IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE :

COMPANY, :

: CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: NO. 05-281

COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE :

INSURANCE COMPANY, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

BUCKWALTER, S.J. January 20, 2011

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Nationwide Life Insurance Company’s

Motion in Limine to Exclude the expert report and testimony of Defendant Commonwealth Land

Title Insurance Company’s expert J. Bushnell Nielsen. For the following reasons, the Motion is

granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This long-pending case arose out of a title insurance policy issued by Defendant

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth”) to Plaintiff Nationwide Life

Insurance Company (“Nationwide”). According to the Complaint, a company by the name of PMI 1

Associates (“PMI”) originally purchased real property from Liberty Mills Limited Partnership

(“Liberty Mills”) in 1988. (Compl. ¶ 8.) At that time, PMI and Liberty Mills entered into a

Declaration of Restrictions (the “Declaration”), which gave Liberty Mills, in part, the right to refuse

approval of future purchasers of the Property and an option to repurchase the Property in certain

 For purposes of this Motion, the Court takes the allegations of the Complaint as true. 1
circumstances. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) 

In 2001, PMI took out a $3.5 million loan from Plaintiff Nationwide using the above

property as interest. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Nationwide, in turn, purchased a title insurance policy

(“Policy”) from Defendant Commonwealth, which contained what is known as an America Land

Title Association (“ALTA”) 9 Endorsement, covering Nationwide, among other things, against loss

or damage sustained by reason of:

Any instrument referred to in Schedule B as containing covenants, conditions or

restrictions on the land which, in addition, . . . (iv) provides for an option to

purchase, a right of first refusal or the prior approval of a future purchaser or

occupant.

(Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) PMI eventually defaulted on the balance of its loan in 2003 and, in lieu of

foreclosure proceedings, it conveyed the property to Nationwide by fee simple deed. (Id. ¶ 18.) In

an effort to recoup its losses, Nationwide attempted to sell the property to Ironwood Real Estate,

LLC (“Ironwood”), but was thwarted when Liberty Mills’s successor-in-interest, Franklin Mills

Associates Limited Partnership (“Franklin Mills”), invoked its rights under the Declaration and

refused to approve Ironwood as a buyer. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)

Thereafter, Nationwide submitted a claim for coverage to Commonwealth, alleging that

Franklin Mills’s rights of refusal were covered restrictions that made the property unusable and

unsalable. (Id. ¶¶ 22-24.) Commonwealth denied the claim on the ground that the Policy expressly

excepted coverage for loss resulting from the rights invoked by Franklin Mills. (Id. ¶ 25.) In light

of its disagreement with such a policy interpretation, Nationwide initiated a lawsuit against

Commonwealth in this Court. Commonwealth moved to dismiss and, on October 19, 2005, the

Court dismissed the case finding that, by listing the Declaration under the heading “exceptions from

coverage” in Schedule B of the Policy, the Policy “expressly excepted” any loss or damage arising

2
from the Declaration. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Commw. Land Title Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.05-281,

2005 WL 276492, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2005). Nationwide subsequently sought reconsideration,

arguing that the Court’s plain-language interpretation of the Policy was inconsistent with industry

custom and practice. The Court, however, rejected that claim and further held that Plaintiff

Nationwide bore the burden of proper diligence before issuing the mortgage to PMI. Nationwide

Life Ins. Co. v. Commw. Land Title Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 05-281, 2006 WL 1192998, at *3 (E.D.

Pa. May 3, 2006).

Nationwide appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Via

decision issued January 28, 2009, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the

case. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Commonw. Land Title Ins. Co., 579 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Specifically, the Appeals Court reinterpreted the insurance Policy considering not only the text of

the contract, but also its purpose and industry custom and practice. Doing so, it found that, “[t]o

except expressly from ALTA 9 Endorsement coverage a right of refusal or other restrictions noted

in paragraph 1(b)(2) of the Endorsement, an insurer must list those restrictions specifically in

Schedule B. It is not enough for the insurer merely to list in some part of Schedule B the document

in which the restrictions are embedded.” Id. It went on to hold that, “Commonwealth bore the

burden of detecting the restrictions stated in the Declaration, and had to list those restrictions

explicitly as exceptions to avoid covering loss from them.” Id. at 319.

Under Third Circuit mandate, the parties returned to this Court and Plaintiff filed a First

Amended Complaint on November 12, 2009. The parties have now proceeded through discovery

and filed dispositive motions. The Motion presently at issue reflects Plaintiff’s efforts to exclude

Defendant’s expert from either testifying or being considered by the Court during summary

3
judgment proceedings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court has explained that district court judges perform a “gatekeeping role”

with respect to expert testimony by assessing whether such testimony is admissible under Federal

Rule of Evidence 702. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-91, 597 (1993);

see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1999) (extending Daubert to

testimony about “technical or other specialized knowledge”) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Rule 702 provides as follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in

the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient

facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and

(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702. When the expert testimony at issue is not scientific, “the court must determine

whether the expert is qualified to provide such an opinion, whether the testimony assists the factfinder, whether the testimony is reliable and whether the testimony ‘fits’ the facts of the case.” D &

D Assoc., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Plainfield, 411 F. Supp. 2d 483, 487-88 (D.N.J. 2006), aff’d,

2006 WL 755984 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2006). 

The first requirement of qualification is interpreted liberally to encompass “a broad range of

knowledge, skills, and training.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994). 

At minimum, the expert “must possess skill or knowledge greater than the average layman.” Elcock

v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). The second factor of

reliability “means that the expert’s opinion must be based on the ‘methods and procedures of

science’ rather than on ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation’; the expert must have ‘good

4
grounds’ for his or her belief.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90). 

Finally, the requirement of “fit” concerns relevancy. “‘Expert testimony which does not relate to

any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.’” In re Unisys Savings Plan Litig., 173

F.3d 145, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Motion seeks to preclude the expert testimony of J. Bushnell Nielsen on multiple

grounds. First, according to Plaintiff, Mr. Nielsen’s report contradicts the Third Circuit’s mandate

in this case. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the language of the Policy is so clear and unambiguous

that expert testimony is irrelevant and unnecessary to assist with its meaning. Third, Plaintiff claims

that the report is unreliable because it is based solely on Mr. Nielsen’s own subjective belief and not

on any reliable methodology. Fourth, according to Plaintiff, Mr. Nielsen’s expert report was

untimely filed and should therefore be stricken. Fifth, Plaintiff avers that Commonwealth should be

judicially estopped from presenting any arguments or evidence that are incompatible with the

arguments Commonwealth originally relied upon to convince the Court to dismiss this action. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Nielsen offers only impermissible conclusions of law, which are

not admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.2

A. Whether Nielsen’s Testimony is Precluded by the Third Circuit’s Ruling

As a primary matter, Plaintiff contends that the conclusion contained in Mr. Nielsen’s report

is directly contradictory to the Third Circuit’s ruling on appeal in this case and, therefore, is barred

by the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine provides that “when a court decides

upon a rule of law, that rule should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the

 Plaintiff does not present its arguments in this order. For ease of discussion, however, the 2

Court has re-ordered the arguments.

5
litigation.” In the Matter of Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1281 (3d Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). 

In other words, “once an issue has been decided, parties may not relitigate that issue in the same

case.” Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 616 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998). With this well-established

proposition, however, comes the equally well-settled corollary that a trial court “may consider, as a

matter of first impression, those issues not expressly or implicitly disposed of by the appellate

decision.” Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 950 (3d Cir. 1985). Thus,

the trial court is “free to make any order or direction in further progress of the case, not inconsistent

with the decision of the appellate court, as to any question not settled by the decision.” Id.; see also

In re Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1282 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that issues raised but not reached on

a prior appeal are not within the law of the case doctrine.). Moreover, “[t]he doctrine does not apply

to dicta.” United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, Pa., 316 F.3d 392, 397 n.4 (3d

Cir. 2003).

A detailed review of the present case’s procedural background reveals the law of the case

doctrine to be inapplicable to Mr. Nielsen’s expert report. As noted above, the entire dispute in this

matter centers upon interpretation of the ALTA 9 Endorsement to the Policy issued to Plaintiff. 

That Endorsement states:

The Company [Commonwealth] insures the owner of the indebtedness secured by

the insured mortgage against loss or damage sustained by reason of:

1. The existence at Date of Policy of any of the following:

(a) Covenants, conditions or restrictions under which the lien of the

mortgage referred to in Schedule A can be divested, subordinated or

extinguished, or its validity priority or enforceability.

(b) Unless expressly excepted in Schedule B

. . .

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(2) Any instrument referred to Schedule B as containing covenants,

conditions or restrictions on the land which, in addition, . . . provides

for an option to purchase, a right of first refusal or the prior approval

of a future purchaser or occupant.

(Compl., Ex. A, Title Insurance Policy Between Nationwide Life Insurance Company and

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Policy”), at ALTA 9 Endorsement.) In its

Motion to Dismiss and again on appeal to the Third Circuit, Commonwealth argued that loss

arising from the Declaration between PMI and Liberty Mills was expressly excepted in Schedule B3

and, therefore, not covered by the additional assurance of paragraph 1(b)(2) of the ALTA 9

Endorsement. Via an alternative argument, it contended that Liberty Mills’s invocation of its rights

under the Declaration were use restrictions, not prior-approval-of-future-purchaser restrictions,

thereby making the ALTA 9 Endorsement inapplicable.

When granting the Motion to Dismiss, this Court focused entirely on Commonwealth’s first

argument and determined that, based on a plain language reading of the contract, the restrictions

contained in the Declaration had been “expressly excepted” from coverage. Nationwide, 2005 WL

 Schedule B, Part I provides, in pertinent part: 3

SCHEDULE B

EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE

. . .

PART I

. . .

This policy does not insure against loss or damage . . . which arise by reason of

. . . 

Declaration of Restrictions between Liberty Mills Limited Partnership and PMI

Associates dated August 14, 1998.

(Policy at Schedule B)

7
 2716492, at *7. On appeal, the Third Circuit likewise limited the issue before it to “what a title

insurer must do to except restrictions from coverage under a specific endorsement to the policy.” 

Nationwide, 579 F.3d at 306. Answering this inquiry, the Court of Appeals held that:

To except expressly from ALTA 9 Endorsement coverage a right of refusal or other

restrictions noted in paragraph 1(b)(2) of the Endorsement, an insurer must list those

restrictions specifically in Schedule B. It is not enough for the insurer merely to list

in some part of Schedule B the document in which the restrictions are embedded. 

Commonwealth thus failed to “expressly except[]” from ALTA 9 Endorsement

coverage loss from the restrictions contained in the Declaration, and should cover

Nationwide’s claim.

Id. at 317. It concluded that, “Commonwealth bore the burden of detecting the restrictions stated in

the Declaration, and had to list those restrictions explicitly as exceptions to avoid covering loss

from them.” Id. at 319.

In stark contrast to the Third Circuit’s ruling, Nielsen’s expert report engages in no

discussion of the meaning of “expressly excepted” and provides no opinion as to whether

Commonwealth expressly excepted from the ALTA 9 Endorsement coverage the restrictions

contained in the Declaration. Rather, he returns to Commonwealth’s alternative argument

presented in its Motion to Dismiss – one not ruled upon by the prior court decisions – and interprets

the language of the Endorsement, which references “[a]ny instrument referred to Schedule B as

containing covenants, conditions or restrictions on the land which, in addition, . . . provides for an

option to purchase, a right of first refusal or the prior approval of a future purchaser or occupant.”

(Policy at ALTA 9 Endorsement.) Upon reviewing applicable case law and custom and trade

practice, he opines that, “paragraph 1(b)(2)’s reference to an option to purchase, right of first refusal

or right to approve a purchaser or occupant is a reference to restraints on alienation that are not use

restrictions. This assurance of the ALTA 9 Endorsement indemnifies the insured against loss

8
suffered due to the existence of any such rights that are ‘in addition’ to the use restrictions excepted

in Schedule B.” (Pl.’s Mot. in Limine, Ex. A (“Nielsen Report”), 11-12.) In other words, Mr.

Nielsen concludes that the ALTA 9 Endorsement does not provide coverage for losses due to the

use restrictions invoked by Liberty Mills. Such an opinion does not touch upon, let alone

contradict, any portion of the Third Circuit’s holding.

Plaintiff nonetheless contends that, despite the Third Circuit’s carefully confined ruling, the

Court expressly addressed and rejected this attempted distinction between prior-approval-of-future

restrictions and use restrictions. Specifically, Plaintiff cites to the Court’s statement that:

Because Franklin Mills based its refusal on the Declaration’s restrictions,

Commonwealth’s calling them another name – use restrictions rather than a priorapproval-of-future-purchaser restriction or some other right of refusal . . . – is

irrelevant. Though we need not decide whether use restrictions necessarily are

restrictions on the approval of future purchasers of property, they are deemed so here

because that is the practical effect of Franklin Mill’s actions in this case. (In any

event, use restrictions are, like prior-approval-of-future purchaser restrictions,

among the important items of information lenders and owners seek in obtaining title

insurance policies.)

Id. at 306 n.3.

The Third Circuit’s commentary on this argument, however, was nothing more than dicta,

as evidenced by several factors. First, the discussion took place in a footnote inserted within the

“Factual and Procedural Background” section of the opinion, not within the body of the opinion or

even under the “Discussion” section. Id. Second, the Third Circuit’s statement that it “need not

decide whether use restrictions necessarily are restrictions on the approval of future purchasers of

property” clearly indicated that it was not including this opinion in its holding or mandate. Finally,

had the Third Circuit intended for this statement to become controlling, it would have necessarily

found that Plaintiff was entitled to coverage and remanded the matter only for a calculation of

9
benefits. It did not do so. Rather, it remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 

Id. at 319. Accordingly, the Court declines to find that this footnote constitutes the law of the case

that now binds the Court and the parties as to the issue of whether the restriction invoked by Liberty

Mills was covered by the ALTA 9 Endorsement.

In short, nothing in the Third Circuit’s opinion suggests that it, either implicitly or

expressly, disposed of the issue opined upon by Mr. Nielsen. The Third Circuit’s remarks on this

issue are, by its own description, nothing more than dicta to which the law of the case doctrine does

not apply. United Artists, 316 F.3d at 397 n.4. Accordingly, because no prior ruling on the issue

binds the parties, Defendant’s expert report does not violate the law of the case.

B. Whether the Language of the Policy Is So Clear as to Not Require Expert

Testimony

Alternatively, Plaintiff asserts that the unambiguous language of the ALTA 9 Endorsement

that Mr. Nielsen interprets is not properly the subject of expert testimony. It explains that a basic

reading of the plain language of the Endorsement offers an unequivocal meaning: “if an instrument

on Schedule B of the Title Policy is referred to as containing conditions, covenants or restrictions,

and, in addition that instrument provides for (i) an easement, (ii) a lien for liquidated damages, (iii)

a private charge or assessment, or (iv) an option to purchase, a right of first refusal or a right to

approve a future purchaser or occupant, then Commonwealth has insured Nationwide for damages

caused by such an instrument.” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. in Limine 4.) Because such an

unambiguous contract is not subject to reinterpretation by extraneous expert evidence, Plaintiff

contends that the Nielsen report must be stricken from the record.

Plaintiff’s argument, however, misconstrues the applicable law. Under Pennsylvania

10
jurisprudence, the court must “ascertain the intent of the parties by reading the policy as a whole,

and . . . give unambiguous terms their plain meaning.” Nationwide, 579 F.3d at 307-08 (citing

Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 375-76 (3d Cir. 2001); J.C.

Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2004)). The court must, however, also

consider evidence of industry custom and practice. Id. at 308 (citing Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2001)). Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held

that trade usage must always be considered in interpreting a contract, regardless of whether a phrase

is ambiguous. Sunbeam, 781 A.2d at 1193 (“In the law of contracts, custom in the industry or

usage in the trade is always relevant and admissible in construing commercial contracts and does

not depend on any obvious ambiguity in the words of the contract.”). As the Court explained, “[i]f

words have a special meaning or usage in a particular industry, then members of that industry are

presumed to use the words in that special way, whatever the words mean in common usage and

regardless of whether there appears to be any ambiguity in the words.” Id.; see also Lititz Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Steely, 785 A.2d 975, 982 n.12 (Pa. 2001) (“Once such custom or usage is established . . ., it

will be considered part of the contract, the presumption being that the contracting parties knew of

such custom or usage and contracted with reference to it.”); Simon Wrecking Co., Inc. v. AIU Ins.

Co., 530 F. Supp. 2d 706, 713-14 (E.D. Pa. 2008). In other words, even absent an ambiguity, a

court may consider evidence of custom in the industry or usage in the trade. Swiss Reins. Am.

Corp. v. Airport Indus. Park, Inc., 325 Fed. Appx. 59, 65 (3d Cir. 2009); USX Corp. v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 444 F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 888 (2006); see also AstenJohnson,

Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 562 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Parol evidence cannot be used to

contradict the provisions of such a contract. In determining whether such a contradiction would

11
occur, however, the text of the contract must first be interpreted in light of any evidence of trade

usage and the performance of the parties under the contract.”); see also PA. CONS. STAT § 2202

(“Terms . . . which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression

of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein . . . may be explained or

supplemented . . . (1) by course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade (section

1303).”)

In the present case, the parties dispute the precise meaning of the phrase “covenants,

conditions or restrictions on the land” as contained in the ALTA 9 Endorsement. Pennsylvania law

clearly allows for consideration of trade usage and custom to interpret that Policy language and

determine whether it has a particular meaning within the land title industry. Mr. Nielsen’s Report is

directed to that custom and practice and, more precisely, to the meaning of the term “covenants,

conditions or restrictions on the land” in connection with a right of first refusal. Thus, it is relevant

for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

C. Whether Mr. Nielsen’s Conclusion Are Reliable or Based Only on Subjective

Belief

Plaintiff next argues that Mr. Nielsen’s report should be excluded because it is based solely

on subjective belief and unsupported opinion. Plaintiff specifically contends that Nielsen’s

limitation of the phrase “covenants, conditions or restrictions” found in the ALTA 9 Endorsement

finds no basis either in the expert report or its attachments; rather “[i]t is simply plucked out of thin

air.” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. in Limine 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff suggests that Mr. Nielsen “offers no

methodology, reliable or otherwise, to support th[e] peculiar proposition” that “easements, liens for

liquidated damages, private charges, private assessments, purchase options, rights of first refusal,

12
rights to approve a future purchaser and rights to approve a future occupant . . . cannot be

covenants, conditions or restrictions.” (Id.) Plaintiff concludes that “[g]iven that Mr. Nielsen’s

opinions contradict applicable law, his methods cannot possibly be reliable.” (Id. at 9.)

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a “usage of trade” as “having such regularity

of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with

respect to [a particular agreement].” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1); see also 13

PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303(c). “[T]o be an interpretation aid, trade usage evidence need not

demonstrate that a particular term always carries a particular meaning or that the particular meaning

claimed cannot be otherwise stated.” AstenJohnson, 562 F.3d at 222. The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has held that, “[w]here terms are used in a contract which are known and understood by a

particular class of persons in a certain special or peculiar sense, evidence to that effect is admissible

for the purpose of applying the instrument to its proper subject matter.” Resolution Trust Corp. v.

Urban Redev. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 638 A.2d 972, 975 (Pa. 1994). In such cases, “the emphasis is

placed not on the methodology of the expert testimony, but on the professional and personal

experience of the witness.” Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (D.N.J. 2004) (citing

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). The methodology of proffered nonscientific testimony need not be

subjected to rigorous testing for scientific foundation or peer review. Id.

In the present matter, Mr. Nielsen is, despite Plaintiff’s protestations to the contrary, clearly

well-qualified to opine on custom and trade usage within the land title insurance industry. He has

twenty-nine years of work experience in that industry. (Nielsen Report 12.) During sixteen of

those years, he was employed with two title insurance companies for whom he examined and issued

title insurance commitments, served as chief underwriting counsel in two states, was the regional

13
claims counsel for nine states, and acted as a state operations manager. (Id. at 12.) In the

remaining thirteen years of his land title insurance experience, Mr. Nielsen worked in private legal

practice, engaged almost exclusively on matters involving title insurance, real estate titles, and

conveyancing issues. (Id.) Beyond his work experience, he has conducted at least 200 training

seminars and was the past president of both the Michigan Land Title Association and the Wisconsin

Land Title Association. (Id.) Further, he is a member by invitation of the America College of Real

Estate Lawyers and has assisted in the drafting of several Wisconsin laws concerning real estate

conveyancing. (Id.) Finally, Mr. Nielsen is the author of a 1,400 page treatise on title and escrow

claims, which is used by employees of every major title insurer in the United States, and, since

1998, has been the editor of The Title Insurance Law Newsletter. (Id.) Such an extensive

background in the land title insurance industry unequivocally puts Mr. Nielsen in the particular

class of persons who could testify as to the custom and trade usage of certain terms used within title

insurance policies. No further “methodology” for his opinions is necessary.

4

Plaintiff also contends that Mr. Nielsen’s theories conflict with long-established

Pennsylvania law, meaning that “his methods cannot possibly be reliable.” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot.

in Limine 9.) It goes on to cite to several Pennsylvania cases purportedly showing that the terms

“covenants,” “conditions,” and “restrictions” are used interchangeably to refer to a wide variety of

 Plaintiff emphasizes the fact that an expert report authored by Mr. Nielsen was excluded in a 4

different case because it contained legal conclusions and failed to provide any support for the

conclusions reached. See Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. of NY v. Intercounty Nat’l Title Ins. Co.,

No. CIV.A.00-5658, 2001 WL 789218, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 12, 2001). Mr. Nielsen’s report in

that case, however, was on an entirely different subject area, i.e. the legal requirements for

depositing and delivering escrow money, the liability of title agencies and underwriters, and

defining the fiduciary duty an escrowee has to principals. Id. at *2. Plaintiff has not made any

showing that the report in that matter is at all comparable to the one at issue in this matter.

14
real estate encumbrances. (Id. at 8-9 (citing Central Delaware County Auth. v. Greyhound Corp.,

588 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Pa. 1991); Tohida v. Gelbert Improvement Co., et al., 58 Pa. D. & C. 321,

323 (1946); Kaufman v. Bergert, 45 A. 725, 725 (Pa. 1900); Barton v. Thaw, 92 A. 312 (Pa.

1914)).) Notably, however, Mr. Nielsen also cites an ample number of authorities – both legal and

industry-based – in support of his opinion. (Nielsen Report 6-11.) The mere existence of such

conflicting sources does not require the exclusion of Mr. Nielsen’s opinion. Rather, if an expert’s

testimony “rests upon ‘good grounds . . .’ it should be tested by the adversary process – competing

expert testimony and active cross-examination – rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear

that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” United States v.

Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted); see also Keller v. Feasterville

Family Health Ctr., 557 F. Supp. 2d 671, 678 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (where expert’s methodology in

formulating opinion is reliable, any weaknesses or inadequacies can be highlighted through

effective cross-examination).5

In short, the Court deems Mr. Nielsen’s report to be sufficiently reliable to survive Rule 702

scrutiny. Moreover, and without question, the proffered testimony is particularly relevant to the

issue before the Court. Accordingly, the Court declines to exclude it on this ground.

D. Whether Mr. Nielsen’s Report Was Untimely

Plaintiff next seeks exclusion of Mr. Nielsen’s report on the basis that it was not timely

 Plaintiff suggests that Mr. Nielsen’s report contradicts the Third Circuit’s opinion, wherein it 5

found that the term “restrictions” included “defects in title, liens, easements, encumbrances,

conditions, and covenants (such as the rights at issue in this case) affecting the insured

property.” Nationwide, 579 F.3d at 308 (emphasis added). Notably, however, this statement was

irrelevant to the ultimate holding of the opinion, was made in a footnote, and, most importantly,

was expressly made only “[f]or purposes of [the] opinion.” Id. Such dicta, as noted above,

cannot constitute the law of the case.

15
submitted. Specifically, Plaintiff offers the following conclusory argument:

In accordance with this Court’s scheduling orders and the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, expert reports were due August 17, 2010. F.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2). Mr.

Nielsen’s Report was not served until September 3, 2010. The Report was therefore

untimely. Mr. Nielsen’s Report should be struck and his testimony barred.

(Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. in Limine 9.)

According to the exhibits submitted by Defendant, however, some confusion existed

between the parties’ counsel as to when expert reports were due. The Court’s original January 21,

2010 Order set discovery to be completed by July 30, 2010, and indicated that the case would be

placed in the trial pool on August 30, 2010. (Court Order January 21, 2010.) Thereafter, on July 6,

2010, the Court extended deadlines so that discovery was to close on September 13, 2010,

dispositive motions would be filed by September 18, 2010, and the case would be placed in the trial

pool on October 14, 2010. (Court Order July 6, 2010). Finally, on August 31, 2010, the dispositive

motion deadline was extended to October 18, 2010, with the trial pool date set for November 15,

2010. (Court Order Aug. 31, 2010.) Pursuant to this latest order, and under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(a)(2)(D), expert reports were thus required to be submitted by August 17, 2010. 6

 This Rule states as follows: 6

Time to Disclose Expert Testimony. A party must make these disclosures at the

times and in the sequence that the court orders. Absent a stipulation or a court

order, the disclosures must be made: 

(i) at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial; or 

(ii) if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject

matter identified by another party under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C), within 30 days after the

other party’s disclosure. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(2)(D) (emphasis added).

16
On September 2, 2010, counsel for Defendant sent the following e-mail to Plaintiff’s

counsel:

Just confirming two things: (1) continuation of NW30(b)(6) set for 9/20 at your

office at 10:00; (2) we have agreed that since things are, due to scheduling,

happening after discovery deadline, neither of us objects to that and expert reports as

well, so long as they are disclosed by end of September or so, will not be

objectionable.

Thanks and have a good holiday weekend. You’ll have our first report by mail tomorrow.

(Def.’s Resp. Mot. in Limine, Ex. D-1.) The following day, Defendant delivered a copy of

Nielsen’s report to Plaintiff’s counsel. Approximately five weeks later, however, counsel for

Plaintiff responded to this e-mail, as follows:

I was cleaning up my files today and noticed that I had not responded to this email. 

Obviously we finished the 30(b)(6) on September 20 . My understanding with th

regard to expert was that we would produce them for depositions after the deadline

if either of us requested. I never agreed that reports produced after discovery was

closed were timely. My understanding is that we reserved all objections.

(Id. Ex. D-2.) In light of this belated e-mail, counsel for both sides engaged in another e-mail

exchange, on October 11, 2010, with each party expressing a different view of the “agreement”

between them as to the production of expert reports. (Id. Exs. D-3, D-4.) Plaintiff’s Motion in

Limine was filed four days later.

Irrespective of the parties’ actual agreement, the Court now sees no reason to strike Mr.

Nielsen’s report as untimely. First, Defendant’s counsel was under a reasonable belief that he had

until the end of September to file the expert report, as evidenced by his September 2, 2010 e-mail. 

While Plaintiff’s counsel had, in fact, read Defendant’s e-mail on September 2nd, (see id. Ex. D-4),

he failed to apprise opposing counsel of any purported or imagined error until five weeks later. At

that time, it was far too late for Defendant to seek leave of Court to amend the deadlines so as to

17
timely file its expert report. Second, although Defense counsel believed it had until the end of

September to provide the report, counsel submitted it on September 3, 2010, only sixteen days after

the official Court deadline. Such a delay is far from gross or undue. Finally, Plaintiff points to –

and this Court can find – no prejudice to Defendant resulting from the delay, particularly in light of

the fact that Plaintiff has been able to prepare a rebuttal expert report. See Chase Manhattan Mortg.

Corp. v. Advanta Corp., No. CIV.A.01-507, 2004 WL 422681, at *10 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2004) (“The

touchstone for determining whether to exclude untimely expert reports is whether the party

opposing their admission is prejudiced.”) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 791

(3d Cir. 1994). As such, the Court rejects this portion of Plaintiff’s Motion.

E. Whether Commonwealth’s Arguments Should Be Judicially Estopped by

Incompatible Arguments Defendant Used in Its Earlier Motion to Dismiss

In a fifth effort to exclude Mr. Nielsen’s report, Plaintiff argues that Defendant should be

judicially estopped from using the report, or otherwise presenting arguments or evidence, that are

incompatible with Defendant’s initial arguments used to deny coverage. This doctrine of judicial

estoppel states that “‘where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds

in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed,

assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the

position formerly taken by him.’” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting

Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)); see also In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d

507, 517 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Judicial estoppel can be applied when a party asserts a certain position in

a legal proceeding and prevails, only to assert a contrary position later on because of changed

interests.”). Judicial estoppel bars a party’s argument only when “(1) the party to be estopped is

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asserting a position that is irreconcilably inconsistent with one he or she asserted in a prior

proceeding; (2) the party changed his or her position in bad faith, i.e., in a culpable manner

threatening to the court’s authority or integrity; and (3) the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to

address the affront to the court’s authority or integrity.” Montrose Med. Group Participating Sav.

Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 777-78 (3d Cir. 2001). Notably, “[i]t is not intended to eliminate all

inconsistencies, however slight or inadvertent; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from

playing fast and loose with the courts.” In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 229 (3d Cir.

1998). Indeed, an inconsistent position alone does not trigger the doctrine,

unless intentional self-contradiction is used as a means of obtaining unfair

advantage. Thus, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply when the prior

position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to

mislead the court. An inconsistent argument sufficient to invoke judicial estoppel

must be attributable to intentional wrongdoing.

Chambers, 148 F.3d at 229 (quoting Ryan Operations, G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81

F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Plaintiff contends that, through the attachments to the report, Defendant has tacitly admitted

that Nationwide’s original interpretation of the Policy – i.e., that exceptions to the Policy must be

specifically listed in Schedule B – was correct. Moreover, it claims that to the extent the ultimate

purpose of Nielsen’s report is to set the stage for Commonwealth to argue that it was not required

to list “use restrictions” on Schedule B, this argument is “entirely incompatible” with

Commonwealth’s earlier argument that no restrictions are required to be listed on Schedule B. 

(Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. in Limine 13.) Accordingly, it claims that “Commonwealth should be

estopped not only from using Mr. Nielsen’s testimony and his Report, but also from offering any

evidence or arguments to define, characterize, minimize or classify those matters from paragraph

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1(b)(2) that must be listed on Schedule B.” Id.

This argument fails to establish the two crucial elements of judicial estoppel. First, nothing

in the record shows that Defendant has asserted inconsistent positions. In its Motion to Dismiss,

Defendant claimed that the ALTA 9 Endorsement was not triggered because the Declaration was

“expressly excepted” by Schedule B of the Policy. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 4-5.) Although this Court

initially agreed with Defendant as to its interpretation of the phrase “expressly excepted,” the Third

Circuit conclusively ruled to the contrary. This decision left Defendant with its second argument,

raised via a footnote in the Motion to Dismiss, that the ALTA 9 Endorsement only indemnifies the

insured against loss suffered due to restraints on alienation that are not use restrictions, unlike those

in the subject Declaration. This argument, which is at the very foundation of Mr. Nielsen’s report,

is not at odds with any previous contention made by Defendant.

Plaintiff’s current claim is nothing more than a criticism of Defendant’s original

interpretation of the Policy and an assertion that Defendant’s expert has now proven that

interpretation to be incorrect. Crucially, however, both Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

Plaintiff’s response were premised on a plain-meaning interpretation of the Policy language. Since

the Third Circuit’s ruling, which also looked at custom and trade usage, Defendant has undertaken

further research and engaged an expert, which has shown that some industry usage of the phrase

“expressly excepted” is, in fact, inconsistent with Defendant’s initial plain-language interpretation. 

As noted by Defendant, “there was no logical reason for Commonwealth to look into third-party or

other extrinsic evidence to see if that plain meaning were incorrect prior to Nationwide’s appeal of

this court’s grant of the motion to dismiss.” (Def.’s Resp. Mot. in Limine 14.) As a matter of

necessity, Defendant has now adopted the interpretation mandated by the Third Circuit, and moved

20
on to its alternative argument that the restrictions included in the Declaration were not brought into

coverage by the ALTA 9 Endorsement. Certainly, there is no inconsistency in such an argument.

Likewise, the second crucial element for invoking judicial estoppel – bad faith by the party

to be estopped – is absent in this matter. Even if the Court could find the existence of inconsistent

positions, no evidence establishes that Defendant asserted such positions in bad faith. Rather,

Defendant set forth what it believed to be the plain meaning of the Policy – an interpretation with

which this Court concurred. When the Third Circuit took the opposite stance, Defendant had no

choice but to accept that interpretation and proceed with a different argument. The mere facts that

some newfound external sources lend support to Plaintiff’s original interpretation of the Policy and

that Defendant’s expert cites those sources to bolster his interpretation of the ALTA 9 Endorsement

does not mean that Defendant acted with any “intent to play fast and loose with the court.” Ryan,

81 F.3d at 361. As Plaintiff has not come forward with any showing of a “scheme” by Defendant

“to mislead the court,” judicial estoppel does not preclude Defendant from presenting its present

arguments.

F. Whether Nielsen is Offering Only an Inadmissible Conclusion of Law

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Nielsen’s report is inadmissible because he attempts to

define the meaning of the Title Policy which is clearly a conclusion of law. Under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 704, an expert may provide an opinion that embraces an ultimate issue to be

decided by the trier of fact. FED. R. EVID. 704. Nonetheless, “[t]he district court must limit expert

testimony so as to not allow experts to opine on ‘what the law required’ or ‘testify as to the

governing law.’” Casper v. SMG, 389 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (D.N.J. 2005) (quoting U.S. v. Leo,

941 F.2d 181, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1991)). “[T]he purpose of the rule excluding expert opinions on

21
legal issues is to avoid confusing the jury or usurping the role of the judge in instructing the jury on

the relevant law.” Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 424 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 (D.N.J. 2006). 

Thus, when an expert purports to testify as to the ultimate legal issue, that testimony is not

admissible and should not be considered on summary judgment. See, e.g., Casper, 389 F. Supp. 2d

at 621 (expert’s report relying on case law and statutes, and applying them to the evidence of record

constituted an impermissible conclusion of law); Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd.

Defined Ben. Plan and Trust Agreement, 812 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that

proposed expert testimony as to propriety of employer’s requiring employee to sign general release

as condition of receiving pension benefits would take form of opinion on question of law and, thus,

was inadmissible).

Notably, however, when the expert report concerns customs and practices of a particular

industry, “the line between admissible and inadmissible expert testimony . . . often becomes

blurred.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 218 (3d Cir. 2006). It is well-settled

that expert testimony regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy is impermissible. Smith v.

Cont’l Cas. Co., No. CIV.A.07-1214, 2008 WL 4462120, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008), aff’d,

347 Fed. Appx. 812 (3d Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit, however, has recognized that parties

working in specialized fields “may understand the argot of their business and see no need to define

terms. They may be able to juggle multiple meanings of a term, with no need for explanation.” 

Swiss Reins. Am Corp., 325 Fed. Appx. at 65. For the court or factfinder to understand what is

meant by a specific insurance contract term, evidence of custom and usage may well be of

assistance. Id. Such “‘evidence of trade practice and custom does not trump other canons of

contract interpretation, but rather cooperates with them.’” Keegan v. Steamfitters Local Union No.

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420 Pension Plan, 67 Fed. Appx. 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Metric Constructors, Inc. v.

Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 169 F.3d 747, 753 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To that end, numerous

courts, both within and outside of the Third Circuit, have permitted expert testimony as to custom

and practice as to the meaning of a particular contract term within an insurance policy, so long as

the expert’s testimony does not venture into the realm of purely legal contract construction or

interpretation. See, e.g., First Nat’l State Bank of NJ v . Reliance Elec. Co., 668 F.2d 725, 731 (3d

Cir. 1981) (affirming use of expert testimony as to customs in the banking industry, even in the face

of an unambiguous contract); Manhattan Re-Ins. Co. v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 83 Fed Appx. 861,

863 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that expert testimony about insurance industry contract drafting custom

and practice was admissible so long as expert “did not improperly testify about the legal

interpretation of contract clauses”); Smith, 2008 WL 4462120, at *1 (recognizing that expert

testimony as to industry customs and practice may be helpful so long as expert does not engage in

legal construction of insurance policy terms); Simon Wrecking Co., 530 F. Supp. 2d at 715-16

(considering expert testimony regarding custom and trade usage of term “sudden and accidental” in

insurance policy); N. River Ins. Co. v. Employers Reins. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 972, 990-91 (S.D.

Oh. 2002) (permitting expert testimony as to the custom, usage, or practice in the American

reinsurance market as to the “follow the fortunes” doctrine).

In the present case Mr. Nielsen’s report presents a combination of proper testimony as to

custom and practice within the title insurance industry and an improper statement of the legal

definition of various terms set forth in treatises, cases, and statutes. To the extent that Mr. Nielsen

testifies as to his understanding of industry custom and practice as to (1) how title insurers classify

transfer restrictions and use restrictions and (2) what the term “covenants, conditions or restrictions

23
on the land” refers to in the ALTA 9 Endorsement (sections III and IV of Nielsen’s report under the

“Opinions” section), the Court finds his report admissible and useful in understanding the industry

usage of these terms. To reach his conclusions, Mr. Nielsen spends ample time referencing his own

experience, title insurers’ underwriting manuals, bulletins, articles by leading title insurers, leading

treatises, and the general practice of underwriting employees. See Robert Billet Promotions, Inc. v.

IMI Cornelius, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-1376, 1998 WL 151806, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1998) (noting

that expert’s interview of industry people, review of industry documents and accounting rules, and

consideration of industry treatises constituted an appropriate methodology upon which businessmen

and accountants would rely in the ordinary course of their trades). Although he also makes

reference to some legal sources, his report “does not reach what the law requires, but rather, touches

upon what a person familiar with the custom of the insurance industry would believe to be the

impact of the law upon the business.” Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 424 F. Supp. 2d 781,

793 (D.N.J. 2006). Accordingly, the Court deems these portions of his report admissible.

Mr. Nielsen, however, also goes on to define purchaser approval rights as direct restraints

on alienation, and use restrictions as encumbrances on title and indirect restraints on alienation

(sections I and II of the report under the “Opinions” section). In doing so, he references none of the

aforementioned sources, but rather turns almost exclusively to legal sources such as the

Restatement, Pennsylvania state legal journals, and case law. Such conclusions as to legal

definitions are not the proper subject of competing expert opinions, but rather are more

appropriately arguments among lawyers, with the ultimate conclusions being left to the courts. See

Crink v. People’s Benefit Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.04-1068, 2005 WL 730688, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar.

29, 2005) (finding that expert’s report was inadmissible because it was “littered with impermissible

24
legal conclusions on the issue of contract construction.”); GallatinFuels, Inc. v. Westchester Fire

Ins. Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420-21 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that expert’s opinion on the

application of the insurance policy to plaintiff’s loss are impermissible legal conclusions because

expert’s “opinions on the issue of contract construction would not assist the jury in understanding

coverage,” and are “based solely on [expert]’s subjective interpretation of the policy language”). 

While the Court recognizes that these portions of the report are used to provide context for his later

opinions, the dictates of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 do not allow him to place a stamp of

expertise on such definitions.

To that end, the Court now reaches a two-fold finding as to the admissibility of Mr.

Nielsen’s expert report. Mr. Nielsen’s interpretation of the various legal documents as to the

classification and definition of both (1) “direct” restraints on alienation and (2) indirect restraints on

alienation/use restrictions are not admissible because they usurp the legal interpretive ability of the

court. As such, these portions of the report (sections I and II under “Opinions”) will be stricken and

not considered in connection with the pending cross-motions for summary judgment. To the

extent, however, that Mr. Nielsen discusses title insurance industry practice and customs and

whether the reference, in the ALTA 9 Endorsement, to “covenants, conditions or restrictions on the

land” generally refers to restraints on alienation that are not use restrictions (sections III and IV

under “Opinions”), the Court will take those reports into consideration during summary judgment

proceedings.7

 This bifurcated approach to the Motion in Limine is a remedy commonly used in these types of 7

motions. See Brill v. Marandol, 540 F. Supp. 2d 563, 568-71 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (legal conclusions

by expert were not admissible, but conclusions based on industry custom and practice would be

admissible); Smith, 2008 WL 4462120 at *1-2 (holding that expert report regarding legal

conclusions as to construction of insurance policy terms were not admissible, but portion of

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IV. CONCLUSION

Having fully considered Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, the Court finds no basis on which to

exclude the entirety of Defendant’s expert’s testimony. Mr. Nielsen’s report, while potentially at

odds with some dicta contained within the Third Circuit’s opinion in this case, does not contradict

either the holding or the mandate of that opinion. Moreover, Pennsylvania law clearly makes

expert testimony as to industry custom and usage always admissible when interpreting commercial

contracts, regardless of whether the contract language is ambiguous. The Report’s conclusions are

well-founded on Mr. Nielsen’s extensive experience in the land usage industry. Finally, the Court

finds that the Report was timely submitted and is not barred by any principles of judicial estoppel. 

Nonetheless, the Court deems sections I and II of the Report to be impermissible conclusions of

law, as they seek to provide legal definitions – via reference to various legal sources – for “direct

restraints on alienation” and “use restrictions,” without offering any specialized expert knowledge

on these subjects. As such, those portions of the Report shall be excluded, both from this Court’s

consideration during summary judgment proceedings and at any subsequent trial. The remainder of

the Report, however, shall be admissible.

An appropriate Order follows.

report addressing insurance industry standards was admissible).

26