AIRLINE

COMPETITION

Issues Raised by

Consolidation Proposals

Statement for the Record by

JayEtta Hecker, Director,

Physical Infrastructure Issues

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

For the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on

Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition, U.S. Senate 

Hearing Held on

February 7, 2001

Statement Submitted on

February 7, 2001

GAO-01-402T
1

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement for the record on the potential

implications of merger proposals recently announced by major airlines. In May 2000, United

Airlines (United) proposed to acquire US Airways and divest part of those assets to create a new

airline to be called DC Air. More recently, American Airlines (American) has proposed to

purchase Trans World Airlines (TWA), along with certain assets from United. These proposals

have raised questions about how such consolidation within the airline industry could affect

competition in general and consumers in particular.

Extensive research and the experience of millions of Americans underscore the benefits that

have flowed to most consumers from the 1978 deregulation of the airline industry, including

dramatic reductions in fares and expansion of service. These benefits are largely attributable to

increased competition--by the entry of both new airlines into the industry and established airlines

into new markets. At the same time, however, airline deregulation has not benefited everyone;

some communities have suffered from relatively high airfares and a loss of service due in part to

a lack of competition. GAO has been analyzing aviation competition issues since enactment of

the Airline Deregulation Act. Our work over the last decade has focused on challenges to

competition and industry performance, including various mergers, the Department of

Transportation’s (DOT) role, concentration in select airports, key airline operating and marketing

practices, barriers to entry, small community service, and fares in dominated markets.1

The potential shifts in industry structure that would be brought about from the proposed mergers

represent a crossroads for the structure of the airline industry and the state of competition and

industry performance.2

 These proposed mergers raise numerous public policy issues that require

reasoned responses. Ultimately, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has the primary responsibility

to evaluate these mergers. In its review, Justice considers a number of factors, including

increases in market concentration; potential adverse effects on competition; the likelihood of

new entry; possible efficiencies or other benefits; whether one of the airlines would fail and exit

the market if the merger failed to occur; and whether a less anticompetitive alternative exists.

 1

 See list of related GAO products attached to this statement.

2

 Technically, American has proposed to acquire the assets of TWA, which declared bankruptcy. For

presentation purposes in this statement, however, we will refer to the transaction as a merger.
2

We recently issued a report on the potential effects of the proposed merger between United and

US Airways.3

 That review, using the most recently available data from DOT on the top 5,000

domestic airline markets, generally focused on changes in market structures and not on other

issues that DOJ might take in consideration.4

 This statement is based on that report and our

earlier work on airline competition issues, along with initial analyses of the potential effects of

the various proposed transactions between American, TWA, United, and US Airways. The

statement: (1) presents an overview of potential shifts in industry structure and markets

associated with both the American and United proposals, including information on markets in

which the merged airlines would dominate travel; (2) identifies key issues associated with

American’s proposed transactions; and (3) identifies some critical public policy issues associated

with the potential consolidation in the industry.

In summary:

! If both the United-US Airways merger and American-TWA acquisition are consummated,

new United would have the largest market share of any U.S. carrier—over 27 percent—

and new American would have a 22.6 percent share. Each proposal could have both

harmful and beneficial effects on consumers. The United and American proposals would

each reduce competition in approximately 300 markets, with each affecting over 10

million passengers. Each proposal would allow the new larger carrier to dominate (i.e.,

obtain a greater than 50-percent market share) more than 100 new markets. However,

the mergers would also each create new competitors where, previously, each of the

merging carriers had less than a 10-percent market share. Each would provide other

benefits to consumers as well, such as creating new online service in certain markets and

possible new routings allowing passengers to connect over different cities.

 3

Aviation Competition: Issues Related to the Proposed United Airlines—US Airways Merger (GAO-01-212,

Dec. 15, 2000).

4

 We analyzed the most recent data available from DOT on the top 5,000 city-pair markets, which covered

calendar year 1999. For this statement, we applied the same methodology, using the same data, as we did

in our December 2000 report on the proposed United-US Airways merger. We recognize that competition

or service in particular markets is likely to change over time with the entry or exit of different carriers.

Carriers may add or reduce service in markets. These data illustrate the approximate orders of magnitude

of the various transactions. We have not subtracted passengers or markets that may be affected by DC Air

markets or the proposed agreement between United and American to share the current US Airways shuttle

from the data for new United.
3

! American’s proposed arrangements with TWA, United, US Airways, and DC Air raise a

number of significant questions that cannot be answered now, in part because many of

the details of these arrangements are still unknown. Although TWA has been in poor

financial condition for years, the question remains whether American’s purchase of TWA

represents the least anticompetitive means to preserve its assets. Other questions arise

about how the agreements that American has tentatively made with United (regarding the

future of the US Airways Shuttle between Washington, New York, and Boston and the

assets associated with the proposed DC Air) would affect competition.

! The consolidation in the industry that might result from both the proposed American and

United transactions raises major public policy issues. These include, but are not limited

to, questions about how a more consolidated industry might further raise barriers to

market entry by new airlines, how the two merged airlines might compete in key markets,

whether the merged carriers would expose the public to greater risks of travel

disruptions, and how service to small communities might be affected.

Background

On May 24, 2000, United and US Airways agreed to merge their operations. Under the terms of

the proposed merger, United would acquire US Airways in a transaction valued at $11.6 billion.

Specifically, United would pay $60 for each share of common US Airways stock for a total of $4.3

billion and would assume $1.5 billion in US Airways net debt and $5.8 billion in aircraft operating

leases. According to information from United, the combined company (“new United”) would

have approximately 145,000 employees. It would operate eight hubs in six states and serve a

total of 380 airports throughout the country, reaching communities in every state.

Under the terms of the proposed merger, United plans to divest some of the assets US Airways

possesses at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (Reagan National). These assets would

be used to create a new airline known as DC Air. They include 222 departure and arrival slots,5

several gates and related airport facilities, and the operations of an existing commuter airline.

 5

The Federal Aviation Administration limits the number of operations (takeoffs and landings) that can

occur during certain periods of the day at four congested airports--O'Hare in Chicago; Reagan National in
4

In January 2001, American proposed acquiring TWA (which declared bankruptcy) for

approximately $3.5 billion, including $500 million in cash, $3.0 billion in estimated lease

assumptions, and $200 million in other financing. In addition, American also announced that it

had agreed with United to purchase certain assets from United and US Airways, including half of

the US Airways Shuttle between Washington, New York, and Boston, and a 49-percent share of

DC Air. According to information from American, the combined company (“new American”)

would have approximately 120,000 employees. It would operate five hubs, nearly 1,000 aircraft,

and gain a large number of slot and gate resources at key airports in the eastern United States.

The consummation of the proposed mergers is subject to approvals by various regulatory bodies.

Both DOJ and DOT have responsibilities for reviewing airline mergers and acquisitions.6

 DOJ has

the authority to review mergers or stock acquisitions before they take place to determine

whether they violate antitrust laws. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, an acquisition of voting

securities above a set monetary amount must be reported to DOJ for prior review. DOJ has the

authority to institute judicial proceedings under the Clayton Act if it determines that a merger or

acquisition may substantially lessen competition in a relevant market or if it tends to create a

monopoly.7

 If DOJ believes any agreement is anticompetitive in whole or in part, it may seek to

block the agreement in federal court. TWA’s bankruptcy proceeding is now before the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. DOT conducts its own analysis of airline mergers

and acquisitions and submits its views and any relevant information in its possession to DOJ. In

addition, when transactions involve the transfer of international route authority, DOT is

responsible for approving such matters to ensure that they are consistent with the public

interest.

 Washington, D.C.; and Kennedy and LaGuardia in New York. The authority to conduct a single operation

during these periods at these four airports is commonly referred to as a “slot.”

6

 The merger may also be reviewed by the European Commission and state attorneys general.

7

 Justice’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines (United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade

Commission Revision to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 8, 1997)) describe the process used to

analyze the potential effect of a merger under the Clayton Act. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, an

acquisition of voting securities above a set monetary amount must be reported to Justice for prior review.

Justice has the authority to institute judicial proceedings under the Clayton Act if it determines that a

merger or acquisition may substantially lessen competition in a relevant market or if it tends to create a

monopoly.
5

Highlights of Potential Changes in Industry Structure

Although the proposed acquisition of TWA by American would not impact as many passengers as

the merger between United and US Airways, the transaction itself has the potential for preserving

assets in the market. If both the United-US Airways merger and the American-TWA acquisition

are consummated, new United would have the largest market share of any U.S. carrier—27.2

percent—and new American would have a 22.6 percent share (based on revenue passenger miles,

a recognized measure of airline size8

). Thus, if both transactions are consummated, new United

and new American would together control nearly 50 percent of total airline traffic. Many

industry analysts observe that these measures would more than likely not be the end of this

move toward further industry consolidation. Figure 1 compares the percentage share of total

revenue passenger miles that new American and new United would carry relative to that flown

by other major U.S. airlines. Appendix I shows the relative size of major U.S. passenger airlines

as indicated by common measures of airline market presence, along with the airlines’ 1999 total

operating revenue.

 8

 These percentages do not take into account the market share that might be attributable to DC Air or

sharing the US Airways Shuttle. Revenue passenger miles represent the number of paying passengers

transported over each mile. “Revenue passengers” do not include those who are flying on frequent flyer

award tickets and others who did not pay for their flights (e.g., airline employees).
6

Figure 1: New American and New United Would Have Nearly 50 Percent of Total U.S. Domestic and

International Passenger Travel

Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from DOT for the 12 months ending June 30, 2000.

In general, American’s acquisition of TWA would lead to the decline of competition in 367

markets--more than the 290 markets in which competition would be reduced from the proposed

merger between United and US Airways. 9 The number of passengers potentially affected by the

new American restructuring would be 11 million, compared to 16 million potentially affected by

new United. New American would also have a larger increase in the number of markets they

could dominate (161) compared to United (126). However, the dominated markets associated

with proposed American-TWA arrangement affect fewer passengers than those dominated

markets associated with the proposed United-US Airways merger (4.9 million compared to 6.9

million). The total number of markets that new American would dominate would be 552

compared with 1,156 that new United would dominate. On the other hand, new American would

 9

 As we did in our December 2000 report on the proposed United-US Airways merger, we define a market

as a city-pair. We define a competitor as an airline that had at least a 10 percent share of the passenger

traffic in that market, based on DOT’s 1999 data on the top 5,000 city-pair markets, which was the most

currently available at the time of our analysis.
7

increase competition in more markets than new United (150 compared to 65), potentially

benefiting more than five times as many passengers (15.4 million compared to 2.9 million).

As a frame of reference for analyzing the competitive significance of the proposed mergers, we

compared them with our analysis of the proposal in 1998 by Northwest to acquire a majority of

the voting stock in, and enter into an alliance with, Continental.10 In general, the potential

number of markets and passengers who might be adversely affected by either the proposed

United-US Airways or American-TWA mergers are much greater than those that might have been

affected by the Northwest-Continental stock acquisition and alliance. The number of passengers

who could benefit from the American-TWA merger is roughly comparable to those who could

have benefited from the Northwest-Continental stock acquisition and alliance. Table 1

summarizes the number of markets and passengers affected by the proposed mergers and

compares them to the markets and passengers that potentially would have been affected by the

Northwest-Continental stock acquisition and alliance.

 10 Northwest proposed to acquire a majority of the voting stock in, and enter into an alliance with,

Continental. Northwest and Continental announced in January 1998 that Northwest was to acquire 8.7

million shares of Continental’s stock. These shares gave Northwest 51 percent of the voting rights in

Continental. In addition, the two airlines were entering into an alliance that would connect their route

systems. A variety of industry analysts told us they believed that Northwest and Continental would not act

as independent competitors over the long run. As a result, our analysis of the potential competitive effects

of the stock acquisition and alliance assumed that Northwest and Continental would behave as though

they had merged. See Aviation Competition: Effects on Consumers From Domestic Alliances Vary

(GAO/RCED-99-37, Jan. 15, 1999). Our analysis here largely parallels our analysis of the NorthwestContinental stock acquisition and alliance.

DOJ announced a tentative settlement in its antitrust suit opposing Northwest’s purchase of a

controlling interest in Continental on November 6, 2000. Under the terms of the agreement in principle,

Northwest would divest all but 7 percent of the voting interest in Continental and would be subject to

significant restrictions on its ability to vote any stock it retains.
8

Table 1: Comparison of Potential Competitive Impact of the Proposed United-US Airways and American-TWA

Mergers with the Proposed Northwest--Continental Stock Acquisition and Alliance

American-TWA (1999

data)

United-US Airways (1999

data)

Northwest-Continental

(1997 data)

Competitive

Factor

Numbers

of markets

Passengers

affected

(millions)

Numbers

of markets

Passengers

affected

(millions)

Numbers of

markets

Passengers

affected

(millions)

Markets where

competition would

decline

367 11 290 16.0 63 2.0

Newly dominated

markets

161 4.9 126 6.9 25 2.4

Total dominated

markets

552 27.5 1,156 61.1 492 40.7

Markets where

competition would

increase

150 15.4 65 2.9 286 15.1

Source: GAO’s analysis.

If both mergers proceed, the two new carriers would both compete in 1,106 of the top 5,000

markets. Competition could be reduced in 267 of those markets where, in 1999, about 10.3

million passengers traveled. That is, in 267 markets, as a result of combining what are now

separate competitors (i.e., each airline had at least a 10 percent share of the market) through

their proposed merger, one competitor would no longer be present. However, the data net out

markets where a new effective competitor may be created by the merger (i.e., where the two

merging carriers previously had less than 10 percent but combined have over 10 percent.) Table

2 shows the number of markets and passengers that could potentially be affected by a reduction

in competition due to the combined effect of the two mergers.
9

Table 2: Markets Where New American and New United Would Meet and Competition Could be Reduced

Change in the number of

competitors Markets

Passengers

(millions)

From 3 to 2 64 2.6

From 4 to 3 123 3.5

From 5 to 3 3 0.1

From 5 to 4 69 3.7

From 6 to 5 8 0.4

Total 267 10.3

Note: Figures may not total due to rounding.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from DOT.

Thus, in 64 of the 267 markets, the two proposed mergers leave new United and new American as

the only remaining competitors.11 In 1999, about 2.6 million passengers traveled in those 64

markets. In 126 markets where 3.6 million passengers traveled in 1999, new United and new

American would be two of only three remaining competitors.

Conversely, the proposed United-US Airways and American-TWA mergers would also benefit

consumers. In markets where one of the two merging airlines now has limited market shares,

the merger would allow them to create competition against other airlines. For example, were

both mergers to be approved, approximately 7 million passengers could benefit from gaining an

additional competitor in 105 markets. Additionally, by extending the carriers’ operations to city

pairs where only one of the two airlines previously operated at each endpoint, the merger would

create new on-line service between those communities.12 Finally, the merger would benefit

members of each airline’s frequent flyer programs by expanding the number of destinations that

the members could reach. The airlines also assert that the proposed mergers would deliver other

 11 See app. II for a list of the 64 city-pair markets that, according to 1999 data from DOT, would have only

two competitors if both of the proposed mergers were to be approved. Because competition or service in

particular markets is likely to change over time with the entry or exit of different carriers, more recent

data may show that other airlines could compete in these markets. We use these numbers of markets

generally to illustrate the orders of magnitude of markets that the mergers may affect.

12 On-line service provides passengers with connecting flight without requiring them to change airlines.

Service that requires passengers to change airlines to continue their flights (excluding those requiring a

passenger to transfer between a larger airline and its commuter affiliate or other airlines with which it may

have a code-sharing agreement) is referred to as “interline” service.
10

benefits as well. For example, American and TWA passengers may benefit through being able to

connect to their destination over different hubs.

Proposed Arrangements Between American, TWA, United, US Airways, and DC Air

Raise Questions and Major Competition Issues

American’s acquisition of TWA and its purchase of certain assets of United and US Airways,

including a portion of DC Air need to be discussed separately, as the implications would seem to

be quite different. Each component of American’s proposed transactions raise numerous

questions.

-- Does American’s purchase represent the “least anticompetitive” means to

preserve the presence of TWA’s assets in the market? By many accounts, TWA has been in

a difficult financial position for years. Since 1992, TWA has entered bankruptcy three times. It

has failed to earn an annual profit during the past 12 years. Regardless of whether TWA would

cease operating entirely because of its financial failure, or whether TWA is purchased by another

airline, an independent competitive presence in the 103 cities that the airline served will be lost.

(However, were TWA to cease operating entirely, the loss of service would likely be temporary,

as the would market adjust to meet the demand for travel.)

Whether the loss of competition from TWA is positive or negative depends on a number of

factors. DOJ will have to review many of those factors, including increases in market

concentration, potential adverse effects on competition of the transaction, possible efficiencies

or other benefits, and the likelihood of new entry. It is also DOJ’s responsibility to determine

whether, for example, absent the merger, TWA’s assets would exit the market if it failed, and

whether there is no less anticompetitive alternative. On the one hand, we recognize that there

are many important considerations involved with preventing TWA from ceasing operations

entirely, such as continuing service to markets and maintaining jobs for its employees. On the

other hand, the question exists about how the loss of TWA’s competitive presence could be

mitigated. For purposes of creating more competition in the U.S. domestic aviation market,

would it be better if an airline other than American bought TWA?

American’s purchase of certain assets of United and US Airways, including a portion of DC Air,

raises other significant questions about how competition may be affected. Several issues appear

central to an assessment of possible anticompetitive impacts of the proposed transactions:
11

-- How would American’s purchasing part of DC Air affect competition? As DC Air

was originally conceived in the proposed merger between United and US Airways, questions

arose about whether it would be an independent competitor, particularly in certain key markets

relative to new United. Now American has proposed to purchase 49 percent of DC Air.

Passengers who may fly on DC Air can now earn American frequent flyer miles instead of miles

with United. Passengers, who may be flying beyond Washington, D.C., can now connect with

online service onto other American flights rather than on flights operated by United. American’s

purchase of part of DC Air means that American, not United, would provide some of the aircraft,

crew, and other support to DC Air.

-- How might American’s purchasing part of DC Air affect service to DC Air’s

markets? Under the original proposal to create DC Air, the airline was to serve 44 markets out

of Reagan National, most of which are now served by US Airways. DC Air had expressed a

commitment to maintain service to essentially all of those cities, using the 222 arrival and

departure slots that it would obtain as part of the US Airways divestiture. We do not know what

commitment, if any, American expressed regarding maintaining that service. We also do not

know what agreements, if any, American made with DC Air to buy out the remaining 51 percent

interest in the company or whether American will push to use the slots at Reagan National for

other markets.

-- How would American’s sharing shuttle operations with United alter competition?

American and United are now proposing to form a joint venture to share the operations of the US

Airways shuttle at New York LaGuardia, Boston, and Washington Reagan National for at least 20

years. The two airlines expect to coordinate schedules, ticketing, frequent flyer programs, and

access to passenger lounges. We do not yet know how this arrangement might affect price

competition in the market.

-- Does American’s adding flights in certain United-US Airways hub routes enhance

competition? As part of the agreement with United, American has agreed to provide at least

two daily flights on five routes for 10 years. Four of those markets--between Chicago O’Hare and

Charlotte, Los Angeles and Philadelphia, San Jose and Philadelphia, and Washington and

Pittsburgh--complement American’s existing network by originating in one of the airline’s “focus

cities.” However, we do not know what impact the agreement between American and United will

have on competition between the two airlines on price and service in those markets.
12

Critical Public Policy Issues Associated With the Industry’s Possible Consolidation

Some industry observers have suggested that the American and United proposals mark the

beginning of a new wave of transition. Any industry consolidation that would be brought about

by these proposals raises a number of important public policy issues for consideration. We

highlight some of these issues--relating to market entry, competition among the newly merged

airlines in key markets, potential travel disruption, and small community service--recognizing

that there are also many others.

-- What barriers to market entry might the proposed mergers exert? Scores of new

airlines have begun commercial passenger service since the deregulation of the industry.

Although most failed, other airlines have managed to compete, and some have done so quite

profitably. The most notable example, of course, is Southwest. Others—such as ATA, AirTran,

and JetBlue--have also experienced success so far. The success of airline deregulation in leading

to lower fares and better service stems in part from competition spurred by the entry of new

airlines, i.e., low fare carriers are recognized as providing the primary fare discipline in the

marketplace. A January 2001 DOT report on exclusionary practices concluded that major

airlines have the opportunity and the means to protect their market power by frustrating new

entry. DOT found there had been instances in which incumbents drove new entrants out of

markets by cutting fares and flooding the market with capacity. Once the new entrant was

driven out of the market, the incumbent sought an increase in fares and reductions in service.

If American and United fly nearly half of the industry’s traffic, a key issue that policy makers

need to address is whether or not new low-cost carriers will be able to enter markets and

compete. Because established carriers will control vast numbers of facilities (including slots and

gates) at key airports, will those new carriers even be able to offer service in major markets?

Will American’s and United’s sales and marketing efforts (such as their frequent flyer programs

and code-sharing affiliations such as the Star Alliance and OneWorld) present barriers that are

too great for new entrants to overcome? How effectively will those new carriers be able to

compete if the American and United transactions spur additional consolidation in the industry,

possibly raising entry barriers even higher?

-- Would the transactions between American and United alter how they would

compete in key markets? The proposed United and American arrangements—including the

agreements in which American would share the US Airways shuttle with United and compete in
13

certain markets between United and US Airways hubs-- raise questions regarding the extent to

which the carriers may compete vigorously. Economic literature and empirical evidence indicate

that when there are fewer firms in a market and those firms meet in many markets (e.g., citypairs), they are likely to recognize their interdependence and compete less vigorously.

To identify the orders of magnitude of markets that might be affected by new United and new

American, we examined the number of markets where the merged carriers would each

compete.13 New American would be a competitor in over 2,100 of the top 5,000 markets, while

new United would compete in over 2,900. The new carriers would both be competitors in 1,106

markets. Table 3 summarizes the combined passenger shares of the two carriers in these

markets.

Table 3: Passenger Shares of New United and New American in Markets Where Carriers Would Both Operate

Combined passenger

share of new United and

new American Markets Percent

81-100% 286 25.9

61-80 324 29.3

41-60 323 29.2

20-40 173 15.6

TOTAL 1,106 100.0

Source: GAO’s analysis of 1999 data from DOT.

In 610 of the 1,106 markets (or about 55 percent), the two carriers would account for over 60

percent of the traffic. To the extent the two large carriers recognize their interdependence in

these and the other 496 markets where they would both operate, should the carriers not compete

vigorously, it could adversely affect fares and service.

-- Will the public be exposed to greater risk of travel disruptions, in light of the

merged carriers’ breadth of service? Unfortunately, we have witnessed three relatively

recent examples of how carrier’s labor difficulties can greatly disrupt travel: American’s 1997

 13 As noted earlier, in this and in previous reports, we defined a competitor as an airline that carried at least

10 percent of the passenger traffic in a given market. This is the same definition used by DOT.
14

disruption following its purchase of Reno Air, United’s difficulties this past summer, and Delta’s

current challenges with its pilots. Other labor groups’ contracts with the airlines are also coming

up for renewal in the near future. If the proposed mergers are approved, and either airline

encounters major labor problems, how severely could the public’s travel be disrupted? The

aviation system has relatively little unused capacity in it now, having been operating at or near

record load levels for some time. In general, could the significant integration challenges (not

only labor, but also systems and fleets) presented by the American and United proposals make

the public more vulnerable to network wide disruptions?

-- How might a consolidated industry affect service to small communities? The

quality of air service to smaller communities and the fares that passengers in those communities

pay relative to those paid in larger communities have been issues that the Congress has been

concerned about for some time. At the same time, one of the benefits of airline mergers and

alliances has been the ability of the larger carrier to provide online service to increased numbers

of destinations. For example, the United-US Airways merger could improve competition and

service in 256 relatively small markets by providing new online connections. The airlines have

also claimed that small communities would gain greater access to international markets through

their global alliances. However, the mergers could erode service to many small communities

where the merging airlines compete, even if the service provided is over different hubs. One

analyst suggested, for example, that American might discontinue TWA’s current turboprop

service between Bloomington, Illinois, and St. Louis, because American also serves Bloomington,

but using small jet aircraft to and from Chicago. Would a more dispersed and competitive

market structure offer better promise of providing affordable air access for small and medium

sized communities to major US business centers? How might the potential effect of industry

consolidation on new entry affect small and medium sized communities?

Conclusions

There are a number of unanswered questions that the Congress, DOJ, and DOT need to address

in evaluating the proposed mergers. The proposals by American, TWA, United, US Airways, and

DC Air constitute the most significant recent changes that have occurred in the airline industry,

and the outcome of these decisions could have both positive and negative effects for consumers

for years to come.
15

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or other members

of the Committee might have.

Contact and Acknowledgment

For further information on this testimony, please contact JayEtta Hecker at (202) 512-2834.

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Steve Martin, Chuck Wilson,

Triana Bash, David Hooper, and Joseph Kile.
16

Appendix I

Combined Domestic and International Measures of Airline Size, 12 Months Ending

June 30, 2000

Revenue passenger

enplanementsa

Revenue passenger

miles

Total operating

revenue I

Airline

Number in

thousands

Percent

of total

Number in

thousands

Percent

of total

Dollars in

millions

Percent

of total

Delta Air Lines 106,218,000 18.8 106,849,814 17.0 14,711 16.3

United Airlinesa 87,113,000 15.4 127,455,682 20.3 18,027 20.0

American Airlinesb 85,400,000 15.1 114,832,223 18.3 17,730 19.6

Southwest Airlinesc 69,056,000 12.2 39,641,182 6.3 4,736 5.2

US Airwaysd 56,417,000 10.0 42,898,817 6.8 8,595 9.5

Northwest Airlines 56,003,000 9.9 77,324,776 12.3 10,276 11.4

Continental Airlines 44,868,000 7.9 60,980,078 9.7 8,639 9.6

Trans World Airlines 26,271,000 4.7 26,650,717 4.2 3,309 3.7

America West Airlinese 19,523,000 3.5 18,558,027 3.0 2,211 2.4

Alaska Airlinesf 13,694,000 2.4 11,962,007 1.9 2,082 2.3

Total g 564,563,000 100.0 627,153,323 100.0 90,316 100.0

New United h 143,530,000 25.4 170,354,499 27.2 26,622 29.5

New American h 111,671,000 19.8 141,482,940 22.6 21,039 23.3

a

“Passenger enplanements” represent the total number of passengers boarding an aircraft. Thus, for example, a passenger that

must make a single connection between his or her origin and destination counts as two enplaned passengers because he or she

boarded two separate flights.

a

Total operating revenues are for the parent (UAL Corporation).

b

Total operating revenues are for the parent (AMR Corporation).

c

Southwest Airlines provides only domestic service.

d

Total operating revenues are for the parent (US Airways Group, Inc.).

e

Total operating revenues are for the parent (America West Holdings, Inc.).

f

Total operating revenues are for the parent (Alaska Air Group, Inc.).

g

Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

h

Totals for new United and new American do not make any allowance for those operations that might become part of DC Air or

sharing the US Airways Shuttle.

I Figures for total operating revenue are for the period January 1, 1999 through December 31, 1999.

Sources: GAO’s analysis of DOT data.
17

Appendix II

Markets in Which Only The Merging Airlines Would Remain As Competitors14

Albuquerque – Des Moines

Atlanta – Peoria

Baltimore – Springfield, MO

Boston – Colorado Springs

Boston – Peoria

Cedar Rapids, IA -- Tampa

Charlotte – Wichita

Charlotte – San Jose

Chicago – Washington, D.C.

Chicago – Harrisburg

Colorado Springs – Washington, DC

Dayton – Ontario, CA

Dayton – San Jose

Dayton – Orange Co., CA

Denver – Harrisburg

Des Moines – San Antonio

Harrisburg – Kansas City, MO

Harrisburg – Los Angeles

Harrisburg – San Diego

Harrisburg – San Francisco

Harrisburg – Orange Co., CA

Hartford – Ontario, CA

Hartford – San Jose

Hartford – Los Angeles

Hartford – San Francisco

Hartford – Springfield, MO

Kansas City, MO – Rochester

Las Vegas – Pittsburgh

Las Vegas – Springfield, MO

Lincoln, NE – Philadelphia

Los Angeles – Rochester

Los Angeles – San Diego

Los Angeles – Santa Barbara

Los Angeles – Springfield, MO

Madison – San Antonio

Miami -- Seattle

Miami – Washington, D.C.

 14 Source: GAO analysis of Department of Transportation data on the largest 5,000 markets in calendar

year 1999, which was the latest available at the time of our analysis. Because competition or service in

particular markets is likely to change over time with the entry or exit of different carriers, more recent

data may show that other airlines could compete in these markets. The data reflect the Department of

Transportation’s definitions of city-pair markets.
18

Newark -- Wichita

Omaha – Pittsburgh

Ontario, CA – Springfield, MO

Orlando -- Peoria

Palm Springs – Los Angeles

Peoria – Washington, D.C.

Peoria – Phoenix

Peoria – Raleigh/Durham

Peoria – San Diego

Peoria – San Francisco

Peoria -- Tampa

Philadelphia – Wichita

Phoenix – Springfield, MO

Pittsburgh – Wichita

Pittsburgh – Sacramento

Pittsburgh – San Jose

Portland, OR – Springfield, MO

Rochester – San Diego

Rochester – San Francisco

Rochester – Orange Co., CA

Sacramento – Springfield, MO

Salt Lake City – Springfield, MO

San Diego – Springfield, MO

San Francisco – Springfield, MO

Orange Co., CA – Springfield, MO

Springfield – Washington, D.C.

Wichita -- Washington, D.C.
19

Related GAO Products

Aviation Competition: Issues Related to the Proposed United Airlines-US Airways Merger (GAO01-212, Dec. 15, 2000).

Reagan National Airport: Capacity to Handle Additional Flights and Effect on Other Area

Airports (GAO/RCED-99-234, Sept. 17, 1999).

Aviation Competition: Effects on Consumers From Domestic Alliances Vary (GAO/RCED-99-37,

Jan. 15, 1999).

Aviation Competition: Proposed Domestic Airline Alliances Raise Serious Issues (GAO/T-RCED98-215, June 4, 1998).

Domestic Aviation: Service Problems and Limited Competition Continue in Some Markets

(GAO/T-RCED-98-176, Apr. 23, 1998).

Aviation Competition: International Aviation Alliances and the Influence of Airline Marketing

Practices (GAO/T-RCED-98-131, Mar. 19, 1998).

Airline Competition: Barriers to Entry Continue in Some Domestic Markets (GAO/T-RCED-98-

112, Mar. 5, 1998).

Domestic Aviation: Barriers Continue to Limit Competition (GAO/T-RCED-98-32, Oct. 28, 1997).

Airline Deregulation: Addressing the Air Service Problems of Some Communities (GAO/T-RCED97-187, June 25, 1997).

International Aviation: Competition Issues in the U.S.-U.K. Market (GAO/T-RCED-97-103, June 4,

1997).
20

Domestic Aviation: Barriers to Entry Continue to Limit Benefits of Airline Deregulation (GAO/TRCED-97-120, May 13, 1997).

Airline Deregulation: Barriers to Entry Continue to Limit Competition in Several Key Domestic

Markets (GAO/RCED-97-4, Oct. 18, 1996).

Domestic Aviation: Changes in Airfares, Service, and Safety Since Airline Deregulation (GAO/TRCED-96-126, Apr. 25, 1996).

Airline Deregulation: Changes in Airfares, Service, and Safety at Small, Medium-Sized, and Large

Communities (GAO/RCED-96-79, Apr. 19, 1996).

International Aviation: Airline Alliances Produce Benefits, but Effect on Competition Is

Uncertain (GAO/RCED-95-99, Apr. 6, 1995).

Airline Competition: Higher Fares and Less Competition Continue at Concentrated Airports

(GAO/RCED-93-171, July 15, 1993).

Computer Reservation Systems: Action Needed to Better Monitor the CRS Industry and

Eliminate CRS Biases (GAO/RCED-92-130, Mar. 20, 1992).

Airline Competition: Effects of Airline Market Concentration and Barriers to Entry on Airfares

(GAO/RCED-91-101, Apr. 26, 1991).

Airline Competition: Industry Operating and Marketing Practices Limit Market Entry

(GAO/RCED-90-147, Aug. 29, 1990).

Airline Competition: Higher Fares and Reduced Competition at Concentrated Airports

(GAO/RCED-90-102, July 11, 1990).

Airline Deregulation: Barriers to Competition in the Airline Industry (GAO/T-RCED-89-65, Sept.

20, 1989).
21

Airline Competition: Fare and Service Changes at St. Louis Since the TWA-Ozark Merger

(GAO/RCED-88-217BR, Sept. 21, 1988).

Competition in the Airline Computerized Reservation Systems (GAO/T-RCED-88-62, Sept. 14,

1988).

Airline Competition: Impact of Computerized Reservation Systems (GAO/RCED-86-74, May 9,

1986).

Airline Takeoff and Landing Slots: Department of Transportation's Slot Allocation Rule

(GAO/RCED-86-92, Jan. 31, 1986).

Deregulation: Increased Competition Is Making Airlines More Efficient and Responsive to

Consumers (GAO/RCED-86-26, Nov. 6, 1985).

(394001)
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