, 255 P.3d 1275, 1278-79 (2011). If the district court finds 

noncompliance, an FMP certificate must not issue. Holt v. Regional 

Trustee Services Corp., 127 Nev. , 266 P.3d 602, 607 (2011). 

Absent factual or legal error, the choice of sanction in an FMP judicial 

review proceeding is committed to the sound discretion of the district 

court. Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 127 Nev. , 255 P.3d 1281, 

1287 (2011). 

Appellant argues that the beneficiary of the deed of trust in 

this matter is Bank of America, but that Bank of America failed to attend 

the mediation.' NRS 107.086(4) specifically permits the beneficiary of a 

deed of trust to send a representative to the mediation. Here, based on the 

documents in the record on appeal, the subject loan was originated by 

Linear Financial. The promissory note and deed of trust were assigned to 

Wells Fargo, N.A., which in turn assigned the deed of trust "[t]ogether 

with the [n]ote" to Bank of America, N.A. Further, the note itself was 

endorsed in blank by Wells Fargo. See generally Edelstein v. Bank of New 

York Mellon, 128 Nev. , 286 P.3d 249 (2012) (discussing transfers of 

promissory notes and deeds of trust). Wells Fargo remained the servicer 

of the loan, on behalf of the beneficiary of the deed of trust, Bank of 

America. Wells Fargo also retained physical possession of the promissory 

note. Because Wells Fargo's assignment of the deed of trust carried with 

'We direct the clerk of this court to amend the caption to conform 

with this order. Bank of America, N.A. is the beneficiary and holder of the 

note in this matter, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is its servicer and 

attended the mediation as Bank of America's representative. 

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it the promissory note, Wells Fargo's continued possession of the note was 

in its capacity as servicer. As an agent, Wells Fargo's physical possession 

of the note provided actual possession of the note to its principal, Bank of 

America. Id. at , 286 P.3d at 261. Thus, when Wells Fargo attended 

the mediation, it did so as a representative of Bank of America, satisfying 

NRS 107.086(4)'s attendance requirement. 

Appellant also argues that the Broker's Price Opinion (BPO) 

provided in lieu of an appraisal failed to meet the technical requirements 

set forth by FMR 11(7) (2011) (amended and renumbered FMR 11(11), 

effective January 1, 2013). While this court adopted a strict compliance 

standard for the production of core or essential documents related to the 

deed of trust and promissory note enumerated in NRS 107.086(4), see 

Pasillas, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 1285; Leyva, 127 Nev. at , 255 

P.3d at 1277, 1279, we did not establish strict compliance for the 

individual contents of a BP0 and other collateral documents required by 

the FMR. Here, Wells Fargo produced a BP0 that substantially complied 

with the FMR and NRS 645.2515 (setting forth requirements for a BPO), 

and appellant has not demonstrated that any technical deficiencies had 

any prejudicial effect. Indeed, in the district court, appellant conceded 

that he was not challenging the value reflected in the BPO. Consequently, 

the district court properly concluded that the BP0 was sufficient to satisfy 

the FMR requirements. 

Appellant's final argument is that Wells Fargo's refusal to 

offer a loan modification demonstrated a lack of authority and bad faith 

participation. The district court found that each party to the mediation 

was dissatisfied with the document production, and that this resulted in a 

lack of results. Having considered the record and the arguments of the 

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parties, we perceive no error in the district court's determination that 

Wells Fargo's refusals to offer a modification was an appropriate business 

decision, due to appellant's failure to provide certain financial documents. 

Thus, unlike Pasillas where that beneficiary's representative needed 

additional authority to consider a modification, here, Wells Fargo, on 

behalf of Bank of America, had sufficient authority, and the district court 

properly found that the refusal to modify was not a manifestation of bad 

faith. See Pasillas, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 1286. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

J. 

Dougtas 

Saitta 

cc: Eighth Judicial District Court, Department 14 

James S. Kent 

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A. 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

J. 

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