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. 

Military Values and Leadership 

The means by which the Department achieves its mission, military values, and leadership 

goals is by application of command and control structure and authorities. This structure of 

the “chain of command” promotes the ability of leaders to give and execute war-fighting 

orders as well as account for the health, welfare, and morale of forces. Each of the Services 

specifically identifies core values that are a part of every member’s reception, training and 

continued service. Examples of these values are: integrity, selfless service, courage, honor, 

respect, commitment, and discipline. While the Services may articulate their values 

differently, all capture the importance of these values to the profession of arms. These values 

help instill confidence, respect, and create a willingness to go forward during the most 

difficult situations. They are the essence of our standards of conduct and the bedrock of our 

profession. 

 

2 From www.defenselink.mil Facts and Figures, DOD 101 briefing slides. 

4 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
The standards we hold leaders to and the nature of command leadership are inimitable to the 

military. Commanders and leaders are carefully selected for their job because of their 

demonstrated judgment and abilities. Leaders are entrusted with commensurate powers in 

relation to the level of responsibilities they shoulder. Sometimes it is difficult for those 

unfamiliar with or outside of the military to understand the scope of leaders’ responsibility 

and authority over their subordinates and how these interrelate to the decisions and actions 

taken to ensure readiness and mission accomplishment. At each level, leaders have the 

crucial responsibility to care for, train, equip, and manage the force under their control in 

order to accomplish the military mission. Because of this inordinate level of responsibility, 

every leader’s conduct must be exemplary. 

A leader’s ability to be trusted and followed is based principally on a subordinate’s respect 

for the leader’s moral values, demonstrated tactical and technical competence, and physical 

and mental vigor. Trust between and among different ranks within a unit is essential in 

achieving the unit cohesion, morale, and teamwork necessary in stressful combat conditions. 

Any action that results in the appearance of partiality or favoritism undermines the ability to 

enforce good order, discipline, and authority and compromises the chain of command. 

Furthermore, any abuse of a leader’s power shakes the very foundations where our Service 

men and women anchor their faith and trust. If an allegation of sexual assault is not 

appropriately acted upon by trusted commanders and leaders or if an act of sexual assault 

comes at the hands of a non-commissioned officer or commissioned officer, faith and 

confidence in the command and its leaders are undermined. 

Military Justice System 

The purpose of the military justice system is to promote justice, to assist commanders in 

maintaining good order and discipline, to promote efficiency and effectiveness within the 

military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States. 

The legislative underpinning for this system is the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 

which is found at Title 10, United States Code (USC), Sections 801 through 946. Congress 

enacted the UCMJ in 1950 as a major revision of then-existing military criminal law. The 

UCMJ is implemented through Executive Orders of the President of the United States, 

pursuant to his authority under Article 36, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. §836). Those Executive Orders 

form a comprehensive volume of law known as the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), 

which includes the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) and Military Rules of Evidence (MRE). 

Over the past 54 years, the UCMJ and its implementing regulations have undergone multiple 

amendments and changes to meet the evolving legal requirements of commanders and their 

respective service members. Congress makes changes to the UCMJ on almost a yearly basis 

in response to recommendations of the Services and the public. Likewise, the President 

publishes Executive Orders modifying the Manual for Courts-Martial. The Services also 

routinely promulgate implementing instructions. The purpose of all these changes and 

modifications is to maintain the military justice system as a fair and progressive system of 

criminal justice. 

Unlike civilian society—where District Attorneys and U.S. Attorneys make prosecutorial 

decisions—the military justice system holds alleged offenders accountable through 

“command” decisions. Commanders are responsible and entrusted with specific legal 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 5
responsibilities pertaining to offenses and offenders within their scope of responsibility. As 

such, commanders at all levels typically receive formal training in their legal responsibilities 

before they assume command. Also, commanders routinely receive advice from their 

supporting Staff Judge Advocate personnel with respect the commanders’ obligations and 

options for handling offenses. The authority and discretion of a commander for how best to 

handle offenses that come to his or her attention is addressed in Rule for Courts-Martial 

(R.C.M.) 306. 

Options available under the UCMJ 

The unique ability of the military system to address alleged offenses in a variety of judicial 

and administrative ways is poorly understood both outside and within the military. 

Ordinarily, the immediate commander of a person accused or suspected of committing a 

criminal offense initially determines how to dispose of that offense. Each commander in the 

chain of command has independent, yet overlapping discretion to dispose of offenses within 

the limits of that officer’s authority. A decision by a commander does not bar a different 

disposition by a superior commander. In many cases, the immediate commander will 

forward the matter to a superior commander because the lower-level commander lacks

sufficient authority to take action that he or she believes is appropriate to deal with the 

severity of the offense. 

Rules for Courts-Martial 306(b) provides a list of factors a commander should consider 

when deciding how to dispose of an offense. These factors include: (1) the character and 

military service of the accused, (2) the nature of and circumstances surrounding the offense 

and the extent of harm caused, (3) the appropriateness of the authorized punishment to the 

particular accused or offense, (4) possible improper motives of the accuser, (5) reluctance of 

the victim or others to testify, (6) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or 

conviction of others, (7) the availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction 

and the existence of jurisdiction over the accused and the offense, and (8) the availability and 

admissibility of evidence. 

When commanders, typically based upon the legal advice of the Staff Judge Advocate, 

conclude that proper sanctions lay in a judicial forum and that the criminal burden of proof 

of “beyond a reasonable doubt” can be met, they have the option to refer alleged offenses 

for trial by courts-martial in several types of forums, each having different levels of rights 

and authorized punishments. 

General Court Martial: This forum is the highest trial level in military law and, with rare 

exceptions; it is typically only convened by order of a general or flag officer. Those 

exercising general courts-martial convening authority are typically division or corps 

commanders in the Army, commanders of numbered air forces or major commands in the 

Air Force, Navy regional commanders, or Marine Corps general officers in command. Prior 

to the convening of a general court-martial, a formal pretrial investigation into the offense(s) 

must be conducted, and a written legal opinion as to the disposition of the charges must be 

given to the convening authority. The court-martial may be composed of a military judge 

sitting alone or a combination of at least five members with a military judge presiding. 

6 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
An accused elects whether to be tried by military judge alone or by a court-martial panel of 

members. If an accused pleads guilty to some or all of the charges, only the military judge 

will accept the plea(s) and enter the finding(s) of guilty and the accused elects whether to be 

sentenced by the military judge or by a panel of members. The trial counsel (prosecutor) 

represents the government and defense counsels are appointed to represent the accused. In

addition, the accused may retain civilian counsel at no expense to the government or request 

to be represented by a military counsel of choice when reasonably available. The only limits 

upon a general court-martial sentence are the maximum limits established for each offense 

and punishments may include: the death penalty (imposed by court members only), a 

dishonorable discharge or bad-conduct discharge for enlisted members, a dismissal for 

officers (which is generally viewed as equivalent to a dishonorable discharge), confinement, 

loss of all rank for enlisted members, loss of all pay and allowances, and fines. 

Special Court-Martial: This is the intermediate court in the military’s trial structure and 

must be convened by an officer (typically in the grade of O-5 or higher) specifically vested 

with authority to convene a special court-martial. Similar to a general court-martial, but less 

formal in nature, special court-martial convening authorities receive the benefit of legal 

advice from their Staff Judge Advocate and alleged offenses are investigated before charges 

are preferred (initiated) and referred to trial, where the legal standard is proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The court-martial may be composed of either a military judge sitting 

alone, at least three members sitting without a judge, or a combination of a military judge 

presiding with at least three members. 

Similar to a general court-martial, the accused generally has the same options with respect to 

being tried and sentenced by a military judge or panel members, and the accused has similar 

options regarding defense counsel representation. Any service member may be tried by a 

special court-martial for any non-capital offense. Maximum punishments from this 

proceeding include confinement at hard labor for one year, forfeiture of two-thirds of one 

month’s pay for one year, and loss of all rank for an enlisted member. A bad-conduct 

discharge may also be assessed against enlisted members so long as a military judge was 

detailed and a defense counsel represented the accused. 

Summary Court-Martial: This type of trial is designed to dispose of non-capital offenses in 

a simplified proceeding, consisting of one commissioned officer that may, but not need be, a 

lawyer. The accused must consent to trial by this forum as a prerequisite to the proceeding. 

The accused is not entitled to a detailed lawyer, but may be represented by a civilian counsel 

at no expense to the government, or by an individually requested military counsel. Such 

requests for counsel shall be granted if the appearance will not unreasonably delay 

proceedings and military exigencies do not preclude it. The proceedings include examination 

of witnesses and evidence, application of the Military Rules of Evidence, factual conclusions, 

and imposition of punishment. 

Only enlisted service members may be tried by summary court-martial. The maximum 

punishment that may be imposed by a summary court includes reduction in grade, 

confinement at hard labor for one month, forfeiture of two-thirds of one month’s pay for 

one month, hard labor without confinement for forty-five days, or restriction for two 

months. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 7
Unlike civilian jurisdictions, commanders can take a variety of adverse actions against alleged 

offenders when the evidence falls short of that required for criminal prosecution or the 

offense otherwise does not warrant trial by court-martial, or when other issues suggest a 

more appropriate disposition (e.g., a victim’s desire to not testify). 

Nonjudicial Punishment: Nonjudicial punishment is specifically addressed in Article 15 of 

the UCMJ and often referred to as an “Article 15,” Captain’s Mast (in the Navy), or 

nonjudicial punishment proceedings. Essentially, the commander serves as sole decision 

authority (i.e., judge, jury, and sentencing official) in nonjudicial punishment proceedings. 

Part V of Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) notes that commanders considering cases under 

Article 15 “will exercise personal discretion in evaluating each case, both as to whether 

nonjudicial punishment is appropriate and, if so, as to the nature and amount of punishment 

appropriate.” However, commanders are always cognizant of the fact that an alleged 

offender does not have to accept nonjudicial punishment proceedings as the forum to 

dispose of the charges, but may instead demand to be tried by court-martial. 

Procedures and maximum punishments are specified within Part V of MCM. Additionally, 

each Military Department has its own implementing regulations providing guidance for the 

administration of cases under Article 15, UCMJ. Punishments can include correctional 

custody for certain enlisted members, arrest in quarters for officers, extra duties for certain 

enlisted members, reductions in grade for enlisted members, forfeitures of pay, restrictions 

to certain geographical limits, reprimands, and admonishments. 

Administrative Action: When circumstances surrounding reported offenses present 

evidence problems or other legal issues, commanders may instead elect to pursue 

appropriate types and combinations of administrative actions to hold a military member 

accountable for violating military standards. 

Although the administrative options vary somewhat by Service, options commonly available 

include: administrative discharges with or without unfavorable characterizations, 

downgraded performance or efficiency reports, administrative reductions in rank, extra 

training, censures, reprimands, rebukes, administrative withdrawal or withholding of 

privileges, establishment of unfavorable or derogatory information files, reassignment or 

transfer actions, rehabilitation, career field reclassifications, bars to reenlistment, personnel 

reliability program recertification, security classification changes; and pecuniary liability for 

negligence or misconduct. 

It is also important to note that commanders often can utilize many of these administrative 

options in conjunction with courts-martial convictions or nonjudicial punishment 

proceedings. In addition, both nonjudicial punishment and administrative actions can have 

significant negative career and employment repercussions, both within the military and in the 

civilian community. However, the Privacy Act and other privacy considerations for both the 

victim and the alleged offender (who is not convicted of a crime), make it nearly impossible 

to make these administrative and nonjudicial options “transparent” to the public. 

 

8 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
3 Where We Are Today—Current Policies and 

Procedures 

 

This chapter provides an overview of current DoD and Service policies and programs that 

address or have direct relevance to sexual assault. Appendix D provides a list of relevant 

policies. Specific policies can be accessed by hyperlink. 

Following enactment of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Victim and Witness 

Assistance policies were established across DoD to assist victims of crime through 

investigation, prosecution and confinement of the offender. Guidance requires that 

particular attention be paid to victims of serious, violent crime, including sexual assault. All 

of the services have policies and procedures for implementing Victim Witness Assistance 

Program (VWAP) requirements. Officers and employees engaged in the detection, 

investigation and prosecution of crime and in the confinement of offenders ensure that 

victims are accorded their rights under federal law. These include rights to: 

 Be treated with fairness and respect for dignity and privacy. 

 Be reasonably protected from the offender. 

 Be notified of court martial proceedings. 

 Be present at all public court proceedings unless the court determines that testimony by 

the victim would be materially affected. 

 Confer with the government attorney.

 Receive available restitution. 

 Be provided information about conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release of the 

offender. 

Specific policies relating to sexual assault have not been promulgated for DoD-wide 

application. Joint Commands rely upon their Service Executive Agents to develop and 

implement sexual assault policy and to provide services for victims assigned to these 

commands. 

The Department of the Navy (DON) has published Navy-wide policies requiring a 

standardized sexual assault prevention and victim assistance program. For the purposes of 

this chapter, DON refers to Secretary of the Navy requirements that apply to both the Navy 

and Marine Corps. Policies are implemented through a stand-alone program in the Navy, the 

Sexual Assault Victim Intervention Program (SAVI), and through provision of specialized 

victim advocacy and assistance to sexual assault victims within the Marine Corps Family 

Advocacy Program (FAP). 

Prevention 

Currently, DoD has no policy requiring a standard approach in preventing sexual assault. 

However, the UCMJ requires each enlisted member be briefed on the UCMJ, including the 

articles on sexual assault upon entrance on active duty, after 6 months, and upon reDoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 9
enlistment. The Army currently requires sexual assault awareness and response training for 

Drill Sergeants and Initial Entry Training soldiers. The Air Force includes rape awareness, 

reporting, and prevention information in basic training and officer training, commander’s

courses and at the First Sergeant’s Academy. DON requires sexual assault awareness and 

prevention programs at both junior and senior levels and at key career progression points for 

officers and enlisted. 

Navy implementation includes: 

 Annual mandatory general military training (GMT) that is coordinated or implemented at 

the installation or command level by SAVI-designated staff. 

 Dissemination of sexual assault related video and/or briefing materials by Naval 

Education and Training Command. 

 Special emphasis on personal avoidance of risk and incorporation of sexual assault 

awareness into Navy substance abuse prevention education. 

 Commanding officers are required to institute and publicize a means of informing the 

chain of command of situations that may place individuals at risk of sexual assault. 

Marine Corps implementation includes: 

 Annual follow-on training to E1-E7, O2-O3 and WO1-CWO2 during unit battle skills 

training. 

 Sexual assault briefings by victim advocates to commands upon request that include 

information on myths, risk factors, and referral services. 

 Sexual assault reporting and prevention briefings to all incoming Marine Corps 

Commanders (O-5 and O-6), using multi-disciplinary briefers. 

While standardized prevention programs are not specifically required by the Air Force, 

sexual assault prevention efforts may be addressed at the installation, major command 

(MAJCOM) or service level through a multidisciplinary group known as the Integrated 

Delivery System (IDS). At the installation level, the core IDS is composed of representatives 

from Family Advocacy Programs, Life Skills (behavioral health), medical, chaplains, family 

support, child and youth programs, and health and wellness. Other representatives from 

security, safety, and the judge advocate’s office provide support and participate as required. 

They report to the Community Action Information Board (CAIB), chaired by the installation 

commander, the Vice Commander at MAJCOM, and the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff at 

headquarters Air Force. The IDS and CAIB monitor the health and well being of their 

populations, targeting prevention and intervention services that are tailored to local 

community needs. 

Reporting

Privacy concerns are frequently cited as a barrier to sexual assault reporting. In accordance 

with the Privacy Act, there are DoD and Service-level policies that govern the maintenance, 

storage, retrieval, and disclosure of personal information maintained in any DoD system of 

records. These policies state that personal information may be disclosed without the 

individual’s consent to DoD officials who have a need to know in the performance of their 

10 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
assigned duties. It should be noted that these privacy protections would apply to both a 

victim and an alleged offender. 

While these policies do not specifically require disclosure of an alleged sexual assault to the 

command, both active duty and DoD civilian service providers have generally interpreted

knowledge of an alleged crime to meet the threshold of a commander’s need to know to 

maintain good order and discipline. Service members are also taught from their initial 

appointment or enlistment in the military that all military members should report to the 

chain of command any offenses that come to their attention. In the case of sexual assault, 

Navy SAVI-recommended protocols (for medical, family service center, victim advocate and 

command personnel) include notification to NCIS if a sexual assault that falls under military 

jurisdiction is alleged. Conversely, these protocols specifically afford a victim of sexual 

assault the option of reporting to civilian authorities if the assault does not fall under military 

jurisdiction (i.e., the assault did not occur on military property and the offender is not 

affiliated with the military.) 

To meet requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, DoD 

has also issued policies specific to the disclosure of protected health information. This could 

include care provided in military treatment facilities to victims of sexual assault. However, 

several exceptions could be applied that would permit disclosure of protected health 

information without authorization by a sexual assault victim. The policy also states that 

covered healthcare entities are responsible for compliance with DoD Privacy Act Program 

regulations that are described in the first paragraph. While disclosure of an alleged sexual 

assault is permitted without the victim’s consent under existing DoD privacy policies, there 

is nothing that specifically mandates reporting if not otherwise required by law. 

In the end, there is considerable latitude in DoD and Service privacy policies for different 

interpretation and application between individuals, organizations, and military medical 

departments. However, in our review of DoD and Service policies, we noted no explicitly 

stated mandate to report sexual assault to command unless it involves alleged child 

maltreatment or spouse abuse. 

While DoD and Service VWAP policies afford crime victims the right to be treated with 

respect for their privacy, these policies do not provide victims any assurance that 

information will not be disclosed without their permission. Army policy specifically protects 

the identity of sexual assault victims in police blotter entries. Navy and Air Force policy 

requires commanders to be sensitive to victim privacy by expressly limiting need to know 

personnel and by reporting trend data without identifying information. Air Force policy 

provides specific guidance on how commanders and others should handle investigative 

material. 

Information is typically viewed as confidential when it is communicated in private with the 

expectation that it will not be disclosed routinely to third parties without the individual’s 

permission. Privilege provides legal protection from disclosure of communications between 

specified individuals. Jurisdictions vary as to which communications are considered 

privileged, whether the privilege extends to written communications and work product, and 

what exceptions may apply. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 11
There are few regulations within DoD or the Services that assure individuals, particularly 

military members, that their communications will be confidential or privileged. There are 

several types of privileged communications recognized by the Military Rules of Evidence 

(MRE) that might apply when a service member reports that she or he is a victim of sexual 

assault. These include those made to clergy and those between a lawyer and client or 

between a psychotherapist and patient. 

Under MRE 503 a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from 

disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a chaplain or chaplain’s assistant if 

the communication is made as a formal act of religion or as a matter of conscience. In 

practice, there has been variance among the Services’ Chaplains Corps and between 

chaplains and the legal community with respect to the application of this privilege. The DoD 

Chaplains Board is currently working on standardizing the application of the privilege within 

and across the Services and developing associated regulations. In any case, communications 

between chaplains and victims of sexual assault are generally considered to provide the 

greatest assurances of confidentiality within DoD or the Services. For victims who do not 

choose to disclose to military authorities, chaplains may be an avenue for getting 

confidential, spiritual guidance and advice. 

MRE 513 provides a limited privilege with respect to communications between 

psychotherapists (or their assistants) and patients. Psychotherapists include licensed 

psychiatrists, psychologists, or clinical social workers that hold credentials to provide services 

in any military healthcare facility. Communications are considered confidential in cases 

arising under the UCMJ, if the communication was made for the purpose of facilitating 

diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental or emotional condition. The rule does not 

specify what is meant by “cases arising under the UCMJ.” There are also a number of 

exceptions to privilege including: 

 When the communication is evidence of spouse abuse, child abuse or neglect. 

 When federal or state law or service regulation imposes a duty to report information 

contained in a communication. 

 When the patient’s mental or emotional condition makes the patient a danger to self or 

others. 

 If the communication clearly contemplated the future commission of a fraud or crime. 

 When necessary to ensure the safety and security of military personnel, military 

dependents, military property, classified information, or the accomplishment of a military 

mission. 

 When admission or disclosure of a communication is constitutionally required. 

As with DoD and Service privacy policies, there is considerable room for interpretation and 

application of the privilege, with no clear assurances within the military system that a victim 

of sexual assault may seek confidential information or assistance from a psychotherapist. 

For victims of sexual assault not seeking confidential disclosure, there are numerous avenues 

for reporting within the military services. These include DoD and Service Inspector 

Generals, command, installation security, criminal investigative agencies, legal, medical, 

representatives, chaplains, family services, FAP and, where available within the military, 

12 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
victim advocates. VWAP policy addresses the need for good coordination and 

communication between responders, as does the DON policy on sexual assault.

Response

Safety and Protection 

oD VWAP regulations, sexual assault victims have the right to be 

the

n

ay 

y

s

s a tool for commanders, DoD has recently promulgated a standard Military Protective 

l

inst

ild

Care for Victims 

nd DoD and Service VWAP policies, crime victims have the right to be 

ins,

hile all Services provide multiple avenues for supporting and caring for sexual assault 

nate a

rks.

he Navy’s SAVI program has developed victim-sensitive commanders’ guidelines and 

response protocols for chaplains, NCIS investigators, Command Duty Officers, Command 

Under federal law and D

reasonably protected from the accused. This includes protection from threat, harm or 

intimidation from the accused or people acting in concert with or under the control of

accused. These requirements are included in Service VWAP policies, with Service-specific 

augments. The Air Force has detailed policy and procedures to ensure threatened airmen ca

be moved when a credible threat is validated. Although this is usually implemented in 

extreme cases, the Threatened Airman Program is a tool for command. Commanders m

also impose military protective orders, arrange separate living and working conditions. Arm

commanders may include temporary assignment/attachment or permanent reassignment. If 

both the victim and accused are assigned to the same command, Navy SAVI policy instructs

commanders to consider temporary reassignment of either the victim or accused until the 

case is legally resolved and/or the victim is out of danger and states that the victim’s desire

should receive preferential consideration. 

A

Order form (e.g., DD Form 2873). Under the attached Privacy Act Statement, the principa

purpose of the form is to “document commanding officers’ orders and members’ 

understanding thereof to avoid all manner of contact with specified individuals aga

whom members are alleged, or are confirmed to have committed, domestic violence, ch

abuse, and any other crime, as stipulated in the terms and conditions of the orders.” 

Under federal law a

treated with fairness and respect for dignity and privacy. Current policies require a multidisciplinary approach by VWAP service providers including criminal investigators, chapla

judge advocates, unit commanders, and personnel from law enforcement, corrections, family 

services, and the emergency department. The Services are required to ensure that providers 

receive training to assist them in complying with VWAP requirements. All of the services 

require specialized sexual assault training for specific key responders. 

W

victims that include medical, behavioral health, chaplains, and family services, a single 

program or dedicated agency to coordinate sexual assault victim care is not currently 

required by DoD policy. Navy SAVI policy requires installation commanders to desig

program coordinator to provide overall program management, while the Army requires the 

medical command to coordinate care through Sexual Assault Review Boards (SARB) at each

installation. The Air Force recognized the importance of victim care and established an 

interim victim support liaison requirement while they assess their existing support netwo

T

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 13
Victim and Witness Assistance Coordinators, Judge Advocates, victim advocates, and 

responders from medical and family services. Commanders are also required to establish 

procedures command personnel should take in responding to sexual assault incidents a

ensure personnel receive training to execute procedures effectively. 

Medical requirements and protocols pertaining to sexual assault have

nd

been promulgated in 

e Air Force, Army and Navy. (Medical services to Marine Corps members are provided 

en

n

y of

erbated by sexual 

sault are available to victims within all Service medical departments or through referral to 

th

e

uthorization Act for FY95 (October 5, 1994) required DoD to revise policies and 

sh 

ictim

by

ose benefits and services.

th

through the Navy.) These policies typically address sensitivity to sexual assault victims, 

timeliness of care, collection of forensic evidence, provision of general medical care, and 

availability of mental health resources for victims. All military departments require writt

consent of sexual assault victims prior to general medical examination or collection of 

forensic evidence. Provision of medical care or behavioral health care is not predicated upo

their participation in the criminal justice response in any of the Services. Sexual assault

training requirements for medical personnel are specifically delineated in DON and the 

Army. The Air Force recently encouraged medical service leaders to build effective 

partnerships (through the use of Memoranda of Understanding) with community sexual

assault agencies. Navy SAVI and Air Force policies specifically address the availabilit

medical services for sexual assault victims in the deployed environment. 

Behavioral health services for mental health sequelae arising from or exac

as

TRICARE providers in the community. Accessibility and availability of care may be limited

both in and out of the military. Concerns about mandatory reporting and lack of privacy 

when utilizing military services may inhibit victims from freely seeking assistance. Current 

record keeping policies require at least minimal documentation of military behavioral heal

contact in the member’s medical record. DON family service centers offer brief, solutionfocused counseling to victims if appropriate to their presenting status. Documentation of 

this counseling is separate from the medical record, although still governed by Privacy Act

requirements. Navy SAVI policy requires installation commanders to identify an agency or

facility to provide psychological and supportive counseling for sexual assault victims. 

 

With respect to victim advocacy, Section 534 of Public Law 103-337, National Defens

A

regulations specific to the VWAP, FAP and Equal Opportunity (EO) Program to establi

victim advocate programs within each of the military departments. Under this law, v

advocate programs are required to provide assistance to members of the Armed Forces and

their dependents who are victims of crime, intrafamilial abuse, and discrimination or 

harassment. As required, the Victim and Witness Assistance Council established by DoD is 

responsible for coordinating and overseeing the implementation of victim advocate 

programs. The military departments are directed to establish similar councils. Those working

in victim advocate programs are required to principally serve the interests of a victim

initiating action to provide: 

 information on available benefits and services. 

 assistance in obtaining th

 other appropriate assistance. 

14 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
The Army and Air Force do not currently have designated programs to provide advocacy for 

tion 

ation

board and

victim

Investigation and Prosecution 

ve military justice functions to perform in strict accord

f this

fulfilling this obligation, the Services are resourced with legal assets, military police, and 

ecial

ervice criminal investigative agencies are also responsible for liaison and coordination with 

se

all Services, commanders are required to report allegations of serious offenses to their 

s

dditionally, due to resources and other priorities, local civilian agencies may decline to 

ired

ss

sexual assault victims and are meeting requirements through VWAP, particularly through 

VWAP liaison personnel. The Marine Corps provides installation civilian and volunteer 

advocates for sexual assault victims through the FAP. Advocates are activated by installa

police and are on call 24/7, responding within 30 minutes of a report. They provide crisis 

intervention, emotional support, and information on and referral to support services. With

the victims’ agreement, an advocate will accompany them to investigatory interviews, 

medical exams, legal appointments, and court proceedings. Navy policy requires install

commanders to develop and implement a highly responsive sexual assault victim advocate 

program through the use of trained volunteers or available civilian resources or a 

combination of both. Afloat commands are required to have trained advocates on

available during deployments if a civilian agency is used to provide advocacy on the 

installation. Assistance provided by SAVI advocates is as described for Marine Corps

advocates. 

The Services require their respecti

with the U.S. Constitution, the UCMJ, and implementing regulations. This includes 

protecting the rights of both the victim and the accused. The MCM and Chapter 3 o

report provide further discussion of the administrative, disciplinary, and judicial options 

available to commanders under the UCMJ. 

In

criminal investigators, specifically United States Army Criminal Investigation Division 

(USACID), Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and the Air Force Office of Sp

Investigations (AFOSI). Trained investigators also exist in military police forces within all of 

the Services, although these assets may not be available to all commands or at all 

installations. 

S

other Federal, state, local or foreign law enforcement agencies. All Services have security 

force and criminal investigation regulations that detail procedures for handling criminal 

matters. The handling of sex crimes is described in the Services’ procedural manuals. The

manuals recognize the sensitivity of sexual assault and the need for specialized skills and 

techniques in investigating this category of crime. 

In

respective criminal investigative agency. Investigations of serious offenses like rape are 

typically conducted by USACID, NCIS, and AFOSI. Service and case-specific variation

may occur with respect to whether less serious indecent assaults are investigated by the 

criminal investigative agency or referred back to the command or security force 

investigators. 

A

initiate some investigations that the military criminal investigative agencies would be requ

by policy to investigate. Under current USACID, NCIS, and ASOSI investigative policies, 

reports of sexual assault are assigned a case number at the time the report is made, regardle

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 15
of the merits of the facts presented or when the facts of the case are ultimately determined

to be insufficient to establish a crime occurred. Also, investigative databases often limit 

removal of a reported case from the system once it goes into the database. This results in

allegations, proven or disproved, being incorporated into the database. This process in each 

of the military departments should be considered in any statistical comparison of rates of 

incidence with civilian jurisdictions.

all

prosecuting these offenses, crime victims may be compelled to testify through subpoena 

ed

cline to

System Accountability

assures compliance with DoD and service VWAP 

ed

es

ll Services have specific guidelines and system accountability detailing their response to

ly 

ommander, Navy Personnel Command is responsible for management and implementation 

. Casermy medical policy requires the establishment of a multidisciplinary Sexual Assault Review 

tion, 

In

or military order, although this seldom occurs within the military justice system, especially in

sexual assault cases. The Services recognize the sensitivity of sexual assault and do not 

compel an unwilling victim to participate in investigation or prosecution. Nevertheless,

participation by sexual assault victims in the criminal justice process is strongly encourag

in VWAP and Service policies and practices. Service criminal investigation manuals afford 

victims choices with respect to their participation. These choices include options of having

an advocate or other trusted person present during the interview or of submitting an initial 

statement in writing in lieu of interview. Processes for informing victims of how 

investigation and case disposition may be adversely impacted or limited if they de

participate and procedures for documentation of their decision are also discussed. Navy 

protocols require all key responders to ensure that all options available to the victim with

respect to their participation in the criminal justice process have been discussed 

The responsible Inspector General

requirements through the inspection process. Service medical departments are accredit

with respect to the provision of professional medical and behavioral health services. Servic

provided in family centers undergo periodic review and accreditation in the Army and DON. 

Navy IG, component commanders, and immediate superiors in command are also required 

to incorporate an assessment of SAVI requirements into their inspection programs. The Air

Force IG has specifically initiated a special interest item on sexual assault deterrence and 

response. 

A

sexual assault investigations. Navy and Army policies provide for processes that specifical

foster system accountability with respect to management and coordination of sexual assault 

response. 

C

of the SAVI Program. Navy SAVI policy also requires installation commanders to establish a 

SAVI Program Coordination Committee that is composed of medical, Trial Service Office, 

base security, NCIS, chaplain and family service representatives. The purpose of the 

committee is to facilitate program execution and coordination among key responders

specific review/oversight is not a required function or routinely conducted in practice. 

A

Board (SARB) at each installation where there is a medical command. The SARB is required 

to meet quarterly and is composed of representatives from clinical services, emergency 

medicine, nursing, social work, pathology, obstetrics and gynecology, patient administra

16 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
staff judge advocate, USACID, military police and the chaplains. Responsibilities of the 

SARB include case review to assess handling and disposition of each case relevant to 

required medical protocols, annual review, and approval of sexual assault protocols, an

determination of needs and provision of sexual assault awareness training for medical 

personnel. 

d a

ith respect to command reporting and accountability, all of the Services have special 

as

e

form 

data on

IBRS is structured to collect administrative, offense, property, victim, offender/arrestee, 

ully 

eparate from DIBRS requirements and systems, the Navy and Marine Corps are required to 

t

ion 

se.

W

incident reporting requirements that require commanders to report serious crimes such

sexual assault to the chain of command. DoD also requires the Services to collect and 

forward statistical information on criminal incidents for which the military has exclusiv

jurisdiction or military authorities coordinate with civilian authorities. Forwarded data is 

maintained centrally within the Department of Defense in the Defense Incident Based 

Reporting System (DIBRS). System requirements were originally developed to meet uni

federal crime reporting requirements, but have evolved over time to meet additional 

statutory requirements and to respond to internal and external requests for statistical

criminal offenses and other high-interest issues within DoD. 

D

commander’s action, results of trial and corrections data. DIBRS requires data to be 

submitted in five functional areas including law enforcement, criminal investigations,

commander’s actions, judicial functions, and corrections. Current reporting in all five 

functional areas is variable across the services. None of the services are transmitting to

DIBRS across all five functional areas, although a Service’s functional database may be f

operational. 

S

maintain integrated, victim-focused databases to analyze demographic, victim support and 

offense and disposition trends, and to evaluate and develop effective programs and assess

command climate with respect to identification and prevention of sexual assault. Data 

submission in the Marine Corps has been the responsibility of the Marine Corps’ victim

advocates, with input from key responders. Within the Navy, commanders have been 

required to meet sexual assault reporting requirements since 1998 by including SAVI 

required data elements in special incident reporting message traffic. A Situation Repor

(SITREP) is required within 24 hours of report for any alleged sexual assault. Continuat

reports are required on a monthly basis to provide new, revised or previously missing 

information, until a final message is forwarded that reports official resolution of the ca

Data forwarded does not include personal identifiers of the victim or accused.

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 17
4 Task Force Findings 

 

Sexual Assault Data and Definition

Finding 1 

Data systems and records on reports of sexual assault are incomplete and not 

integrated. 

As a part of this review, we asked each Service to provide quantitative data on reported 

assaults for calendar years 2002 and 2003. (See Appendix A, Data Call, Services and Combatant 

Commands.) Meeting the request required significant time and effort by the Services to gather, 

collate, and present the data. In some instances, aggregation required case-by-case review 

and manual collation of text data. Data was captured in multiple, unrelated data systems 

developed for different purposes that do not necessarily complement one another. Despite 

the Services’ best efforts, the data provided to the Task Force was inconsistent and 

incomplete, in some cases. This was true for all relevant data pertaining to victim care, as 

well as command disposition and case outcomes. 

While mechanisms such as serious incident reports, situation reports, and special interest 

reporting frequently report more serious cases of rape and sexual assault, these reporting 

methods do not capture all incidents, they are not standardized, they are not intended to 

analyze data, and the lack of record-keeping and follow-up by higher levels of command 

make it difficult to assess risk factors, trends, and accountability. What is needed is a system 

to help senior level commanders understand and manage trends and characteristics of 

Service level crime for the purpose of better understanding risk environments and mitigating 

those risks. 

Capturing data with respect to victim preferences and the range and timeliness of support 

services provided appears particularly problematic. Specific data with respect to victim care

is provided in Finding 23. A lack of integration and coordination among functional areas was 

also noted with respect to the Task Force request that each installation visited provide 10 

reports of investigations, with corresponding records reflecting any and all support services 

provided to victims in those cases. With the exception of one installation that made a 

conscientious attempt to provide information on mental health support provided to victims 

in the identified cases, the information provided could not establish the timeliness or extent 

of support services provided to victims. Although the victim-focused sexual assault 

databases required by the DON are structured to provide at least some victim support 

information, problems with data submission and system functionality significantly impede 

current effectiveness. 

The Department cannot identify or explain trends with respect to how cases are handled

using the current data collection methods. Service investigative and military justice databases 

vary widely among and within each military department and often do not capture sufficient 

18 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
information to analyze why many initial reports of sexual assault do not result in criminal 

convictions. For instance, there are no coded fields of information to generally explain why 

cases are unfounded or determined to have “insufficient evidence” or why commanders 

choose to pursue various options other than courts-martial. More importantly, there are no 

data fields or codes in these systems to reflect victim preferences during investigation (e.g., 

delayed reporting, refusal to participate, recantation) or during the legal process (e.g., 

preferring alternate dispositions to courts-martial process). Some investigators and legal 

offices annotate this information in individual case summaries within their respective 

databases, but this practice is not uniform and there is no way to retrieve this information 

without searching individual case records. 

With respect to the investigation, command action, and military justice response, Defense 

Incident-Based Reporting System will capture much of the information that is needed when 

it is fully implemented within the Department. Each of the Services have various legacy 

security, investigation and judicial databases that are not well-integrated. Service systems are 

developed, under development, or testing transmission of DIBRS information to the DoD. 

However, current implementation in all five functional areas is variable across the Services. 

None of the Services are transmitting to DIBRS across all five functional areas, although a 

Service’s functional database may be fully operational. All services are currently reporting or 

testing submission of law enforcement data to DIBRS and the Air Force and Army report 

commander’s action information. 

In the end, there is no integrated system or strategy for reporting, tracking, or reviewing 

reports of sexual assault and actions taken. The Department has no data collection 

requirement to systematically aid commanders (mission centric), service providers (victim 

centric) and legal and law enforcement (offender centric) officials in understanding the scope 

of the problem, how timely and effectively the services are provided, or how consistent and 

timely we are in resolving the issues for both victims and alleged offenders. Evaluating 

program effectiveness, assessing system accountability, and implementing data-informed 

process and program improvements is seriously compromised without more effective and 

integrated methods of data collection. 

Finding 2 

The rates of reported alleged sexual assaults were 69.1 and 70.0 per 100,000 

uniformed service members for 2002 and 2003, respectively. 

As described in Chapter 1, the Services were asked to provide data on cases reported in 

calendar year 2002 and 2003 in which the victim at the time of the incident was a uniformed 

service member. For cases reported, they were also asked to provide further quantitative data 

with respect to select demographic, offense and response variables. Despite a standardized 

request, Service differences in interpretation and reporting resulted. To what extent this was 

a function of the wording of the data call or different data reporting and capturing 

capabilities is unknown. 

Across DoD, there were 901 and 1012 alleged cases of sexual assault with uniformed service 

member victims reported to criminal investigations in 2002 and 2003, respectively. These 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 19
figures include 24 (2002) and 94 (2003) reported cases in the CENTCOM AOR. Sexual 

assault, as referred to here, includes the alleged offenses of rape, forcible sodomy, assault 

with intent to commit rape or sodomy, indecent assault or an attempt to commit any of 

these offenses. There were 2,012 identified service member victims in the 1,913 alleged cases 

of sexual assault. Males constituted 9% of identified victims in these cases. Of the 1,913 

cases of alleged sexual assault across DoD for 2002 and 2003, 1,634 alleged offenders were 

service members at the time of the incident. Males represented 99% of alleged service 

member offenders. 

For our purposes, prevalence refers to the number of persons within an identified group 

who are victimized during a particular time period. Incidence refers to the number of 

separate victimizations or incidents perpetrated against persons within an identified group 

during a specified time period. Incidence cannot be inferred from the Service data provided 

because a case does not necessarily translate directly to an incident of sexual assault. 

However, prevalence rates can be estimated. The rates of alleged sexual assault across DoD 

were 69.1 and 70.0 per 100,000 uniform service members for 2002 and 2003, respectively. It 

is very important to note that these rates are NOT comparable, for a number of reasons, to 

those published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program 

(UCR). For example, the DoD rates include:

 All types of sexual assault, as opposed to being limited to forcible rape/attempted rape, 

as reported in the UCR program. 

 Sexual assault of females and males, as opposed to being limited to forcible 

rape/attempted rape of females in the UCR program. 

 Reports that may not be opened for investigation and reported to the UCR program by 

civilian law enforcement agencies. 

Finding 3 

Differences in definition create significant challenges for DoD in evaluating sexual 

assault trends and program execution. 

The Task Force realized early on that there is considerable inconsistency in the terminology 

used and the behaviors included in related terms. To complicate matters, the same term may 

be used variably within and between DoD, the Services, and federal and civilian agencies. 

This disparity in defining terminology and behaviors makes it very difficult to compare data 

within DoD or with non-DoD agencies and research. For example, in the DoD anonymous 

survey pertaining to sexual harassment (Lipari and Lancaster, 2003), sexual assault was 

defined as “had sex with you without your consent or against your will.” (See Chapter 6, 

Literature Review for more information.) In contrast, the National Crime Victimization Survey 

collects information on rape (which includes attempted rape) and sexual assault, which 

covers a wide range of victimizations including completed or attempted attacks generally 

involving unwanted sexual contact that does not involve penetration (Hart, 2003). When 

discussing “military sexual trauma,” the Veteran’s Administration is referring to either sexual 

harassment or sexual assault occurring during military service, both of which are defined 

further. (See Chapter 6, Literature Review.) 

20 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Differing terms and definitions are also used in policies, procedures, and legal documents 

within DoD. For example, the term “sexual assault” is not currently a specific offense under 

the UCMJ. In the MCM, the term is used only in MRE, 413, which governs the admissibility 

in a court-martial of a wide variety of past sexual acts and sexual contact that an accused 

committed and are being offered as evidence to support some relevant matter in issue during 

the trial. Depending upon the circumstances involved, DoD and the Services have included 

a number of separate UCMJ offenses into the term “sexual assault” when reviewing cases or 

trends. Indeed, different policies and instructions in the Services and in various task forces, 

commissions, panels, and process teams that have addressed “sexual assault” have all defined 

the term in different ways and included different offenses under the UCMJ in this more 

general and inclusive term. 

The scope of behavior covered in terms like sexual misconduct and sex-related offenses 

have blurred the distinctions even more. For instance, the DIBRS manual defines sex-related 

offenses as those involving “sexual misconduct” (another term not defined under the 

UCMJ) and includes offenses used in this Task Force definition of sexual assault, as well as 

the offenses of conspiracy and solicitation to commit those offenses and conduct 

unbecoming an officer (if a sexually violent offense is involved). Albeit completely unrelated 

to sexual assault, the DoD Instruction 5505.8 pertaining to the investigation of “sexual 

misconduct” uses the term to address UCMJ offenses involving sexual acts between 

consenting adults in private. However, the DoD VWAP instruction also notes that particular 

attention should be paid to victims of serious and violent crime including “sexual 

misconduct,” which is not defined in the instruction. 

Perhaps, the area with the greatest potential for confusion within the military system is the 

overlap between the terms sexual harassment and sexual assault. At the beginning of each 

focus group, participants were asked their understanding of the meeting purpose. Almost 

without exception, participants responded that they were there to discuss sexual harassment. 

This occurred even though all Task Force communication with installations identified our 

focus as “sexual assault.” Participants continued to use the terms interchangeably until 

redirected several times. It was clear that there is confusion in the distinctions between 

harassment and assault, and it was often articulated that these are simply behaviors that fall 

on a continuum. 

There is reason for confusion, even at the policy level. The DoD Equal Opportunity 

Program directive defines the term “sexual harassment” to include unwelcome “verbal or 

physical contact of a sexual nature.” While contact could often form the basis for a criminal 

charge under the punitive articles of the UCMJ and investigative agencies would typically 

have responsibility for investigating more egregious cases of such conduct, commanders and 

service members are often confused about the proper avenue for reporting these allegations 

when they arise. Notably, the equal opportunity representative (the appropriate resource for 

reports of sexual harassment) was often identified by focus group participants as the point of 

contact for reporting sexual assault. 

In the end, confusion in definition and lack of consistency in applying the definitions present 

significant challenges for DoD in terms of tracking, evaluating trends, training, and program 

execution. Focused attention in this area is indicated. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 21
Finding 4 

Sexual assault risk factors in the military are not significantly different from those 

reported in civilian literature. 

Research has consistently demonstrated that youth are at greater risk of sexual assault (e.g., 

Hart, 2003; Perkins, 1997; Tjaden and Thoennes, 2000). Data reported by the Services 

indicated the same. For those cases in which the age of the service member victim was 

available, ages 17 – 24 represented, on average, 87% of Air Force victims, 85% of DON 

victims and 83% of Army victims for the two years reported. For service member 

offenders, ages 17 – 24, represented, on average, 68% of Air Force offenders, 66% of DON 

offenders, and 40% of Army offenders. 

In a national survey of college women, almost all of the completed rapes occurred on 

campus, in living quarters (Fisher, Cullen and Turner, 2000). Service data reported a 

consistent trend, despite definition and data capturing difficulties. Although the Task Force 

asked for the number of cases that occurred in mixed-gender living quarters on military 

installations, this could not be obtained from Army or DON databases. However, data 

supplied by the Army and DON was informative. In the Army, 52% of the total cases 

occurred in living quarters on military installations. In DON, 47% of the total cases occurred 

in living quarters under military control. However, when cases not occurring in areas under 

military control were excluded, 79% of DON cases occurred in living quarters. Had the Task 

Force asked for information on reported assault occurring in living quarters not under 

military control, it is believed that a greater percentage of all cases would have occurred in 

living quarters. In the Air Force, 19% of cases, on average, occurred in mixed-gender living 

quarters or military installations across the two years. It is believed that Air Force data 

reflects a lower trend because they reported only assaults in mixed gender quarters, as 

requested, as opposed to those occurring in all living quarters on military installations. 

 

Research with different samples has found that approximately half of sexual assaults are 

associated with alcohol use by either the perpetrator or victim (Abbey, Clinton-Sherrod, 

McAuslan, Zawacki and Buck, 2003). Data provided by two of the Services indicated that 

the use of alcohol was associated, on average, with 50% of alleged sexual assault cases 

involving service member victims during 2002 and 2003. With respect to the CENTCOM 

AOR, the percentage of associated alcohol use ranged from 19% in the Army to 48% in the 

DON. It is important to note that some of the DON reported cases within the CENTCOM 

AOR occurred outside the combat area. 

The use of alcohol as a risk factor was a prevailing theme during discussions with leaders, 

junior enlisted, providers and investigators, validating both civilian and military data. The 

focus groups suggested that alcohol is involved in most reported cases of sexual assault in 

circumstances when the victim and alleged offender were engaged in social drinking before 

the alleged assault occurred. 

It is believed that training environments are also at risk for the occurrence of sexual assault, 

although definition and data capturing difficulties did not permit effective review of Service 

data call information. For many, arrival at technical training may be the first time away from 

home and away from parental controls. This newfound independence, coupled with peer 

22 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
pressure and easy access to alcohol, may lead to reckless and risky behavior. Although in 

most circumstances it is illegal to drink under the age of twenty-one and illegal to provide 

alcohol to someone under the age of twenty-one, alcohol is easily accessible to service 

members in the United States and in a number of foreign countries. Young enlisted 

personnel, like their civilian counterparts, view social drinking as a rite of passage. Alcohol is 

restricted within the combat theater; however, the Task Force observed that it is accessible 

in this environment. It was also noted that close quarters, integration of units, limitation on 

privacy and personnel unfamiliar with each other could increase the risk of sexual assault. 

Despite the fact that there are a number of identified risk factors for sexual assault, the Task 

Force was unable to confirm that this information has been effectively or consistently 

communicated to military members in existing prevention education efforts that are either 

directly or indirectly related to sexual assault. Notably, several victims who had received such 

risk-focused training subsequent to their sexual assaults indicated that they might have 

modified behavior that placed them in a risky situation had they had the information prior to 

the assault. 

Prevention 

Finding 5 

Existing policies and programs aimed at preventing sexual assault are 

inconsistent and incomplete. 

Several studies have been conducted to identify best practices for the prevention of sexual 

assault. Some promote mixed gender training, while others identify the benefits of single 

gender training. Regardless of the approach, education and awareness is an effective tool for 

the prevention of sexual assault. Although there are well-defined policies and programs for 

the prevention of sexual harassment, there is not a clearly defined DoD-wide policy or 

program aimed at preventing sexual assault. While some commands have made laudable 

efforts in sexual assault prevention training, a DoD-wide set of standards for sexual assault 

prevention would give this subject the emphasis it merits. 

Commanders place special emphasis on a variety of subjects including alcohol/drug offenses 

and related behavior, improper relationships (e.g., fraternization and adultery), suicide 

prevention, and various forms of sensitivity training. While sexual harassment training is 

taught at basic officer and enlisted entry-level schools and throughout the career lifecycle, 

sexual assault prevention, and awareness training is rarely included, and if addressed at all, it 

is cursory. Junior enlisted personnel noted that installation “newcomer” and holiday safety 

briefings would be an excellent opportunity for Commanders to address sexual assault 

concerns with their personnel. 

 

Limited instruction on sexual assault awareness is conducted at formal military schools 

during entry-level instruction for officers and enlisted personnel. Training and education 

beyond the institutional setting is sporadic and varies among the Services. The Navy requires 

annual training on the prevention of sexual assault during general military training 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 23
instruction for all Navy and Marine Corps personnel. In 1997, the Marine Corps also 

established the Mentors in Violence Prevention (MVP) program. MVP provides tools to 

assist and encourage male Marines to actively participate in efforts to prevent rape, battering, 

sexual harassment and all forms of male violence against women. MVP is a “Marines helping 

fellow Marines” program, which encourages Marines to become involved when they see 

abusive situations. Because the MVP program is currently only offered during senior 

noncommissioned officer (NCO) and staff NCO courses, many junior enlisted personnel

were not familiar with MVP. 

Finding 6 

At some locations, commanders have developed local sexual assault awareness 

training. 

During the installation and theater visits, the task force discovered some locally developed 

educational materials related to sexual assault. Much of the material was based on 

information from other federal, state, and local government agencies or educational tools 

published by various college and university functional matter experts. Often in response to a 

specific incident, commanders developed programs to ensure service members are better 

informed on the dangers of risky behavior. 

For example, the Dorm Awareness Program at Travis Air Force Base provides invaluable 

information to young airmen to improve situational awareness, how to avoid becoming a 

victim of sexual assault and addresses appropriate dating behavior. Kusan Air Force Base, 

Korea has created a Sexual Assault Free Environment (SAFE) program for all personnel 

assigned to the base, both permanent party personnel and those on temporary duty. The 

program includes briefings by the wing commander, the military equal opportunity 

representative and guest speakers who are subject matter experts. The training is informative 

and widely publicized. Enlisted personnel participating during the focus groups commented 

that the SAFE program enhanced their awareness of issues related to sexual assault. 

With the assistance of the Department of Justice, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada has 

developed and implemented the Nellis Sexual Assault Prevention Program (NSAPP). It is a 

three-pronged program focusing on prevention, education and on- and off-post community 

outreach. The training is mandatory for commanders, first sergeants, and all personnel. 

Some installations have also adopted a local “buddy system” program requiring service 

members to travel in pairs. In spite of the potential of these programs as preventive 

measures, they have not been shared or adopted Service-wide. 

Finding 7 

Sexual assault awareness training in the joint operational environment presents 

serious challenges due to operations tempo. 

In the operational environment commanders must maintain a high degree of readiness and 

their focus is mission accomplishment. Conducting tactical training and mission rehearsals 

are priorities. Combatant Commanders outline theater requirements including training in 

24 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
personnel deployment instructions that are applicable to all Services. Commanders expect 

that prior to arrival in a combat theater, units will have completed the array of mandatory 

training including equal opportunity/sexual harassment and cultural awareness training. 

The operational environment is very transitory with units and individual replacements 

arriving and departing on a daily basis. With over 200,000 troops deployed to the 

CENTCOM area, it is difficult to maintain unit integrity in living accommodations while also 

providing separate quarters for females and males. Although co-ed living presented no major 

sexual assault issues during field exercises with their parent unit, Army female enlisted 

personnel did not like having to “bunk in the same area with males they did not know.” Lack 

of privacy for females and males was widely discussed among focus group participants. 

Generally, active duty females indicated they received information on how to deal with co-ed 

living arrangements prior to deployment, while reserve unit personnel we spoke to stated

that they were not sure what to expect because it was not a topic identified for discussion in 

unit training. 

 

The challenges for providing sexual assault awareness and prevention training in the joint 

environment is further complicated because of the large number of reserve component 

personnel (21% of deployed forces) in the CENTCOM theater. Reserve component 

personnel who participated in focus groups identified a lack of training on the prevention of 

sexual assault at home station and upon arrival in theater. This insight, coupled with 

increased utilization of reserve component personnel, cross-leveling of service members to 

fill unit vacancies, and lack of pre-deployment awareness training was highlighted during the 

Task Force’s visits throughout the CENTCOM theater of operation. 

Commanders identified the need to conduct sexual assault awareness training prior to arrival 

in theater due to the high operations tempo. In addition, enlisted personnel also expressed 

strong desire for training that was not “death by PowerPoint.” Junior enlisted focus group 

participants that had deployed to a combat theater overwhelmingly endorsed the need for 

sexual assault awareness training prior to arrival in theater. They also indicated that, in order 

to be better prepared to protect themselves in a transitional wartime environment, the 

training may also need to be reinforced in theater, primarily because conditions and 

circumstances could not be anticipated in pre-deployment training. They noted that such 

training should be interactive in nature, using realistic scenarios, and come directly from their 

commanders. Many male focus group participants observed that current awareness training 

(on sexual harassment, mostly) is directed primarily toward females. They noted that many

all-male units tend to believe such training efforts are wasted on them, since there are no

women in their units. However, in the combat environment, mixed gender support and 

service support units become integrated into their command, and require service members 

not used to operating with females to quickly assimilate appropriate sensitivity not previously 

required. In many focus group discussions, male participants indicated that awareness 

training on sexual assaults should be directed toward males, especially regarding male 

behaviors and risky situations that male service members should be aware of (and seek to 

avoid) that might lead to being accused of sexual assault or becoming victims themselves. 

There was general consensus among focus group participants that in-theater training on 

sexual assault be given to all personnel (active, reserve and civilians) assigned to the theater, 

e.g. permanent party personnel as well as personnel on extended temporary duty, and that 

such training should be standard. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 25
Finding 8 

American service personnel are not well prepared to deal with inappropriate 

behavior by foreign nationals. 

Prior to deployment, service personnel are supposed to receive information on cultural 

norms for the country/region to which they are being deployed. This training is a broad 

overview of the host country’s traditions and social customs but does not address gender 

socialization or sexual assault. Focus groups with commanders and leaders reported that

there was a general lack of awareness of how coalition military and third country nationals 

perceived American women. Several women reported that they had been inappropriately 

touched by local nationals or subjected to indecent acts of a sexual nature. In addition, they 

noted significant differences in cultural norms and expectations about women in interacting 

with men. Because some service members in the CENTCOM area were sexually assaulted by 

third country nationals, host nation citizens or coalition partner service members, aggressive 

efforts must be taken to ensure U.S. service members understand the cultural and religious 

differences of coalition and host country foreign nationals that could affect their interactions 

with U.S. service members (male and female), and more specifically, how to deal with any 

inappropriate behavior of a foreign national. 

Finding 9 

Training and education designed to prevent sexual assault is limited and varies 

from location to location. 

Because the Department has not developed or required standardized education and training 

materials for the prevention of sexual assault, most service members lack a basic 

understanding of what constitutes sexual assault, risk factors, or preventive measures. This 

lack of knowledge and understanding of sexual assault was prevalent across both officer and 

enlisted ranks. Service members at all levels often confuse the definition of sexual assault 

with that of sexual harassment and sexual misconduct. During focus group sessions, it was 

also apparent that many did not know the situations and circumstances in which most sexual 

assaults occur and, consequently, they were unprepared to recognize and handle the risks in 

their environment. There is a common misperception that most cases of sexual assault 

involve a stranger waiting to attack an unsuspecting victim. Service members were surprised 

to learn that men could also be victims of sexual assault. While several commands have 

written “zero tolerance” policies that condemn sexual assault, these policies are not widely 

publicized and were not reinforced through awareness or sexual assault prevention training. 

Finding 10 

Junior enlisted personnel prefer training conducted by those with first hand 

experience. 

There was nearly a unanimous opinion among most focus group participants that they would 

welcome awareness training and education in this area. Junior enlisted personnel also stated 

that training conducted by those with first-hand experience (i.e. testimonials) is more likely 

26 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
to grab and keep their attention. They also indicated that training conducted by their 

leadership reinforces written policies because it shows that commanders are really concerned 

about their safety and protection. Based on current state of awareness, the Task Force is 

convinced that sexual assault awareness training should be provided throughout the career 

and during pre deployment and post deployment processing. The training should address 

issues specifically related to female and male potential victims and most importantly, how to 

respond to an incident should it occur. Pre-deployment training should prepare service 

members for what to expect in a joint, multinational environment. Studies indicate that 

effective training programs are those that address all learning styles and include 

audience/group participation. 

At the time of the focus groups, enlisted participants stated that they had not received or

could not remember receiving any training specifically on sexual assault. Those who had

received special training in this area e.g., through the Navy’s Sexual Assault Victims 

Intervention (SAVI) program or through some installation initiative like we observed at 

Travis AFB, were the exception to this finding, but these individuals still recommended 

training relevant to risks, what sexual assault is and is not, and the local process for reporting 

and receiving support and assistance if a sexual assault occurs. 

Finding 11 

Focus groups identified gaps in physical safety measures, which increased risk of 

sexual assault on service members. 

The chain of command is responsible for ensuring that polices and practices regarding crime 

prevention and security are in place for the safety of service members. Command polices

and practices regarding sexual assault prevention are major components of safety and reduce 

the risk of victimization of service members. During focus group sessions, participants 

identified the need for preventive measures. Some measures could be used at both CONUS 

installations and overseas areas, while others were more applicable to the operational 

environment. 

 Adequate lighting 

 Controlled access to buildings and living quarters 

 “Crime Watch” programs 

 Smart Cards with points of contact and emergency information 

 “You are here” boards 

 Roving Security Patrols (Foot, vehicle and use of technology)

 Noise mitigation around shower facilities (e.g. generators right next to showers)

 Placing view obstructing screens at entrances of shower facilities 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 27
Reporting 

Finding 12 

There are barriers to reporting incidents of sexual assault. Some are consistent 

with those in the civilian community while others are unique in a military setting. 

Although reporting differences made it difficult to summarize the information provided 

across the Services, available data indicated that there is little delay in reporting, when cases 

are reported to investigators. Roughly two-thirds of the sexual assault cases with service 

member victims in 2002 and 2003 were reported within 72 hours of the alleged sexual 

assault. 

Nevertheless, focus group participants consistently articulated reasons why uniformed 

victims of sexual assault might choose to forgo reporting sexual assault in a timely fashion, 

or at all. Some of the barriers they expressed were consistent with information received from 

experts as well as research literature (Baumer, et al. 2003): 

 Concerns that they will not be believed. 

 Feelings of embarrassment and stigma. 

 Ambiguity about what constitutes sexual assault. 

 Concerns that the criminal justice system is largely ineffective at responding to or 

preventing such incidents. 

 Fear of reprisal from the offender. 

Individuals were concerned that the chain of command and other unit personnel would not 

believe them and would ignore the complaint altogether. This was of particular concern 

when an alleged offender is of superior rank, has a good military record and reputation, 

controls the victim’s professional success, or is very popular. Focus group participants also 

expressed concern of embarrassment and stigma since they believed that everyone in their 

unit would know and talk about what occurred once the investigative process began. 

Focus group participants expressed a general lack of confidence in the chain of command’s 

ability to effectively address a report of sexual assault. These comments were based on 

individuals’ observations within their units and often stemmed from a lack of understanding 

about what had previously occurred in response to an allegation of sexual assault. Another 

barrier that we heard was about fear of repercussions from the chain of command because 

of the victim’s own misconduct (e.g., underage drinking, fraternization, adultery, sexual 

relations in prohibited areas). 

Participants also thought that reporting a sexual assault would damage their reputation, have 

negative career implications, or cause them to be ostracized by friends and unit personnel. 

For men, in particular, there was a general perception that reporting a male-against-male 

sexual assault might cause people to question the victim’s sexual orientation. They also 

articulated that they were reluctant to report a sexual assault because the investigative 

process might disrupt the unit mission or negatively impact unit morale and cohesion. 

28 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Others indicated sexual assaults went unreported because victims were concerned that if 

they reported it would delay their redeployment or change of assignment date. 

Finding 13 

Generally, individuals are not aware of the full range of reporting options 

available to them. 

Focus group participants believed that their chain of command was the sole avenue for 

reporting sexual assaults. They thought they would be more likely to report a sexual assault 

to a friend. This is consistent with civilian findings. (Fisher, et al., 2003). When focus group 

participants were informed of other reporting options outside the chain of command, they 

perceived there would be negative consequences for failing to notify their superiors. In other 

words, reporting anywhere else would be viewed as “jumping the chain of command’ and 

disloyal to the unit. 

Regardless of the entry point for reporting, focus group participants repeatedly stated that 

they believe there is a critical need for education and training on where to report and how to 

support a victim of sexual assault. Focus group participants also felt that it was critical for all 

service members to receive this education because a victim is more likely to report a sexual 

assault to a friend/junior enlisted than to a superior in their chain of command. 

Focus groups also spoke about wanting to avoid the scrutiny of their chain of command and 

peers. In general, individuals had no awareness of the quality of the support “outside” and 

lacked awareness that in some cases, the support provided would be at their own expense. 

They expressed a preference to use outside sources, if available near the installation. Their 

reasoning was to deflect the concerns stated above and an additional desire of not wanting 

to engage the investigative and legal process mainly due to concerns about loss of privacy 

and/or a perception that they would be forced to defend their own conduct in the 

circumstances surrounding the assault. 

Currently within DoD, there is not a way for victims of sexual assault to get military 

sponsored medical or mental health treatment without reporting the incident and triggering 

the investigative and judicial processes. While there are more private, and often times 

confidential, or anonymous reporting options available in the surrounding civilian 

communities and through the DoD-wide “One Source” 1-800 services now available, these 

are not widely publicized and the duration of support is limited. Unfortunately, there are 

limited options OCONUS and there are not any similar options in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Finding 14 

Victim’s privacy needs must be positively assured. 

Commanders bear the primary burden of responsibility for protecting the privacy of victims 

under their command. However, current chain of command reporting mechanisms may 

intensify the problem. Many focus group participants indicated that, although identifiers 

were not shown, the facts of these offenses appear in blotter reports, Serious Incident 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 29
Reports, and on incident reports maintained on the shared drive of a computer network and 

are seen by non-command personnel and command personnel alike. In small ships and 

commands, the names don’t have to be on the reports for people to intuitively derive the 

victim’s and the offender’s identities. 

Focus group participants widely expressed their view that the NCOs and officers within 

their command structure who have no disposition responsibility in the case should not be 

informed of the details of the alleged incident. Many others expressed frustration that 

leaders/NCOs were not doing enough to positively assure the victim’s (and the alleged 

offender’s) privacy. Some focus group participants suggested that individuals questioned in 

connection with the investigative process be required to sign non-disclosure statements, with 

stiff penalties for violation. 

Currently, a report to authorities of a sexual assault triggers an investigative process 

involving interviews with witnesses, friends, co-workers, and unit personnel. Collection of 

physical evidence, sometimes in the victim’s or offender’s room is equally invasive. This 

activity, necessary to hold the offender accountable, often serves to engage the “grapevine” 

and further erode the victim’s privacy and reputation. 

Some victims in response to rumors and not-so-veiled innuendos about their conduct and 

judgment, reported that they regretted their decision to report. After seeing this happen to 

others, several focus group participants cited this circumstance as a key barrier to reporting. 

Finding 15 

Balancing the issue of confidentiality for sexual assault victims with the 

commander’s responsibility to ensure community safety and due process of law 

is very complicated, but must be addressed. 

The perceived lack of privacy and confidentiality within DoD is thought by many to be one 

of the most significant barriers to reporting by military sexual assault victims. Experts 

consulted suggested that sexual assault victims benefit significantly from access to a safe 

haven—that is, a place to receive confidential advice, referrals for needed medical and social 

services, and to feel safe and protected from physical and verbal attacks. For military victims, 

this would mean providing a means to receive immediate care, legal advice, and support 

following the incident without, at least initially, having to advise his/her chain of command 

or trigger an investigation. 

However, there is considerable confusion at all levels with respect to issues of mandatory 

reporting of sexual assault, and whether confidentiality or privilege applies under our current 

policies and regulations. One potential avenue for confidential disclosure within the military 

(for any subject, not just sexual assault), is to go to a military chaplain. In practice, there has 

been variable understanding and application of the privilege, as MRE 503 states it only 

applies to communications made either as a formal act of religion or as a matter of 

conscience. While many focus group participants believed that the chaplain’s office would be 

a “safe haven” to disclose sexual assault without fear that it would be further disclosed, many 

recognized that such disclosure would not insure access to needed medical, advocacy or 

30 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
mental health services. There was also difference of opinion by participants, including 

chaplains, whether the disclosure would be held in confidence. Some focus group 

participants reported that they were aware of situations in which chaplains informed 

commands in general terms about allegations, without disclosing the specific personnel 

involved. However, focus group participants also related that victims of sexual assault might 

not be comfortable approaching a military chaplain. For instance, some voiced concerns that 

a victim might be uncomfortable discussing sexual matters, that he or she may not desire 

spiritual guidance, or that a victim might feel awkward because of differences in rank or 

religious denomination. 

As discussed in Chapter 2, MRE 513 provides a limited privilege between a psychotherapist 

and a patient. However, the rule does not specify what is meant by the phrase “in a case 

arising under the UCMJ” and DoD has not promulgated guidance in this area. In the Report 

of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the Air Force Academy, the Panel interpreted 

this phrase to include consultations with psychotherapists during the investigative phase of 

an offense under the UCMJ and concluded the privilege could extend to victims of sexual 

assault. In response, the Panel recommended establishing partial confidentiality for victims 

reporting to credentialed officials practicing under the umbrella of the psychotherapist 

privilege at the Air Force Academy. 

For sexual assault victims seeking confidential disclosure, another problem with the 

application of MRE 513 is the fact that there has been no implementing guidance for 

providers and that exceptions to the privilege could be interpreted as “swallowing the rule.” 

For instance, under the rule a communication is not privileged “when necessary to ensure 

the safety and security of military personnel, military dependents, military property, classified 

information, or the accomplishment of the mission.” Under circumstances commonly 

applicable to many reports of sexual assault, a provider could determine this exception 

would apply and not afford a victim confidentiality. During focus group sessions with 

mental health providers and judge advocates, there was a great deal of confusion as to 

whether this privilege would extend to most sexual assault victims. 

Although a lawyer-client privilege is recognized under MRE 502 this privilege would not 

extend to most victims of sexual assault. Reporting crimes falls outside the scope of legal 

assistance programs offered by legal offices in each of the military departments. 

Furthermore, confidential privileges available through military defense counsel services 

would not generally be available to victims, unless the victims were themselves suspected of 

committing criminal offenses. However, even if a victim accused of minor misconduct 

arising out of a sexual assault allegation sought counsel, the few defense counsel we spoke 

with noted that a counsel might advise a client victim to not discuss his or her circumstances 

with anyone else in order to help shield the victim from potential criminal liability. 

Even if a “safe haven” could be assured for sexual assault victims through clarification of the 

existing rules with respect to communications to the clergy or between a psychotherapist and 

patient, existing policies and regulations might still preclude victims from seeking medical 

care within the military system for issues related to sexual assault. 

 

Although most individuals we spoke to recognized that the lack of confidentiality within 

DoD serves as a barrier to reporting, there was equal concern that affording victims avenues 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 31
for confidential disclosure within DoD will result in either a delay or lack of investigation 

that ultimately impedes commanders’ solemn responsibility to hold offenders accountable 

and to ensure community safety. Resolving these inherent tensions is complicated, but must 

be addressed. 

Response—Safety and Protection 

Finding 16 

DoD guidelines are needed to ensure victim safety and protection. 

Several focus group participants reported that steps to provide for the safety and protection

of sexual assault victims are either not fully understood, inadequately applied, or take too 

long. Sexual assault can have a powerful and potentially long term effect on a victim’s ability 

to cope. It often destabilizes a victim’s sense of control, safety and well being, particularly if 

the victim lives in the same building, is assigned within the same command, and frequents 

the same base support and recreation facilities as the offender. Commander/leader focus 

group participants indicated that they did not have, or were unaware of clear-cut guidelines 

for actions that could be taken to address the physical and emotional needs of the victim. 

The lower the rank of the command/NCO leader focus group participants, the less was 

known. 

Currently, Staff Judge Advocates (SJAs) are available to consult with commanders regarding 

what steps need to be taken to protect the victim from the alleged offender if the latter is an 

active duty service member (e.g., issuing a military protective order, ordering the service 

member - if the victim requests it - into dorms/barracks away from victim, temporarily 

suspending the suspected service member’s access to firearms and ammunition, temporarily 

reassigning the alleged offender or the victim to ensure workplace separation of both). 

Additionally, the SJA can advise on steps to be taken to protect the victim from the alleged 

offender if the latter is a civilian. 

At DoD installations, legal offices are also available to advise commanders on how to ensure 

the safety of victims of sexual assault. Legal staff can provide commanders with critical 

information regarding both military and civilian protection orders; the scope and 

applicability of the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act; a basic description of the 

immigration provisions of the Violence Against Women Act; and the scope and applicability 

of the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act. 

Finding 17 

Actions to segregate alleged victim and alleged offender are not always timely. 

Many sexual assaults take place in the victim’s domicile. Among university students who are 

assaulted on campus, almost 60 percent take place in the victim’s dormitory (Fisher, Cullen 

and Turner, 2000). Service data suggested a similar trend. Quickly segregating the victim and 

the offender, especially if they live in the same building or tent, is important. Several victims 

32 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
who spoke to the task force noted that actions to provide for their safety and protection 

were either not initiated, inadequate or took too long. Because the victim often feels a loss of 

control after a sexual assault, it is important to give high priority to his/her wishes in making 

segregation decisions. 

Focus group leader/commander participants widely acknowledged that they had the ability 

to move or transfer victims or offenders to another location, temporarily, but acknowledged 

that it was based on their personal judgment of the situation rather than on any specific set 

of guidelines or sensitivity training about the importance of assuring safety or protection of 

sexual assault victims. 

Commanders/leaders expressed they have had a more difficult time accommodating the 

need to segregate victims from their assailants in a combat theater, when limited options are 

available, even temporarily. One commander noted that movement of one or both trained 

service members out of a unit supporting a critical war-fighting mission could significantly 

erode its ability to accomplish it, particularly if either party performed a critical skill. 

Another officer indicated that he would immediately send both the victim and the offender 

out of the theater, to different but appropriate locations, even while the investigation was 

ongoing. The rationale offered for sending the victim out was there were limited support 

services available to provide timely ongoing assistance to a traumatized victim, whose 

performance may be impaired by the event. The rationale for sending the alleged offender 

out, often with no public indication of the basis for the action, is to remove the potentially 

criminal behavior from an environment where judgments being made were supposed to save 

lives, not ruin them. 

Some victims reported that they felt they had been re-victimized by the commander’s 

unilateral decision to send them home. They expressed frustration that their commanders 

had not consulted them prior to deciding to relocate them. Commanders expressed difficulty 

in making decisions to move either party because of the career implications and other 

consequences that may potentially occur if the investigation later finds that the report was 

not substantiated. 

Finding 18 

Assuring victim safety is a challenge when offenders are from coalition forces or 

foreign nations. 

CENTCOM leader/commander focus group participants identified the challenges they 

faced in sorting through how to navigate jurisdictional authorities for issuing protection 

orders, seeking to strip them of their weapons, initiating criminal charges or otherwise 

holding offenders accountable. This was particularly problematic in countries that had no 

governing authorities for the U.S. to work with. Because no specific DoD policy or 

standards to address these issues existed prior to and during most of the conflict, Combined 

Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7, with only partial agreement with the coalition partners, published 

guidelines for responding to sexual assaults involving coalition partners in early March 2004. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 33
Response—Care for Victims 

Finding 19 

Commanders have variable responses in support for victims. 

Sexual assault can have a substantial impact on a victim’s work habits and performance. 

Several victims noted that the emotional and physical consequences of sexual assault may 

make it difficult to continue working and/or maintain levels of proficiency required for 

success. 

Focus group participants noted that the chain of command response to sexual assault 

victims varied. Some commands were reported to be very supportive, while others were 

noted to respond with indifference or disbelief. Some commands communicated, either 

directly or indirectly, that “the mission comes first.” It was difficult for some commands to 

appreciate the need for long-term supportive care for some victims, both with respect to 

mental health and legal support. Additionally, it was not always recognized that other military 

members, spouses or support personnel might need time away from work to accompany the 

victim in obtaining these support services. Over time, it became apparent from discussion in 

the leadership focus groups that this apparent insensitivity may be related to an absence of 

training that specifically addresses the needs of sexual assault victims rather than general 

disregard. Furthermore, it was not uncommon in these focus groups for leaders to indicate 

that the group discussion had enlightened them and they expressed a need for further 

education and information. 

Finding 20 

DoD has not mandated requirements to provide advocacy for sexual assault 

victims. 

Under the best of circumstances and in all due diligence, there are aspects of criminal 

investigation that contribute to a victim’s sense of shame, self-blame and guilt. For this 

reason, among others, victim advocacy is thought to be most effective when engaged from 

the very beginning. 

 

Provider and other focus group participants agreed that sexual assault victim advocate policy 

and programming is needed throughout DoD. While DoD and Service VWAP policies 

require designated personnel to provide victim support, mostly in conjunction with the legal 

process, implementing regulations do not mandate appointment of liaisons to accompany 

and guide victims of sexual assault throughout the medical, counseling, and investigative 

processes. In the end, there is no one person or office across the military departments who 

are mandated to principally and exclusively serve the needs of sexual assault victims. 

Notably, the Task Force found that Victim and Witness liaison officers in the combat 

theater were far more proactive in contacting sexual assault victims during the initial stages 

of an investigation and facilitating services on behalf of victims. These liaison officers were 

always JAGC officers who took a personal interest in performing duties that would normally 

34 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
be performed by an advocate. They acknowledged that their effort to contact and provide 

support to victims early in the investigative process was beyond the mandate of DoD 

VWAP. Nevertheless, Victim and Witness liaison officers are not required, nor are they 

routinely trained, to provide the scope of services typically found within civilian advocacy 

models. 

While victim advocates within the Navy and Marine Corps provide a range of services and 

support more in keeping with civilian advocacy models, their programs are resourced and 

implemented differently. The Navy’s SAVI program is resourced with service funds and the 

Marine Corps victim advocacy program is funded through their Family Advocacy Program 

(FAP). The success of the Navy and Marine Corps’ programs at installations we visited are 

largely dependent upon individual command attention, the resources available, and the 

experience and training of personnel acting as victim advocates. Although trained volunteers 

are available within Navy units ashore and deployed on ships, the adequacy of this support is 

largely dependent upon the experience and training of individuals selected to fill those 

positions. The Marine Corps trained civilian victim advocates are generally not available for 

deployment to the combat theater. 

Finding 21 

There is a perception that some victims are not consistently informed on the 

status of their cases. 

Some victims interviewed felt their needs were not being met with respect to obtaining 

information on the status or outcome of their cases during the investigatory, command 

decision-making, and legal processes. The continuity and relative success of programs under 

the VWAP tend to work better at those locations where the liaison personnel are full-time 

civilian employees who are proactively involved with victims. Unfortunately, because of lack 

of funding, this function often becomes an additional or shared duty among personnel 

assigned to the local staff judge advocate office. Too frequently, this results in victims feeling 

as though nobody cares about them and is especially problematic when the victim and 

alleged offender are stationed in geographically dispersed locations. Strong coordination 

between victim advocates, where available, and VWAP personnel is critical in reducing this 

perceived gap. 

Finding 22 

There are multiple factors causing delays in immediate response to victims. 

During focus group discussions, it became apparent that if the victim went to a military 

treatment facility, care was rendered; however, timeliness of care was identified as a problem 

for several reasons. These included long waiting times in emergency rooms, waiting for 

responders to arrive, waiting for medical evaluation of any other traumas, and delays in 

arranging for transportation of victims to “outside the gate” civilian facilities. Many medical 

commands, particularly in CONUS, have partnered with civilian agencies to obtain forensic 

evidence, since their experienced SANE nurses assure reliable evidence for trial and because 

a significant number of installations no longer have full military hospitals and instead 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 35
provide Monday-Friday clinical support. While these agreements are practical for a number 

of reasons, they may have unintended consequences. Through the eyes of a victim who 

recently experienced the trauma of a sexual assault, it is difficult for them to be forced to 

wait longer than absolutely necessary before showering. It may also unnecessarily require 

them to relate events to more than one medical provider. The response protocol at Nellis 

Air Force Base was notable in that victims are transported directly to the civilian facility by 

investigators, bypassing the military treatment facility except on rare occasions when the 

victim has other additional trauma. 

Delays associated with investigation can also be a significant problem. Some delays noted

during this review included geographic separation of the personnel involved that were 

caused by cases occurring during deployment or other temporary duty situations, and those 

reported after personnel have been redeployed or reassigned. 

Finding 23 

A system to coordinate and track victim support services for effective case 

management does not exist at all installations. 

With respect to Service data call information pertaining to the care provided to victims, the 

Army reported that for cases of alleged sexual assault involving active duty victims, 86% of 

the victims accessed military or civilian services. Of the total number of Army victims, 48% 

received military medical care, 27% received behavioral health care and 12% received civilian 

purchased care. Service member victims who accessed care received a total of 1,272 clinic 

visits, with behavioral health visits being the greatest. With respect to the Department of the 

Navy, 63% of active duty victims received either medical or mental health care within Navy 

medical facilities. Of those, only 71% of the victims seen had diagnostic codes that reflected 

the sexual assault as the reason for the visit. In the Air Force, 98% of uniformed victims 

received medical care. Of the total number of victims, 52% received medical care within 7 

days of the alleged sexual assault, while 5% received behavioral health care within 7 days. 

In reviewing the reports submitted by the installations we visited, it was difficult to ascertain 

the level of support services offered, the timeliness of response, the extent to which 

commanders took action in regards to safety measures for the victim, or what was the final 

disposition of the case. 

From our focus group discussions, there did not appear to be any organizational mandate to 

coordinate or integrate services and care for each victim of sexual assault case at most 

installations. However, at locations that we visited in CENTCOM, policies for 

transportation and coordination of care have recently been developed, but not well 

published. 

Although multiple services are available for victims at most locations, many victims were 

unaware of them and were unable to identify a centralized individual, or process, responsible 

for insuring the timely and coordinated delivery of those services. Navy utilizes SAVI 

Program Coordinators and a SAVI Program Coordinating Committee on a quarterly basis to 

36 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
address system issues that may limit access to care for victims. While an excellent model,

focus group participants reported inconsistency in practice. 

The Army has a MEDCOM regulation requiring SARBs (Sexual Assault Review Boards) at 

medical treatment facilities to perform quarterly reviews on how well the various providers 

coordinated their “stovepipe” services to support the victim; however these boards have not 

been consistently implemented Service-wide. 

The Nellis Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention Program also uses a SART (Sexual Assault 

Response Team) concept to make certain all necessary team members are notified of an 

alleged assault. The SART concept allows for follow-up evaluation on how support services 

provided coordinated care for the victim, and a forum to address any gaps in care. Their 

SART reports directly to the installation Community Action Information Board (CAIB) to 

close any loops and keep the Command informed. 

While Services have policies and procedures concerning each of the separate support 

services that may be used to help victims, many of these policies are outdated and are not 

consistently applied or not designed to insure integrated support for each victim’s case. A 

system is needed to assess how well each sexual assault case was managed, facilitate local 

policy changes and address any trends or risk factors. Additionally, a mechanism to report 

significant installation findings to the Service level is needed to perform Service-level system 

review and improvement. This process would allow the Services to obtain consistent data, 

assess trends, and be able to adjust policies or training materials on an ongoing basis. 

Finding 24 

Resourcing to deliver integrated case management support for victims in a

combat theater is currently not a part of force planning. 

At many CONUS locations, military treatment facilities have entered into memoranda of 

understanding (MOUs) with local organizations to provide specialized, expert medical and 

supportive care for victims. These facilities often utilize Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners 

(SANE) who are certified specialists. We found these relationships to be of great benefit to 

sexual assault victims, providing expert forensic evidence collection, advocacy, and on going 

medical and psychological support. Active duty victims we spoke to who chose to receive 

confidential care through these agencies were generally satisfied with the care and assistance 

received. However, these programs differ with respect to the scope of assistance provided 

from location to location, they may not be affordable for all victims if not otherwise 

reimbursed by the Services or through healthcare benefits, and may require significant travel 

time for the victim. 

While the use of civilian experts has improved our ability to provide optimal care for victims 

in CONUS, it has consequently diluted professional training, development, and expertise 

within the Services. Therefore, one of our greatest challenges is providing this same level of 

care for victims at small, isolated installations CONUS, at OCONUS installations where 

expert host nation resources have not been developed and in the deployed environment. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 37
With respect to forensic medical examination, we have SANEs in the active and reserve 

components, but have not strategically developed or implemented these assets throughout 

DoD. Medical and mental health professionals deployed to combat theaters are specifically 

trained and resourced to provide care for casualties and combat stress, but are not trained to 

provide specialized assistance to sexual assault victims (see finding 25). In addition, access to 

victim advocacy is minimal in the combat theatre. Where available, victim advocacy is an

additional responsibility to the member’s routine duties in support of the combat mission. 

While the Navy SAVI program purposefully utilizes military deployable victim advocates,

ensuring that these assets are available in Navy units deployed to support joint forces has not 

occurred. There is no specific mechanism within the Navy to insure effective multifunctional 

case management and integration when commands are deployed away from Naval 

installations. 

Finding 25 

Department-wide uniform training of providers and standards of care for victims 

of sexual assault do not exist. 

There is no clear DoD consensus on standards of medical care and optimal services in the 

care of victims of sexual assault, including DoD-wide standards of training for all care 

providers. Many focus group providers (physicians, nurses, chaplains, social workers) 

expressed concerns about inadequacy of specialized training in this area. Additionally, due to 

the frequent movement of both providers and victims, a focus group finding identified 

continuity of mental health care as a significant issue. Another frequent comment from 

focus groups were the desire for routine access to “after hours” support groups on military 

installations. 

Very recently, the Department of Veterans Affairs established a continuing medical 

education program to assist primary care providers in identifying victims of military sexual 

trauma. This program is aimed at enhancing clinician’s awareness of specific conditions and 

sensitivities associated with a veteran who has experienced sexual trauma in order to assure 

these victims receive the care they deserve. This program may be useful for DoD to evaluate 

for potential use in training of providers. 

Response—Investigation and Prosecution 

Finding 26 

There is a backlog of DNA evidence waiting for processing at the United States 

Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) and this can significantly delay 

investigations and prosecutions. 

Investigators and prosecutors who must rely on the backlogged United States Army Criminal 

Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) to process their evidence are frustrated by the length of 

time required to have forensic evidence analyzed. More importantly, the lengthy delays cause 

hardship to sexual assault victims who must wait for the test results and any command 

38 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
decision with respect to the disposition of the alleged offense(s). Finally, the delays 

contribute to perceptions that the justice system is too slow in holding offenders 

accountable. During focus group sessions at installations, prosecutors and investigators said 

it normally takes at least six-months to get laboratory reports on DNA or similar analysis 

and that USACIL has a policy that won’t allow cases to be expedited unless charges in a case 

have already been preferred. However, the results of laboratory analysis frequently are 

needed before deciding to prefer charges against an alleged offender and, even if they are not 

required, referral of charges starts the 120-day speedy trial clock. Prosecutors and 

investigators also noted that the waiting list for expedited results could still mean delays of

several months. In some cases, investigators have sought and received higher headquarters 

authorization to pay for and use state or local laboratories in order to expedite cases. 

The Services have taken affirmative steps to try to deal with this issue. A Process Action 

Team (PAT) from the Army, in coordination with the other Services, is conducting a review 

of current laboratory practices and any required immediate action to eliminate the current 

backlog and improve efficiencies. The Air Force senior leadership approved resources to 

provide additional manpower to USACIL, thus attempting to decrease the evidence 

processing time for these tests. 

Finding 27 

The environment in the combat theater can have a severe and detrimental 

impact on the ability to timely and effectively investigate and prosecute cases. 

In theater, agents working for AFOSI, NCIS, and USACID are often tasked to perform 

counter-intelligence and force protection duties in addition to their criminal investigations 

responsibilities. Those agents who deployed to Kuwait and Iraq during the initial months of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom reported that they lacked sufficient manpower and transportation

resources to cover every forward operating location in a timely manner. These shortages are 

compounded by new missions, such as investigating mass gravesites for potential war crimes 

prosecutions and being required to investigate all combat deaths as possible homicides or 

violations of the law of war. Some investigators acknowledged that current shortages in 

investigative resources within the combat theater might mean they would have to rely on

“reach back” capability. Furthermore, the focus of their efforts was on trying to gather 

intelligence and protect U.S. personnel from enemy forces. 

Other than being able to preserve perishable evidence and secure an initial statement from 

someone reporting a sexual assault, any case that would have arisen would have required 

outside, additional resources. Judge advocates deployed in theater during this period 

reported having to conduct large portions of criminal investigations on their own. It is 

possible the unavailability and workload of investigative agents also may have been a reason 

why a number of sexual assaults reported in the combat theater were first investigated by the 

command rather than by investigative agencies with appropriate expertise. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 39
Finding 28 

Investigations run by the command, both formal and informal, without 

involvement of investigative agencies may compromise cases of sexual assault. 

Pursuant to R.C.M. 303, commanders “shall make or cause to be made a preliminary 

inquiry” into suspected offenses that are triable by court-martial. The discussion to that rule 

notes that commanders may conduct investigations personally or with members of the 

command, but that they should consider whether to seek the assistance of law enforcement 

personnel in conducting any inquiry or investigation in serious or complex cases. Generally, 

commanders immediately contact investigative agencies whenever serious crimes that have 

not been investigated come to their attention. Occasionally, commanders initiate 

commander-directed inquiries or investigations before contacting investigative agencies 

when allegations of serious criminal misconduct arise within their command. Although there 

may be a myriad of reasons for this (e.g., lack of investigative resources, not realizing full 

seriousness of allegation as reported) many focus group participants have questioned this

practice because cases of sexual assault are serious crimes that fall within the regulatory 

jurisdiction of the investigative agencies for each military department (AFOSI, USACID, 

and NCIS). Some focus group participants complained that the current emphasis on chainof-command reporting (e.g., serious incident reports, situation reports) results in commands 

trying to ascertain facts surrounding sexual assault reports before investigators are on scene. 

This can often negatively impact an investigation, including tainting potential evidence or 

testimony. This informal process of trying to ascertain facts can produce multiple victim 

statements that may be viewed as inconsistent or, even worse, increase a victim’s anxiety to 

the point that he or she shuts down because of being required to continually repeat what 

happened. 

Finding 29 

Addressing victim misconduct is a significant challenge for commanders. 

As noted in Findings 4, 5, and 12 many reported cases of sexual assault involve 

circumstances where the victim may have been involved with some type of minor 

misconduct (e.g., adultery, fraternization, underage alcohol offenses, and violations of certain 

regulations or orders). At every location we visited, the general deterrence message was 

effectively and forcefully communicated with respect to alcohol-related offenses and 

improper personal relationships, though not always adhered to by members of the 

command. One reason these offenses are such strong command focus items is because they 

can often be contributing factors in even more serious crimes, such as sexual assault 

offenses. 

Commanders and their supporting judge advocates explained the dilemmas associated with 

handling minor misconduct on the part of a victim of sexual assault. They acknowledged the 

misperceptions that can arise when the command takes fairly quick action to address minor 

victim misconduct stemming from circumstances surrounding an allegation of sexual assault. 

In some cases involving alcohol, we heard commanders were very concerned that the 

amount and patterns of alcohol consumption by a victim required the victim to be enrolled 

40 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
in alcohol abuse counseling. In other cases, we were told the victim had violated specific 

orders from the commander and that swift action was deemed necessary. Although 

somewhat rare, we heard of cases where commanders would address minor victim 

misconduct before the disposition of the sexual assault offense (and any other misconduct) 

against the alleged offender was resolved because the commander believed he or she needed 

to dispose of each offense in the most expeditious manner. 

Because the criminal process associated with investigating and taking any action against an 

alleged offender for sexual assault typically takes much longer and frequently lacks 

transparency, there was a misperception among some junior service members that victims

get punished for reporting a sexual assault and that alleged offenders frequently go 

unpunished. This may have been because those who knew about the offense had been redeployed or reassigned before final disposition or because the disposition did not involve a 

public proceeding, such as a court-martial. Also, focus group participants expressing these 

opinions would not have been in a position to know all the facts and circumstances 

surrounding an individual case. 

Commanders, senior NCOs, and legal office personnel all recognize the seriousness of this 

misperception and were very concerned about how to address this issue. It would be 

improper to communicate any type of “amnesty” message for minor victim misconduct in 

cases involving sexual assault, especially because such a message might encourage false 

reporting of a sexual assault if service member wanted to divert attention from his or her 

own misconduct (e.g., pregnancy through adulterous relationship). There is no DoD policy 

guidance for commanders regarding this issue. However, the Department of Navy has a 

policy as part of its SAVI instruction that advises commanders to consider delaying any 

action to address minor victim misconduct until the final disposition of the sexual assault is 

resolved and to consider that disposition when deciding how to best address the minor 

victim misconduct. 

Finding 30 

Understanding the dynamics of false allegations of sexual assault may help the

Department minimize victimization of actual victims. 

The Task Force is extremely sensitive to the challenge presented when individuals make a 

false allegation of sexual assault. The reasons for these vary, and often the allegation is not 

the result of conscious deception, but rather the result of multiple other factors impacting 

the individual making the allegation. Nonetheless, the issue is of particular concern because 

of the negative effect these false allegations have on all involved. 

This challenge is not unique to the military and confronts the civilian community as well.

Many focus group participants expressed concerns about the effect of false allegations, but 

in truth, there is little formal research to help us understand the various reasons why a victim 

might allege sexual assault when it has not occurred. We currently do not know the number 

of circumstances where the alleged victim deliberately and maliciously makes a false claim. 

Often there are other mechanisms at play, involving complex individual factors not well 

understood. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 41
Focus group participants, especially enlisted personnel, expressed the belief that there were 

individuals who made such allegations for secondary gain and that the alleged accused was at 

a disadvantage. Commanders expressed concerns in terms of the impact on unit cohesion

and mission accomplishment. Investigators and legal personnel expressed the negative 

impact on limited resources and their ability to investigate and litigate legitimate cases. Some 

victims expressed their experience in encountering skeptical commanders, investigators, and 

peers as questioning the assault claim. 

A number of focus group participants expressed a desire to require commanders to take 

clear and unambiguous action against malicious false accusers. The challenge is, however, 

that rarely is there clear and unambiguous understanding of the factors that lead a person to 

use an unconventional and undesirable act to get needed help vice a truly malicious act. This 

requires recognition that the individual, despite negative behavior, may need to be assessed 

by a professional behavioral health counselor. 

Finding 31 

The investigative and legal communities are not currently resourced to provide

investigators and prosecutors at each location with specialized training in 

handling sexual assault cases. 

Installation law enforcement, judge advocates, and investigator resources are scarce, have 

heavy caseloads, and have no specific requirement to be trained in how to effectively handle 

sexual assault cases; in a combat theater, such resources are even more limited. 

For the most part, investigators and judge advocates participating in focus groups reported 

that they did not have formal, specialized training in handling sexual assault cases. However, 

because sex offense cases represent a large percentage of cases within the criminal justice 

system, many investigators and prosecutors had extensive experience in handling sexual 

assault cases. In addition, AFOSI, NCIS, and Army CID all reported having agents with 

specialized training (often forensic consultants) available at the regional and headquarters

levels. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) now has a block of 

instruction specifically related to investigating cases of sexual assault. AFOSI and NCIS 

conduct all basic investigator training at FLETC. AFOSI established an Advanced Sexual

Assault Investigations Workshop, conducted at the Air Force Academy in December 2003. 

They are in the process of expanding this course for investigators from each MAJCOM. 

Many prosecutors also reported they were exposed to the issues involved with sexual assault 

cases as part of overall litigation training programs. Recently, the Air Force Judge Advocate 

General School offered its first course of instruction devoted solely to the prosecution of 

sexual assault cases and the course is open to judge advocates from all military departments. 

In addition, some judge advocates were able to attend various types of specialized training 

through civilian training programs offered by the Department of Justice, the National 

College of District Attorneys, and some state-run programs. 

42 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Finding 32 

Due to a lack of system transparency, there is a perception that commanders do 

not always take appropriate action and/or alleged offenders are not always held 

accountable. 

There is very little transparency during the investigation of sexual assault cases and the 

decision-making process for individual cases. Consequently, most service members 

(especially more junior personnel) do not understand why cases are handled a particular way. 

This lack of transparency is due to, in part, the need for investigative operational security and 

the Privacy Act protections afforded to both the victim and alleged offender. 

Because of the military’s inability to tell “its side of the story” in individual cases of sexual 

assault (i.e., due to Privacy Act restrictions and other victim or alleged offender privacy 

concerns), most commanders, investigators, and judge advocates expressed frustration at not 

being able to address the specific factors in individual cases that caused particular findings or 

dispositions. Because most reports of sexual assault involved fact patterns that make burdens 

of proof very difficult to meet, this often drives individual results. Everyone involved with 

the investigation and prosecution of cases acknowledged that DoD must devise better ways 

to educate members within DoD and the civilian community that cases are taken seriously. 

There was universal recognition that commanders are usually unable to advise unit and 

installation personnel how cases were handled or what action was taken against alleged 

offenders, unless the case involved a public proceeding, such as a court-martial. 

At some installations, attempts by the command backfired when it tried to get out the word 

on disciplinary action taken in individual cases. Focus group participants reported seeing 

installation newspaper articles where reported cases involved the same or similar offense 

under the UCMJ, and where the more senior offender received nonjudicial punishment and 

the junior offender received a stiff sentence by a court-martial. Because the actual facts of

each case were unknown, this reinforced the misperception that the system treats senior 

enlisted and officer offenders more favorably.

Finding 33 

Sexual assault cases are often very difficult to investigate and to successfully 

prosecute, but available data shows commanders are taking action. 

Because of the nature of the crime and the circumstances that are typically involved, 

obtaining the quality of evidence required to meet the criminal burden of proof is very 

difficult in cases involving sexual assault. Very often, there is no issue with respect to 

whether sexual activity occurred between the parties involved and, therefore, the issues of 

consent and the exact nature of the sexual conduct become central to the case. Given the 

prevalence of alcohol involved in these cases, the frequency of cases where the victim and 

alleged offender are social acquaintances or have been consensual sexual partners prior to 

the allegation, and the lack of corroborating witness testimony, investigators are often faced 

with the difficult task of trying to evaluate the credibility of two conflicting stories; the one 

of the victim and the other of the alleged offender. Every consistency and inconsistency in

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 43
the statements given by both parties becomes critical. Add these factors to those discussed 

earlier in this chapter related to the barriers and problems with reporting, and commanders 

are often faced with extremely difficult decisions in deciding the best way to handle 

allegations. 

The Department of the Navy’s (DON) reported statistics on cases of insufficient evidence 

show how difficult these cases can be for investigators, prosecutors, and commanders. The 

DON (includes both Navy and Marine Corps data) identified 235 of its cases resulted in a 

determination of insufficient evidence and more than 38% of those determinations were 

because the victim refused to cooperate (59 cases) or victim fabrication was involved (31 

cases). 

The data provided by the military departments for this report reveals there were 1,634 

military individuals identified and accused of sexual assault during the last two calendar years. 

Of the 1,634 alleged offenders identified, 401 were from the Air Force, 670 were from the 

Army, 440 were from the Navy, and 123 were from the Marine Corps. 

Of the 401 Air Force cases, charges were preferred, i.e., initiated, (rough equivalent of 

indictment) against 97 (just over 24%) of the alleged offenders and nonjudicial punishment 

proceedings under the UCMJ were initiated against another 42. Consequently, 139 cases 

(nearly 35%) resulted in some type of military justice action. 

None of the other military departments were able to provide information on the initial 

command actions taken in the cases reported. Due to the Army’s self-identified problem of 

receiving timely and accurate commander’s reports of disciplinary action for entry into its 

criminal databases, the Army was unable to identify final dispositions in nearly half (45%) of 

its cases. Army was only able to determine that there was court-martial action in 76 cases and 

nonjudicial punishment proceedings in another 97 cases. 

Of the 563 DON cases (including both Navy and Marine Corps data), there was courtsmartial action in 154 cases and nonjudicial punishment proceedings in another 85 cases. This 

data shows some type of military justice action was taken in nearly 43% of cases. 

Excluding the Army’s incomplete data on command actions taken, the combined data 

provided by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps show that courts-martial charges were at 

least preferred (i.e., initiated) in 26% of cases, and military justice action was taken in over 

39% of cases. 

System Accountability for Sexual Assault 

Finding 34 

No overarching policies, programs, and procedures exist within DoD to ensure all 

functional areas responsible for dealing with victims of sexual assault provide an 

integrated response to reported cases of sexual assault. 

44 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there is no policy office with sole 

responsibility for establishing policy and maintaining oversight in matters involving sexual 

assault. Consequently, there are no policies specifically geared toward responding to reported 

cases of sexual assault and this lack of oversight means there are no standardized 

expectations that the military departments and defense agencies must meet. The lack of 

policy guidance and oversight translates into a lack of such policies and oversight 

mechanisms within DoD components. 

Finding 35 

Accountability for resolving sexual assault problems is diffused. 

Currently, Service-specific programs, policies and organizational structures that provide care 

for victims of sexual assault are either addressing specific systemic needs or have augmented 

and reinforced program offices established for other purposes. In all cases, resources to 

execute these programs were accomplished through application of the discretionary funds of 

the Service, primarily because no DoD-wide policy or program guidance exists to reinforce 

the need to specifically apply resources to this issue. 

 Each of the Services evolved their focus on this issue in response to internal management 

awareness that these problems needed management attention. The Services deserve credit 

for the individual initiatives across the functional spectrum to increase capability to respond 

to risks relating to sexual assault, improve care for victims of sexual assault, and establish

command emphasis to rapidly report sexual assault incidents. 

 

However, pockets of excellence in each of the Services’ in establishing sexual assaultfocused management initiatives are not adequate. The absence of DoD-wide policies and 

programs to deal with this pervasive, underreported problem has led to this situation, 

coupled with the fact that, except in the Navy, Service-wide command emphasis on 

supporting victims and preventing sexual assault is lacking. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 45
5 Task Force Recommendations 

 

Recommendations for Immediate Action 

Recommendation 1 

Establish a single point of accountability for all sexual assault policy matters 

within the Department of Defense.3

This office would: 

1.1. Support the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in advising 

the Secretary of Defense on all policy, program development and resourcing, and 

program oversight matters relating to sexual assault within the Department of 

Defense. 

 Address the gaps in the current stovepipe systems created by the absence of any specific 

sexual assault policies and programs not otherwise covered by FAP. 

 Address the issues of standardization of definitions, and create outcome-based 

accountability for the Services.

1.2. Develop strategic program guidance and joint planning objectives to ensure that 

needed resources are available within the same timeframe across all Services and 

Combatant Commands for sexual assault prevention, reporting and response. 

 Assess Service budget and program adequacy to implement new standards, guidelines, 

and reporting data management systems.

1.3. Conduct a functional evaluation within three years to consider expanding the

scope of this office to include other related programs. (e.g., Equal Opportunity, 

VWAP, FAP, domestic violence, and child abuse). 

Recommendation 2 

During the upcoming Combatant Commanders Conference, allocate time on the 

agenda to discern how the findings and recommendations of this report should

apply to their areas of responsibility.4

The Task Force received information from the unified combatant commands on current 

policies and procedures in place to address the issue of sexual assault while assigned to their 

organizations or areas of responsibility. The responses varied based on missions and 

 

3 Addresses findings 1-5,6,9,11,12,14,15,16,19,20,23-31,34,35 4 Addresses findings 3,7,8,9,11,13,17,18,23, 24,27

46 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
functions, geographical locations, and administrative, medical, and investigative support 

provided by their Service executive agent. In addition, the information provided by the 

geographical commands raised the issues related to host country customs, laws and the 

limited availability of local civilian resources to assist victims. 

During this review, it became apparent that although the Task Force focus on CENTCOM 

was necessary to meet the intent of the Task Force charter, more information from the other 

combatant commands is needed to understand more fully the scope of the combatant 

commander’s responsibilities and the challenges of providing support to victims in a joint 

operational environment. Adding this topic to the conference agenda will provide an 

opportunity to: 

2.1. Discuss the roles and responsibilities of the combatant commands in preventing 

sexual assault and for providing care to victims of sexual assault in a joint 

environment. 

 Identify to what extent the unified combatant commands’ needs should shape the 

Department’s policies and programs on sexual assault in theaters of operation. 

 Key considerations of geographical commands 

y Multinational (Coalition partners and host nation civilians) 

 Key considerations of functional commands 

 Identify requirements for sexual assault prevention and for the care and support of 

victims of sexual assault as they apply to an operational theater, including but not limited 

to: 

 Force structure 

 Training (predeployment and in theater) 

Recommendation 3 

Ensure broad dissemination of relevant sexual assault information through DoDwide communication outlets.

The Task Force found an evident need for victims, friends, family members, leaders and 

responders to have access to various sources of reliable information regarding DoD’s 

policies, programs and resources available for sexual assault prevention, reporting, response, 

protection and accountability. This could be accomplished by taking action to: 

3.1. Update and leverage existing information sources and communication structures 

available within DoD and the Military Departments with reliable information 

regarding sexual assault prevention, reporting, response, protection and 

accountability.5

 

5 Addresses findings 5, 12, 13 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 47
 Potential outlets are: official websites, One Source 1-800 numbers, and/or other print, 

voice and telecommunication mediums. Each of these should ensure that they have the 

ability to provide updated and accurate information for reporting, and obtaining services. 

3.2. Develop a web-based knowledge management compendium of resources and 

information available for use in achieving sexual assault prevention, response, 

reporting and accountability objectives. This would include, but not be limited to 

actions to:6

 Identify and maintain a listing of useful sexual assault resources and subject matter 

experts for use throughout the Department. 

 Research, develop and maintain exportable information materials and modules for 

general military training, functional specialty training for service providers, and 

leadership development training. 

Recommendation 4 

Within the next three months, convene a summit of DoD leaders (military and 

civilian) and recognized experts on sexual assault, to develop strategic courses of 

action on critical, unresolved issues. This would include, but not be limited to,

courses of action that will: 

4.1. Develop better operational definitions and delineation of distinctions between 

terms like sexual harassment, sexual misconduct, and sexual assault, and how those 

definitions relate to crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Courses of 

action should consider the following issues: 7

 The term “sexual assault” is not a specific offense under the UCMJ. Depending upon 

what is being evaluated and the circumstances involved, DoD and the Services have 

consolidated a number of separate UCMJ offenses into the term “sexual assault” when 

reviewing cases or trends. 

 Separate instructions and policy guidance in the Military Departments and various task 

forces, commissions, panels, and process teams that have addressed “sexual assault” 

have all defined the term in different ways. 

 The scope of behavior covered in terms like sexual misconduct, sex-related offenses, and 

sexual harassment have blurred the distinctions even more. The varied use of these and 

similar terms throughout regulatory and policy guidance cause service members to view 

them interchangeably. 

 Although service members are taught that “sexual harassment” should be dealt with 

under the DoD Military Equal Opportunity Program, more egregious cases of such 

conduct may likely result in sexual assault charges under the UCMJ and investigative 

agencies would typically have responsibility for investigating them. Service members are 

often confused about the proper avenue for reporting allegations when they arise. 

 

6 Addresses findings 6, 7, 9, 13 7Addresses findings 3, 9 

48 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
 Clearer and more uniform definitions should be developed to facilitate training, 

awareness, and accountability for all service members. 

4.2. Establish avenues within DoD to increase privacy and provide confidential 

disclosure for sexual assault victims. Courses of action should consider the following 

issues: 8

 Perceived lack of privacy and confidentiality within DoD is thought to be one of the 

most significant barriers to reporting by military sexual assault victims. 

 There is equal concern that confidential disclosure within DoD will impede a 

commander’s solemn responsibility to hold offenders accountable and ensure 

community safety. 

 Unreported sexual assault has adverse consequences for victims, commands,

communities, units and mission accomplishment. 

 Reconciling the inherent tension between a victim’s need for confidentiality and a 

commander’s need to know is very challenging and it requires substantial additional work 

to resolve, including well-informed discussions among many parties (military, civilian, 

medical, JAG, chaplains, law enforcement). 

4.3. Establish ways to increase transparency of the reasons for the handling and 

disposition of reported sexual assault cases. Courses of action should consider the 

following issues: 9

 Given current limitations on collecting and synthesizing data related to sexual assault 

allegations, the Department is ill-equipped to educate its own members and the general 

public that our system of justice is fair and balanced. 

 The Department is frequently criticized for its handling of specific cases or particular 

classes of cases and is often unable to fully respond because of legal impediments (e.g., 

national security, Privacy Act, or other privacy considerations). 

 The inability (for valid privacy reasons) to fully inform members of a command and the 

general public about the reasons supporting dispositions of individual cases can 

undermine morale and full faith in our system of justice. 

 Public affairs strategies, statistical reports of trends related to dispositions of sexual 

assault cases (e.g., investigative findings, command actions), educational briefings at all 

levels, and possible legislative solutions should be explored as some potential options to 

help improve system transparency. 

4.4. Develop and maintain an expert, full-spectrum sexual assault response capability 

in OCONUS, CONUS remote, and operational environments, such as through the 

use of deployable Sexual Assault Response Teams (SARTs). Courses of action 

should consider the following issues: 10

 Partnering with civilian agencies in CONUS has assured an expert response to sexual 

assault at many locations. 

 

8 Addresses findings 12, 14, 15 9 Addresses findings 1, 2, 4, 6, 12, 23, 32, 33. 10 Addresses findings 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 49
 Providing specially trained and experienced medical, investigative, legal and advocacy 

personnel in all locations presents an ongoing challenge, given the mobility of the armed 

forces. 

 Strategic planning is needed to develop, resource and sustain a trained, expert, fullspectrum, deployable sexual assault response within DoD.

4.5. Establish flexible templates for diplomatic and/or military-to-military 

agreements with coalition partners that address the jurisdiction and responsibility for 

crimes committed by a citizen of one nation against the citizen of another nation. 11 

Recommendations for Near-Term Action

Recommendation 5 

Establish an Armed Forces Sexual Assault Advisory Council. 

 This council would be composed of key DoD officials and officials of other federal 

agencies with recognized expertise in dealing with issues surrounding sexual assault. The 

council could also seek input from other nationally recognized sexual assault experts, as 

needed. 

 The primary responsibility of this council would be to work with the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness and other senior military leaders in providing 

advice or recommendations on issues and policies related to sexual assault in the military, 

including those related to prevalence, etiology, care, reporting, and prevention. 

Recommendation 6 

Develop policies, guidelines, and standards for sexual assault prevention, 

reporting, response, and accountability. 

This would be the responsibility of a new OSD policy office and include efforts to: 

6.1. Establish overarching policies, identifying common tenets while remaining 

flexible enough to allow for diversity between Service cultures and programs.12

 We strongly advise the new OSD Policy Office to evaluate research identified in Chapter 

6 for applicability in the development of new DoD policies, standards, and guidelines. 

 Our expectation is for these policies to be applicable to the military departments and the 

full range of operational environments. 

 We foresee that the optimal path to developing and implementing a seamless policy and 

program will require each of the Services to establish a focal point or office of primary 

responsibility. 

 

11 Addresses findings 8, 18. 12 Addresses all findings 1-35 

50 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
 We anticipate the inclusion of best practices from within and outside the Department to

address common definitions, roles and responsibilities and program details focused on 

standards of care and performance-based metrics. 

6.2. Develop standardized requirements, guidelines, protocols, and instructional 

materials that are focused on prevention across the total force.13

 Identify and develop effective, inter-operable, and exportable prevention training 

methodologies (tools and guidelines) for service members, leaders and trainers at all 

levels. This may include validating and leveraging current, “best practice” prevention 

training efforts. 

 Incorporate leader and individual awareness training throughout an individual’s career 

path to reinforce prevention efforts. 

 Make training scenario-based, using real-life situations to demonstrate the entire cycle of

reporting, response, and accountability procedures/standards. 

 Approach should also incorporate all learning styles, be inclusive of audience and group 

participation. 

6.3. Encourage reporting through well established, publicized and unobstructed 

reporting channels. 14

 Work to remove real and perceived barriers to reporting. 

 Partner with and publicize non-military support options available to service members. 

 Inform and train service members about the reporting options and response 

mechanisms. 

 Work to overcome non-reporting in order to care for victims and prosecute offenders. 

 Incorporate recommendation from Leaders Summit regarding confidentiality and 

reporting. 

6.4. Develop DoD-wide standards and guidelines for sexual assault response to 

assure all victims are afforded safety and protection, receive the best care possible, 

and have a coordinated, timely response to and resolution of their cases. 15 

 The report identified variabilities in standards of care that range from timeliness of care, 

training of personnel and availability of support personnel for deployed environments. 

The Department needs to ensure uniformity in the standards of care to assure all victims. 

 Additionally, it is apparent from the inability of the Services to provide accurate data on 

support services provided to victims that there is a need to establish a case management 

system within the Services that can ensure coordinated care. 

6.4.1 Develop sexual assault “force protection” guidelines for installation and 

operational use focused on identification and mitigation of risk factors.16

 

13 Addresses findings 4-11 14 Addresses findings 12-15 15 Addresses finding 16, 23, 24 16 Addresses findings 2, 3-9 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 51
 This should be part of the mission and operations planning process, inclusive of 

locality or culture awareness and their associated risk factors for operating in an 

at-risk stateside environment or in coalitional and foreign national environments. 

6.4.2 Develop DoD-wide medical standards of care and clinical practice 

guidelines for treatment and care of victims of sexual assault. 17

 Establish a Health Care Integrated Process Team to: 

y Consider how to better incorporate Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners 

(SANEs) within the Military Health System in both the Active and Reserve 

component force structure, and/or through contract support 

y Review and consider adopting the Department of Justice National Protocol 

for sexual assault forensic exams (when it becomes available later this year).

y Assess the need for and propose operational and combat theater-specific 

adjustments to standards of medical care and clinical practice guidelines 

y Determine standards of training required for personnel providing medical 

support services for victims of sexual assault 

y Assess the need and mechanisms for periodically screening of servicemembers for sexual assault 

y Assess the adequacy of the number of qualified, appropriately trained mental 

health professionals available to support victims of sexual assaults in the 

workforce 

6.4.3. Establish performance metrics for the United States Army Criminal 

Investigation Laboratory to ensure more timely forensic evidence 

processing.

18 

The Task Force consistently heard that there were significant backlogs and delays in 

forensic evidence processing at USACIL. The Army is currently evaluating the 

procedures at USACIL, including reexamination of resource requirements needed to 

ensure performance goals are achieved. 

6.5. Establish DoD-wide policy requiring victim advocates be provided to victims of 

sexual assault and create a mechanism for providing victim advocates in deployed 

environments.19

 Ensure Victim Advocates can assist in providing a range of coordinated services and 

support to victims which may be used to help the victim in reducing the effects of 

trauma. 

 One of the major components of a “victim-centric” program is rapid access to and 

availability of victim advocates. First responders should contact victim advocates 

immediately upon a case being reported. 

 Ensure funds and personnel authorizations are identified to provide needed victim 

advocates at CONUS installations and in the deployed environment. 

 

17 Addresses findings 22, 24, 25 18 Addresses finding 26 19 Addresses findings 20, 24 

52 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
6.6. Establish uniform Commander guidelines. 

6.6.1. Establish uniform guidelines for commanders’ use in assuring that a 

sexual assault victim’s safety and protection needs are met.20

Although under federal law and DoD VWAP regulations, victims have rights for 

reasonable protection from the accused, assuring safety and protection of victims is 

imperative and there is clearly need for concise and sexual assault-specific guidance. 

Recently the military protective order language has changed so that it can be used in 

cases of sexual assault. However, commanders are looking for clear, accessible 

guidance in this area. 

 The Department should consider developing overall guidance similar to that 

used by in the Navy SAVI program, which instructs commanders to consider 

temporary reassignment of either the victim or accused until the case is legally 

resolved and/or the victim is out of danger and that the victim’s desires should 

receive preferential consideration.

6.6.2. Develop DoD guidance to positively assure a victim’s privacy. 21

 This policy may need to include restrictions on “need to know,” what 

information is released in reports up the chain of command, and possibly a 

requirement to sign non-disclosure statements, with stiff penalties for violating it. 

6.6.3. Review the process and institute guidelines on how and when reports of 

sexual assault are forwarded up the chain of command, as well as what 

information is included in those reports. 22

6.6.4. Develop policy or regulatory guidance to specifically advise 

commanders that command investigations of all serious criminal offenses 

(e.g. sexual assault cases) should be avoided.23 

 Guidance should emphasize that the use of criminal investigative agencies is the 

preferred method of investigating reports of sexual assault. 

 All UCMJ offenses covered under the umbrella term of “sexual assault” (as 

defined for the purposes of this review) carry potential maximum sentences of 

imprisonment for five years or more. Consequently, early involvement of 

investigative agencies is imperative for most allegations. 

6.6.5 Establish DoD policy guidance on when a victim’s misconduct that 

occurs in association with a sexual assault should be addressed.24

 The Navy’s policy on this issue may serve as a good starting point, which advises 

commanders to consider delaying any action to address minor victim misconduct 

until final disposition of the sexual assault is resolved. 

 

20 Addresses finding 16, 21 21 Addresses finding 14 22 Addresses finding 28 23 Addresses finding 28 24 Addresses finding 29 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 53
Recommendation 7 

Assure manpower and fiscal resources are authorized and allocated, especially in 

the near years, to implement required policies and standards. 

Several findings of the Task Force were attributed to insufficient fiscal, training, and 

manpower resources. The new DoD policy office established per Recommendation 1 must 

work with the Services to identify fiscal and manpower requirements needed to execute 

emerging sexual assault policies, standards, and protocols. To the fullest extent possible, the 

new OSD staff office must work with the Services and the DoD Comptroller to establish 

and resource required sexual assault policies and standards for the current and next 2 fiscal 

years. 

This would include, but not be limited to actions that will: 

7.1. Assure DoD resourcing of Victims Witness Assistance Program (VWAP).25

VWAP programs have been implemented but they are not able to meet the needs of all 

victims because of a lack of dedicated manpower on many installations. 

7.2. Implement specialized training on sexual assault cases for all investigators and 

legal personnel and military judges that will be involved in these cases.26

There is a need to better resource and provide specialized training in the realm of sexual 

assault to investigators and legal communities. 

7.3. Consider increased manpower authorizations for Service investigative agents, 

especially in the deployed environment where they have additional responsibilities. 27

The impact of multiple taskings for investigators in the combat theater further impairs their 

ability to provide timely and effective investigations because there are simply not enough 

investigators for everything that needs to be accomplished. 

Recommendation 8 

Develop an integrated strategy for sexual assault data collection to aid 

commanders, service providers, legal staff, and law enforcement entities in 

evaluating response effectiveness and system accountability.28 

8.1. This recommendation is best accomplished through a two-step approach to:29 

 Require Services to fully implement Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS) 

reporting during FY05. 

 

25 Addresses finding 21 26 Addresses finding 31 27 Addresses finding 27 28 Addresses finding 28 29 Addresses findings 1, 23, 32, 33 

54 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
 Establish an Integrated Process Team during the next six months to develop near- and 

long-term recommendations to standardize data requirements, and system solutions for 

the capture and integrate data not included in DIBRS. 

Recommendations for Longer-Term Action

Recommendation 9 

Establish institutional sexual assault program evaluation, quality improvement, 

and oversight mechanisms.30

If the Department of Defense is to provide a responsive system to address sexual assault, it 

must be a top-down program with emphasis placed at the highest levels within the 

Department down to the lowest levels of command and leadership. 

To ensure the Department’s efforts toward confronting sexual assault remain vigilant, it is 

important to monitor the development and implementation of policies and program 

execution. This will require a concerted effort throughout the department to ensure that the 

system accomplishes this objective. 

More importantly, commanders and leaders must have the appropriate tools (education, 

training, resources and support) to ensure that our service members understand the issues 

and know how to prevent becoming victims; that support personnel provide care and 

support and treat victims with dignity and respect, and that we reassure the parents of those 

future service members that their sons and daughters will be protected. Commanders must 

also be able to provide swift resolution and/or punishment. 

9.1. Develop performance metrics, establish an evaluative framework, and conduct 

Quality Assurance and Program Improvement Reviews 

 Monitor progress in minimizing force-wide risks associated with sexual assaults. 

 Efforts to increase quality of support and care to victims. 

 Efforts to increase visibility of incidents and their dispositions to the Secretary, 

Combatant Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

 Assess effectiveness of commander tools and guidelines for preventing and responding 

to sexual assault. 

 Establish and publish an annual research agenda, using inputs from the Services, 

Combatant Commands, and other outside experts to evaluate applied strategies and their 

effect on incidence of sexual assault in DoD. 

 

30 Addresses findings 1, 3, 5, 23, 30, 34, 35 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 55
6 Literature Review 

 This provides an overview of the sexual assault research, practices, and protocols that were 

reviewed by the Task Force. Consistent with our tasking, this review focuses upon 

information of direct relevance to care for victims of sexual assault. There is an equally large 

body of relevant sex offender research that was is not included, given the time limitations 

and the Task Force mandate to address victim care. The literature reviewed and discussed 

here is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 

Definition 

In the 1970s and 1980s, extensive rape reform laws were enacted throughout the United 

States, and the legal definition of “rape” changed dramatically. Currently, the Illinois criminal 

sexual assault statute is considered a national model. The statute has the following 

characteristics: 

 Rape is defined as “gender neutral,” to include men as well as women. 

 It includes acts of sexual penetration other than vaginal penetration by a penis, such as 

oral or anal penetration. 

 Types of sexual abuse are distinguished on the basis of the degree of force or threat of 

force used similar to the “aggravated” versus “simple” assault distinction with physical 

assaults. 

 Threats as well as overt force are recognized as means to overpower the victim. 

 A new category of rape victim is included, entitled “taking advantage of an incapacitated 

victim.” Incapacitation may include mental illness, victims under the influence of drugs, 

and alcohol intoxication. 

Prevalence 

General Population 

There are several national surveys that provide information about the prevalence of sexual 

assault within the United States. The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is 

conducted annually by the Department of Justice. Using in-person and telephone interviews, 

information on reported and unreported crime is collected from a representative sample of 

approximately 40,000 households. All individuals in the household ages 12 and over are 

sampled. In 2002, there were 240,730 rape/sexual assault victimizations among U.S. 

residents age 12 and over. In the NCVS, rape includes forced oral, anal or vaginal 

penetration by the offender. Sexual assault covers a wide range of victimizations distinct 

from rape or attempted rape that generally include completed or attempted attacks involving 

unwanted sexual contact. Sexual assault may not involve force and includes such things as 

grabbing, fondling or verbal threats. The rate of all types of sexual assault (i.e., rape, 

attempted rape, and sexual assault) was 110 per 100,000 persons. Averaging across 2001 and 

2002, the annual rates of rape/attempted rape and sexual assault were 70 and 40 per 100,000 

persons, respectively (Rennison and Rand 2003). Some researchers believe that the 

56 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
methodology used in the NCVS may underestimate the actual prevalence of rape/sexual 

assault (Fisher et al. 2000). 

The National Violence Against Women (NVAW) survey was conducted in 1995 and 1996. A 

total of 8000 women and 8000 men, age 18 and over, were interviewed over the telephone

about their lifetime and annual experiences of attempted rape/rape, physical assault and 

stalking. Approximately 18% of women and 3% of men surveyed reported that they had 

experienced rape/attempted rape at some point in their life. This equates to 17.7 million 

women and 2.8 million men. With respect to the prior 12 months, one-third of one percent 

of women and one-tenth of one percent of men reported experiencing a rape or attempted 

rape. Projecting to the U.S. population, 302,091 women and 92,748 men experienced 

rape/attempted rape in the prior 12 months (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). Although direct 

comparisons are difficult due to substantially different methodologies, it is possible that the 

NVAW survey may have resulted in higher rates of rape/attempted rape than comparableyear NCVS data because the NVAW survey used a greater number and more specific 

screening questions, both of which are thought to increase disclosure. 

The National Women’s Study (NWS) consisted of a national household probability sample 

of 4008 women who were interviewed by telephone initially and twice later, at one and two 

years. Rape was defined as nonconsensual sexual penetration of any kind that involved force 

or threat of force. It was consistent, as defined, with the legal definition of forcible rape in 

the U.S. Code. An estimated 12.1 million women reported being raped at some point in their 

life. Over half (56%) reported being raped once, while 39% reported more than one rape 

and 5% were unsure how many times they were raped (Kilpatrick 1997). 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports annually on crime reported by state and 

local law enforcement agencies. Forcible rape, as defined in the Uniform Crime Reporting

(UCR) program, is defined as carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. It 

includes assault or attempts to commit rape by force or threat of force. Rapes by force and

attempts or assaults to rape are included, regardless of the age of the victim. Carnal 

knowledge is not otherwise defined in published materials. In 2002, there were 95,136 

forcible rapes/attempted rapes reported by law enforcement agencies. This constitutes a rate 

of 33 rapes/attempted rapes per 100,000 population. However, given that the UCR does not 

include the rape/attempted rape of males in rape numbers, it is perhaps more representative 

to calculate UCR prevalence rates using female population figures. As such, the 2002 rate of 

reported rape/attempted rape is 64.8 per 100,000 females. Of the total, 91% were classified 

as rapes, with the remainder classified as attempted rapes (FBI 2002). 

Military Population 

While not necessarily representative of the current active duty population, research with 

veterans provides one source of information about sexual assault within military populations. 

In one study, a random sample of over 2100 women veterans who served in the Vietnam 

and Persian Gulf eras were selected from the Department of Veterans Affairs women’s 

health care registries (Sadler et al., 2003). For the purposes of this study, rape included any 

act of attempted or completed sexual penetration without the individual’s consent, involving 

the use or threat of force. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 57
Of the 558 women who were then interviewed, 28% experienced one or more 

rapes/attempted rapes during military service. Over one-third of these women indicated they 

experienced rape/attempted rape at least twice while serving. There was no significant 

difference in the occurrence of rape/attempted rape between the two eras of service. Given 

that 66% of the sample had a service-connected disability, it is important to note that

respondents may not have been representative of female veterans as a whole or of those 

currently serving in the military. It was unclear in the study to what extent disability status 

varied for those who were and were not sexually assaulted while serving in the military. 

Since 1992, federal law has authorized the Veteran’s Administration (VA) to provide 

counseling and treatment for military sexual trauma. By definition, this includes both sexual 

harassment and sexual assault occurring during military service. Sexual harassment is defined 

as any repeated, unwelcome sexual behavior such as offensive sexual remarks, unwanted 

sexual advances, or pressure for sexual favors occurring in the workplace. Sexual assault is 

defined, as any sort of sexual activity in which one person is involved against his or her will, 

with or without physical force. Of the almost 3 million veterans screened between March 

2002 and October 2003, approximately 20.7% of females and 1.2% of male veterans 

screened positive for a history of military sexual trauma (Veterans Administration, 

unpublished data). 

In another study of over 3600 female veterans (mean age of 48 years) who had at least one 

ambulatory visit at a VA facility between July 1994 and June 1995, 55% of the women 

reported they were sexually harassed while in the military, while 23% reported that they were 

sexually assaulted (Skinner et al. 2000). 

Although anonymous survey data within the military is limited, the Armed Forces 2002 

Sexual Harassment Survey provides at least preliminary information on the prevalence of 

sexual assault among military personnel (Lipari and Lancaster 2003). Active duty 

respondents were asked if they experienced at least one incident of sexual assault involving 

military personnel, civilian employees or contractors in the prior 12 months. Sexual assault 

included both attempted and completed sexual assault. Attempted sexual assault was defined 

as “attempted to have sex with you without your consent or against your will, but was 

unsuccessful” whereas sexual assault was defined as “had sex with you without your consent 

or against your will.” Across DoD, 3% of females and 1% of males reported experiencing at 

least one incident of sexual assault in the prior 12 months. Given differences in definition 

and survey methodology, comparisons with civilian survey data are not possible and would 

be irresponsible. 

Using 1995 DoD sexual harassment survey data, Harned and others (2002) reported that 

4.2% of the over 22,000 active duty women surveyed reported experiencing sexual assault by 

workplace personnel. The most common type of sexual assault was attempted rape (2.5%), 

followed by attempted and completed rape (1.3%) and completed rape (.4%). 

In a study of Navy recruits who were initially surveyed during basic training and then 

followed for two years, 7.5% of females reported experiencing behaviors that constituted 

rape within 6 months of entering the Navy. Active duty members were reported to have 

perpetrated over 80% of these rapes. Among males , 2.6% admitted to behaviors that 

58 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
constituted rape within 6 months after entering the Navy, with 27% of those rapes 

perpetrated against active duty victims (L.L. Merrill, unpublished data). 

In response to this Task Force, the Services were asked to provide the total number of 

alleged sexual assaults involving service member victims reported to criminal investigations 

for 2002 and 2003. Sexual assault included rape, forcible sodomy, indecent assault, and any 

attempts of these offenses. The Services reported a total of 1007 victims in 2002 and 1113 in 

2003. This translates to prevalence rates of 69.1 and 70 alleged sexual assaults per 100,000 

active duty members for 2002 and 2003, respectively. Again, because of differences in 

sampling and definition, comparisons with civilian crime reports are not possible and would 

be irresponsible. 

Risk Factors for Sexual Assault 

Age 

Research has consistently demonstrated that youth are at greater risk of sexual assault. In the 

2002 NCVS, the rates of rape/sexual assault for ages 12-15, 16-19 and 20-24 were 210, 

550 and 290 per 100,000 persons, respectively. In contrast, the rates of rape/sexual assault 

for persons ages 25-64 varied from 20 (ages 50-64) to 60 (ages 25-34) per 100,000 persons. 

Examining NCVS data for 1992 to 1994, minors (i.e., ages 12-17) represented 10% of the 

population, but 20% of rape/sexual assault victims. Individuals who were 18-24 represented 

12% of the population, but 35% of rape/sexual assault victims (Perkins 1997). Analyzing 

NCVS data from 1995-2000, Hart (2003) found that the average rate of rape/sexual assault 

among college students was almost 3 times higher than the average overall rate of 

rape/sexual assault for those same years. Notably, the rate of rape/sexual assault among 

college students was not higher than non-students, ages 18-24. 

 

In the National College Women Sexual Victimization (NCWSV) study, a random sample of 

almost 4500 women attending two or four-year colleges were interviewed during the spring 

of 1997. Using behaviorally specific screening questions similar to the NVAW survey, 

around 2.8% of the sample experienced rape/attempted rape sometime during the academic 

year. This constituted a rate of 2770 victims per 100,000 female college students. Higher 

rates of victimization were thought to be attributable to the use of more behaviorally specific 

questioning. Notably, when data was collected in a comparison sample using a method 

similar to NCVS, only .34% of the sample reported rape/attempted rape during the 

academic year, which translated to a rate of 340 per 100,000 female college students (Fisher, 

Cullen, and Turner 2000). Nevertheless, the comparable rate for rape/attempted rape in the 

1997 NCVS was 90 per 100,000 persons age 12 and older. 

In the NWS, approximately 62% of the women surveyed reported that they were under the 

age of 17 at the time of the rape, 22% were between the ages of 18 to 24 and 12% were 25 

and older (Kilpatrick 1997). Likewise, 54% of female and 71% of male respondents to the 

NVAW survey were age 12-17 at the time of their first rape, while 29% of females and 17% 

of males were ages 18 to 24 (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). 

In response to the Task Force, the DON and Air Force provided frequency data for the age 

of the victim for cases reported in 2002 and 2003. On average, victims, age 17-24, 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 59
represented 87% of all Air Force active duty victims and 85% of all DON active duty 

victims for 2002 and 2003. The mean age of Army victims for 2002 and 2003, respectively, 

was 22 and 23 years. 

Victim-Offender Relationship 

Contrary to the stereotype, sexual assault is more likely perpetrated by an acquaintance than 

a stranger. Friends or acquaintances perpetrated a little over half (52%) of the rape/sexual 

assaults against males in the 2002 NCVS, with the remainder perpetrated by strangers. In the 

case of female victims, 57% of the rapes or sexual assaults were perpetrated by friends or 

acquaintances, while 10% were perpetrated by intimate partners, 2% by other relatives, and 

the remainder (28%) perpetrated by strangers (Rennison and Rand 2003). Women were 

significantly more likely than men to be a victim of attempted rape/rape by an intimate 

partner during their lifetime. In this study, intimate partners included current and former 

spouses, cohabiting partners, boyfriends/girlfriends and dates (Tjaden and Thoennes 1998). 

 

Among college students, an average of 74% of rapes/sexual assaults were perpetrated by 

offenders known to the victim from 1995 to 2000 (Hart 2003). According to NCWSV data, 

college women who experienced rape/attempted rape knew 9 in 10 of the offenders. For 

over two-thirds of the completed rapes, the offender was a classmate or friend. In almost 

24% of the completed rapes, the offender was a current or former boyfriend (Fisher, Cullen, 

and Turner 2000). 

Among Navy female recruits who reported a pre-military history of rape and male recruits 

who reported pre-military perpetration of rape, the most common relationship reported 

between the victim and perpetrator were boyfriend/girlfriend or acquaintance (L.L. Merrill, 

unpublished data). 

Alcohol Use 

Research with different samples (e.g., convicted rapists, community samples, college 

samples) has found that approximately half of sexual assaults are associated with alcohol use 

by either the perpetrator or victim (Abbey et al. 2003). In most research, perpetrator and 

victim alcohol use are typically strongly and positively correlated. Other research has 

indicated that drinking by both the offender and victim may be more common in sexual 

assaults where victims are less well acquainted with the perpetrator prior to the assault 

(Ullman and Brecklin 2000). In the NCWSV study, one of several factors that consistently 

increased the likelihood of each type of sexual victimization for college women was frequent 

drinking to intoxication (Fisher, Cullen, and Turner 2000). 

Data provided by two of the Services indicated that the use of alcohol was associated, on 

average, with 50% of alleged sexual assault cases involving service member victims during 

2002 and 2003. For the available data from CENTCOM AOR, the percentage ranged from 

20% to 26%. 

Aside from the presence of alcohol use in sexual assault, the relationships between alcohol

use and other assault characteristics and outcomes are complicated. When offender and 

victim drinking are examined as discrete variables, findings are mixed with respect to the 

relationships between variables such as alcohol use, perpetrator aggressiveness, rape 

60 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
completion, and injury. Findings also vary depending upon whether males or females are 

studied. 

Examining data from the NVAW survey, Brecklin and Ullman (2002) found that offender 

drinking was associated with an increased likelihood of rape, but was unrelated to physical 

injury or medical care outcomes. Neither victim alcohol use at the time of the incident nor 

during the past-year was significantly related to the assault outcomes examined. After 

reviewing the literature, Abbey and others (2003) have suggested and tested the hypothesis 

that the quantity of alcohol consumed may have a curvilinear relationship to different assault 

variables. However, they found perpetrator alcohol use to be positively and linearly related 

to aggressiveness, but curvilinearly related to the type of assault committed. That is, the 

likelihood of more severe sexual assault outcome was associated with moderate alcohol use 

(i.e., 4-9 drinks) by perpetrators. Victim alcohol consumption during the assault (as reported 

by the males) was linearly and positively related to the severity of sexual harassment. 

Prior Sexual Assault 

A substantial body of research studying different populations has consistently found that 

women who report adult sexual victimization are more likely to report a history of childhood 

sexual abuse (Siegel & Williams 2001). In the NVAW survey, Tjaden and Thoennes (1998) 

found that 18% of respondents who indicated that they had been sexually abused as children 

were victims of rape/attempted rape as adults, in contrast with 9% of women who denied 

childhood sexual abuse. 

Among female Navy recruits, those who experienced childhood sexual abuse prior to age 14 

were five times more likely than those who did not to report experiencing adult rape prior to 

entering the military (Merrill et al. 1999). Childhood sexual abuse was defined as sexual 

contact with a person at least 5 years older than the participant at the time of the abuse. Male 

recruits who experienced childhood sexual abuse (CSA) were twice as likely to report that 

they committed rape prior to the military as those who did not report CSA. Participants who 

reported committing rape did so by indicating that they engaged in behaviors consistent with 

legal definitions of rape. However, those who experienced both childhood physical and 

sexual abuse were four to six times more likely to report committing rape prior to the 

military than those who reported neither form of child maltreatment (Merrill et al. 2001). 

Likewise, women veterans who joined the military before the age of 20, who were of enlisted 

rank (regardless of age) or who experienced childhood physical or sexual violence prior to 

the military were at least twice as likely to experience rape during their military service (Sadler 

et al. 2003). 

A history of prior sexual assault was found to increase the likelihood of all types of sexual 

victimization for college women (Fisher, Cullen and Turner 2000). 

Military Workplace Factors 

Using causal modeling techniques, one study examined several theoretical antecedents of 

sexual assault and sexual harassment among over 22,000 active duty women. It was found 

that low sociocultural power (i.e., age, education, race/ethnicity, marital status) and low 

organizational power (i.e., pay grade and years of active duty service) were associated with an 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 61
increased likelihood of both sexual assault and sexual harassment. However, the 

organizational climate (defined as perceived efforts by the military to enforce harassment 

policies, to provide services to victims, and to provide training on harassment) and the 

degree to which respondent’s job was traditional, were not directly related to sexual assault. 

(Harned et al. 2002). 

In a retrospective study of women veterans, the likelihood of rape during military service 

increased for those who: 

 reported hostile work environments (six fold increase) 

 experienced unwanted sexual advances, remarks or pressure for dates in sleeping 

quarters (three fold increase) 

 observed the heterosexual activities of others in military sleeping quarters (three fold 

increase for Viet Nam era; four fold increase for Post Gulf War era) 

In addition, when ranking officers or immediate supervisors engaged in quid pro quo 

behaviors and initiated or allowed sexually demeaning comments or gestures toward female 

soldiers, the likelihood of rape during military service increased (Sadler et al. 2003). 

Prevention 

Although a plethora of prevention programs have been designed to decrease the prevalence 

of sexual assault in college populations, few programs have been empirically evaluated. Most 

common are psychoeducational programs that use formats directed toward female-only, 

male-only or mixed gender groups. 

In a 1999 review of research in this area, Yeater and O’Donohue concluded that there were a 

number of methodological and conceptual problems in the literature. These problems 

included, among others, the lack of information on type of programming and length of time 

changes are expected to last, failure to evaluate the verbal competence of participants, and 

the lack of replication. Perhaps most important, however, was the lack of outcome research 

demonstrating that the likelihood of sexual assault decreased for participants. Only one 

prospective study reviewed at the time demonstrated a reduction in sexual assault among 

participants. In particular, Hanson and Gidycz (1993) demonstrated a statistically significant 

decrease in rates of sexual assault over a nine-week period for college women who did not 

report a prior history of sexual victimization. The intervention was also noted to be effective 

in increasing knowledge regarding sexual assault and altering dating behaviors found to be 

highly correlated with rape. 

In a meta-analytic review of 72 studies, traditional gender role beliefs, adversarial sexual 

beliefs, needs for power and dominance, aggressiveness and anger predicted rape acceptance, 

which was generally higher in men (Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura 1997). It was also 

noted that cognitive predispositions toward perpetrating rape were also strong predictors of 

rape acceptance Another meta-analysis of 39 studies found that masculine ideology was 

related to sexual aggression, with the largest effect sizes found for hostile masculinity and 

hyper-masculinity (Murnen, Wright, and Kaluzny 2002). 

Experts whom the Task Force consulted recommended gender-segregated, small-group 

educational programs that include information on recommended actions for people who 

62 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
have been sexually assaulted. Programs should also be experiential, variable in format to 

appeal to different adult learning styles, and developmentally appropriate to the audience.

Programs should focus on socialization and positive messages about healthy relationships

Efforts that are intensive, long-term and periodically repeated to reinforce the message are

best. Programs with young men should include victim empathy, consent modeling and 

bystander intervention components. Finally, any programs developed should include 

outcome evaluation. 

 

Finally, there is growin

.

g opinion that sexual violence should be viewed and addressed as a

blic health problem (Basile 2003). A public health approach typically includes four steps 

plementation.

ommended that focuses upon personal 

icrosystem of the victim-offender, the social 

e

to

a

probably the most underreported crime in America. From 1992 to 2000, 

ated that a majority of rapes and sexual assaults against females were not 

ms

the 

orted

m 1992 to 1994, incidents were more likely to be reported to police 

they resulted in physical injury or the offender used a weapon (Backman 1998). In 2002, 

m

e women, less than 5 % of the rapes/attempted rapes were 

ported to law enforcement. However, in about two-thirds of the rapes, victims told 

someone, most often a friend. Incidents that were most likely to be reported to police or

pu

of: 

 surveillance (to better understand the incidence, prevalence and associated risk factors)

 identifying causes, 

 development, and evaluation of programs, 

 dissemination and im

An ecological approach toward prevention is rec

history of each individual involved, the m

structures and institutions in which the relationship is embedded (i.e., exosystem), and th

larger society and culture (i.e., macrosystem). Basile noted that most preventive efforts

date have focused on the individual and microsystem levels only and that there is generally

lack of evaluation with respect to what does and does not work. 

Reporting 

Sexual assault is

NCVS data indic

reported to police. About a third of all rapes and attempted rapes were reported to the 

police, in contrast with roughly a quarter of sexual assaults, as defined in the prevalence 

discussion. When rape was reported, the victim most often made the report. When victi

of rape, attempted rape or sexual assault did not report the crime to police, the most 

commonly cited reason was that it was a personal matter. Fear of reprisal was another 

common reason for not reporting to police. There was a negative relationship between

closeness of the victim-offender relationship and the likelihood the crime would be rep

to police. In other words, sexual assaults by strangers were most likely to be reported to 

police (Rennison 2002). 

Analyzing NCVS data fro

if

54% of the rape/attempted rape and sexual assaults reported by NCVS participants were 

reported to the police (Rennison & Rand 2003). Given the fluctuation in rape reporting fro

year to year by NCVS respondents, it is difficult to know whether this represents a trend 

toward increased reporting. 

In a national sample of colleg

re

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 63
authorities if the assault had characteristics that made them more believable, such as the u

of a weapon or involving a stranger perpetrator and were less likely to be reported if 

substances were involved (Fisher et al. 2003b). 

Reasons these women commonly cited for not reporting the incident included not wa

family or others to know, being unclear that the

se 

nting 

rape/attempted rape was a crime, not 

inking it was serious enough to be reported, and fear of reprisal by the assailant or others. 

g

ollege women generally mislabel their sexual 

ictimization experiences, further analysis did not suggest a tendency to label a victimization 

ere as follows:

atrick, Edmunds, and Seymour

Cullen (2002) found that 84% of the institutions offer sexual assault victims confidential 

porting options and 46% offer anonymous reporting.

02)

e victim’s confidential counseling

mmunications. Victim counselors and advocates are typically not covered in most states

sent

of

when

th

Likewise, roughly two-thirds of women raped within the past five years reported concerns 

about their family or others knowing, about their name being published and about bein

blamed for the rape (Kilpatrick 1997). 

Notably, only 46% of college women who were victims of rape labeled their experience as

rape. While some might conclude that c

v

experience as rape when in fact the experience did not constitute rape (Fisher et al. 2003a).

In a national survey of organizations providing crisis counseling to rape victims, 

recommended actions and activities to increase women’s willingness to report rape to police

w

 Educate the public about acquaintance rape. 

 Pass laws protecting confidentiality and disclosure of victims’ names. 

 Expand counseling and advocacy services. 

 Provide mandatory HIV testing for indicted defendants. 

 Provide free pregnancy counseling and abortions. 

 Provide confidential, free testing for HIV and STDs (Kilp

1992). 

In a recent review of sexual assault programs on college campuses, Karjane, Fisher and 

re

Given the privacy concerns of many sexual assault victims, the Department of Justice (20

has concluded that there is a critical need to protect a crim

co

by the testimonial privilege that is extended to psychotherapists and their patients. As a 

result, DOJ has proposed model legislation that covers “...any communication, either 

written or spoken, between a victim and a victim counselor that is communicated in private

in the course of the counseling relationship or in the presence of a third party who is pre

to facilitate communication or further the counseling process.” In 2002, more than half

the states have passed laws extending privilege to sexual assault and domestic violence 

counselors. The extent to which the communication is privileged under existing state laws 

falls into one of three categories including absolute (i.e., protects virtually all 

communications), semi-absolute (i.e., authorizes disclosure in limited situations such as

disclosure is in the public interest), and qualified (i.e., authorizes disclosure if appropriate 

when the court uses a balancing test to determine relevance). 

64 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Response

Medical Care 

NCVS data for 2002 indicated that a weapon was least likely to be used in the commission of 

rape and sexual assault, compared to the other categories of violent crime. A weapon was 

e rapes/sexual assaults reported in 2002, with a firearm used in 4% of the

to

hat

three-quarters of male and female

ictims who reported injury sustained relative minor injuries such as scratches, bruises and 

efinition, all rape victims were considered injured. Minor injury constituted 33%, 26% and 

as

ill the victim or someone close

for female rape victims if the victim used drugs and/or alcohol

nt treatment in a hospital was most 

ommon (Rennison 2002; Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). It was estimated that hospital 

ding 

d was

IV/AIDS (42%), contracting STDs (49%) and unwanted pregnancy (51%) (Kilpatrick 

concern.

used in 7% of th

incidents and a knife used in 2% (Rennison 2003). A weapon, mostly commonly a knife, was 

used in 5% of the rapes and sexual assaults perpetrated against college students from 1995

2000 (Hart 2003). Despite the fact that the perpetrator may not use a weapon during the 

sexual assault, almost half of the NWS respondents surveyed indicated that they feared 

serious injury or death during the rape (Kilpatrick 1997). 

With respect to injury, women were twice as likely as men (32% vs. 16%) to self-report t

they sustained an injury other than the rape itself. Almost

v

lacerations. However, more serious injury (i.e., broken bones, head or spinal cord injuries or 

internal injuries) was reported in at least 14% of rape victims (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). 

Analyzing NCVS data from 1992 to 2000, Rennison (2002) found that 39% of attempted

rapes and 17% of sexual assaults against female victims, on average, resulted in injury. By 

d

9% of the rapes, attempted rapes and sexual assaults, respectively. Likewise, minor injury w

reported in 24% of the NWS respondents who were raped, with serious injury reported in

4% (Kilpatrick 1997). Notably, the risk of injury increased for female rape victims if: 

 the perpetrator was a current or former intimate partner and used drugs or alcohol at the 

time of the rape 

 the rape occurred in the victim’s or perpetrator’s home 

 the rape was completed 

 the perpetator used a weapon or threatened to harm or k

to them 

The risk of injury decreased

at the time of the incident (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). 

Data from several sources indicated that only about one-third of injured sexual assault 

victims seek medical treatment for their injuries. Outpatie

c

emergency departments treated approximately 130,000 female rape victims in the prece

12 months (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). Victims who reported a rape to police (59%) were 

more likely to receive medical treatment than those who did not (17%). The same tren

true for injuries sustained during attempted rape and sexual assault (Rennison 2002). 

Despite the fact that most female victims do not seek medical treatment, about half of them 

report medical concerns in relation to the recent rape, such as fear of contracting 

H

1997). In a small sample of women (N=62), just over 90% of rape victims reported at least 

some degree of initial fear of contracting HIV, with 72% reporting extreme fear or

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 65
Not surprisingly, extremely fearful women were more likely to have been raped by strang

The degree of fear was not a function of the intensity of their post-traumatic stress 

symptoms at the time (Resnick et. al 2002). 

In another study, factors associated increased the likelihood of receiving post-rape m

care included the degree of fear of death or in

ers.

edical

jury experienced during the assault and fear of 

ontracting STDs or HIV/AIDS. Use of drugs or alcohol decreased the likelihood of postgenital examination. In a review of the literature, 

ommers et al. (2001) reported that rates of genital and nongenital injury after rape vary 

y

al

trunk,

 olcoscopy is the technique of choice 

in hospital

d chaotic

nvironments that may compound the victim’s trauma and result in deteriorated evidence. In 

or

lihood

BI; Gaennsslen and Lee 2002). In accordance with the 

iolence Against Women Act, the DOJ is in the process of developing a National Protocol 

for Sexual Assault Forensic Exams. The goals of the protocol are to ensure that all victims 

c

rape medical care (Resnick et al. 2000). 

With respect to sexual assault forensic examination, reported rates of genital injury may vary

depending upon the mechanism used for

S

from 5% to 87%. The use of direct visualization results in the lowest rates of injury (5% 

to53%) while the use of colposcopy resulting in the highest rates (68% to 87%). Colposcop

allows the examiner to visualize microscopic genital injury that is missed with direct 

visualization. The authors discussed the most common locations for genital injury in sexu

assault and noted that anal penetration and age was positively associated with higher rates of 

injury. Several studies reviewed found that nongenital injury (e.g., of the extremities,

face, head, neck) was more common than genital injury. With respect to practice 

implications, the authors noted that: 

 sexual assault examinations need to include examination of the entire body for injury in

addition to gynecological examination

 examination of the external genitalia is perhaps more important than internal

examination following sexual assault 

 direct visual examination does not provide sufficient detail needed for forensic 

examination

illumination and magnification with c

Policy and research implications were also discussed by Sommers and others. 

As noted above, sexual assault victims have typically received medical services

emergency departments, where they have often been subjected to long waits an

e

response and as the science of forensic examination has improved and become more 

specialized, communities have increasingly developed Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 

Programs (SANE) (Ledray 2001; Ahrens et al. 2000). SANE programs were developed to 

improve the treatment of sexual assault victims through explicit, sensitive attention to

victims’ medical, emotional and legal needs. While there is little controlled research 

demonstrating the efficacy of SANE model, much anecdotal information exists to suggest

that SANE programs improve the community response to sexual assault (Little 2001). F

example, one study suggested that the presence of forensic evidence doubled the like

of prosecution (Lindsey 1998). 

Several protocols and reports with respect to collection, preservation and analysis of forensic

evidence have been published (F

V

66 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
receive the same high quality medical and forensic exam, while being treated with respect 

and compassion. The protocol is currently being vetted within DOJ and is expected to b

available in final form within the next few months. 

Emotional and Psychological Support 

It is widely believed that rape is perhaps the most traumatic of violent crimes on victims 

(excluding murder). Some research has focused on p

e

erceived support of the victim when

informal and formal support is sought. For example, in a relatively small sample of sexual 

that tangible aid and information was more 

y

l

t. In contrast,

ictims who sought services through contact with the mental health system, rape crisis 

icial 

forts to assist the victim were effective and believed their friendship 

ith the victim grew closer. However, this positive picture did not hold true for all friends 

n, in contrast with less than 10% of women who were not victims of crime. 

hirteen percent of rape victims attempted suicide, in contract with 1% of non-crime victim 

avioral

be

on training is designed to treat fear and anxiety associated with 

xual assault. It consists of three phases, education, skill building and application and has 

a

assault victims (N=155), researchers found

commonly reported by victims with respect to support received from formal support 

providers, such as rape crisis centers, police and physicians. Emotional support and 

validation was more commonly reported by victims disclosing to rape crisis centers, when

compared to telling informal supports such as friends and relatives. However, emotional

support from friends was related to better recovery than when emotional support was

received from others. In contrast, feeling blamed, being treated differently and being

discouraged from talking about the sexual assault were more common responses reported b

victims with when disclosing to physicians or the police (Ullman 1996). 

In another study, a majority of rape survivors who reported their assault to the medica

system did not receive needed services in terms of information about pregnancy prevention 

or information about STDs, although they did receive antibiotic treatmen

v

centers or through their religious community generally perceived those services as benef

(Campbell et al. 2001). 

Ahrens and Campbell (2000) found that when victims disclosed a sexual assault to their

friends, those friends reacted positively, did not blame the victim, were not distressed by 

helping, felt that their ef

w

studied. 

In a national survey of women, roughly a third of rape victims reported that they had 

contemplated suicide or experienced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Major 

Depressio

T

women (Kilpatrick 1997). Other research has suggested that 94% of all rape victims 

reporting a recent rape to authorities will meet criteria for PTSD two weeks the rape 

(Rothbaum et al. 1992.) 

Given the prevalence of PTSD in association with sexual assault, there are several beh

and cognitive behavioral treatments that have been empirically evaluated and found to

effective. Stress inoculati

se

been found in a controlled study to reduce PTSD symptoms (Foa et al. 1991). Prolonged 

exposure has also been found to be an effective treatment for rape victims with PTSD (Fo

et al. 1991). 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 67
Investigation and Prosecution 

For 2002, the UCR program reported that approximately 44% of forcible rapes or attempted

rapes toward females were cleared by arrest or exceptional means (i.e., the offender was 

identified and sufficient evidence was gathered to support an arrest, but circumstances 

ment prohibited arrest). There were roughly 28,300 arrests 

lt.

e was 136 months for those sentenced to prison and 8 months for

ose sentenced to be incarcerated in jail (Durose and Langan 2003). Analyzing 1990 data 

,

d for

e offense

as highest for sex offenders (Langan 2003).

nce rape to 212 police officers. The officer’s

erception of the victim’s intoxication influenced evaluation of the assault, particularly for 

,

ictim’s 

avior at the time of the incident. Charges were more likely to be filed in 

ranger rape cases if the offender was armed or the victim was Caucasian. 

is a

T) is generally 

recognized as a model. At a minimum, the SART includes a SANE or medical provider who 

outside the control of law enforce

for forcible rape in 2002. 

In 2000, there were 31,500 felony convictions in state courts for rape/other sexual assau

Of those convicted, 84% were sentenced to incarceration in prison or jail. The average 

maximum sentence for rap

th

from six states, felony prosecution was sought for 80% of those arrested for rape. Of those

48% resulted in conviction. Forty percent were convicted of a felony offense, while 6%

resulted in misdemeanor conviction. Of the 32% not convicted, 29% were dismissed, while 

2% were acquitted (Greenfield 1997). In 1992, the average sentence for those convicted of

felony rape varied from 139 months, when a guilty plea was entered, to 292 months, when 

conviction resulted from a jury trial. In contrast, the average sentence for all convicted 

rapists was 128 months in 1990 and 124 months in 1999. The percentage of sentence served

for 1990 was 46%, in contrast with 53% in 1999 (Greenfield, unpublished data). 

Of the nearly 10,000 sex offenders released from state prisons in 1994 and then followe

three years, rapists and sexual assaulters had lower rates of re-arrest than non-sex offenders. 

However, among violent offenders, the relative likelihood of re-arrest for the sam

w

Notably, there is some research to suggest that intoxication by the victim or offender may 

influence police evaluation of the incident and jurors’ perception of guilt. Schuller and 

Steward (2000) provided vignettes of acquainta

p

male officers. However, the only factors related to the likelihood of charging the alleged 

offender were the victim’s credibility and the likelihood of conviction. In another study

participants were provided a description of a sexual assault trial in which the intoxication of 

the parties was varied. When the victim was sober and the defendant was intoxicated, 

harsher judgments were rendered, particularly when the defendant was extremely 

intoxicated. However, when the victim was reported to be extremely intoxicated, defendant 

intoxication did not exert any discernable impact on participant judgments (Wall and 

Schuller 2000). 

In a study of charging decisions, Spohn and Holleran (2001) found that prosecutors were 

less likely to file charges in acquaintance rape cases if there were questions about the v

character or beh

st

Team-based Approaches 

It is generally recognized that the response to sexual assault is most effective when there

coordinated community response. The Sexual Assault Response Team (SAR

68 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
is trained in the collection of forensic evidence, an advocate, a law enforcement officer and a 

e

T

prosecutor. Other members may include domestic violence victim advocates, state crime 

laboratory personnel, clergy, and social services staff. While specific implementation of thes

response teams may vary, integrated approaches like SART are thought to best meet the 

needs of victims, while insuring the best possible collection of forensic evidence and more

effective prosecution. Although little controlled research exists on the efficacy of the SAR

model, there is considerable testimonial and anecdotal information to suggested that 

coordination increases effectiveness (Ledray 2001). 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 69
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DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 73
Acronyms 

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

AOR Area of Responsibility 

C2 Command and Control 

CAIB Community Action Information Board

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force 7

COCOM Combatant Command

CONUS Continental United States 

CSH Combat Support Hospital 

DIBRS Defense Incident Based Reporting System (DoD) 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoD(IG) Department of Defense Inspector General 

DON Department of the Navy (refers to Navy and Marine Corps)

EO Equal Opportunity 

ER Emergency Room 

FAP Family Advocacy Program (All Services) 

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

GMT General Military Training 

IDS Integrated Delivery Services 

IHE Institutions of Higher Education 

JAG Judge Advocate General 

JAGC Judge Advocate General Corps

MCM Manual for Courts-Martial 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

MRE Military Rule of Evidence 

MVP Mentors in Violence Prevention

NCIS Naval Command Investigative Services 

NCO Non-commissioned Officer 

OASD(HA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 

OASD(RA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

OCONUS Outside the Continental United States 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OGC Office of the General Counsel

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OPTEMPO Operational Tempo 

OSD(LA) Office of the Secretary of Defense, Legal Affairs 

OSD(PA) Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs 

OUSD(FAP) Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Family Advocacy Program 

OUSD(P&R) Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

PACOM U.S. Pacific Command

POC Point of Contact 

RCM Rule for Courts-Martial 

RAINN Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network 

74 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
SA Sexual Assault 

SAFE Sexual Assault Free Environment (an Air Force program in Kunsan) 

SANE Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 

SARB Sexual Assault Review Boards

SART Sexual Assault Response Team 

SAVI Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (a Dept of Navy Program) 

SITREP Situation Report 

SJA Staff Judge Advocate

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

USACID United States Army Criminal Investigations Division (CID for short) 

USACISL United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory 

USAMEDCOM United States Army Medical Command 

USUHS Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences 

VWAP Victim Witness Assistance Program 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 75
List of Appendices 

A. Data Call: Services and Combatant Commands 

B. Focus Group Questions 

C. Chronology of Surveys, Reports, and Hearings 1988–2004 

D. Matrix of DoD and Service Policies 

76 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
A Data Call: Services and Combatant Commands 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 77
 

78 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 79
 

80 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 81
B Focus Group Questions 

COMMANDERS/SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISORS 

1. Describe the command climate with respect to Sexual Assault.

a. How does the command encourage reporting?

b. What are the barriers to reporting? 

c. What mechanism(s) is in place to evaluate risks/trends with respect to sexual misconduct? 

d. Are you aware of any single, comprehensive information source regarding the support 

available, reporting processes involved and rights and regulations affecting victims and 

alleged offenders? 

2. In regards to required policies and procedures (Service level, installation/local, immediate higher

command, their level and subordinate commands) tell me about those concerning Sexual Assault: 

a. Prevention? 

b. Response? 

c. Protection? 

d. Notification requirements through the Chain of Command (Serious Incident Reports) 

3. Describe your actions in the event of a Sexual Assault.

a. What resources are available to support the victim and the command in response to a Sexual 

Assault incident? (medical, mental health, law enforcement, legal, victim advocate, 

command)

i. Are there private channels for reporting and services? 

ii. Describe your Victim Advocate program. 

iii. Are these support functions timely? How do you know? 

iv. From recent experience, describe coordination and interface between these support 

agencies 

b. Where are the gaps? 

c. Are there differences for responding or supporting a victim based on their gender? 

d. What are the differences when deployed? 

4. What training have you, your subordinate commanders and other members of your command 

received? 

5. How are you or subordinate commanders and support functions held accountable for their response 

to reports of sexual assaults? 

6. Discuss how you hold alleged offenders accountable? Are there differences in a deployed

environment? 

7. In the areas of Sexual Assault prevention, response, protection, accountability, what is working well? 

82 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
8. What concerns do you have? 

9. From your perspective, what recommendations or improvements would you make to improve 

responsiveness to the victim? And for your role in responding to incidents of Sexual Assault? 

(institutional, toolkits) 

(If you could speak one-on-one with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss sexual assault, prevention, protection, 

and accountability, what would you tell him?) 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 83
 ENLISTED (E-1 TO E-4) 

1. Describe the command climate with respect to Sexual Assault. 

a. How does the command encourage reporting?

b. What are the barriers to reporting? 

c. Are you aware of any single, comprehensive information source regarding the support 

available, reporting processes involved and rights and regulations affecting victims and 

alleged offenders? 

2. In regards to required policies and procedures, tell me about those concerning Sexual Assault: 

a. Prevention? 

b. Response? 

c. Protection? 

3. Describe your actions in the event of a Sexual Assault.

a. What resources are available to support the victim in response to a Sexual Assault incident? 

(medical, mental health, law enforcement, legal, victim advocate, command) 

i. Are there private channels for reporting and services? 

ii. Describe the Victim Advocate program. 

iii. Are these support functions timely? How do you know? 

iv. From recent experience, describe coordination and interface between these support 

agencies 

b. Where are the gaps? 

c. Are there differences for responding or supporting a victim based on their gender? 

d. What are the differences when deployed? 

4. What training have you received? 

5. Are alleged offenders held accountable? Are there differences in a deployed environment?

6. In the areas of Sexual Assault prevention, response, protection, accountability, what is working well? 

7. What concerns do you have and what recommendation would you make? (If you could speak one-onone with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss sexual assault, prevention, protection, and accountability, what 

would you tell him?) 

84 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
PROVIDERS 

1. Describe the command climate (both line and departmental perspectives) with respect to Sexual 

Assault. 

a. Do either of these encourage or discourage reporting? 

b. What are the barriers to reporting? 

c. Are you aware of any single, comprehensive information source regarding the support 

available, reporting processes involved and rights and regulations affecting victims and 

alleged offenders? 

2. In your area of expertise and your Service/command, describe required policies and procedures, tell 

me about those concerning Sexual Assault: 

a. Prevention? 

b. Response? 

c. Protection? 

3. Describe your actions in the event of a Sexual Assault.

a. What resources are available to support the victim in response to a Sexual Assault incident? 

(medical, mental health, law enforcement, legal, victim advocate, command) 

i. Are there private channels for reporting and services? 

ii. Describe the Victim Advocate program. 

iii. Are these support functions timely? How do you know? 

iv. Are there adequate resources for responding? (specialized equipment) 

v. From recent experience, describe coordination and interface between these support 

agencies. 

b. Where are the gaps? 

c. Are there differences for responding or supporting a victim based on their gender? 

d. What are the differences when deployed? 

4. What training have you received? Is the training sufficient? Have you sought additional training from

non-DOD sources? 

5. In the areas of Sexual Assault prevention, response, protection, accountability, what is working well? 

6. What concerns do you have and what recommendations would you make? (If you could speak oneon-one with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss sexual assault, prevention, protection, and accountability, 

what would you tell him?) 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 85
VICTIM ADVOCATES

1. Describe your perception of command climate for the victims you work with. 

a. Does it encourage or discourage reporting? 

b. What are the barriers to reporting? 

c. Are you aware of any single, comprehensive information source regarding the support 

available, reporting processes involved, and rights and regulation affecting victims and 

alleged offenders? 

2. Describe required policies and procedures concerning Sexual Assault with respect to: 

a. Prevention? 

b. Response? 

c. Protection? 

3. Describe your actions in the event of a Sexual Assault.

a. How are you initially contacted? 

b. What resources are available to support the victim in response to a Sexual Assault incident? 

(medical, mental health, law enforcement, legal, victim’s advocate, command)

i. Are there private channels for reporting and services? 

ii. Describe the Victim Advocate program. 

iii. Are these support functions timely? How do you know? 

iv. Are there adequate resources for responding? (specialized equipment) 

v. From recent experience, describe coordination and interface between these support 

agencies. 

c. Where are the gaps? 

d. Are there differences for responding or supporting a victim based on their gender? 

e. What are the differences when deployed? 

4. What training have you received? Is the training sufficient? Have you sought additional training from

non-DoD sources? 

5. In the areas of Sexual Assault prevention, response, protection, accountability, what is working well? 

6. What concerns do you have and what recommendations would you make? (If you could speak oneon-one with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss sexual assault, prevention, protection, and accountability, 

what would you tell him?) 

86 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
LEGAL 

1. Describe the command climate with respect to Sexual Assault.

a. How does the command encourage reporting?

b. What are the barriers to reporting? 

c. What choices are available for victim participation for command response? (charging 

decisions, alternate dispositions, “opting out”) 

d. What mechanism is in place to evaluate risks/trends with respect to sexual misconduct? 

e. What are your notification requirements through the Chain of Command (Serious Incident 

Reports)? 

f. Are you aware of any single, comprehensive information source regarding the support 

available, reporting processes involved and rights and regulation affecting victims and alleged 

offenders? 

2. How do you implement the Federal Victim’s Witness Assistance Program?

3. In regards to required policies and procedures (Service level, installation/local, immediate higher

command, their level and subordinate commands) tell me about those concerning Sexual Assault: 

a. Prevention? 

b. Response? 

c. Protection/Safety? 

4. Describe your actions in the event of a Sexual Assault.

a. What resources are available to support the victim and the command in response to a Sexual 

Assault incident? (medical, mental health, law enforcement, legal, victim’s advocate,

command)

i. Are there private channels for reporting and services? 

ii. Describe your Victim Advocate program. (versus VWAP, inclusive of?) 

iii. Are these support functions timely? 

iv. From recent experience, describe coordination and interface between these support 

agencies. 

b. Where are the gaps? 

c. Are there differences for responding or supporting a victim based on their gender? 

d. What are the differences when deployed? 

e. Describe the relationships with local prosecuting authorities? (coalition considerations) 

i. To resolve jurisdictional issues. 

ii. Search and Seizure protocols. (accused and victim) 

5. What training have you received with respect to Sexual Assault? Is the training sufficient? Have you 

sought additional training from non-DoD sources? 

6. What are the primary issues/factors/concerns for taking judicial action or securing a conviction for 

charges of Sexual Assault? (evidentiary, victim’s conduct, consent)

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 87
7. In the areas of Sexual Assault prevention, response, protection, accountability, what is working well? 

8. What concerns do you have and what recommendation would you make? (If you could speak one-onone with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss sexual assault, prevention, protection, and accountability, what 

would you tell him?) 

88 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
VICTIM 

1. How would you describe the command environment (or command climate) at the time of the 

assault? 

a. Was sexual harassment or other indicators of indiscipline pervasive? 

b. Does it encourage or discourage reporting? 

c. What are the barriers to reporting? 

d. Are you aware of any single, comprehensive information source regarding the support 

available, reporting processes involved and rights and regulation affecting victims and alleged 

offenders? 

2. Prior to the Sexual Assault what was your familiarity with or training received regarding: 

a. Prevention? 

b. Reporting? 

c. Your rights? 

d. Available resources? 

3. Did you report? 

a. Was the person you reported to knowledgeable, sensitive and responsive? 

b. To the extent possible, was your privacy respected? 

c. How has reporting affected you? 

4. Describe the command’s response. 

a. Safety. (physical and emotional)

b. Privacy/Confidentiality 

c. Accountability 

d. Retribution. (career) 

5. What assistance was available or offered to you? Did you seek help? 

a. What resources were available to support you? (medical, mental health, law enforcement, 

legal, victim’s advocate, command) 

i. Were there private channels for reporting and services? 

ii. Describe support from the Victim Advocate program. 

iii. Do you feel that adequate resources were/are available to support you? 

iv. Were these support functions timely? 

b. Are there gaps? 

c. Were your needs met? 

6. What concerns do you have and what recommendation would you make? (If you could speak one-onone with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss sexual assault, prevention, protection, and accountability, what 

would you tell him?) 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 89
LAW ENFORCEMENT/INVESTIGATORS

1. Describe the command climate with respect to Sexual Assault. 

a. How does the command encourage reporting?

b. What are the barriers to reporting? 

c. What choices are available for victim participation for command response? (charging 

decisions, alternate dispositions, “opting out”) 

d. Are you aware of any single, comprehensive information source regarding the support 

available, reporting processes involved and rights and regulation affecting victims and alleged 

offenders? 

2. What role do you play in implementing the Federal Victim’s Witness Assistance Program? 

3. Describe required investigative policies and procedures concerning Sexual Assault.

4. What is your role with: 

a. Prevention? 

b. Response? 

c. Protection/Safety? 

5. Describe your actions in the event of a Sexual Assault.

a. What resources are available to support the victim and the command in response to a Sexual 

Assault incident? (medical, mental health, law enforcement, legal, victim’s advocate,

command)

i. Are there private channels for reporting and services? 

ii. Describe your interaction with the Victim Advocate program. (versus VWAP,

inclusive of?) 

iii. Are these support functions timely? 

iv. From recent experience, describe coordination and interface between these support 

agencies and within law enforcement community. 

b. Where are the gaps? 

c. Are there differences for responding or supporting a victim based on their gender? 

d. What are the differences when deployed? 

e. Describe the relationships with local/military law enforcement agencies? (coalition 

considerations) 

i. To resolve jurisdictional issues. 

ii. Search and Seizure protocols. (accused and victim) 

5. What training have you received? Is the training sufficient? Have you sought additional training from

non-DoD sources? 

6. What are ways that we could improve investigative process to strengthen prosecutorial outcomes for 

charges of Sexual Assault? 

7. In the areas of Sexual Assault prevention, response, protection, accountability, what is working well? 

90 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
8. What concerns do you have and what recommendation would you make? (If you could speak one-onone with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss sexual assault, prevention, protection, and accountability, what 

would you tell him?) 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 91
C Chronology of Surveys, Reports, and Hearings 

1988–2004 

The issue of sexual misconduct in the military and the Department of Defense’s response to 

it has evolved over the last 15 years. 1988 was the first year the Department of Defense 

conducted an in-depth survey on sexual harassment across the Services. Over the years, 

additional studies, reviews, and surveys indicate the following major findings: 

 Sexual misconduct has been viewed through the lens of sexual discrimination, which has 

continuously evolved as women increasingly expanded their integration and roles in the 

U.S. Armed Forces. Many of the reports and hearings in this digest address the 

prevailing challenges of integrating women into the predominantly male military 

workforce: e.g., effect on unit cohesion, perceived inequity of fitness and weight 

standards for women, discrimination against women for promotions, etc. 

 Despite exhaustive reviews of the Tailhook and Aberdeen incidents, sexual assault as a 

crime distinct from sexual harassment and discrimination was not addressed by the 

Department of Defense previous to this Task Force report. Sexual assault, when 

addressed, is under an umbrella of “and other matters.” 

 Some of the various findings and recommendations of this report have been examined 

previously, but in the context of preventing and reducing sexual harassment, not assault. 

The need for better reporting mechanisms (see Congress, Sexual Harassment of Military 

Women and Improving the Military Complaint System, March 9, 1994), victim advocacy, 

leadership training, and data tracking, are recommendations that appear repeatedly, but 

in the context of improving the climate and reducing adverse conditions for women 

operating in the military environment. 

 Finally, it is clear from a review of the hearings, reports, and surveys that have been 

issued that the military, often with the support and direct assistance of Congress, is very 

adept at planning and implementing programs designed to effectively, if not immediately, 

address long-standing cultural issues that challenge both the civilian and military 

population. This is evidenced by the Department’s notable but continuously evolving 

success in executing programs which have significantly reduced race and sex 

discrimination within its ranks. 

1988 

 The Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted the first DoD-wide survey on sexual 

harassment. This produced the first baseline data on sexual harassment in the active-duty 

Services. 

Department of Defense. Sexual Harassment in the Military: 1988.

∗ ƒ

 

∗

 Referenced in the April 15, 2004 letter from Congress to the SECDEF. 

ƒ

 Sources for this Chronology: The Women’s Research and Education Institute, Bibliography of Women in the Military; and the 

Pentagon Library.

92 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
1990 

An Update Report on the Progress of Women in the Navy. Woman’s Study Group, 1990. 

1991 

 The Tailhook Association loses Navy sponsorship after widely reported incidents of 

alcohol abuse, destruction of private property, and sexual assault at the association’s 

annual convention. 

Strategies to Eradicate Sexual Harassment in the Military and Civilian Environment. U.S. Department of 

Defense. 1991.* 

Congress, Senate. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. 

Congressional Record. July 31, 1991 S11412-S11437. (Discussion on combat 

exclusion laws.) 

1992 

 The House Armed Service Committess conducts a hearing on gender discrimination in 

the military on July 29-30, 1992. 

Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. Report to the 

President. November 15, 1992. 

Roper Organization, Inc. Attitudes Regarding the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces: The 

Military Perspective. Conducted for the Commission on the Assignment of Women in 

the Armed Forces. September 1992. 

Operation Desert Storm: War Highlights Need to Address Problem of Non-Deployable Personnel. 

GAO/NSIAD 92-208, August 1992. 

Women in the Military: Deployment in the Persian Gulf War. GAO/NSIAD 93-93, August 1992. 

Congress, House, House Armed Service Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel and 

Readiness, and the Defense Policy Panel. Hearings into Gender Discrimination in the 

Military. 102nd cong. 2nd sess. July 29–30, 1992.* 

Congress, House, House Armed Services Committee. Women in the Military: The Tailhook 

Affair and the Problem of Sexual Harassment. Draft report prepared by Les Aspin and 

Beverly B. Byron, September 14, 1992. 

1993 

Inspector General, Department of Defense. The Tailhook Report: The Official Inquiry into the 

Events of Tailhook ‘91. February 1993.*

Culbertson, Amy L., Paul Rosenfeld, and Carol Newell. Sexual Harassment in the Active Duty 

Navy: Findings from the 1991 Navy-Wide Survey. Naval Personnel Research and 

Development Center. December 1993.* 

1994 

 The Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearings on “Honor Systems and Sexual 

Harassment at the Service Academies” on February 3. 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 93
 The House Armed Services Committee conducts hearings on sexual harassment and 

specifically examines how to improve the military complaint system on March 9. 

Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee. Honor Systems and Sexual Harassment at the Service 

Academies. 103rd Congress. Second session. February 3, 1994. 

Congress, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Sexual Harassment of Military 

Women and Improving the Military Complaint System. 103rd Congress. Second session. 

March 9, 1994.

DOD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual Harassment. GAO/NSIAD 94-

6, January 1994.* 

Abuse Victims Study Final Report. Department of Defense. 1994.* 

1995 

 The DoD Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment convenes.

 The DoD conducts its second Sexual Harassment Survey. 

Defense Equal Opportunity Council. Report of the Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual 

Harassment, vols. I and II, May 1995.* 

Thomas, Patricia J., Carol E. Newel, and Dawn M. Eliassen. Sexual Harassment of Navy 

Personnel: Results of a 1993 Survey. Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, 

November 1995.* 

GAO. DoD Service Academies. Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment. March 1995. 

1996 

1995 Sexual Harassment Survey. Department of Defense, 1996.* 

1997 

 Incidents of rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment occurring at the Army’s 

Aberdeen (Maryland) Proving Grounds are revealed. In the aftermath, several drill 

sergeants are convicted by courts-martial of rape or charges related to sexual harassment. 

As a result of the problems found at Aberdeen, the Army convenes a Senior Review 

Panel to look at the problem of sexual harassment Army-wide. 

 In February the Senate Armed Services Committee conducts a hearing on Aberdeen. 

 The Army’s top enlisted man, the Sergeant Major of the Army, is charged with sexual 

harassment. 

 In October the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel 

conducts hearings on “Department of the Army Reports on and Corrective Actions 

Related to Recent Cases of Sexual Misconduct and Related Matters.” 

 As a result of the incidents at Aberdeen, the Secretary of Defense appoints the Federal 

Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues with former 

Senator Nancy Kassebaum-Baker as chair. The committee’s report is issued in 

December 1997. 

Department of Defense. Report of the Federal Advisory Commission on Gender-Integrated Training 

and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense. Kassebaum Report. December 16, 1997.* 

94 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Department of the Army Inspector General. Special Investigation of Initial Entry Training, Equal 

Opportunity and Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures December 1996–April 1997, 22 

July 1997.* 

Human Relations Action Plan: The Human Dimensions of Combat Readiness. Department of the 

Army, July 1997. 

Secretary of the Army. Senior Review Panel Report on Sexual Harassment. vols. I and II, July 1997.* 

Naval Inspector General. Report of Investigation of Integration of Women into Carrier Air Wing 

Eleven, February 10, 1997. 

Thomas, Patricia J., and Zanette Uriells. Pregnancy and Single Parenthood: Results of a 1997 Survey. 

Harrell, Margaret and Laura C. Miller. New Opportunities for Military Women: Effects Upon 

Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale. Rand Corporation MR-896, October 2, 1997. 

1998 

 The Sergeant Major of the Army is court-martialed on five charges springing from the 

accusations of sexual harassment lodged against him. He is acquitted of all charges 

related to sexual harassment, but convicted of one charge of obstruction of justice. 

 In response to the incidents at Aberdeen, Congress orders its own commission—The 

Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues—to review 

matters. 

Analysis of Methodologies in Reports to Secretaries of Defense and Army. Army Senior Review Panel. 

GAO/NSIAD-98-125, March 1998. 

Analysis of Promotion and Career Opportunity Data. GAO/NSIAD 98-157, May 1998. 

Changes Would Be Needed to Expand Selective Service Regulations to Women. GAO/NSAID 98-99, 

June 1998. 

Improved Guidance and Oversight are Needed to Ensure Validity and Equity of Fitness Standards. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-9, November 1998. 

Information on DoD’s Assignment Policy and Direct Combat Definition. GAO/NSIAD 99-7, 

October 1998. 

Information to Assess Servicemembers Perception of Gender Inequities is Incomplete. GAO/NSIAD, 

November 1998. 

Burelli, David. Women in the Armed Forces. Congressional Research Service, November 18, 

1998. 

1999 

 The Report of the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related 

Issues is released. 

Congress. Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues—Final Report. 

Blair Commission, vols. I-IV, July 1999.*

Department of Defense. Adapting Military Sex Crime Investigations to Changing Times: Summary 

Report. National Academy of Public Administration, June 1999.* 

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 95
DoD Career Progression of Minority and Women Officers. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness, August 1999. 

Scarville, Jacquelyn and Scott B. Button, Jack E. Edwards, Anita R. Lancaster and Timothy 

W. Elig. Armed Forces Equal Opportunity Survey. Defense Manpower Data Center, 

August 1999. 

Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, TR-98-6, September 1998. Women at 

Sea: Unplanned Losses and Accession Planning. Center for Naval Analysis, CRM-98, 

March1999. 

Costs of Separate Barracks for Male and Female Recruits in Basic Training. GAO/NSIAD 99-75, 

March 1999. 

Medical Support for Female Soldiers Deployed to Bosnia. GAO/NSIAD 99-58. 

Perceptions of Readiness in Various Units. GAO/NSIAD 99-120, May, 1999. 

Trends in Occupational Distribution of Military Women. GAO/NSIAD, September 1999. 

2003 

 Investigations into charges of sexual assault at the Air Force Academy and retaliation 

against women cadets who report it are initiated by the Air Force and the DoD 

Inspector General. Congress also sponsors its own investigative panel. 

Report of the Working Group Concerning the Deterrence and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the 

U.S. Air Force Academy, HQ USAF, June 2003.* 

Fowler, Tillie K. Report of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the U.S. Air Force 

Academy. September 2003.*

96 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
D A Matrix of DoD and Service Guidance for Response to Sexual As

Agency Policy No. Policy LinkU.S. Code Title 10, Sections 801-946 Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), 

United States (2002 edition)

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10

U.S. Code Section 113 note of Title 10 

(Section 534, Public Law 103-337) 

Victims’ Advocate Programs inDepartment of Defense 

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?c103:4:./temp/~c1031lOL

Dept. of Defense DoD Directive 1030.1 Victim and Witness Assistance http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cor

Dept. of Defense DoD Directive 5400.11 DoD Privacy Program http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corDept. of Defense DoD Directive 6025.18 Privacy of Individually Identifiable 

Health Information in DoD Health Care Programs

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cor

Dept. of Defense DoD Directive 6490.1 Mental Health Evaluations of 

Members of the Armed Forces

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cor

Dept. of Defense DoD Instruction 1030.2 Victim and Witness Assistance 

Procedures 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cor

Dept. of Defense DoD 5400.11-R DoD Privacy Program http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corDept. of Defense DoD 6025.18-R DoD Health Information Privacy 

Regulation 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cor

Dept. of Defense DoD 7730.47M Manual for Defense Incident Based 

Reporting System 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/cor

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 97
Army Army Regulation 27-10 Military Justice

(Includes Victim and Witness Assistance) 

http://docs.usapa.belvoir.army.mil/jw2/

Army Army Regulation 190-40 Serious Incident Report http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r19Army Army Regulation 190-45 Law Enforcement Reporting* http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdfArmy Army Regulation 195-2 Criminal Investigation Activities http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r19

Army Army Regulation 340-21 The Army Privacy Program http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r34Army Army Regulation 600-20 Army Command Policy http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdfArmy MEDCOM Regulation 

40-36 

Medical Facility Management of Sexual Assault 

Army MEDDAC Memorandum

40-26 

Medical Facility Management of Sexual Assault 

http://www.narmc.amedd.army.mil/kacms/Memorandum_40-26.pdf

DON SECNAVINST 1752.4 Sexual Assault Prevention and Response http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/17DON SECNAVINST 1754.1A DON Family Service Center Program http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/17DON 

SECNAVINST 5520.3B 

Criminal and Security Investigations and Related Activities Within the Department of the Navy

http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/55

DON SECNAVINST 5520.4B Department of the Navy Polygraph Program http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/55DON SECNAVINST 5800.11A Victim and Witness Assistance Program http://www.dod.mil/vwac/vwguide.htmDON SECNAVINST 5800.14 Notice of Military Offenders 

Convicted of Sex Offenses or Crimes Against Minors 

http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/58

Navy OPNAVINST 1752.1A Sexual Assault Victim Intervention 

(SAVI) Program 

http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/17

Navy OPNAVINST 5800.7 Victim and Witness Assistance Program http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/58Navy NAVMEDCOMINST

6310.3 

Management of Alleged or SuspectedSexual Assault and Rape Cases

http://navalmedicine.med.navy.mil//Fil

98 DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 
Marine Corps ALMAR 295/95 Sexual Assault http://www.usmc.mil/almars/almar2000

04f3afc/1b392fc2f7c5bf4d85256a55005e=2,295%2F95

Marine Corps MCO P1700.24B, Chapter 5 Marine Corps Personal Service 

Manual, Counseling Capabilities 

http://www.usmc.mil/directiv.nsf/0dce8c2b89e75e8fcd4d85256b510067cbe7?Op

Air Force Air Force Instruction 44-102 Medical Community Health Management http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfilesAir Force Air Force Instruction 44-109 Mental Health, Confidentiality and 

Military Law 

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles

Air Force Air Force Instruction 51-201 Administration of Military Justice 

(Includes Victim and Witness Assistance) 

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles

Air Force Air Force Instruction 51-202 Nonjudicial Punishment http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfilesAir Force Air Force Instruction 71-101 Criminal Investigations http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles

101v1.pdf

Air Force AFOSIMAN 71-121 Case Initiation/closure, Report 

Writing 

For Official Use Only

Air Force AFOSIMAN 71-122 Conduct Sexual Assault Investigations For Official Use OnlyAir Force AFSOIMAN 71-118 Victims/Witness Assistance Program, 

Handling Evidence, ConductingInterviews, Search Record Reviews 

For Official Use Only

Air Force AFOSIMAN 71-124 Sexual Assault Kits and Medical 

Examinations 

For Official Use Only

Air Force AFOSIMAN 71-103 Offering Polygraphs to Victims For Official Use OnlyAir Force AFOSIMAN 71-103 Specialized Interview Techniques, 

Forensic Science Support and Laboratory Services 

For Official Use Only

DoD Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force Report 99