COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-17-00109-CR

STEPHEN DAVIS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. F15-2152-16

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Stephen Davis appeals his conviction and his twenty-five-year 

sentence for intoxication assault.2 We affirm.

A grand jury indicted Davis for intoxication assault. The indictment alleged 

that while operating a car in a public place while intoxicated, he had crashed into 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.07(a) (West 2011).
2

a woman’s car and had caused her serious bodily injury. For sentenceenhancement purposes, the indictment also alleged that he had two prior felony 

convictions. 

At a jury trial, Davis pleaded not guilty. After considering the parties’ 

evidence and arguments, the jury found him guilty. The jury also found that he 

had used a deadly weapon—the car—while committing the offense. After 

hearing more evidence and arguments concerning Davis’s punishment, the jury 

assessed twenty-five years’ confinement.3 The trial court sentenced him 

accordingly, and he brought this appeal. 

Davis’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a 

brief under Anders v. California, representing that “any appeal . . . would be 

wholly frivolous.” 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s 

brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional 

evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds 

for relief. See id.; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 

 

3Davis pleaded true to the indictment’s sentence-enhancement allegations. 

His pleas of true, standing alone, were sufficient to support the enhancement of 

his sentencing range. See Wilson v. State, 671 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1984); see also Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

(reciting the general rule “that a plea of true to an enhancement paragraph 

relieves the State of its burden to prove a prior conviction alleged for 

enhancement and forfeits the defendant’s right to appeal the insufficiency of 

evidence to prove the prior conviction”). With Davis’s two prior felony 

convictions, the minimum sentence in the enhanced range was twenty-five years,

which is the punishment that the jury assessed. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2017).
3

2008) (orig. proceeding) (analyzing the effect of Anders). We gave Davis an 

opportunity to file a pro se response to counsel’s brief, and he did so. The State 

has not filed a brief.

Once an appellant's court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we 

must independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 

511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and Davis’s pro se 

response. We agree with counsel that this appeal is frivolous and without merit; 

we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See 

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also 

Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we 

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

WADE BIRDWELL

JUSTICE

PANEL: KERR, PITTMAN, and BIRDWELL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: April 12, 2018