J-S17004-20 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHARLES ROBERT BALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 234 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001949-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHARLES ROBERT BALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 235 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001254-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHARLES ROBERT BALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 236 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001253-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
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MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED MAY 08, 2020

Charles Robert Ball appeals from the judgments of sentence entered on 

November 1, 2018, which followed the revocation of three probation 

sentences in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas. After Ball admitted 

to a probation violation, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate period 

of nine to thirty-six months of incarceration. On appeal, Ball challenges the 

discretionary aspects of his sentences. We affirm.

As indicated by the trial court, after pleading guilty to various drugrelated offenses at three separate docket numbers, the court sentenced Ball 

to a term of incarceration followed by two years of probation. Ball admitted to 

violating the terms of his probation by using methamphetamines. The trial 

court revoked his probation based upon these admissions.

Ball filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration, challenging the 

length of his sentences. The trial court granted reconsideration of the 

sentences on November 29, 2018. After a hearing, the trial court found no 

issues with the duration of the sentences and refused to reduce them. Ball 

filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Ball and the trial court have complied 

with the dictates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Accordingly, Ball’s appeal is properly 

before us. 

Ball presents one issue for our review:

1) Did the lower court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Ball 

to a total of 9 months to 36 months at a State Correctional 

Institution with the only alleged violation being an admission to 

consumption of methamphetamine and when such a sentence 
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would interfere with the treatment recommendation that had 

already been made by the State Parole Board?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

The “[r]evocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and that court's decision will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2007). Our 

review of a revocation proceeding is limited to determining the validity of the 

proceeding, the legality of the judgment of sentence imposed, and the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 

A.3d 1030, 1033-35 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).

Ball challenges the discretionary aspects of the three consecutive 

sentences that he received. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing do not guarantee a petitioner’s right to our review. See 

Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see 

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant's brief 

has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted).
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In this case, Ball properly preserved the issue by filing a post-sentence 

motion and filed a timely notice of appeal. Additionally, Ball’s brief includes a 

statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal, as is required by 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-19. We must therefore look to 

whether Ball has presented a claim that would constitute a substantial

question.

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 

533 (Pa. Super. 2011). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant 

advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were 

either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or 

(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Ball raises two separate challenges to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. However, the second challenge consists of two distinct challenges. 

We therefore proceed to analyze whether these challenges present substantial 

questions. 

First, he claims that the court abused its discretion by imposing 

sentences of incarceration for a mere technical violation. This challenge raises 

a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 

(Pa. Super. 2010).

Next, he argues the court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 

sentence that did not consider his rehabilitative needs. This challenge, too, 
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raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 

340 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Intertwined with his excessiveness argument is an allegation that the 

trial court’s sentence should be vacated for a failure to state the reasons for 

the sentences on the record. Even by itself, this ancillary claim raises a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 741 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa. 

Super. 1999) (en banc).

As all three of Ball’s challenges present substantial questions, we turn 

to the merits of each challenge.

In Ball’s first challenge, he claims the trial court abused its discretion by 

imposing sentences of total confinement for a mere technical violation. The 

Sentencing Code grants the trial court the authority to “revoke an order of 

probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b). When revocation occurs, “the sentencing alternatives 

available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial 

sentencing.” Id. Nonetheless, the court may not impose a sentence of 

confinement unless it finds that (1) the defendant has been convicted of 

another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely 

that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or (3) such a 

sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court. See id. § 9771(c).

Here, Ball’s probation sentences were all imposed for convictions 

involving the possession of narcotics. The trial court was presented with 

evidence that within nine days of his release from incarceration, Ball once 
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again possessed and used a narcotic. Further, the court received evidence that 

Ball resisted rehabilitation efforts and failed to appear for evaluations.

Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused 

its discretion. While Ball argues that he was not charged with or convicted of 

any crime for his most recent possession and use of narcotics, Ball 

misconstrues the required antecedent under subsection (c)(2). 

He received sentences of probation for his original crimes. These are the 

previous crimes implicated in subsection (c)(2). Section 9721(c)(2) does not 

require that the defendant be charged with or convicted of a new crime after 

the crime for which he is serving a probationary sentence. Indeed, such a 

construction would make subsection (c)(2) superfluous to subsection (c)(1). 

Rather, (c)(2) merely requires the court to determine that the probationer’s 

conduct leads to a conclusion that he is likely to commit more crimes.

The fact that Ball quickly committed another drug possession offense, 

even though he was not criminally charged for it, can reasonably be construed 

to support a finding that Ball is likely to continue seeking out and using 

narcotics while on probation. Combined with the facts that he has been 

resistant to rehabilitation efforts and failed to appear for evaluations, we have 

no difficulty in concluding that Ball’s first challenge to the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence merits no relief.

In his second challenge, Ball argues the court imposed an excessive 

sentence that failed to take into consideration his rehabilitative needs. 

Specifically, he contends that the court’s imposition of an aggregate sentence 
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of nine to thirty-six months’ incarceration exceeded the state probation and 

parole board’s recommendation and interfered with his attempts to enroll in 

the recommended drug rehabilitation program.

Ball does not assert that his sentences fell outside the guideline 

recommendations. Instead, his argument centers on his allegation that the 

sentences of incarceration interfered with his ability to enroll in a drug 

rehabilitation program. 

Once again, based upon the circumstances set forth above, it is clear 

the trial court considered Ball’s rehabilitative needs. The hearing on Ball’s 

post-sentence motion focused almost exclusively on Ball’s drug addiction and 

the proposed methods for dealing with the addiction. However, the 

circumstances presented also included Balls’ resistance to previous addiction 

treatments and failure to appear for evaluations. The court concluded that 

Ball’s struggles indicated that he was unlikely, at this time, to benefit from 

another opportunity at addiction treatment while under supervision. We 

cannot find that this conclusion constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion, 

and Ball’s second challenge merits no relief.

In his final challenge, Ball contends his sentence should be vacated due 

to the court’s failure to state the reasons for the sentence on the record.

We agree with Ball that at the revocation hearing and after listening to 

both sides present their arguments, the trial court did not explicitly discuss 

Ball’s rehabilitative needs or state that confinement was necessary to protect 

the public. However, as noted previously, the court held a hearing on Ball’s 
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post-sentence motion. While the court did not go into much more detail in its 

disposition of Ball’s motion, the very fact that the court held the hearing and 

received further evidence in support of Ball’s needs provides sufficient context 

to its short discussion. Clearly, the court was concerned with Ball’s recidivist 

history, admitted narcotic addiction, and past failures to successfully treat his 

addiction. The court did acknowledge Ball’s rehabilitative needs, albeit briefly. 

See N.T., Post-Sentence Motion Hearing, 1/11/19, at 7 (“He can finish up 

whatever he has [on these newly imposed sentences] and then go to 

treatment. I think that would work well.”). Accordingly, we conclude Ball’s 

third and final challenge merits no relief. 

As a result, we affirm Ball’s judgments of sentence.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/08/2020