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82–708 PDF 2004

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SHUTTLE SAFETY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,

AND SPACE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 6, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director 

MOSES BOYD, Democratic Chief Counsel 

MARK BUSE, Republican Staff Director 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE 

RON WYDEN, Oregon, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 6, 2001 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Allen ..................................................................................... 2

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 7

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 5

Statement of Senator Wyden .................................................................................. 1

WITNESSES

Blomberg, Richard D., Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and President, Dunlop & Associates, Inc. .......................................................................... 24

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26

Li, Allen, Director, Acquisition & Sourcing Management Team, U.S. Government Accounting Office ........................................................................................ 29

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31

McCulley, Michael James, Chief Operating Officer, United Space Alliance ...... 18

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19

O’Connor, Bryan D., Director, Engineering Division, Futron Corporation ......... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38

Readdy, William F., Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters ...................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

APPENDIX

Berger, Brian, Staff Writer, Space News, ‘‘Shuttle Officials Prepare for Impending Budget Shortfall,’’ article dated August 13, 2001 ............................... 91

Murray, Bruce, President; Huntress, Jr., Wesley T., Vice President; and 

Friedman, Louis, Executive Director of The Planetary Society, letter with 

attachment dated May 15, 2001, to Hon. John McCain and Hon. Ernest 

F. Hollings ............................................................................................................ 92

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to: 

William F. Readdy ............................................................................................ 77

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to: 

William F. Readdy ............................................................................................ 79

Richard D. Blomberg ........................................................................................ 83

Bryan D. O’Connor ........................................................................................... 86

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to: 

Michael James McCulley ................................................................................. 87

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SHUTTLE SAFETY 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2001

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Wyden, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator WYDEN. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today, 

the Subcommittee is going to examine the issue of Space Shuttle 

safety. It is a vital issue, and certainly a timely one, as the U.S. 

Congress and, indeed, our country has an appropriate and important debate about our future budget priorities. I especially want to 

thank our colleague, Senator Bill Nelson of Florida. He has spoken 

repeatedly to me about the importance of this hearing. We have 

scheduled it specifically at his request, and I want to thank him 

for his leadership on these issues and tell him how pleased I am 

that he is a Member of our Subcommittee. 

I am of the view that Space Shuttle safety is not a luxury that 

is prioritized only when there is a budget surplus. This is a critical 

issue for our country. Reasonable people can have differences of 

opinion with respect to the best way to achieve the safety requirements that are necessary for these space flights, but let it be understood that this Subcommittee is not going to let anything compromise the critical safety needs for this and other programs that 

are so important to the development of space flight in our country. 

Beyond safety, there are a variety of questions that we are going 

to look at in the months ahead with respect to the future of NASA. 

These problems include the financial management issues that dog 

not only the Space Shuttle program but also the International 

Space Station. In fact, there is a $500 million shortfall in the Station’s budget. The mission of the Station has gone from an eightperson crew performing all manner of scientific experiments to a 

three-person crew whose work is severely limited by the cancellation of several of the Station’s planned modules. Clearly, the agency needs to focus on an integrated vision to address these concerns 

and move forward. 

Certainly, when I was a young man, when I had a full head of 

hair and rugged good looks, I used to watch space flights and think 

about how these dreams become reality. Crude rockets derived 

2

from war machines sent men into space and to the moon. The idea 

of a reusable spacecraft that landed on a runway was a dream as 

well. The original vision for the Shuttle was to serve as a so-called 

space truck to service a space station such as the one that exists 

today. 

When the Shuttle program took off successfully, almost 2 decades 

before the Space Station did, NASA did an admirable job of adapting the Shuttle to new purposes. Now, however, the Shuttle does 

what it was intended to do, deliver components, cargo, and crews 

to the Station. It is clear that we are going to have to look beyond 

the technology of today and look at the creative possibilities of tomorrow. In light of that, we have to view every investment made 

in Shuttle upgrades and operations with a critical eye. Does it enhance the prospects and benefits of our long-term presence in 

space? We are going to hear today from witnesses who can very capably testify to the need for additional investment in the Shuttle. 

I want to especially commend our witnesses for their service to 

this country. As I was looking over materials that have been prepared by a number of them, I was particularly struck by a comment that was made by Richard Blomberg, who chairs the ASAP, 

the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. He said, and I want to conclude my remarks with this, and I quote here, ‘‘Everyone is completely aware that safety is the top priority. Nobody is going to 

cross the line intentionally. The problem, of course, is that you can 

get fairly close to the line without knowing it. What price will be 

paid down the road is not clear, and I don’t mean the dollar price.’’ 

I think that is a very appropriate comment to make. 

This Committee is committed to ensuring that this program and 

the other space programs clearly are on the line that ensures that 

our citizens who are involved in this work have every possible safety precaution in place. With that, I would like to yield to my friend 

and colleague, Senator Allen, our Ranking Minority Member. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

calling this hearing today. I very much appreciate your leadership 

and that of Senator Nelson and Senator Hutchison as well on this 

matter that I know is of great concern to all Americans, and particularly in this Subcommittee. 

I would also like to welcome our guests here today. This is a very 

distinguished panel. I look forward to hearing the testimony of a 

variety of great insights into this issue. Mr. Readdy; Mr. McCulley, 

a genuine hero; Mr. Blomberg; Mr. Li; and Mr. O’Connor. Your insights will be very helpful to us. 

The reason we care about this is that the Space Shuttle is a very 

unique and, indeed, it is a national asset, and we do have to take 

good care of it, but also not just be happy with the way things are, 

the way things have been, but where it can go into the future. I 

think some are very correct when they say the Space Shuttle is an 

example of some of the very best, if not the best, that the United 

States has to offer in our ability not just the technical, but the ability to achieve our dreams, and to reach for the stars, and live in 

the stars, so to speak, into reality. 

3

Now, the Space Shuttle has been around for 20 years, and even 

today, everybody in the country stops and holds their breath whenever the Space Shuttle is being launched. Some of that is because 

of the tragedy back in 1986, but Americans are still in awe and, 

indeed the world is, and I think we all do recognize the risks that 

our American astronauts are taking each time that an orbiter is 

launched. 

Each launch represents the coordination of so many highly technical, sophisticated systems that it is almost inconceivable that 

they all go right, which makes you wonder, you know, what if one 

goes wrong, and that is where I think some of the advancement 

and some of the ideas that you all have been talking about as far 

as using technology to address safety. So you are not relying just 

on human eye-balling and idea, but have a system that double or 

triple checks that, because there are so many systems that need to 

be coordinated for safety and also for the efficient operation of the 

particular mission. 

And NASA has, through all of this, continued to make the Shuttle assembly safer and more reliable after many years of operation, 

but again we need to not only applaud those efforts, but also look 

forward to the implementation of additional developmental efforts 

in this area. 

I am disappointed, as was also reflected by Senator Wyden, our 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, that the budget for fiscal year 2002 

has a shortfall. A shortage of over $200 million, combined with the 

cost overruns of the International Space Station of over $4 billion, 

has made for a very tough situation—I will use that phraseology—

a very tough situation in Human Space Flight right now in NASA. 

We should be, I think, concerned with these budgetary problems, 

but as unfortunate as all this is, it does not mean that this should 

be something you say, ‘‘Well, we cannot be ambitious any longer.’’ 

I think we have to have some very important technological problems solved. The programs that are being addressed I do think 

make some sense. Some—in my view as a layman trying to be a 

juror so to speak, listening to you all as experts—some make more 

sense than others. Some you scratch your head and just wonder, 

well, how can you be so far off on some of these estimates, and 

maybe some of your testimony will reflect on that. But we still 

have to advance the state of human space flight and advance the 

state of research. This is absolutely essential. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, and we all know very well, our 

economy and, indeed, the success of the United States is based on 

a continuous flow of technological advancements and, indeed, on a 

spirit of our continual innovation and improvement, which have 

been and always must be part of our nature, our culture as Americans. Whether it is questing or pioneering or advancing better improvements, technological advancements have always been what 

has made America great, and it has to continue in the future. 

Now, we know that space is considered to be one of the next 

growth areas for major economic development. The reality is that 

NASA is responsible for much of the technological underpinning of 

this growth, and we must recognize that the space-based problems 

that we are discussing and will be discussing here today and in the 

4

months to come could have very valuable impacts on the quality of 

life and in the future here on earth. 

Furthermore, I am concerned about the effects that these cost 

overruns will have on the other programs at NASA, such as Aeronautics. I have major concerns for this area of research in Aeronautics, given the problems we are now experiencing in the aviation community. The Senate has spent a lot of time ensuring a balanced budget, so to speak, at NASA, and we should not let any one 

program become the total focus of the agency. Aeronautics and 

aviation have been neglected, I think to our nation’s economic and 

security detriment, and all of these and more concerns were 

brought up in an earlier hearing we had on the subject of Aeronautics. Suffice it to say, as these concerns of funding come about, 

NASA should not be taking it out of the Aeronautics aspect of it. 

It will have to be handled some other way, other than raiding that 

pocket, or that aspect of NASA. 

On a separate note, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned and alluded 

to it, and we seem to both be disturbed as much as anyone to learn 

from the recent GAO report that NASA has not been able to provide detailed transaction-based support amounts charged to the 

Space Station and Shuttle programs, as required by the cost limitation provisions contained in last year’s authorization of NASA. 

I know the cost limitation provision was something that—I was 

not here, but in researching for this hearing—I know that the then 

and current Chairman and Ranking Member, Senator McCain and 

Senator Hollings, spent a great deal of time on that issue, and I 

know that our GAO witness is not here to specifically address that 

report, but we all look forward to more discussions on this matter 

both with the GAO and also with NASA. 

But the Space Shuttle program right now, with this budget situation, and the challenges you are facing, we know is in a very tough 

situation. There are shortfalls in the budget, there are infrastructure concerns, and there are work force issues. Many of the work 

force issues are not unique, I would say, to space. You hear that 

in aviation, you hear that in many technology areas, but many 

times in life, struggling becomes the pathway to success, and I 

think that this can happen if we acknowledge whatever problems 

exist now, deal with them honestly, and then I hope what we can 

accomplish here today with the insight and expertise of these five 

gentlemen here, we can at least find the pathway to move forward, 

because I think it is essential for our security, it is good for our 

economy, and it is also just the way Americans ought to be, always 

questing to do better, always improving, always innovating. 

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing, and 

thank all these gentlemen for sharing their time and expertise with 

us. Thank you. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you. Senator Nelson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having 

this meeting. I want to thank Senator Daschle for putting me on 

this Committee. I want to thank Chairman Hollings and Senator 

5

McCain for talking to Senator Daschle to put me on this Committee. 

Senator WYDEN. That leaves only 96 Senators left. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. Well, we have a lot at stake in this hearing. 

Senator Allen, I am grateful for your interest. Senator Hutchison, 

you have a great deal at stake in the subject matter of this hearing, and I am grateful for your interest and your support. I am 

grateful to the expertise that we are going to hear from today, 

which is going to be unvarnished testimony, and I am grateful to 

a lot of the people in this room today who share the passion with 

all of us that we want to continue to have a robust, Human Space 

Flight program. That is what we are talking about, ultimately, the 

bottom line: are we going to continue to have a successful manned 

space flight program? 

We are not talking about dry numbers and ledgers today. Make 

no mistake about that. We are talking about the men and women 

who serve their country by exploring its frontiers. We are talking 

about an exploration program, since Alan Shepard first lifted off in 

1961, that has provided the most valuable research available to 

people anywhere, because NASA technology has touched the lives 

of Americans every day in every way. More than 1,300 documented 

NASA technologies have gone beyond the space program, including 

freeze-dried foods, cordless power tools, and miraculous medical advancements such as CAT scans and kidney dialysis machines, and 

this Space Shuttle program alone has generated more than 100 

technology spin-offs, including the artificial heart, developed 

through technology used in the Space Shuttle fuel pumps, and even 

the insulating materials in NASCAR race cars have come from 

Shuttle thermal technology. 

So as we move forward in this hearing, this is the importance of 

the funding question before us. This is the importance of making 

certain that we build, maintain, and fly the safest vehicles possible, 

and it is against this backdrop, and this history of our space program, that we now delve into these very serious funding and safety 

questions that have been raised. 

So Mr. Chairman, thanks to you and Senator Allen. I have asked 

for this panel of experts to speak to our Subcommittee today, because I fear that if we do not provide the Space Shuttle program 

with the resources it needs for safety upgrades in the future, our 

country is going to pay a price that we cannot bear. This proposed 

budget abandons some of the most critical safety upgrades of our 

aging fleet, and mind you, it is aging. It was developed in the seventies, starting in the early seventies. It first flew in 1981, and 

now, under increased budget pressures, we have got tough decisions to make about spending priorities. 

But our budgetary decisions should not come at the risk of astronauts’ lives and, in fact, whether or not—ultimately, the bottom 

line is whether or not we are going to have a Human Space Flight 

program. This budget fails to adequately protect these and future 

astronauts. 

Most think that we are going to continue to fly the Shuttle for 

another 20 years. Now, mind you, let me repeat that. Most people 

in this room will agree that we are going to fly this existing fleet 

6

of Space Shuttles for another two decades. That was not the plan. 

There was going to be a follow-on vehicle, and a lot of these budgetary decisions predicated in this budget were on the fact that we 

were going to have a new vehicle ready, and therefore these safety 

upgrades were not going to be necessary. So we are basing, if we 

do not watch out, our budgetary decisions on the long-lost premise 

that the Shuttle would be replaced in 2 or 3 years. 

But this is not proper planning, and this is not putting safety 

first. This is putting the safety of our Shuttle fleet, the crews, the 

cargoes, as well as the people on the ground supporting the Shuttle, all at an unnecessarily high risk. In order to pay for continued 

operations of the Shuttle fleet at a flight rate of 6 per year. By the 

way, I compliment these folks, because they just had 8 very successful flights in 11 months. 

But if we are just looking at a rate of only 6 per year in the face 

of these budget constraints, then NASA is abrogating its commitment to upgrade the Shuttle orbiters by canceling, by deferring, or 

by stretching out its previous upgrade plan. At the same time the 

agency has yet to request any funds to make improvements to the 

ground infrastructure, which is literally falling apart. You cannot 

have infrastructure at the Kennedy Space Center with all that salt 

air, and with hurricanes coming by every now and then, and not 

have those upgrades. 

So safety improvements considered critical two years ago are now 

discretionary projects subject to available funding. All but one of 

the Shuttle’s pending safety upgrades have been targeted for cancellation or deferral. That is unacceptable, when our motto is supposed to be safety first. 

NASA has canceled continued work on the Electric Auxiliary 

Power Unit, even though this upgrade was previously considered to 

be one of the highest safety priorities of the agency. At Kennedy, 

in order to protect people from huge pieces of concrete falling from 

the ceiling of the vehicle assembly building, a net has been strung 

up to catch any falling items. 

The Shuttle program part of NASA’s budget is $218 million short 

in the next fiscal year, and in the absence of a permanent leader 

for the agency, and I say that in reality, because the new Administrator has not been named, decisions about NASA priorities are 

coming not from NASA, but from bean counters at the Office of 

Management and Budget. 

I said I was going to talk unvarnished, but I am talking truth. 

We have got accountants making life and death technical decisions 

for our astronauts and our ground crews, instead of the engineers 

and the program managers who have dedicated themselves to keeping the United States in the forefront of space exploration. Now, we 

here have an opportunity to fix this problem, because this hearing 

is timely, because the VA–HUD conference committee meets next 

week, which includes NASA appropriations. 

I have talked to Senator Mikulski, who chairs the VA–HUD Subcommittee, about this. They have the ability to increase the budget 

to pay for some of these safety improvements that are so critical 

to our Shuttle program, and I urge you all, as you hear the testimony today, and I have talked with Fritz Hollings, he is going to 

the floor with his Commerce-Justice Appropriations bill this afterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
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noon, so he cannot be here. I have talked to John McCain. Senator 

McCain is in the markup on the Armed Services Committee right 

now, but he is going to try to get in. 

I urge all my colleagues to seek the reprioritization in the conference committee of the funding for this program, and as it stands, 

what we are doing, if we do not do anything, we are starving 

NASA’s Space Shuttle budget, and thus greatly increasing the 

chance of a catastrophic loss. I wonder if the lessons of Challenger 

are fading. 

So let me say that the witnesses here can speak the truth. We 

all have great respect for all of you. You are extremely accomplished. You all believe in NASA’s future. You believe in our 

Human Space Flight program, and you believe in reducing the risk 

for our astronauts and ground crews to the lowest possible acceptable level, and I also believe, I personally believe that you all have 

had your hands tied, that in recent months—and I am not talking 

about just this Administration. 

Please understand this has nothing to do with partisan politics. 

I am talking about the direction that this has taken over the last 

decade, that you all have had your hands tied over the years, but 

we are dealing with the now, because decisions have been taken 

out of your hands, and you are out of the decision loop, and I hope 

you can get back in it, but the witnesses here on this panel represent the wealth of wisdom that we in the Congress had better 

start listening to. 

So Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the privilege of being here 

today. 

Senator WYDEN. I thank my colleague for an excellent, excellent 

statement, and we are anxious to work with him on these matters. 

Senator HUTCHISON.

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Senator Wyden. I thank you for 

calling the hearing. Senator Nelson, you are certainly a welcome 

addition to the Committee. I did not know it was so hard for you 

to get here, but I am glad you are here, and certainly Senator Allen 

has been a long-time supporter of engineering and research and 

space, and I look forward to working with all of you. 

The fact of the matter is, the NASA budget and the Senate Appropriations Committee final result is a disaster. It is a disaster for 

the International Space Station, and without the Space Station 

there would be no reason for a Shuttle. I led the fight in the appropriations process last time to upgrade the Shuttle and the safety 

that was necessary for the Shuttle, because we all lived through 

the Challenger disaster, and none of us want to see that happen 

again, ever—ever. 

But to short-change the vehicle for the scientific research, which 

is the Space Station, would be just irresponsible. So I think we 

have all got to come together and try to work through the appropriations process to secure adequate funding for the Station, to 

make sure that we stop these overruns, which no one thinks is acceptable, and to go forward making safety our first priority and 

8

making sure that we have the scientific basis for NASA, or we are 

going to see NASA careen into a nonfunctioning agency. 

You cannot lose any part of NASA—as Senator Allen said, you 

have got to have your aeronautical research, you have got to have 

your engineering. All of the things that Senator Nelson mentioned 

that we have gotten from our space research—the CAT scans, the 

MRI’s, all of these things—are so much a part of the investment 

we have made in NASA. But to all of a sudden start whittling 

away at the Space Station and keep all of the parts that would 

service the vehicle that we are whittling away is crazy. So we have 

got to have a plan that makes sense, that keeps a solid, research 

facility in the Space Station, and does the upgrades for the Shuttle 

that would make it not only safe, but also a good service tool for 

the space station. That is what I want to work for, and I hope all 

of us will be able to come together when we get to this appropriations bill and try to make sure that we are doing the right thing 

for our goal, which is the research capability. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, you have just heard four United States Senators say 

they want to work with you on this important issue, and suffice it 

to say it is going to be a challenge in this budgetary environment. 

We will make your prepared remarks a part of the hearing record 

in their entirety. We have asked each of you to try to keep within 

5 minutes or thereabouts. Let us begin that end of the table with 

the NASA folks and we will go right down the line, Mr. McCulley, 

Mr. Blomberg, and let us proceed. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. READDY, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION HEADQUARTERS 

Mr. READDY. Chairman Wyden, Senator Allen, members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today. First, though, I would like to compliment fellow astronaut 

Senator Bill Nelson on his timely editorial in this week’s Space 

News. As proud as we are of the past 20 years of achievement and 

over 100 Space Shuttle missions, we must never allow our current 

successes to cause complacency to set in. 

Today, just as in 1981, a safe and successful Space Shuttle 

launch is the only metric the world uses to judge the quality of 

NASA’s Human Space Flight program. 

Since Challenger, with your steadfast support we have continued 

our quest to improve the Space Shuttle safety. Our loss of vehicle 

rating has gone from one in 78, post Challenger, to one in 483, and 

while maybe that is acceptable to the general public, and they 

would label this quite an accomplishment, to us it is not sufficient. 

In the realm of human space flight, 95 percent is not an A, 99 percent is not an A. Anything less than 100 percent is an F. 

Modern day fighters such as the F–22 are on the order of 1 in 

10,000. Modern airliners like the Boeing 777 have a safety level of 

1 in a million, or 2 million. These statistics show us that even 

though we have achieved significant improvements in the first genVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
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eration of reusable human space flight, we have a long, long way 

to go, and we need upgrades to get there. 

At present, the Shuttle is the safest, most capable and reliable 

vehicle in history. We have flown more than 80 successful missions 

since return to flight, and I have to applaud the NASA/contractor 

Shuttle team for its superb stewardship to date in continuing to fly 

safely and accomplishing the most complex of missions in assembling the International Space Station, servicing the space telescope, 

and doing space research against a background of a 40-percent reduction in budget purchasing power. This is nothing short of remarkable. 

That said, beginning in fiscal year 2002, we have reached a point 

where simply accounting for inflation may eclipse future efficiencies and could foreclose our options to recapitalize this program. To be more specific, our Apollo era infrastructure is aging, 

obsolescence issues are arising more frequently, many of our vendors are going out of business, and the operating costs for our contractors are going up. 

In 1997, NASA established a Space Shuttle Program Development Office at the Johnson Space Center for the purpose of systematically identifying, prioritizing the required upgrades that would 

maximize flight safety, mission success, and improve the end-toend reliability of the total Space Shuttle system. 

Since 1997, NASA has implemented many safety and performance upgrades, super lightweight tank, the new, improved Block 

II’s Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), and the glass cockpit all 

come to mind, and because of the improvements in the Space Shuttle Main Engines, we have reduced the risk of launch failure by 80 

percent. We have increased the launch probability to support International Space Station limited launch windows of 5 minutes or 

less, and we have increased the payload to orbit by 8 tons. 

Two years ago, Congress took the leadership in providing a plusup to start the Space Shuttle upgrades program. In the fiscal year 

2000 budget, and subsequently, the Office of Management and 

Budget established a challenging goal of implementing all safety 

upgrades starting in 2005. Given the current budget environment, 

and all the reasons I mentioned above, it is now anticipated that 

development of these safety upgrades would not be completed until 

2005, with implementation into the fleet actually beginning in 

2007. 

Although our upgrades program has been focused on vehicle improvement, the vehicle is only one part of a vehicle integrated system. Ground facilities that support training, processing, launch, 

landing operations are all equally critical to mission success and 

the safety of our astronauts. This infrastructure includes facilities 

located literally across the country, some in fact overseas, much of 

which was built during the early sixties in support of the Apollo 

program. 

Current Space Shuttle infrastructure revitalization projects are 

predominantly focused at the Kennedy Space Center, where currently there are four major vertical assembly building projects, but 

to date the Space Shuttle program has only been able to address 

these projects on an emergent case-by-case basis. 

10

In the mid-nineties, NASA underwent significant downsizing. At 

NASA headquarters, the Civil Service work force went from 2,200 

to 1,000. Within the Office of Space Flight, where I work, we went 

from 240 to 80, and within the Space Shuttle Program Office the 

Civil Service count went from 4,000 to the current count of approximately 1,700. 

In 1999, when the NASA centers were experiencing a shortfall of 

people with critical skills for the International Space Station, Space 

Shuttle, and advanced space transportation programs, Office of 

Space Flight received permission to discontinue the downsizing and 

commence rehiring, and with respect to the Space Shuttle, those 

hires focus on the increased flight rate for the International Space 

Station, and the safety upgrades program. 

To conclude, I would like to reemphasize that safety maintainability obsolescence issues must not be allowed to threaten our nation’s only human-rated access to space. Delaying the implementation of key improvements could expose future flight crews to higher 

levels of risk for longer than is necessary. 

We accept the fact that human space flight and the quest to explore and develop space does not come without risk. We have accomplished much over the past decades. Our continued success in 

this undertaking depends on never overlooking the fact that, along 

with the astronauts on board those Space Shuttles, a little piece of 

all of us flies on each and every mission. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Readdy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. READDY, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

OFFICE OF SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

HEADQUARTERS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the subject of Space Shuttle safety. 

There is no higher priority for NASA than the safe launch, operation and return 

of our Space Shuttle vehicles and their astronaut crews. The Space Shuttle represents assured human access to space for this nation for at least the next decade, 

and is indispensable to the success and viability of the International Space Station 

(ISS). 

NASA’s Space Shuttle program has been one of the agency’s real success stories 

over the last several years. The program, working with their contractors, has made 

significant reductions in operations costs—by about a third even before accounting 

for inflation. At the same time as the operations costs have been coming down, the 

Space Shuttle has made dramatic improvements in the capabilities, operations and 

safety of the system. The payload-to-orbit performance of the Space Shuttle has 

been significantly improved—by over 70 percent to the Space Station. The safety of 

the Space Shuttle has also been dramatically improved by reducing risk by more 

than a factor of five. In addition, the operability of the system has been significantly 

improved, with five minute launch windows—which would not have been attempted 

a decade ago—now becoming routine. This record of success is a testament to the 

quality and dedication of the Space Shuttle management team and workforce, both 

civil servants and contractors. 

The fact that the Space Shuttle is the safest, most capable, and reliable space 

transportation system in the world is due, in large part, to the commitment of 

NASA, the White House, and the Congress to make the necessary improvements 

across the system to ensure safety and mission success. Let me assure you, however, 

that this has not been an easy task. It has taken exceptional leadership and an unfailing commitment to safety to navigate through a prolonged period of steadily decreasing budgets, although the last 2 years have seen increases in the Shuttle request. We have delayed needed investments in support equipment and infrastructure that today present themselves as significant management challenges. 

11

We find ourselves searching for innovative methods to achieve additional operational efficiencies while continuing to safely fly the Space Shuttle fleet through 

2012. The truth is that most significant efficiencies have already been realized. 

Since submission of the President’s FY 2002 budget request, the program has projected increased costs for Shuttle operations for FY 2002 and the outyears, some of 

which is driven by factors beyond the control of the Shuttle Program. These include 

contractor rate increases, core skill and business base erosion, supportability/obsolescence issues, and energy cost increases. Internal cost increases are largely driven 

by the cost of orbiter operations support, such as critical re-wiring on the mature 

orbiter fleet. 

In the following testimony, I will address the subjects of Space Shuttle upgrades, 

infrastructure revitalization and the Space Shuttle workforce as they relate to Space 

Shuttle safety in FY 2002 and beyond. I will also address NASA’s FY 2002 Budget 

Plan for the Space Shuttle and associated challenges related to these same subjects. 

The primary objective of safety upgrades to Space Shuttle systems is to achieve 

major reductions in the operational risks associated with those systems, and to provide safer Space Shuttle operations through system safety upgrades. NASA’s FY 

2002 budget request provides a large increase to the Space Shuttle safety allocation, 

from $256 million in FY 2001 to $406 million in FY 2002. The total Space Shuttle 

budget in FY 2002 and the out-years is flat, and does not provide for adjustments 

due to inflation in anticipation of achieving incremental operational efficiencies. 

NASA has been conducting an external review to assess how the Safety Allocation 

funds can most effectively be used to improve the safety of the Space Shuttle, to 

include investments in hardware/software upgrades, personnel, facilities, or other 

safety-related areas. NASA will proceed with investment activities once Authority 

To Proceed (ATP) has been accomplished. Space Shuttle safety investments are an 

important element of NASA’s strategy for an Integrated Space Transportation Plan 

(ISTP). 

Cost challenges to the Space Shuttle Program and upgrade technical issues are 

presenting significant potential impacts to increasing Space Shuttle safety. Some individual safety upgrade projects are being evaluated for cancellation or deferral in 

FY 2002, due to either technical issues or to pay for increased costs that were not 

known at the time of the FY 2002 budget submission. These issues will be addressed as we work with the Administration in formulation of our FY 2003 budget. 

In our deliberations we will try to avoid near-term decisions at the expense of improved safety (current risk) in order to preserve a safe and viable six flight rate per 

year core Space Shuttle program. We will also seek to address facilities and infrastructure requirements in the program. 

Space Shuttle Upgrades and Program Achievements 

The Space Shuttle is a very mature system, remarkably reliable, very mission 

flexible, and a true testbed—not just for scientific inquiry, but also for forming international partnerships and goodwill. Wise investments in safety upgrades during the 

course of the program have kept the Space Shuttle viable and ready to meet the 

needs of our nation’s space program. 

High Launch Rate Reliability—Of 106 launch attempts, there have been 105 

successful launches, equating to a launch reliability of greater than 0.99. Let me 

add to that, Mr. Chairman, that while we are proud of our accomplishments, anything less than 100 percent is still unacceptable in a Human Space Flight program. 

Mission Diversity—The Space Shuttle has launched over 3 million pounds of 

cargo and over 600 humans from around the world. The Space Shuttle is the only 

launch system in the world that can deliver and return large payloads to and from 

orbit. Each Space Shuttle flight can support a diverse package of mission objectives. 

The Space Shuttle is very flexible in accommodating all types of missions, including 

those dealing with national security. 

International Leadership—No other country has been able to integrate the 

technical, operations management, and financial resources to develop its own 

human-rated RLV system. At least 38 percent of the Space Shuttle flights so far 

have carried non-U.S. astronauts. This percentage will increase as we continue to 

assemble and operate the International Space Station. 

Invaluable RLV Operating Experience—The Space Shuttle Program has provided over 20 years of invaluable experience in Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Payload Integration and Flight and Ground Operations. It has produced a massive database of technical information from which future improvements will be made to next 

generation RLVs. 

Privatization—The Space Flight Operations Contract has proven to be successful in finding efficiencies and reducing cost. Lessons learned with this effort will ulVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
12

timately pave the way for further privatization of the Space Shuttle that is envisioned under the President’s Blueprint. 

Space Shuttle Technology Spin-offs—The trickle-down of benefits from the 

Space Shuttle Program continues to impact the development of new electronic devices, medicines, improved manufacturing procedures. The Space Shuttle Program 

in the U.S. private industry has created thousands of jobs. 

Space Shuttle Upgrades Program—Objectives and Strategy 

The Space Shuttle Upgrade program is intended as a proactive measure to keep 

the Space Shuttle flying safely and efficiently in support of the Agency’s commitments and goals for human access to space. Shuttle Upgrades are intended to enhance the primary goals of the Space Shuttle Program:

Fly safely; 

Meet the manifest; 

Improve mission supportability; and, 

Improve the system.

The two types of Space Shuttle upgrades are safety (high priority) and 

supportability. Safety upgrades are those upgrades that minimize ascent, descent, 

and critical operations risks. Supportability upgrades are those upgrades that maximize Flight Hardware Availability Assurance (FHAA), and Operational Improvements (OIs). 

The following table illustrates the focus areas for Shuttle Upgrades over the last 

several years.

Main Focus Examples 

Shuttle Safety; Supporting the ISS SSME Alternate turbo pump 

Super Lightweight Tank

Combating Obsolescence Checkout and Launch Control system

Enhanced Capability (does not change 

the fundamental Shuttle configuration) 

Avionics 

Extended Nose Landing Gear 

Long life Fuel Cell 

Space Shuttle Upgrades Selection Process 

Any Space Shuttle Program Element or Project Office may propose potential candidate projects to the Space Shuttle Program Development Office (SSPDO). The recommending organization is responsible for providing a technical description of the 

proposed upgrade concept, the rationale for the proposal in terms of benefit to the 

program, and a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of cost and schedule to implement. 

The SSPDO scores and weighs the proposals with respect to how well they meet 

Program goals and objectives of flying safely, meeting the manifest, improving 

supportability, and improving the system. The primary goal of the selection process 

is to allocate resources, on a priority basis, to the significant safety improvement 

opportunities and significant supportability needs. Approval of upgrade candidates 

is an ongoing activity of the Upgrades Review Board. 

NASA’s upgrade investment strategy is to pursue high priority safety upgrades, 

supportability and obsolescence upgrades. The principal discriminators for the highpriority safety upgrades are the degree of safety improvement, and how quickly the 

associated benefits can be realized. 

The upgrade portfolio consists of project proposals in various stages of definition 

and approval. These proposals include those undergoing initial definition and feasibility assessments, those that have received formal approval for further definition 

and implementation planning, and projects that have been approved for implementation and thus form the base lined Space Shuttle Safety Upgrades Program content. Addendum 1 shows the Shuttle Safety Upgrade Schedule Strategy and Addendum 2 depicts the organizational relationship of the SSPDO to the OSF. 

High Priority Safety Upgrades List

The current Upgrades plan calls for High Priority Safety Upgrades which, all 

combined, have the potential to reduce the overall risk of a catastrophic loss of vehicle by a factor of two. All total funding figures listed below are in the President’s 

FY 2002 Budget request. 

13

The Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) Increments I & II, totaled $20 million 

in FY 2000 and $40 million in FY 2001. The total funding is estimated to be around 

$500 million. These upgrades will provide: 1) access to more systems data; 2) increased organization of data display and command capabilities; and, 3) improve 

human-to-machine interface, all of which reduces crew workload in the cockpit during all phases of the mission. Implementing the CAU into the Space Shuttle fleet 

in a timely manner with other Space Shuttle upgrades will: 1) reduce the cost of 

scheduling separate Orbiter Maintenance Modification periods, 2) increase the quality of the training of Shuttle astronauts, and 3) eventually begin to further lower 

the Loss of Vehicle (LoV) risk. 

The Electric Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) would have replaced the Orbiter’s 

three hydrazine power unit. Using battery-powered electric motors to replace the hydrazine system and high-speed turbines, this upgrade would have eliminated the potential of extremely toxic and hazardous conditions for processing and in flight. 

However, due to technical issues, this upgrade will not go forward and instead will 

be a technology development effort in FY 2002. 

The Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) Phase I & II upgrades 

to the Space Shuttle main engines will provide improved real-time monitoring of engine performance and environmental data, will provide improved engine health 

advisories to the onboard crew and ground controllers, and will provide improved 

engine anomaly response capabilities. The AHMS will reduce the risk of catastrophic engine failure by up to 40 percent. This project has been allocated $13.8 

million in FY 2000 and $17.7 million in FY 2001. The total funding is $155 million. 

The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Advanced Thrust Vector Control (TVC)

upgrade, if implemented, will replace the hydrazine power turbines currently used 

to drive the hydraulic pumps with helium. This eliminates hydrazine leakage/fire 

hazards, turbine over speed hazards, and reduces toxic materials processing hazards. This project was allocated $5 million in FY 2000 and $11 million for studies 

in FY 2001. The total funding is $207 million. 

Safety Upgrade Studies

Studies are also being conducted in several areas of high risk. The completion of 

these studies is vital to successfully supporting our safety upgrade efforts and may 

result in the selection of additional upgrade candidates to be prioritized and reviewed within the proposed five-year period of safety upgrade development (FY 

2001–FY 2005). 

Crew Escape Engineering Design Trade Study—This is an in-depth engineering study of contingency crew survival options; extraction, ejection, crew module 

separation; determine feasibility, survival utility, cost, and technical impacts; increases probability of a successful crew bailout. 

Thermal Protection System (TPS) Lower Surface Tile Study—This study 

will develop a more durable lower surface tile for the bottom of the Orbiter which 

would reduce the risk of tile burn-through, reduce post-landing repair, and may provide additional micro-meteoroid and orbital debris protection. 

Self-Contained Apparatus Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) Suit Improvement Study—The objective of this study is to develop a safer and more efficient 

SCAPE suit used for hazardous operations during ground processing; the current 

suit is heavy, allows undesirable levels of carbon dioxide, and is not efficiently 

cooled. 

Space Shuttle Abort Improvements Study—This study will investigate Space 

Shuttle hardware, software and procedural improvements to eliminate/decrease specific abort scenarios, reducing the areas of no coverage, eliminate abort scenarios, 

and increase probability of a successful abort. 

Main Landing Gear (MLG) Tire Study—This study is investigating improved 

tire designs that allow for higher landing speeds, increase cross winds limits, increase the landing load limit, mitigate obsolescence issues, and improve margins for 

pressure leakage and colder temperature environments. 

SSME Block III Study—This study would investigate the incorporation of an 

Extra Large Throat Combustion Chamber and a more robust channel wall constructed nozzle, increasing performance margins and abort thrust capability and 

eliminating main combustion chamber and nozzle failure modes. However, due to 

technical issues, this study is being discontinued. 

The Industrial Engineering for Safety (IES) Study—This study is a significant and comprehensive effort to increase flight and ground safety through improved handling and inspections via changes in flight and ground hardware and 

ground procedures and processes. Within this study, several small projects are in 

formulation, and a few projects in this category have been authorized for implementation. 

14

No candidate upgrades will be approved until NASA’s overall safety investment 

strategy has undergone external independent review by the Office of Space Flight’s 

(OSF) Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC) to assure that only technologically 

ready projects will be pursued. Moreover, NASA must complete its full management 

review process to ensure that the cost is fully defined, accurate, and has sufficient 

reserves to ensure that it can be completed within the overall safety allocation. Approved projects will be reviewed annually, and reprioritized if necessary, to make 

sure that they are managed within the plan. 

Supportability/Infrastructure Revitalization

Another issue of concern for the Space Shuttle Program is maintenance of the 

ground infrastructure that is so vital to the continued success of the program. We 

recognize the importance to the Space Shuttle Program of the facility structures, 

systems and test support equipment. That importance extends across all stages of 

the program from manufacturing, assembly, testing, transportation, processing, and 

all the way through launch, SRB retrieval, and the final landing of the orbiters. We 

have identified the projects that are required to revitalize the Shuttle infrastructure 

over the next decade. There are over 200 projects that will eventually need to be 

completed. Many of these projects are required to revitalize a set of buildings, systems, and equipment that were developed for the Apollo program and then retrofitted to accommodate the Space Shuttle. 

The Space Shuttle infrastructure revitalization projects are predominantly focused 

at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), but there are also many important projects required at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), Stennis Space Center (SSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), and the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF). The highest priority projects are at the Launch Complex 39 

(LC–39) area at KSC, including projects at both Pads A & B and the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB). There are four major VAB revitalization projects needed for 

the roof, siding, door openings, and the door mechanisms that need to be addressed 

in the near future. Other key KSC projects include refurbishment of the high-pressure gaseous nitrogen and helium pipelines, communications cabling replacement, 

power distribution systems, and refurbishment of the crawler/transporters that 

move the Orbiters from the VAB to the launch pads. 

The Space Shuttle Program has addressed these projects to the best of its ability. 

This has been accomplished while at the same time flying an accelerated set of missions over the past two years in support of the ISS, and initiating the Space Shuttle 

Upgrades program that will enable the Space Shuttle to fly safely well into the second decade of the 21st century. Our Space Shuttle philosophy places the highest priority first and foremost on crew safety and then on mission success. These priorities, 

when coupled to the challenging budget realities facing the entire Federal government, requires us to place our funding priorities on meeting the operational requirements of the Space Shuttle and on the high priority need for safety upgrades. We 

have tackled the most urgent infrastructure projects, but we have had to defer action on a number of projects that we feel are very important to the program and, 

if not addressed in the near future, could at some point impact mission schedules. 

We would like to perform more infrastructure projects, and at the same time strike 

the difficult balance between ensuring the operational requirements of the Orbiter 

and maintaining an extensive ground infrastructure that is also critical for the successful long-term operation of the Space Shuttle Program. 

Space Shuttle Upgrades Independent Assessments

Over the past three years, OSF has relied on several advisory organizations like 

the SFAC and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), to provide comprehensive review and feedback, assessing the definition and prioritization of Space Shuttle Upgrades. Both of these organizations played a key role in the definition and 

prioritization of the current Safety Upgrades plan. 

The ASAP was established by Congress in the aftermath of the fatal Apollo1 fire 

in 1967 and provides NASA with an annual report outlining any findings and recommendations for improvements regarding its programs. In its latest annual report 

submitted last February, ASAP submitted important comments on Space Shuttle 

safety upgrades and infrastructure. Just last month, ASAP provided to OSF the results of the overall impact to Space Shuttle safety if Orbiter Maintenance Modifications (OMMs) are delayed until FY 2005 and 2006, and orbiter structural inspections (SIs) are retained at KSC, for orbiters Discovery and Endeavour. 

In the last twelve months, SFAC, an internal committee of the NASA Advisory 

Council, has provided quarterly assessments of the Space Shuttle Program and upgrades. This past June, SFAC recommended to NASA that the Electric Auxiliary 

Power Unit (EAPU) upgrade project be redesignated as a technology project. The 

15

primary reasons given were because the EAPU technology was not mature enough, 

project costs were increasing, and schedule slips were beginning to occur. NASA 

thanks these organizations for their valuable input and will continue to rely on 

them for various Space Shuttle upgrades assessments in the future. 

Addendum 3 summarizes the results of the independent assessments. 

SSP FY 2002 Cost Issues and Mitigation Strategy

During preliminary FY 2003 budget development this Spring, increased costs to 

FY 2002 baseline requirements were identified totaling as much as $218 million. 

This projected cost increase is due to the following:

1. Content changes and growth. 

• Orbiter OMM phasing/re-estimate 

• Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) alternate turbopump development support 

• SSME minor components 

• Orbiter operations support

2. Contractor rate increases that factored in normal inflationary labor cost 

growth, higher fringe benefits (driven by higher medical costs) and other nonlabor escalation. Contractor rate increases have always been projected to grow 

at 4–5 percent per year vs. 3.5 percent assumed.

3. Core skills and business base erosion, particularly within the rocket propulsion 

sector of the aerospace industry.

4. Supportability/Obsolescence issues.

5. Recent price increases in natural gas and electricity are projected to continue. 

These increases are not limited to the aerospace sector nor to prime contractors 

but include industries nationwide.

NASA Headquarters has partnered with the SSP project offices and SFAC on a 

strategy to maintain safety while mitigating the identified cost challenge. In order 

to maintain a healthy content in the Safety Upgrades plan, the following upgrade 

initiatives have been retained in the FY 2002 budget to Congress:

1. CAU Increment I, this was just approved as a project last month.

2. AHMS Phase I

3. ET Friction Stir Weld

4. New Main Landing Gear Tires Study

5. Industrial Engineering for Safety

6. Program Integration/Studies

In addition to eliminating Program reserves, delaying infrastructure revitalization 

support, and the reductions due to the re-designation of the EAPU, OSF is in the 

process of analyzing budget decisions dealing with the following Upgrades-related 

initiatives for possible cancellation or deferral.

1. Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) Phase II for the SSME

2. SRB Thrust Vector Control (TVC)

3. RSRM Propellant Grain Geometry

4. Industrial Engineering for safety

5. Orbiter Maintenance Down Period (OMDP) timing and location 

Safety and The Space Shuttle Work Force

At the end of FY 1999, OSF undertook an assessment of its staffing requirements 

at the field centers. While maintaining Space Shuttle safety as our highest priority, 

OSF began an intense phase of building, integrating and testing significant ISS 

flight elements. We were also continuing ISS Operations while planning to integrate 

assembly and logistics flights to the ISS. During this time we began development 

of High Priority Safety Upgrades to the Space Shuttle fleet. 

Given this workload environment, our internal assessment of core civil service 

workforce requirements at four Space Flight Centers convinced us that full-time 

equivalent (FTE) targets would have to be adjusted upwards. In late December 

1999, each Center was directed to address critical workforce shortfalls in the SSP, 

ISS, and Advanced Space Transportation Programs. With respect to the Space Shuttle Program, the objective was to hire employees to support the increased flight rate 

16

and the Space Shuttle Upgrades program. Since January 2000, we have seen our 

Space Shuttle FTE levels grow from a FY 1999 base of 1819 to a planned FY 2001 

level of 1968 FTEs. 

Our new hires have addressed our need for additional support in the areas of 

Flight and Ground Operations, hardware, and software design. In addition, the new 

hires have also contributed to our ability to develop and train flight engineers for 

future flight operations activities. Beyond the new hires, we also transferred personnel from existing Center organizations to support on-going Shuttle Program requirements. As we move forward in maintaining our Space Shuttle flight rate and 

complete the construction of the International Space Station, our recent hires will 

increase our ability to safely and meet our program commitments. 

The ‘‘Safety Culture’’ within our Human Space Flight program is robust and 

healthy. It is a culture that is led from the front—management demonstrates its 

commitment to safety by listening and rewarding, and by being willing to accept impacts to schedule in the interest of safety. Every single Space Shuttle employee is 

empowered to call a ‘‘time out’’ if they believe that there may be a potential threat 

to safety. 

There is concern about the uncertainty facing the workforce towards the end of 

this decade, should a next generation RLV be ready to begin a transition with the 

Shuttle. NASA is very sensitive to the need to preserve a work environment that 

emphasizes safety, and is beginning to think about transition issues at a very early 

stage so that we can ensure safe operations through any transition. In addition, reducing the level and implementation frequency for upgrades could cause many of 

these experienced and uniquely skilled employees to seek aerospace job opportunities elsewhere. Replacing these workers could become very difficult. We will also 

have the same problem with vendors that provide the unique services and products 

NASA needs to maintain the flight elements. NASA will work with the Administration and the Congress to proactively address these issues and ensure that human 

space flight activities continue to have the level of safety needed. 

Space Shuttle Upgrades Program and the Space Flight Operations Contract

The Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) is a cost-plus-award-fee performance-based contract. NASA works closely with the contractor, United Space Alliance 

(USA), to ensure that the ‘‘scope of work’’ adequately covers all technical and management activities necessary to support all ground, flight, and orbiter services required for space flight operations. These activities also include management of approved Space Shuttle Upgrades projects and the requirements for Orbiter Modification Down Periods (OMDPs), which are necessary to implement Orbiter Maintenance Modifications (OMMs) and Orbiter Structural Inspections (OSIs). Revisions to 

the SFOC are negotiated based on additions or deletions to the scope of work. The 

current SFOC contract expires in 2002, but we have two, non-priced two-year options and are in the process of starting the negotiations to exercise the first option. 

Given NASA’s cost issues as described in my previous remarks, NASA Headquarters, JSC, KSC, and United Space Alliance have commenced activities to develop long-range facility and staffing plans for OMDP activities. With this plan, 

NASA will be able to better ascertain what critical resources are required to keep 

the high priority safety upgrades on schedule. The plan will address the requirements for retention of critical skills in the Shuttle workforce to accomplish the necessary upgrades and sustaining engineering work. 

Space Shuttle Upgrades Program and Assembly of the International Space 

Station 

Improving Space Shuttle safety and reliability to support ISS assembly operations 

and utilization for at least the next decade is currently a top priority for NASA. 

While we may be able to alleviate the short-term SSP cost challenges by delaying 

OMMs and OSIs, this may also increase the long-term risk for the SSP and could 

impact the current schedule of assembly flights for ISS. Addendum 4 illustrates that 

NASA’s ability to maintain the SSP is facing increasing cost challenges. 

At projected funding levels we are confident that we will be able to maintain a 

flight rate of six flights per year until FY 2003. Beyond that point, unless cost challenges are met, the Space Shuttle may not be able to sustain the projected flight 

rate, seriously impacting the ISS assembly and operations (Addendum 4, Part II). 

Space Shuttle Upgrades Program and the Integrated Space Transportation 

Plan

The President’s FY 2002 Budget Blueprint reaffirms NASA’s commitment to work 

with the aerospace industry to explore new space transportation systems that will 

dramatically increase safety and reliability, and reduce costs. NASA’s Integrated 

Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) is the long-range investment strategy for the GovVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
17

ernment to accomplish its mission objectives by enabling its partners to develop a 

new, commercially-viable, reusable space transportation architecture, focused on 

NASA’s priority needs. 

The ISTP consists of the Space Shuttle Program, the Space Launch Initiative 

(SLI) also known as the 2nd Generation RLV Program and the Advanced Space 

Transportation Program (3rd Generation research and in-space transportation technology). Under the plan, the Space Shuttle will be maintained through investment 

in the safety upgrades. The Space Launch Initiative formulates and implements risk 

reduction activities and technologies to enable development of a 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle. Addendum 5 illustrates the ISTP concept. 

The follow-on RLV to the Space Shuttle will be operating from the subsonic (Mach 

< 1) to the hypersonic range (Mach > 5) of the high-speed envelope. Currently, the 

Space Shuttle orbiter is the only reusable operational vehicle in the world that flies 

in the hypersonic regime. With 106 Space Shuttle flights completed, NASA has accumulated a total of 50–60 hours (ascent-descent) of hypersonic flight over twenty 

years. The Space Shuttle could play a valuable role in assisting SLI to evaluate 

promising 2nd RLV technologies if SLI provides the necessary funding for ground 

and/or flight tests during one or more Space Shuttle missions. An orbiter outfitted 

with SLI technology demonstrations for flight software, computers, internal vehicle 

health management system, and non-hazardous fluids could significantly reduce the 

development time and financial resources needed to flight-test these prototype systems. By acting as a technology pathfinder, SSP will be supporting SLI management 

and technical processes, to efficiently and accurately accumulate and analyze data 

that will improve/influence the various RLV concepts and designs. This type of effort 

would certainly minimize the operational transition problems from the SSP to an 

operational 2nd Generation RLV. 

The two programs are working together to bring the Space Shuttle heritage and 

lessons learned to the SLI concepts and evaluating the benefit of key technologies. 

The large majority of technologies being pursued in SLI is relevant to the Space 

Shuttle and can be evaluated using the Space Shuttle as a reference point. The 

Space Shuttle and SLI programs are also investigating other areas of collaboration 

and synergy. 

The following list summarizes some of the design features that the SSP could help 

to influence for SLI:

1. Number of toxic fluids

2. System margins

3. Number of systems with build-in-test (BIT) build-in-test equipment (BITE)

4. Number of confined spaces on vehicles

5. Hours for turnaround between launches

6. Number of different propulsion systems

7. Number of unique stages for flight and ground

8. Number of active ground systems required for servicing

Current plans call for the Space Shuttle to be maintained until the 2nd Generation RLV can achieve ‘‘Initial Operating Capability’’ (IOC). That milestone is projected to be the start of FY 2012. Under the ISTP, the transition from the Space 

Shuttle to the new vehicle could begin as early as FY 2009 and be completed by 

the end of FY 2011. 

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Chairman, safety continues to be our top priority. The American taxpayers 

have every right to expect the Space Shuttle program they pay for to operate safely 

and efficiently. However, our ability to continue to perform to the highest safety 

standards in the long-term will require that we continue to address the critical 

needs of an aging Apollo era infrastructure. 

Safety, maintainability and obsolescence issues will need continuing attention to 

ensure that the needs of our nation’s Human Space Flight program can be met 

while next generation RLV technology is being developed. Safety investments must 

continue in order to ensure a safe program for as long as we are asked to fly. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks for the record. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you very much for your attention.

Senator WYDEN. Very good. Mr. McCulley. 

18

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL JAMES MCCULLEY, CHIEF 

OPERATING OFFICER, UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE 

Mr. MCCULLEY. Chairman Wyden, Senator Allen, Senator Nelson, if I had a tape recorder, perhaps you could just punch Mr. Nelson’s, put it on replay and run it, and then I would not have to say 

much. 

I am Mike McCulley, Chief Operating Officer of United Space Alliance, which I will refer to as USA in the future, and we are responsible, as NASA’s prime contractor, for the day-to-day operations of the Space Shuttle. 

Our mission is safe operation of the Shuttle, our No. 1 mission. 

We plan flights, train astronauts, prepare all the hardware and 

software for launch, mission, landing of the Space Shuttle. As Senator Nelson mentioned, I am very proud of the fact that in the last 

11 months we have had 8 highly successful missions, a flight rate 

of around 9 a year. Six of those went on-time the first time on 5-

minute windows, one of them was delayed for weather, and one of 

them was delayed for an infrastructure issue for a couple of days. 

We have done an outstanding job, as Mr. Readdy said, of continuing safe operations while reducing cost. When I left the Astronaut Corps in 1990, if I had known that today I was going to be 

an expert in how to execute lay-offs, I might have taken a different 

job. I am unfortunately an expert on the Warn Act, the Fair Labor 

Standards Act, the Service Contract Act, and how to get through 

these things, and whether you do them performance-based or seniority-based, but I have done enough of it. 

At the time NASA and USA signed the space flight operations 

contract, the next generation RLV was expected to replace the 

Shuttle in 2004 or thereabouts. Of course, that resulted in nobody 

being interested in infrastructure upgrades or safety upgrades, and 

as Mr. Readdy said, and as Mr. Nelson said, we are still sitting 

there looking at those type of budgets today. 

But now we are being asked to fly for at least another decade, 

safely, efficiently, and in order to do that we have got to do something different than this flat budget we are looking at. 

At the direction of Congress in 2001, we were provided additional 

funding to initiate the safety upgrades, and NASA and its contractors, many of us, have been working very, very hard on a systematic approach to prioritize and work those upgrades. These upgrades would take the probability of a catastrophic failure during 

ascent from one in 483, as previously been mentioned, to around 

1 in 1,000, or a 50-percent, half reduction in that risk, but now 

those high priority safety upgrades have become discretionary 

funding. 

We believe that the proposed cancellations, or deferral of key 

spatial upgrades, are due to shortfalls in available budgets and not 

due to the project’s lack of contribution to that safety improvement. 

USA believes that the NASA policy should be to dedicate the entire 

amount of funds provided by Congress for safety upgrades to the 

highest priority initiatives. If technological challenges make it impossible to move aggressively on one project, then we should revise 

the timetable for implementation or redirect to the next, rather 

than reprogram for other purposes. 

19

We have mentioned the infrastructure. The ground facilities are 

essential. It is a tough environment for KSC. We have similar problems in Mississippi, in Alabama, and in Texas. You have to take 

care of these things, and we have not done as good a job in the past 

few years, in my 10 years in the management side of this, as we 

should have. 

The hands-on work force, technicians, inspectors, and engineers 

is at the lowest level ever and yet, as we said earlier, we completed 

essentially a nine flight rate a year schedule in the last 11 months 

with near perfect vehicles, near perfect software, and near perfect 

performance on the part of the ground crews, flight controllers, and 

the astronauts. 

This work force number has stabilized over the past 2 years. Morale is high. We have actually had some new hires, some fresh 

outs, or seed corn, as I call them, and they are excited. They like 

to be part of this program. But we need to be ever watchful that 

these folks are protected and augmented where necessary. They 

have very unique skills. For example, nobody in the world knows 

how to do proximity ops and rendezvous in space, except some of 

our folks. We helped DARPA, for example, in a program that they 

have got, because there is nobody else to do that, and we need to 

protect those skills. 

In summary, I have had the incredible opportunity for the last 

17 years to work on this program. I have had, depending on how 

you count, eight different jobs, from astronaut, to weather pilot, to 

deputy program manager, and now the chief operating officer of 

this fine company. We have made remarkable success in budget, in 

quality, in predictability of schedules. I am an optimist. My wife 

says I am an optimist to a fault, that I hide my head when the bad 

things come, but I will tell you that I am more pessimistic today 

than I have been in the 17 years that I have been doing this, and 

I worked through those years in the nineties that Bill talked about, 

downsizing, looking for efficiencies with my eyes wide open, and 

taking little, small steps, because the ice is getting thinner under 

our feet as we move out toward the middle of this lake, but as I 

look at the budget that is laid out for the next 5 or 6 years, it is 

a very disturbing budget that has got me more pessimistic, as I 

said, than I have been in 17 years. 

Thank you, sirs, for having us. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCulley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL JAMES MCCULLEY, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE

Chairman Wyden, Senator Allen, Senator Nelson and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the giving me the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee on a subject that is very important to our nation—Space Shuttle safety. 

Good afternoon, I am Mike McCulley, Chief Operating Officer of the United Space 

Alliance (USA). USA is responsible for the day-to-day management of NASA’s Shuttle fleet under a single prime contract, the Space Flight Operations Contract 

(SFOC), awarded by NASA in 1996. The company employs over 10,000 people, primarily in Texas and Florida. USA’s mission is safe operation of the Shuttle and the 

International Space Station (ISS). We plan the flights, train the astronauts, and 

prepare all of the hardware and software for launch, mission, and landing of the 

Space Shuttle as well as support the ISS on orbit. 

Prior to joining USA, I managed the Lockheed Martin contract at Kennedy Space 

Center. I also had the opportunity to pilot the highly successful Galileo mission on 

STS–34 in 1989. I come before you today with seventeen years of experience on the 

20

Shuttle program. Working over 80 Shuttle missions in 8 different jobs from weather 

pilot to astronaut to manager, I can state with certainty that the Shuttle program 

today is at the most robust and safest condition in its history. 

Together with NASA, the USA Team works continuously to reinforce the ‘‘safety 

first’’ culture of the Shuttle program. I am very proud that in the past eleven 

months, the Shuttle team successfully launched and landed 8 missions, which represents the highest flight rate in several years. Those flights have contributed to 

the establishment of a permanent outpost in low earth orbit. 

In order to continue supporting the nation’s Human Space exploration goals, USA 

and NASA have implemented significant initiatives to further improve Shuttle operations as well as our performance. We have exceeded all of our industrial safety 

goals by substantial percentages and are performing significantly above the aerospace industry average. Having safely and successfully launched 29 Shuttle missions since the inception of SFOC in 1996, USA gained invaluable experience and 

is now working closely with NASA to implement upgrades to the flight hardware, 

improve our processes and recommend improvements to ground facilities. However, 

in my opinion, our drive toward efficiency has moved us below sufficient funding for 

the many years of Shuttle operation ahead of us. 

Over the past decade, the Space Shuttle Program has done an outstanding job of 

continuing safe operations while reducing cost. Under the SFOC contract, USA and 

NASA have saved the American taxpayers $1.2B to date. USA has under-run the 

SFOC contract every year, and POP submissions to NASA reflect under-runs in 

GFY01 and GFY02. In addition to the savings realized under SFOC, NASA has reduced the Space Shuttle account by 40% since FY90. The Shuttle program succeeded in meeting reduced budget guidelines by achieving operational efficiencies, 

eliminating program reserves, and reducing its uncosted obligations to a level unacceptable for a program of this complexity. The budget limitations drove the Shuttle 

program to allow flight hardware upgrades and ground infrastructure projects to remain unfunded. 

As you may recall, at the time NASA signed the USA SFOC contract, the agency 

expected to phase in a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) to ultimately replace the 

Shuttle fleet in 2004. As a result, NASA’s management plans for Shuttle out-year 

budgets were greatly reduced, and plans for orbiter fleet and ground infrastructure 

improvements were very limited. Now, the Shuttle program is being asked to fly for 

many more years, yet the current and out-year budget profiles remain unchanged. 

USA believes that both the Congress and the American people support the continuation of the Federal Government’s efforts to maintain human presence in space. 

If we are correct, the Space Shuttle Program is the link to all human space flight 

initiatives. The next generation launch vehicle is at least a decade away. The safety 

of our astronauts is paramount to USA and NASA, and it is obvious from the statements made on the Senate Floor by Members of this Committee, this objective is 

paramount to the Congress as well. USA strongly agrees with the emphasis of the 

Congress on the need to prioritize funding for the Shuttle program, in particular, 

the safety upgrades. Moreover, we believe that the long-term budget policy of the 

Federal Government should reflect a determination to refrain from reducing safety 

upgrade initiatives and ignoring ground infrastructure requirement. Prudent, timely 

and pre-planned modifications and upgrades of the Shuttle must be a national priority that transcends the budget limitations of any given year. Affordable upgrades 

are an essential investment in retaining the value of this indispensable national 

asset. 

Today, I have been asked to focus my remarks on safety upgrades, infrastructure 

and the Shuttle workforce. 

Safety Upgrades 

The Space Shuttle is the foundation for our nation’s continued human access to 

space in the 21st Century. It is uniquely capable of carrying humans into space 

while simultaneously providing the ability for heavy lift, rendezvous, docking, space 

walking, micro-gravity research, and new technology testing. These capabilities are 

unmatched elsewhere in the world. 

At the direction of Congress, in the FY01 budget, NASA was provided additional 

funding to initiate the High Priority Safety Upgrades Program. NASA and its industry team have embarked on a systematic approach to upgrading and maintaining 

the Shuttle system. 

Contrary to some perceptions, the Shuttle Upgrades program has done exactly

what it was designed to do during project formulation: define requirements, establish project costs and schedules, and produce initial designs. I’d like to take this opportunity to provide the Committee with some information on the outstanding 

21

progress that has been made on these projects and the need for their continued development. 

New designs for Shuttle steering systems will eliminate the use of explosive and 

highly toxic hydrazine fuels. These new designs reduce hazards for both astronauts 

and ground crews. Complete integrated system prototypes of these designs, which 

could replace the current Auxiliary Power Units (APUs), have been built and tested. 

I am proud to say that this summer these prototypes have performed full mission 

simulations that meet and/or exceed current Shuttle capabilities on high fidelity test 

stands. 

The Orbiter APU prototype, known as the Electric APU (EAPU), would eliminate 

the single largest risk to Orbiter flight safety. The EAPU reduces the APU’s contribution to Orbiter flight risk from 30% to less than 5%. This project has advanced 

the state-of-the-art for spacecraft batteries and demonstrated that they have more 

than enough energy for their intended usage. Electric motors and pumps have also 

been built and tested that can provide the hydraulic power necessary to move Shuttle main engine actuators and aerodynamic surfaces. With requirement definition 

complete and many technical issues solved, the project is ready to produce detailed 

and cost-efficient designs. 

The current APUs on the Solid Rocket Boosters use the same hazardous hydrazine fuel, and, similarly, represent a significant Shuttle safety risk. Multiple prototypes were created for this system, and each met mission requirements. A very simple, low-risk design was selected that uses safe helium gas in a blow-down configuration. The design not only has shown to be effective and efficient, but also has 

made use of composites technology from the X–34 program to reduce weight. 

We have seen significant progress in the formulation and definition of the Cockpit 

Avionics Upgrade (CAU) over the last year and a half. The CAU is an important 

safety upgrade to the Orbiter that will greatly improve the situational awareness 

of the crew and reduce their workload, particularly in unexpected and critical emergency situations. 

Prototyping activities for the CAU software and hardware have clearly proven the 

safety benefits of this upgrade as well as the major modification required to the heritage onboard computers. Display prototypes have been evaluated by flight crewmembers against established criteria and have improved the increased response and 

performance by the crew in life critical situations. A hardware prototype of the new 

direct access capability to the onboard computers has proven the ability for all parameters contained in those computers to be available for display to the crew, thereby further enhancing their ability to have full control and reaction capability. Not 

only do these prototypes demonstrate the feasibility of key architectural components 

of CAU, they also reduce the risk associated with the development of the system. 

Designs for the Advanced Health Monitoring System (AHMS) for the Space Shuttle Main Engines continue to achieve greater definition, and a prototype is planned 

for a ground experiment in spring 2002. New engine controllers, new software and 

added computer power will ‘‘see’’ trouble coming a split second before it can do 

harm, thus allowing either a safe engine shut down or commanding a reduced utilization of the engine thereby increasing landing and/or orbit options. 

A number of smaller improvements also add significantly to overall Shuttle safety. 

A new tire has been tested that will support higher landing speeds and provide 

greater safety margins. Likewise, new welding technology has been developed that 

can increase weld strength and fracture toughness on the External Tank. Finally, 

a modification to the Orbiter’s radiators and wing leading edges that substantially 

reduces their susceptibility to orbital debris penetrations has nearly been completed 

across the Shuttle fleet. 

There are other product-improvement efforts that can further enhance the safety 

and operability of the Space Shuttle, particularly if it is to fly for an additional 10 

years or more. Delaying the implementation of these improvements will expose 

flight crews to higher levels of risk for longer than necessary. 

Also under consideration is the slippage of scheduled Orbiter Major Modifications 

[OMM’s]. This slippage may initiate a damaging trend, as budgets at NASA are not 

expected to improve. Delayed maintenance will delay incorporation of the upgrades 

creating detrimental fleet-wide implications. We prudently conduct scheduled 

OMM’s, which we believe are essential to ensuring the integrity of the vehicle. Onschedule, fleet-wide modifications are necessary and prudent—consistency in configuration of the Orbiters is a must for training, safety, and reliability of operations. 

USA believes that proposed cancellations or reductions in the Space Shuttle upgrades budget are due to shortfalls in available NASA budgets, and are not the result of the projects’ lack of contribution to overall Shuttle safety improvements. USA 

believes that NASA policy should be to dedicate the entire amount of funds provided 

by the Congress for safety upgrades to the highest priority Space Shuttle safety upVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
22

grades initiatives. If technological challenges make it impossible to move aggressively forward on one project, NASA should revise its timetable for implementation 

or redirect to the next project, rather than reprogramming the funds for other purposes. 

The continued, safe operation of the Space Shuttle is paramount until its replacement vehicle is in place. 

Infrastructure 

Space Shuttle ground facilities are essential to safe and reliable operation of the 

Shuttle fleet. Crumbling equipment has already begun to adversely affect program 

performance and safety. Necessary upgrades to the infrastructure supporting the 

Shuttle program at the four Human Space Flight Centers (KSC, JSC, MFSC, SSC) 

can no longer be ignored. 

NASA’s own Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC), a Subcommittee of the 

NASA Advisory Council, recently reported that the Shuttle might be operational for 

at least a decade beyond its originally predicted 2012 lifetime. Two quotes from the 

2000 SFAC Report are apropos at this point: ‘‘For a system that will go well beyond 

the 2012 timeframe, attention must be given to this infrastructure. This should be 

a separate budget initiative’’; and, ‘‘Flight hardware upgrades alone won’t keep Shuttles operating into the 2020’s without ground upgrades also.’’

Unfortunately, for years the NASA budget has not included funding for critical 

Shuttle infrastructure projects. Infrastructure revitalization appears to have become 

the ‘‘unwanted stepchild’’ of the budget process. The need to address infrastructure 

is a well-documented issue and represents a glaring deficiency in the NASA budget. 

Eroding infrastructure is creating long-term issues of reliability and supportability. 

There have been incidents where eroding infrastructure has created serious safety 

concerns and launch delays. Some of the infrastructure impacts and concerns include: 

In the Launch Control Center (LCC), operators have had to change firing rooms 

for each of the last two launches because of computer interface failures. 

Within the last six months, the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) had to shut 

down during stacking because of antiquated load breaker switches, which have a potential to explode and burn. 

Although NASA has spent millions of dollars to crutch the crumbling 8-acre VAB 

roof and corroded exterior paneling on the facility, paneling designed to withstand 

winds in excess of 100 mph, is being blown off the facility at winds of half the design load. 

The corrosive salt air environment of the Florida coast and launch plume impingement on the Shuttle launch pads result in a continuing battle against corrosion. Although the launch pads are periodically refurbished, the extensive amount of structure and operational activity restrictions has resulted in serious corrosion problems 

that need attention. 

There are also corrosion and obsolescence issues with respect to the crawler/transporters and the mobile launch platforms that have been in service since Apollo. 

Power, water, high-pressure gas, steam, and communications cabling distribution 

systems are suffering increasing failures due to age degradation and obsolescence. 

These basic utility distribution systems, at multiple operational locations, have outlived their design life. 

One-of-a-kind test equipment used for flight hardware repairs and spare parts 

production have been in service since the early 1970’s and are not expected to last 

through the now-extended Shuttle program life. 

At JSC, outdated, unsupported computer systems operated by obsolete computer 

languages are performing critical flight software validation. In some cases, these 

systems are still loaded with punch cards. 

The Electrical Power Systems Laboratory (EPSL), a one-of-a-kind replica of the 

Space Shuttle Electrical Power Distribution and Control System, is over 20 years 

old. Trends indicate major maintenance costs in the near term unless major updates 

in test equipment, facilities, and maintenance of this unique Shuttle asset are made. 

At Stennis Space Center, propellant barges are in dire need of having their old 

mechanical and electrical systems replaced as well as having their hulls overhauled 

in dry dock. The barges operate in a harsh, corrosive atmosphere on a continuous 

basis. Barge overhaul has not occurred in over 15 years, yet, the Coast Guard recommends every 5 years. Additionally, recent operating experience and inspection of 

the barges indicate a loss or compaction of vessel insulation. 

Large High Pressure Industrial Water (HPIW) Pumps that provide water for 

flame bucket cooling and deluge water to the Shuttle main engine test stands are 

in need of refurbishment. These pumps were installed at Stennis Space Center in 

23

the mid-1960’s. The rotating elements of the pumps and gearboxes need to be replaced to assure reliable service. 

One half of annual maintenance budgets are spent band-aiding systems that are 

failing and then maintaining the band-aids, which becomes an additional maintenance burden. Expensive makeshift fabrications are a common occurrence as obsolescent spare parts and replacement units become harder and harder to acquire. 

We believe infrastructure improvements can wait no longer. The Federal Government must begin to budget annual funds to address NASA’s prioritized list of infrastructure projects. 

Shuttle Operations 

USA has become increasingly concerned that NASA will resort to reductions in 

the number of Shuttle flights as a stopgap method of accounting for anticipated 

shortfalls in its budget. Reduction of the number of Shuttle flights presents serious 

erosion in the capability of NASA to engage in human space flight activities. USA 

does not believe that a reduction in space flights is in the best interest of the nation. 

Moreover, such an approach fails to recognize the impact of flight rate on program 

costs. 

The Shuttle program’s extraordinary achievement in operational efficiencies was 

driven by NASA’s desire to help sustain the Shuttle program, thus assuring that 

the workhorse of the nation’s Human Space Flight programs would be available to 

meet the full demands of research and human development of space. Reducing the 

number of flights as a budgetary tool wipes out years of developing these operating 

efficiencies. At some point, reduced activity eliminates operating efficiencies and results in unjustifiable increased operating costs on a per mission basis. A flight 

schedule of at least six flights per year must be maintained to sustain the efficiency 

of the Shuttle Program. Flight reductions also threaten to seriously erode and irreparably harm the entire Human Space Flight program. Reducing the flight schedule 

below six flights per year will force a delay in the pace of the Space Station assembly thereby driving further ISS cost growth as the assembly process stretches in 

time. A decision to limit Shuttle flights would also severely limit opportunities for 

space based scientific research, which remains a top priority for the Congress. 

Shuttle Workforce 

The Shuttle workforce is at the lowest number of personnel it has ever been, and 

yet, through numerous efficiencies, it is achieving the aggressive goals of the Space 

Shuttle Program with the best record in its history of on-time launches (excluding 

weather, the last 6 missions launched without delays) and lowest number of inflight anomalies (IFA) (averaged 20 IFAs in FY92 and steadily decreased to an average of 4 in FY00). The workforce total has stabilized over the past two years and 

morale is high. Even with the prospect of a lower flight rate, the demands on the 

workforce are increasing due to aging hardware, upgrades implementation, and normal lifecycle modifications. We need to be ever watchful that this very talented and 

dedicated workforce is protected and augmented when necessary. The experience of 

our management, engineering, and technician personnel will keep an aging Shuttle 

program at its highest level of efficiency. The dedication and skill of this workforce 

is the cornerstone of Shuttle safety. 

Summary 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, USA is proud to operate this 

unique and indispensable national asset. The Space Shuttle is a critical part of the 

nation’s space infrastructure and must continue to fly safely for at least another 

decade, possibly longer. To ensure continued safe and efficient operation of the nation’s Shuttle fleet, NASA and USA must pursue vehicle hardware, processing and 

ground facility improvements. Safety, maintainability and obsolescence issues must 

not be allowed to cripple the progress of our nation’s Human Space Flight program 

while next generation systems are being developed. Given the likely lead times associated with the definition, funding and development of a new human-rated space vehicle, the Space Shuttle should be acknowledged and supported as the primary 

method for humans to reach the ISS throughout the Station’s life. 

Over the past decade, the Space Shuttle program has done an outstanding job of 

continuing to fly the Shuttle safely and reliably while reducing costs. The Space 

Shuttle program is now under-funded. If we hope to continue our world leadership 

role in human space flight, it is imperative that adequate funding be provided to 

keep the Shuttle flying safely and reliably, including specific funding for Shuttle upgrades and infrastructure revitalization. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee. I will be 

happy to answer any questions you might have.

24

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much for some very helpful testimony. 

Mr. Blomberg, I think you heard me address one of the comments you had made earlier, because I was particularly struck with 

this assessment you made that it is hard to know when you are 

getting close to the line. I did not read into the record at that time 

that you stated, apparently somewhat thankfully, that fortunately 

you did not have to get into the budget issues in the past. 

My guess is, that is going to have to change in the days ahead, 

because these calls are so difficult, so gut-wrenching, with respect 

to the choices we are making, but we are very pleased that there 

is an independent safety advisory group, and that you all are part 

of it, and why don’t you go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. BLOMBERG, CHAIR, AEROSPACE 

SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL, AND PRESIDENT, DUNLOP &

ASSOCIATES, INC. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to 

summarize the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s current view of 

Space Shuttle safety. Both NASA and its contractors are handling 

near-term Space Shuttle safety admirably. Our primary concern, 

therefore, relates to the long-term picture, which has seemingly deteriorated since we highlighted it in our last annual report, which 

was last February. 

The Space Shuttle cannot continue indefinitely at an acceptable 

level of risk unless appropriate steps are taken now. There are four 

areas that we on the panel believe are critical to long-term Space 

Shuttle safety, and many of them have been mentioned, but I think 

it is worth reiterating them. The first deals with flight system improvements to reduce the risks associated with the servicing and 

use of the flight hardware. Unfortunately, budgetary pressures 

have forced the Space Shuttle program to eliminate or defer many 

needed upgrades. The panel does not think this is prudent, because 

it means the system must continue to operate at a higher risk level 

than is necessary, resulting in a lost safety opportunity. 

Under present guidelines, upgrades must be funded at the expense of activities needed to continue flying safely in the present. 

No program should be forced into a position in which tradeoffs between current and future safety are required. Safety should be 

foremost forever. 

The panel cautions that now is not the time for significant cutbacks. At this stage in the life of a complex vehicle that will likely 

remain in service for several more decades, increased rather than 

diminished risk reduction efforts are necessary. 

Our second focal area relates to the renewal of the ground infrastructure, and we include in that facilities, ground support equipment, and test and checkout gear, not just the buildings. These assets, like the vehicle itself, are aging. Much maintenance and improvement of this infrastructure has been deferred to conserve resources for operations. As a result, there is a large backlog of restoration and upgrade work. If needed efforts are delayed further, 

it may become impossible to catch up. 

25

Aging infrastructure becomes unreliable. Safety can be compromised when systems fail at inopportune times or multiple simultaneous failures occur, and the risk of this goes up as infrastructure ages. 

The third area requiring attention is logistics. An aging flight vehicle faces logistics challenges not only from wear and tear, but 

also from obsolescence. Some suppliers lose skills when they stop 

production. Others go out of business, or lose interest in maintaining capabilities when relegated to a minor support role. 

Space Shuttle logistics are hampered by a lack of sufficient assets to support the program for its likely service life. Where total 

inventory is adequate, flight-ready spares are still often less than 

desirable, because of slow repair turn-around times. NASA must 

analyze its logistics needs for the entire projected life of the Space 

Shuttle, and adopt a realistic program for acquiring and supporting 

sufficient numbers of suitable components and maintaining a key 

supplier base. Acquisitions must be made soon because of the long 

lead times for some complex, safety-critical Space Shuttle components. 

The final area I would like to highlight deals with work force. 

NASA and its contractors are inexorably losing experienced workers to retirement. Previous downsizing and hiring freezes that have 

already been mentioned have limited the available numbers of fully 

qualified successors. This projected loss of experience need not be 

detrimental to future safety if current planning is adequate to 

present the next generation of Space Shuttle managers with reasonable tasks. The knowledge and experience of current personnel 

must be captured and transferred to the future work force if safety 

and efficiency are to be maximized. 

In summary, in order to fly safely until 2020 and beyond, and we 

firmly believe that this vehicle will be the human space flight vehicle for this nation during that period, the Space Shuttle will need 

improvements, additional care, infrastructure revitalization, better 

logistics, a skilled and experienced work force, and development of 

an operational posture consistent with the capabilities of that work 

force. The longer that these vital steps are postponed, the harder 

they will be to accomplish, the more they will cost, and the higher 

will be the safety risk. 

The preferred alternative is to acknowledge now the role of the 

Space Shuttle as our human space flight vehicle for the foreseeable 

future, and to care for the total system appropriately in a timely 

manner. 

As Senator Wyden quoted, the boundary between safe and unsafe 

operations can never be well-defined. As equipment and facilities 

age, and work force experience is lost, the likelihood that the line 

will be inadvertently crossed, even by well-meaning managers, increases. The best way to prevent problems is to be proactive and 

continuous with risk reduction efforts. The panel fears that the 

Space Shuttle program is not being allowed to do this, and in fact 

has been forced to forego appropriate long-term planning in order 

to maximize the safety of present operations. This is not a wise approach, and we hope it will not continue. 

26

I thank you for this opportunity to present the thoughts of the 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and I stand ready to answer any 

questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blomberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. BLOMBERG, CHAIR, AEROSPACE SAFETY

ADVISORY PANEL, AND PRESIDENT, DUNLOP & ASSOCIATES, INC. 

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to appear before you today to summarize the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s current position on issues relevant to the safety of the Space Shuttle. 

The Subcommittee’s focus on both the short-term and the post-2012 era is particularly germane. The Panel has focused much recent attention on the clear dichotomy 

between future Space Shuttle risk levels and the extent of current planning and investment directed at operating an aging space vehicle for the foreseeable future—

to 2020 and beyond. Our most recent Annual Report delivered to the NASA Administrator last February highlighted the issues. We noted that efforts of NASA and 

its contractors were being primarily addressed to the immediate safety needs of the 

Space Shuttle. Little effort was being expended on the long-term safe use of the system. The overarching theme of our report, therefore, was the need for NASA, the 

Administration and the Congress to use a longer, more realistic planning horizon 

when making decisions with respect to the Space Shuttle. 

In the months since last year’s report was prepared, the long-term situation has 

deteriorated. Budget constraints imposed on NASA’s human spaceflight programs 

have forced the Space Shuttle program to adopt an even shorter planning horizon 

in order to continue flying safely. As a result, more items that should be addressed 

now are being deferred. This adds to the backlog of restorations and upgrades required for safety and continued efficient operations and postpones many risk reduction benefits. The resulting situation is suboptimal at best and gives the Panel 

cause for significant long-term concern. NASA needs a reliable human rated space 

vehicle to reap the full benefits of the International Space Station (ISS), and the 

Panel believes that, with adequate planning and investment, that vehicle can be the 

Space Shuttle. 

Before addressing our concerns, it is important to stress that the Panel does not 

believe that safety has been compromised at present. NASA and its contractors 

maintain an excellent level of safety consciousness, and this has contributed to significant flight achievements. The defined requirements for flying at an acceptable 

level of risk are always met. Increasingly, though, these requirements can only be 

achieved through the innovative and tireless efforts of an experienced workforce. As 

hardware wears out and veterans retire, the program will inevitably lose some of 

this compensatory ability. The options will then be to accept increased risk or to 

ground the fleet until time-consuming improvements and repairs can be accomplished. Neither of these is an acceptable option when there are clearly defined 

paths to reduce risk and increase operational reliability in the future. 

The Panel believes that four areas are critical to the long-term safe operation of 

the Space Shuttle:

• Flight system improvements—Reducing the risks associated with the servicing 

and use of flight hardware and compensating for obsolescence and wear.

• Renewal of the ground infrastructure—Ensuring that the facilities, ground support equipment and test and checkout gear used with the Space Shuttle are 

fully capable and supportive of operations at the lowest possible risk.

• Logistics—Providing for the timely availability of properly functioning components throughout the projected life of the Space Shuttle.

• Workforce—Providing for the continuing availability of critical skills and the retention of experienced personnel. 

Flight System Improvements 

The Space Shuttle is not unique as an aging aerospace vehicle that still possesses 

substantial flight potential and has yet to be superseded by significant new technology. Any replacement for the Space Shuttle started now would likely take a decade or more to be designed, built and certified and likely would not be materially 

more capable than the current system with appropriate updates. Commercial airlines and the military have faced the same situation and have implemented timely 

27

product improvement programs for older aircraft to provide many additional years 

of safe, capable and cost effective service. 

The Space Shuttle program is not presently able to follow this proven approach. 

Responding to budgetary pressures has forced the program to eliminate or defer 

many already planned and engineered improvements. Some of these would directly 

reduce flight risk. Others would improve operability or the launch reliability of the 

system and are therefore potentially related to safety. In addition to the obvious 

safety concerns related to loss of vehicle and crew, we view anything that might 

ground the Space Shuttle while the ISS is inhabited as unnecessarily increasing 

risk. The Panel also does not think it is prudent to delay ready to install safety upgrades and to continue to operate at a higher risk level than is necessary. 

An example of a potentially valuable improvement that has recently been dropped 

is the electric auxiliary power unit (EAPU). This upgrade can reduce risk both on 

the ground and in flight through the elimination of hydrazine and the high-speed 

turbo-machinery characteristic of the current auxiliary power unit (APU). It can also 

improve operability by doing away with the use of cumbersome Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) suits and the need to clear the work area 

during many APU ground-processing steps. Development of an acceptable EAPU 

will require some battery technology advances and weight reduction efforts. If the 

Space Shuttle is to fly until 2020 and beyond, it would appear that an investment 

in this type of multi-pronged improvement would be well justified. Under present 

guidelines, however, the human spaceflight program would have to fund EAPU development and certification at the expense of activities needed to continue flying 

safely in the present. No program should be forced into a position in which tradeoffs 

between current and future safety are required. Total risk can only be minimized 

if managers are free to make decisions with full recognition of the entire expected 

life cycle of the system for which they are responsible. 

Also, if the Space Shuttle does not introduce the EAPU or another replacement, 

it must rely on the present hydrazine-powered APU for the life of the program. This 

will require focusing additional current attention on ensuring the long-term availability of APU components and maintaining the ability of the supplier to provide 

support. 

Other improvements to the orbiter and the other Space Shuttle elements are 

being delayed in order to accommodate current budget needs. This type of ‘‘stretch 

out’’ usually ends up costing a program significant additional funds in the long run. 

More importantly, when risk reduction efforts, such as the advanced health monitoring for the Space Shuttle Main Engines, Phase II of the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade, orbiter wire redundancy separation, the orbiter radiator isolation valve and 

the helium auxiliary power unit for the solid rocket boosters, are deferred, astronauts are needlessly exposed to current levels of flight risk for longer than necessary. This is a lost opportunity that is not offset by any real life cycle cost saving 

for the program. 

The Panel cautions that now is not the time for significant cutbacks. At this stage 

in the life of a complex vehicle that will likely remain in service for several more 

decades, increased rather than diminished risk reduction efforts are essential. 

NASA must focus on applying the best available technologies to increasing the safety of the total system. 

Ground Infrastructure 

In order to fly safely, the Space Shuttle must be supported by a properly functioning ground infrastructure including facilities, ground support equipment and 

test and checkout gear. These assets, like the vehicle itself, are aging. Much maintenance and improvement of this infrastructure has already been deferred to conserve 

resources for operations. As a result, there is a large backlog of restoration and upgrade work. The sheer magnitude of this backlog means that it will take some time 

to bring the infrastructure back to an acceptable condition if the available numbers 

of trained and experienced managers and engineers are applied to the task and 

funding is available. Unfortunately, rather than improving, the situation becomes 

worse each year. If restoration continues to be delayed, it will reach a point at 

which it may be impossible to catch up. 

Aging infrastructure becomes unreliable. At best, this will be a costly nuisance 

when failures delay launches. At worst, safety can be compromised when systems 

fail at inopportune times or multiple, simultaneous failures occur. As individual system reliability goes down, the likelihood of conjoint failures typically increases. 

Often, these multiple malfunctions have safety implications when the individual 

failures of which they are composed do not. The Panel is particularly concerned 

about the infrastructure at the Kennedy Space Center. The data cables leading to 

the launch pads and the deteriorating roof and siding panels on the Vehicle AssemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
28

bly Building are examples of weak spots that could blossom into full-fledged safety 

or operations issues. 

Much of the Space Shuttle ground infrastructure dates to the Apollo era or earlier. It will be needed for at least another 20 years of Space Shuttle operations. In 

order to keep these critical parts of the system safe and fully supportive of the overall program, NASA needs to revitalize them as expeditiously as possible. If the infrastructure is updated and kept viable, it can also be a legacy to any vehicle that 

supersedes the Space Shuttle. 

Logistics 

A safe flight program needs a viable supply chain that ensures the availability 

of functionally appropriate and reliable spare parts. An aging flight vehicle faces logistics challenges not only from wear and tear but also from obsolescence. Suppliers 

often lose skills when they stop production. Some go out of business or lose interest 

in maintaining capabilities when relegated to a minor support role. Technological 

advances can also strain the logistics function when new, safer approaches to subsystems become available and must be phased in. 

Space Shuttle logistics, although handled admirably by NASA and its contractors, 

is hampered by a lack of assets. Simply, the program has inadequate spare parts 

for many key subsystems. The Ku-band antenna is an example of a component for 

which the available stock is simply not sufficient. Where total inventory is adequate, 

flight-ready spares are still often less than desirable because of slow repair turnaround times. The logistics problem facing the Space Shuttle program is exacerbated by the long lead times for the manufacture of many critical components. The 

program is keeping up with logistics needs at present, but as the vehicle and its 

systems continue to age, problems can be expected. The response to these types of 

problems is often cannibalization of components from one vehicle to another. When 

cannibalization is used as a routine response to parts shortages, safety can be compromised. 

Supportability is also a logistics concern. The nozzle for the Space Shuttle Main 

Engine (SSME) is one example. It retains its original design in which over 1,000 

tubes for carrying coolant must be inserted by hand before they are brazed. This 

is a highly specialized task that is dependent on an eroding base of experienced contractor personnel. If the Space Shuttle is to fly safely for its entire anticipated life, 

attention must be focused now either on developing a new nozzle or on procuring 

a sufficient number of the existing nozzles to ensure the availability of safe components and the maintenance of the contractor’s skill base. 

Overall, NASA must analyze its logistics needs for the entire projected life of the 

Space Shuttle and adopt a realistic program for acquiring and supporting sufficient 

numbers of suitable components. 

Workforce 

Identifying and implementing essential vehicle, infrastructure and logistics improvements to the Space Shuttle system requires an appropriately trained, experienced and motivated workforce. Motivation does not seem to be an issue. When permitted, NASA and its contractors have been successful in recruiting some of the best 

and brightest engineers and technicians even at less than prevailing industry salaries. These individuals almost universally express a desire to work on the Space 

Shuttle and ISS because they represent inspiring and challenging opportunities. It 

is fair to say that when it comes to human spaceflight, the dream is still truly alive! 

A complex endeavor such as the Space Shuttle, however, requires an experienced 

as well as a skilled and motivated workforce. Even with extensive training, inexperienced engineers and technicians are more prone to errors and less likely to detect 

problems than their experienced counterparts. NASA and its contractors are inexorably losing experienced workers to retirement. The hiatus in new hires during the 

1990’s has created a gap in the distribution of experience. As a result the successors 

to current managers will be operating without the same level of first-hand experience as their predecessors. 

The projected loss of experience need not be detrimental to future safety if current 

planning is adequate to present the next generation of Space Shuttle managers with 

reasonable tasks. This can be accomplished by ensuring that they are given a vehicle that is upgraded to the maximum extent possible and fully ready to conduct its 

mission for a realistic service life. Allowing experienced personnel to plan and execute any needed upgrades before they retire will permit their successors to focus primarily on safe operations based on clearly defined requirements while they amass 

their own experience. It would also be advisable to capture as much of the knowledge of the existing workforce as possible so that it can be archived for use in the 

future. 

29

Conclusion 

The minimum risk approach is clear. In order to fly safely until 2020 and beyond, 

the Space Shuttle will need improvements, additional care, infrastructure revitalization, better logistics, a skilled and experienced workforce and development of an 

operational posture consistent with the capabilities of that workforce. The longer 

that these vital steps are postponed, the harder they will be to accomplish, the more 

they will cost and the higher will be the safety risk. The preferred alternative is 

to acknowledge now the role of the Space Shuttle as our human spaceflight vehicle 

for the foreseeable future and to care for the total system appropriately in a timely 

manner. This will give our astronauts a safer and more capable vehicle to operate 

and reduce life cycle cost. 

Safety is an intangible whose true value is only appreciated in its absence. The 

boundary between safe and unsafe operations can never be well defined. As a result, 

even the most well meaning managers may not know when they cross it. Nobody 

would deliberately jeopardize Space Shuttle safety. But, as equipment and facilities 

age and workforce experience is lost, the likelihood that the line will be inadvertently breached increases. The best way to prevent problems is to be proactive and 

continuous with risk reduction efforts. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel fears 

that the Space Shuttle program is not being allowed to do this and, in fact, has been 

forced to forego appropriate long-term planning in order to maximize the safety of 

present operations. This is not a prudent approach to an ongoing program, and we 

hope it will not continue. Long-term safety is best achieved by giving capable managers a realistic budget and permitting them to exercise reasonable engineering discretion. By analogy, we would all willingly fly today on an airline whose aging aircraft were as well cared for as the Space Shuttle. If, however, that airline had neglected preparations for the future as the Space Shuttle program has been forced 

to do, we would certainly not invest in its stock. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present the thoughts of the Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel on this important topic.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Blomberg. Mr. Li. 

STATEMENT OF ALLEN LI, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION & 

SOURCING MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Mr. LI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and at the risk of Senator 

Nelson thinking I am a bean-counter, my background is aerospace 

engineering, so I am not a bean-counter, so I hope I am on your 

good side here. 

Senator NELSON. But you are a good bean-counter. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LI. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am 

pleased to be here today to discuss work force and safety issues facing NASA’s Space Shuttle program. As requested, I will highlight 

the key points in our prepared statement. 

Two years ago, the Shuttle program was at a critical juncture. 

Its work force had declined significantly since 1995, its flight rate 

was about to double to support assembling a space station, and 

costly safety upgrades were planned to enhance the Shuttle’s safe 

operation until at least 2012. 

For the purposes of today’s hearing, we updated our prior work 

to reflect where NASA is today. First, the work force issue. While 

NASA is making progress in rebuilding its Shuttle work force, 

many challenges still remain. NASA’s current budget request 

projects an increase of more than 200 full-time equivalent staff 

through fiscal year 2002. During the past 11⁄2 years, NASA has 

added 191 new hires and 33 transfers to the Shuttle program. 

Agency officials told us that the new staff are being assigned in 

areas critical to Shuttle safety. 

30

NASA has also focused more attention on human capital management and its annual performance plan, by outlining an overall 

strategy to attract and retain a skilled work force. Even with these 

gains, however, challenges lie ahead. For example, because many 

of the additional staff are new hires, they will require extensive 

training, and they will need to be effectively integrated into the 

Shuttle program. Also, NASA still needs to fully staff areas critical 

to Shuttle safety, deal with critical losses to retirement in coming 

years, and most of all, sustain management attention to human 

capital reforms. 

As Senator Allen stated earlier, NASA’s work force problems are 

not unique. Many agencies have also been contending with serious 

human capital shortfalls. This is why GAO recently added strategic 

human capital management to its list of federal programs and operations identified as high risk. 

Turning now to the issue of Shuttle upgrades, we see some 

progress. I believe that NASA’s ability to implement safety upgrades in a timely manner is uncertain. On the positive side, NASA 

has started to define and develop some specific Shuttle upgrades. 

For example, requirements for the cockpit’s avionics upgrade have 

been defined. Also, Phase I of the main engine advanced health 

monitoring system is in development. 

NASA officials at Johnson told us that staffing for the upgrade 

program is now adequate. According to these officials, Johnson has 

added about 70 people to the upgrade program, while Marshall has 

added about 60 people. We did not assess the quality or sufficiency 

of the added staff, but according to officials from the development 

office, the work force skill level has improved to the point where 

the program has a good skill base. 

On the down side, the agency is still assessing the full package 

of its plan improvements, and some projects have already encountered funding and scheduling problems. NASA has not yet fully defined plan upgrades. Studies on particular projects such as developing a crew escape system are not expected for sometime. Moreover, our previous concerns with the technical maturity and potential cost growth of particular projects have proven to be warranted. 

For example, implementation of the electric APU has been delayed indefinitely because of technical uncertainties and cost 

growth. Also, the estimated cost of the Phase II of the main engine 

advanced health monitoring system has almost doubled, and NASA 

has canceled the proposed development of a Block III main engine 

improvement because of technological costs and schedule uncertainties. 

Compounding these challenges is the uncertainty surrounding 

the long-term future of the Shuttle. NASA is attempting to develop 

alternatives to the Shuttle, but it is not yet clear what these alternatives will be, and when this will happen. I recently testified before the House Science Committee on NASA’s Space Launch Initiative. This is a risk reduction effort enabling NASA and industry to 

make a decision in the 2006 timeframe on whether to proceed with 

the full-scale development of a reusable launch vehicle, also known 

as an RLV. A future RLV is envisioned to significantly reduce the 

cost of sending payloads to space, and would be an alternative to 

the Shuttle. 

31

1See Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management Attention (GAO/T–

NSIAD–00–133, Mar. 22, 2000) and Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require Continued Attention (GAO/NSIAD/GGD–00–186, Aug. 15, 2000). 

However, as illustrated by the difficulties NASA experienced 

with the X–33 RLV technology demonstrator, this is no easy task. 

Because an exact timeframe for the Shuttle’s replacement cannot 

be determined at this time, Shuttle work force and upgrade issues 

will need to be considered without fully knowing how the program 

will evolve over the long run. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, NASA has made a start at addressing serious work force problems that could undermine Shuttle safety. It has also begun undertaking the important task of making 

needed safety and supportability upgrades. Nevertheless, the challenges ahead are significant. NASA is operating in an environment 

of uncertainty as to when the Shuttle will be replaced, and is still 

contending with the effects of its downsizing effort. As such, it will 

be exceedingly important that NASA sustain its attention and commitment to making Shuttle operation as safe as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my summary statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Li follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALLEN LI, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION & SOURCING

MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss workforce and safety issues facing the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Space Shuttle program. 

As requested for this hearing, we have updated the information we provided to this 

Subcommittee in a March 2000 testimony and in an August 2000 report.1 At the 

time, the Space Shuttle program was at a critical juncture: its workforce had declined significantly since 1995, its flight rate was to double over that of recent years 

to support the assembly of the International Space Station, and costly safety upgrades were planned to enhance the Space Shuttle’s safe operation until at least 

2012. 

We reported that workforce reductions were jeopardizing NASA’s ability to safely 

support the Shuttle’s planned flight rate. For instance, many areas critical to safety 

were not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers. Recognizing the need to revitalize 

the Shuttle’s workforce, NASA terminated its downsizing plans for the Shuttle program in December 1999 and initiated efforts to hire new staff. Furthermore, we also 

reported that NASA faced a number of programmatic and technical challenges in 

its efforts to develop and begin equipping the Shuttle fleet with a variety of safety 

and supportability upgrades over the next 5 years. These included a demanding 

schedule and undefined design and workforce requirements. 

Today, I will discuss NASA’s current progress in addressing these workforce and 

safety issues and the challenges still ahead. In brief, we found that NASA is making 

progress in revitalizing the Shuttle program’s workforce. NASA’s current budget request projects an increase of more than 200 full-time equivalent staff through fiscal 

year 2002. NASA has also focused more attention on human capital management 

in its annual performance plan by outlining an overall strategy to attract and retain 

a skilled workforce. Even with these gains, however, there are still considerable 

challenges ahead. For example, because many of the additional staff are new hires, 

they will require considerable training, and they will need to be effectively integrated into the Shuttle program. Also, NASA still needs to fully staff areas critical 

to Shuttle safety; deal with critical losses due to retirements in the coming years; 

and, most of all, sustain management attention to human capital reforms. NASA’s 

workforce problems are not unique. Many agencies have also been contending with 

serious human capital shortfalls. We recently added strategic human capital management to our list of federal programs and operations identified as high risk. Moreover, while NASA is making strides in revitalizing its workforce, its ability to implement safety upgrades in a timely manner is uncertain. NASA is still assessing the 

full package of its planned improvements, and some projects have already encountered funding and scheduling problems. Overcoming challenges related to the upVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
32

2Several workforce studies had been completed since 1996, including Independent Assessment 

of the Shuttle Processing Directorate Engineering and Management Processes, NASA Human Exploration and Development of Space Independent Assessment Office, (Nov. 4, 1999); Annual Report for 1999, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (Feb. 2000); and Report to Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (Mar. 7, 2000). 3The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to prepare annual 

performance plans. The purpose is to improve the efficiency of all federal agencies, under the 

goals of improving management, effectiveness, and public accountability; improving congresgrades is critical since NASA will be relying on the Space Shuttle longer than originally anticipated. 

Background 

The Space Shuttle is the world’s first reusable space transportation system. It 

consists of a reusable orbiter with three main engines, two partially reusable solid 

rocket boosters, and an expendable external fuel tank. Since it is the nation’s only 

launch system capable of carrying people to and from space, the Shuttle’s viability 

is important to NASA’s other space programs, such as the International Space Station. NASA operates four orbiters in the Shuttle fleet. 

Space systems are inherently risky because of the technology involved and the 

complexity of their activities. For example, thousands of people perform about 1.2 

million separate procedures to prepare a Shuttle for flight. NASA has emphasized 

that the top priority for the Shuttle program is safety. 

The Space Shuttle’s workforce shrank from about 3,000 to about 1,800 full-time 

equivalent employees from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 1999. A major element of this workforce reduction was the transfer of Shuttle launch preparation and 

maintenance responsibilities from the government and multiple contractors to a single private contractor. NASA believed that consolidating Shuttle operations under 

a single contract would allow it to reduce the number of engineers, technicians, and 

inspectors directly involved in the day-to-day oversight of Shuttle processing. However, the agency later concluded that these reductions caused shortages of required 

personnel to perform in-house activities and maintain adequate oversight of the contractor. 

Since the Shuttle’s first flight in 1981, the Space Shuttle program has developed 

and incorporated many modifications to improve performance and safety. These include a super lightweight external tank, cockpit display enhancements, and main 

engine safety and reliability improvements. In 1994, NASA stopped approving additional upgrades, pending the potential replacement of the Shuttle with another reusable launch vehicle. 

NASA now believes that it will have to maintain the current Shuttle fleet until 

at least 2012, and possibly through 2020. Accordingly, it has established a development office to identify and prioritize upgrades to maintain and improve Shuttle 

operational safety. 

Progress and Challenges in Revitalizing the Shuttle Workforce 

Last year, we reported that several internal studies showed that the Shuttle program’s workforce had been negatively affected by downsizing.2 These studies concluded that the existing workforce was stretched thin to the point where many areas 

critical to Shuttle safety—such as mechanical engineering, computer systems, and 

software assurance engineering—were not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers. 

(Appendix I identifies all of the key areas that were facing staff shortages). Moreover, the workforce was showing signs of overwork and fatigue. For example, indicators on forfeited leave, absences from training courses, and stress-related employee 

assistance visits were all on the rise. Lastly, the program’s demographic shape had 

changed dramatically. Throughout the Office of Space Flight, which includes the 

Shuttle program, there were more than twice as many workers over 60 years old 

than under 30 years old. This condition clearly jeopardized the program’s ability to 

hand off leadership roles to the next generation. 

According to NASA’s Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, the 

agency faced significant safety and mission success risks because of workforce 

issues. This was reinforced by NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, which concluded that workforce problems could potentially affect flight safety as the Shuttle 

launch rate increased. 

NASA subsequently recognized the need to revitalize its workforce and began taking actions toward this end. In October 1999, NASA’s Administrator directed the 

agency’s highest-level managers to consider ways to reduce workplace stress. The 

Administrator later announced the creation of a new office to increase the agency’s 

emphasis on health and safety and included improved health monitoring as an objective in its fiscal year 2001 performance plan.3 Finally, in December 1999, NASA 

33

sional decision-making on where to commit the nation’s fiscal and human resources; and improving citizens’ confidence in the government’s performance. 4See Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders (GAO/OCG–00–14G, 

Sept. 2000). 5Full-time equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those of an employee who works 

40 hours per week in 1 year. Thus, a measure of 200 full-time equivalent staff does not necessarily represent the actual number of new hires. 6Workforce Planning and Restructuring, OMB Bulletin No. 01–07 (May 8, 2001). 

terminated its downsizing plans for the Shuttle program and initiated efforts to 

begin hiring new staff. 

Following the termination of its downsizing plans, NASA and the Office of Management and Budget conducted an overall workforce review to examine personnel 

needs, barriers to achieving proper staffing levels and skill mixes, and potential reforms to help address the agency’s long-term requirements. In performing this review, NASA used GAO’s human capital self-assessment checklist.4 The self-assessment framework provides a systematic approach for identifying and addressing 

human capital issues and allows agency managers to (1) quickly determine whether 

their approach to human capital supports their vision of who they are and what 

they want to accomplish and (2) identify those policies that are in particular need 

of attention. The checklist follows a five-part framework that includes strategic 

planning, organizational alignment, leadership, talent, and performance culture. 

Recent Actions Taken by NASA 

NASA has taken a number of actions this year to regenerate its Shuttle program 

workforce. Significantly, NASA’s current budget request projects an increase of more 

than 200 full-time equivalent staff 5 for the Shuttle program through fiscal year 

2002—both new hires and staff transfers. According to NASA, from the beginning 

of fiscal year 2000 through July 2001, the agency had actually added 191 new hires 

and 33 transfers to the Shuttle program. These new staff are being assigned to 

areas critical to Shuttle safety—such as project engineering, aerospace vehicle design, avionics, and software—according to NASA. As noted earlier, appendix I provides a list of critical skills where NASA is addressing personnel shortages. 

NASA is also focusing more attention on human capital management in its annual performance plan. The Government Performance and Results Act requires a 

performance plan that describes how an agency’s goals and objectives are to be 

achieved. These plans are to include a description of the (1) operational processes, 

skills, and technology and (2) human, capital and information resources required to 

meet those goals and objectives. On June 9, 2000, the President directed the heads 

of all federal executive branch agencies to fully integrate human resources management into agency planning, budget, and mission evaluation processes and to clearly 

state specific human resources management goals and objectives in their strategic 

and annual performance plans. 

In its Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan, NASA describes plans to attract and 

retain a skilled workforce. The specifics include the following:

• Developing an initiative to enhance NASA’s recruitment capabilities, focusing 

on college graduates.

• Cultivating a continued pipeline of talent to meet future science, math, and 

technology needs.

• Investing in technical training and career development.

• Supplementing the workforce with nonpermanent civil servants, where it makes 

sense.

• Funding more university-level courses and providing training in other core functional areas.

• Establishing a mentoring network for project managers.

We will provide a more detailed assessment of the agency’s progress in achieving 

its human capital goals as part of our review of NASA’s Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan requested by Senator Fred Thompson. 

Alongside these initiatives, NASA is in the process of responding to a May 2001 

directive from the Office of Management and Budget on workforce planning and restructuring.6 The directive requires executive agencies to determine (1) what skills 

are vital to accomplishing their missions, (2) how changes expected in the agency’s 

work will affect human resources, (3) how skill imbalances are being addressed, (4) 

what challenges impede the agency’s ability to recruit and retain high-quality staff, 

and (5) what barriers there are to restructuring the workforce. NASA officials told 

34

7See Annual Report for 2000, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. 8See Performance and Accountability Series—Major Management Challenges and Program 

Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective (GAO–01–241, Jan. 2001). In addition, see the accompanying 21 reports (numbered GAO–01–242 through GAO–01–262) on specific agencies. 9See Human Capital: Taking Steps to Meet Current and Emerging Human Capital Challenges

(GAO–01–965T, July 17, 2001). 10See High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO–01–263, Jan. 2001). In addition, see Human Capital: Meeting the Governmentwide High-Risk Challenge (GAO–01–357T, Feb. 1, 2001). 

us that they have already made these assessments. The next step is to develop 

plans specific to the space flight centers that focus on recruitment, retention, training, and succession and career development. 

Remaining Workforce Challenges 

If effectively implemented, the actions that NASA has been taking to strengthen 

the Shuttle workforce should enable the agency to carry out its mission more safely. 

But there are considerable challenges ahead. For example, as noted by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in its most recent annual report, NASA now has the 

difficult task of training new employees and integrating them into organizations 

that are highly pressured by the Shuttle’s expanded flight rates associated with the 

International Space Station.7 As we stressed in our previous testimony, training 

alone may take as long as 2 years, while workload demands are higher than ever. 

The panel also emphasized that (1) stress levels among some employees are still 

a matter of concern; (2) some critical areas, such as information technology and electrical/electronic engineering, are not yet fully staffed; and (3) NASA is still contending with the retirements of senior employees. Officials at Johnson Space Center 

also cited critical skill shortages as a continuing problem. Furthermore, NASA headquarters officials stated that the stress-related effects of the downsizing remain in 

the workforce. Addressing these particular challenges, according to the Aerospace 

Safety Advisory Panel, will require immediate actions, such as expanded training 

at the Centers, as well as a long-term workforce plan that will focus on retention, 

recruitment, training, and succession and career development needs. 

Human Capital Shortfalls—A Governmentwide Problem 

The workforce problems we identified during our review are not unique to NASA. 

As our January 2001 Performance and Accountability Series reports made clear, serious federal human capital shortfalls are now eroding the ability of many federal 

agencies—and threatening the ability of others—to economically, efficiently, and effectively perform their missions.8 As the Comptroller General recently stated in testimony, the problem lies not with federal employees themselves, but with the lack 

of effective leadership and management, along with the lack of a strategic approach 

to marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed for government to discharge its responsibilities and deliver on its promises.9 To highlight the 

urgency of this governmentwide challenge, in January 2001, we added strategic 

human capital management to our list of federal programs and operations identified 

as high risk.10

Our work has found human capital challenges across the federal government in 

several key areas.

• First, high-performing organizations establish a clear set of organizational intents—mission, vision, core values, goals and objectives, and strategies—and 

then integrate their human capital strategies to support these strategic and programmatic goals. However, under downsizing, budgetary, and other pressures, 

agencies have not consistently taken a strategic, results-oriented approach to 

human capital planning.

• Second, agencies do not have the sustained commitment from leaders and managers needed to implement reforms. Achieving this can be difficult to achieve 

in the face of cultural barriers to change and high levels of turnover among 

management ranks.

• Third, agencies have difficulties replacing the loss of skilled and experienced 

staff, and in some cases, filling certain mission-critical occupations because of 

increasing competition in the labor market.

• Fourth, agencies lack a crucial ingredient found in successful organizations: organizational cultures that promote high performance and accountability. 

Progress and Challenges in Making Shuttle Safety Upgrades 

At this time last year, NASA planned to develop and begin equipping the Shuttle 

fleet with a variety of safety and supportability upgrades, at an estimated cost of 

35

11See Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in Managing Its Reusable 

Launch Vehicle Program (GAO–01–826T, June 20, 2001). 

$2.2 billion. These upgrades would affect every aspect of the Shuttle system, including the orbiter, external tank, main engine, and solid rocket booster. 

Last year, we reported that NASA faced a number of programmatic and technical 

challenges in making these upgrades.

• First, several upgrade projects had not been fully approved, creating uncertainty within the program.

• Second, while NASA had begun to establish a dedicated Shuttle safety upgrade 

workforce, it had not fully determined its needs in this area.

• Third, the Shuttle program was subject to considerable scheduling pressure, 

which introduced the risk of unexpected cost increases, funding problems, and/

or project delays. Specifically, the planned safety upgrade program could require 

developing and integrating at least nine major improvements in 5 years—possibly making it the most aggressive modification effort ever undertaken by the 

Shuttle program. At the same time, technical requirements for the program 

were not yet fully defined, and upgrades were planned to coincide with the peak 

assembly period of the International Space Station.

Since then, NASA has made some progress but has only partially addressed the 

challenges we identified last year. Specifically, NASA has started to define and develop some specific Shuttle upgrades. For example, requirements for the cockpit avionics upgrade have been defined. Also, Phase I of the main engine advanced health 

monitoring system is in development, and Friction Stir Welding on the external 

tank is being implemented. 

In addition, according to Shuttle Development Office officials, staffing for the upgrade program is adequate. Since our last report, these officials told us that the 

Johnson Space Center has added about 70 people to the upgrade program, while the 

Marshall Space Flight Center has added another 50 to 60 people. We did not assess 

the quality or sufficiency of the added staff, but according to the development office 

officials, the workforce’s skill level has improved to the point where the program has 

a ‘‘good’’ skill base. 

Nevertheless, NASA has not yet fully defined its planned upgrades. The studies 

on particular projects, such as developing a crew escape system, are not expected 

to be done for some time. Moreover, our previous concerns with the technical maturity and potential cost growth of particular projects have proven to be warranted. 

For example, the implementation of the electric auxiliary power unit has been delayed indefinitely because of technical uncertainties and cost growth. Also, the estimated cost of Phase II of the main engine advanced health monitoring system has 

almost doubled, and NASA has canceled the proposed development of a Block III 

main engine improvement because of technological, cost, and schedule uncertainties. 

Compounding the challenges that NASA is facing in making its upgrades is the 

uncertainty surrounding its Shuttle program. NASA is attempting to develop alternatives to the Space Shuttle, but it is not yet clear what these alternatives will be. 

We recently testified before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, House 

Committee on Science on the agency’s Space Launch Initiative. This is a risk reduction effort aimed at enabling NASA and industry to make a decision in the 2006 

time frame on whether the full-scale development of a reusable launch vehicle can 

be undertaken.11 However, as illustrated by the difficulties NASA experienced with 

another reusable launch vehicle demonstrator—the Lockheed Martin X–33—an 

exact time frame for the Space Shuttle’s replacement cannot be determined at this 

time. Consequently, Shuttle workforce and upgrade issues will need to be considered 

without fully knowing how the program will evolve over the long run. 

In conclusion, NASA has made a start at addressing serious workforce problems 

that could undermine Space Shuttle safety. It has also begun undertaking the important task of making needed safety and supportability upgrades. Nevertheless, 

the challenges ahead are significant—particularly because NASA is operating in an 

environment of uncertainty and it is still contending with the effects of its 

downsizing effort. As such, it will be exceedingly important that NASA sustain its 

attention and commitment to making Space Shuttle operations as safe as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any 

questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

36

Contact and Acknowledgement 

For further contact regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li. Individuals 

making key contributions to this testimony included Jerry Herley, John Gilchrist, 

James Beard, Fred Felder, Vijay Barnabas, and Cristina Chaplain. 

Appendix I: Space Shuttle Program Skill Shortfall Areas 

In December 1999, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

completed an internal workforce assessment focusing on the Office of Space Flight, 

which includes the Shuttle program. That assessment identified work areas in 

which NASA was experiencing skill shortfalls. At our request, NASA provided a listing of skill shortages in the Shuttle program. The areas the agency identified follow:

• Program/project management/project engineering 

• Aerospace vehicle design and mission analysis 

• Avionics 

• Guidance, navigation, and control systems 

• Materials analysis 

• Mechanical engineering 

• Thermal control 

• Structural dynamics 

• Vehicle dynamics 

• Aircraft ground systems 

• Human factors 

• Environmental controls 

• Robotic systems 

• Computer systems 

• Fluids (liquid propulsion systems) 

• Information technology security 

• Aerospace systems test engineering 

• Software (applications and systems) 

• Sensors and transducers 

• Electrical engineering 

• Software assurance engineering 

• Flight assurance 

• Quality engineering 

• Reliability engineering 

• Safety engineering 

• Flight controls

Senator WYDEN. All right. Let us move now to Mr. O’Connor. 

STATEMENT OF BRYAN D. O’CONNOR, DIRECTOR, 

ENGINEERING DIVISION, FUTRON CORPORATION 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you very much for inviting me here to testify. My name is 

Bryan D. O’Connor, and I was the Chairman of the National Research Council’s Committee on Space Shuttle Upgrades in 1998–

1999. 

Now, I know that goes back a little bit, but I think my purpose 

here today is to go back a little bit, about three years, and show 

you where we were with the upgrade situation back then, because 

that is what our committee was asked to do. 

During fiscal year 1997, NASA lifted the design freeze that they 

had established the prior year, and they authorized the Space 

Shuttle program to dedicate about $100 million of its reserves each 

year to a new upgrade program. This program funded relatively 

minor modifications intended to improve safety, support missions, 

reduce obsolescence, and reduce costs. It also supported studies of 

potential major upgrades. 

Implementation of any major upgrades, however, would necessarily be delayed until a high-level national decision scheduled 

37

for the end of the decade was made on whether to phase out the 

Shuttle by the year 2012, or to continue operating it indefinitely. 

At NASA’s request, a committee of the National Research Council, the principal, operating arm of the National Academy, undertook an independent assessment of NASA’s Space Shuttle upgrades 

program. Our committee looked at NASA’s method for evaluating 

and selecting its upgrades. We also conducted a top-level technical 

assessment of several of the proposed Shuttle upgrades that had 

not yet been implemented. 

The committee found that in spite of budget uncertainties at that 

time, and technical risks with the development of a Shuttle replacement, as well as existing national policy restrictions on the 

use of the Shuttle, NASA’s approach appeared to be appropriate. 

The committee strongly supported their use of program goals, safety, schedule, supportability and cost to help prioritize these upgrades, and we suggested 25 specific improvements to the decision 

support process that they were using at that time. 

Our committee believed that with a few improvements, a couple 

of the systems that they were using for decision support (one of 

which one of our panel members has mentioned here in terms of 

risk numbers, called the quantitative risk assessment system, and 

another one called decision support system) had the potential to be 

even more helpful aids and upgrade decisionmakers than they had 

been to that point. 

Since the committee’s report was published, events have dictated 

that NASA look at the Shuttle for longer term while difficult technology and market issues are worked out for its eventual replacement. At the same time, fiscal challenges with NASA’s Human 

Space Flight programs require continued selectivity and prudence 

with Shuttle upgrade choices. The latest probablistic risk assessments for the Shuttle show that, although upgrades since the Challenger accident have improved the risk posture of the vehicle, it 

still falls well short of the kind of overall safety level NASA has 

required of future human-rated vehicles in its Space Launch Initiative (SLI), and even further below that required of military transports, as you have heard. 

Considering the fundamental design and complexity of the Shuttle, it is my own personal opinion that no amount of money for upgrades will get it to those levels of reliability that we have as goals 

for that program. That does not mean we give up. While NASA 

works toward those worthy goals on SLI, they should continue 

looking with care at those affordable improvements to keep the 

Shuttle flying safely in an environment of component obsolescence. 

Moreover, it is equally important that they continue to pay very 

close attention to the people aspects of this complex system. 

This unique, human-crewed space vehicle, with its high-risk propulsion and hydraulic control systems, and its extremely limited escape system, requires nothing short of full attention 100 percent of 

the time by the best 20,000-plus people that NASA and its contractors can field. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Connor follows:]

38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRYAN D. O’CONNOR, DIRECTOR, ENGINEERING DIVISION, 

FUTRON CORPORATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here 

to testify. My name is Bryan D. O’Connor. I was Chairman of the National Research 

Council’s Committee on Space Shuttle Upgrades in 1998/99, and I hold a regular 

position as Director, Engineering Division at Futron Corporation in Washington, 

DC. As you know, the National Research Council (NRC) is the operating arm of the 

National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute 

of Medicine, chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on matters 

of science and technology. 

In May 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) asked 

the NRC to examine the agency’s plan for further upgrades to the Space Shuttle 

system. The NRC was asked to assess NASA’s method for evaluating and selecting 

upgrades and to conduct a top-level technical assessment of proposed upgrades. The 

committee finished its work in late 1998, and published its report in early 1999. 

NASA responded to the report in March 1999. The full report is available to the 

public through the National Academy Press. Attached to my written statement is 

the report’s executive summary as well as NASA’s written response. 

At the time of the committee’s assessment, NASA was looking ahead to a decision 

by the end of the decade to either begin a phase out of the Shuttle system, or to 

extend its operations beyond 2012. With this major decision still ahead of them it 

was difficult for NASA to plan with confidence on major upgrades, so their main 

efforts were being spent on those near term improvements that would make sense 

no matter what the decision might be. Flight safety was, as usual, the highest priority, and our committee looked at the upgrade selection process with that in mind. 

With only a few minor exceptions, we found their process and decision support tools 

consistent with safety and the other NASA priorities of launch schedule dependability, supportability of the system’s aging components, and operations efficiency. 

Although we made no specific recommendations as to implementation of the various 

upgrade options, we did offer 25 recommendations for improvements in the upgrade 

selection process, most of which were agreed to and enacted by NASA. 

Since the committee’s report was published, events have dictated that NASA look 

at Shuttle for the long term while difficult technology and market issues are worked 

out for its eventual replacement. At the same time, fiscal challenges with NASA’s 

human spaceflight programs require continued selectivity and prudence with Shuttle upgrade choices. The latest risk assessments for the Shuttle system show that 

changes since the Challenger accident have improved the risk posture of the vehicle 

by nearly an order of magnitude, but it still falls well short of the overall safety 

level NASA demands of future human rated vehicles. Considering the fundamental 

design and complexity of the Shuttle, it is my own personal opinion that no amount 

of money for upgrades will get it to the levels of reliability and operational cost that 

NASA has stated as its goals for the Space Launch Initiative (SLI). So, while the 

SLI works towards those worthy goals, NASA should continue looking with care at 

those affordable improvements that keep the Shuttle flying safely in an environment of component obsolescence. Moreover, it is equally important that they continue to pay close attention to the people aspects of such a complex system. This 

unique human-crewed space launch vehicle with its high risk propulsion and hydraulic control systems and extremely limited escape system will always need substantial hands on care and preparation between flights. It requires nothing short 

of full attention—100% of the time—by the best 20,000 people NASA and its contractors can field.

Attachments:

Executive Summary—Upgrading the Space Shuttle 

NASA Response to the NRC Report on Space Shuttle Upgrades 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY—UPGRADING THE SPACE SHUTTLE

The Space Shuttle system has been modified many times since the first launch 

of Space Shuttle Columbia in 1981. During the 1980s, major upgrade programs were 

established to respond to problems and anomalies experienced during the initial 

flights and the Challenger accident. Additional upgrades were approved in the early 

1990s to enable the Shuttle to visit the Mir space station and support the International Space Station. In 1996, however, the Shuttle program effectively ceased approving new changes to the Space Shuttle design to concentrate scarce resources on 

developing potential replacements for the Shuttle. The same year, the responsibility 

39

for some operational elements of the Space Shuttle Program were transferred to the 

United Space Alliance (USA) corporation. 

During fiscal year 1997, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) lifted the ‘‘design freeze’’ and authorized the Space Shuttle Program to dedicate about $100 million of its reserves each year to a new upgrade program. This 

program funds relatively minor modifications intended to reduce obsolescence, support missions, improve safety, and reduce costs, as well as studies of potential major 

upgrades. Implementation of any major upgrades, however, will necessarily be held 

off until a high-level national decision scheduled for the end of the decade is made 

on whether to phase out the Shuttle by the year 2012 or to continue operating it 

indefinitely. 

Information on potential upgrades to the Shuttle is collected, organized, and 

prioritized by the Space Shuttle Program Development Office, which reports to the 

manager of the Space Shuttle Program. Each candidate upgrade is designated as 

Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, or Phase IV, depending on when it was approved and 

its anticipated cost and effect on the Space Shuttle design (see Table ES–I).

Table ES–1 Upgrade Phases 

Phase Main Focus Typical Cost Status 

I Improving safety, supporting 

the International Space Station 

>$100 million Either completed or 

will be by 2000

II Combating obsolescence $10 to $50 million Some underway; 

some in study phase

III Enhancing Shuttle capability 

(does not change the fundamental Shuttle configuration) 

$10s to $100s of 

millions 

Studies only

IV Enhancing Shuttle capability 

(changes the fundamental 

Shuttle configuration) 

>$1 billion Studies only 

In addition to the phased upgrades, the USA corporation has limited incentives 

to initiate and implement cost-saving upgrades. 

Choosing Upgrades 

NASA uses its limited budget for Shuttle upgrades to fund minor upgrades with 

identifiable short-term benefits and to conduct preparatory studies for major upgrades that may be warranted if the Shuttle program is called upon to operate after 

2012. In spite of budget uncertainties, technical risks with the development of a reusable launch vehicle (Shuttle replacement strategy), and existing national policy 

restrictions on Shuttle use, the committee believes that NASA’s approach to upgrade 

planning is appropriate. Candidate upgrades are proposed to a central office, which 

prioritizes them with the assistance of tools that are under development. The committee commends NASA for its efforts to develop a formal process for evaluating and 

prioritizing upgrades. 

Prioritizing and Selecting Upgrades 

Decision makers in the Shuttle program are facing an uncertain future. They do 

not know how long the nation will want Shuttle flights to continue, the number of 

flights per year that will be required, or the missions (if any) beyond supporting the 

International Space Station (ISS) the Shuttle will be expected to perform. For these 

reasons, developing an appropriate process for selecting upgrades for implementation has been difficult. Other organizations, such as the U.S. Air Force, have faced 

similar situations, however, and NASA should evaluate their investment decision 

processes for upgrades and identify appropriate processes and investment strategies 

to emulate. 

The committee strongly supports NASA’s use of program goals to help prioritize 

upgrades. However, the Space Shuttle Program Development Office should restate 

the goals of the upgrade program to ensure that they reflect the upgrade program’s 

actual priorities, are feasible, and are clearly understandable by everyone working 

in the program. NASA should also provide better incentives for the USA corporation 

(and any future prime contractors for Shuttle operations) to propose, fund, and implement upgrades to achieve the Shuttle program’s goals. Whether or not a Shuttle 

40

unique upgrade supports an increased flight rate should not be considered in the 

prioritization process unless NASA can prepare a viable business plan showing that 

(1) the Shuttle could attract enough additional business to justify the increased 

flight rate, (2) the Space Shuttle Program would not unfairly compete with commercial launch vehicles, and (3) the Shuttle, a national asset, would not be subjected 

to unnecessary risks. 

NASA is taking steps to improve its process for selection of upgrade candidates 

for implementation. These steps are designed to provide a more visible quantitative 

comparison approach that should help balance some of the traditional internal and 

external political and other subjective pressures on the program. 

One of the tools that NASA is using to help prioritize candidate upgrades is the 

quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS), a software tool being developed specifically for assessing risks to the Shuttle. The committee believes that this tool has 

the potential to be very helpful in assessing and comparing the impact of Shuttle 

upgrades on Shuttle safety. NASA should continue to increase the scope and capability of the QRAS system so that it provides better models of failures caused by 

human error, combinations of risks, abort modes, on-orbit hazards, reentry and 

landing hazards, and software problems. Until these improvements are made, the 

Space Shuttle Program Development Office should be very cautious in using QRAS 

to aid in prioritizing upgrades. 

NASA is also funding development of the Decision Support System to assist in 

prioritizing upgrades. The committee believes that when this system is more mature, it will be a valuable tool. However, the current Decision Support System will 

require significant modifications before it can be a reliable input to the prioritization 

process. NASA should consider modifications that would place less emphasis on 

quantitative results and more on a clear, defensible decision process that takes into 

account all of the available evidence. 

Upgrade cost estimates provided by NASA to the committee contained inconsistencies in their scope, assumptions, and basis. For these estimates to be helpful, the 

agency must ensure that they are as accurate as possible and are calculated consistently. All calculations, comparisons of costs and cost savings, and cost-benefit assessments should be based on fixed-year dollars and should include all of the costs 

associated with the upgrade, including hidden costs, such as integration costs and 

the cost of operating and maintaining the upgrade. 

Improving Candidate Upgrades 

To ensure that NASA can select the best upgrades for the Shuttle program, there 

must be a pool of high quality potential improvements. The Shuttle program can 

take steps to improve the pool of proposed upgrades such as external proposals, 

early compatibility studies, limits to software changes, and trade-off studies. The 

Space Shuttle Program Development Office should not consider proposed upgrades 

as stand-alone proposals, but where appropriate, should look for ways to combine 

upgrades (or features of upgrades) to efficiently meet future requirements. 

Assessments of Proposed Upgrades 

From the information presented to the committee, it is clear that a great deal of 

creative and useful work has been done to design and develop ongoing and proposed 

upgrades to the Space Shuttle system. The committee was able to assess the potential of some key upgrades to meet Space Shuttle Program goals, point out areas of 

technical or programmatic risk, and suggest alternatives. Figure ES–I shows the locations of selected representative upgrades in the Shuttle system. 

Phase II Upgrades 

Checkout Launch and Control System 

The checkout launch and control system (CLCS) is an upgrade to the launch processing system used to check out, control, and process Shuttle flight systems, ground 

support equipment, and facilities at Kennedy Space Center. The current system is 

growing obsolete, and the CLCS upgrade will replace it with modern commercial 

hardware and software. Based on historical precedent, the committee believes that 

the large and complex CLCS upgrade is likely to experience schedule delays and 

budget overruns. NASA should audit the requirements, specifications, plans, schedules, development budgets, status, and life cycle costs of the CLCS project. The objective of this audit should not be to cancel the upgrade but to make more accurate 

estimates of the time and cost required to complete it and to identify potential problems early enough in the project to rectify them. 

41

Protection from Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris 

As part of the Phase II upgrade program, the Shuttle orbiters will be modified 

during 1999 and 2000 to protect the radiators and the leading edge of the wings 

from meteoroids and orbital debris. Considering the predicted high level of risk from 

this hazard even after these modifications are made, the Space Shuttle upgrades 

program should solicit additional upgrade proposals for protecting the Shuttle from 

meteoroids and orbital debris. 

Phase III Upgrades 

Auxiliary Power Unit 

Every Shuttle orbiter has three auxiliary power units (APUs) to pressurize the vehicle’s hydraulic systems during ascent and reentry. NASA is studying a number 

of options for replacing the current APUs—which use toxic hydrazine propellant—

with an electric system that would be safer and easier to maintain. NASA should 

continue studying potential modifications to the APUs to determine the costs, benefits, and appropriate scope of each upgrade. The development of electric power systems worldwide should be monitored for technologies and techniques that could improve an APU upgrade. 

Avionics 

The orbiter’s current avionics system was conceived in the early 1970s but contains hardware that was added during the 1980s and 1990s. The objective of 

NASA’s proposed avionics upgrade is to avoid the growing costs associated with obsolescent components by judiciously replacing hardware and, at the same time, positioning upgrades as components of a modern, functionally partitioned avionics architecture. NASA should continue this strategy and should develop and publish 

scaleable, long-term requirements and interface definitions for the future architecture. 

Channel-Wall Nozzle 

The channel-wall nozzle is a proposed replacement for the current Space Shuttle 

main engine nozzle. The channel-wall nozzle is a relatively simple design based on 

a manufacturing process developed in Russia. NASA plans to build the nozzle in 

Russia (through Rocketdyne’s subcontractor Aerojet) to reduce development costs. If 

NASA decides to implement this upgrade, it should take steps to ensure that channel-wall nozzles are available in the United States, either by stockpiling additional 

nozzles or developing a channel-wall nozzle manufacturing capability in the United 

States. 

Extended Nose Landing Gear 

The proposed extended nose landing gear is a modification intended to reduce 

loads on the orbiter’s landing gear. Based on work performed to date, the proposed 

upgrade appears to be a good design for reducing Shuttle landing loads. However, 

the existing nose landing gear meets current requirements, so NASA should pursue 

the upgrade only if future plans require that the Shuttle land with heavier payloads 

than are currently allowable. 

Long-Life Fuel Cell 

The orbiter’s fuel cells provide electric power for the orbiter and water for the 

crew. Two distinct upgrades—longer-life alkaline fuel cells and proton exchange 

membrane (PEM) fuel cells—are being considered to replace the current cells. Modified alkaline cells would be similar to the current cells but would require less maintenance. The PEM cells would last longer, produce more power, and be less toxic 

than either the current or the improved alkaline cells. However, the PEM cell upgrade would involve an expensive and potentially open-ended technology research 

program. NASA should explore the costs and benefits of the PEM cell further before 

deciding on a new fuel cell. Planners of future space missions that could benefit 

from PEM fuel cells should be closely involved in these studies. These planners 

could help determine the value of PEM cells for future missions, influence the design of the Shuttle’s PEM cells so that they will be applicable to future missions, 

and, perhaps, provide funding. 

Nontoxic Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control System 

This upgrade would modify the Shuttle Orbiter’s orbital maneuvering and reaction control systems to use nontoxic liquid oxygen and ethanol propellants and 

would connect both systems to common propellant tanks. NASA believes that the 

proposed upgrade would reduce hazards on the ground and in orbit, improve ground 

operations and turnaround times, save money, and increase Shuttle performance. 

Before making any decision on implementation, however, NASA should very careVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
42

fully study all of the risks inherent in changing to a liquid oxygen/ethanol system 

and conduct trade-off studies to determine whether modifications to the existing system may be a more cost-effective means of meeting program goals. Commonality 

with the propulsion (and possibly the life-support) systems of the ISS and other future NASA programs should be considered in the final design. 

Water Membrane Evaporator 

The water membrane evaporator (WME) is being considered as a replacement for 

the orbiter’s flash evaporator system (FES), which cools the orbiter during ascent 

and entry and provides supplemental cooling in orbit. The WME appears to be a 

simple passive device that can accomplish the FES’s cooling function without the 

corrosion that creates a risk of freon leaks in the FES. However, other options to 

reduce freon leakage (such as using more corrosion-resistant materials in the FES) 

could potentially be lower cost and lower risk solutions to the problem. NASA 

should carefully weigh the costs and benefits of all options for dealing with the FES 

corrosion problem before choosing a solution. 

Phase IV Upgrades 

NASA is currently evaluating the merits of two new first stage booster concepts: 

the five-segment reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB), and the liquid fly-back booster (LFBB). To varying degrees, each concept promises improvements in safety, performance, and life cycle cost. Each concept also requires significant system integration, as well as a thorough ground and flight test program. Each will also require 

large initial investment. 

An important consideration in NASA’s ongoing space transportation studies is 

that the existing four-segment RSRB has demonstrated high reliability since its first 

flight in 1988. It also satisfies NASA’s known performance requirements for the 

Space Station era. These facts, combined with the risks involved in changing to a 

relatively unproven booster on a manned vehicle with only minimal crew escape capability means that NASA is not likely to, and the committee agrees it should not, 

enter into any major new booster program without substantial national need for the 

performance enhancements and long-term safety and cost benefits. 

Five-Segment Reusable Solid Rocket Booster 

A recent proposal by Thiokol Propulsion, this upgrade would add a fifth segment 

to the Shuttle’s RSRB, alter the grain of the solid fuel to provide a safer thrust profile, and modify the RSRB’s nozzle and insulation. On its surface, the five-segment 

RSRB appears to be a relatively straightforward approach to improving the performance of the booster, but it will require substantial integration engineering and testing. Early estimates suggest at least $1 billion development cost. A thorough evaluation of the potential for separate implementation of subsets of the proposal should 

be included in NASA’s ongoing assessment. 

Liquid Fly-Back Booster 

This NASA generated concept would replace the Shuttle’s solid rocket boosters 

with liquid-fueled boosters designed to fly back automatically to the launch site 

after they have separated from the orbiter. NASA believes that the LFBB would 

cost $4 to $5 billion to develop but would improve safety, reduce long-term operational costs, enable a higher flight rate, and increase the Shuttle’s payload capacity. Before proceeding with the LFBB, NASA should initiate a detailed independent 

assessment of configuration trade-offs, costs, and programmatic and technical risks 

to determine the best fundamental configurations for a new liquid shuttle booster. 

Should NASA proceed with this program, they should closely coordinate their efforts 

with other government and industry transportation initiatives. 

NASA RESPONSE TO THE NRC REPORT ON SPACE SHUTTLE UPGRADES

NRC Report on Shuttle Upgrades 

In May 1998, NASA requested the National Research Council (NRC) to examine 

the Agency’s plans for further upgrades to the Space Shuttle system. The assessment was conducted with reference to the National Space Transportation Policy and 

NASA’s 1998 Strategic Plan, which calls for the Shuttle upgrade program to improve the reliability, performance, and longevity of Space Shuttle operations to meet 

International Space Station (ISS) needs and human exploration goals beyond 2012. 

NASA presented the set of proposed Shuttle upgrades, including approved upgrades and upgrades currently under study, and the rational and criteria used to 

select the upgrades. The NRC, and its committee, assessed NASA’s method for evalVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
43

uating and selecting upgrades and conducted a top-level technical assessment of 

proposed upgrades that have not yet been implemented. 

The NRC formed a committee composed of experts from various fields. The committee members are the individuals responsible to perform the study. Committee 

members are:

Bryan O’Connor (chair), Aerospace Safety Consultant, Alexandria, Virginia 

Stephen Book, The Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles, California 

Benjamin Cosgrove, The Boeing Company (retired), Seattle, Washington 

Donald Emero, Boeing Reusable Space System (retired), Fountain Valley, California 

B. John Garrick, PLG (retired), St. George, Utah 

Richard Harper, IBM Research, Raleigh, North Carolina 

Nancy Leveson, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 

Donald Maricle, Maricle Consulting, Glastonbury, Connecticut 

Robert Sackheim, TRW, Redondo Beach, California 

George Sutton, ANSER, Arlington, Virginia 

Richard Weiss, Richard R. Weiss Consultant Services, Palmdale, California

The committee delivered a sixty-page report to NASA that includes various observations and recommendations. The observations and recommendations are both programmatic and technical. 

As part of its observation, ‘‘the committee believes that NASA’s approach to upgrade planning is appropriate’’ (page 2) and the ‘‘committee commends NASA for its 

efforts to develop a formal process for evaluating and prioritizing upgrades’’ (page 

2). Also, the committee ‘‘strongly supports’’ (page 3) the use of the goals set by the 

program to prioritize upgrades. 

The committee acknowledges that the Shuttle Program’s uncertainty of not knowing how long to operate and the number of flights per year required has made the 

development of an appropriate process for selecting upgrades and implementing 

them difficult. The committee states that ‘‘the Shuttle program’s limited budget for 

upgrades has constrained the program’s responses to this environment, which has 

made it difficult for program managers to prepare adequately for the range of possible future scenarios’’ (page 24). Also, the committee agrees with NASA’s approach 

to use the limited upgrade funds to combat obsolescence problems and to perform 

studies on major upgrades that may be needed if the Shuttle is required to operate 

after 2012. The committee correctly identifies that the implementation of the larger 

upgrades will require additional support from the Administration and Congress. 

NASA would like to thank the National Research Council for their assessment of 

the Space Shuttle Upgrades program. The Space Shuttle will remain an integral 

part of America’s space program for the next decade and possibly beyond. It is imperative that NASA takes an aggressive role in ensuring that the Shuttle fleet is 

capable of supporting the monumental task of assembling the International Space 

Station; to successfully accomplish this, current obsolescence issues, aging hardware 

problems, and budgetary concerns must be resolved. The NRC, in their diligent review of the Shuttle Upgrades Program, formulated a list of twenty-five recommendations for NASA. Of those twenty-five recommendations, two have been implemented, twenty-one are being worked, and two are under consideration. The following is NASA’s response to the NRC’s recommendations. 

NASA’s Response to NRC Recommendations

Recommendation 1. NASA should benchmark other large organizations’ investment processes for technological upgrades and attempt to identify and emulate appropriate processes and investment strategies. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. To date, the Shuttle Program has 

benchmarked upgrade programs like Concorde, B–1, B–52, F/A–18, nuclear power 

plants, and others. NASA will continue to look at organizations that have performed 

similar projects. Specifically, the move towards quantitative methodology, i.e. developing Quantitative Risk Assessment Software and use of Decision Support Software, 

was derived from industry benchmarking.

Recommendation 2. The ability of a shuttle-unique upgrade to support an increased flight rate should not be a factor in the prioritization process, unless NASA 

can show through a viable business plan that has been reviewed and approved by 

financial and technical experts inside and outside the agency, as well as national 

policy makers (1) that the Shuttle could attract enough business to justify the increased flight rate, and (2) that the Shuttle program would not unfairly compete with 

commercial launch vehicles or pose unnecessary risks to a national asset. 

44

Currently, the focus of the Shuttle Upgrade program is on the Phase II upgrades, 

which primarily address obsolescence issues. NASA has not approved any upgrades 

solely to support an increase in launch rate. Most upgrades that enhance meeting 

the manifest commitments, increase supportability and reduce cost also inherently 

enable an increased capacity or launch rate. Increasing fundamental flight rate does 

provide short-term surge capability and added flexibility for unexpected manifest 

changes and would also reduce operations costs. For these reasons, NASA considers 

it appropriate to consider flight rate capability improvements as a factor in 

prioritization of Shuttle upgrade candidates. Given that: 1) the United States currently only enjoys a 40% market share in space launch and 2) that following International Space Station ‘assembly complete,’ Shuttle will have excess capacity, and 

3) that NASA’s current direction includes privatization of Shuttle processing and operations with the downstream vision to become an ‘anchor tenant’ for commercialized Shuttle services, it seems only prudent to look beyond the current restrictive national policy directives regarding Shuttle use. 

NASA agrees that a viable business plan must be developed prior to implementing 

the Phase III & IV upgrades that will enable an increase in flight rate. As the committee recommends, NASA will continue to perform preliminary studies for the 

Phase III & IV upgrades.

Recommendation 3. The Space Shuttle Program should reassess the goals used to 

prioritize candidate upgrades to ensure that they reflect the upgrade program’s priorities, are feasible, and are clearly understandable to everyone working in the program. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. The Space Shuttle Upgrades goals have 

been explicitly the same as the Space Shuttle Program since the Space Shuttle Development Office was organized in 1997. They, in turn, map to the NASA and HEDS 

Strategic Plans. They were selected to be simple, direct and consistent within the 

Space Shuttle Program. Without question, they could be collapsed into more focused 

goals which still compliment the Space Shuttle Program’s objectives. NASA will reevaluate the Space Shuttle Upgrades goals to ensure that these goals are properly 

balanced within the Space Shuttle Program.

Recommendation 4. The Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise 

should bring the cost goals for the Space Shuttle in its strategic plan into line with 

budget and policy realities. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA continues to stretch for the maximum safe vehicle performance at the minimum cost. Striving for those stretch goals 

rather than settling for less challenging objectives causes the Shuttle Program to 

reinvent rather than do business as usual. Business as usual will not achieve the 

magnitude of improvement the Agency must achieve to live within a flat budget that 

equates to a 20% funding reduction when compensating for inflation over the fiveyear budget horizon.

Recommendation 5. NASA should continue to increase the scope and capabilities 

of the quantitative risk assessment system by improving its models of failures attributable to combinations of risks, human error, abort modes, on-orbit hazards, reentry 

and landing, and software. Until these improvements are made, the Space Shuttle 

Program Development Office should be very cautious in using the quantitative risk 

assessment system to aid in prioritizing upgrades. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA’s Quantitative Risk Assessment 

Software (QRAS) has been acknowledged by the quantitative modeling community 

as a ‘world class’ tool to help assess risk drivers within complex, interdependent systems. QRAS has been developed in a phased fashion. The first phase fielded the 

software and modeled the systems to at least the same fidelity was previous done 

by SAIC’s PRA. The second phase added additional modeling fidelity and subsystems. The next phase of the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) system is currently being developed and will address the committee’s recommendations. NASA 

recognizes that there are some limitations to the current QRAS model and until the 

model is fully developed will use the data accordingly as one of many inputs to the 

Shuttle upgrade decision making process.

Recommendation 6. NASA should take care that the Decision Support System’s 

quantitative tools are used as a supplement to, not as a substitute for, formal qualitative evaluations. Expert Elicitation should be considered as an additional formal 

qualitative tool. Also, NASA should consider modifying the quantification algorithm 

that the Decision Support System employs for cost-benefit comparisons so that it uses 

full probability values rather than 20th percentile S-curve values. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. As the committee states in its report, the 

Decision Support System is one of the many tools that NASA uses in making upVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
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grade decisions. NASA has also used a more widely accepted method called ‘Analytical Hierarchy Process’ to do upgrade weighting and ranking. Expert Elicitation is 

simply another method of obtaining knowledge and evaluating solutions. 

Unmentioned in the NRC report, the Shuttle Program has also initiated the Orbiter 

and GFE Trending Report which has done trending of critical subsystems to identify 

the subsystems and components most in need of upgrades from a reliability and 

supportability standpoint. 

The use of the 20th percentile S-curve in the DSS represents one method of comparative assessment. Discussions with the NRC panel in September 1998 included 

a healthy discussion of statistical and probabilistic theories. From these discussions, 

NASA is examining the suggestions made by the NRC to use other statistical methods to compare and rank the collection of upgrades. This activity is part of the continuing development of the DSS.

Recommendation 7. All calculations, comparisons of costs and cost savings, and 

cost-benefit assessments done by NASA, as well as its DSS independent contractor, 

should be performed using fixed-year dollars and should include all costs (including 

hidden costs) associated with the upgrade. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation and will continue to account for all costs 

as projects mature. The Space Shuttle Upgrades Program Requirements Control 

Board (SSU PRCB) membership includes all the Program elements, Program Integration, and the principle contractors. All upgrades and change requests are assessed by all parties prior to being presented to the board and dispositioned. Every 

attempt is made to establish integration costs and flush out hidden costs prior to 

approval of each upgrade.

Recommendation 8. NASA should provide stronger incentives for the Shuttle prime 

contractor to propose, finance, and implement upgrades to meet the Shuttle program’s goals. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation and has developed and implemented a 

plan. The challenge is to have the incumbent contractor invest in upgrades that do 

not show return on investment within the remaining life of the contract when the 

contractor is being simultaneously incentivized to reduce program cost for which he 

receives a 35% share of the savings. A modified ‘Value Engineering Clause’ has been 

implemented as a way of compensating the contractor for upgrades with a longer 

payback time should that contractor not be selected for the follow-on contract option(s). This method is currently being reviewed at NASA Headquarters and approval is anticipated in the near term.

Recommendation 9. Upgrade project managers should involve industry more in the 

definition and early development of candidate upgrades. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA has involved industry, other NASA 

Centers and academia in the identification and selection of upgrades. All Centers 

and contractors are welcome to propose upgrades to the SSU PRCB under the sponsorship of NASA or USA. The NRC committee chairman agrees that the level of involvement of these contractors and industry is adequate. 

The Integrated Product Teams (IPT) supporting the Shuttle upgrade projects have 

members representing a variety of government and industry organizations. IPT 

membership generally includes representatives from NASA Engineering, NASA Operations, NASA Project Management, United Space Alliance (USA) Engineering, 

USA Logistics, USA operations, and Boeing Engineering. In addition, IPT’s, such as 

the Avionics IPT and the Cockpit IPT, have members from the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy. 

Since its inception, the Space Shuttle Upgrades Development Office has sponsored 

numerous symposia to bring the best from industry to focus on Shuttle Upgrades 

(SATWG at Boeing, Seattle; SATWG at JSC, Houston; ATWG at KSC, Florida; 

ATWG at Palmdale, CA; Nano-MEMS Technology Conference JSC; USA Industry 

Space Council, United Technologies, East Hartford, CT; USA Joint NASA-Industry 

Upgrades Conference TBD).

Recommendation 10. The Space Shuttle Program should institute a process early 

in the development of a candidate upgrade to ensure that the upgrade is compatible 

with other Shuttle systems and relevant to meeting program goals. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. As the committee stated in its report, the 

upgrade priorities are based on Shuttle Program goals. All proposed upgrades must 

compete within the SSU PRCB forum for scarce resources. The composition of the 

SSU PRCB makes compatibility and relevance explicit parts of the evaluation process. All upgrades are vetted by other Shuttle Program elements for impacts to hardware, training, cost and schedule.

46

Recommendation 11. NASA should limit the software changes associated with new 

Shuttle upgrades. The agency should consider standardizing its guidelines for using 

commercial off-the-shelf software in Shuttle upgrades. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. As part of the system engineering process, all software changes required for each candidate upgrade are evaluated. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products are considered to reduce cost and schedule. 

The Shuttle Program’s experience in using COTS products has occasionally uncovered deficiencies which may be costly in terms of schedule and program risk. NASA 

(JSC Engineering) has developed a set of COTS utilization guidelines that will be 

used for all Orbiter Government Furnished Equipment hardware. These guidelines 

will also be reviewed and considered for broader adoption by the Shuttle Program. 

Where appropriate, for example, the Government Furnished Equipment projects, 

NASA is in the process of developing standards for off-the-shelf software and hardware.

Recommendation 12. Before embarking on the larger, more costly upgrades, NASA 

should examine alternative solutions and conduct trade-off studies to determine if the 

proposed upgrade is the best way to achieve the desired result. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. Trade-off studies will be performed prior 

to the implementation of any upgrade. Case in point, NASA conducted a trade study 

for the Phase III global Avionics Upgrade to the Orbiter. Studies are currently underway on Phase III Integrated Communications Upgrade and Liquid Flyback 

Booster versus Fifth Segment Solid Rocket Motor Phase IV upgrades.

Recommendation 13. The Space Shuttle Program Development Office should not 

consider proposed upgrades as stand-alone modifications but should look for opportunities to combine upgrades (or features of upgrades) to efficiently meet future requirements. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA will continue to combine upgrades 

in the most efficient and practical manner while adhering to the Shuttle Upgrade 

goals and the Shuttle Program goals. NASA has challenged the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) contractor, United Space Alliance, and the Orbiter contractor, Boeing North American, to strive for synergy within the upgrades proposed.

Recommendation 14. NASA should conduct an audit of the requirements, specifications, plans, schedules, development budgets, status, and life cycle costs of the 

checkout launch and control system project. The objective of this audit should not 

be to cancel the upgrade but to estimate more accurately the time and cost required 

to complete it and to identify potential problems early enough to rectify them. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. The Independent Assessment Review 

(IAR) team has completed a review of CLCS project and the Shuttle Program is formulating a response to the IAR. The review to date shows the base system on COTS 

platforms and application program interfaces are near completion, thereby traversing a period of unknown complexity. The end product functionality is better understood and defined. The remaining development is being addressed and replanned 

with particular attention on lessons learned metrics gathered to date. On the 

strength of new detailed basis of estimate, a schedule of the remaining tasks and 

an updated budget is being finalized for review by program management.

Recommendation 15. The Space Shuttle Program Development Office should solicit additional proposals for upgrades to protect the Shuttle from meteoroids and orbital debris. 

Under evaluation. The Space Shuttle Program has used and continues to use control of the attitude timeline to minimize debris impact risks. In preparation for 

International Space Station assembly missions, where the attitude is constrained by 

assembly requirements, the Program conducted an extensive evaluation of the components with the highest contribution margin to debris risk. To minimize the risk 

of early termination of the mission, modifications are being made to the radiator 

systems. ‘‘Armor’’ is being applied over the coolant flow loops and isolation valves 

are being added, so that if a radiator is penetrated, it can be isolated so that the 

fluid is not lost from the water boiler portion of the heat rejection loop. To minimize 

the risk of significant critical damage during entry the thermal protection of the 

wing leading edge has been modified to contain the heating loads of plasma flow 

due to a penetration of the reusable carbon-carbon leading edge. Previously the design accommodated only the radiant heat loads from the RCC. While other potential 

changes have been identified they have not demonstrated significant impact on the 

overall meteoroid and debris risk.

Recommendation 16. NASA should continue studying potential modifications to 

the APUs to better determine the costs, benefits, and appropriate scope of an upgrade. 

47

Developments in electric power systems worldwide should be monitored to identify 

technologies and techniques that could be useful for an APU upgrade. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA continues to develop a proof of 

concept for an electric Auxiliary Power Unit to eliminate the toxic propellant, high 

temperature hazard in the aft fuselage, eliminate high speed rotating turbine 

wheels and reduce the continuing maintenance and reliability burdens.

Recommendation 17. NASA should continue its strategy of judiciously replacing 

obsolete avionics components while developing a plan for a future improved architecture. Consistent with the year 2000 decision process, NASA should develop scaleable, 

long-term requirements and interface definitions for the future architecture. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation and will continue to develop an avionics 

upgrade plan. NASA has already solicited the major aerospace contractors’ architectures and costs to address this issue. This is a phase III upgrade candidate.

Recommendation 18. If NASA decides to implement this upgrade, it should take 

steps to ensure that channel-wall nozzles are available in the United States, either 

by stockpiling additional nozzles or developing a channel-wall nozzle manufacturing 

capability in the United States. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. The decision has been made that if NASA 

decides to implement the channel wall nozzle, the nozzle will be manufactured in 

the United States.

Recommendation 19. NASA should pursue the extended nose landing gear only if 

future plans require that the Shuttle land with heavier payloads than are currently 

allowable. 

Under evaluation. The Extended Nose Landing Gear modification is currently 

under review by the Space Shuttle Program. The Extended Nose Landing Gear 

project will be presented to the Space Shuttle Upgrades Program Requirements 

Control Board (SSU PRCB) in April 1999. The decision to proceed with this upgrade 

will be based on the amount of additional margin this upgrade provides versus the 

cost and complexity of the upgrade. If the cost (∼$20 M) and complexity does not 

justify the gain in margin then this upgrade would be put on hold. If larger orbiter 

landing weights are required in the future and this change proves to be beneficial 

in providing additional downweight capability, along with significant structural 

modifications, then this upgrade may be reconsidered.

Recommendation 20. NASA should continue to explore the costs and benefits of 

PEM cells before making a decision on a future Shuttle fuel cell. Planners of future 

space vehicles and/or missions that could benefit from PEM fuel cells should be 

closely involved in these studies. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA has decided to implement the long 

life alkaline Fuel Cell for the Shuttle Program to address reliability and maintainability issues for the next decade. At the present time, though, the technology is elusive for space applications with only modest progress having been made in terrestrial applications despite the investment of approximately $10B worldwide in the 

automotive industry. Shuttle integration and implementation are likely to be complex and expensive due to incompatibility with current plumbing. Without question, 

Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) Fuel Cell technology has tremendous potential 

for future space systems.

Recommendation 21. Before NASA makes any decision on implementation, it 

should very carefully study the risks inherent in changing to a nontoxic OMS/RCS 

system and conduct trade-off studies to determine whether modifications to the existing system may be a more cost-effective means of meeting program goals. Commonality with the propulsion (and potentially life-support) systems of the ISS and 

other future NASA programs should be considered in any final design. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA will consider all factors prior to 

implementing Non-toxic Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control System. Currently the reliability driver is the RCS thrusters.

Recommendation 22. NASA should reassess the costs (including those associated 

with surface tension issues and development testing) and benefits of all options for 

dealing with the corrosion problems in the flash evaporator system before choosing 

a solution. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA is evaluating various options. The 

Water Membrane Evaporator is, as yet, only a promising technology. In the interim, 

NASA continues to repair and fabricate the existing design.

Recommendation 23. NASA should formally evaluate the merits of the five-segment reusable solid rocket booster as it prepares for the decision on the future of the 

48

Shuttle program. A thorough evaluation of the potential for the separate implementation of subsets of the proposal should be included in this assessment. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA’s Office of Independent Assessments is currently conducting a trade of Liquid Flyback Booster vs. 5th Segment 

SRB. NASA has approved funding for a fifth segment Solid Rocket Booster study 

that will aid in the evaluation of alternative booster options for the Space Shuttle 

Program. Refinements continue to the existing RSRM/SRBs to address remaining 

opportunities to reduce CILs and address environmental and material obsolescence 

issues.

Recommendation 24. NASA should initiate a detailed independent assessment of 

configuration trade-offs, costs, and programmatic and technical risks for a new Shuttle booster. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. An independent assessment of the booster options is being performed by the NASA Langley Research Center Independent 

Assessment Office.

Recommendation 25. NASA should coordinate closely with other government and 

industry transportation initiatives in determining the need and, if appropriate the resources for any new Shuttle booster. 

NASA agrees with the recommendation. NASA is currently working with industry 

on the Space Transportation Architecture Study to develop an evolutionary path for 

reusable first stage technologies and possible evolution of a subscale demonstration 

vehicle.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, I have got to 

leave in a few minutes to deal with the problems faced by the 

Klamath County farmers in my home State that you may have 

heard about. Therefore, I am going to turn the hearing over to our 

colleague, Senator Nelson, but I did want to ask a couple of questions. One quick question for you, Mr. Li. 

In the GAO report that has been recently released, at page 4 of 

the report, there appears to be what certainly strikes me as a very 

troubling finding by your agency, indicating that when it comes to 

the Space Station, NASA cannot really tell you what it is they have 

spent thus far. I want to know, if that is the case, if I am reading 

it correctly. 

For obvious reasons, there are those of us who agree with Senator Nelson that we are going to have to spend money, as it relates 

to these safety upgrades. However, it is going to be pretty difficult 

to convince our colleagues that these expenditures ought to be 

made when those who are not so sympathetic come back and wave 

a GAO report in our face and say, well, page 4, it says it cannot 

tell you what they have already spent. 

Are we reading that correctly, number one? And, if so, what are 

the implications? Just so the NASA people are at the ready here, 

I will be asking you to respond after Mr. Li has answered my question. 

Mr. LI. Yes. This is a very complicated issue. What we were 

asked to do was the Congress asked us to make sure that there 

was no exceeding of the cap that was established. What we found 

was that at the subsystems level, at the system level, at the individual modules, they could not identify what was actually spent for 

that particular component. 

NASA disagrees and feels that their accounting system, in terms 

of using simply the budget authority that is being provided to 

them, is sufficient. We were looking for actual expenses, and they 

do not track it in that manner. 

Senator WYDEN. Does NASA want to respond to that? 

49

Mr. READDY. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to speak today on the 

Space Shuttle, and I can assure you that in the Space Shuttle 

arena, we are down to a tenth of a percent in terms of accounting 

for what we spend in our program. 

Senator WYDEN. That is fair. Let us just say I would like a response to that in writing, though, with respect to the Space Station. 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

NASA has complete and reliable data concerning the total cost of the International Space Station program. The disagreement between GAO and NASA centers 

on how NASA should track Space Station costs at a detailed level. 

GAO believes that NASA should track the cost of individual Space Station subsystems or elements. NASA, however, believes that for project management purposes it is important to track costs by work breakdown structure. This approach facilitates NASA’s and the contractor’s understanding of costs incurred and future 

projected costs. Within these work breakdown structures are identified subsystems 

and hardware elements, among others. NASA requires the identification of all supporting costs, such as systems engineering and safety and mission assurance, but 

these costs remain separate and are not included in the costs of individual subsystems and hardware elements. This approach provides NASA with a valuable 

project management tool and assures that all Space Station costs are fully accounted for.

Senator WYDEN. Because it does go to the heart of this effort to 

properly fund safety. If we do not have answers to those questions 

and people wave GAO reports that make a finding like that, it will 

be difficult to get the funds that are needed for safety. 

Let me ask one question for the entire panel, and I want to go 

right down the row. I think what we are going to see this issue 

come down to, given the budget situation, is looking at how to balance the safety gains, which are so important and which we have 

all made clear we are not going to compromise, against cost considerations and technical readiness. I would like to hear from each of 

you how you would go about trying to strike that balance because 

clearly, if you have unlimited funds, then there is no problem. You 

get everything under the sun with respect to safety and you hope 

some of it works, and if it does not, so be it. But we are going to 

have to figure out a way to balance these questions of necessary 

safety upgrades against cost and technical readiness. 

If you would, pretend you have the election certificate and you 

are sitting up at this end of the dais and tell us how you would 

go about striking that balance. We will begin with NASA, and we 

will go right down the line. Then when I am done with that question, I am going to turn it over to our friend from Florida. 

Mr. READDY. Mr. Chairman, I had prepared a very detailed answer for you, but it took 10 years and $40 billion to develop the 

Space Shuttle. It goes from a rocket ship for 81⁄2 minutes to a space 

craft for 2 to 3 weeks to a hypersonic reentry vehicle for an hour, 

and the lowest L over D fighter type airplane you would ever land, 

fly by wire for about the last 5 minutes. It is complicated because 

it has to accomplish all those things in one vehicle. That investment is the foundation of human space flight for this nation, and 

the world counts on us to do that, to leverage the investment in 

the International Space Station. 

We are on the threshold of being able to utilize that International Space Station, having just finished Phase II of the assemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
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bly, using the Space Shuttle as the work horse and as the assembly 

platform and now to use it as the logistics platform and the utilization vehicle for that. 

So, what hangs in the balance is not simply our previous investment, not only in Shuttle and Station, but the future harvest from 

the International Space Station from those other missions that are 

unique that the Space Shuttle can perform. So, I guess I would 

couch it in those terms. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. McCulley. 

Mr. MCCULLEY. I will go back to part of my opening statement 

that said there is a fundamental question; that is, do you want 

human access to space in a safe and reliable vehicle? And a bit of 

a history lesson, which I might have already said, in the 1990–1991 

timeframe the NASA Space Shuttle program manager, I think had 

about $5 billion for a budget, and today he has $3 billion for a 

budget. So, it is a 40 percent decrease in that 10-year period, yet 

we are still flying. We just finished a period where we flew at the 

same flight rate. So, we have given at the office, to put it in one 

form. And the life has changed because now we are looking at flying it for many more years, not just a few more years, and it requires investment. 

I think it is probably more of a schedule issue and reliability 

issue in many cases than safety, because we have a very rigorous, 

some would say cumbersome, set of requirements that get you 

down to go fly at T–Zero, and we will continue to press to satisfy 

every single one of those thousands of requirements for each mission. But what we are going to find with infrastructure not being 

there and with the older systems on the Shuttle is that we will 

then end up with safety concerns. 

If I were in your position, then I would answer that first question 

about whether we want that human access and then here is what 

it takes to get it. And, oh, by the way, these guys have done a pretty good job in the last 10 years bringing costs down, where many 

other agencies are having increasing budgets. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Blomberg. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. I certainly agree with what my two colleagues 

have said, but I would also like to point out that perhaps we have 

a semantic issue here when we use the phrase ‘‘upgrades.’’ We 

think of that as an improvement, but we really have to look at upgrades first as holding our own. If we do not do something to this 

vehicle, the safety level will decline inevitably because of the aging 

nature of the vehicle and the infrastructure. So, I guess I would 

first focus on what will it take to just break even, and I think that 

is not trivial. As you mentioned, Senator, our panel does not look 

at budget, but I am afraid, from my own sense of things, that the 

budget is only barely adequate to break even, and maybe not even 

enough. 

Then if you look at the opportunity for risk reduction that is out 

there, that is what can really be captured once you get to a stable 

position and say we can hold our current safety level. Now how can 

we improve it and what are the most cost effective ways to improve 

it? But we cannot lose sight of the fact that if we do not do something, this vehicle is going to get riskier and riskier to fly. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Li? 

51

Mr. LI. I guess I have, perhaps a slightly different perspective on 

this. I think it is a matter of setting priorities, and that sounds 

very trite. I think when you set priorities, you have to be able to 

establish what is the risk level of each one of these individual improvements you want to make. 

I think one of the difficulties that NASA has is that there is a 

mixture of both safety and performance capabilities in a lot of these 

upgrades. Of course, sometimes you cannot really differentiate and 

say that if you are going to improve the performance, you would 

not be improving the safety also at the same time. I think that 

those are very difficult to differentiate. 

The other thing that I would provide as a suggestion is that you 

need to take a look at how long is your exposure to risk. In my testimony, I mentioned the fact that if the replacement, which is possibly an RLV, how long is it going to take for that vehicle to come 

about. If that vehicle is going to be coming in 2012, I may make 

different decisions than if it is going to be in 2020. I have an 1986 

Volvo. If I know I am going to keep it for another 5 years, I may 

get myself a new pump or something, a new water pump. But if 

I am going to get rid of it next week, I am certainly not going to 

do it. 

Senator WYDEN. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Connor? 

Mr. O’CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, I do not have much to add to 

what you have heard other than when we first came up with Space 

Shuttle, we saw it as an operational vehicle. It had a huge, high 

flight rate. It had all kinds of missions. It was flying commercial 

type activities very early. You remember that we declared the 

Space Shuttle ‘‘operational’’ after its fourth test flight. 

Today it is not anywhere close to operational. If you look at the 

risk picture of this vehicle, from an operational viewpoint, they are 

so well below what would be considered an operational vehicle from 

a safety risk view, or of any kind of a DOD or commercial flying 

vehicle. The Space Shuttle is far from that. Further, it has no escape system to accommodate that high risk. 

Therefore, I believe that we continue to fly operations with what 

I would consider to be a risk prototype, an R&D type vehicle. It is 

doing very well, but we cannot let it go backward. As Mr. Blomberg 

pointed out, you have to spend money to keep the risk level where 

it is today, and it must be replaced by something that started from 

the bottom up to be operational, and this time we need to do it 

right. 

Mr. READDY. Mr. Chairman, if I could amplify Colonel O’Connor’s 

statement there. Just for comparison, the F–22, which of course is 

undergoing flight test right now, has flown approximately 600 

flight test missions. The Space Shuttle has flown a little over 100. 

We are going to field the F–22 in 2005 or thereabouts. It has had 

over 1,200 flying hours to date. The Space Shuttle in dynamic 

flight, 81⁄2 minutes of ascent and roughly an hour on entry, has had 

about 120 hours of dynamic flight test. So, we are nowhere near 

the operational program that we would like to be at this particular 

point, and it is going to require continued R&D to maintain our 

Human Space Flight program. 

52

Senator WYDEN. Gentlemen, I wish I could stay here longer, but 

in a sense, at least for me, this may be a good breaking point as 

well. I want to leave you, though, with one thought. 

My thought is that as Chairman of this Subcommittee, I am very 

sympathetic to this issue of additional funds being needed with respect to safety. I can tell you, even apart from the fact that Bill 

Nelson has been a friend of mine for now 2 decades, for 20 years, 

I would still be willing to go to Barbara Mikulski and to those that 

are on this conference and to make the case for additional funding. 

But I would urge you to do what Mr. Li just mentioned, and that 

is to set some priorities. That is absolutely critical at a time when 

this budget is strapped in a very dramatic fashion. Senator Nelson 

and I represent a lot of senior citizens. This morning we were told 

that the Administration recosted prescription drug benefits and 

one-third of the money disappeared. One-third of the money, in effect, just vanished. So, these budget choices are going to be very, 

very tough. I am prepared to go to Senator Mikulski and those on 

that Subcommittee with my colleagues to argue for additional 

funds, but I would urge you to take heed of what Mr. Li has said 

with respect to some priorities. They have got to be set. 

In addition, if I might paraphrase what my mother always said. 

When we were talking about a budget, she would always say, son, 

sharpen your pencil because there are savings that can be found 

and economies that can be found in every single budget. 

You have been an excellent panel. Senator Nelson has told me 

about how dedicated all of you are and that is very evident in your 

comments here today. I look forward as Chairman of the Subcommittee to working very closely with each of you. With that, I 

am going to turn it over to Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, before you leave, let me just say 

that I think the quandary, the conundrum that we find ourselves 

in, the reason we are trying to have this hearing today, is the fact 

that NASA has mismanaged the Space Station, and as a result, 

you have had these huge cost overruns. But then when confronted 

with what we are going to do in the future, it appears that sources 

would want to punish NASA for NASA’s misdeeds by cutting back 

on other parts of the program which I think the testimony here 

from all these people has dramatically demonstrated that we do so 

at the risk of life, indeed at the risk of the entire Human Space 

Flight program. 

So, it kind of reminds me of my colloquy on the floor with Senator McCain. He was very rightly taking out after NASA’s mismanagement and cost overruns on the Space Station. But we have 

got to get beyond that because we have got a lot at stake right 

here. 

Senator WYDEN. Very good. 

Why do we not recognize Senator Allen and Senator Nelson will 

chair. 

Senator NELSON [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator ALLEN.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman-designee. 

We have about 5 minutes. There are so many questions listening 

to you all. 

53

I want to say to Mr. Li that I loved the way you use an analogy, 

whether it is the Volvo or an automobile. Senator Wyden and I 

were saying about these add-ons or upgrades, it is like getting upgraded tires, although your tires on the Space Shuttle cost $9 million for the upgrades, which of course may seem very high. But regardless, I think to get public support and understanding for some 

of these things, I like to use analogies and try to just use some 

common sense ways of looking at things. 

I will try to prioritize my questions to everyone here. First to Mr. McCulley, of this projected $218 million shortfall in fiscal year 

2002, $54 million was due to contractor rate increases, according 

to NASA. This is the same sort of thing to some extent with fuel, 

for example, that anybody would understand, with the costs for 

natural gas, the spike we had with that earlier, as well as just regular old fuel that some of us would use in our Volvos or Dodges 

or Fords or whatever. 

As a contractor or the operator of it, can you elaborate on what this $54 million increase in costs is? 

Mr. MCCULLEY. The $218 million is program-wide, and United 

Space Alliance is approximately 50 percent of the program-wide 

budget. So, just on a straight scale, linear scale, we would represent maybe half of that $218 million. I do not know exactly how 

it is distributed. 

But what we have done for the first 5 years of the space flight 

operations contract and what we have projected for the years in 

front of us has been basically 4 percent a year for each of those 

years. And we have performed very, very close to our projections. 

That 4 percent is our merit pool. It is our annual raise to account 

for inflation and to keep our engineers, technicians, and other employees lined up with the rest of the economy. 

We are maybe $1.5 billion or so for the whole contract. I think 

between Florida and Texas, maybe two-thirds of that is in the salaries and medical and benefits range. So, if you take 4 percent of 

that, then that puts you in the $40 million or so there. The $54 

million would probably apply to all the contractors, not just to us. 

So, that would represent I think around a 4 percent or so escalation, which is what most of us have been telling NASA all along. 

Both our historical track record and our projections have been at 

that 4 percent rate. 

Senator ALLEN. I know I am green and new here, but should that 

not somehow be reflected in budget projections rather than saying 

it is a shortfall if everyone has known that the salary increases and 

so forth are going to be going up 4 percent? 

Mr. MCCULLEY. Yes, sir. There is a difference between contract 

value which is back when we started the contract and we bid the 

proposal to NASA, we put those escalation rates into our pricing 

for our proposal. However, the budget is quite a bit different than 

the contract value, as it turns out, and the contract value has been 

higher every year than the budget. So, we had those escalation 

numbers in the proposal that was accepted when the contract was 

originally issued. The budget numbers are a different subject. 

Senator ALLEN. It is just the way, I guess, things operate up 

here. It does not make a great deal of sense to me having come 

from the real world. 

54

[Laughter.] 

Senator ALLEN. Let me ask you this question because I think it 

matters a great deal. I am glad they will have some of those Space 

Shuttle objects flying around the Richmond International Raceway 

Saturday night—the Winston Cup Races. But other than for the 

Space Station assembly, what do you see as the prospects for the 

future use of the Shuttle, and are there any commercial interests 

in the Shuttle orbiters that you are aware of? 

Mr. MCCULLEY. Let us see. Mr. Readdy may be better. 

Senator ALLEN. Well, either one. I thought you would. Whoever 

feels most capable of answering. 

Mr. MCCULLEY. Let me start. Then you can finish. 

Next year we have a Hubble servicing mission, which will be the 

third or fourth trip back to Hubble Space Telescope. There is a 

science mission on the horizon that would utilize Columbia either 

late next year or early the next year. And let me go to Mr. Readdy 

with that. 

Senator ALLEN. Hubble folks understand that. But, for example, 

whatever the last thing you said was. What did you say? 

Mr. MCCULLEY. A science mission that would supplement Space 

Station, and I think it is presently on the manifest for early 2003. 

Senator ALLEN. Yes, but what is the science that is being transacted? 

Mr. READDY. Human biology and microgravity research. It maybe 

is not quite ready for International Space Station yet, so the Space 

Shuttle is being used as an augmentation to do near-term research. 

Senator ALLEN. Are there any commercial interests involved in 

that? 

Mr. READDY. There are commercial payloads that we fly. On typical missions we will fly commercial payloads, and we are making 

more of an initiative to seek out commercial payloads. We have 

SpaceHAB, which is one of our contractors, that has a set-aside for 

a percentage for commercial on each and every one of their lab 

module missions. So, we are doing that. 

The other thing that we have is preliminary discussions for 

maybe a salvage mission in space for a commercial satellite. 

We also have another interagency support mission that we have 

done. We did a Shuttle radar topography mission for the DOD. We 

have a rich history of having launched communication satellites before Challenger, and we have supported all manner of missions 

over the Shuttle’s 106 flights. 

Mr. MCCULLEY. And as a company we have worked, in the last 

couple of years, fairly actively with the Air Force and with other 

DOD interests to make sure they know that the capability is there, 

the heavy-lift capability in the Shuttle, for some of their payloads. 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. 

Colonel O’Connor, this was generally what Senator Wyden was 

getting at and you brought it up in your testimony about finding 

a quantitative way. I was reading through these briefings of all the 

different improvements that were safety improvements, whether it 

is the Space Shuttle Main Engine Block III, or the Advanced 

Health Management System, or the Thrust Vector Controls, and so 

forth and so on. In each and every one of them that I went 

55

through, there was an analysis. This might reduce it by 40 percent 

and so forth. Mr. Li naturally understood all those. 

You mentioned as well having a quantitative approach or try to 

get some way of judging, if you cannot do everything, what will 

have the most bang for the buck, what is the most affordable. 

Your 1999 NRC report recommended that NASA should modify 

its system for prioritizing upgrades. Now, has NASA changed its 

system in your view to adequately prioritize the implementation of 

new upgrades? And if not, would you suggest any improvements? 

Mr. O’CONNOR. We made something like 25 recommendations. 

There was only one that they did not endorse and take action on, 

and they may have since then. That had to do with putting more 

effort on looking for ways to reduce orbital debris risk. 

The reason we brought that up, though, was right on the mark 

you are making. We looked at how much money was spent to reduce the risk of the main engines, over $1 billion at that time on 

the turbo pump upgrades, and the reduction in risk that that represented was a certain value. Then we looked at how much money 

was spent to reduce almost that same amount of risk for the whole 

Shuttle on orbital debris upgrades where they had put some covers 

on the radiators that are exposed to orbital debris risk on orbit, 

and they had changed the thermal control system for the leading 

edge of the wings so that if they did take a hit, it would not destroy 

the vehicle on reentry. That was something like $60 million. So, 

you got almost the same reduction in risk for a tremendous difference in price. 

My numbers may be a little off, but when we looked at that, we 

realized that you need to always look at that. You need to look at 

the bang for the buck that you get for these things when you are 

looking at safety. 

Now, having said that, we also realize that you should never use 

just one of these tools to make your decisions. The committee was 

firm in saying they do not believe in making your decisions only 

on a quantitative bang for the buck study. You have to do the qualitative, the subjective, the engineering looks. 

If you like analogies, the one I use is when I was a little kid 

growing up in southern California, my dad on some weekends 

would take us to Disneyland. At the time Disneyland was not built 

yet. They had a green fence around the whole place. Mr. Disney 

was a great guy. He put little holes in that fence at various heights 

so children of all sizes could look through and see what is going 

on at Disneyland. But the routine was that the parents would 

bring the children, they would look in the fence, they would drive 

around the block, they would look in that hole in the fence, they 

would drive around the block, they would look in that hole, and 

they would look through about four or five different holes to try to 

get some understanding of what was going on in Disneyland. 

And that is what they have to do with these upgrades, to 

prioritize them, to see which ones are the best. It is not just a single bang for the buck peephole, but do the engineering and the 

qualitative and all these other things along with that. That was 

our recommendation. 

Senator ALLEN. And do you feel that NASA has followed through 

on that recommendation? 

56

Mr. O’CONNOR. Yes, sir. At that time, when we looked at it. 

Again I have not been looking at Space Shuttle myself since this 

committee, which is about 2 years ago now, to watch for the followons. The committee was not asked to do that. But at that time, we 

thought they have an excellent system for prioritizing. They did not 

use just one system. They had independent look-sees to try to take 

care of the normal biases you get from center to center, from region 

to region, the advocates from different companies saying that mine 

is the best. They hired independent people to come and take a look 

and try to strip that away and get the best they could, and we 

thought they were doing the appropriate actions. 

Senator ALLEN. Well, it seems like they did. Seeing how you are 

outside of it now, but obviously with a great deal of knowledge 

from the recent past, it seems to me that in a roundabout way on 

some of these that ended up on this—Electric Auxiliary Power Unit 

I believe it was. The cost just kept going up and up and up, and 

they finally said let us have some reality here. We are not sure 

about the quality of this, the engineering of it, and certainly the 

cost. It seems to me that almost got winnowed out by using that 

sort of an analysis. Would you agree, Mr. Readdy? 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. Senator Allen, I would like to submit something for the record here that was omitted from your package. 

First I would like to say that with respect to the NRC study, 

they had 25 recommendations. We implemented all 25. We have 

had 9 independent reviews from external groups to look over our 

shoulder on Space Shuttle upgrades. They have all found that we 

have a systematic approach to address the risk in the Space Shuttle program. 

A picture is worth a thousand words. If I could share this with 

you. I am sorry I only have one copy, but I will bring it forward. 

Basically what it shows is all these little icons are elements of the 

different components of the Shuttle. Some are main engine. Some 

have to do with solid rocket boosters. Some have to do with the external tank. Some have to do with the orbiter itself. What we did 

was used a quantitative tool that Colonel O’Connor described, and 

we looked at each and every one of those elements. This box down 

here represents the highest risk. We methodically put in place an 

upgrade program to address each and every one of those. 

For example, in the electric APU, that remains the highest risk 

item in the Space Shuttle orbiter. The unfortunate thing is the battery technology, the packaging density for those batteries does not 

exist today to be able to implement it. As a result, we thought we 

made a prudent decision to go ahead and stop that program, put 

some money into technology, and use that money for other purposes. But we have done the same thing with the other upgrades. 

So, we do have a very systematic approach to attack each and 

every one of these higher risk items. 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I will yield to you. I know I went way over 5 minutes. 

Senator NELSON. No, Senator Allen. I had them turn off the 

lights because we are going to be at this as long as we need to. 

I wanted to follow up on an initial question of Senator Allen’s. 

He was wondering about what does the Space Shuttle deliver for 

57

us today, and it occurred to me, did we not launch the Chandra Observatory on the Space Shuttle? 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir, we did. STS–93 in July 1999. 

Senator NELSON. Does it have a capability of being serviced by 

the Space Shuttle? 

Mr. READDY. Chandra does not, but the Hubble Space Telescope 

does. And we are flying our fourth servicing mission. It is scheduled for this coming January. 

Senator NELSON. The point that I want to make, Senator Allen, 

in response to your question, is just today—I know it is in The 

Washington Post, so it must be in most every other newspaper. 

Senator ALLEN. You might want to get an independent 

verification. But go ahead. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. What is the name of the Richmond newspaper? 

Senator ALLEN. Richmond Times Dispatch. 

Senator NELSON. It is probably in the Richmond Times Dispatch

as well because it was a major story. The fact is that the Chandra 

observatory, which is one of the great observatories that the Space 

Shuttle has put up, like the Hubble Space Telescope, which is in 

the visual part of the electromagnetic spectrum—the Chandra is 

the in X-ray spectrum. Chandra has discovered a huge black hole 

that we have been looking for for years. And it is just another example that it is a routine article, nevertheless a very important 

news article, in this morning’s newspapers about what is the viability and the importance to the country as we are explorers, as we 

are adventurers in trying to understand what is out there and 

where we came from and how it evolved and what still might be 

out there. So, I just mention that to you. It is a timely story. 

Please feel free to——

Senator ALLEN. I have to go. 

Senator NELSON. You are going to have to go. And we are going 

to have a vote momentarily, but even if I have to recess, we are 

going to keep going and get all the questions in. 

Mr. Blomberg said that he thinks that the current budget may 

only be barely enough to break even, or words to the effect that you 

used. So, Mr. Readdy, I want to ask in your professional opinion, 

is the fiscal year 2002 budget, as proposed by NASA, enough to 

break even at a flight rate of six flights a year? 

Mr. READDY. Sir, as I said in my statement, we are facing a 

shortfall right now in 2002 of $218 million. Inflation continues to 

erode our purchasing power and we are somewhere around 40 percent of what we were starting in 1990 at this point, and it will continue to erode at the rate of inflation. Maybe Mr. McCulley can 

speak to it, but I see it being increasingly hard to get more efficiencies out of the contract that we have with United Space Alliance, even if we go to further privatization. 

Senator NELSON. Does anybody else want to comment on that? 

Mr. MCCULLEY. Also, to put that $218 million in perspective, I 

think it is around maybe 7 or 8 percent of the total Shuttle program budget. So, it is a number that will work. If it is what we 

have to live with, then it is what we have to live with. As I said 

earlier, the process we go through to satisfy requirements to make 

us safe, Senator, we will go through that process. What will suffer 

58

in the short term, in particular, is schedule. If you cannot get 

there, there is not enough money for overtime or you do not have 

enough people, you just do it at a slower rate, but you still do it 

in a safe manner. And safety always is number one. 

So, from my point of view as the contractor with the people who 

do the hands-on work, if I am given some budget challenge that I 

did not expect, whether it is $20 million, $30 million, $40 million, 

or $50 million, then I will have to figure out what to do with that. 

Now, as a service contractor, most of my budget is in people, and 

so I do not have very much flexibility to not buy parts and put 

them on the shelf or delay the development of something. Because 

the vast majority of my resources are spent on people doing things, 

as I mentioned earlier, over the years I have gotten to be an expert 

in how to do layoffs whether I wanted to or not. So, if we are told 

to eat some unanticipated amount of money, then we will just go 

deal with that, and it will impact the work force predominantly in 

Florida and Texas. 

Senator NELSON. I want to show you a chart and I want to talk 

about it. You all are quite familiar with this chart. This is before 

Challenger when the risk was 1 in 25 because the 25th flight blew 

up. Post Challenger, with the upgrades that were made, the catastrophic risk on ascent is 1 in 78. You all upgraded that to 1 in 

248. It has now been upgraded to where we are now to about 1 in 

483. The idea was to double that to 1 in 1,000. Again to compare, 

Mr. Readdy, with what you said, a Boeing 777 is 1 in multiples of 

thousands. I think you said 20,000. 

Mr. READDY. A combat aircraft, 20,000; and a commercial aircraft, 1 in a million. 

Senator NELSON. One in a million; a combat aircraft, 1 in 20,000. 

So, we are just trying to get the Space Shuttle on ascent to 1 in 

1,000. But you have got to do these things. So, let us go through 

these, let us talk about them, and let us see if we can get some 

sense—and I invite all of you. I cannot thank you enough for all 

of your participation today because you bring your particular expertise to the table and it is very valuable. So, let us talk about it. 

The orbiter avionics/cockpit safety upgrade. If you got into an 

emergency landing, return to the site of launch, RTLS, or a transAtlantic abort, for that commander and for that pilot, it would sure 

be nice to have that, would it not? 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. And this is what we have today. We have 

got checklists on velcro that we put up in the window. You know 

these because you flew them, and they have not really changed 

much other than the procedural steps since STS–1. But that is 

what we have at our disposal to fly our Mach 25 rocket ship. 

Senator NELSON. What are we talking about in cost for that and 

over what period? What are we looking at for the first cost? 

Mr. READDY. Well, we will get you the precise numbers, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. If I recall, it is about $380 million, and that is 

over some period of time. You would be talking about $60 million 

in 2002. 

Mr. READDY. The rough order of magnitude that we submitted in 

November 2000 was between $400 million and $500 million to implement that upgrade, sir. 

59

Senator NELSON. Do you want to assign a percentage to that of 

all these upgrades to double the safety or, to describe it another 

way, to half the risk? Do you want to assign a percentage to that 

of how important that is to us? 

Mr. READDY. Well, in terms of operation of the Space Shuttle, 

when we do our quantitative risk assessment, we use the crew as 

a reliability of 1.0. The crew always makes perfect decisions. The 

ground always makes perfect decisions because we model only the 

hardware aspects of it. So, the cockpit is one upgrade that gives the 

ground control and the flight crew on board the decisionmaking 

aids to be able to crisply decide among what the different abort options are among the systems. 

For example, on STS–93, the crew had a momentary indication 

on a caution and warning panel, but the crew did not really have 

any idea what sub-bus, what other systems were affected until the 

ground, with literally dozens of flight controllers, could assess the 

situation and send up not only what had failed but what the corrective action should be. The crew did not have the situational 

awareness to be able to deal with that on board. That is what we 

are trying to provide. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. Senator, if I may. 

Senator NELSON. Yes, please, Mr. Blomberg. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. I do a lot of work in cockpit displays of various 

aircraft. The Space Shuttle is the fastest vehicle that humans fly. 

So, things happen most quickly. Decision making has to go on most 

quickly. And it has the lowest level of situational awareness of any 

vehicle I have ever seen. So, perhaps that will put it in context for 

you. 

Senator NELSON. Yes. This is year 2001 and the Space Shuttle 

started to be developed in the year 1971. It is basically 30-year-old 

technology. And in order for it to fly for another 20 years, it is 

going to need to be upgraded. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. And it is 30-year-old technology that was barely 

adequate for just under Mach 1, and we have a hypersonic vehicle. 

Senator NELSON. All right. Let us talk about some more. The 

electric APU. Right now you have an APU that has all of these explosive materials. You call them hypergolics. That adds additional 

risk. What you would like to do is to make that APU electric and, 

therefore, take out that explosive risk. As you said, you are having 

difficulty developing the batteries and to get the batteries down 

into a sufficiently small size and small weight. What would you assign to that as a percentage of risk so that we can half the risk 

for the Space Shuttle? 

Mr. READDY. As memory serves here, that was about 15 percent 

of the total Shuttle risk, and that winds up being the highest risk 

driver on the Space Shuttle orbiter vehicle. 

Senator NELSON. 15 percent of the overall catastrophic failure 

risk, but in the orbiter risk, it brings the risk down from 30 percent 

to less than 5 percent. This is a costly item, is it not? 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. It started out at about $224 million, and now 

the costs keep escalating. 

Mr. MCCULLEY. It is important to note on that particular upgrade, that that also has tremendous implications for the ground 

60

processing team, in addition to just the flight, because dealing with 

the hydrazine fuels requires a self-contained breathing apparatus. 

It requires safety considerations that slow down the overall process. So, that upgrade, more than any of the others on there, definitely affects the ground systems as well as the flight systems. 

Senator NELSON. Speaking of that, when I get back from voting, 

Mr. McCulley, I wish you would remind me. I want you to tell the 

story about what happened in the orbiter processing facility with 

regard to the hypergolics and how it could have blown up the whole 

Shuttle and the orbital processing facility, just another example. 

In this particular case, if we are doing this, we are not just doing 

it for the Space Shuttle. We are doing it for the future manned 

space vehicle that ultimately in 20 years or so is going to take over 

the Space Shuttle. These are technologies that are going to be applied for the future. Is that correct? 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. We should never commit to building another human space flight vehicle that we have to process that has 

hypergolic propellants. 

Senator NELSON. Let us talk about the main engine. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. Excuse me, Senator. Could I just also add? 

Senator NELSON. Please, yes. All of you interrupt any time, 

please. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. If we are going to fly the Space Shuttle to 2020 

or beyond, as we believe it will be, the current APU’s cannot support. They will wear out. There will have to be an investment in 

APU’s one way or the other. So, the issue is—and I do not know 

the numbers—do you buy more of the current APU’s from a vendor 

who may or may not still have the capability or do you upgrade? 

It is not purely an upgrade. There is an obsolescence issue and a 

wear and tear issue here also. 

Senator NELSON. And you underscore the point, are we going to 

have human space flight or not? And if we are, as you point out, 

Mr. Blomberg, it is getting to be obsolescent, and for that reason 

alone, you are going to have to change. 

All right. I am down to 2 minutes to vote. What I am going to 

do is recess the hearing. I am going to go over and vote and come 

right back. The next thing we are going to talk about is the main 

engine advanced health management. 

[Recess.] 

Senator NELSON. The Subcommittee will resume. 

Let us resume discussing these upgrades. The main engine advanced health management. Mr. Readdy? 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. Our quantitative risk assessment shows 

that that would be about a 19 percent decrease in ascent risk. 

Senator NELSON. And how much of a cost is that? It looks like 

it is about $155 million? 

Mr. READDY. Phase I of that is $27 million, and Phase II of it—

excuse me. That is the remaining. Phase I is $55 million and Phase 

II is $100 million, sir. 

Senator NELSON. And that upgrade is done over how long a period, just approximately? 

Mr. READDY. About 5 years, sir. 

61

Senator NELSON. Let us talk about the main engine Block III. 

That is under study. You told us a little bit about that. Tell us 

some more. 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. Well, I think you have been provided the 

ascent risk breakdown with the icons associated with all the different elements. If you look at the one that says SSME, our current 

engine configuration shows the cluster of three main engines at 1 

in 1,000. 

Then as you march up and left on that chart, the next highest 

risk element is the high pressure fuel turbo pump, which we have 

just flown on STS–104 and are planning to fly again here on STS–

108 at the end of November. 

We have already implemented the next element, which is the 

high pressure oxidizer turbo pump, and if you continue up and left 

on that line, the large throat main combustion chamber we have 

implemented. The main injector we have implemented. The fuel 

preburner we have implemented. 

And the next item up there, right about the middle of the chart, 

is the nozzle. That is really the core around which the Block III 

main engine would be built. That is the single element in the main 

engine that has not received any upgrade over the time since we 

have been flying STS–1. So, that would be what we would build the 

Block III main engine around. Unfortunately, Colonel O’Connor talked about over $1 billion invested in bringing the Block II engine to fruition. We also think 

that a Block III main engine would probably also be on the order 

of over $1 billion to develop. 

Mr. READDY. But there again, Senator, if I could point out that 

the propulsion specialist on our panel, who is the former head of 

the SSME program for NASA, has expressed great concern about 

the ability of the current nozzle to last throughout the entire program. So, there is an issue here again of either a need to acquire 

more nozzles and reinitiate the manufacturing capability or develop a new one. You are not going to get there with the current 

resources. 

Senator NELSON. Well said. 

Mr. Readdy, that is over what kind of period for Block III? 

Mr. READDY. That would be least 5 years in development. The 

past track record on the pumps has been it could take as long as 

10 years. 

Senator NELSON. And that is roughly about a $400 million program up to $1 billion, did you say? 

Mr. READDY. I think $1 billion would be a reasonable estimate 

based on what the pumps have cost, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Are there any of these others that you want to 

comment on? 

Mr. READDY. Well, once again, looking at our stack-up of risks, 

the other element that we did want to look at was the solid rocket 

booster thrust vector controller. Right now that is the one that is 

shown with the icon for the solid rocket booster that says HPU. 

That stands for hydraulic power unit. That is, in essence, an APU 

for the orbiter that has a lesser duty cycle, and there are two of 

them per solid rocket booster. They operate for about 21⁄2 minutes 

and then, of course, they splash down in the Atlantic, get dragged 

62

back to Florida, refurbished, and used again. But it has the same 

toxic, flammable propellant (hydrazine), the same high temperature environment, the same kind of rotating machinery that goes 

around at 80,000 rpm or more. So, we would hope to retire a similar amount of risk in that area. 

Senator NELSON. And would that be replacing the hydrazine with 

electric? 

Mr. READDY. In this particular case, because it has got a lesser 

duty cycle of only 21⁄2 minutes, instead of 81⁄2 minutes in ascent 

and an hour plus on entry, our proposal right now would be to use 

high pressure helium, which is an inert gas, as the motive agent 

instead of hydrazine. Helium, of course, is nontoxic, nonflammable. 

Senator NELSON. This reduces the SRB failure by about 21 percent. 

Mr. READDY. For the SRB, that may be correct. For overall ascent mission risk, it would be about a 9 percent contribution. 

Senator NELSON. It is roughly a $200 million item? 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Now, Mr. Readdy, did you have a chart that 

you wanted to show us on this same issue? 

Mr. READDY. We affectionately call that particular chart the 

‘‘Volkswagen’’ chart. You see kind of the streamlines as it goes up. 

Really the attempt there was to illustrate where we are now and 

what the possibilities are. We do not have a precise number because these are all probabilities. We have got a range of numbers 

that go up vertically there. 

Senator NELSON. You have a chart on the Space Shuttle program 

historical budget that you wanted to show us. 

By the way, we will enter into the record the Block II configuration ascent that we have just gone over. 

[The charts follow:]

63


906read1.eps
64


906read2.eps
65


906read3.eps
66


906read4.eps
67


906read5.eps
68


906read6.eps
69

Senator NELSON. Please. 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. I think this really speaks to Senator Allen’s original question, credibility in terms of cost estimation. I 

think even though we would not characterize our vehicle as operational in terms of the relative risk, we would certainly characterize the program as operational in that we know, to a pretty 

large degree, what it costs for the hardware and what it costs for 

the people to run the program. 

What we have done here is we have put it in current year dollars 

and adjusted it backward for inflation and then forward we have 

discounted the dollars to show the effect of inflation on our budget. 

Our current budget in real year dollars is a constant $3.2 billion. 

This shows the upgrades wedge that you all initiated, and it also 

shows what is resourced for six flights per year in the current 

budget. 

Senator NELSON. Does anybody else want to comment on the 

chart? 

Mr. MCCULLEY. Well, Senator, I would repeat what I said earlier 

that it is that profile that has me greatly concerned because as an 

almost people-only contract, the only way to achieve those numbers 

is to reduce staff by significant numbers, which is not only painful 

but dangerous to the long-term health of the program. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Blomberg, you were shaking your head. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. I was shaking my head, Senator, because just 

the thought of reducing any of the people right now would mean, 

almost with certainty, that certain critical skills would be eliminated from the program and risk would just go out of sight. 

That curve is really almost the mirror image of what it should 

be for a vehicle of this age. At this point in time, there should be 

an increased investment in the vehicle to bring it back to the operating state that it had when it was new and to apply modern technology to reduce risk. 

I think there are two stages, as I mentioned, that you have got 

to go through. One is let us make sure we are holding our own and 

we have a vehicle that is as capable as it was when it was new 

or, in this case, when it was redesigned after Challenger. And then 

let us see what makes sense to improve the reliability and improve 

the safety of the vehicle above that. You cannot do that with a 

funding profile like that. That is just the opposite. 

Mr. MCCULLEY. Richard, I would only comment that ‘‘vehicle’’ is 

too narrow a term because you need to include the whole system. 

Mr. BLOMBERG. I agree with you completely. 

Senator NELSON. Right, which is an excellent reminder that you 

have got a force of people who are trained who are experienced, 

and if you do not have that and you have to lay off people, then 

it takes you a long time to accumulate that kind of experience as 

you would ramp up in the future. 

Take this opportunity, Mr. McCulley, to tell them about what 

happened a few years ago and how the orbiter processing facility, 

along with the orbiter, could have gone sky high. 

Mr. MCCULLEY. One of my reasons for being such a big fan of 

those two upgrades that dealt with the auxiliary power units—one 

of them would be replaced by helium; the other would be by electric—is that the very things that make those fuels work so well in 

70

orbit also result—you really have a controlled fire going on in those 

in the back. 

But in the ground processing system, you have valves that leak 

and heaters that fail and things of that nature. So, you routinely 

have to work on those orbital maneuvering system pods and in and 

around those hypergolic fuels and the hydrazine on the auxiliary 

power units. 

But the incident to which you are referring was we were working 

on OMUS pod on Endeavor in OPF processing facility bay 1, 3, or 

4 years ago, and the techs and inspectors, who were in the protective gear—and we had the bay cleared—opened the line up that 

they thought had been cleared of fluids but it was not. These 

things are self-igniting. So, second shift, everything is cleared out 

of the way. These three guys found themselves up inside a very 

confined space with an uncontrolled fire in their face. 

They had a couple of options at that point. One was to run, and 

nobody would have faulted them for that because they were working with something that could have exploded catastrophically very 

quickly. It was all caught on tape because we have these video 

cameras that run as a safety and security issue. So, we were able 

to watch this thing take place the next day. It was absolutely incredible the way these three men responded to that fire. 

They were wearing gloves. But one guy was beating the fire out 

with his hands, which were gloved. In the meantime, one of the 

other guys got the nearest water bucket that he could get, and the 

third guy got on the phone. They each did a part that was there. 

And the end result was they put the fire out in about 25 or 30 seconds, and the damage was minimal. Actually there was more water 

damage than there was heat damage, the way it turned out. 

But it points out what you wanted to point out that there is not 

just flight hazards associated with these types of fuels, there are 

also ground hazards that we have to deal with. It puts our folks 

in a hazardous environment, and that by definition makes it a 

more expensive and less efficient environment. So, this particular 

set of upgrades not only would make life safer on the ground and 

in the air, but it would also greatly increase efficiency and your 

ability to manifest and schedule. 

Senator NELSON. Let us talk about some of the upgrades for the 

infrastructure and why that is important. One of the obvious 

things, there was a hurricane that was headed straight for the 

Cape about 2 years ago, and thankfully it turned. Yet, some winds 

did hit the Cape and blew off some panels of the Vehicle Assembly 

Building or VAB. The continuing assault of corrosion, as well as, 

I understand, other things that have been there since the Apollo 

days that simply are going to have to be updated. Share with us 

what you know about all of that and how does that fit with the 

overall safety that we are looking at here and the efficiency. 

Mr. MCCULLEY. First of all, from a Shuttle program point of 

view, it is far more than just a Kennedy problem. The Johnson 

Space Center has a huge number of facilities that are devoted to 

the Shuttle program, simulators, trainers, mock-ups, a number of 

things, that also require periodic upgrading or repair and maintenance. The Stennis Center in Mississippi has propellant barges 

that, like all ships, need refurbishment that has been put off. They 

71

have water pumps that are out on the test stands that need work. 

The Marshall Space Flight Center has a number of areas that need 

work. Then, as you mentioned, the Kennedy Space Center, the 

most visible, of course, is the vehicle assembly building. 

These are facilities that were built many years ago. We have 

done the required maintenance over the years, and that is evidenced by the fact, as I said earlier, we launched 8 times in the 

last 11 months and we had no failures of things like fuel pumps 

that pump the fuel into the vehicle, heaters, electrical switch boxes, 

RF transmitters, any of those things. So, the facility is working but 

it is working primarily because we are just doing what has to be 

done and we are not doing as much of what you would like to do 

so that it is still there 10 years from now to protect. 

Some of it is things like 1970’s technology-based, oil-based circuit 

breakers that can get hot and can explode, and the technology 

today would allow you to be much further along. Those sort of upgrades are not very glamorous, certainly nothing like putting a new 

main engine or some sort of fancy cockpit in, but they are just as 

important for the long haul. 

Senator NELSON. Does everybody agree with that? 

Mr. BLOMBERG. Definitely, and I would just add another example 

that happens to be at the Kennedy Space Center. But the data cables that run out to the launch pads are in just a horrid state of 

repair. They are being Band-Aided. They have been working fine. 

People are doing as much as can be done with them, but the bottom line is they need to be replaced. They could be replaced with 

fiber optics or modern technology and become much less of a worry. 

If they fail at the wrong time, a smart failure as we call it, it could 

be a very serious safety issue. 

Senator NELSON. I would like to get your opinions on the record. 

Since we have concentrated on the Shuttle safety, now I would like 

you to put on the record your opinions with regard to the threat 

with the safety to the International Space Station. If the Shuttle 

is grounded, obviously we have got a problem except for the crew 

escape vehicle. But what are some of the other things that would 

imperil the Space Station vis-a-vis Shuttle safety and these upgrades? 

Mr. READDY. I think our mission in the Space Shuttle program 

is to provide safe, reliable, sustainable, human-rated space transportation during the International Space Station era. Those things 

which allow us to do that, of course, are very important. We have 

got Captain Frank Culbertson and his crew orbiting right this 

minute on International Space Station. Pretty soon there will be a 

year of continuous crew on board International Space Station. We 

expect to do this for the next 15 years. Without the Space Shuttle 

to provide crew rotation, to provide logistics, to provide repairs and 

a platform to be able to do further assembly, it does put that investment in the International Space Station at risk and it causes 

further reliance on our Russian partners in terms of the Soyuz vehicles for crew up and down, for crew rescue and progress vehicles 

for crew resupply. 

Senator NELSON. Any other comments? Mr. Li? 

Mr. LI. Yes, sir. While the Shuttle is extremely important for 

servicing the Space Station, I think that the alternatives obviously 

72

that are available to us—they might not be the ones that we would 

want to use—are indeed more reliance on the Russians and perhaps reliance on the Europeans. They are developing an ATV vehicle that will provide that sort of replenishment. 

But I am reminded, when I think about what the Shuttle has 

done recently, that there have been situations where the Shuttle 

was extremely useful in helping out the Space Station, for example, 

when they had difficulty with the air conditioning and they were 

actually using the air and the oxygen from the Space Station. 

There was that incident where to boost it to a higher orbit, they 

used some of the propellant and used some of the power from the 

Shuttle. 

So, I think there are those instances, but I think that we have 

to take a look at the Shuttle as not being the sole provider for 

being able to help the Space Station. 

Mr. READDY. In terms of harvesting that investment that we 

have made in the International Space Station, the other thing that 

the Shuttle provides is the research up and the research down from 

the Space Station. That harvest occurs because the Space Shuttle 

is able to take up those racks that are full of experiments, those 

materials that are used in those experiments, and also has the capacity to bring them down to a soft landing. 

Senator NELSON. In other words, to put this in investment terms, 

everything that we have got invested in the Space Station is going 

to be dependent upon a workable, safe, and reliable Space Shuttle 

to get to and from the Space Station. 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. I would like your opinions, so that we can get 

on the record and clarify in people’s minds what was conceived to 

be the follow-on vehicle to the Space Shuttle—I think it is referred 

to as the Space Launch Initiative. I wish you would tell about how 

that all has been delayed and set aside and how that is not likely 

to come for some period of time, but that in upgrading the Space 

Shuttle, you are also starting to do your advance, your planning, 

your design that can be incorporated in the Space Launch Initiative so that ultimately we have the follow-on vehicle. Mr. Readdy, 

and I would like to go right down the panel. 

Mr. READDY. Well, I think Allen Li has recently testified on SLI, 

but from the Space Shuttle standpoint, we really enthusiastically 

support the Space Launch Initiative and the goals to provide a next 

generation vehicle. The Space Shuttle’s 20 years of service, though, 

should be the launching platform because we wind up being a pathfinder for very many of these technologies because we can provide 

the test bed that takes them to the relevant environment and back. 

Also, the lessons that Mike McCulley was talking about in terms 

of the vehicle processing. We always look at T–O, which is lift-off, 

to wheel stop, landing. That is only 10 percent of what happens in 

a reusable spacecraft’s life cycle. Ninety percent of that time right 

now is spent in vehicle processing for the next mission. That is one 

of the lessons that we need to learn. Part of that is driven by the 

fact that we have toxic propellants. Part of it is driven by the fact 

that it was such a cutting edge endeavor to do in the first place 

that we had to shoehorn things into a vehicle rather than a priority 

to make them maintainable. So, the maintainability, the reliability 

73

aspects need to be engineered into the next generation vehicle. 

Those technologies need to be started right now. 

The 777 enjoyed, from the tip of the nose to the tip of the tail, 

the benefit of research that was done 20 and 30 years earlier in 

digital fly by wire flight control, super critical wing, composite primary structure, glass cockpit, high bypass turbo fan engine technology, et cetera. What we need to do is have the analog to that 

that will allow us in the next decades to build the next generation 

of vehicles. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Li? 

Mr. LI. Yes, sir. The Space Launch Initiative that you referred 

to was really the latest reincarnation of what they have been trying 

to do. But if I can turn you a few years back, there was a recognition of the fact that the Shuttle, even though it is the only game 

in town, is a very expensive game in town. 

That said, there was a need to be able to reduce the cost of sending payload to space from the $10,000 a pound that we currently 

pay on the Shuttle to maybe $1,000 a pound. The thought is, once 

we can bring it down to that level, we are going to be able to expand economies of scale, people will be interested, and it will suddenly be economical to send things up in space, and it will generate 

all these good things. 

That said, a few years ago, NASA decided to embark upon an experiment with industry in a cooperative agreement with Lockheed 

Martin, who won competitively. It was a situation, Senator, where 

NASA in essence said we are going to put $900 million on the table 

and you put about $200 million something. With that amount of 

money, you go out and build the X–33 demonstrator. Well, as you 

perhaps know, that experiment was not successful. 

One of the foundations of them feeling and being optimistic that 

that would work was that they felt that industry was going to be 

able to reap some benefits from the development of an RLV. They 

thought that tons of satellites would be launched and that the commercial sector would be willing to take advantage of that. But as 

you know, with the demise of things like Iridium and Teledesic, 

that did not happen. As a result, industry was not willing to fork 

over the additional amounts of money that would be required for 

the X–33 to continue. 

The SLI process that you were referring to is the current one 

that NASA has, and they have about $700 million of contracts. 

Those contracts will go about reducing risk. They are not developing a vehicle. They are just coming up and identifying individual 

technologies. And that is what they are doing right now. They are 

hoping that by the 2006 timeframe they can make a decision on 

whether or not to go forward. But as I said in my statement, Senator, I think that having that 2006 timeframe and not knowing 

how long you are going to have to keep the Shuttle operational is 

a real difficult task that people like Mr. Readdy have to deal with. 

Senator NELSON. Just to underscore that, what you had said, Mr. Readdy, earlier it took 10 years and $40 billion to develop the 

Space Shuttle and you compared it with some other programs that 

were developed. 

Mr. READDY. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. What were they? 

74

Mr. READDY. Well, that would be one end of the curve which is 

the first generation reusable launch vehicle. The other end of the 

curve—and I shamelessly pirated this from Norm Augustine’s book 

Augustine’s Laws—would be the 777, which Boeing would admit to $12 billion of their money tied up for 6 years to develop. 

So, somewhere on that continuum is what it takes to do aerospace hardware. I guess my first order cut on it is it is probably 

somewhere in the middle, maybe more toward the Mach 25 end of 

it rather than the .85 end of it, not the subsonic end, but the 

hypersonic end. 

Also, just to amplify what Mr. Li said. We talk about cost per 

pound to orbit, but the unit cost is not cost per pound. The unit 

cost is cost per launch. In the Apollo era, those launches were 

about $10 billion to $11 billion per launch. If you just take the 

Shuttle budget and divide it by our flight rate, right now it is on 

the order of about a half a billion dollars per launch, which is expensive, but it is on the same order as the Titan IV launch vehicle 

and it has the reliability of about 1 in 20 for similar lift capability 

compared to our launch reliability. 

Then the final thing is where we would like to get to in terms 

of human-rated space transportation is where Herb Kelleher is in 

Southwest Airlines, and he does not charge by the pound either. 

Senator NELSON. Well said. And when you add in the factor of 

how many billions of dollars that we have spent on the International Space Station that we are now assembling and the ability 

to use that asset, recognizing that the follow-on launch vehicle is 

going to be some number of years down the road, then you have 

got to provide an access to space to the Space Station. And we best 

get about the process of making this one as safe as we can for the 

future. 

Now, my hat is off to you, all of you, for what you have done in 

the reliability and the increased safety that you have given to this 

point. With what you have done over 10 years of a declining budget 

in real dollars—that is overall NASA, but what you have done in 

a Space Shuttle budget with 40 percent less money over that decade is nothing short of miraculous to have the kind of safety record 

that you have today. But that is not going to continue for the future, and that is the whole point of us getting together today. 

I was able to see Senator Bond on the floor when I went to vote. 

I grabbed Senator McCain. Those were the two that I grabbed and 

gave them a little bit of a vignette of what we have been talking 

about today, and I will continue to do this as we get ready to make 

the appropriations decisions on down the line. 

Does the staff have any more questions that you want asked? 

OK. 

We are going to keep the hearing record open for two weeks for 

any additional comments. Do any of you all have any additional 

comments that you would like to make? 

Mr. LI. I would like to say something about lessons learned, Senator. I do not think I will be here 30 years from now, but if I were 

30 years from now sitting at this table, I would not want to be in 

a situation where there was an operational RLV and we had the 

similar types of problems where we had to do upgrades. I want to 

go back to perhaps why this is happening. 

75

I believe that the Shuttle was developed not with supportability 

and maintainability in mind, and I think that is what we have to 

do. If we go to a future vehicle, let us start thinking about building 

something that we can maintain, something that we can use every 

day, something that we do not require an army to take care of. Let 

us not shortchange that part of the process. 

Senator NELSON. Well said. 

And on the same issue of lessons learned, I deem it a great privilege to have the opportunity to be here now representing the State 

of Florida, and there were some lessons that I learned. And it is 

absolutely obligatory on my part, now that I sit as a Member of 

this Committee, to try to pass on those lessons learned, for that 

was a very painful time in January 1986, only 10 days after our 

flight had returned to earth and which almost happened to us what 

happened 10 days later. So, I just deem it a great privilege to be 

here and to try to speak out. 

Mr. McCulley? 

Mr. MCCULLEY. I told you earlier off the record—and I would 

like to say it again now on the record, and that is to thank you 

for bringing your interest and your expertise and having us here 

today and giving us a forum to express our concerns and with some 

confidence now that you can go do battle perhaps armed a little 

better than you were before. So, thank you very much. 

Senator NELSON. Indeed. You all have brought excellent testimony to the Senate today, and I thank you. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(77)

A P P E N D I X

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

TO WILLIAM F. READDY

Budget 

Question 1. NASA has stated that due to cost growth its FY 2002 Space Shuttle budget would have a shortfall of $218 million. In briefing the Committee, NASA has 

identified $185 million in cost savings but was unable to address the remaining $33 

million because costs are still in flux. Does NASA have a better grasp of how much 

the FY 2002 budget shortfall will be? Has NASA identified cost savings, which offset 

the entire amount of the shortfall? 

Answer. NASA identified the FY 2002 Space Shuttle budget shortfall to be ap- proximately $218 million. Changes to the outyear flight manifest reductions to a 

flight rate of four Shuttle missions per year may yield some modest additional savings in FY 2002. Additional program content adjustments may also be necessary to 

offset the entire amount.

Question 2. NASA is funding Shuttle supportability upgrades at about $100 million 

annually. However, cost growth on the Checkout and Launch Control System at 

Kennedy Space Center has reached the point that it almost consumes the annual 

funding for all supportability upgrades. How does NASA plan to fund other needed 

supportability upgrades in the future? 

Answer. Although the Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS) has experienced cost growth, it does not consume the annual Supportability Upgrades funding 

in the FY 2002 President’s Budget. CLCS represents less than half the 

Supportability Upgrades budget for FY 2002, with a steady decline to less than 10 

percent of the budget by FY 2006. 

Orbiter Major Modifications 

Question 3. The orbiter Discovery (OV–103) was scheduled for an OMM later this 

year. But NASA has proposed that, due to severe budget limitations, the OMM 

scheduled for the orbiter Discovery had been deferred and a more cursory ‘‘structural inspection’’ would be performed at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. What 

are the differences between these two types of inspection? Will the structural inspection allow for the same level of safety that the OMM would? Please explain. 

Answer. During an Orbiter Major Modification (OMM), at a minimum, major safety upgrades and structural inspections are performed on the orbiters and would be 

performed on Discovery irrespective of the location of the modifications. At this 

time, NASA is still assessing the pros and cons of both sites. The Office of Space 

Flight expects to decide the content and location by the end of CY–2001. 

Workforce Issues 

Question 4. Last year, GAO noted that training of new hires was a challenge facing 

NASA. Given the extent, to which the agency has recently added new hires to the 

workforce, what specific plan has NASA adopted to ensure that these workers are 

properly trained? 

Answer. As a result of beginning to hire new employees and fresh-outs, the NASA 

Centers have instituted, or have begun to revitalize, various orientation and other 

training programs designed to assimilate new employees into the workforce and provide mentoring and career development guidance. Many programs also include the 

requirement for specific types of training (e.g., technical or administrative), and include both on-the-job and developmental experiences over a period of time. Components in many Centers’ training programs also provide for guidance to supervisors 

in designing a training plan or individual development plan, providing mentoring 

and coaching, and evaluating work products and progress. The goals of these programs are to aid in the smooth and effective integration of new employees into the 

Center and Agency workforce. This will be accomplished by: providing a continuing 

and accelerated learning process; providing employees a way of identifying with the 

Center by understanding its mission and values; providing interaction with more 

78

senior staff and leaders; and, providing opportunities to develop relationships with 

peers. At the Agency level, efforts are being initiated to establish a network of experienced practitioners who can provide mentoring and access to expertise in project 

management. 

At the Agency level, resources have been requested to enable NASA to expand the 

delivery methods being utilized to develop the workforce. Specific emphasis is being 

placed on the development of e-learning alternatives that can be accessed at all locations and levels, and increasing the ability to expand participation levels across the 

Agency. In addition, new capabilities are being developed to facilitate learning within intact teams, delivering tailored content directly to a project team at the point 

in time specific training is needed. In addition, some Centers have also increased 

their resources available for training, and are instituting Center specific initiatives 

based upon Center needs. In addition, learning organization tools and methods 

being introduced in pilot projects within NASA are increasing organizational understanding, motivation, buy-in, and results. Examples of new initiatives include webbased course delivery and partnerships with universities for academic training. 

Infrastructure 

Question 5. In testimony before the Committee, Mr. Mike McCulley from United 

Space Alliance stated that we can no longer wait to begin infrastructure improvements. Why has NASA not included these projects in its annual budget request? 

Will the FY 2003 budget request begin to address this issue? 

Answer. The President’s FY 2002 budget request for NASA’s Space Shuttle Program (SSP) assumed a flat budget, across the entire budget horizon, with assumed 

productivity offsets for inflation and other increased requirements. Over the past 

several years, the SSP has aggressively pursued, realized and exhausted operational 

and productivity efficiencies. To operate with a flat budget profile the Program must 

continually find productivity offsets for inflation and other increased requirements. 

As a result of operating in this environment, the Program has only been able to sustain a minimal maintenance schedule. The Shuttle program has determined infrastructure requirements necessary to support the Shuttle Program until 2012 and 

plans to address these requirements in future budget requests. 

Because of a desire to limit growth of the Space Shuttle budget, the program has 

included a minimal maintenance schedule. The Shuttle program has determined infrastructure requirements necessary to support the Shuttle Program until 2012 and 

these requirements are being considered in preparation of the FY 2003 budget request. 

Long-term Vision for Human Space Flight 

Question 6. What is the long-term vision for human space flight now that the X–

33 has been canceled? and cost overruns of the International Space Station are putting tremendous pressure on the budget? When the Shuttle is retired, what will the 

next generation space vehicle look like and be capable of? What is NASA doing to 

build that vehicle? 

Answer. X–33 was an unmanned, suborbital technology demonstration project 

aimed at paving the way for an unpiloted, commercially-developed Lockheed-Martin 

Venture Star reusable launch vehicle. NASA’s role in the follow-on Venture Star vehicle would have been to provide requirements and funding for ‘human-rating’ of the 

vehicle. 

NASA is dedicated to assuring the nation continues to play a leadership role in 

human space flight. Despite International Space Station fiscal challenges, NASA remains committed to NASA’s Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program. SLI is targeted 

at investing in the technology that offers the greatest potential to reduce the technical and business risk associated with the design, construction, and operation of 

the next generation reusable launch vehicle architecture to support human space 

flight and other NASA missions. The makeup of that architecture is being defined 

through a competition among industry’s best ideas. 

SLI investments are expected to lead to commercially developed and operated 

Earth-to-orbit vehicles/systems, combined with unique government assets that can 

meet NASA’s human and robotic needs as well as commercial and military space 

access requirements. Recent SLI contract awards have committed approximately 

$750 million in funding as an investment in technology development and demonstrations for various critical technology drivers. Additional awards are expected 

next year. The Program will mature these technologies over the next several years 

to allow selection of at least two competing vehicle architectures by mid-decade with 

an initial operating capability early in the next decade.

Question 7. What will NASA’s Human Space Flight enterprise be doing in ten years? 

In twenty years? In fifty years? 

79

Answer. As described in NASA’s current strategic plans for the future Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS), the coming decades will enable the 

U.S. and our international partners to achieve truly profound advances in scientific 

knowledge, in economic opportunity, and in building a better future for humanity. 

In the coming decade, the Space Shuttle will continue to be operated safely and 

it will be also further privatized. The International Space Station (ISS) will be completed and groundbreaking scientific and applied research will create the foundation 

of knowledge needed to enable long-duration human space flight beyond low Earth 

orbit. Particular progress will be made in our knowledge of effects of long-term 

space flight on humans as well as needed countermeasures. At the same time, major 

new technologies will be validated in space and on ISS, setting the stage for a new 

generation of space systems and infrastructures opening up the Earth’s neighborhood the area of space containing low and high Earth orbits, the moon and the Sun 

Earth and Earth-Moon Libration points) for space science, exploration and space development. NASA’s Human Space Flight enterprise will partner with the science enterprises to understand and plan for the most effective science-driven human missions. 

In the next twenty years, the International Space Station will transition to largely 

commercial operations that will include providing laboratory services to the science 

community while major new infrastructures are deployed for government and commercial applications—opening the way for revolutionary new space missions. Opportunities may include the deployment of a small, human-tended outpost near the 

Moon. From such an outpost, large new telescopes might be built and deployed and 

the global exploration of the Moon by robots and humans might be undertaken. At 

the same time, transformational new technologies and systems (including new 

Earth-to-orbit transportation) could be developed and demonstrated—setting the 

stage for human missions to Mars and the asteroids. On these foundations, new 

commercial opportunities can emerge, including new generations of communications 

satellites, commercial power utilities in space and public space travel. 

Within the next fifty years, which is the same distance in time from the present 

as the present is from the earliest days of the space age; pursuing the current 

HEDS strategic plan will enable the U.S. economy to expand significantly into 

space. This will include new industries in low Earth orbit (e.g. space business parks 

and in-space manufacturing) and across the Earth’s neighborhood (e.g. space solar 

power stations and the development of Solar System resources on the Moon and 

elsewhere). Also, new generations of lower-cost reusable space launch systems will 

be developed and deployed. The global exploration of the Moon and Mars by robot 

and human teams could have been accomplished—and permanent outposts on both 

worlds could have been established. The extraordinary space observatories made 

possible by our new capabilities in space will have made ground-breaking discoveries such as the imaging of the first Earth-like planets beyond our Solar System. 

Furthermore, the development of the needed technologies and capabilities for 

these goals will also have made possible the transformation of our goals and accomplishments in the exploration of the Solar System beyond. This will include sample 

returns from the outer planets, probes beneath the icy crust of their moons, and perhaps the first probes beyond our Solar System. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN

TO WILLIAM F. READDY

Question 1a. In correspondence to the Committee, NASA indicated that the cost of 

the Electric Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) has grown from an initial estimate of 

$224 million to as much as $600 million since its inception in 1999. 

Can you explain this three-fold increase in such a relative short period of time? 

Answer. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) encountered significant technical challenges with the EAPU project as the technical formulation phase progressed. Assumptions made for the initial estimate about the maturity of necessary technology, 

primarily the power cells, turned out to be incorrect, and there was significantly 

more technology development that needed to be performed. The estimate of cost to 

project completion increased due to the inability to mature the technology resulting 

in significant weight, mass, and cost growth. As a result, the most recent proposal 

was close to $500–600 million, between two to three times the original cost estimates.

Question 1b. Is there a generic problem with cost estimating at NASA, given the 

type of estimate increases we have seen on other programs? 

Answer. According to the recent International Space Station Management and 

Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force report, continued escalation of cost estimates 

80

are an indication of inadequate cost estimating methodology, tools and controls. Although a multitude of cost estimating techniques are used by NASA and its contractors, program control techniques have suffered from insufficient early warning analysis due to lack of experienced program control personnel, modern management information tools, reduced emphasis on control and reporting techniques, and diverse 

accounting systems. 

NASA is responding to this concern by taking actions to improve cost management and cost estimating, including shifting of NASA personnel to enhance its program evaluation capability. The recent award of the Independent Program Assessment Contract to Booz-Allen-Hamilton/Raytheon is a step towards improving the 

Agency’s independent assessment capability. The contractor will support the Johnson Space Center Systems Management Office in providing full programmatic and 

institutional assessment capability. 

The increases in cost estimates on Electric APU were an indication of a generic 

problem with the ability of NASA’s Human Space Flight programs to develop cost 

estimates. The causes in this case were primarily underestimating the technological 

risk remaining for developing the unique batteries required for EAPU as well as 

growth in requirements early in the formulation phase of the project or task.

Question 2a. You stated that NASA has a milestone for a Shuttle replacement to 

achieve ‘‘Initial Operating Capability’’ at the start of fiscal year 2012. This seems 

to be a very aggressive schedule given that it is only ten years away. 

What firm plans does NASA have for this milestone other than the Space Launch 

Initiative, which does not guarantee an operational vehicle at the end of its efforts? 

Answer. ‘‘Initial Operating Capability’’ is a Space Launch Initiative (SLI) milestone and, as explained below, is the point at which the Space Shuttle operations 

can begin to phase down as new systems begin operations. The Space Shuttle upgrades will improve the safety of the Space Shuttle fleet until the next generation 

system is operational. NASA will assess the progress of SLI in the middle of this 

decade, and may re-evaluate Space Shuttle upgrade needs for longer-term requirements if it appears that 2nd Generation RLV systems will not reach operational capability by 2012.

Question 2b. What is meant by ‘‘Initial Operating Capability?’’

Answer. Certification of 2nd Generation RLV systems begins in the 2008 to 2009 

timeframe with the first full-scale launch. The specifics of the certification process 

and the number of launches to certify the vehicle have not been defined; the vehicle 

type and the technologies used will influence the certification process. At the completion of the certification process, anticipated to be in 2012, the RLV system will 

be operational, reaching its ‘‘initial operating capability’’ milestone. At the time, 

Space Shuttle operations can begin to phase down as new systems begin operations.

Question 3. Can you explain why the NASA annual budget requests have not included funding for Shuttle infrastructure projects? 

Answer. The President’s FY 2002 budget request for NASA’s Space Shuttle Program (SSP) assumed a flat budget, across the entire budget horizon, with assumed 

productivity offsets for inflation and other increased requirements. Over the past 

several years, the SSP has aggressively pursued, realized and exhausted operational 

and productivity efficiencies. To operate with a flat budget profile the Program must 

continually find productivity offsets for inflation and other increased requirements. 

As a result of operating in this environment, the Program has only been able to sustain a minimal maintenance schedule. The Shuttle program has determined infrastructure requirements necessary to support the Shuttle Program until 2012 and 

these requirements are being considered in preparation of the FY 2003 budget request.

Question 4. Of the projected $218 million shortfall in fiscal year 2002, $35 million 

is from core skills and business base erosion. Can you elaborate on what is included 

in this category? 

Answer. Increases in core skills and business base erosion are a direct result of 

Rocketdyne business base declines in the production of major engine components. 

In last year’s budget estimate, NASA assumed reductions in Rocketdyne funding 

consistent with production demands. In addition to the Space Shuttle Main Engine 

(SSME), other Rocketdyne business areas are below last year projections. Contributing factors are reduced demands for Delta launches, and cancellation of the X–

33 causing the resultant drop to the RS–2200 Aerospike engine effort. Many of the 

personnel supporting the SSME project did so on a part-time basis, while working 

other projects as well. Because of the drop in other projects, the SSME project must 

pay for more than the time it needs from key Rocketdyne staff, in order to preserve 

the key skill base. The $35 million shortfall represents a preliminary estimate of 

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the cost to maintain core skills within Rocketdyne that NASA needs in support of 

the SSME project. 

NASA is pursuing alternative approaches to preserving the necessary skill mix at 

Rocketdyne. Maximum use of Rocketdyne critical skills and capabilities on Space 

Shuttle upgrade activities is being fully explored, particularly for Space Shuttle 

Main Engine health monitoring. The potential impact of SLI-funded propulsion activities is also being fully incorporated into skill mix assessments. Finally, NASA 

is working with Rocketdyne to assess how information technology could be used to 

capture critical knowledge and skills from the Rocketdyne workforce, to assist in 

training and expand the flexibility of the workforce to reduce the need for supporting some skill areas. NASA believes that the critical skills can be preserved at 

lower cost than the initial estimate if the above actions are aggressively pursued.

Question 5. How many more years is NASA planning to operate the Shuttle orbiters? 

Answer. NASA’s current plans are to safely operate the Space Shuttle through at 

least 2012, to support the ISS for assembly and logistics missions, undertake nonISS missions that require unique Space Shuttle capabilities, and to meet other national reusable launch vehicle (RLV) goals. The transition plan to a 2nd Generation 

RLV must ensure that the new system is operated effectively and efficiently before 

final retirement plans for the SSP are implemented. It is important to note that 

there is sufficient airframe margin remaining (70–75 missions) in the certified life 

of each Shuttle orbiter to operate the fleet beyond 2012 if necessary.

Question 6. GAO has stated in its written testimony for today that several upgrade 

projects for the Shuttle had not been fully approved which created uncertainty within the program, and while NASA had begun to establish a dedicated Shuttle safety 

upgrade workforce, it had not fully determined its needs in this area. Can you comment on these findings? 

Answer. The FY 2002 Space Shuttle Upgrade program budget requirements are 

currently under review by Agency management, and this review has been complicated by the increased budget pressures and cost increases to Space Shuttle operations in FY 2002. These decisions will undoubtedly revise plans for the current upgrades portfolio. The SSP’s goal is to resolve these competing priorities and cost 

challenges as expeditiously as possible, thus identifying the resultant impacts to the 

upgrades planning and the upgrades workforce.

Question 7. You have spoken about NASA’s use of advisory panels and the role they 

play in your management. How do you distinguish between your responsibilities for 

planning, leading, organizing, and controlling projects and that of advisory panels? 

Answer. NASA’s responsibilities for providing direct management over its programs and projects are described in NASA Policy documentation. NASA Headquarters and Lead Center organizations (engineering, safety, reliability, quality assurance, etc.) generate specific policy and guidelines for carrying out their day-today duties as it pertains to the type of program/project being developed. 

The present NASA advisory structure consists of two top-level committees that report to the NASA Administrator, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), established by Congress to examine safety issues, and the NASA Advisory Council 

(NAC). There are eight standing committees that report to the NAC. One of these 

subcommittees is the Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC). The Council and its 

committees review the agency’s policies, programs, and strategies and consider the 

degree to which they achieve their objectives. The NAC also serves as an additional 

source of reflection and consultation for the NASA Administrator on broad-reaching 

issues. From time to time, study groups or task forces may be asked to examine particular issues of special concern. 

The ASAP and the NAC and its subgroups are agency advisory committees and 

provide advice and counsel to the NASA Administrator. NASA also receives valuable 

advice from independent groups such as the Space Studies Board and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, administered by the National Research Council for the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering. These two boards, however, are advisory to many elements of the Federal government and are primarily 

responsible to their parent academies. Thus, they provide their counsel from a different perspective than that of NASA’s own advisory groups.

Question 8. You have testified that NASA has to balance funding priorities concerning crew safety, Space Shuttle operational requirements, high priority safety 

upgrades, and infrastructure projects. In this balance, infrastructure improvements 

are delayed creating a backlog. What can Congress do to help NASA more aggressively repair infrastructure problems and reduce the growing backlog? 

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Answer. The President’s FY 2002 budget request for NASA’s Space Shuttle Program (SSP) assumed a flat budget, across the entire budget horizon, with assumed 

productivity offsets for inflation and other increased requirements. Over the past 

several years, the SSP has aggressively pursued, realized and exhausted operational 

and productivity efficiencies. With the continued flat-lined Space Shuttle budget 

across the entire budget horizon, it has become more and more difficult to manage 

the program within these funding constraints. The program has had to continue to 

make some difficult decisions in order to address requirements to maintain its primary goal to fly safely. The majority of the real property the Shuttle program uses 

is currently more than 34 years old. The Agency will continue to use the Space 

Shuttle as the primary human rated space access vehicle through at least 2012. The 

Shuttle program has determined infrastructure requirements necessary to support 

the Shuttle Program until 2012 and these requirements are being considered in 

preparation of the FY 2003 budget request. It would be beneficial for the Congress 

to provide necessary budget flexibility within the Space Shuttle Program rather 

than mandating specific infrastructure projects.

Question 9. In 1999, the National Research Council (NRC) criticized your Decision 

Support System for prioritizing upgrades. What steps has NASA taken to create a 

‘‘clear, defensible decision process that takes into account all of the available evidence?’’

Answer. A separate Development Office was formed within the Space Shuttle Program Office at NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) to prioritize, select and fund 

upgrades. The role of this office is to select upgrades that are technologically ready 

for implementation. This Space Shuttle Program Development Office (SSPDO) manages the upgrades program content, and final approval of upgrades requires the approval of the Space Shuttle Program Manager. 

In addition, the Space Shuttle program has benefitted from the advice of the 

Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC), an element of the NASA Advisory Committee (NAC). The SFAC reviews the prioritization process for upgrades and makes 

findings and recommendations based on their reviews. The review and validation of 

the upgrades decisions by this advisory group adds to a clear, defensible decision 

process. 

The selection process for establishing the Space Shuttle Upgrades program content is based on prioritization of candidate upgrades based on rigorous systems 

analyses. The goal of this process is to develop and maintain an integrated suite 

of baselined upgrade projects that have been selected for optimal compliance with 

the Space Shuttle Upgrades program objectives. The portfolio therefore consists of 

candidate proposals undergoing initial definition and feasibility assessments, proposed upgrade projects, which have received formal approval for further definition 

and implementation planning, and those projects which have been approved for implementation and thus form the baselined Space Shuttle safety upgrades program 

content commitment. 

The following general set of criteria and considerations are used by the SSPDO 

in developing a program content recommendation to the Space Shuttle Program 

Manager and higher level approving officials:

a) Significant improvement to flight safety is the highest priority of the Space 

Shuttle Upgrades program.

b) Significant Space Shuttle flight system supportability threats must be mitigated to have a viable and reliable SSP through at least 2012.

c) Iterative systems analysis and trade studies are used to search for a set of 

optimal affordable combinations of safety and supportability upgrades; i.e., 

focus is placed on substantiating safety risk and supportability threats 

through quantitative analysis, and alternate solutions are actively researched.

d) The SSPDO strategy in case of resource conflict among high priority safety 

improvement opportunities and supportability needs is to direct in-depth 

trade studies on options to solve the supportability threats adequately at 

lower cost than initially proposed. For example, trades may consider adequate but less comprehensive supportability upgrades, or analysis may 

show that temporary low cost solutions may allow deferral of longer term 

more expensive supportability solutions. In any case, every significant 

supportability threat shall be adequately addressed in the Space Shuttle 

Upgrades Program implementation planning.

Question 10. Both the NRC in 1999 and GAO recently have questioned the accuracy 

of NASA’s cost estimates, and whether they accurately reflect the actual costs that 

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are incurred by programs. For example, there have been allegations that part of the 

$218 million shortfall is due to a deliberate NASA underestimate of contractor rate 

increases. How does NASA intend to improve its cost estimating system? 

Answer. The Space Shuttle Program’s budget has been on a steady decline over 

the past several years. The President’s FY 2002 budget request for NASA’s Space 

Shuttle Program (SSP) assumed a flat budget, across the entire budget horizon, 

which assumed productivity offsets for inflation and other increased requirements 

that have not been realized due to cost increases. Since that time, NASA identified 

additional increases for the SSP totaling $218 million in FY 2002, such as escalation 

of contractor rates and health benefit increases, utilities increases, core skills and 

business base erosion, and increasing orbiter maintenance modification estimates. 

These increases further exacerbated pressure on the already lean Shuttle budget. 

NASA is responding to this concern by taking actions to improve cost management and cost estimating, including shifting of NASA personnel to enhance its program evaluation capability. The recent award of the Independent Program Assessment Contract to Booz-Allen-Hamilton/Raytheon is a step to improving the Agency’s 

independent assessment capability. The contractor will support the Johnson Space 

Center Systems Management Office in providing full programmatic and institutional assessment capability. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN

TO RICHARD D. BLOMBERG

Question 1. What type of investments in the Space Shuttle do you believe will be 

needed to allow NASA to reap the full benefits of the Space Station? 

Answer. The Space Shuttle is the major resupply and crew transfer vehicle for 

the International Space Station (ISS). Its capabilities with respect to crew and payload size are unmatched by any other human-rated space vehicle. The Space Shuttle 

is the only vehicle servicing the ISS that is capable of returning payloads and 

science results from orbit. It has also been providing significant reboost for the ISS 

thereby reducing reliance on Russian Progress vehicles. It is essential to keep the 

Space Shuttle as reliable and safe as possible since it is the key element in the ISS 

logistics chain. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is concerned that both the 

safety and reliability of the Space Shuttle are being compromised in the long term 

because of lack of investment in four areas:

• Flight systems—Many of the subsystems of the Space Shuttle are aging and 

likely cannot support flight at current risk levels for the entire expected service 

life of the total system. For many others, advancing technology has provided 

ways to reduce risk significantly if improved components are designed, developed, tested and certified. The Panel believes that, at a minimum, significant 

investment above and beyond current budget levels are required just to retain 

present safety margins over the next 20 or more years. Additional expenditures 

are warranted in areas for which risk can be meaningfully reduced from those 

produced by the original design. In both cases, it is important to recognize that 

the long lead times involved in manufacturing current components or designing 

and qualifying improved replacements dictate the need to make investments 

now so that the Space Shuttle is fully capable of safely meeting the flight needs 

for ISS support.

• Renewal of the ground infrastructure—Investment is critically needed to revitalize the launch facilities, ground support equipment, laboratories and test and 

checkout gear needed to support safe Space Shuttle flights. A significant portion 

of this infrastructure is over 30 years old, and continual budgetary pressures 

have forced the deferral of much needed maintenance and replacement. The ISS 

cannot be supported adequately if these ground assets force a reduced flight 

rate or a temporary grounding of the Space Shuttle. Safety of the Space Shuttle 

can be compromised by unreliable ground infrastructure. Interruptions of Space 

Shuttle flights would also markedly impact the chance of ISS mission success. 

The Panel believes that NASA must be able to make proactive investments in 

ground infrastructure to prevent failures and assure the availability of flight 

support for the ISS.

• Logistics—Providing for the timely availability of properly functioning components throughout the projected life of the Space Shuttle is essential to its ability 

to support the ISS. Many items for the flight vehicle and ground support equipment are not in sufficient supply to carry the program until a viable replacement vehicle is qualified. Therefore, in addition to making sure that flight systems and ground infrastructure are as capable as possible, NASA must invest 

84

to ensure that there are sufficient assets readily available to support safe and 

effective operations for the lifetime of the Space Shuttle. The Panel believes 

that investment both for parts and in refurbishment capability is warranted.

• Workforce—The Space Shuttle is a complex system that will always depend on 

the ability and insight of a trained and experienced workforce for safe operation. Over the years, there has been a ‘‘natural’’ succession of Space Shuttle 

leaders. Experienced managers mentored younger members of the workforce 

and prepared them to assume leadership roles. Recent staff cutbacks and hiring 

freezes have created a gap in the ranks. Future budget limitations suggest that 

replenishing the ‘‘understudies’’ will be difficult. The Panel believes that NASA 

should be in a position to invest in the hiring and nurturing of future Space 

Shuttle managers. Such an investment would also create a cadre from which 

the leaders of future human spaceflight programs could be drawn just as many 

Space Shuttle veterans received their initial experience on the Apollo Program.

Question 2. You have mentioned four areas of which the ASAP considers critical to 

the long-term operation of the Shuttle: flight system improvements, renewal of 

ground infrastructure, logistics and workforce. 

Did the Panel place these in any order of priority for NASA? 

Answer. All four of these areas are critical over the expected service life of the 

Space Shuttle. The most immediate priority area, however, is likely maintaining 

and augmenting the workforce. This will provide the leadership necessary to direct 

the actions in the other three areas. Flight system improvements and infrastructure 

revitalization must also be given an immediate priority because of the relatively 

long lead times involved in their implementation. Some logistics actions can await 

decisions between the simple replacement of aging components and the development 

of improved substitutes.

Question 3. You have mentioned that any replacement for the Shuttle likely would 

not be more capable than the current system with appropriate upgrades. Can you 

elaborate on this conclusion? 

Answer. One or more major technological advances will be needed in order to advance the state-of-the-art of human-rated spaceflight vehicles beyond the level of the 

Space Shuttle. For example, more efficient propulsion systems operating at lower 

stress levels could profoundly alter both the safety and cost of placing humans into 

earth orbit. 

At present, there are no major technological breakthroughs available upon which 

a new, safer and more capable Space Shuttle replacement could be based. Upgrades 

have been identified, such as the electric auxiliary power unit and advanced health 

monitoring of the Space Shuttle main engines, which could improve the safety and 

reliability current vehicle. These same features would likely be standard equipment 

in any new vehicle designed today. Although they represent significant improvements, they are not the basis for a radical, new system design.

Question 4. You have mentioned the impact of budgetary constraints on the program. For the Advisory Panel’s review of the program, did you find that management of existing funds was sufficient? 

Answer. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is chartered to examine the safety 

of NASA’s operations. When appropriate, we will highlight budget shortfalls that we 

believe have the potential to be detrimental to safety. We do not trace the management of existing funds to determine if it is sufficient. Over the likely service life of 

the Space Shuttle, however, the magnitude of the present projected budget shortfall 

appears to be beyond the ability of any management to correct while still flying 

safely and meeting program objectives.

Question 5. You have mentioned that the Panel is particularly concerned about infrastructure at KSC. How do the infrastructure problems at KSC compare to the 

needs at other NASA centers? 

Answer. All of the human spaceflight centers are facing similar infrastructure 

problems because the maintenance and restoration of key facilities has been continually deferred. The situation at KSC is of particular concern to the Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel because it has the most direct potential impact on Space Shuttle 

safety. Other centers evidence similar examples of obsolete and worn infrastructure, 

but the preponderance of infrastructure related to the preparation and launch of the 

Space Shuttle is at KSC. Many of the KSC facilities are legacies from the Apollo 

Program. Assets such as the data cables to the launch pads are old and deteriorated 

and are only being kept operational through the ingenuity of the workforce. This 

cannot continue indefinitely.

85

Question 6. How would you recommend capturing the knowledge of the current 

workforce for future use? 

Answer. There are numerous emerging techniques for ‘‘mining’’ experience that 

have been developed as part of knowledge engineering efforts. Basically, however, 

two fundamental conditions must be satisfied before any sophisticated efforts can 

be effective. First, there must be an adequate supply of suitable replacement candidates within the operations of NASA and its contractors. If these individuals overlap the tenure of the current workforce, those with the best experience and knowledge can mentor them. This is an ideal way to perpetuate quality. 

Second, once there is an adequate pipeline of prospective replacements, each entity within NASA must have a long range training and relief plan. Such a plan identifies each person who has a planned termination (retirement, resignation or transfer) 

as soon as it is known and designates a trainee, new hire or promotion candidate 

whose task it will be to capture the knowledge of the departing person. Since every 

worker is included, each can see his or her ‘‘career path’’ and identify the knowledge 

domain that will eventually be their responsibility.

Question 7. Your testimony states that the requirements for flying the Space Shuttle 

at an acceptable level of risk is achieved only through the innovation and tireless 

efforts of an experienced workforce. NASA Administrator Goldin has testified that 

a large portion of NASA’s workforce is aging and about to retire. What effects will 

large-scale retirements of experienced NASA and contractor personnel have on 

Shuttle safety? 

Answer. This question touches at the crux of the concerns of the Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel. As the Space Shuttle ages, it will require innovative technical and 

management initiatives to continue flying safely. Large-scale retirements of experienced NASA and contractor personnel will deprive the Program of the highly experienced people needed to formulate and execute these initiatives. It will therefore become increasingly difficult to know when the illusive line between safe and unsafe 

operations is being approached, and safety risk will almost assuredly increase. 

The Panel believes that two major actions are needed now to compensate for the 

likely departure of much of the government and contractor talent responsible for 

safe Space Shuttle operations. First, as discussed above, both NASA and its contractors should begin a vigorous hiring program as soon as possible so people will be 

available to work at the sides of the prospective retirees before they leave. Second, 

the experienced workforce should be given the means to execute a meaningful life 

extension program for the Space Shuttle. If modeled after successful commercial and 

military aircraft life extension programs, this effort will reduce safety risk and simplify the tasks facing future generations of Space Shuttle managers. This will reduce rather than increase the reliance of the Space Shuttle on workforce experience 

to maintain safety.

Question 8. You also said that NASA must fund EAPU and other upgrade development and certification ‘‘at the expense of activities needed to continue flying safely 

at present.’’ What creates this tradeoff? Should NASA’s Human Space Flight account be restructured to prevent tradeoffs like these in the future? 

Answer. Insufficient funding to meet present flight objectives and make appropriate investments for the future creates the referenced tradeoffs. When managers 

are faced with this dilemma, they have only two viable choices—defer upgrades and 

expenditures for the future or reduce current operations. The Space Shuttle program cannot reasonably reduce the present flight rate and still adequately support 

the construction and utilization of the ISS. Therefore, planning horizons have been 

severely limited to provide for current needs. Although this maintains current Space 

Shuttle safety, it has created serious concerns on the part of the Panel about the 

ability of the Program to maintain or improve risk levels in the future.

Question 9. Your testimony also highlights that the infrastructure situation becomes 

worse each year due to a growing backlog. What can NASA and Congress do to reverse the trend in this problem and ensure greater emphasis on the infrastructure 

maintenance? 

Answer. This is purely a budget issue. Present funding is insufficient to support 

current operations, flight system improvements and infrastructure backlog reduction. NASA and contractor managers are well aware of the infrastructure weak 

spots. With adequate resources and a reasonable degree of flexibility, they can reverse the trend and begin improving the situation rather than letting it deteriorate 

further. Giving management prerogative to NASA and its contractors is essential 

because the relative priority of various infrastructure revitalization efforts can shift 

over time due to circumstances beyond the control of the Program.

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Question 10. You have also stated today that logistics is a serious problem that is 

affecting the Space Shuttle Program. For example, the long lead times for the manufacture of critical components creates logistical problems and cannibalization. Can 

NASA use other contracting and purchase strategies, such as are used by commercial companies, to reduce these logistical bottlenecks? 

Answer. In general, the long lead times NASA faces are due to the unique nature 

of the components in question. They are a technical rather than a management 

issue. Some critical components take a year or more to manufacture. Given the 

small production runs involved, it is likely not cost effective to invest significant 

sums to develop and qualify new, more rapid manufacturing techniques. NASA and 

its contractors must therefore accept the lengthy production schedules and plan sufficiently far in advance to ensure an adequate supply of components. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN

TO BRYAN D. O’CONNOR

Question 1. You have mentioned that the Shuttle will always need substantial 

hands-on-care and preparations between flights. If the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) 

produces a new vehicle, do you feel that the same level of ‘‘hands-on-care’’ will be 

needed? 

Answer. In my opinion. SLI will not get anywhere near production if its early development work suggests even half the hands-on of the Shuttle. Those hands are 

what make up the high cost of Shuttle operations, and SLI has as a goal an order 

of magnitude decrease in operational cost. Roughly, there can only be one RLV 

worker for every ten Shuttle workers (for a given mass of cargo to orbit) to meet 

that goal.

Question 2. You have stated that although the Shuttle has made significant safety 

improvements since the Challenger accident, it falls short of the overall safety levels 

NASA demands of future human space flight. Can you elaborate why you feel that 

no amount of upgrades to the Shuttle will get to the levels of reliability and operational costs envisioned for the SLI? 

Answer. Since the Challenger accident, incremental improvements to Shuttle safety have come at great cost, largely due to the complexity and inflexibility of the 

basic design. It might be instructive to ask NASA for a summary account of cost 

of risk reduction over the past 15 years. It takes a lot of money to significantly reduce risk for this vehicle. I think you will also find that most of the easy changes 

have been made, and that any further marginal risk improvements will be difficult 

to accomplish and expensive. The money required to further reduce the crew safety 

number for Shuttle to the 1/10,000 mission goal that the SLI team is working is 

probably not reasonable. One of the biggest problems here is the difficulty in retrofitting a viable crew escape system into the Shuttle. That means that to meet the 

crew safety goal, the Shuttle system itself must meet the goal. The SLI program 

is starting from scratch, so, in principal, they have the flexibility to design a vehicle 

with less than 1/10,000 loss rate and an escape system that makes up the difference. For example, the Russian Buran was designed with an expected failure rate 

of 1/50. The design included a world class crew escape system with an expected success rate of 75% (throughout the high-risk portions of launch and entry). That combination gave them a crew loss prediction of 1/200 for the first manned flight, which 

was never flown due to cancellation of the program after one unmanned test flight. 

What that says is that an escape system with even marginal capability will substantially improve the crew safety story for a high-risk flight vehicle. If the same thinking were applied to Shuttle, it’s current expected failure rate of ∼1/500 would jump 

to 1/2000 with a similar escape capability. On the other hand, today’s Shuttle would 

require an impossibly good escape system with a success rate of 95% to meet the 

expressed SLI goal. Unfortunately, several studies have shown that even a modest 

escape system for Shuttle is not feasible unless the agency is willing to pay several 

billions, give up performance and potentially crew size, and take several years down 

time to do the upgrade to each flight vehicle.

Question 3. In its 1999 report, the NRC recommended that NASA should ‘‘provide 

better incentives for the USA Corporation . . . to propose, fund, and implement upgrades to achieve the Shuttle program’s goals.’’ As you consider the recent cost 

shortfalls in the Shuttle program and delays in implementing Shuttle upgrades, do 

you believe that NASA is fully meeting this recommendation? 

Answer. NASA’s response to the NRC report was that they were in the process 

of changing the contract with USA to include a value engineering clause that would 

provide the needed incentive. My understanding is that this clause has since been 

87

formalized, but I have no direct knowledge of how effective this incentive has been 

in encouraging USA to come forward with upgrade ideas or financial support for upgrades.

Question 4. The 1999 NRC report also recommended that NASA use more accurate 

cost estimates that include all costs associated with the upgrade, including hidden 

costs. In your opinion, has NASA followed this recommendation in evaluating Shuttle upgrade options? 

Answer. NASA’s response to the NRC report said that they were implementing 

the recommendation. Neither the NRC nor I have independently confirmed either 

the implementation or its effects. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON

TO MICHAEL JAMES MCCULLEY

Question 1. You have stated in your written statement that the Electric Auxiliary 

Power Unit (EAPU) project had completed the requirements definitions, resolved 

many technical issues, and was ready to produce detailed and cost-efficient designs. 

However, NASA’s Space Flight Advisory Committee stated in a letter report, ‘‘. . . 

this upgrade appears to be much more challenging than originally anticipated. 

There are major weight, cost and technical issues. The Committee suggests that this 

project be removed as an active Shuttle upgrade project and that it become a technology project.’’ NASA has terminated plans for full development of the EAPU until 

the technology is more mature. 

Can you explain the apparent difference in opinions on this project? 

Answer. While USA agrees with the statement that ‘‘this upgrade appears to be 

much more challenging than originally anticipated,’’ it strongly disagrees with the 

characterization that there are cost issues, technical issues and that the project 

should not proceed toward full implementation. 

This fundamental difference in opinion stems from the immaturity of the data 

that the NASA Space Flight Advisory Council (SFAC) reviewed and the inappropriate baseline that was used for comparison. Since the SFAC’s review, progress has 

only confirmed our previously held position that the EAPU project has no technology 

issues and can be ready for implementation in FY03 if appropriate funding is made 

available in FY02. 

NASA’s Space Flight Advisory Council met May 1–2, 2001. At that time, the 

EAPU project was in the process of developing cost proposals, placing prototype 

units on test stands and validating designs and requirements as additional data became available. The review of the project was premature at that time since the 

project did not come forward for an Authorization to Proceed decision until October 

2001. Key items not available for the SFAC’s review include:

• Prototype testing results: The EAPU project was just starting its end-to-end 

testing of its high-fidelity prototype systems. This end-to-end system testing 

evaluated both hydraulic power performance and battery performance.

• Battery cell testing and design data: The battery cell Preliminary Design Review was held later in the month of May. That review contained key information about cell life, capacity, safety and the development process needed to 

produce a flight-qualified cell. The cell safety and performance testing (on over 

100 cells) was on going at that time, and data was not available for the SFAC’s 

review.

• Cost data: None of the cost proposals had been negotiated, nor had fact-finding 

been complete prior to the SFAC’s review. Furthermore, the cost information 

that was reviewed contained almost $250M in Rough-Order-of-Magnitude cost 

data. The project office was in the process of issuing a Request for Proposal for 

the battery system and reviewing the content assumptions of the proposals 

when the project office was told that it would not be implemented in the near 

future.

As mentioned earlier, the EAPU project was in the formulation phase, not the implementation phase, when the SFAC reviewed its progress. During this phase, as 

specified in NASA plans, the project should be establishing requirements and programmatic cost and schedule baselines. Also, data and requirements from early 

studies should be updated to reflect any new design data that is available. The 

EAPU project followed this process. The original cost data that was developed for 

the project ($220M) was an early, low fidelity figure based on very conceptual design 

data, immature requirements and did not include large cost elements such as the 

required single-string EAPU flight demonstration (the so-called ‘‘1-of-3 flight’’ reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:50 Apr 02, 2004 Jkt 082708 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\82708.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
88

quirement). Any comparison between this cost estimate and the rough proposal data 

is strictly an apples-to-oranges comparison. Likewise, the weight estimate was based 

on a different design, was not based any detailed estimates, and, did not have 

standard growth margins. This initial weight estimate helped establish the early 

EAPU requirement of 2000 pounds greater than the current APU system. This 

weight target is not a hard Shuttle requirement. It was not derived from capabilities 

or mission needs, but rather reflects a desire not to change a Space Station Interface Control Document. While the EAPU project cannot currently meet this requirement, its current weight estimate is within actual Shuttle capabilities based on mission requirements. Finally, it should be mentioned that the project’s technical 

progress, as referenced above, was compared to systems that are in the implementation phase, not ones that were in the process of demonstrating technical feasibility 

and design approaches. 

Excellent progress has been made since May 2001. During this time, the EAPU 

project completed its prototype testing, performed a cost reduction analysis, conducted five design reviews and revisited and validated its top-level requirements. 

The prototype testing and design reviews demonstrated a number of very important system capabilities:

• The motor/pump system provides sufficient hydraulic power and power quality 

under standard Shuttle mission profiles and more stressing evaluation profiles. 

Comparisons with the current APU system show that the EAPU meets or exceeds its performance in transient response and hydraulic power quality.

• The battery meets performance characteristics of 50 mission cycles and overall 

mission energy.

• The battery cell test data indicates that the Lithium-ion cells are very durable, 

produce higher energy densities than their rated values and can be produced 

under standards that are acceptable for the Shuttle program.

• The safety and reliability benefits of the EAPU project have been established 

by extensive study and detailed probabilistic risk assessments. (The EAPU is 

ten times safer than the existing APU and eliminates the largest risk to Orbiter 

safety).

With hydraulic transparency to the existing hydrazine APU demonstrated and 

battery performance characteristics clearly met through test, USA does not see any 

technology-related issues with the development of the EAPU system. 

The continuing cost reduction analysis, which focuses on finding alternatives to 

key cost drivers, has been exceptionally successful in reducing both cost and weight. 

By validating key requirements, the project found conservatism in many of them. 

Energy requirements were too high, ground operations constraints were too stringent and battery lifetimes did not reflect the new operational aspects of the design. 

These requirement reductions had a large effect on the overall design. The cell size 

was reduced. Likewise, consolidating functions reduced parts counts. The battery location and packaging was changed. Finally, the number of facility and test site 

modifications was also minimized. The result to date is an EAPU project that has 

a weight estimate of less than 6000 pounds (1000 pounds less than when SFAC reviewed the project) and a cost that is competitive with industry averages for the development of systems of this size and complexity. 

The EAPU represents increased safety for our astronauts and for the Shuttle 

Team that gets them into space. No other safety upgrade improves the safety of the 

Shuttle as much as the Electric APU. The project has demonstrated its technology 

through test. It has validated its requirements and reduced its overall weight estimate. Furthermore, the EAPU project team performed all of these efforts within its 

authorized funding limits and within its schedule constraints. 

The EAPU project has matured beyond technology development and should be 

funded to a level needed to support an implementation decision in FY03.

Question 2. What have been the changes to Shuttle operations since the termination 

of the X–33 program and the reality that the Shuttle is NASA’s only option going 

forward for human space flight? 

Answer. In terms of current, day-to-day operations of the Shuttle Program, there 

were no impacts or changes to the operations part of what we do. The strong safety 

focus with which we approach all our work and processes is the same, and we use 

the same Certification of Flight Readiness process to ensure that every element that 

supports a typical Shuttle mission is ready to proceed with every phase of flight 

(hardware, software, and people are ready). Of course, events like the termination 

of X–33, X–34, or other development/technology programs remind one that it becomes even more important to include a robust Shuttle Upgrades program as part 

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of the overall plan for future operations. If we need to operate the Shuttle longer, 

then we also need to be alert for more cases of obsolescence, increased wear and 

tear on the hardware, and we need to continue to look for improvements in safety 

and supportability.

Question 3. You have mentioned that if technological challenges on one upgrade program make it impossible to move aggressively forward on one project, NASA should 

revise its timetable for implementation or redirect to the next project, rather than 

reprogramming the funds for other purposes. 

As the operator of the Shuttle program, have you had funds that have been taken 

from your contract and place in other areas of NASA? 

Answer. Funds will be taken from the USA contract if the NASA proposed plan 

is implemented.

Question 4. You have talked about the flight schedule for the Shuttle program. The 

annual budget includes some fixed and variable costs, with those variable costs dependent upon the number of Shuttle flights. Can you comment on the marginal cost 

of a Shuttle launch? 

Answer. There are two different concepts that are evaluated periodically relative 

to cost impacts for changes in the Space Shuttle flight rate. The first is the marginal 

cost associated with adding or deleting one flight, in one year only, from a current 

baseline (with adequate lead time notice) and then resuming the baseline flight 

rate. The second is changing the baseline flight rate to a sustained level at some 

specified rate. 

Current ROM estimates for SFOC impacts for each of these cases are as follows:

1. Add one flight in one year only from a baseline of 6 flights per year— ∼$23M in FY03 dollars; $23M impact may not all occur in the same year 

as the year the flight is added. Impacts include significant overtime, expendable hardware, repairs, consumables and travel as added incremental 

cost.

2. Delete one flight in one year only from a baseline of 6 flights per year— ∼$10M in FY03 dollars; $10M impact may not all occur in the same year 

as the year the flight is deleted. Impacts include limited overtime, expendable hardware, repairs, consumables and travel as reduced incremental 

cost. The principal difference to the cost of adding one flight is overtime.

3. Initial studies on a sustained flight rate of 5 per year versus 6 per year 

indicate an average annual reduction in cost of ∼$17M in FY03 dollars; the $17M impact may not all occur in the same year as the year the flight rate 

is changed from 6 to 5. Impacts include overtime, expendable hardware repairs, consumables and travel as reduced annual cost. These impacts are 

in the process of being revalidated.

4. An impact assessment of a sustained flight rate of 4 per year versus 6 per 

year is in process and will soon be provided to NASA.

Question 5. Based upon your experience as the operator of the Shuttle Program, 

what level of funding would we need to get the program at the level it should be? 

Also, what areas would you recommend for these changes? 

Answer. Earlier this year, USA participated in the FY01 Program Operating Plan 

(POP) cycle, during which all elements partnered with their NASA counterparts a 

budget level that they thought was appropriate for continuing the program in a 

healthy, safe manner. That POP was first developed for a flight rate of seven missions per year and then adjusted for a flight rate of six missions per year. The recommended level from that effort represents the appropriate level of funding (developed by NASA and Contractor partnering) for operations for the Shuttle Program. 

Also, the recommended budget level for Shuttle Upgrades should be available with 

plus-ups for infrastructure supportability and Orbiter Maintenance and Modification 

(OMM) in addition to the operations budget.

Question 6. NASA is reported to be considering delaying Orbiter Major Modifications 

and delaying and canceling upgrades to the Space Shuttle. What affect will these 

delays have on the long-term use of the Space Shuttle? 

The deferral of the efforts performed during the Orbiter Major Modifications 

(OMM) creates four main issues for the long-term use of the Space Shuttle System. 

Answer. The first issue encountered by these deferrals is the potential Orbiter 

safety and hardware issues that would go undetected without the OMM. It must 

first be understood that the internal Orbiter access that is provided to the Shuttle 

team during the performance of major modifications provides the team with a 

unique insight into the vehicle’s integrity that cannot be obtained during the regular 

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operational servicing of the vehicle. Simply put, many problems discovered during 

the OMM would not be discovered during routine maintenance or Orbiter Structural 

inspection. This is clearly illustrated by the wire inspections that were performed 

during the OV–102 (Columbia) OMM that yielded significantly more discrepancies 

than similar inspections in Orbiter processing flows. In addition, the presence of corrosion under the Orbiter 582 bulkhead and in the aft avionics bays was not discovered until the OV–102 OMM. 

The second issue with OMM deferrals is the risk to the program schedule that 

is created by extended Orbiter down time due to hardware issues that are detected 

late in the processing flow or could be avoided by upgrading the component/system 

during the OMM. The major modifications to upgrade Orbiter system components 

cannot be incorporated into the normal processing flow of the Orbiter or even into 

a mini-modification period. These major modifications are more complex than the 

replacement of an existing component and are also extremely intrusive to the Orbiter’s systems and subsystems. These major modifications require extensive end-toend integrity checks to insure safe operation of the Orbiter when it is returned to 

the Space Shuttle fleet. In addition, major system/subsystem issues that are discovered during the OMM do not impact flight-processing activities for other vehicles 

and can be fixed while the system is disassembled. 

A third issue that would be encountered by OMM deferrals is the additional cost 

and schedule growth that will be encountered when the OMM is performed downstream. As OMMs are deferred, the systems and subsystems that are currently part 

of the Orbiter obsolescence cause the Space Shuttle program to operate on a more 

costly ‘‘fix as you fly’’ basis as compared to upgrading the items. In addition, the 

continued use of the currently installed systems/subsystems will lead to increasing 

the likelihood of late mission scrubs on the pad and/or early mission terminations 

due to on-orbit failures. Also, deferral of the OMM delays or eliminates potential 

safety improvements that can be made with technological advances. Stretching out 

existing upgrades programs will lead to increased overall costs, as more is spent on 

studying how to fix on-going problems as compared to implementing solutions. 

Finally, an OMM deferral will cause the loss of key personnel with critical Shuttle 

Orbiter knowledge. This loss of experienced personnel due to re-assignment, transfer, etc. will eventually drive up the total costs of implementing the needed Orbiter 

upgrades. The Space Shuttle program needs to ensure that the elimination/deferral 

of the OMM in the near term to meet today’s funding issue doesn’t create an untenable downstream cost, schedule and risk threat to the program due to the loss of 

the critical Orbiter vehicle knowledge and experience.

Question 7. Are there any upgrades that you believe must be implemented in order 

to ensure the safe operation of the Space Shuttle and that NASA has indicated an 

intention to cancel? 

Answer. The Shuttle continues to operate safely within its current risk of loss parameters. We believe that delay of the safety upgrades will unnecessarily delay improving safety to levels that can be achieved with today’s technology. USA recommends that any move to delay the implementation of Multifunction Electronic 

Display Subsystem (MEDS), to cancel the Advanced Health Monitoring System 

(AHMS Phase 2), the Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and Electric Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) projects and extend the schedule of the Cockpit 

Avionics Upgrade should not be approved.

Question 8. Your testimony also covers important NASA infrastructure problems 

and their effects on the Shuttle Program. In your opinion, is NASA putting the right 

amount of emphasis on infrastructure maintenance, such as repair of the Vehicle 

Assembly Building in Florida? 

Answer. The short answer is that NASA has not been putting enough resources 

into maintaining infrastructure as evidenced by the size of the backlogged maintenance and repair of facilities. 

NASA infrastructure maintenance occurs on two primary paths. First is day-today asset maintenance and repair. This type of maintenance is comprised of preventive maintenance procedures, which keep a reliable asset in proper operating condition, and corrective maintenance actions to repair unexpected system failures. Secondly is larger capital projects to replace systems, which have become unreliable or 

obsolete due to age degradation and/or lack of available vendors to provide for continued system use. Day-to-day maintenance is funded through the normal programoperating budget. Capital projects are funded primarily through the Construction of 

Facilities (CoF) cycle using either program or institutional fund sources. 

Within NASA the recognized standard for necessary annual investment in infrastructure maintenance and repair is 2–4% of the current replacement value of all 

assets in operation. This standard was recommended in the American Public Works 

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Association Special Report #60 ‘‘Committing to the Cost of Ownership, Maintenance 

and Repair of Public Buildings,’’ first published in 1990. Data gathered by NASA 

since 1996 shows that the agency has consistently invested below 2% of the current 

replacement value. Likewise, the Space Flight Centers at which the Shuttle Program operates have spent below 2% of the current replacement value. 

The trend in CoF funding has also seen a sharp decline from annual investments 

of around $500M in the early 1990s to a low of less than $140M in 1998. NASA 

has begun to increase the investment level, but it is still just over one half of the 

earlier required investment. This funding supports NASA’s new construction as well 

as projects of a ‘‘maintenance’’ nature. 

With these investment strategies the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair in the 

agency has grown to near $900M (∼$550M in Code M) and without a substantial 

investment to buy down this backlog a vicious cycle will worsen. This cycle is one 

in which more of the day-to-day maintenance and repair funding is expended performing band-aid type corrective maintenance on old, unreliable systems which are 

backlogged for permanent solutions due to lack of CoF level funding. As more dayto-day maintenance funding is expended on corrective maintenance, less can be used 

for preventive maintenance that results in accelerated degradation of operable systems. 

SHUTTLE OFFICIALS PREPARE FOR IMPENDING BUDGET SHORTFALL

Space News, August 13, 2001

By Brian Berger, Staff Writer 

WASHINGTON—When NASA’s Space Shuttle Discovery returns later in August 

from its planned 11-day mission to deliver a fresh three-person crew to the international space station, the 18-year-old orbiter will not be sent out to the California 

desert for a new cockpit as previously planned. 

That is because Discovery’s year-long stay in Palmdale, Calif., for upgrades and 

thorough maintenance could be delayed until 2005 as part of a slew of cost-cutting 

measures NASA Space Shuttle officials are contemplating in light of a looming 

budget shortfall. 

Higher than expected labor costs, rising energy bills and other expenses are expected to put a pinch on NASA’s anticipated $3.2 billion-a-year Space Shuttle budget starting in 2002, forcing Shuttle officials to come up with hundreds of millions 

of dollars in savings in the coming years. 

Facing a $218 million shortfall in 2002 alone, NASA Space Shuttle officials are 

preparing to scrap or scale-back a half-dozen safety upgrades and postpone sending 

Discovery and sister ship Endeavour to Palmdale for the installation of modern 

cockpit displays and other improvements. 

Space Shuttles Atlantis and Columbia already have been to Palmdale to have 

their old-fashioned flight gauges and analog dials replaced with modern flat-panel 

displays designed to ease pilot workload. Until recently, NASA’s plans called for 

modernizing all four Shuttles’ cockpits by the end of 2002, but now it appears that 

date could slip to 2006 as Shuttle officials scramble to come up with near-term savings. 

Also on the chopping block are several Shuttle upgrades NASA officials identified 

as recently as last year as high priorities with the potential to cut in half the odds 

of losing a Shuttle during launch. 

NASA canceled one of those planned upgrades, an Electric Auxiliary Power Unit, 

in June, citing concerns that the battery-powered system would not be ready on 

time and within budget. Shuttle officials now are pondering canceling or scaling 

back two other high-priority upgrades, an advanced health monitoring system for 

the Shuttle’s main engines and miscellaneous avionics and cockpit upgrades. 

Other upgrade efforts that could be affected by NASA’s budget woes include a 

thrust vector control system for the Shuttle’s solid-rocket boosters, designing a 

stronger tire for the Shuttle’s main landing gear, modifying the geometry of Shuttle 

solid-rocket propellant for a more uniform burn, and a study of further improvements for the craft’s main engines. 

NASA spokeswoman Kirsten Larson said such steps are being considered as the 

agency attempts to reconcile an essentially flat Shuttle budget with inflation and 

rising operations costs. Larson said NASA also is considering mothballing Columbia, 

the oldest and heaviest of the agency’s four orbiters, in 2003 or 2004. 

Larson said no final decisions have been made on any of the proposed cuts. Any 

decisions, she said, will depend on how the Shuttle program fares in NASA’s 2003 

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budget, currently being developed in cooperation with the White House Office of 

Management and Budget and due to be released early next year. 

NASA does not plan to abandon Shuttle upgrades altogether, according to Shuttle 

program officials. For example, the agency’s 2002 budget includes funding for an initial phase of cockpit and main-engine health monitoring system upgrades, program 

officials said. NASA also intends to fund an effort to strengthen the Shuttle’s external fuel tanks with a different welding technique. 

Shuttle program officials said canceling or scaling back a half-dozen upgrades and 

postponing sending Discovery and Endeavour to Palmdale would enable the program to live within its proposed $3.2 billion budget for 2002, but would not fully 

eliminate funding shortfalls in subsequent years. 

William Readdy, NASA’s deputy associate administrator for human space flight, 

was unavailable to comment by press time due to his engagement in Discovery’s 

launch preparations, Larson said. 

Readdy assumed responsibility for the Shuttle program in an acting capacity Aug. 

10 upon the retirement of Norman Starkey, the agency’s deputy associate administrator for the Space Shuttle. 

James Eyman, vice president and general manager for Space Shuttle upgrades at 

United Space Alliance, the Houston-based company that operates the Shuttle fleet 

under contract to NASA, said his company is prepared to continue operating the 

Shuttle at current risk rates if NASA scales back some of the planned upgrades. 

However, he said he remains hopeful that NASA will find a way to proceed with 

the upgrade strategy approved in 1999, two years after the agency lifted a threeyear design freeze on Shuttle improvements. 

‘‘We are watching the political process just as others surely are,’’ Eyman said. 

‘‘We’re hopeful NASA will get fully funded and will be able to continue most if not 

all of these upgrades.’’

Congress already has signaled a willingness to help NASA cover at least part of its $218 million shortfall in 2002. 

The NASA budget bill approved by the U.S. House of Representatives in early Au- gust added $35 million to the Space Shuttle program’s 2002 budget to pay for refurbishment of the Vehicle Assembly Building at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, Fla. 

Meanwhile, a companion bill in the Senate includes an extra $50 million for Shuttle 

safety upgrades. 

But it remains unclear just how sympathetic lawmakers and other government officials will be to NASA’s human space flight budget woes. 

‘‘Code M’s problems are of their own making,’’ one U.S. government official said, 

referring to the NASA division responsible for human space flight activities. Code 

M also is wrestling with a projected $4.8 billion cost overrun on the international 

space station. 

A Washington space policy analyst said rising costs are putting a squeeze on 

NASA’s Shuttle budget at a time when there is no place to look for savings other 

than the upgrades program. With the international space station’s projected overrun 

putting intense pressure on NASA’s human space flight budgets, the Shuttle program is ‘‘between the proverbial rock and a hard place,’’ the analyst said. 

Additionally, the analyst said, some Shuttle upgrades are turning out to be more 

expensive than NASA and its contractors had estimated. ‘‘This just raised further 

questions about the reliability of NASA’s cost estimating procedures,’’ the analyst 

said. 

THE PLANETARY SOCIETY, 

Pasadena, CA, May 15, 2001.

Hon. JOHN MCCAIN, 

Washington, DC

Hon. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, 

Washington, DC

Dear Senator:

We know that Congress believes that it is important to hear from representatives 

of the public concerning matters of public interest. In that spirit we present this 

letter to you, and ask that it be included at the next opportunity with testimony 

before your Committee, in keeping with our efforts to provide information to Congress about public support for space exploration. 

It has been six years since The Planetary Society testified before this Committee. 

During those years, the Society’s membership included more than 250,000 people 

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who are interested in, and inspired by, the exploration of other worlds and the 

search for life elsewhere. We are, by far, the largest organized constituency in the 

space community. 

The principle message of our constituency is that space exploration is popular—

and your support for NASA programs should build on that popularity and public 

interest. There are four specific issues that we ask you to address in this year’s 

budget deliberations. 

First, we urge the restoration of program elements in NASA’s human spaceflight 

enterprise to study concepts for future flight beyond low Earth orbit and to begin 

addressing the required technologies. The Space Station should not be the next step 

to nowhere as it is now. The purpose of the Space Station is to prepare humans 

for destinations beyond earth orbit. 

Second, human spaceflight should lead eventually to Mars. We do not advocate 

a start now on any such human mission, but we urge you to insure that the robotic 

planetary program is designed to lead to that end. The Planetary Society believes 

this requires the establishment of robotic outposts on Mars that will support science 

goals in early phases and human habitation later when it is feasible. 

We ask you to restore and support the Pluto-Kuiper Express mission that was removed from the Space Science budget. Otherwise, this nation will miss a unique opportunity to visit the last unexplored planet that will not reoccur for some time to 

come. Fourth, we believe in the importance of international cooperation, public support, 

and interest in the space program and ask that you support international cooperation in the NASA program. Space exploration has become an inherently international enterprise, and this type of cooperation is key to carrying out complex exploratory and scientific programs in space. 

Public Interest 

In many conversations we have had with legislators and decision-makers over the 

years, almost all of them are positive about the value and popularity of space exploration. It may generate less public expression than bread-and-butter, financial, and 

quality of life issues, but as has been wisely said, ‘‘man does not live by bread 

alone.’’ The public understands this. The support is proven by the way the public 

follows NASA missions that venture to other worlds; by the large numbers of visitors at the National Air and Space Museum, Kennedy and Johnson Space Centers; 

by the spectacular attention paid to scientific discoveries by Hubble, Mars Global 

Surveyor, the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous mission; and by the adventures of 

both humans, like John Glenn, and robots, like Mars Pathfinder. 

Human Spaceflight 

The basis of the popularity of space is exploration. It is the raison d’etre for 

NASA. We are concerned that exploration is threatened in the current NASA budget 

and cite the following examples of this in both the human and robotic program. 

The space station is running into cost overruns and NASA has no resiliency to 

deal effectively with the problem without severely cutting the program. This lack 

of budget resiliency is a result of the large loss of purchasing power exceeding 30% 

in the last eight fiscal years—a budget reduction uniquely large compared to the 

rest of the Federal Government. So the crew on the space station will be limited, 

the duration of stay will be limited, the TransHab is cancelled, and no preparation 

or study of human space flight out of Earth orbit will be undertaken. In short, we 

have a human spaceflight program leading to nowhere. If the space station leads 

nowhere with astronauts neither conducting nor preparing for exploration, then it 

will turn off the public as happened a decade ago when we had a Shuttle program 

that also was leading nowhere. 

The Planetary Society has consistently supported a space station worth the cost—

we hope Congress and the Administration will provide adequate support to NASA 

so that the International Space Station remains so. 

Robotic Spaceflight—Mars Outposts 

Robotic scientific exploration of space has proven its value. Congress, the Clinton 

Administration, and now the Bush Administration have played a constructive role 

in providing increasing support for Mars exploration. It is no wonder—Mars is the 

only extraterrestrial world we know that holds clues to past life and the promise 

of future habitation. The public is enthralled with the search for extraterrestrial life 

and the attempts to understand humankind’s place in the cosmos. Much of this endeavor centers on Mars. We ask you to support the increase in funding for Mars 

in the FY2002 budget request. 

As good as the Mars program is, there is something lacking. It is not funding. 

As with the space station, it is direction. It is a subject about which we can only 

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whisper; it is too dangerous to say out loud in Washington. It is called humans. The 

irony is clear to us, but seems to escape many policy makers. While Mars has received increased funds and commitment for robotic missions, based on its link to 

possible microbial life and the sense of Mars as an ultimate human destination, the 

link to human exploration is not permitted. The public makes this link and most 

assume we are on our way there. But NASA is forced to cut even small study programs about the future of human exploration. We do not call for a premature and 

ill-founded political initiative for a human Mars mission. But there is no reason not 

to acknowledge this as a goal of the robotic program and begin to develop robotic 

Mars outposts that can one day serve as the infrastructure for human exploration 

when the time is right. Our position on Mars Outposts is submitted as an appendix 

to this letter. 

Pluto 

Mars is not the only planet in the Solar System, nor the only place for humankind 

to gain an understanding of our place in the cosmos. This country has explored the 

solar system from Mercury to Neptune, and has visited scores of solar system 

moons, asteroids and comets. But not Pluto. Pluto is the only unvisited planet in 

the solar system and also the most conspicuous member of a new class of objects 

about which we are just learning—the Kuiper Belt objects beyond the orbit of Neptune. The opportunity for our generation to complete the reconnaissance of the solar 

system and reach Pluto is fleeting. NASA has a plan to reach Pluto with a 2004 

launch, the last chance for centuries to reach the planet with its atmosphere intact 

and with favorable lighting conditions. But for a lack of about 0.5% in the NASA 

budget, those plans are proposed for cancellation. Because this issue has received 

such great public attention, we specifically ask that Congress review the proposed 

cancellation in an open hearing. We will be pleased to testify about the important 

scientific reasons to explore the planet and the consequences if we fail to take advantage of the narrow window to launch a mission. 

International Cooperation 

There are many other issues that could be mentioned concerning the space program—too many for this letter. But we must cite one that deeply concerns us: losses 

to the U.S. space program resulting from inhibitions to international cooperation. 

The inability of the United States to develop low cost launchers coupled with a policy prohibiting Americans to take advantage of the world’s oversupply of rockets and 

launch sites, is holding back the country’s access to space. Additionally, technology 

and communication policies slow down scientific and technical accomplishment in 

the space program, or make it much more expensive. Congress has added restrictive 

language supposedly protecting American space launch industry that has actually 

restricted access to space and inhibiting American space exploration and development. Regulations imposed by the Congress are keeping American ideas earthbound instead of in space. 

Public support for international cooperation is strongly evidenced by the space 

station—a program which gained little support as a nationalistic endeavor when 

first proposed, and which has enjoyed widespread support when converted to an 

international program. This is an important consideration in planning the future of 

the space exploration. 

Conclusions 

We ask that the Committee:

1. Add funds to Space Science specifically to accomplish a Pluto mission.

2. Initiate funding for programs to study the future of human space flight beyond low Earth orbit, including the development of Mars Outposts in the 

Space Science program.

3. Easing of regulations restricting international cooperation. 

The Planetary Society presents our position in terms of public interest and popularity of space exploration. The Society is the largest space interest group on Earth. 

We ask for your consideration of the great interest in space exploration, and thank 

you for your attention. 

Sincerely,

Bruce Murray 

President 

Wesley T. Huntress, Jr. 

Vice President 

Louis Friedman 

Executive Director 

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NEXT OUTPOSTS IN SPACE

Recommendations For Mars Exploration

Bruce Murray, Wesley T. Huntress Jr., Louis Friedman, Risto Pellinen

The Planetary Society 

A key issue now facing all spacefaring nations is the alignment of the International Space Station (ISS) and future goals in space. The main scientific rationale 

for investing billions of dollars in the ISS is to learn how to keep humans healthy 

in space over long durations. Scientists will conduct research onboard the orbiting 

laboratory to understand the debilitating effects of weightlessness and develop countermeasures. With this knowledge, humans will be able to venture beyond the Moon 

to Mars and other distant bodies. Thus, the station is an essential stepping stone 

for human exploration of our solar system. 

But will humans venture beyond the Moon? When? Under current policy, this decision is deferred until after the ISS is assembled in 2005. To wait four years to 

plan our next steps in space is both unnecessary and unadvisable. Delaying the decision potentially threatens the ISS if something should go wrong during assembly—

a likely possibility. If the station is perceived to be without purpose, difficulties experienced during assembly may imperil the program and thus our nation’s human 

exploration goals. 

To prevent such misfortune—and to demonstrate bold vision—The Planetary Society urges a new cornerstone of space policy be laid: a pathway—not yet an approved 

project—that leads to human exploration of space beyond Earth orbit, and eventually to the surface of Mars. 

Currently, there is no planned transition from robotic missions (which are currently exploring the red planet) to future human expeditions. The Planetary Society 

proposes to form a bridge between these programs and make possible the incremental, affordable, and inevitable human exploration of Mars. Announcing such a 

policy would generate tremendous excitement, yet necessarily leaves open details 

such as cost, commitment, and the date for an eventual human mission to Mars. 

To provide the draw towards the ultimate destination for humans in the 2lst Century, The Planetary Society proposes a program called Mars Outposts. It involves 

the selection of candidate outposts on Mars—high-intensity research sites—that in 

the future would serve as potential landing areas for human expeditions. At these 

sites, continuous communications and navigational systems would be established to 

support robotic missions, such as advanced rovers to search for evidence of life and 

return samples to Earth for study. In the years ahead, the same equipment would 

be used to facilitate in-situ production and storage of propellant and breathable oxygen and other key technologies for human missions. 

The Mars Outposts program would create the necessary, and needed, transition 

from robotic exploration to human exploration. Importantly, it connects through policy and programs, the International Space Station, robotic missions to Mars, and the 

eventual launch of human expeditions. 

The outposts can be viewed as ‘‘robotic Antarcticas’’ on Mars, areas of intensive 

scientific study of Mars from Earth. At these sites, robotic probes would comprehensively explore the surrounding terrain. Using virtual reality, humans worldwide 

would be able to participate in the exploration of our sister planet. Imagine looking 

through the ‘‘eyes’’ of a robotic probe as it first ventures through a canyon or over 

the lip of a hill, or digging below the surface and discovering evidence of water and 

possible life. 

Just like the scientific station in Antarctica and the ISS the Mars Outposts would 

be built through international cooperation. In actuality, the outposts would be an 

extension of the ISS. And importantly, financial resources would be shared and allocated incrementally. 

The Planetary Society urges the adoption of an international Mars Outposts program. Over the next four years, plans would be crafted and preliminary candidate 

sites selected. Space planetary programs would begin to be integrated with Human 

Space Flight programs to cross-fertilize engineering and operations. Mars Outposts 

that would eventually make possible human expeditions. 

Exploration is the raison d’etre of a government space program. Public interest 

and support is repeatedly demonstrated by the new ventures to Mars, by the search 

for extraterrestrial life, understanding our origins and the sensing of the cosmos. 

We are blessed to live at a time when we are able to not only dream about distant 

worlds, but to actually explore them. Mars is special—the only place so far discovered with hints of extraterrestrial life, the only world we can imagine humans settling on in the foreseeable future. 

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1The Planetary Society’s mission statement. 

Mars Outposts will be the bridge to that possible future—a bridge affordable in 

today’s space program but carrying us in tomorrow’s. We look to the new Administration for leadership, on that bridge to the future and invite you to join us in ‘‘inspiring the people of Earth to explore other worlds and seek other life through research, education, and public participation.’’ 1

In addition to addressing the shortfall in resources for space science, a primary 

concern for the next administration will be the International Space Station. Its assembly is scheduled for completion in 2005. Dozens of flights must be precisely executed to complete the mission. Inevitably there will be problems, some potentially 

severe. It is critical for the new administration to guide the project to its completion, 

making sure that its main goal—learning how to keep humans healthy in space for 

long durations to enable human expeditions beyond the Moon—remains tied to the 

future goals of our nation’s space program. 

The ISS program will become increasing complex as components are added to the 

station’s structure, and a full-time crew begins to pursue ‘‘scientific, exploration, engineering and commercial activities.’’ Sixteen countries are involved in the construction of the orbiting laboratory—the largest, international effort ever undertaken. 

Only by conducting research in space can scientists fully understand how space 

affects human health and how to develop and validate countermeasures. As explained in the 1990 Augustine Report, ‘‘A space station is needed specifically to establish effective strategies to prevent or mitigate the debilitating deconditioning effects on humans of long stays in low gravity fields, and to establish absolutely reliable and efficient life support systems for extended human stays in unforgiving, hostile environment.’’

With the knowledge gained from research aboard the ISS, humans will be able 

to venture beyond the Moon to Mars and other distant bodies. Thus, the station is 

a stepping stone to the exploration of our solar system by human expeditions. 

But when will human missions begin? The main purpose of the ISS—exploration—has not be sufficiently integrated into potential human missions. To date, 

NASA has focused attention on building the space station and wants to delay determining the next step in our nation’s space program until 2005, when the ISS is completed. Waiting four years wastes valuable time. It is unnecessary and inadvisable 

to delay until after the station is assembled to announce the next important goal 

in human exploration. 

Mars Outposts 

Robotic probes and human exploration tend to be viewed as separate goals. Conventional wisdom assumes robotic missions will be conducted for a period of time, 

then human expeditions will somehow take over. This view is flawed. Robotic probes 

and other robotic technologies are but tools and their contribution will not suddenly 

stop when humans plant a footstep on the surface of Mars. 

At issue is understanding the tasks that can best be accomplished by robotic technologies and those tasks best performed by humans. There are a myriad of questions to be answered as we explore Mars with an eye toward human missions in 

the future. What operations on Mars can be handled autonomously? What tasks are 

best accomplished by humans using robotic tools? 

The better we can understand the opportunities and limitations of robotic technologies, the better we will be able to mount a successful human expedition to Mars. 

To prepare for the future, the process of connecting robotic and human exploration 

of Mars can and should begin today. 

The Planetary Society urges the new administration, as a cornerstone of its space 

policy, to announce a program, called Mars Outposts, to establish research sites on 

Mars. In the near term, the outposts would focus and enhance robotic exploration. 

Eventually, they would serve as potential landing areas for human expeditions. 

(This proposal assumes it is premature to commit to a date, cost, or other program 

specifics for a human Mars mission.) 

At the Mars Outposts, continuous communications and navigational systems 

would be established to support robotic missions, such as rovers, balloons, and sample returns. Scientific instruments positioned at the sites would monitor radiation, 

dust and winds, creating an historical record so scientists can predict local weather 

patterns. In the years ahead, the robotic systems would be used to facilitate the insitu production and storage of propellent and breathable oxygen, paving the way for 

human missions. We would have a comprehensive understanding of the surrounding 

terrain and know what specific scientific tasks should be undertaken by a human 

expedition. 

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Establishing the Mars Outposts creates a bridge between robotic and human exploration. Importantly, it connects through policy and programs, the International 

Space Station, the robotic exploration Mars, and eventual human expeditions. 

The outposts would allow scientists and engineers to develop the ‘‘complex human/

machine symbiosis of the future.’’ Using virtual reality, the public would be able to 

directly experience the thrill of exploring a new world. Imagine looking through the 

‘‘eyes’’ of a robotic probe as it ventures for the first time through a canyon or over 

the lip of a hill, or digging below the surface and discovering evidence of water and 

possible life. 

Developing the robotic tools to explore Mars will stretch our imaginations and 

lead advanced technologies to assist the private sector. 

Just as the space station is an international endeavor, so too will be the human 

exploration of Mars. The robotic outposts create the pathway. They provide the 

structure for the shared, robotic exploration of Mars, leading to human presence. 

Just as the nations of the world collaborate in scientific research on Antarctica, so 

would we join together to build the Mars Outposts. 

To mount a human mission to Mars at this time is a very expensive proposition. 

Creating the Mars Outposts can be accomplished incrementally, with limited resources. The initial step would involve an announcement of the Mars Outposts program and inviting the participation of our international partners. Over the next four 

to eight years, we would select the potential landing sites and determine how they 

can best facilitate scientific exploration. Missions would be undertaken to place 

large, robust rovers and landers at the sites and establish continuous communications. 

Over time, the sites would become familiar places, inspiring the world and a generation of students, as well as focus research for scientists. The next four year 

should not be wasted thinking about our future; we should be making our future. 

We cannot afford to delay until after the ISS is completed to plot our next step in 

space. 

With the Mars Outposts program, the new administration can demonstrate its vision and make history by setting the path that will enhance science and lead to the 

eventual exploration of Mars. 

APPENDIX

The Planetary Society 

The Planetary Society has spearheaded numerous innovative opportunities for the 

general public to participate in the exploration of the solar system and the search 

for extraterrestrial life. 

Conducting such exploration has traditionally been the province of scientists and 

engineers. Yet the rationale for spending public resources for exploration involves 

a greater societal interest that does not rest solely on science. 

Among the more notable opportunities for the public’s participation in our nation’s 

space program are:

• The Mars Microphone—The first privately funded instrument to be sent to another world (was onboard the Mars Polar Lander);

• Red Rover Goes to Mars—The first commercial/education partnership on a planetary mission;

• Visions of Mars—A CD containing works of science fiction about Mars, designed 

to be placed on the Red Planet as the first library to serve future human explorers;

• MAPEX—A Microelectronics And Photonics Experiment to measure the level of 

radiation on Mars in preparation for human explorers, and contains an electronbeam lithograph of the names of all members of The Planetary Society;

• Participated in the naming of the spacecraft Magellan and Sojourner;

• Student-designed nanoexperiments to fly on a Mars lander;

• SETI@home—A software tool that allows millions of people to contribute to research and data processing in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.

Such projects/events as above presage the day when planetary exploration will be 

truly a global, mass public enterprise, with people in their homes and schools in direct communication—and even control—of robotic devices on other worlds. 

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Mars Exploration 

The Planetary Society advocates the exploration of Mars, with robotic missions 

leading to eventual human exploration. The Society has sponsored numerous 

projects connected with Mars exploration, including field tests of a Russian built 

rover, designing the guiderope system for a Mars Balloon, and the development of 

the Mars Microphone, which was an instrument on the Mars Polar Lander. 

The Society has also sponsored the Mars Declaration calling for an international 

space goal of human Mars exploration. 

Search For Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) 

The Planetary Society is the sponsor of one of the most innovative SETI projects 

on earth, SETI@home which utilizes the combined computing power of over 2 million personal computers to sift through data gathered in a radiotelescope SETI 

search. The Society has sponsored numerous SETI programs for nearly two decades, 

including radiotelescope searches Project BETA in Massachusetts and META in Argentina; and optical SETI searches in both Massachusetts and northern California. 

The Planetary Society 

Carl Sagan, Bruce Murray, and Louis Friedman founded the Society in 1980 to 

advance the exploration of the solar system and to continue the search for extraterrestrial life. With 100,000 members in more than 140 countries, the Society is 

the largest and most influential space interest group in the world. 

The Society supports research and test programs, student projects, hands-on involvement for the public in space exploration, and special events.

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