J-S89004-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

M & T BANK, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

ACLI TRADING, LLC AND CORESTATES 

GROUP LLC,

Appellees No. 816 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered March 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 150201107

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017

Appellant, M & T Bank, appeals from the order denying its petition to 

set aside sheriff’s sale in this mortgage foreclosure action initiated against 

Appellee, ACLI Trading, LLC, at which the foreclosed property was sold to 

Appellee, Corestates Group, LLC (“Corestates”). After careful review, 

we affirm.

The trial court summarized the history of this case as follows:

This case commenced [on] February 2, 2015, with the 

filing of a complaint in mortgage foreclosure against ACLI 

Trading Company and the Property located at 4640 Large Street, 

Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 19124.

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On April 20, 2015, [M & T Bank] filed a Motion for 

Alternative Service, which was granted May 5, 2015.

On May 21, 2015 and May 22, 2015, [M & T Bank] filed 

Affidavits of Service of the Praecipe to Reinstate the Complaint 

as well as the Complaint on ACLI Trading, Inc.

On June 18, 2015, [M & T Bank] filed a Praecipe to Entry 

of Judgment by Default.

On July 23, 2015, [M & T Bank] filed an Affidavit of Service 

of Notice of Sale by posting the premises.

On July 24, 2015, [M & T Bank] filed an Affidavit of Service 

of Notice of Sale by Posting Premises, Certified Mail, and First 

Class Regular Mail.

On October 6, 2015, the Property was sold at Sheriff’s Sale 

to [Corestates] for $180,000.00.

On October 7, 2015, [M & T Bank] filed a [Petition] to Set 

Aside Sheriff’s Sale. The petition averred that [M & T Bank’s] 

counsel had received bidding instructions for a maximum of 

$318,967.30; that the fair market value of the Property was 

$425,000.00; that a representative of [M & T Bank] attended the 

sale; that there were multiple third party bidders bidding on the 

Property; that [M & T Bank’s] representative followed standard 

and customary procedure to bid; that the auctioneer sold the 

Property despite [M & T Bank’s] representative remaining 

standing and indicating she was prepared to bid $319,000.00; 

that the manner in which the sale was conducted was highly 

irregular and prejudicial as the final bid was grossly inadequate 

given the fair market value of the Property. [M & T Bank] 

provided an Affidavit from its representative who had attended 

the sale. Thus, [M & T Bank] requested this court set aside the 

sale on an equitable basis.

On October 27, 2015, [Corestates] filed a Motion to 

Intervene, and an Answer in Opposition to the Motion to Set 

Aside Sheriff’s Sale. In its Motion to Intervene, [Corestates] 

averred that it was the successful third party bidder on the 

Property, and that it sought leave to intervene to protect its 

interest in the Property. In its Answer in Opposition, 

[Corestates] argued that the sale was conducted properly; that 
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the auctioneer knocked down the Property by the fall of the 

hammer and allowed for and provided a verbal three (3) count; 

that the sale price was not grossly inadequate as courts had 

concluded that “grossly inadequate” meant ten (10) per cent or 

less of the established market value and in the instant case the 

sale price was 42.35% of the fair market value; that the 

competitive bidding process was not impacted as no other third 

party bidders had complained.

On November 18, 2015, [the trial] court scheduled an 

evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale.

On December 18, 2015, [M & T Bank] filed a Reply in 

Support of its Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale, arguing that 

[Corestates’s] brief relied on unpublished case law; that 

[Corestates’s] answer was not properly verified; that 

[Corestates] had provided no evidence; and that the sale price 

was grossly inadequate because it was below both the market 

value of the Property and the outstanding debt to which the sale 

was intended to satisfy.

On December 22, 2015, [Corestates] filed a Praecipe to 

Supplement its Motion to Intervene and a Praecipe to 

Supplement its Answer in Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside, 

namely, to add proper verifications.

On March 2, 2016, following a number of continuances, 

[the trial] court heard oral argument and considered testimony 

on the Motion to Set Aside.

* * *

On March 3, 2016, [the trial] court denied [M & T Bank’s] 

Motion to Set Aside.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/16, at 1-3, 7. This timely appeal by M & T Bank 

followed. On March 10, 2016, M & T Bank filed a motion to stay proceedings 

seeking to stay delivery of a sheriff’s deed to Corestates pending the 

outcome of this appeal, which the trial court granted on April 25, 2016. 

Both M & T Bank and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
J-S89004-16

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M & T Bank presents the following issues for our review:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying M & T’s 

petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale under Pa.R.C.P. 3132 

where there is evidence showing the sale was abruptly cut off, 

hindering competitive bidding and rendering the sale void?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying M & T’s 

petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale under Pa.R.C.P. 3132 due 

to the gross inadequacy of the sale price in comparison to the 

underlying judgment amount and the market price of the subject 

property?

III. Did the trial court fail to appropriately exercise its equitable 

discretion in denying Appellant’s petition to set aside the sheriff’s 

sale pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3132 where the resulting unfair 

prejudice to M & T far outweighs the absence of any harm 

whatsoever to Appellee if the sale was reset?

M & T Bank’s Brief at 3 (renumbered for ease of discussion).

Initially, we observe that each of M & T Bank’s issues challenge 

whether the trial court erred in denying its petition to set aside the sheriff’s 

sale. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3132 governs petitions to set 

aside sheriff’s sales and provides as follows:

Upon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the 

personal property or of the sheriff’s deed to real property, the 

court may, upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and 

order a resale or enter any other order which may be just and 

proper under the circumstances.

Pa.R.C.P. 3132.

Our Supreme Court has long held that a petition to set aside a sheriff’s 

sale is governed by equitable principles. Doherty v. Adal Corp., 261 A.2d 

311, 313 (Pa. 1970). Equitable principles are applied to sheriff’s sales 

because “[t]he purpose of a sheriff’s sale in mortgage foreclosure 
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proceedings is to realize out of the land, the debt, interest, and costs which 

are due, or have accrued to, the judgment creditor.” Kaib v. Smith, 684 

A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. Super. 1996). Moreover, we are mindful that the 

petitioner has the burden of proving circumstances warranting the exercise 

of the trial court’s equitable powers. Bornman v. Gordon, 527 A.2d 109, 

111 (Pa. Super. 1987). As a general rule, the burden of proving 

circumstances warranting the exercise of the court’s equitable powers is on 

the applicant, and the application to set aside a sheriff’s sale may be refused 

because of the insufficiency of proof to support the material allegations of 

the application, which are generally required to be established by clear 

evidence. Id. This Court will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent an 

abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where, for example, 

the trial court misapplies the law. Bank of America, N.A. v. Estate of 

Hood, 47 A.3d 1208, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Warmkessel v. 

Heffner, 17 A.3d 408, 413 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

In its first issue, M & T Bank argues that the trial court erred in 

denying its petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale because there was a clear 

deviation from the standard procedure in conducting the sale of the 

property. M & T Bank’s Brief at 12. M & T Bank contends that the 

auctioneer conducted the sale in an irregular manner by arbitrarily cutting 

off the competitive bidding, thus requiring that the sale of the property be 

set aside. Id.
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Irregularities in a sheriff’s sale proceedings have been found to be 

grounds to set aside a sheriff’s sale under Pa.R.C.P. 3132. Allegheny 

County v. Golf Resort, Inc., 974 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).1 

“[I]rregularities may appear in the conduct of either the sheriff’s office 

representative conducting the sale or the parties to the transaction.” Id. 

(citing McKenna v. Sosso, 745 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1999)).

The trial court painstakingly summarized the testimony regarding the 

actual sheriff’s sale proceedings, which was offered at the set-aside hearing, 

as follows:

Beatrice Rile, a foreclosure manager with the law firm of 

Mettleman, Weinroth, and Miller [who was bidding on behalf of M 

& T Bank], testified that she had worked for the firm for eighteen 

(18) years. N.T. 3/2/16 at 9-10. She has attended around fifty 

(50) sales on behalf of the firm’s clients as an attorney on writ, 

and is familiar with the sale and bidding process. N.T. 3/2/16 at 

10-11. Rile stated the auctioneer announces the book and writ 

for the Property being sold, open with the cost, and if there are 

competitive bidders they will bid in increments to obtain the bid; 

if the max bid has not been reached, they continue to bid in 

increments to meet the bid that their client provides them. N.T. 

3/2/16 at 11, 17. When bidding, she always stands and remains 

standing until she is done bidding. N.T. 3/2/16 at 11. The 

maximum bid is not announced, and is not public information. 

N.T. 3/2/16 at 12-13. If the third party bids are not near the 

maximum bid, Rile will continue to stand and bid until the bids 

____________________________________________

1

“Although decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this 

Court, we may rely on them if we are persuaded by their reasoning.” 

NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Secs., 52 A.3d 296, 308 n.7 (Pa. 

Super. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 107 

n.7 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Although the decisions of the Commonwealth Court 

are not binding upon this Court, they may serve as persuasive authority”).
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reach that maximum bid, after which she will allow competitive 

bidders to continue bidding. N.T. 3/2/16 at 15-16.

Rile testified that on the date of the sale, there was 

competitive bidding and a packed house of more than one 

hundred (100) people, and she sat in the middle of the room, 

approximately five (5) to seven (7) rows back. N.T. 3/2/16 at 

15-17. She stated the competitive bidding stopped and as she 

was going to announce her next bid, the auctioneer was already 

saying, “Going once, going twice,” and as Rile attempted to 

speak, the auctioneer stated, “Sold to third-party for $180,000.” 

N.T. 3/2/16 at 15-16. Rile then stated, “I’m not done bidding,” 

but the auctioneer stated, “the case is closed.” N.T. 3/2/16 at 

16. Rile identified herself as being from the attorney’s office, 

and a representative from the sheriff’s office stated she could 

put in a third-party bid, which Rile stated she did not wish to do. 

N.T. 3/2/16 at 16. During a deposition conducted prior to the 

instant hearing on January 29, 2016, Rile stated she had said, 

“Wait a minute, I’m not done bidding” as the auctioneer was 

stating “going twice.” N.T. 3/2/16 at 19-20. In that deposition, 

Rile stated that she had not heard anyone say “wait a minute” 

during bidding before. N.T. 3/2/16 at 22. During cross[-] 

examination, she stated that she “may have” started to 

announce a dollar amount, but she could not remember. N.T. 

3/2/15 at 23.

Michael Silverman, managing director of Integra 

Resources, a company that performs real estate evaluations, 

testified for [M & T Bank]. N.T. 3/2/16 at 26. He stated that he 

conducted an appraisal of 4640 Large Street, the Property in 

question. N.T. 3/2/16 at 27. The property is a 31,490 square 

foot loft industrial building, and is a shell. N.T. 3/2/16 at 27-28. 

In September, 2015, based upon an examination of the outside 

of the Property, Silverman appraised the Property at 

$300,000.00 and its disposition value at $225,000.00. N.T. 

3/2/16 at 29-30, 34. Silverman was aware of open fire code 

violations related to the Property. N.T. 3/2/16 at 32. Silverman 

worked deferred maintenance into his appraisal, but did not 

include the fire code violations in the deferred maintenance 

category, because such issues were not easily repaired. N.T. 

3/2/16 at 36.

[Corestates] argued the sale was conducted properly and 

that [M & T Bank’s] argument was solely that the sale was 
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conducted too quickly and that the price was not inadequate, as 

the bid was approximately forty-two (42) percent of the value 

provided in the motion and sixty (60) percent of the value 

provided in evidence at the hearing. N.T. 3/2/16 at 7, 75. 

[Corestates] argued that there was no irregularity or any 

procedural misconduct in the sale. N.T. 3/2/16 at 74. 

Consequently, given that the price was not grossly inadequate 

and that there was no procedural irregularity, there was no 

reason to set aside the sale. N.T. 3/2/16 at 76.

Ilya Rabovetsky, the owner of Corestates Group, LLC, 

testified for [Corestates]. N.T. 3/2/16 at 38. He testified that 

he is involved in purchasing properties at sheriffs sale and 

renovating them for sale. N.T. 3/2/16 at 38-39. He has been 

attending almost every sheriff’s sale for the past ten (10) years. 

N. T. 3/2/16 at 39.

Rabovetsky testified that he attended the October 6, 2015 

sale, and that he bid on the Property located at 4640 Large 

Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as soon as he realized it was 

being auctioned. N.T. 3/2/16 at 39-40. He was unaware of the 

bank’s upset price, but he did come prepared with information 

on its location, its size, and the fact that fire code violations 

existed against the Property. N. T. 3/2/16 at 40. Rabovetsky 

viewed the bid of $180,000.00 as a risk, as he had limited 

information on the Property, and that it had outstanding 

violations, needed a lot of work, and was not in the best area. 

N.T. 3/2/15 at 40. There were other bidders on the Property, 

but at the last three bids, it was solely Rabovetsky and the bank. 

N.T. 3/2/16 at 41. Rabovetsky testified that the sale was a large 

sale of one thousand (1,000) properties, that it was crowded, 

and that it was conducted the same as any other sale, and that 

no one else attempted to enter a bid after him. N.T. 3/2/16 at 

41. Following placing the successful bid, he paid ten (10) per 

cent on the bid. N. T. 3/2/16 at 42. Also following the 

successful bid, Rabovetsky received a quote for cost to replace 

the sprinkler system in the Property, per the violations, at 

$200,000.00. N.T. 3/2/16 at 44-45.

Lori Santiago, a title clerk at City Line Abstract Company 

and a deputy in the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department until 2008, 

testified for [Corestates]. N.T. 3/2/16 at 51. Santiago also 

conducts sheriff’s sales for the sheriff’s department as an 

auctioneer. N.T. 3/2/16 at 51-52. She conducted the auction 
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for the subject Property on October 6, 2015. N.T. 3/2/16 at 52. 

Santiago testified that she conducts the sales standing on an 

elevated platform, with a microphone. N.T. 3/2/16 at 52. 

Santiago is familiar with Rile, as she has been attending the sale 

for years, and saw and heard her at the sale that day. N.T. 

3/2/16 at 53.

Santiago testified that the Property was called by file 

number, book, and writ number, and that the opening bid is 

what is owed to the city in real estate, water, or gas liens. N.T. 

3/2/16 at 53. The Property’s opening bid was $29,000.00; a 

third party bidder bid $30,000.00. N.T. 3/2/16 at 54. The next 

acceptable bid is from the attorney on the writ, and Rile did 

announce her bid, though there were several other bidders 

engaged. N.T. 3/2/16 at 54. Towards the end, the only bidders 

remaining were the Corestates Group and Rile, who seemed 

distracted and was reading a book when [Corestates] bid 

$180,000.00. N.T. 3/2/16 at 54. Santiago stated she could not 

hold the bids, so she said, “Going once, going twice,” but Rile did 

not respond. N.T. 3/2/16 at 55. Santiago then stated the

Property had been sold to Corestates Group. N.T. 3/2/16 at 55. 

Rile said she was not finished bidding, but Santiago stated that 

she had given the count and instructed her to see the sheriff. 

N.T. 3/2/16 at 55. Santiago assumed Rile would place a second 

bid, meaning that the first bidder would be locked into settling 

the matter within thirty (30) days and then, if the matter is not 

settled, the first bidder would lose the benefit of their deposit. 

N.T. 3/2/16 at 55-56. Santiago testified she did not wait to see 

if Rile did so, as it was a busy day with a sale of one thousand 

(1,000) properties. N.T. 3/2/16 at 56.

Santiago testified that she gave the count in the same 

rhythm and speed as she always does. N.T. 3/2/16 at 56-57. 

Santiago testified that as soon as there is a lull, she will end the 

sale after giving the “once, twice” warning. N.T. 3/2/16 at 57. 

Santiago testified she gave Rile a full opportunity to bid, but that 

as the hammer fell, Rile was not paying attention. N.T. 3/2/16 

at 58, 60.

Captain Richard Verrecchio, a sheriff’s representative 

assigned to the Real Estate Settlement Unit, testified for 

[Corestates]. N.T. 3/2/16 at 63. He is assigned to the 

mortgage and tax sales, where he enforces the writ of 

executions, decrees for tax sales to make sure that the sale was 
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fair and equitable. N.T. 3/2/16 at 63. He was present at the 

instant sale on October 6, 2015, at the front of the room with his 

staff. N.T. 3/2/16 at 64. He recognized Rile, having seen her at 

many sales. N.T. 3/2/16 at 64. He did not see the bid, but was 

approached by Rile following the sale, whereupon Verrecchia 

asked her if she wished to place a second bid. N.T. 3/2/16 at 

65. Rile stated she was not sure. N.T. 3/2/16 at 65.

Rick Tyer, an employee of the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office, 

testified that he is the Director of Real Estate for the office and 

participates in and conducts Sheriff’s Sales. N.T. 3/2/16 at 68. 

His role is to sit with the auctioneer and ensure that they 

conduct a fair sale. N.T. 3/2/16 at 69. Tyer attended the 

October 6, 2015 sale, and was sitting in the front of the room 

behind Rile, who is familiar to him from previous sales. N.T. 

3/2/16 at 69-70. He did not have direct communication with 

Rile regarding the bid, but from his own observations, believed 

her bid untimely. N.T. 3/2/16 at 71. In his experience, Tyer 

makes determinations to challenges of the sale at the time of 

sale, and has never reopened the bidding at the request of the 

attorney on the writ, to avoid prejudice to third–party bidders. 

N.T. 3/2/16 at 71.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/16, at 3-7.

In addressing M & T Bank’s claim that procedural irregularities 

occurred that required a set aside of the sheriff’s sale, the trial court 

presented the following apt analysis:

[M & T Bank] cannot show a procedural irregularity requiring 

[the trial] court to set aside the sale. Regarding the procedure 

of the sale itself, based upon the evidence and the testimony 

presented during the hearing, there was no irregularity requiring 

the set aside of the sale. In the instant case, [the trial] court 

heard extensive testimony and argument regarding the manner 

in which the sheriff’s sale was conducted on October 6, 2015. 

[M & T Bank’s] representative testified that the sale was 

conducted irregularly and that it was concluded abruptly before 

she could place a bid. [Corestates] presented testimony from 

four (4) separate witnesses, including the auctioneer and 

representatives of the sheriff’s office, to testify that the sale was 

conducted properly and in accordance with the manner all sales 
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are conducted. Consequently, there was no reason to set aside 

the sale.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/16, at 9. Upon review of the certified record, we 

are constrained to agree with the trial court that the record supports its 

determination that there were no irregularities in the conduct of the sale of 

the property that would necessitate a set aside of the sheriff’s sale. 

Accordingly, we conclude that M & T Bank’s contrary claim lacks merit.

M & T Bank next argues that the trial court erred in denying its petition 

to set aside the sheriff’s sale because the sale price of the property was 

grossly inadequate. M & T Bank’s Brief at 13-14. M & T Bank asserts that 

the sale price of $180,000.00 is inadequate because it is sixty percent of the 

appraised value of the property and only fifty-seven percent of the 

outstanding judgment amount and warrants reversal of the trial court’s 

decision. Id.

“Pennsylvania law is clear that mere inadequacy of price is not 

sufficient reason to set aside a Sheriff’s Sale.” Scott v. Adal Corp., 509 

A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 1986). Rather, the sale price must be “grossly 

inadequate” in order to set aside a sheriff’s sale. Id. The courts have 

traditionally looked at each case on its own facts. Id. It is for this reason 

that the term “grossly inadequate price” has never been fixed by any court 

at any given amount or any percentage amount of the sale. Id. 

Furthermore, it is well settled that the price received at a duly advertised 

public sale is the highest and best price obtainable. Bank of America, N.A. 
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v. Estate of Hood, 47 A.3d at 1211 (citing Blue Ball National Bank v. 

Balmer, 810 A.2d 164, 166-167 (Pa. Super. 2002)). In addition, we 

observe that “Pennsylvania courts have concluded that a sheriff’s sale price 

is grossly inadequate where sale price was a small percentage-roughly ten 

percent or less-of the established market value.” Bank of America, N.A. v. 

Estate of Hood, 47 A.3d at 1212.

The trial court discussed M & T Bank’s allegation that the sale price of 

the property at the sheriff’s sale was grossly inadequate, as follows:

In the instant case, evidence introduced at the hearing showed 

that the Property was valued at approximately $300,000.00. 

The judgment was for $313,961.13. The winning bid of 

$180,000.00 is approximately sixty (60) per cent of the 

valuation provided by Appellant, and approximately [fifty-seven 

(57)] percent of the judgment amount. Recently, the Superior 

Court of Pennsylvania has held that a purchase price of fortyfour (44) percent does not constitute a gross inadequacy of 

price. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Estate of Hood, 2012 PA Super 

70, 47 A.3d 1208, 1212-13 (2012). While in the instant case 

the purchase price was still below the amount of the judgment, 

[fifty-seven (57)] or sixty (60) percent of the fair market value 

does not constitute a gross inadequacy.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/16, at 9. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion 

that the instant sheriff’s sale price of $180,000.00, which is sixty percent of 

the property’s appraised value of $300,000.00, is not grossly inadequate. 

Accordingly, M & T Bank has failed to establish that the trial court abused its 

discretion. Hence, this claim fails.

In its final issue, M & T Bank argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying the petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale because the 
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prejudice suffered by M & T Bank far outweighs any harm to Corestates in 

the event of a resale of the property. M & T Bank’s Brief at 14. M & T Bank 

contends that if the sale is permitted to stand, the bank will not realize the 

best price obtainable on the property, thereby suffering prejudice. Id.

As we previously observed, a petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale is 

governed by equitable principles. Doherty, 261 A.2d at 313. We reiterate 

that “[a] sale may be set aside upon petition of an interested party where 

‘upon proper cause shown’ the court deems it ‘just and proper under the 

circumstances.’” Blue Ball National Bank, 810 A.2d at 166 (citing 

Pa.R.C.P. 3132). “Courts have entertained petitions and granted relief 

where the validity of sale proceedings is challenged, or a deficiency 

pertaining to the notice of sale exists or where misconduct occurs in the 

bidding process.” Blue Ball Nat’l Bank, 810 A.2d at 166. Compare 

Merrill Lynch Mortg. Capital v. Steele, 859 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (reversing refusal to set aside sheriff’s sale upon deciding equities 

clearly warranted the grant of relief where judgment creditor received the 

money that it was owed when the mortgage pay-off proceeds were sent by 

the appellant to the mortgage creditor before the sheriff’s sale, thereby 

negating the need for the property to be sold at sheriff’s sale). Moreover, 

we note that it is presumed that the price received at a duly advertised 

public sale is the highest and best obtainable. Provident Nat’l Bank, N.A. 

v. Song, 832 A.2d 1077, 1081 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting Blue Ball 
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National Bank, 810 A.2d at 167). In addition, “[t]he purchaser at a 

sheriff’s sale assumes some risk concerning the property’s future value[, 

and] we declined to deprive the purchaser of the reward he received for 

assuming that risk.” Bank of America, N.A. v. Estate of Hood, 47 A.3d at 

1211 (citing Blue Ball National Bank, 810 A.2d at 168).

Here, as we previously discussed, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining there was no misconduct in the bidding process 

that would warrant the granting of M & T Bank’s petition to set aside the 

sheriff’s sale. Furthermore, M & T Bank’s claim that the sale price realized 

from the sheriff’s sale was not the best obtainable price is nothing more than 

an unsubstantiated allegation in light of the presumption that “the price 

received at a duly advertised public sale is the highest and best obtainable.” 

Provident Nat’l Bank, N.A., 832 A.2d at 1081. Finally, M & T Bank’s bald 

conclusion that Corestates will not suffer prejudice from being forced to 

purchase the property at a subsequent sheriff’s sale ignores the potential 

reward that Corestates stands to receive from assuming the risk of 

purchasing the property at the duly held sheriff’s sale. Bank of America, 

N.A. v. Estate of Hood, 47 A.3d at 1211. Consequently, we conclude that 

M & T Bank has failed to meet its burden of proof to show that the trial court 

abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the sheriff’s sale.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/13/2017