IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Elke Plaxton :

:

v. :

:

Zoning Board of Adjustment and :

1903 Spring Garden Associates, LP :

: No. 438 C.D. 2018

Appeal of: Arthur and Elke Plaxton : Submitted: January 25, 2019

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: July 9, 2019

Arthur Plaxton (Mr. Plaxton) and Elke Plaxton (Mrs. Plaxton) 

(collectively, Objectors) appeal, pro se, from the Philadelphia County Common Pleas 

Court’s (trial court) February 22, 2018 order denying Objectors’ appeal and affirming 

the City of Philadelphia (City) Zoning Board of Adjustment’s (ZBA) April 25, 2017 

decision granting 1903 Spring Garden Associates, LP (Applicant) a use variance to 

park four vehicles in the rear yard of its property located at 1903 Spring Garden 

Street, Philadelphia (Property) and a dimensional variance from the Philadelphia

Zoning Code’s (Code) landscaping requirements. Objectors present three issues for 

this Court’s review: (1) whether the trial court erred by determining that Objectors 

lacked standing; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by applying the 

unclean hands doctrine; and (3) whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion 

by upholding the ZBA’s decision. 

In Plaxton v. Zoning Board of Adjustment (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 727 C.D. 

2015, filed June 13, 2016) (Plaxton I), this Court reversed the ZBA’s ruling that rear 

parking on Applicant’s property was permitted as of right, and granted Applicant a 
2

variance from the Code’s landscaping requirement due to Applicant’s inability to use 

the Property. This Court remanded the matter for the ZBA to determine whether 

Applicant is entitled to a variance for the proposed parking and, if so, whether a 

variance should be granted from the Code’s landscaping requirements.

On February 15 and March 22, 2017, the ZBA held remand hearings 

during which various witnesses testified in support of the variances. The witnesses 

described their concerns about the lack of parking in the neighborhood and explained 

that it was usual and customary for property owners to use rear yards for parking. 

See ZBA Decision at 3. Further,

Objectors testified that they had previously obtained zoning 

approval to alter the rear of their property to create a rear 

yard and that Objectors have been using this rear yard as 

space in which to park their vehicle for many years. Mrs. 

Plaxton testified that to pull their vehicle into their rear 

yard, they do not have to drive over anyone else’s property. 

However, Mrs. Plaxton claimed that, to pull out of the 

parking spaces Applicant seeks to use, cars have to 

‘trespass’ over her public sidewalk ([] which Objectors are 

legally obligated to maintain) and into her yard before they 

can drive away down Monterey Street. Moreover, Mrs.

Plaxton testified that the cars leave tire marks in her yard.

Mr. Plaxton also testified that the traffic in and out of 

Applicant’s proposed parking spaces has not caused the 

poor, cracking, and deteriorating condition of his sidewalks. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 4.

On April 25, 2017, the ZBA unanimously approved Applicant’s 

variances, allowing the Property’s rear yard area to be used for four parking spaces. 

On May 5, 2017, Objectors appealed to the trial court. On February 22, 2018, the 

trial court dismissed Objectors’ appeal because they lacked standing and were 
3

ineligible for equitable relief based on the doctrine of unclean hands.1 In dismissing 

the appeal, the trial court determined:

Objectors did not have standing to appeal from the [ZBA]’s

decision to the [trial court] because Objectors failed to 

demonstrate that they were ‘aggrieved’ persons. More 

specifically, Objectors failed to prove that the granting 

of the variances would have some discernible effect on 

some interest of the Objectors in a way that is greater 

than that of any other citizens. The credible evidence at 

the hearing indicated that vehicles entering or leaving 

Applicant’s proposed parking spaces would not trespass 

over Objectors’ property or affect it in any way.

The [ZBA] found [Applicant’s agent’s] testimony as 

credible and persuasive and accepted that cars entering or 

leaving Applicant’s proposed parking spaces would not 

trespass over Objectors’ property or effect it in any way.

Moreover, the [ZBA] found [Applicant’s agent’s] testimony 

consistent with the [City’s] Streets Department’s approval 

of the parking spaces. Indeed, Objectors even stated that to 

move vehicles into and out of their rear yard (which they, 

like the Applicant, use for parking), they do not have to 

drive over anyone else’s property. Mr. Plaxton[] even

stated that the cars entering or leaving Applicant’s proposed 

parking spaces had not and would not have any effect on 

the condition of Objectors’ sidewalk.

Thus, the variances did not harm any interest of Objectors 

in any way that was greater than any other citizen. As such, 

Objectors failed to demonstrate that they are ‘aggrieved’

persons with standing to appeal from the [ZBA]’s decision 

to the [trial court].

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8 (emphasis added; citations omitted). The trial court further 

reasoned:

Objectors were ineligible for equitable relief - in other

words, barred from objecting to the variances - based upon 

 

1 Because the trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing, it did not address the 

substantive questions pertaining to whether the ZBA properly granted the variances. 

Notwithstanding, the trial court affirmed the ZBA’s decision granting the variances.
4

the doctrine of unclean hands.[2] Both Objectors testified 

that, in 1986, they had previously obtained zoning approval 

to demolish a garage in the rear of their property and 

replace it with a rear yard. Objectors indicated in their 

[z]oning [a]pplication that the rear yard would not be used 

as ‘off-street parking’ as their drawing did not include such 

a label. However, both Objectors testified that, for many 

years, they have used this rear yard as a parking lot in 

which to park their vehicle. Objectors’ use of the rear yard 

as a parking lot is clearly contrary to and not permitted by 

the zoning approval they received in 1986.

Objectors cannot use the [Code] as both a sword and a 

shield. Objectors’ use of their rear yard as space for 

parking their vehicle in violation of the terms of their 

zoning approval while at the same time objecting to and 

appealing from the [ZBA]’s granting of a variance allowing 

accessory parking in the rear of Applicant’s Property is (1) 

bad faith conduct offending the moral sensibilities of the 

Judge, (2) related to the controversy at issue, (3) detrimental 

to the opposing party, and (4) affecting the balance of 

equities between the litigants.

Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Objectors appealed to this Court.3

Objectors first contend that the trial court erred by dismissing their 

appeal for lack of standing. Objectors assert that they have standing. In particular, 

they claim that the Property’s close proximity to their property, and the record 

testimony alleging visual impacts, trespass onto their property, and potential damage 

to their building, constitutes sufficient evidence of aggrievement. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

Zoning in the [City] is governed by the [] Code . . . , as well 

as the [First Class City] Home Rule Act, [(Home Rule Act), 

 

2

“The doctrine of unclean hands requires that one seeking equity act fairly and without 

fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.” Terraciano v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 753 A.2d 233, 237-38 (Pa. 2000).

3

“Where no additional evidence is taken by the trial court, our scope and standard of review 

is limited to determining whether the trial court and the zoning hearing board abused [their]

discretion or erred as a matter of law.” Laughman v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 964 A.2d 19, 22 n.3 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2008).
5

Act of April 21, 1949, P.L. 665, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 

13101-13157,] rather than the [Pennsylvania Municipalities 

Planning Code (]MPC[)4]. The [] Code, unlike the MPC, 

provides no definition of who is a party before the [ZBA]

and does not limit who may appear and participate in a 

zoning hearing. . . . [A]s this Court decided in Spahn [v. 

Zoning Board of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 2009)], 

the Home Rule Act defines who may appeal from the 

[ZBA] to the trial court.

Specifically, Section 17.1 of the Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. § 

13131.1, [added by Section 2 of the Act of November 30, 

2004, P.L. 1523,] provides standing in appeals from zoning 

matters in Philadelphia, as a city of the first class, to ‘any 

aggrieved person’ as follows:

In addition to any aggrieved person, the 

governing body vested with legislative powers 

under any charter adopted pursuant to this 

[Home Rule A]ct shall have standing to appeal 

any decision of [the ZBA] . . . . As used in this 

section, the term ‘aggrieved person’ does not 

include taxpayers of the [C]ity that are not 

detrimentally harmed by the decision of the 

[ZBA] . . . .

53 P.S. § 13131.1.

Scott v. City of Phila., Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 126 A.3d 938, 948 (Pa. 2015).

The law is well-established:

In order for an appellant to have standing to appeal a 

determination of the ZBA, they [sic] must demonstrate that 

they [sic] are [sic] an ‘aggrieved person.’ Spahn. For a 

party to be ‘aggrieved,’ the party must ‘show an interest 

that is substantial, direct, and immediate.’ Id. (citing 

William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, . . 

. 346 A.2d 269, 280 ([Pa.] 1975)). For an interest to qualify 

as ‘substantial, there must be some discernible effect on 

some interest other than the abstract interest all citizens 

have in the outcome of [the] proceedings.’ Id. at 1151; see 

also William Penn, 346 A.2d at 280-81 (noting that ‘it is not 

sufficient for the person claiming to be ‘aggrieved’ to assert 

 

4 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202.
6

the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience 

to the law’). . . . An interest is direct where the party 

demonstrates ‘some causation of harm to his interest.’

[Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1151]. In order for an interest to be 

considered ‘immediate, there must be a causal connection 

between the action complained of and the injury to the 

person challenging it.’ Id. Therefore, to meet the three 

requirements for an aggrieved party, the party must 

demonstrate that the challenged action personally harms his 

or her interest in a way that is greater than that of another 

citizen. Id. at 1151-52.

Armstead v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Phila., 115 A.3d 390, 396 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015). The Court expounded:

In Spahn, our Supreme Court consolidated three separate 

appeals from this Court involving, inter alia, standing in 

zoning cases and the constitutionality of Section 17.1 of the 

[Home Rule Act]. Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1136. In the first 

case, appellant Spahn appealed the ZBA’s granting of a 

dimensional variance of the [] Code’s open area 

requirements. Id. In examining whether Spahn had 

standing to pursue the appeal, this Court considered the fact 

that ‘[he] lived approximately one and a half blocks from 

the subject properties’ and that he ‘walked by the properties 

every day.’ Id. at 1138. This Court concluded that Spahn 

was not an aggrieved party because his ‘interest was no 

different from ‘the interest common to all citizens regarding 

obedience to the law.’’ Id. (quoting Spahn v. Zoning B[d.]

of Adjustment, 922 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)). On 

appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision, 

holding that because Spahn only made legal arguments 

against the variance and failed to establish he was 

‘aggrieved,’ he lacked standing. Id. at 1152.

In the third consolidated case in Spahn, the Society Created 

to Reduce Urban Blight (hereinafter ‘SCRUB’), several 

other organizations, and three individuals appealed the 

ZBA’s granting of a variance to Keystone Outdoor 

Advertising to erect a 2,400 square foot billboard. Id. at 

1139-40. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, on appeal to 

this Court, the individuals argued they had standing because 

they lived in the general area of the billboard. Soc[’]y 

Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB) v. Zoning 
7

Hearing B[d.] of Adjustment of City of Phila[.], 951 A.2d 

398, 403-04 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). We determined that 

‘the distance between [a protesting individual’s]

property interest and the property subject to the 

challenged zoning decision can be critical because 

proximity of the properties may be sufficient to establish 

a perceivable adverse impact.’ Id. at 404. Moreover, we 

concluded that ‘an adjoining property owner, who 

testifies in opposition to a zoning application before the 

[ZBA], has sufficient interest in the adjudication to have 

standing to appeal the [ZBA’s] decision to the trial 

court.’ Id. . . . On appeal, the Supreme Court reiterated 

our holding, concluding that because the individual 

[o]bjectors lived over a mile from the proposed billboard, 

they could not establish that they had standing as aggrieved 

parties. Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1152.

Armstead, 115 A.3d at 396-97 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Similarly, in 

Laughman v. Zoning Hearing Board of Newberry Township, 964 A.2d 19 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2009), this Court explained that “[g]enerally, in order to establish standing 

as an ‘aggrieved person,’ it must be shown that the person has a substantial, direct 

and immediate interest in the claim sought to be litigated[;]” notwithstanding, “a 

property owner need not establish pecuniary or financial loss if his property is

located in close proximity to the subject property because the zoning decision is 

presumed to have an effect on the property owner’s property.” Id. at 22

(emphasis added).5 Thus, “[t]he owner of property that is adjacent to or abuts the 

 

5 The Laughman Court explained:

Obviously, property that is adjacent to or abuts the zoning area in 

question is in close proximity for standing purposes. We have also 

held that the owner of property that is within 400 to 600 feet of the 

challenged zoning district is also within close proximity and has 

standing. However, the owners of property one-half mile and one 

mile or more away from the challenged zoning area have been 

deemed to not be in close proximity in order to confer standing on 

those challenging a change to the zoning ordinance or map.

Laughman, 964 A.2d at 22-23 (citations omitted).
8

property at issue is ‘aggrieved’ and has standing to appeal a [zoning] board decision.” 

Bradley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of New Milford, 63 A.3d 488, 491 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2013). 

In the instant matter, the trial court described Objectors’ property as “a 

five-apartment building located at 520 North 19[th] Street which is directly across 

from the rear of Applicant’s Property on the other side of Monterey Street.” Trial 

Ct. Op. at 3 (emphasis added). As this Court described in Plaxton I, “Monterey 

Street [is] a small street identified in Applicant’s site plan as approximately 6 feet, 8 

inches wide[.]” Plaxton I, slip op. at 2. The Property’s close proximity to Objectors’ 

property, coupled with Objectors’ testimony, establishes Objectors’ standing as 

aggrieved parties. Accordingly, the trial court erred by dismissing Objectors’ appeal 

for lack of standing.

Objectors also argue that the trial court erroneously applied the unclean 

hands doctrine. This Court acknowledges that “[a] court may deprive a party of 

equitable relief where, to the detriment of the other party, the party applying for such 

relief is guilty of bad conduct relating to the matter at issue.” Terraciano v. Dep’t of 

Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 753 A.2d 233, 237 (Pa. 2000) (emphasis 

added); see also N. Chester Cty. Sportsmen’s Club v. Muller, 174 A.3d 701, 707 n.3 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citation omitted) (“Under the doctrine of unclean hands, a court 

may deny equitable relief where the person seeking such relief acted unfairly or with 

fraud or deceit with respect to the matter at issue.”). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has emphasized:

The doctrine of unclean hands is

far more than a mere banalty. It is a selfimposed ordinance that closes the doors of a 

court of equity to one tainted with 

inequitableness or bad faith relative to the 

matter in which he seeks relief, however 
9

improper may have been the behavior of the 

defendant. That doctrine is rooted in the 

historical concept of court of equity as a 

vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the 

requirements of conscience and good faith. . . . 

Thus while ‘equity does not demand that its 

suitors shall have led blameless lives’ . . . as to 

other matters, it does require that they shall 

have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as 

to the controversy in issue. . . .

Shapiro v. Shapiro, . . . 204 A.2d 266, 268 ([Pa.] 1964), 

quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto[.] Maint[.]

Mach[.] Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 . . . (1945).

Jacobs v. Halloran, 710 A.2d 1098, 1103 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis added). 

However, “[i]t is a cornerstone principle in equity that when the 

legislature provides a statutory remedy, equity has no place. An action in equity 

cannot be used to adjudicate zoning questions. Thus, when the applicable zoning 

laws provide an adequate remedy, the law must be followed.” Borough of Trappe v. 

Longaker, 547 A.2d 1311, 1313 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (footnote and citations omitted). 

Here, Objectors filed a statutory appeal. Because the instant appeal is not an equity 

action, and the legislature established a statutory remedy, the equitable unclean hands 

doctrine cannot be used to bar Objectors from challenging the variances. 

Accordingly, the trial court erred by dismissing Objectors’ appeal on that basis.

Having concluded that Objectors had standing to appeal from the ZBA’s 

decision, this Court is constrained to remand the matter to the trial court to address 

the merits. See Soc’y Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB) v. Zoning Bd. of 

Adjustment, 729 A.2d 117, 122 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (having determined objectors 

have standing, “this case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the 

merits of [objectors’] appeal”); see also Walters v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the City of 

Easton, 125 A.3d 479, 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (having “conclude[d] that [the 

objector] possesses standing to appeal,” the case is remanded to the trial court); 
10

Borough of Brookhaven v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Borough of Brookhaven, 427 

A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (“We will reverse the decision on the motion to 

quash and remand the case for consideration of the merits of the variance grant.”).

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is reversed and the 

matter is remanded to the trial court.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Elke Plaxton :

:

v. :

:

Zoning Board of Adjustment and :

1903 Spring Garden Associates, LP :

: No. 438 C.D. 2018

Appeal of: Arthur and Elke Plaxton :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of July, 2019, the Philadelphia County 

Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) February 22, 2018 order is reversed and the 

matter is remanded to the trial court for a decision on the merits.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge