IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

COMAPER CORPORATION, :

Plaintiff, :

: CIVIL ACTION

v. :

: NO. 05-1103

ANTEC, INC., ET AL., :

Defendants. :

Tucker, J. September 27, 2007

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is a patent case. Plaintiff Comaper Corporation (“Comaper”) brings this action against

Defendants Antec, Inc., Best Buy and MicroCenter (collectively “Antec”) for allegedly infringing

on United States Patent No. 5,955,955 (the “‘955 Patent”), which Plaintiff owns. The‘955 Patent

disclosed a device entitled Drive-Bay Mounted Cooling Device. Presently before this Court is

Antec’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Noninfringement (Doc. 51), Plaintiff’s Response in

Opposition (Doc. 54), Comaper’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement (Doc. 53), Antec’s

Response in Opposition (Doc. 56), Antec’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Invalidity Due to

Obviousness (Doc. 52), Plaintiff’s’ Response in Opposition (Doc. 55), the parties’ reply briefs (Docs.

57 & 58); and oral argument held before this Court on September 24, 2007. For the reasons set forth

below, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-motions, and all responses filed thereto, this Court

will deny the parties’ cross motions infringement/noninfringement, and deny Defendants’ motion on

invalidity due to obviousness.

BACKGROUND

From the evidence of record, the pertinent facts are as follows. Comaper is a Pennsylvania

corporation and is the owner of the ‘955 patent. The co-owners of Comaper are William Corcoran

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and Gary Smith. In the early 1990s, Corcoran and Smith became acquainted with one another while

they were both employed at a company named UCR in Pennsylvania. While at UCR the two men

discussed Corcoran’s idea for a drive bay cooling system for computers and decided to apply for a

patent as co-inventors. 

Smith and Corcoran sought to prosecute their application for a patent and formed a

corporation which was later named Comaper. The Patent was assigned to Comaper in or about 2004.

Antec, Inc., a California corporation having its principal place of business in Fremont.

California, manufactures computer accessories sold under the names “Hard Disk Cooling System

with Temperature Monitors, “HD Cooler, and “Hard Disk Drive Cooler,” (collectively “ the Accused

Devices”). In or about 2003, while at MicroCenter and Best Buy, Corcoran saw two devices that he

felt infringed the ‘955 Patent. Corcoran purchased the devices and sent them to his attorney.

Comaper identified the Accused devices as infringing. 

Comaper sent letters to Antec informing them of the ‘955 Patent and its claim that the Antec

devices infringed the ‘955 Patent. Defendants continued to sell and market their cooling drive

equipment. In 2005, Comaper brought suit against Antec for infringement of independent claims 1

and 12 as well as dependent claims 2, 7, and 13 (“the claims”) of the ‘955 Patent. 

On July 17, 2006, pursuant to Markman v. Westview, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), a Markman

hearing was held before this Court to determine the meaning of disputed terms in the ‘955 Patent.

On September 13, 2006, the Court ordered the disputed terms defined as follows:

1. “Case” shall mean a structure for containing and holding something;

2. “Drive Bay Slot” shall mean the relatively narrow opening in the housing of the

computer that leads to the drive bay;

3. “Second Opening” shall mean a separate opening that is exposed to the drive bay

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region;

4. “Case occupies substantially the entire drive bay slot” shall mean, when installed, the

case occupies almost entirely the slot leading to the drive bay.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A factual dispute is

“material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing the

district court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the

movant’s initial Celotex burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district court that there is

an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325. After the moving party

has met its initial burden, “the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or otherwise as provided in this

rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). That is, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making

a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[I]f the

opponent [of summary judgment] has exceeded the ‘mere scintilla’ [of evidence] threshold and has

offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant’s version of events

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against opponent, even if the quality of the movant’s evidence far outweighs that of its opponent.”

Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Under Rule

56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the

opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

I. Noninfringement/Infringement

In its Motion for Summary Judgment on Noninfringement, Antec argues that the accused

devices do not literally infringe the patent because none of the devices have a separate “second

opening.” Antec claims that in order to infringe, the accused devices must have an opening, separate

from the first opening, which has access to outside air. None of the accused devices, according to

Antec have a separate, second opening since that the front and back side of the fan cannot constitute

a second, separate opening.

Comaper responds that Antec’s argument cannot be accepted since it is “divorced from

reality” and that summary judgment on the issue of infringement should be granted. Specifically,

Comaper argues that Antec seeks a finding that if the back side of the fan is the same as the front side

of the fan, then the opening on front side must be the same opening on the back side of the fan.

Comaper explains that Antec’s argument cannot be accepted given that the front side of the fan is

not the back side, since the fan, as a three-dimensional object, has separate planes. The front side,

Comaper avers, is essentially on one plane and the back side is essentially on a different plane at

distance from the first plane. Thus, the back plane must, under Comaper’s analysis, have its own

separate opening–a second opening, and literally infringes the ‘955 patent.

Antec contends that adoption of Comaper’s argument would require that the Court construe

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In 1994, Corcoran and Smith filed Application No. 08/349,964 entitled “Drive-Bay Mounted Computer

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Cooling Device.” (Andris Decl. ¶ 5 , Ex. B.) In the First Office action and the Second Office action the PTO

rejected certain claims as unpatentable. Of specific relevance, the Examiner stated that the amended claims 14-16

were anticipated under section 102 by Pollard et al. (U.S. Patent No. 5, 171, 183). (Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B). The

Examiner noted that the “case” as claimed, was met by a case found in Pollard having a plurality of openings which

was attached to an air movement device configured within a bay of the computer. (Id.) After several rejections of the

application and amended applications, in 1998 an Examiner Amendment was filed with a Notice of Allowance. (Def.

Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C). The specific reason for allowance cited states: “The case for the cooling device mounted in the

drive slot does not provide housing for a disk drive which is different from Pollard et al. reference wherein the case

housed both the cooling device and the disk drive.” (Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C).

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the claims in a way that would render them invalid. Antec claims that Comaper’s construction would

invalidate the patent since it would read on the Pollard prior art. Antec points out that during the 1

prosecution of the instant applications, the patentees distinguished their invention from the Pollard

patent and thus they are barred by prosecution history estoppel from reclaiming what was changed

in their efforts to distinguish. Antec points out that the Pollard patent consisted of a face plate over

a drive bay slot behind which were mounted fans that blew directly into the interior of the computer.

However Antec’s explanation does not necessarily result in its asserted conclusion none of the

devices have a separate second opening. Further, Antec’s bald assertion that “the backside of the

fan is not separate from its front side as a matter of law” cannot serve to satisfy its Rule 56 burden.

Antec’s second contention on non-infringement professes that the accused devices do not

infringe under the doctrine of equivalents because they do not perform the same function in the same

way. The doctrine of equivalents provides a cause of action for a patentee against the producer of

a device “if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the

same result.” Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S.605, 608 (citing

Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929). Antec correctly states that equivalence

is a question of fact and summary judgment can be granted only if no reasonable fact finder could

find equivalence. However, Antec’s argument in this regard relies on the premise that the accused

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devices do not have a separate opening. This Court cannot agree that there is exists no issue of

material fact in determining whether there exists a “second opening” in the “case” as interpreted by

the Court in its Markman opinion. A jury could reasonably conclude that Antec’s products have a

second opening through which air leaves the case. That finding could reasonably lead to the

conclusion that Antec’s devices perform substantially the same function in substantially the same

way to obtain the same result; in other words that Antec’s devices infringe under the doctrine of

equivalents. 

The existence of an issue of material fact on whether the case in Antec’s devices contain a

“second opening,” precludes summary judgment of patent infringement/non-infringement. 

II. Obviousness

In support of its motion for summary judgment based on invalidity due to obviousness, Antec

argues that the claims are rendered obvious by a combination of alleged prior art: (1) Fujitsu

M2311K with a Hard Drive (M2322K) and Fan (B03B-4740-E005A) (1982) (“Fujitsu”);(2) IBM

RISC System/6000 Model 58H (1993) (“IBM Risc”); and (3) Control Data Corporation 910

Workstation (1988) (“CDC 910"). 

As the movant, Antec has failed to meet its initial burden of production under Rule 56. The

party asserting invalidity of a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing

evidence of facts underlying invalidity that no reasonable jury could find that challenger failed to

meet its burden. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

This burden does not shift to Comaper unless Antec has meet its burden. Celotex Corp. v. Carrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

Pursuant to the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103, a patent may not be issued when: 

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the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are

such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the

invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject

matter pertains.”

The Supreme Court of the United States elaborated the analysis for applying the statutory

language of 103 stating:

Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; the

differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the

level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background the

obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject matter determined. Such secondary

considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,

etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the

subject matter sought to be patented.

See also, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (April 30, 2007). 

An issued patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. 282; KSR Int’l Co., 127 S.Ct at 1737. Thus

this Court must determine whether under summary-judgment standards, Antec has overcome the

presumption and demonstrated that the claims are obvious in light of the prior art in existence when

Comaper’s device was invented. See KSR Int’l Co., 127 S.Ct at 1737; See also Graham v. John

Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 

Comaper argues that Antec has failed to establish the devices as prior art. The Court agrees.

Before the Court can begin a § 103 inquiry into scope and content, a device must qualify as prior art

under the subparagraphs of 35 U.S.C § 102, which requires in pertinent part; 

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication or in public use

or sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date if the application for

patent in the United States, or

 . . .

(e) The invention was described in . . . an application for patent . . . by another filed

in the United States [which published] before the invention by the applicant for patent

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. . . .

Although Antec avers that there is no factual dispute that the CDC 910 and the IBM Risc

were sold and used more the one year prior to the filing of the ‘955 patent, the Court finds that this

issue is indeed in dispute. Antec provides no factual basis to conclude that the devices were indeed

accessible to the public. While Antec does provide a thorough explanation of the components of

each device, it does not provide the Court with any factual basis upon which to determine when the

devices were sold or otherwise qualify as prior art under § 102. Further, Antec does not endeavor

to establish under which category the Fujitsu device would qualify as prior art pursuant § 102. Since

Antec has not overcome the presumption of patent validity under summary judgment standards, this

Court cannot grant its motion.

CONCLUSION

The parties now move this Court for summary judgment on the issue of infringement or

noninfringement and agree that the question of patent infringement before the Court turns on what

qualifies as a second opening in the accused devices. Because there remain genuine issues of

material fact for determination at trial, the parties’ cross motions will be denied. Defendant further

moves for summary judgment of invalidity based on obviousness. Since Defendant has failed to

meet its burden, summary judgement will be denied.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

COMAPER CORPORATION, :

Plaintiff, :

: CIVIL ACTION

v. :

: NO. 05-1103

ANTEC, INC., ET AL., :

Defendants. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this ____ day of September 2007, upon consideration of Antec’s Motion for

Summary Judgment on Non-infringement (Doc. 51), Plaintiff’ s Response in Opposition (Doc.

54), Comaper’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement (Doc. 53), Antec’s Response in

Opposition (Doc. 56), Antec’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Invalidity Due to Obviousness

(Doc. 52), Plaintiff’s’ Response in Opposition (Doc. 55),; the parties’ reply briefs (Docs. 57 &

58); and oral argument held before this Court on September 24, 2007, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED AND DECREED that:

1. Antec’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Noninfringement (Doc. 51) is

DENIED.

2. Comaper’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement (Doc. 53) is DENIED.

3. Antec’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Invalidity Due to Obviousness (Doc.

52) is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Petrese B. Tucker

___________________________

Hon. Petrese B. Tucker, U.S.D.J.

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