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. e du/thir dc ir c uit_1998/162Filed July 20, 1998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NOS. 97-7225 and 97-7226

IN RE: JARITZ INDUSTRIES, LTD. VICKERS ASSOCIATES, LTD.

v.

JOEL URICE M.A.F.F., INC. (Intervenor in D.C.) (D.C. Civil No. 96-3)

IN RE: JARITZ INDUSTRIES, LTD. d/b/a PENNYSAVER PRINTING, Debtor

M.A.F.F., INC. (Intervenor in D.C.) (D.C. Civil No. 96-28)

M.A.F.F., Inc. (Intervenor in D.C.) Appellant in No. 97-7225

Estate of Jaritz Industries, Ltd. d/b/a Pennysaver Printing, through its Chapter 7 Trustee, John Ellis, Appellant in No. 97-7226

On Appeal From the District Court For the Virgin Islands (D.C. Civil Action No. 96-cv-00003)

Argued December 9, 1997

BEFORE: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, STAPLETON and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed July 20, 1998)Carol A. Rich (Argued)

Campbell, Arellano & Rich No. 4 A&B Kongens Gade

P.O. Box 11899 Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas

USVI 00801 Attorney for Appellant Jaritz Industries, Ltd.

Richard R. Knoepfel Dudley, Clark & Chan

Suite 1

9720 Estate Thomas Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas

USVI 00802 Attorney for Appellant

M.A.A.F., Inc.

A. Jeffrey Weiss (Argued)

A.J. Weiss & Associates 4002 Raphune Hill Road, Suite 3 Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas

USVI 00802 Attorney for Appellee Vickers Associates, Ltd.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

We are here asked to review a decision of the Distr ict Court of the Virgin Islands in an appeal from an or der of a bankruptcy judge sitting in the Virgin Islands by designation of the Third Circuit Judicial Council u nder 28

U.S.C. S 155. The district court held that section 155 does not authorize the Council to transfer bankruptcy ju dges temporarily to the Virgin Islands. It concluded tha t the order appealed from was thus entered without author ity

and was invalid. We will reverse and remand for fur ther proceedings.

2I.

Section 155 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:

(a) A bankruptcy judge may be transferred t o serve temporarily as a bankruptcy judge in any jud icial district other than the judicial district fo r which such bankruptcy judge was appointed upon the appr oval of the judicial council of each of the circuits involved.

(b) A bankruptcy judge who has retired may, upon consent, be recalled to serve as a bankruptc y judge in any judicial district by the judicial counci l of the circuit

within which such district is located.

The Honorable Joseph L. Cosetti is a retired bankru ptcy judge of the United States District Court for the W estern District of Pennsylvania. On August 13, 1996, an or der was entered by the Judicial Council of the Third Circui t memorializing its determination that there was an u nmet need for the services of a bankruptcy judge in the Virgin Islands and recalling Judge Cosetti, pursuant to S 155(b), to

meet that need.1

___________________________________________________ ______________

1. There are two authorized district judge seats in the District of the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. S 1614. A retirement in O ctober of 1988 resulted in the district's having only one resident judge for the ensuing 14 months. Diane Russell, Some Ethical Consideratio ns of Judicial Vacancies: A Case Study of the Federal Court System in the United States Virgin Islands, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 697, 697-98 (1992) (reprinted in 138 Cong. Rec. H8313). The death of the remaining j udge in December of 1989 was followed by a period of two and one-hal f years during which there was no resident judge in the district. Id. Th e two incumbent district judges were sworn in on June 30, 1992, and May 9, 1994, respectively. See 981 F. Supp. at XII. During the t wo years between their investitures, the district was served by only one r esident judge. Thus, the district was severely understaffed for a period of over five and a

half years. In these circumstances, the development of a backlog was inevitable; intolerable delays were threatened.

The Judicial Council of the Third Circuit dealt wit h this crisis by transferring judges from other districts to help se rvice the Virgin

Islands workload. District judges from elsewhere in the Thi rd Circuit and beyond

were transferred under 28 U.S.C. S 292. In addition , beginning on April 1, 1990, a New Jersey bankruptcy judge was transfer red pursuant to 28

3Jaritz Industries, Ltd. ("Jaritz"), a printing and copying

business, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Di strict Court of the Virgin Islands. The case was referred to Judge Cosetti pursuant to the district court's standing o rder of reference. Joel Urice, the owner of Jaritz, had pur chased the business from Vickers Associates, Ltd. ("Vicker s") in return for an 8-year note that called for two large balloon payments at the end of the term. Jaritz sought bank ruptcy protection primarily due to its inability to make t he first of these balloon payments to Vickers.

Several months after the bankruptcy proceedings beg an, A. Jeffrey Weiss entered an appearance as counsel f or Vickers. Over the next few months, Weiss filed nume rous frivolous and duplicitous motions and appeals, and his unprofessional conduct ultimately resulted in the e ntry of a sanction order by Judge Cosetti. On appeal, the dis trict court sustained Judge Cosetti's order sanctioning W eiss and Vickers, and then directed Weiss and Vickers to show cause why the district court should not invoke its inherent power to impose additional sanctions for their cond uct during the appeal.

Prior to the return date of the order to show cause , the district court sua sponte raised and requested brie fing on

___________________________________________________ ______________

U.S.C. S 155(a). Judge Cosetti relieved him in Janu ary of 1992. Following Judge Cosetti's retirement in 1994, he was recalled under 28 U.S.C. S 155(b) for duty in the Virgin Islands, the Distri ct of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Western D istrict of Pennsylvania. His authority to sit in the Virgin Is lands was continued through two subsequent recalls.

This transfer program has been successful. On Decem ber 31, 1989, there were 1400 civil cases, 395 criminal cases, an d 209 bankruptcy cases pending in the District Court of the Virgin I slands. Administrative Office of the United States, Federal Judicial Workl oad Statistics 26, 36, 58 (Dec. 31, 1990). By March 31, 1996, several mont hs before the order issued in this case, there were 873 civil cases, 16 4 criminal cases, and 137 bankruptcy cases pending in the district. Admin istrative Office of the United States, Federal Judicial Caseload Statis tics 31, 52, 100 (Mar. 31, 1996). While the backlog had been substantially reduced, the two district judges still had a substantial need for as sistance with the bankruptcy workload.

4the issue of its jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders of

a U.S. bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). T he court ultimately concluded that it had "jurisdictio n to review the order of a bankruptcy judge who would be properly authorized by statute to act as a judicial officer of the District Court of the Virgin Islands." In re Ja ritz Indus., 207 B.R. 451, 453 (D.V.I. 1997). The court held, ho wever, that section 155 authorizes temporary transferring of bankruptcy judges only to Article III district cour ts, that Judge Cosetti accordingly lacked authority to sit o n the District Court of the Virgin Islands, an Article I court, and that "there simply [was] no such valid order to rev iew in this case." Id. The district court viewed Judge Cos etti's lack of authority as depriving it of subject matter juri sdiction and dismissed the appeal. Shortly thereafter, the c ourt entered an order withdrawing its standing order of reference. Jaritz timely appealed, and we have juri sdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 1294(3). The issu e in this appeal is a question of law over which this co urt exercises plenary review. Epstein Family Partnershi p v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).

II.

Bankruptcy Judge Cosetti imposed sanctions on Vicke rs and Weiss pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011, which provides for sanctions parallel to those specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a district court has jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions on litigan ts and attorneys appearing before it even if the court is subsequently determined to lack subject matter juri sdiction

over the case in which the sanctionable conduct occ urred. While acknowledging that "[a] final determination o f lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of course, precludes further adjudication of it," the Court

nonetheless clarified that "such a determination do es not automatically wipe out all proceedings had in the d istrict court at a time when the district court operated un der the misapprehension that it had jurisdiction." Id. at 1 37.

The Court explained that "maintenance of orderly procedure" provided sufficient grounds to justify a n

5imposition of non-case dispositive sanctions "even in the

wake of a jurisdiction ruling later found to be mis taken." Id. Although parties may eventually seek appellate revi ew of a court's invocation of jurisdiction over their dispu te, they are required to demean themselves appropriately before that court while awaiting that appeal:

The interest in having rules of procedure o beyed. . . does not disappear upon a subsequent determi nation that the court was without subject-matter ju risdiction.

Courts do make mistakes . . . . But . . . th ere is no constitutional infirmity under Article III i n requiring those practicing before the courts to conduc t themselves in compliance with the applicable procedural rules in the interim, and to allo w the courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their

failure to do so.

Id. at 139.

We recognize that the validity of Judge Cosetti's s anction orders poses a somewhat different issue than that p osed in Willy. The authority of the sanctioning judge to si t in his district was not challenged in Willy. Nevertheless, we believe that the principles found controlling in Wi lly must control here. Judge Cosetti was a duly appointed ju dge with the authority to exercise the judicial power of the United States in bankruptcy matters. He was sitting in the District of the Virgin Islands, rather than his home distric t, pursuant to a duly adopted resolution of the Judici al Council of the Third Circuit. He exercised judicial power over this particular controversy by virtue of a sta nding order of the district court and without protest fro m Vickers or Weiss. Both he and the litigants had a substanti al interest in the proceedings being conducted in an o rderly manner. Just as in Willy, Judge Cosetti's and the l itigants' interests in having rules of procedure obeyed did n ot disappear upon the subsequent determination of the district court that Judge Cosetti lacked jurisdicti on. By the same token, Vickers and Weiss were and are obligate d to conduct themselves appropriately in these proceedin gs unless and until it is finally determined that the apparent authority of Judge Cosetti is invalid.

6It follows that the district court was in error whe n it

concluded that Judge Cosetti's sanction order was i nvalid because it was issued without jurisdiction. It also follows, in our view, that the district court had appellate jurisdiction to review that order and that any sanc tions which the district judge might have imposed as a re sult of improper conduct during the appellate proceedings w ould have to be sustained by us without reference to our determination regarding the validity of the Circuit Council's transfer order. See In re Orthopedic "Bone Screw" P rod. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997).

Under normal circumstances, we would conclude our analysis here. The foregoing discussion therefore p rovides adequate support for our mandate. Nonetheless, the district court's opinion expresses the view that any bankrup tcy judge transferred to the Virgin Islands by the Circ uit Council lacks authority to adjudicate any bankruptc y matters there, and this view has resulted in the wi thdrawal of the district's standing order of reference. This has substantially burdened the administration of bankru ptcy in the Virgin Islands. Because the issue is of such si gnificance and the parties have briefed it extensively, we pur sue our discussion of whether Judge Cosetti was properly authorized to hear bankruptcy matters in the Virgin

Islands.

III.

The specific issue for decision here is a narrow on e: what did Congress intend when it used the term "judicial

district" in section 155. Did it use the term in a generic sense to refer to the geographic area in which a di strict court exercises judicial authority in bankruptcy ma tters, or did it intend its scope to be limited to the geogra phic area in which an Article III district court exercises ju dicial authority over such matters. If Congress intended t he former, section 155 authorizes transfers of bankrup tcy judges to serve in the district in which the Distri ct Court of the Virgin Islands exercises bankruptcy jurisdictio n. If Congress intended the latter, section 155 provides no such authority.

7The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act

of 1984 effected a comprehensive reorganization of our bankruptcy system in the wake of the Supreme Court' s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. M arathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50 (1982), finding the jurisdic tional provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutional. Chapter 6 of Title 28, as amended by the 1984 Act, specifies the character and operation of the reorganized system. The transfers authorized by sec tion 155 are an integral part of that Chapter and of tha t reorganized system.

We find nothing in the text of section 155 that lim its its scope to judicial districts having an Article III d istrict court. Similarly, we find nothing in the text of Chapter 6 that, as a matter of textual analysis, so limits the scope o f that section. Finally, we find nothing in the very spars e legislative history of the 1984 Act that suggests a n intent to restrict the authorization conferred by section 155 to Article III districts. Thus, consideration of the text and legislative history of Chapter 6 alone would tend to support th e view that "judicial district" was intended to include an y district in which judicial authority over bankruptcy matters is exercised. We would, of course, be remiss however i f we decided this statutory construction issue without considering the purpose of section 155 and its plac e in the scheme of Chapter 6. Accordingly, we inquire whethe r the broader or the narrower reading of "judicial distri ct" will best serve Congress's objectives in enacting Chapte r 6 and section 155 in particular.

The overall objective of Chapter 6 was to create a reorganized bankruptcy system in which a specialize d corps of full-time bankruptcy judges would assist distric t court judges in adjudicating bankruptcy matters in a mann er consistent with the teachings of Marathon. It is ev ident from the face of section 155 that its objective was the efficient and effective use of that corps of full-t ime bankruptcy judges. Congress was aware from past experience that the demand for bankruptcy services in any given district would ebb and flow in response to th e economic conditions in the district, and that the s upply of judge power in each district to provide such servic es would

8ebb and flow depending on such things as the number of

district judge and bankruptcy judge vacancies. More over, Congress determined not to provide the new system w ith part-time bankruptcy judges, and it must have been aware that there would be periods when the bankruptcy wor kload in a district would be substantial enough to be dif ficult to service, but nevertheless not yet large enough to w arrant the appointment of a full-time bankruptcy judge. In this context, the new system would be efficient and effe ctive only if someone were given the authority to match d emand with judge power by transferring bankruptcy judges to districts where the regularly assigned judicial off icers were overloaded. This matching authority was appropriate ly conferred on the judicial councils of the circuits, which had earlier been directed to "make all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditiou s administration of justice within [their circuits]." 28 U.S.C. S 332(d)(1).

Having identified the evident purpose of section 15 5, we turn to the overall statutory scheme of Chapter 6 t o determine if there is any reason Congress might hav e wished to garner the efficiencies provided by that section for judicial districts having an Article III distri ct court and not for judicial districts having an Article I dist rict court which exercises the jurisdiction of an Article III court by virtue of the legislation that created it. We perce ive no such reason. To the contrary, our review of the statutor y scheme has convinced us that Congress intended the new bankruptcy system to operate in the Virgin Islands in the same manner it was to operate in an Article III dis trict under comparable circumstances.

Under the new system, the district courts retained their original subject matter jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. This included both district courts created by Congr ess under Article III of the Constitution as well as te rritorial courts created by Congress under Article I which, l ike the District Court of the Virgin Islands, were authoriz ed to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction of Article III district courts. Thus, the judges of the District Court of t he Virgin Islands, like all United States district judges, ar e authorized to adjudicate bankruptcy cases.

9As we have noted, the 1984 Act created a corps of f ulltime bankruptcy judges to assist district judges wi th the bankruptcy workload. These judges were to be appoin ted in

the manner set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 152. Subsection s 152(a)(1) and (2) reflect a determination by Congre ss that the then current bankruptcy workload of each Articl e III district court justified one or more full-time bank ruptcy judges. They establish the number of bankruptcy jud ge seats for each such district and direct that the ju dgeships thus authorized be filled by the United States Cour t of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Subsection 152 (a)(4), on the other hand, reflects a determination by Congres s that the bankruptcy workload of the territorial district courts did not yet warrant a full-time bankruptcy judge in any such district.

Most importantly for present purposes, however, subsection 152(a)(4) also reflects an anticipation on the part of Congress that this situation would change a nd that full-time bankruptcy judges would be needed in one or more of the Article I courts in the future. Subsect ion 152(a)(4) directs that the district judges of the t erritorial courts will handle the bankruptcy work for the pres ent but goes on to authorize the United States Court of App eals for

the circuit within which a territorial district cou rt is located to fill full-time bankruptcy seats for the judicial district as they are created by Congress. Finally, subsection 1 52(b)(2)

directs that the Judicial Conference monitor the ne ed for full-time bankruptcy judges and periodically submit to Congress its recommendations "regarding the number of bankruptcy judges needed and the districts in which such judges are needed." In this way, Congress would be in a position, when the need arose, to increase the numb er of full-time bankruptcy judge seats in Article III dis tricts as well as to create new full-time bankruptcy seats in the

Article I districts.

Section 157 of the Act, which spells out the jurisd iction of bankruptcy judges and their relationships to the judges of the district courts, is not limited by its text to the Article III courts listed in subsection 152(a)(2). Rather, that text is drafted in such a way that once bankruptcy judges a re available to assist the judges of a district court of a

10territory, the system will work in the same fashion in that

district as in other districts with initially autho rized bankruptcy judge seats. Section 157(a), for example

, stipulates that "[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases [, arising under, arising in, or relat ed to a case under] title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district." It was this provision under whic h the district court of the Virgin Islands entered its ge neral order of reference. We believe that order was fully consi stent with the wording and intent of section 157.

Finally, note should be taken of section 158, which governs appeals from final and interlocutory orders of bankruptcy judges in proceedings referred to them u nder section 157. With one exception not here relevant, section 158 provides that "[t]he district courts of the Uni ted States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final. . . orders . . . and with leave of the court, from . . . inter locutory orders . . . of bankruptcy judges," and that an app eal to a circuit court is permissible only after that jurisd iction has been exercised. In In re Kool, Mann, Coffee & Co., 23 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that, because the distri ct court of the Virgin Islands exercises all of the jurisdic tion of a

district court of the United States under 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a), section 158(a) applies to orders of a ba nkruptcy judge sitting in its judicial district and foreclos es an appeal from such an order directly to this court. Implicit in our decision in Kool, Mann is the view that Congress anticipated that the new bankruptcy system would fu nction in the Virgin Islands in the same way it would func tion in other judicial districts having Article III courts in comparable circumstances.

Based on our review of Chapter 6 of Title 28, the following relevant propositions seem to us indisput able: (1) Congress intended bankruptcy matters to be adjudica ted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands; (2) Congr ess determined that bankruptcy judges would assist the judges

of that district when there was a sufficient worklo ad to warrant a full-time bankruptcy judge, and the bankr uptcy system would thereafter function in that district i n the same manner as in Article III districts; and (3) Co ngress intended the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit to make

11the most effective and efficient use of district ju dge and

bankruptcy judge power in the circuit by temporaril y transferring bankruptcy judges so as to match the n eed for bankruptcy services in a district with the judge po wer available there. The remaining issue is whether Con gress intended to foreclose the Judicial Council of the T hird Circuit from acting to meet an unserved need for bankruptcy services in the Virgin Islands by tempor ary transfer prior to the time when the bankruptcy work load is of sufficient size and consistency to warrant the c reation of a full-time bankruptcy judge seat for the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Having considered this issue, w e now make explicit what we believe is implicit in our de cision in Kool, Mann: We conclude that the 1984 Act evidences no Congressional intent arbitrarily to defer the flexi bility and thus the efficiency provided by section 155 in this manner. Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the dist rict court's reading of that section.

We have thus far confined our discussion to an anal ysis of the text and legislative history of the relevant portions of the 1984 Act. As we have indicated, that analysis s upports the conclusion that "judicial district" in Section 155 includes the judicial districts of Article I courts . As Weiss and Vickers stress, however, the relevant portions of the 1984 Act have been codified as a part of Title 28 o f the United States Code, and cognizance of that context should be taken when interpreting section 155. Section 451 of Title 28 contains a set of definitions that apply to term s "[a]s used" throughout Title 28. Section 451 provides tha t the term "judicial district" as used in Title 28 refers to "the districts enumerated in Chapter 5" of Title 28, the chapter

that creates Article III district courts. Section 4 51 can thus be cited in support of a conclusion that the author ity conferred by section 155 is limited to transfers to judicial districts having Article III district courts. The d efinitions of section 451 were codified 36 years before the adopt ion of the 1984 Act, however, and are definitions for gene ral application throughout all 53 chapters of Title 28. While we, of course, recognize that a definitional sectio n like section 451 must presumptively be taken as reflecti ng the Congressional intent when a defined term is used ev en in subsequent legislation, it is not controlling where

12consideration of the term's immediate context and i ts place

in the overall Congressional scheme clearly indicat e that it is being used not as a defined term of art but in i ts commonly understood sense.

We find the situation before us much like that befo re the Supreme Court in International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U. S. 237 (1952). There, the ILWU had sued Juneau Spruce for alleged violations of the Labor Management Relation s Act in the District Court for the Territory of Alaska. Sec tion 303(b) of the LMRA authorized suit for violations of its p rovisions "in any district court of the United States." When it addressed the issue of the district court's jurisdi ction, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he words `distr ict court of the United States' commonly describe

constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution, not the [Article I] courts of the Ter ritories." Id. at 241. Indeed, those words were so defined at the time by section 451 of Title 28. The Court went on to sugge st that there was another less common but permissible readi ng of those words, however, in the context of a district court, like the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, tha t is authorized to exercise the jurisdiction of an Artic le III court. The Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity by referen ce to the context in which the words were used and the pu rpose of the congressional scheme.

The Court noted that the jurisdictional grant in se ction 303(b) removed the jurisdictional limitations of am ount in controversy and citizenship of the parties, defined the capacity of labor unions to sue or be sued, restric ted the enforceability of money judgments against the asset s of labor unions, specified the jurisdiction of distric t courts over unions, and defined the requirements of servic e of process. The Court reasoned that these provisions r eflected Congress's design in passing the LMRA to reshape la bormanagement relations. Part of this design was to re move obstacles to suit in federal courts, and the Distri ct Court for the Territory of Alaska was the only court in A laska with federal jurisdiction to which the Union could seek recourse. Id. at 242. The Court concluded as follows:

13[S]ince Congress lifted the restrictive requ irements

which might preclude suit in courts having t he district courts' jurisdiction, we think it is more co nsonant with the uniform, national policy of the Act to h old that those restrictions were lifted as respects a ll courts upon which the jurisdiction of a district co urt has been conferred. That reading of the Act does not, to be sure, take the words `district court of the United States' in their historic, technical sense. But literal ness is no sure touchstone of legislative purpose. The purpose here is more closely approximated, we believ e, by giving the historic phrase a looser, more liberal m eaning in the special context of this legislation.

Id. at 242-43.

We believe the teachings of Juneau Spruce counsel a liberal interpretation of section 155 based on its underlying context and purpose. Congress enacted a uniform, na tional policy of bankruptcy administration in the 1984 Act , and section 155 of that Act was designed to facilitate efficient use of judicial resources. Congress inserted sectio n 155 into the 1984 Act so that the circuit judicial coun cils could allocate bankruptcy judges among the "judicial dist ricts" in which bankruptcy cases are adjudicated. Although th e term "judicial district" as defined elsewhere in the Jud icial Code refers only to the specifically enumerated district courts, the purpose of section 155 -- ensuring maximally ef ficient use of judicial resources -- is "more closely appro ximated" by a more pragmatic and flexible construction of th at term.

IV.

Even if we were persuaded that section 451 limits t he scope of section 155, and that the latter section, accordingly, does not reflect an affirmative decisi on by Congress to authorize temporary transfers of bankru ptcy judges to judicial districts of Article I courts, o ur ultimate

resolution of the issue before us would be the same

. Section 332(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that "[e]ach judicial council shall make al l necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expedi tious administration of justice within its circuit," and section

14332(d)(2) orders that "[a]ll judicial officers and employees of

the circuit shall promptly carry into effect all or ders of the judicial council." The text of this provision and i ts legislative history convince us that it authorizes circuit councils to take any administrative action that wil l promote the effective and expeditious administration of jus tice in their circuits, so long as the action is not incons istent with rules and policies Congress has previously establis hed in statutes regulating the affairs of the federal judi ciary.

The temporary transfer of a duly appointed bankrupt cy judge to a judicial district of an Article I court to service the bankruptcy workload in that district is clearly an administrative action designed to promote the effec tive and expeditious administration of justice in the circui t. Given our previously stated conclusions that Congress (1) has determined in 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a) that bankruptcy c ases will be adjudicated in the Virgin Islands, (2) has approved in section 152(a)(4) the use of bankruptcy judges t o assist the district judges of the Virgin Islands in servic ing the bankruptcy load, and (3) has endorsed in section 15 5(a) a policy favoring temporary transfer of bankruptcy ju dges to match the demand for bankruptcy services with avail able judge power, we conclude that Judge Cosetti's trans fer to the Virgin Islands by the Third Circuit Judicial Co uncil was authorized by 28 U.S.C. S 332(d).

It is apparent from the text of section 332(d) and from its legislative history that it was intended to charge circuit councils with the responsibility of assuring the pr ompt and efficient administration of justice in their circui ts. This charge included an express mandate that they were t o initiate any and all actions necessary to provide t hat assurance. The authority conferred was neither rest ricted nor discretionary. That authority was clearly broad enough to encompass the action taken by the Circuit Counci l here.

The Honorable Emanuel Celler was a member of the House Committee on the Judiciary when section 332(d ) was debated and enacted in 1939. Two decades later, as Chairman of that Committee, he had occasion to canv ass and comment upon the relevant legislative history o f that provision and the ensuing experience of his Committ ee. Judicial Conference of the United States Report on the

15Powers and Responsibilities of the Judicial Council s, H.R.

Doc. No. 87-201, at v-vi (1961). Chairman Celler characterized S 332(d) as conferring on the circuit councils "all-inclusive responsibility for court management and judicial administration." Id. at v. He went on to m ake the following observations concerning the legislative i ntent:

. . . [I]t was the intention of the Congress to charge the judicial councils of the circuits with the r esponsibility for doing all and whatever was necessary of an administrative character to maintain efficie ncy and public confidence in the administration of j ustice. . . .

The language of title 28, United States Cod e, section 332 was recommended to the Congress in 1939 by the judges themselves and was deliberately worde d in broad terms in order to confer broad respons ibility and authority on the judicial councils. It was t he considered judgment of the Congress that the judicial councils were by their very nature the prope r agents for supervising management and administratio n of the

Federal courts. The councils are close to al l the courts

of the circuit and know their needs better t han anyone else and, by placing responsibility and auth ority in the councils of the circuits, administrative pow er in the judicial branch was decentralized, as it oug ht to be, and in each circuit kept in the hands of jud ges of the

circuit.

* * *

In past years many problems have been calle d to the attention of the Committee on the Judiciary which, in my judgment, should have been settled by the judicial

council of the circuit and need never have b een brought to the attention of the Congress if the judicial council had met the responsibility and exerc ised the powers conferred upon it by the Congress. I will mention only one example.

The Congress is not infrequently importuned to create additional judicial districts and div isions. Most of these demands originate from inadequate j udicial service in the localities concerned. Nearly all of them could and should be remedied by action of th e judicial

16council of the circuit in arranging and plan ning judicial

assignments to provide an equitable distribu tion of the judgepower of the circuit.

As these remarks suggest, the primary criticism of the courts that had been brought to the attention of Co ngress in 1939 concerned delay in the administration of ju stice. See S. Rep. No. 76-426, at 2-4 (1939). One of the r esponses that Congress expressly expected the new judicial c ouncils to adopt was the matching of need for judicial serv ices and judge power through inter-district assignment. In h is

concurrence in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), Justice Harlan underta kes an exhaustive analysis of the legislative background o f section 332. Quoting the testimony of Chief Justice Groner, who "shouldered most of the task of explaining the purp oses of the bill to the committees of both Houses of Congre ss," id. at 99, Justice Harlan observes that section 332 was designed to empower the judicial councils to take a variety of ameliorative actions, including "if the statisti cs showed a particular district court to be falling behind in i ts work, [action by] the Council [to] `see to it . . . that assistance is given to him whereby the work may be made current.' " Id. at 100 (quoting Hearings on S.188 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 11 (1 939)). Circuit Judge Parker testified similarly before the House Judiciary Committee, predicting that the councils c ould explain to districts whose dockets had fallen into arrears that they "will send Judge Smith into your district and he will assist you in holding court in your district u ntil this arrearage is cleared up." Id. at 100 n. 7 (quoting Hearings

on H.R. 5999 before the House Comm. on the Judiciar y, 76th Cong. 20-21 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted).2

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2. The current provision authorizing inter-district transfers of district judges, 28 U.S.C. S 292, was not in existence in 19 39. Section 17 of Title 28 of the United States Code of 1927, as it existed in 1939, provided:

Whenever any district judge by reason of any disability or

necessary absence from his district or the accumulatio n or urgency of business is unable to perform speedily the w ork of his district,

the senior circuit judge of that circuit, or, in his absence, the

circuit justice thereof, may, if in his judgment the public interest requires,

17We believe these portions of the legislative histor y

demonstrate that when the Third Circuit Judicial Co uncil entered its order temporarily transferring Judge Co setti to the Virgin Islands to assist with the bankruptcy wo rkload there, it was doing precisely what Congress intende d to authorize and require when it adopted S 332(d). In the words of Chairman Celler, it was "arranging and pla nning judicial assignments to provide an equitable distri bution of the judgepower of the circuit." Thus, even were we persuaded that section 155 did not affirmatively au thorize Judge Cosetti's transfer, we would sustain his auth ority to sit in the Virgin Islands under section 322(d).

V.

The order of the district court dismissing the appe al before it for want of jurisdiction will be reversed , and this

matter will be remanded to the district court so th at it may affirm Judge Cosetti's sanction order and determine whether additional sanctions are appropriate based on conduct occurring before it during the appeal.

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designate and assign any district judge of any dist rict court within the same judicial circuit to act as district judge in such district and to discharge all the judicial duties of a judge the reof for such time as the business of the said district court may requ ire.

Section 332(d) was viewed as supplementing the auth ority thus

conferred.

18SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, joining in Parts I, II, an d IV of the

majority's opinion and concurring in the result.

Were I a member of Congress, I would willingly vote to support a statute with the provisions that my colle agues read into section 155 of title 28. But I do not joi n Part III of Judge Stapleton's opinion because we have the ob ligation to construe the text of a statute according to its terms, even if we believe that it is likely that Congress made an inadvertent omission. This is particularly so when the language of the statute literally applied, reaches a coherent, albeit undesired, result. Like the district court, I "reluctantly" must conclude that the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 does n ot authorize the temporary transfer of bankruptcy judg es to the district courts of the Virgin Islands.

The relevant statutory language provides that "[a] bankruptcy judge may be transferred to serve tempor arily as a bankruptcy judge in any judicial district othe r than the judicial district for which such bankruptcy judge w as appointed. . . ." 28 U.S.C. S 155(a) (emphasis adde d). Both the majority and the district court have correctly framed the statutory question as "what did Congress intend when it used the term `judicial district' in section 155 ." Maj. op. at 7. And as both the district court and the majori ty have recognized, that term is expressly defined. Section 451 of title 28 provides that "[a]s used in this title . . . [t]he term `district' and `judicial district' mean the distric ts enumerated in Chapter 5 of this title." 28 U.S.C. S 451 (empha sis added). In turn, chapter 5 of title 28 creates 91 enumerate d judicial districts, including one for the District of Puerto Rico, but not for the Virgin Islands. See 28 U.S.C. SS 81-131

.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that

in interpreting a statute a court should alw ays turn first to one, cardinal canon before all othe rs. We have stated time and again that courts must presu me that a legislature says in a statute what it mean s and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this fir st canon is also the last: "judicial inquiry is complete ."

19Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 25 3-54

(1992) (citations omitted) (declining to adopt inte rpretation of section of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 that was inconsistent with pr eexisting section of title 28). The text at issue be fore us admits of no ambiguity. Accordingly, we must assume that Congress meant for the term "judicial district" in section 155 to refer only to those districts enumerated in chapter 5 of title 28. Because the Virgin Islands is not on e of those districts, I am compelled to conclude that section 155 does not authorize the temporary transfer of a bankruptc y judge to the Virgin Islands.

The majority does not purport to have discovered an ambiguity in any of the statutes relevant to its de cision. Rather, they contend that the definitions contained in section 451 are not controlling as they only "presu mptively" reflect congressional intent. Significantly, the on ly authority that the majority cites in support of its interpret ive technique is International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U. S. 237 (1952). There, the Court was called upon to det ermine whether the phrase "district court of the United St ates" as used in section 303(b) of the LMRA included the the nterritorial court of Alaska. After noting that the phrase "district court of the United States" "commonly des cribe[s]

constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution" as opposed to the territorial courts, the Supreme Court reasoned that the context and purpose of the LMRA required a broader definition. Id. at 241 (emphasis added). Significantly, the language at is sue there was not defined in the LMRA nor was it subject to t he definitional sections of title 28. Thus, with no ex plicit direction from Congress, the Court declined to appl y the "historic" definition of the phrase "district court of the United States" and, instead, adopted one more in ke eping with the national policy underlying the LMRA. Id. a t 243.

In contrast, Congress has expressly defined the ter m "judicial district" as it appears in section 155 an d elsewhere throughout title 28. As such, we are not at liberty , as was the Court in Juneau Spruce, to fashion a definition which, in this court's view, better serves the legislative purpose.

20Where Congress has made its intention explicit in t he text

of the statute, we are bound to follow its clear in struction. It is pure conjecture for the majority to presume t hat Congress did not realize that by placing section 15 5 within title 28 it would be subject to that title's defini tional provisions.

Of course, I agree with the majority that one of th e purposes underlying the 1984 Act was "to facilitate efficient use of judicial resources." Maj. op. at 14. It does not follow that Congress intended to enact every provision tha t would enhance judicial efficiency. Admittedly, one of Con gress's overarching objectives was to facilitate the effici ent distribution of judicial resources, but the unambig uous means by which Congress chose to advance that objec tive was to authorize the temporary transfer of bankrupt cy judges to the 91 "judicial districts" enumerated in chapter

5 of title 28. Our belief that other transfers woul d also facilitate efficient use of judicial resources cann ot drive our analysis.

I conclude, therefore, that section 155 did not aut horize the transfer of Judge Cosetti to the Virgin Islands . As such I cannot join in Part III of the majority's opinion

.

I do, however, agree with the majority that 28 U.S. C. S 332(d)(1) invested the Judicial Council with the authority to effect the transfer. Thus, to the extent that I, in my capacity as Chief Judge of the Third Circuit, signe d the orders on behalf of the Judicial Council designatin g and assigning Judge Cosetti to the District of the Virg in Islands under the authority of 28 U.S.C. S 155(a), repeatin g the language used by my predecessor in entering similar orders, I believe I erred in the statutory referenc e, although I believe that the Judicial Council clearly had the authority to assign Judge Cosetti under 28 U.S.C. S 332(d)(1) , given the need for his service. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the court.

21MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring.

While I agree with the general principles expounded by the majority and the majority's ultimate resolution of the issues presented, I write separately to clarify wha t for me are the essential policy considerations that weigh in favor of

the result reached.

I.

The central issue we are called upon to decide is w hether the temporary transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJ A"), confers upon the Third Circuit Judicial Council the authority to assign a United States bankruptcy judg e temporarily to the United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands. Specifically, we mu st determine whether Congress intended the term "judic ial district" as used in section 155(a) of the BAFJA to include territorial districts such as the Virgin Islands.1

A.

Our starting point, as with any case construing a s tatute, is the language of the statute itself. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 846 (1997); International Prim ate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 79 (1991). As always, we interpret the language of the BAFJA by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the BAFJA as a whole. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846. In addition, we interpret the BAFJA in a manner which best effectuates Congressional intent and the legislative purpose underlying its adoption. Intern ational

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1. Section 155(a) of the BAFJA provides as follows:

A bankruptcy judge many be transferred to se rve temporarily as a bankruptcy judge in any judicial district ot her than the judicial district for which such bankruptcy judge was appointed upon the approval of the judicial council of each of the circuits involved.

28 U.S.C. S 155 (a)(1994)(emphasis added).

22Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spr uce

Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 241-43 (1952).

As noted by the majority, the BAFJA was enacted to respond to the United States Supreme Court's decisi on in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), holding that Congress' broad grant of jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy judges w as unconstitutional. In July 1984, Congress passed the BAFJA in order to create a nationwide, comprehensive judi cial bankruptcy system that complied with Northern Pipel ine.

In the interim period between Northern Pipeline and the enactment of the BAFJA, the courts enacted emergenc y rules that complied with Northern Pipeline to gover n the operation of the bankruptcy courts until Congress a cted. See Jean K. FitzSimon and Andrea J. Winkler, Legisl ative History of the Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judg eship Act of 1984, Collier on Bankruptcy, App. Vol. E, Pt . 6-87, 6- 99 (15th ed. 1997). The emergency rules were held t o be justified in order to avoid inundating the district courts with bankruptcy cases when an entire system of bankruptcy judges with specialized knowledge and expertise was already in place. In re Stewart, 741 F.2d 127, 132 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984).

In upholding the constitutionality of one such emer gency rule, our sister court of appeals for the Second Ci rcuit offered the following insight into the purpose and policy behind establishing bankruptcy courts:

There are also strong policy reasons for all owing bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments i n traditional bankruptcy disputes. First, the practice

eliminates the need for the district courts to enter every bankruptcy case at the beginning. Dist rict courts

are thus free to attend to other matters on their crowded calendars, giving all litigants a be tter opportunity to have their day in court. Seco nd, all cases are not appealed. There should be at l east one adjudication made by a judge with expertise in bankruptcy law.

In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983). T he BAFJA enacted by Congress in 1984 was based largely upon the emergency rules adopted by the courts.

23B.

Section 152(a) of the BAFJA provides for the appoin tment of numerous bankruptcy judges for the "several judi cial districts" in the states listed in section 152(a)(2 ). In addition, the BAFJA includes the following provisio n relating to the establishment of bankruptcy judges in territories such as the Virgin Islands:

The judges of the district courts for the te rritories shall serve as the bankruptcy judges for such cour ts. The United States court of appeals for the circu it within

which such a territorial district court is l ocated may appoint bankruptcy judges under this chapter for such district if authorized to do so by the Congr ess of the

United States under this section.

28 U.S.C. S 152 (a)(4)(1994). We have not appointed a bankruptcy judge to the Virgin Islands under this p rovision because Congress has yet to authorize such an appointment.

As the initial BAFJA provision establishing a bankr uptcy system for the territories, section 152(a)(4) is ce ntral to our analysis of whether Congress intended the term "jud icial district" to encompass the Virgin Islands. By using the phrase "for such district" in this section, Congres s expressed its intention to include the territories when employing the term "district." Because the terms "d istrict" and "judicial district" are used interchangeably wi thin the BAFJA and because the word "judicial" has no limiti ng connotation in connection with courts in the territ ories, Congress' clear expression that the term "district" includes the Virgin Islands extends equally to the term "jud icial district." See generally 28 U.S.C. S 156 (1994)(dis cussing appointment of law clerks for bankruptcy judges and using the term "district" in section 156(f) and"judicial district" in section 156(e) interchangeably).2

This interpretation of the terms "judicial district " and

"district" is consistent with their use in the BAFJ A as a

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2. The fact that Congress has traditionally defined the terms "district" and "judicial district" as synonyms further support s this conclusion. See 28 U.S.C. S 451 (1994).

24whole. If Congress were to authorize and we were to

appoint a bankruptcy judge to the Virgin Islands as contemplated by section 152(a)(4), only our interpr etation of these terms would give the statute the meaning Cong ress intended. For example, section 158 which governs ap peals from bankruptcy judge decisions provides that appea ls "shall only be taken to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving." This section contemplates that a decision by a duly auth orized and appointed Virgin Islands bankruptcy judge may o nly be appealed to the District Court of the Virgin Island s. See In re Kool, Mann, Coffee & Co., 23 F.3d 66, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1994)(holding that section 158 requires that an app eal from a bankruptcy judge sitting by designation in the Vi rgin Islands must be taken to the district court).

If we were to interpret the term "judicial district " as excluding the Virgin Islands, the BAFJA would conta in no provision to govern direct appeals from a Virgin Is lands bankruptcy judge. In light of the fact that Congres s undisputedly contemplated the future appointment of such a judge, it is inconceivable that Congress would pr ovide no provision to appeal from that judge's decisions. Th is is especially true given that the BAFJA was adopted to address Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court decisi on that curtailed Congress' former broad grant of jurisdict ion to non-Article III bankruptcy judges. Section 158 ther efore must include appeals from bankruptcy judges in the Virgin Islands, and, a fortiori, the term "judicial distri ct" as used therein must include the Virgin Islands. See also 2 8 U.S.C. SS 154(a), 156, 157(a)(1994)(setting forth general provisions that would have no force in relation to a duly appo inted Virgin Islands bankruptcy judge if the terms "distr ict" and "judicial district" were meant to exclude the Virgi n Islands).

As noted by the majority, 28 U.S.C. S 451, may be c ited as casting doubt upon our determination that the te rms "judicial district" and "district" include the Virg in Islands.

Section 451 defines those terms as "the districts enumerated in Chapter 5," i.e. districts containing only Article III courts. See 28 U.S.C. S 451 (1994). I a gree with the majority, however, that this section is not con trolling in light of the fact that it was codified 36 years pri or to the

25BAFJA and because this definition does not comport with

the logical meaning of the terms as used in the BAF JA. See, e.g., Juneau Spruce, 342 U.S. at 241 (rejecting a h istorical

definition also found in section 451 where that def inition did not comport with the logical meaning of the ter m that best effectuated the purpose of the statute). At mo st, section 451 renders these terms facially ambiguous, an ambiguity that can be conclusively resolved by exam ining the legislative purpose behind adoption of the BAFJ A.

C.

As the majority recognizes, the approach taken by t he Court in International Longshoremen's & Warehouseme n's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952), is particularly instructive to our analysis of the pro per interpretation of the BAFJA in light of the legisla tive purpose underlying its adoption. In Juneau Spruce, the Court was faced with determining whether the Distri ct Court of the Territory of Alaska was a `district co urt of the United States' for purposes of conferring upon it jurisdiction for actions brought under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Juneau Spruce, 3 42 U.S. at 240. While the Court recognized that the wo rds `district court of the United States' are commonly used to describe Article III courts, the Court nevertheless held that in the context of the LMRA, that term was used to d escribe courts which exercise the jurisdiction of district courts. Id.

at 241.

In so holding, the Court relied on the legislative purpose of the LMRA. The Court found that Congress enacted the

LMRA to eliminate obstacles to suits in federal cou rts. Furthermore, the Court relied on the fact that the LMRA "extends its full sweep to Alaska as well as to the states

and the other territories. The trial court is indee d the only

court in Alaska to which recourse could be had." Id . at 242. Recognizing that applying the LMRA to the District Court of Alaska does not give the words "district court of t he United States" their literal and historic meaning, the Cou rt nonetheless embraced this reading as effectuating t he uniform, national policy and purpose of the LMRA.

26As previously noted, the BAFJA was sweeping legisla tion

enacted to establish a national bankruptcy system t hat includes the Virgin Islands. The BAFJA includes pro visions relating to the territories and specifically provid es for the appointment of bankruptcy judges to the territories if authorized by Congress. As sweeping legislation des igned to establish a national bankruptcy system, the BAFJA i s at least as broad as the LMRA at issue in Juneau Spruc e. In addition, as with the LMRA, if general terms within the BAFJA such as "district court" and "judicial distri ct" do not include the District Court of the Virgin Islands, t here are circumstances under which no court within the Virgi n Islands would be able to effectuate its general pro visions.3

Furthermore, the purpose of establishing a nationwi de bankruptcy system is to alleviate the district cour ts of excessive workloads and to provide a system where j udges with experience and expertise in bankruptcy matters can handle bankruptcy claims. In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 15 74, 1581 (2d Cir. 1983). In fact, in addition to revisi ng the bankruptcy system, the BAFJA also created 85 new fe deral judgeships in order to "help alleviate the tremendo us litigation backlogs in our courts." Collier on Bank ruptcy, App. Vol. E, Pt. 6-146 (15th ed. 1997)(Statements f rom floor, 130 Cong. R. H. 7497).

The temporary transfer provision in the BAFJA is analogous to the temporary transfer of district jud ges found at 28 U.S.C. S 291 (1994). Transfer provisions such as

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3. The following example illustrates this point. Se ction 157 provides that "[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 .

. . shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district." 28 U.S.C. S 157(a)(1994). Suppose that a bankruptcy judge was appointed to the Virgin Islands under section 152(a)(4) after author ization by Congress. If general terms in the BAFJA such as "district court" or "judicial district" were read to exclude the District Court of the Virg in Islands, technically, the District Court of the Virgin Islands would neve r have the authority to refer bankruptcy cases pursuant to section 157(a ) to a bankruptcy judge properly appointed under section 152(a)(4). I n construing the BAFJA, we must presume that Congress did not intend this absurd result. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 14 F .3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1994)(stating that "[i]t is the obligation of the c ourt to construe a

statute to avoid absurd results . . . .").

27these are to be used to "deal with an administrativ e

problem" and are purely "ministerial". See Meeropol v. Nizer, 429 U.S. 1337, 1339 (1977)(discussing the na ture of 28 U.S.C. S 291). Generally, such provisions are pr operly used to assist a circuit with a heavy workload. Id.

Given that Congress specifically included the Virgi n Islands within the scope of the BAFJA, there is no rational reason for Congress to have intended to exclude the Virgin Islands from the transfer provision in the BAFJA an d thereby preclude the District Court of the Virgin I slands from obtaining aid and specialized expertise in han dling their bankruptcy caseload. Our construction of the terms "judicial district" and "district" as including the Virgin Islands therefore best effectuates the purpose and scope of the BAFJA generally and the transfer provision spec ifically. Accordingly, because the term "judicial district" m ust be read to include the Virgin Islands, section 155(a) grants the Third Circuit Judicial Council the authority to tra nsfer a bankruptcy judge temporarily to serve in the Virgin Islands.

II.

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear t hat the BAFJA affirmatively confers upon the Council the au thority for a temporary transfer of a bankruptcy judge to t he Virgin Islands. At a minimum, however, the BAFJA is silent on the Council's authority; the BAFJA contains no affirmat ive Congressional statement denying the Council the aut hority to transfer bankruptcy judges to the Virgin Islands

. Because the BAFJA contains no such affirmative restriction, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the Council has the inherent authority to make such a t ransfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 332(d)(1994).

III.

I also agree with the majority's conclusion that re gardless of the Council's authority to transfer temporarily a bankruptcy judge to the Virgin Islands under either the BAFJA or 28 U.S.C. S 332(d), Judge Cosetti's sancti on orders are valid for the reasons the Court articula ted in Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992). In lig ht of our

28determination that both the BAFJA and 28 U.S.C.S 33 2(d)

grant the Council the authority to make temporary t ransfer to the Virgin Islands, however, a specific determin ation on the validity of Judge Cosetti's sanction orders is unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. I wri te separately with regard to this point only to note t hat while I agree with the majority's conclusion on the indep endent validity of Judge Cosetti's sanction orders, I view this issue as secondary to our analysis of the Council's autho rity to make a temporary transfer and consider it to be mer ely a supplemental ground for our decision.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

29