IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

_________________________________________

)

DEDMAS SANCHEZ, )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) CRIMINAL NO. 05-123-3

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

Respondent. )

__________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUFE, J. December 29, 2009

Petitioner Dedmas Sanchez (“Sanchez”) was convicted in this Court on June 6, 2006 for

one count of conspiracy to distribute over one kilogram of heroin in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846,

and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924. Now before this Court is Petitioner’s pro se Motion requesting a

“restructuring” of his prison sentence based on recent Second and Eighth Circuit decisions

pertaining to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). For reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s Motion is dismissed 1

for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This criminal matter commenced on March 8, 2005, upon return of a grand jury

indictment charging Petitioner with conspiracy to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin.2

Shortly after indictment, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute over one

Docket Entry No. 735.

1

Docket Entry No. 32.

2

1
kilogram of heroin and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking

crime. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner “voluntarily and expressly waive[d] all rights to

appeal or collaterally attack [his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to [the]

prosecution.”3

On July 18, 2008, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion to address the Petitioner’s 4

direct appeal of his sentence to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court herein recites

pertinent parts of said memorandum to establish relevant factual and procedural background:

The charges against Sanchez are based on his involvement in the

operation of a large scale, long-standing heroin ring with its hub of

criminal activity in the City of Allentown, Pennsylvania. 

Specifically, Sanchez’s role in the criminal enterprise included

coordinating the daily narcotics activity of the lower-level workers. 

During the time that Sanchez was a member of the drug ring, the

enterprise distributed approximately one kilogram of heroin per

month, which generated approximately 20,000 ten-dollar bags of

heroin. Under the federal statutory sentencing provisions, Sanchez

faced a minimum term of imprisonment of twenty years regarding the

conspiracycount and a consecutive mandatoryminimum term of five 5

years imprisonment on the firearm count. It was undisputed that

Sanchez’s total offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was

thirty-six and a Category III Criminal History. Based on a total

6

offense level of thirty-six and a Category III Criminal History, the

guideline range for imprisonment on the conspiracy count was 235 to

295 months. However, because of the statutory provisions 7

referenced above, the range for the conspiracy count increased to 240

Notwithstanding certain specified limited exceptions expressly stated in the written plea agreement. See

3

Docket Entry No. 362; See also, Change of Plea Transcript, dated October 31, 2009 and Plea Agreement at Para. 10.

Docket Entry No. 550.

4

21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841 (a)(1) and 841 (b)(1)(A).

5

See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A.

6

Id.

7

2
to 295 months. The term of five years imprisonment imposed under 8

18 U.S.C. section 924 (c) runs consecutively to any other term of

imprisonment. As a result, Sanchez’s potential guideline sentence

ranged from 300 to 355 months. The Government filed a motion to

depart downward from the mandatoryminimum sentence pursuant to

18 U.S.C. section 3553 (e) and section 5K.1. of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines based on the level of assistance Sanchez

provided. After carefully considering the Torres factors, the Court 9

granted the Government’s motion and sentenced Sanchez to a term of

imprisonment of 120 months [followed by five years of supervised

release]. The next day, Sanchez filed an appeal, arguing that the

Court should have granted a more significant downward departure

from the guidelines.

Consistent with Petitioner’s plea agreement, however, the Third Circuit enforced

Petitioner’s appellate waiver and dismissed the direct appeal. To date, Petitioner has served

10

approximately forty-two months of his sentence. Now, more than three years after sentencing,

Petitioner challenges the length of his prison sentence and requests that this Court “restructure

the term of his imprisonment.” 

II. DISCUSSION

In the instant Motion, Petitioner pleads for a “sentence restructure.” The Government

argues that it is unclear whether Petitioner intends to bring the instant claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court, however, holds such no confusion and finds that under

either statute, Petitioner improperly attempts to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction over a habeas

petition. Under § 2241, jurisdiction for a habeas petition challenging present physical custody

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1.

8

United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2001) (instructing courts to provide bases of analysis

9

for downward departures and indicate its recognition of factors set forth in sentencing guidelines).

Docket Entry No. 592.

10

3
lies only in the district of confinement. Here, Petitioner is confined at FCI Fort Dix, which is 11

located in the District of New Jersey. As the Government notes, this Court would have no

subject matter jurisdiction to consider a § 2241 petition. 

Under § 2255, a petitioner has one year after the sentence is final or after a direct appeal

to file a habeas petition. Here, Petitioner brings his petition more than three years after 12

sentencing and the filing of his direct appeal. As such, Petitioner is well beyond the one-year

statute of limitations. Moreover, Defendant is precluded from filing a § 2255 petition by the

terms of his guilty plea agreement entered into before the Court on June 5, 2006.13

Further, the Court finds no constitutional grounds to consider Petitioner’s argument that

his sentence should be restructured based on “new case law.” Petitioner relies on recent opinions

from the Second and Eighth Circuits as articulated in United States v. Whittley and United 14

States v. Easter to support his position that the consecutive nature of a sentence for the crime of 15

using a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime does not apply when the defendant is

also subject to a higher, but potentially concurrent minimum penalty provided by another statute. 

Whittley and Easter, however, directly conflict with binding, controlling authority from the Third

Circuit and its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). For these foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s 16

See Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433 (2004).

11

See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003).

12

See Plea Agreement at Para. 10.

13

529 F.3d 150 (2 Cir. 2008).

14 nd

553 F.3d 519 (7 Cir. 2009).

15 th

See United States v. Abbott, 574 F. 3d 203 (3 Cir. 2009) (holding that mandatory consecutive

16 rd

sentencing for§ 924(c) does apply to defendants receiving longer mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed

4
Motion is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate order follows.

Criminal Act).

5