1

Filed 12/16/2019

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re Anthony L., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A154220

 (San Francisco City & County

 Super. Ct. No. JW186044)

Before interrogating a 15-year-old in custody, police must arrange for the youth to 

consult with counsel. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 625.6, subd. (a).)1 Here we address the 

admissibility of a statement taken in violation of this statutory command. Anthony L.

(Minor) appeals a dispositional order of the juvenile court placing him on probation for 

committing assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, 

subd. (a)(4).) He contends that the juvenile court should have excluded his statement to 

police officers, but because his rights under the United States Constitution were not 

violated, we disagree. We will strike an impermissibly vague probation condition and 

otherwise affirm the order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Assault

The victim of the crime, a 61-year-old man, pulled his car into the driveway of his 

home and waited for the garage gate to open. He saw a group of five teenagers nearby. 

 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

They walked behind the victim’s car, and he heard a loud bang, as if someone had hit or 

kicked his car. The victim got out of car and yelled at the teenagers, “ ‘Why did you do 

that? Why did you hit my car?’ ” One of them responded, “ ‘How do you know we did 

it?’ ” The victim said, “ ‘Well, did you do it?’ ” The teenagers “came at” the victim, 

surrounded him, and hit and kicked him repeatedly on his head and face. They ran away 

when someone who worked nearby approached and yelled that he was calling the police. 

The incident was captured on nearby security cameras. One of Minor’s teachers 

was shown a video and still photographs from the videos, and identified Minor as one of 

the assailants. She recognized him by the gray hooded sweatshirt he was wearing and the 

shape of his face. She checked a school photograph to “double check,” but she was 

confident of her identification because she had been spending a lot of time with Minor

since he had begun her class a couple of weeks previously. 

B. Minor’s Statement to Police

After the teacher identified Minor, Sergeant Christopher Smith of the San 

Francisco Police Department contacted Minor’s mother (Mother). Smith told her he was 

investigating a crime and needed to set up a meeting with Minor and Mother. They 

arranged for Smith to come to the family’s home at 11:30 on the morning of February 21, 

2018, a school day. Mother had told Smith she would like a Spanish speaker present, and 

Officer Martinez, who spoke Spanish, accompanied Smith. Smith wore plain clothes 

with a police badge and firearm, and Martinez was in a police uniform. Martinez’s body 

camera recorded the events, and there was a second audio recording. 

When the officers arrived, Mother led them to Minor’s bedroom, where he was 

sleeping. Mother stayed in the room. Minor, who appeared to be wearing shorts, put 

pants on. He sat on his bed, and the officers remained standing. 

Smith began the interview by asking Minor his name and date of birth. Minor had 

recently turned 15. Smith handed Minor a “Juvenile Know Your Rights” form, and 

Minor looked down at it. Smith told Minor, “I’m going to read you your rights just 

because you’re a juvenile. It’s not—you’re not under arrest right now, okay, just 

understand that. But because you’re a juvenile we have to read you your rights, okay.” 
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Minor nodded slightly. Smith then said, “You have the right to remain silent, do you 

understand?” Minor nodded, and Smith continued, “Anything you say may be used 

against you in court, do you understand?” Minor appeared to nod slightly but did not say 

anything, and Smith told him, “[Y]ou’ve got to verbally say it for me,” and repeated the 

admonitions that Minor had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be 

used against him in court, then informed Minor he had the right to an attorney and an 

attorney would be appointed free of charge before any questioning if he could not afford

one. When asked if he understood each statement, Minor answered “Yes.” Smith did not 

ask Minor a common final question in a Miranda warning—“Having those rights in 

mind, do you now wish to speak with me?”—because he did not think Minor was in 

custody. 

Smith first asked Minor general questions about his schooling, asked whether 

Minor knew why Smith was there, then asked Minor where he was the evening of the 

assault. After asking Minor if he was currently under the influence of any substances and 

whether he had ever been arrested, Smith asked whether he remembered being by the 

Safeway store on Marina Boulevard. Minor nodded, and Smith said, “Can you verbalize 

that for me?” Minor said, “Yeah.” Smith said, “And what happened behind the Safeway 

on North Point Street?” Minor shrugged. Smith asked, “Did you do something you 

weren’t supposed to do?” Minor again nodded, and Smith said, “Can you verbalize that 

for me?” Minor replied, “Yeah.” 

Smith asked Minor, “And what did you do?” and Minor was silent. Smith 

continued, “I know it’s hard to talk man, it’s—I don’t want you to feel down on yourself, 

I seriously don’t, but you know you did something wrong, right? So I don’t want you to 

. . . feel like you’re a bad person right now[,] but I want to hear it from you what you did 

wrong.” Minor was silent and shrugged. Smith asked, “Do you remember an old guy in 

a car?” Minor nodded, and Smith said, “Okay, can you verbalize that for me?” Minor 

said, “Yeah.” Smith asked, “And what happened with the old white guy?” and Minor 

said, “He—he started,” then said something unintelligible. Smith said, “I mean, there’s 
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video of it so I mean that’s why I’m here. So I remember him yelling at you. Do you 

remember what he said to you?” Minor shook his head and said, “Huh-uh.” 

Smith asked Minor what caused the group to react as they did, and Minor said, “I 

forgot.” Smith continued, “But you remember what you guys did, what you and your 

friends did to him?” Minor nodded, and Smith asked, “Is that a yes?” Minor said, 

“Yeah.” Smith asked Minor to explain, and Minor said, “You all got the video you can 

see.” Smith told Minor that young people make mistakes, that he wanted him to “own up 

to [his] mistake,” and that Minor should “man-up and take responsibility for [his] 

mistakes.” Smith asked Minor if he agreed, and Minor said, “Yes.” Smith continued, 

“So you want to man-up right now and tell me what happened? [Minor], can you tell me 

what you did?” Minor was silent. Smith asked Minor why he was being “shy,” and 

Minor said, “Because I don’t feel like talking.” Smith told Minor he had been speaking 

to Mother, who wanted Minor to do well, and that he should be in a program. Minor 

agreed he should not be “doing things like that day.” After further discussion about 

Minor’s need for guidance and discipline and the importance of making good decisions, 

Smith asked if Minor could talk about what happened. Minor shook his head, and when 

asked why, said, “You all got the video you all can see what happened.” Smith reiterated 

that Minor should own up to what he did, and asked Minor how many times he punched 

the man. Minor said he did not know. Smith said, “Was it three or more?” and Minor 

again said he did not know. Smith said, “Was it one?” and Minor shook his head. 

Smith asked Minor for the names of the other people who were involved, and 

Minor said he did not know their names, then that he did not want to tell Smith. Smith 

asked why Minor hit the victim, and Minor said it was because the victim “said stuff.” In 

response to more questioning, he admitted that he kicked the car and that he hit the victim 

because the victim made him upset. Asked again for the names of the other people 

involved in the incident, Minor said again that he did not want to tell Smith. Smith then 

placed Minor under arrest. 
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C. The Juvenile Court’s Rulings

A juvenile wardship petition alleged Minor committed assault with force likely to 

cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) Minor moved to exclude his 

statements to the police on constitutional and statutory grounds. The juvenile court

denied the motion, finding that the interrogation was custodial but rejecting Minor’s 

claims that his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 

U.S. 436 (Miranda) and were involuntary. For reasons discussed below, it also found no 

violation of section 625.6. Finding the allegations of the petition true, the court then 

declared Minor a ward and placed him on probation in Mother’s home.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Challenges to Admission of Minor’s Statements

Minor renews before this court his challenge to the admission of his statement to 

the officers. He contends the officers improperly questioned him before he consulted 

with an attorney in violation of section 625.6 and that the juvenile court erred in failing to 

take that fact into account in admitting his statements. He argues the Miranda warnings 

were inadequate and he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his 

Miranda rights. Finally, he contends his statements were not voluntary because they 

were the product of coercion. 

1. Custodial Interrogation

A preliminary issue is whether Minor was in custody when he made the 

statements. A custodial interrogation occurs when “ ‘ “ ‘a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” ’ ” 

(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.) Courts apply an objective test in deciding 

whether a person is in custody: “[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether there was ‘ “ ‘a 

“formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a 

formal arrest.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.) 

Whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of fact and law; we review a 

trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation for 

substantial evidence, and decide independently whether, “given those circumstances, ‘a 
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reasonable person in [the] [minor’s] position would have felt free to end the questioning 

and leave.’ ” (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.) Where the facts are 

undisputed, we review the trial court’s determination independently. (In re Kenneth S.

(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 54, 64.) The prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant 

was not in custody. (In re I.F. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735, 760 (I.F.).) 

We consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a person is in 

custody. Pertinent factors include “ ‘whether contact with law enforcement was initiated 

by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person 

voluntarily agreed to an interview; whether the express purpose of the interview was to 

question the person as a witness or a suspect; where the interview took place; whether 

police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; whether they 

informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any 

time and/or whether the person’s conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; 

whether there were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the 

interview; how long the interrogation lasted; how many police officers participated; 

whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; whether they 

manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; 

whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; whether the 

police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and whether the person was 

arrested at the end of the interrogation. [Citations.] [¶] No one factor is dispositive. 

Rather, we look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to 

determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable 

person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest.” (I.F., supra, 20 

Cal.App.5th at p. 759.) 

Where the person being questioned is a minor, the court may also consider the 

child’s age in the Miranda analysis, as long as the child’s age was known to the officer or 

objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, because “ ‘a reasonable child subjected to 

police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult 

would feel free to go.’ ” (I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 760, citing J. D. B. v. North 
7

Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 272, 277 (J. D. B.); see Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 

596, 599 [“That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and 

overwhelm a lad in his early teens”].) 

An example of a noncustodial interview in a suspect’s bedroom is found in People 

v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1167 (Linton). A detective and a deputy district 

attorney came to the defendant’s home, wearing plain clothes and with no visible 

weapons. They asked to speak to the defendant, making clear that he did not have to do 

so and was not under arrest. The defendant invited them into his house and took them 

into his bedroom. He was not restrained and the interviewers did not block the bedroom 

exit. All three sat in chairs. The interviewers repeated that the defendant did not have to 

speak to them and was not under arrest. Their questioning was not aggressive or 

confrontational. Under these circumstances, our high court ruled, a reasonable person 

would have understood he was free to stop the interview and ask them to leave. (Ibid.)

In this case, there are circumstances consistent with a noncustodial interrogation; 

for instance, Smith told Minor he was “not under arrest right now”; Smith’s tone was 

calm and nonconfrontational; the interview took place at Minor’s home, with Mother 

present, rather than at a police station; and it lasted barely 20 minutes. (See In re 

Kenneth S., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 65 [no custody where minor was brought to 

room only 10 feet from foster mother, with her permission, and door was partially open 

during interview]; I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 770 [officer’s tone in one interview

was “professional and appropriate,” minor was shown door leading to observation room 

where his father was watching, and minor was told he was there of his own free will and 

could walk out any time].) 

However, there are also factors suggesting Minor was in custody. No one asked 

him if he wanted to speak with the police; rather, Mother brought the two officers into 

Minor’s bedroom as he was sleeping. The portion of the body camera video before the 

questioning began is difficult to understand, but it appears Smith asked, “Is it okay to do 

it in this room?” and Mother, not Minor, answered, “Yes.” Smith then asked Minor for 

identification. Minor was not told he was free to leave, and nothing in his conduct 
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suggests he thought he could do so. Smith told Minor he was there because the incident 

had been recorded on video. (See I.F., supra, at pp. 771–773 [interview custodial where 

parent, not minor, agreed to request for interview, officers did not tell minor he was free 

to terminate interview and leave, and they manifested belief they knew minor was 

culpable]; see id. at pp. 775–776.) The bedroom was small, and it appears that Martinez

and Smith stood near the bedroom door throughout the interview. After a few questions 

about Minor’s schooling, Smith began asking him about the incident in question, and 

repeatedly directed him to verbalize his answers when he nodded or shrugged. The 

questioning ended with Minor’s arrest. 

Whether a reasonable 15-year-old in these circumstances would have felt free to 

end the questioning and leave the room, or have the officers leave, is a close issue. For 

purposes of our analysis, we assume the juvenile court was correct in finding the 

interview custodial. 

2. Lack of Consultation with Counsel

Minor contends the juvenile court erred in not taking into account the provisions 

of section 625.6 when it ruled his statements to police were admissible. 

a. Enactment of Section 625.6

Section 625.6 went into effect January 1, 2018, less than two months before police 

questioned Minor in this case. (Senate Bill 395, Stats. 2017, ch. 681, § 2.) Subdivision 

(a) of that statute provides that, “[p]rior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver 

of any Miranda rights, a youth 15 years of age or younger shall consult with legal counsel 

in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be waived.” 

Subdivision (b) directs that “[t]he court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of 

statements of a youth 15 years of age or younger made during or after a custodial 

interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a).”2

 

2 We grant Minor’s request for judicial notice of portions of the legislative history 

of section 625.6.
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In the uncodified portion of Senate Bill 395, the Legislature made findings about 

its reasons for adding section 625.6. (Stats. 2017, ch. 681, § 1.) It found that 

“[d]evelopmental and neurological science concludes that the process of cognitive brain 

development continues into adulthood, and that the human brain undergoes ‘dynamic 

changes throughout adolescence and well into young adulthood,’ ” and that, as 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children “ ‘ “generally are less mature 

and responsible than adults” ’ ”; “ ‘they “often lack the experience, perspective, and 

judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them” ’ ”; “ ‘they 

“are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures” than adults’ ”; “they ‘have 

limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional 

actors within it’ ”; and they “ ‘characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature 

judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.’ ” 

(Id., subd. (a), citing, inter alia, J. D. B., supra, 564 U.S. 261, and Graham v. Florida

(2010) 560 U.S. 48.) The Legislature also found that juveniles are less able than adults to 

understand the meaning of their Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them, 

that adolescents tend to “ignore or discount future outcomes and implications” and 

disregard long-term consequences of important decisions, and that juveniles are more 

vulnerable to “psychologically coercive interrogations” than adults experienced with the 

criminal justice system. (Stats. 2017, ch. 681, § 1, subd. (b).) For these reasons, the 

Legislature concluded, “in situations of custodial interrogation and prior to making a 

waiver of rights under [Miranda], youth under 18 years of age should consult with legal 

counsel to assist in their understanding of their rights and the consequences of waiving 

those rights.” (Stats. 2017, ch. 681, § 1, subd. (c).)

b. Background

The officers did not arrange for Minor to consult with counsel before questioning

him. Smith testified that he was aware of section 625.6 at the time he questioned Minor, 

but that he did not believe Minor was in custody during the interview. 

At the hearing on the admissibility of Minor’s statements, the juvenile court 

expressed uncertainty about how to apply section 625.6, subdivision (b)’s directive that it 
10

take into account Minor’s lack of consultation with an attorney when deciding whether to 

admit the statements. Minor’s counsel argued that this was “a very important factor” to 

consider in determining whether Minor acted knowingly and voluntarily. Based on its 

view that evidence could not be suppressed absent a constitutional violation, the court 

denied the motion to exclude Minor’s statements, stating, “I do find that the statements 

were made voluntarily under the existing case law relating to interrogation before the 

effective date of Welfare and Institutions Code section 625.6.” 

c. Application of Section 625.6

Minor contends the juvenile court misunderstood section 625.6, subdivision (b), 

which, he argues, directs the court to exercise its discretion to decide whether the lack of 

an attorney is a factor indicating a youth’s inculpatory statements are inadmissible. He 

asks us to remand the matter for a new hearing to allow the juvenile court to consider this 

factor. 

This contention fails. The “Truth-in-Evidence” provision of the California 

Constitution provides: “Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds 

vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be 

excluded in any criminal proceeding . . . or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a 

criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. . . .” (Cal. Const., art. 

1, § 28(f)(2).) Under this provision, relevant evidence may be excluded only if exclusion 

is required by the United States Constitution or a statute enacted by two-thirds of each 

house of the Legislature. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890; People v. Ratekin

(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1169; see also People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 374

(Nelson) [“Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of statements made 

during a custodial interrogation must be reviewed under federal constitutional 

standards”]; People v. Guzman (Dec. 5, 2019, S242244) __ Cal.5th ___ [2019 Cal.

LEXIS 8937, *9–*11] [Truth-in-Evidence provision supersedes statutorily-created 

exclusionary rules].) Section 625.6 did not pass each chamber of the Legislature by a 

two-thirds margin. (Sen. Bill No. 395 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), Assem. Floor vote, Sept. 

14, 2017 & Sen. Floor vote, Sept. 15, 2017 
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<http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB395> 

[as of December 13, 2019].)

Although no published opinion has addressed the Truth-in-Evidence provision as 

applied to section 625.6, our high court considered a similar issue in People v. Lessie

(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1169 (Lessie). The defendant there was 16 years old when he 

was questioned, and the police did not advise him that he had a right, pursuant to section 

627, subdivision (b), to make a telephone call to a parent within an hour of being taken 

into custody. In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the court stated, “The bare 

violation of section 627 . . . has very limited relevance in the present context. The 

Legislature has not authorized exclusion as a remedy for such violations, and the Truthin-Evidence provision (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(2)) bars courts from creating 

such a remedy under the state Constitution.” (Lessie, at p. 1170.) 

Recognizing this principle, Minor does not argue that section 625.6 mandates

suppression of inculpatory statements whenever police fail to ensure a minor consults 

with an attorney. Rather, he contends Smith’s failure to comply with section 625.6 was 

one of the factors the court should have considered when it ruled on the admissibility of 

his statements. In considering this contention, we bear in mind our high court’s 

admonition that “the Truth-in-Evidence provision [citation] leaves us with no power to 

exclude a minor’s self-incriminatory statements except as federal law requires.” (Lessie, 

supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1167.) We agree with the juvenile court that a court must apply 

federal constitutional law, rather than more restrictive standards derived from a state 

statute that was not passed by a two-thirds majority, in deciding the admissibility of a 

minor’s custodial statements. Section 625.6 does not authorize a court to exercise its 

discretion to exclude statements if those statements are admissible under federal law. 

This conclusion does not mean the policies underlying section 625.6 are irrelevant 

to whether a minor’s statements should be admitted. Both in deciding whether a child

properly waived his or her Miranda rights and in determining whether the statements 

were voluntary, a court considers the totality of the circumstances, which may include a 

minor’s youth and lack of sophistication or experience in the criminal justice system. 
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(See, e.g., Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1167, 1169 [waiver of Fifth Amendment 

rights]; In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 576 (Elias V.) [voluntariness of 

admissions].) Crucially, the court must inquire into “ ‘all the circumstances’ ” of an 

interrogation, including “ ‘evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, 

background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the 

warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of 

waiving those rights.’ ” (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1167, italics added, quoting Fare 

v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725; see Elias V., at p. 576.) But, as the juvenile

court correctly ruled, the proper inquiry remains not whether officers complied with the 

state statute, but whether federal law compels exclusion of the minor’s statements. 

We also emphasize that our decision is not intended to neuter section 625.6’s 

requirement that youths of 15 years or younger consult with legal counsel before a 

custodial interrogation. Although California’s Truth-in-Evidence law does not authorize 

exclusion of evidence as a remedy for violation of a state statute, nothing we say is 

intended to suggest that authorities are not bound by section 625.6, that officers need not 

be trained in its requirements, or that those who violate it should not face administrative 

or other appropriate consequences.

Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to Minor’s substantive challenges to the 

admission of his statements.

3. Waiver of Miranda Rights

Minor contends his statements were inadmissible because he did not validly waive 

his Miranda rights. Accepting as true the trial court’s determination of any disputed facts 

if supported by substantial evidence, we decide this issue independently. (Lessie, supra, 

47 Cal.4th at p. 1169.) In so doing, “we inquire ‘into the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and 

voluntarily decided to forgo his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of 

counsel.’ ” (Ibid.) Where the subject is a child, this inquiry includes evaluation of the 

factors we have already discussed—the minor’s “age, experience, education, background, 

and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given 
13

him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those 

rights.” (Ibid.) 

Nothing in the record persuades us Minor did not understand his rights to silence 

and counsel and the consequences of waiving those rights. He was informed of each of 

his rights and answered in the affirmative without hesitation when asked if he understood 

them. And he had before him a “Juvenile Know Your Rights” form, which he looked at 

before Smith began his questioning. Although there is no indication Minor had 

previously been arrested, he told Smith he had been detained on one occasion. We 

recognize that Minor was young, only 15 years old. But courts have found waivers of 

Miranda rights by youth 15 years of age and younger. (See, e.g., Nelson, supra, 53 

Cal.4th at p. 375 [15-year-old defendant]; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384 

[14-year-old defendant]; In re Brian W. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 590, 593 [15-year-old 

defendant].) Minor did not expressly waive his Miranda rights, in that Smith never asked 

whether, bearing those rights in mind, Minor wished to speak to him. But a minor may 

waive Miranda “implicitly by willingly answering questions after acknowledging that he 

understood those rights.” (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169.)

Minor argues that Mother’s participation in some way rendered his waiver invalid. 

He suggests that she had a “conflicted role” because she wanted Minor to cooperate with 

the police, and that she likely did not understand the significance of waiving Miranda

rights. Minor relies on I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 760–761, but that case is 

distinguishable. The minor there was suspected of killing his own sister; in those 

circumstances, the court noted, the “grieving parent’s search for answers could bring him 

into conflict with his child.” Here there is no such conflict, as Mother was not a victim, 

or even acquainted with the victim of this crime. Moreover, the question in I.F. was 

whether interviews with a minor were custodial, and we are assuming for purposes of our 

analysis that Smith’s interview with Minor was custodial. 

Minor also relies on patronizing assumptions about the wisdom and life 

experience of a single mother who worked as a janitor for a modest wage. We reject this 

argument on the facts—Mother was rightly concerned that her son was heading down the 
14

wrong track—and also because Mother’s understanding of Miranda is irrelevant. It is 

Minor who must knowingly and voluntarily waive these rights, as Minor did here. 

4. Voluntariness of Minor’s Statements

Minor also contends his statements should not have been admitted because they 

were the product of coercion. 

The use of an involuntary confession in a delinquency proceeding violates a 

minor’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Elias V., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) 

“ ‘A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of ‘ “a rational intellect and free 

will.’ ” [Citation.] The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether 

the defendant’s “will was overborne at the time he confessed.” ’ ” (People v. McWhorter

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346–347; accord Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1176.) A 

confession that is obtained through threats or violence, direct or implied promises, or 

improper influence may be found involuntary. (McWhorter, at p. 347.) We look at the 

totality of the circumstances to determine whether a confession was voluntary, including 

the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. (Ibid.) 

The trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances of the interrogation 

are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its determination of whether police activity 

was coercive is subject to independent review. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 

296.) Where, as here, a defendant’s statement is recorded in full, we review the 

voluntariness of the confession independently. (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1176–

1177; accord, People v. Perez (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 863, 871.) 

Minor relies primarily on Elias V., decided by our colleagues in Division Two of 

this judicial district. The 13-year-old minor there, Elias, was alleged to have committed a 

lewd act on a three-year-old girl. (Elias V., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 570–571.) A 

detective and two deputy sheriffs came to his school to speak to him, and the principal 

brought Elias to a small office. (Id. at p. 574.) During the questioning, the detective 

stated as a fact that Elias had touched the victim in a sexual manner; she first suggested 

he had done so either because he found it exciting or because he was curious. When 

Elias rejected the first suggestion, the detective said, “ ‘[b]ut you did it,’ ” and Elias 
15

accepted her suggestion that he had touched the victim out of curiosity. (Id. at pp. 574–

575, 585–586.) 

The appellate court in Elias V. concluded the interrogation was coercive. It noted 

the evidence that juveniles are particularly suggestible and at risk of making false 

confessions. (Elias V., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 578.) It went on to describe a 

commonly used interrogation method known as the “Reid Technique,” in which 

investigators isolate a suspect in a small private room and employ positive and negative 

incentives to confess. This “ ‘maximization/minimization’ ” technique involves 

confronting the suspect with accusations of guilt and refusing to accept alibis or denials, 

while offering moral justifications and face-saving excuses that minimize the crime and 

lead the suspect to see confession as a means of escape. (Id. at p. 579–580, 583.) 

On the facts of the case before it, the court found the interrogation of Elias 

rendered his confession involuntary. The questioning took place at school, with the 

principal present, rather than in Elias’s home with a parent present. (Elias V., supra, 237 

Cal.App.4th at p. 581.) Although there was only limited evidence that any crime had 

taken place at all, the detective repeatedly referred to Elias’s guilt as an established fact; 

she told Elias falsely that the victim had explained what had happened “ ‘perfectly’ ” and 

that another witness had seen the lewd conduct; she suggested scenarios involving 

improper touching, increasing the likelihood that Elias’s statements were the result of his 

suggestibility rather than his own recall of events, and she threatened to subject him to a 

lie detector test. (Id. at pp. 582–584, 591, 593.) She also provided a face-saving 

excuse—curiosity—for having committed the offense. (Id. at pp. 583–586.) Based on 

Elias’s youth, the absence of any evidence corroborating his inculpatory statements, and 

the likelihood that the detective’s use of deception and overbearing tactics would induce 

untrustworthy admissions, the appellate court concluded the statements were involuntary. 

(Id. at p. 586–587.)

A different panel of this division followed Elias V. in In re T.F. (2017) 16 

Cal.App.5th 202 to find a minor’s confession involuntary. The 15-year-old, who was 

alleged to have committed a lewd act on a child, had a documented intellectual disability. 
16

(Id. at pp. 206, 220–221.) He was interrogated in a small room at his school by two 

armed police officers for nearly an hour without being given Miranda warnings, during 

which time he repeatedly denied having touched the victim inappropriately, sobbed 

uncontrollably, and begged the officers to let him return to class or go home. (Id. at pp. 

208–209, 221.) Finally, in response to a question about whether it was “ ‘a one-time, 

isolated incident,’ ” the minor said it was “ ‘one time,’ ” before again denying that he

touched the victim. (Id. at pp. 208–209.) He was arrested and taken to a police station, 

where he was subject to a “nonstop barrage of questions, all insinuating that he had 

inappropriately touched [the victim] and he should come clean and tell the truth.” (Id. at 

p. 221.) Finally, in response to more questioning and the suggestion that he might have 

touched the victim “ ‘over her pants a little bit,’ ” the minor admitted having done so. 

(Id. at p. 209.)

Elias V. and T.F. are readily distinguishable from the case before us. None of the 

circumstances in this case raise a concern that Minor was induced to give a false 

confession or that his will was overborne through aggressive and suggestive tactics. 

Minor was read his Miranda rights. He was questioned at home, with his mother in the 

room. Although there was independent evidence both of the assault and of Minor’s 

culpability, Smith did not insist on Minor’s guilt in the face of persistent denials. When 

asked, Minor immediately admitted doing something he wasn’t “supposed to do” by the 

Safeway store and said he remembered an “old white guy” in a car. After saying he 

“forgot” why the group reacted as they did, Minor soon said he remembered what he and 

his friends had done, and acknowledged the video would show the incident. Smith’s tone 

was calm and appropriate throughout.

Minor contends the coercive nature of the questioning is shown by the fact that he 

had to put on his pants in the presence of Mother and the officers; his bedroom was small 

and Martinez was between him and the door; Minor spoke in a low, and sometimes 

barely audible, voice; and at one point he said he did not feel like talking. He points out 

that he had only limited experience with law enforcement. In light of Minor’s immediate
17

acknowledgement that he was involved in the assault, we are not persuaded that these 

factors show Minor’s will was overborne.

Minor also argues that Mother’s presence in the room increased the coercive 

nature of the interrogation, citing Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 323 [officers 

overcame defendant’s will by instructing his childhood friend to make false statements to 

him] and Culombe v. Connecticut (1961) 367 U.S. 568, 630 [officer asked defendant’s 

wife to confront him and tell him to confess]. Again, we disagree. At one point during 

the questioning, Smith pressed Minor for the names of the other youths involved in the 

assault. Minor said he did not know their names, and Smith told Minor that it was not 

“smart” to refuse because otherwise Minor would “take the hit for this entire incident,” 

and he suggested Mother would agree with him. Mother asked Smith whether he had 

video of the others, and Smith said, “I haven’t identified the other kids yet so I need your 

son to tell me who they are. So if you want to help him tell me who they are—can you 

talk to him?” Mother said Minor’s name and, as Minor shook his head, she appeared to 

encourage him to give Smith the information. During this time, Minor appeared visibly 

uncomfortable, fidgeting, scratching himself, and falling back on the bed with his arms 

outstretched. But the record belies Minor’s contention that this exchange shows his will 

was overborne; rather than yielding to the questions, he refused to give the names of his 

friends, and after Minor reiterated that he would not tell Smith who they were, Smith 

moved on to another line of questioning. At the end of the interview, Smith asked again 

for the names of the other people involved, and Minor again refused to give them. 

We are also unpersuaded by Minor’s reliance on what he characterizes as Smith’s 

deception and trickery. He suggests that, by asking Minor about his schooling and why 

he was at home instead of at school, Smith was falsely presenting himself as a father 

figure who was concerned about Minor’s truancy and thereby misrepresented the reason 

he wanted to speak with Minor. But after Smith asked Minor about his schooling, he 

said, “So do you know why I’m here?” and immediately began asking about the incident. 

Minor was not deceived about the purpose of the interview. 
18

Minor also argues that Smith falsely created an illusion that he knew all about the 

crime and only needed to verify details. We disagree. The video of the incident, 

although it lacks sound, shows the group beating the victim after he approached them and 

appeared to speak angrily; a teacher identified Minor as a possible participant; and Minor 

acknowledged the incident as soon as Smith asked him if he remembered it. There is no 

reason to conclude Minor’s will was overborne by deception or trickery. The juvenile 

court properly admitted his statements.

B. Vague Probation Condition

One of the conditions of Minor’s probation required him to “[c]onsult with the 

Probation Officer without hesitation when you are in need of advice.” Minor contends 

this condition is unconstitutionally vague and infringes on his right to privacy. We 

review this claim de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.) 

Although Minor did not object to the condition below, his facial constitutional claim is 

not forfeited. (Ibid.)

It is well established that “[a] probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for 

the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether 

the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of 

vagueness.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Minor contends, and the 

Attorney General concedes, that the condition requiring him to consult with his probation 

officer when he is in need of advice violates this standard. We accept the concession. 

The condition makes clear neither what is meant by “in need of advice” nor what subjects 

are encompassed by the order. Indeed, read literally, the condition could be construed to 

require Minor to consult with his probation officer about topics unrelated to his criminal 

activity or rehabilitation, such as minor academic questions, medical concerns, or 

romantic matters. It is highly unlikely that this was the juvenile court’s intent, and Minor 

is left to guess what the order requires him to do. 

Minor asks us to strike the condition. The Attorney General, on the other hand, 

urges us either to modify the condition ourselves or remand the matter to the juvenile 

court for further clarification. We are guided by In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 
19

292, in which our colleagues in Division One of this appellate district considered a 

vagueness challenge to probation conditions that required the minor to “ ‘be of good 

behavior and perform well’ ” at school or work and to “ ‘be of good citizenship and good 

conduct.’ ” Rather than modifying the conditions or remanding to the juvenile court to 

decide whether to strike or modify them, our colleagues concluded the best course was 

“to strike all the challenged language, leaving the court free to impose, if it wishes, 

substitute conditions that are sufficiently clear to comply with constitutional 

requirements.” (Id. at p. 299; accord People v. Perez (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 380, 386 

[striking overbroad condition and providing trial court may impose narrower condition if 

necessary].) The same result is appropriate here. 

Finally, we have no reason to anticipate that any new condition will intrude

impermissibly on Minor’s privacy interests, but he remains free to raise any appropriate 

objection to a substitute condition on remand.

III. DISPOSITION

We strike probation condition 7, which requires Minor to consult with his 

probation officer without hesitation when he is in need of advice, and remand the matter 

to the juvenile court, which remains free to impose a substitute condition that is 

sufficiently clear to comply with constitutional requirements. In all other respects, the 

judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

TUCHER, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

POLLAK, P. J. 

_________________________

BROWN, J.

In re Anthony L. (A154220)
21

Trial Court: City and County of San Francisco Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Michael Begert

Counsel for Appellant: Leila H. Moncharsh, by Court-Appointment under the 

First District Appellate Project 

Counsel for Respondents: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Jeffrey M. 

Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Donna 

M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; 

Melissa A. Meth, Deputy Attorney General