IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : CIVIL ACTION

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., : NO. 05-5368

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

:

ARNOLD LINCOW, D.O., et al., :

:

Defendants. :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. July 16, 2014

Defendant Richard Mintz, D.O., has filed a motion to mark 

the judgment entered against him satisfied. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court will deny the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case began in October 2005, when Plaintiffs filed 

suit against certain health-care providers, including Defendant 

Richard Mintz, who were allegedly involved in various schemes to 

defraud Plaintiffs by billing them for medical services that 

were either never provided or were provided unnecessarily. See

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lincow, 715 F. Supp. 2d 617, 

624 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (Robreno, J.), ECF No. 1038. Plaintiffs

alleged that Defendants’ actions violated the federal Racketeer 

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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and the 

Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Act. 

On March 26, 2009, after a four-week trial, a jury 

awarded Plaintiffs $4,049,741.00 in compensatory damages against 

all Defendants jointly and severally. Judgment, Mar. 26, 2009, 

ECF No. 593. The jury also imposed punitive damages in specific 

amounts against each defendant, for a total punitive damages 

award of $11.4 million. Plaintiffs elected to receive treble 

damages in place of the punitive damages award, as is provided 

for under RICO and under the Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud 

Statute. See Lincow, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 647. Because Plaintiffs 

had prevailed on their civil RICO claims, the Court approved the 

election of treble damages and imposed an amended total damages 

award of $12,149,223.00. Id. at 648. The damages were imposed 

jointly and severally against all Defendants. Id. at 647 n.29. 

Following the entry of the amended damages award, two 

defendants, Arnold Lincow, D.O., and Lawrence Forman, D.O., 

entered into settlement agreements with Plaintiffs. As a result 

of each of those settlements, the parties to the settlement 

filed an “Order to Satisfy Judgment,” which stipulated that the 

judgment entered against the settling defendant be marked 

satisfied. The order as to Arnold Lincow was entered on the 

docket on August 2, 2012 (ECF No. 1142), and the order as to 

Lawrence Forman was entered on November 1, 2012 (ECF No. 1148). 

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Almost two years later, on April 29, 2014, Defendant 

Richard Mintz filed the instant motion to mark the judgment 

entered against him satisfied. ECF No. 1150. Plaintiffs 

responded, and both parties filed appropriate reply briefs. ECF 

Nos. 1151, 1153, 1155. The motion is now ripe for resolution. 

II. DISCUSSION

In the pending motion, Mintz asks the Court to enter an 

order marking the judgment against him satisfied. Mintz does not 

contend that he has made payments that satisfy the judgment 

against him – in fact, Plaintiffs indicate that “[t]o date, Dr. 

Mintz has not made any payment on the judgment.” Pls.’ Resp. 

Opp’n Mot. Mark J. Satisfied 2, ECF No. 1151. Nor does Mintz 

contend that Plaintiffs have received the full award of 

$12,149,223.00. Rather, Mintz argues that the judgment must be 

marked satisfied because of the previous orders Plaintiffs filed 

marking the judgment satisfied as to two of Mintz’s 

codefendants. According to Mintz, Pennsylvania law governs 

satisfaction of judgments, and it provides that “the 

satisfaction of a judgment against one jointly and severally 

liable defendant is a satisfaction against the other jointly and 

severally liable defendants.” Mem. Supp. Mot. Mark J. Satisfied 

1. Plaintiffs respond that federal law governs the issue, and 

that Mintz cannot succeed under either state or federal law. 

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A. What Law Applies

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that, under the 

circumstances of this case, federal law determines the effect of 

a third-party settlement on the satisfaction of a judgment.

Although it is true that Plaintiffs brought both state and 

federal claims against Defendants, the matter was before this 

Court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, and the treble 

damages award was based primarily on the federal RICO claims. 

Under similar circumstances, at least two circuit courts have 

expressly concluded that federal law determines the effect of a 

settlement on a judgment entered against a defendant, and no 

circuits have held to the contrary. See BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l 

Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 1278 n.7 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(concluding in a copyright case that “ample authority supports 

applying the [federal] rule to federal causes of action”);

Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1989) 

(holding in a federal securities action that, because the effect 

of settlement on satisfaction of judgments affects the 

substantive rights of parties and requires uniform application, 

the federal “one satisfaction rule” applies in such cases). 

Other courts, including the Third Circuit, have simply presumed 

that federal law applies to satisfaction of judgments arising 

from federal causes of action. See Gulfstream III Assoc., Inc. 

v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 1993) 

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(applying the federal rule that “a settling plaintiff is 

entitled to only one full recovery” in a federal antitrust 

case); see also Chisholm v. UHP Projects, Inc., 205 F.3d 731, 

737 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying federal law in a case involving a 

maritime claim). 

Mintz does not respond to that body of case law, instead 

contending that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 indicates 

that state law should control. Rule 69 addresses the execution 

of judgments, and it provides that “[t]he procedure on execution 

– and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or 

execution – must accord with the procedure of the state where 

the court is located,” unless a federal statute provides 

otherwise. But, as its plain language indicates, Rule 69 deals 

with the procedural mechanisms used to execute a judgment – it 

does not address the substantive law used to determine whether a 

judgment has actually been satisfied. See Arnold v. Blast 

Intermediate Unit 17, 843 F.2d 122, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1988) 

(noting that, although “[a] district court is required to apply 

the procedural law of the forum state ‘in proceedings 

supplementary to and in aid of judgment,’” “reliance on state 

procedure must not thwart the supremacy of federal law”). As the 

Second Circuit explained in Singer, the effect of settlement on 

satisfaction of a judgment “affects substantive rather than 

procedural rights of the parties,” 878 F.2d at 599, which means 

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that the question of whether the judgment against Mintz should 

be marked satisfied is not within the scope of Rule 69. 

Therefore, because this is a RICO case arising under 

federal law, and because the issue posed by Mintz’s motion 

affects the substantive rights of the parties, the Court will 

apply federal law.

B. Federal Law

Under federal law, it is clear that Mintz is not entitled 

to an order marking the judgment against him satisfied – indeed, 

Mintz implicitly concedes as much, never arguing that he can 

succeed under federal law. The general rule applied by federal 

courts regarding satisfaction of judgments in multiple 

tortfeasor cases is that “a settling plaintiff is entitled to 

only one full recovery” for his injury. Gulfstream III Assoc., 

995 F.2d at 436. Therefore, when a plaintiff settles with one 

alleged tortfeasor, the “amounts received in settlement . . . 

are credited against judgments for the same injury against nonsettling tortfeasors.” BUC Int’l Corp., 517 F.3d at 1276. By 

offsetting a plaintiff’s recovery in that manner, the rule 

“prevent[s] the plaintiff from recovering twice from the same 

assessment of liability.” Chisholm, 205 F.3d at 737. 

That so-called “one satisfaction rule” “has its roots in 

elementary principles of tort law,” BUC Int’l Corp., 517 F.3d at 

1276, and it is now embodied in both the Restatement (Second) of 

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Torts and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Specifically, § 

885 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as follows:

(1) A valid release of one tortfeasor from 

liability for a harm, given by the 

injured person, does not discharge 

others liable for the same harm, unless 

it is agreed that it will discharge 

them. 

 

(2) A covenant not to sue one tortfeasor or 

not to proceed further against him does 

not discharge any other tortfeasor 

liable for the same harm.

(3) A payment by any person made in 

compensation of a claim for a harm for 

which others are liable diminishes the 

claim against the tortfeasors, at least 

to the extent of the payment made, 

whether or not the person making the 

payment is liable to the injured person 

and whether or not it is so agreed at 

the time of payment or the payment is 

made before or after judgment.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885 (1979). 

Similarly, § 50 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 

provides that “[a] satisfaction or release of the judgment . . . 

does not discharge the liability of any of the other persons 

liable for the loss,” but “[a]ny consideration received by the 

judgment creditor in payment of the judgment debtor’s obligation 

discharges, to the extent of the amount of value received, the 

liability to the judgment creditor of all other persons liable 

for the loss.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50 (1982). 

Put more simply, both Restatements indicate that a settlement by 

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one joint tortfeasor does not automatically release the others, 

but it does diminish the amount the plaintiff may recover from 

any non-settling tortfeasors. 

Applied here, that “one satisfaction rule” does not 

entitle Mintz to the automatic entry of an order that the 

judgment against him has been satisfied. Mintz does not contend 

that the full amount of the judgment has been paid; rather, he 

argues that the judgment against him must be deemed satisfied 

because two of his codefendants settled with Plaintiffs and 

entered stipulations that the judgment be marked satisfied as to 

those particular defendants. Under the principles articulated in 

the Restatements and in the relevant case law, however, Mintz is 

merely entitled to a reduction in the amount owed. Until there 

has been “one full recovery” by the injured party, the federal 

“one satisfaction rule” does not operate to foreclose additional 

recovery from other tortfeasors. See Gulfstream III Assoc., 995 

F.2d at 436. In other words, the fact that a judgment has been 

deemed satisfied specifically as to one defendant does not 

necessarily mean that the judgment has been fully satisfied, 

such that the plaintiff cannot collect from any other joint 

tortfeasor in the future. Accordingly, Mintz’s arguments in his 

motion do not provide an appropriate basis for the Court to 

enter an order that the judgment against Mintz has been 

satisfied. 

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C. Pennsylvania Law

Even if Pennsylvania law did apply under these 

circumstances, the result would not be any different. Mintz 

suggests that Pennsylvania applies a more stringent version of 

the “one satisfaction rule,” pursuant to which the “act of 

marking a judgment satisfied against one joint tortfeasor 

precludes recovery against another joint tortfeasor, even where 

plaintiff received substantially less than [the] judgment 

amount.” Mem. Supp. Mot. Mark J. Satisfied 3. He relies 

primarily on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Brandt 

v. Eagle, 602 A.2d 1364 (Pa. 1992), to support that proposition. 

In Brandt, a plaintiff was injured in a car accident, 

brought suit against one defendant, submitted all of her damages 

to a jury, and was awarded a judgment in her favor. Brandt, 602 

A.2d at 1366. After the entry of the judgment, the plaintiff 

reached a settlement agreement with the defendant for 

substantially less than the judgment amount. Id. She then 

brought suit against a different defendant, alleging the same 

damages that were presented to the first jury. Id. Based upon 

those facts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 

plaintiff’s second suit was barred. In so holding, the court 

affirmed the traditional rule that, once a judgment has formally 

been marked satisfied on the docket, a plaintiff is barred from 

suing other tortfeasors for the same harm “because the law 

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presumes that full satisfaction for the harm incurred has been 

received.” Id. at 1367. The court emphasized the “important 

policy reasons” behind that rule, noting that it encourages 

settlement and promotes certainty and predictability in the law 

by not permitting parties to later question the sufficiency of 

the consideration a plaintiff purported to accept “in full 

satisfaction of the judgment.” Id. 

Brandt is distinguishable from the circumstances in this 

case, for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs here are not seeking to 

file a subsequent suit against Mintz – they already sued Mintz 

jointly along with his codefendants, and a judgment has properly 

been entered against him. Second, the orders marking the 

judgment satisfied in this case do not suggest that the judgment 

has been fully satisfied. Rather, the orders state that “the 

Judgment entered against [the settling defendant] . . . is 

hereby SATISFIED.” Although it is true, as Mintz notes, that the 

orders do not use the phrase “partial satisfaction,” they are 

clearly meant to apply only to the settling defendant. Thus, 

unlike Brandt, this is not a situation in which a plaintiff has 

formally indicated that she has received full satisfaction for 

her injury, but then seeks to pursue additional recovery for the 

same injury by suing another defendant. The specific rule 

announced in Brandt therefore does not apply to this case. 

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Furthermore, courts have interpreted the rule imposed by 

Brandt “narrowly,” and they have described it as “bar[ring] a 

subsequent suit against another tortfeasor only where the prior 

proceedings can reasonably be construed to have resulted in a 

full satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim.” Greenleaf v. 

Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 357 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 

Frank v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. of W. Germany, 522 F.2d 321, 324-

26 (3d Cir. 1975)). Except in the particular circumstances of 

Brandt (i.e., where an earlier judgment has been formally marked 

satisfied on the docket), “[d]etermining whether a plaintiff has 

been fully satisfied through a settlement . . . involves a 

highly factually sensitive analysis of the circumstances of the 

prior settlement to see whether the satisfaction . . . 

represent[ed] the true value of the claim.” Id. (quoting Frank, 

522 F.2d at 326) (internal quotation marks omitted; second and 

third alterations in original). In that fact-specific analysis, 

“[t]he party asserting ‘one satisfaction[]’ . . . has the burden 

to provide the court with record evidence of the circumstances 

surrounding the settlement.” Id.

Finally, the policy rationales discussed in Brandt

counsel against marking the judgment against Mintz satisfied in 

this instance. Here, the codefendants’ decision to settle with 

Plaintiffs was presumably motivated at least in part by 

Plaintiffs’ agreement to mark the judgment against them 

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satisfied. Indeed, if the judgment were not marked satisfied, 

the settlements would be essentially meaningless, as the 

defendants could still be held responsible for any outstanding 

balance on the more than twelve million dollar judgment. The 

rule advocated by Mintz would therefore discourage, rather than 

encourage, settlement, and thus it conflicts with the primary 

rationale behind the Brandt holding.

In sum, because the rule and reasoning of Brandt do not 

apply to this case, Pennsylvania law places the burden on Mintz 

to show that the settlements at issue represent the true value 

of the claim – a burden he has made no attempt to meet. 

Therefore, even if Pennsylvania law were to apply, it does not 

support Mintz’s request for relief.

III. CONCLUSION

At base, Mintz is arguing for the adoption of a 

formalistic rule that any satisfaction of a judgment as to one 

jointly and severally liable defendant must automatically be 

deemed a satisfaction as to all. That rule has not been endorsed 

in Pennsylvania, by federal courts, or under the common law 

generally. Accordingly, although Mintz may be entitled to a 

reduction in the amount owed on the judgment, he is not entitled 

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to have the judgment against him marked satisfied.1 The Court 

will therefore deny his motion. An appropriate order follows. 

 

1 Because Mintz’s claims fail on the merits, the Court 

need not consider Plaintiffs’ argument that Mintz’s motion is 

untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c). 

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