By that time Defendant was working with his third attorney and had already been filing 1

pro se motions on a regular basis.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : 

: CRIMINAL ACTION

v. :

: No. 04-506-1

ERIC HUMBERT :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Schiller, J. July 27, 2007

Defendant Eric Humbert, proceeding pro se, was convicted following a four-day jury trial

of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, conspiracy to commit carjacking, carjacking, and two

related firearms charges. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 924, 2119 (2007). Presently before the Court are

Defendant’s post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and, in the alternative, a new trial. See FED.

R. CRIM. P. 29 & 33. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2004, Defendant and his co-Defendants Kevin Jenkins and Rasheen Jones

were charged pursuant to a multi-count superseding indictment with various conspiracy, carjacking,

and firearms offenses. Jones pled guilty on February 8, 2005, and the Court severed Jenkins’s and

Humbert’s cases. 

In late November 2006, after an extensive colloquy, the Court granted Defendant’s motion

to proceed pro se. The Court appointed Steven Britt, who was acting as Humbert’s Counsel before 1

he chose to represent himself, to act as stand-by counsel. Defendant’s trial took place in midCase 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 1 of 16
2

December 2006.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence presented at trial can be

summarized as follows. Sometime in the spring of 2003, Humbert approached Jenkins and Jones

about the possibility of robbing a bank in southern New Jersey that Humbert had successfully robbed

before. The plan was for the three men to travel to Salem County, New Jersey in two cars – Jones’s

car and Jenkins’s car – and then steal a minivan to use in the actual robbery, because a minivan

provided the easiest means of egress and ingress. After the minivan was stolen, Defendants planned

to move Jones’s and Jenkins’s cars to a “switch spot.” During the bank robbery Jones would remain

at the switch spot with the cars. Humbert and Jenkins were to rob to the bank and then drive to the

switch spot and transfer the money and guns from the minivan into Jenkins’s car. After the transfer

of the money and guns to the switch vehicle, Humbert and Jones would drive back to Philadelphia

in Jones’s car, and Jenkins would drive his car containing the contraband. Jones’s car would act as

both a blocker and decoy vehicle during the return trip, shielding Jenkins’s car from view and

misleading police if they were looking for a car with two black males. 

On May 22, 2003, the men traveled to Salem County, New Jersey in two cars with the

intention of carrying out the plan. After familiarizing themselves with the area and surrounding

roads, they returned to the bank but aborted the robbery due to a police presence. Humbert and his

co-Defendants then returned to Philadelphia.

Defendant was not permanently dissuaded, however, and a few days later, on May 27, 2003,

he rallied Jones and Jenkins for another sojourn into New Jersey. Jones rented a Dodge Ram pickup

truck, and Jones and Humbert rode in the rented truck while Jenkins drove in his own car. 

After arriving in Salem County, Jenkins parked his car in a lot near a Cracker Barrel

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 2 of 16
3

restaurant and joined Humbert and Jones in the Dodge Ram. The three drove around the area

looking for a minivan to steal. Ultimately, they spied and decided upon a minivan parked inside the

attached garage of a ranch-style home. 

Humbert and Jenkins exited the rented truck and unlawfully entered the home, in which the

Robinsons, an elderly couple, lived. They ordered the Robinsons at gunpoint to turn over the keys

to their minivan. Jenkins took Mr. Robinson, who was suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, into a

bathroom, tied him up, and left him in the tub. Meanwhile, Humbert tied up and sexually assaulted

Mrs. Robinson in the master bedroom. After the sexual assault, he took cash from her purse and the

keys to the minivan. Humbert and Jenkins then left the house in the Robinsons’ van. 

When they got outside, they realized that Jones and the Dodge Ram were both missing.

Jones was scared off the scene by a diligent security officer from Conectiv, a business located near

the Robinsons’ home, who not only approached Jones multiple times after he gave her evasive

answers to her queries about his intentions in the area, but who also followed him long enough to

record the truck’s license plate number. Without Jones, the plan to rob the bank had to be aborted

once again, and Jenkins and Humbert abandoned the minivan in the Cracker Barrel parking lot and

returned to Philadelphia in Jenkins’s car. 

Law enforcement officers from New Jersey located and arrested all three Defendants in

connection with the home invasion, robbery, and sexual assault. Investigators from the FBI

eventually met with Jones as the case was proceeding in New Jersey state court. Jones explained to

the FBI that the actual reason the three men were in Salem County on May 22 and 27, 2003, was to

rob a bank. In response to that information, the case was adopted by federal authorities, and all three

men were indicted in federal court. 

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 3 of 16
 In a poorly reasoned strategy to convince the Court that he was trying his best to

2

complete his briefs but was being stymied by the unreasonable restrictions placed on him by the

prison staff, Humbert asserted on more than one occasion that he lacked adequate writing

implements. Despite this apparent shortcoming, Defendant managed to file five motions and

numerous letters during the seven month period. No explanation was provided for why

Defendant’s writing tools worked perfectly well when he penned the often lengthy motions and

letters regarding alleged malfeasance by the prison staff but malfunctioned when he attempted to

formulate his post-trial memorandum.

4

On December 13, 2006, after a four-day trial, the jury convicted Humbert of all five counts.

Defendant filed his post-trial motions, unaccompanied by briefing, on December 19, 2006. The

Court granted Defendant thirty additional days to file one consolidated brief in support of his

motions. Following four additional extensions of time and numerous letters and motions by

Defendant regarding various aspects of incarceration, the Court set July 15, 2007 as the final

deadline for filing post-trial briefs. To date, Defendant has not filed any such briefs. 

The Court now rules on Defendant’s motions without the benefit of briefing because it is

convinced that further extensions are unwarranted, fruitless, and that Defendant is purposefully

engaged in dilatory tactics. The Court has followed up with the Federal DetentionCenter in response

to Defendant’s many motions and letters and is satisfied that, after more than seven months,

Defendant has had ample time and access to legal and writing materials to draft his briefs. Any 2

further delay will not serve the interests of justice. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a district court views the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the government and affirm[s] the judgment if there is substantial evidence from which

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5

any rational trier of fact could find [the defendant] guilt[y] beyond a reasonable doubt.” United

States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1992); see also FED.R.CRIM. P. 29. If evidence emerges

from the trial that supports the jury’s verdict, regardless of how probative the court believes such

evidence to be, then the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on insufficient evidence should be

denied. See United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a court may grant a new trial “if the

interest of justice so requires.” FED. R.CRIM. P. 33(a). Such circumstances exist where, inter alia,

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 189 (3d

Cir. 2003). A new trial is warranted under this standard only if the court believes that “there is a

serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred – that is, that an innocent person has been

convicted.” United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Motions

for a new trial based a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence should only be

granted in exceptional cases. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Derricks, 810 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1987).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant is Not Entitled to a Judgment of Acquittal

Defendant appears to argue that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because there was

insufficient evidence to prove any of the charges. (Def.’s Mot. for J. of Acquittal Notwithstanding

the Verdict or For a New Trial [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.] at 1, ¶ 4.)

1. Conspiracy to Commit Armed Bank Robbery

To convict for conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery the government must show beyond

a reasonable doubt an agreement to commit the substantive offense of armed bank robbery and an

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 5 of 16
6

overt act in furtherance of the agreement. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997).

The substantive offense of armed bank robbery occurs when: (1) a person knowingly takes money

from the person or presence of another while it was in the custody of a bank; (2) the taking was by

force and violence or intimidation; (3) the bank was insured by the FDIC; and (4) the person

deliberately assaulted someone with a dangerous weapon or put the life of any other person in

jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon while the money was taken. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2007).

There is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Jones, Humbert’s co-conspirator

who entered into a plea agreement with the government in exchange for histestimony, explained in

detail how he, Humbert, and Jenkins planned to rob “The Bank” in Salem County, New Jersey.

Jones’s testimony was corroborated by: (1) the testimony of other witnesses who viewed Defendants

in the area; and (2) cell phone records. 

At trial and again in his post-trial motions, Defendant raises the issue of FDIC insurance.

(Def.’s Mot. at 3.) Agatha Fagan, a bank employee, gave undisputed testimony that “TheBank” was

FDIC insured during the time period in question. (Dec. 12, 2006 Tr. at 212.) That evidence is

sufficient to establish that the target of the conspiracy was an FDIC-insured bank. The fact that

FDIC insurance does not cover banks for losses caused by robbery – a source of considerable

consternation to Defendant – is irrelevant. United States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 150, 153-59 (3d Cir.

2001); United States v. Watts, 256 F.3d 630, 633-34 (7th Cir. 2001)(“It is . . . of no consequence that

FDIC insurance does not cover losses due to robbery.”). 

2. Using or Carrying a Firearm in Furtherance of Conspiracy to Commit

Armed Bank Robbery

Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to show that he used or carried a firearm

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 6 of 16
7

during the conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. (Def.’s Mot. at 1, ¶4 & at 3.) The testimony

provided by both Jones and Mrs. Robinson that Defendant possessed and wielded a gun is sufficient

to support the jury’s verdict. (Dec. 11, 2006 Tr. at 1.80; Dec. 12, 2006 Tr. at 2.65-2.67, 2.86-2.87.)

3. Conspiracy to Commit Carjacking

As mentioned above, to convict for conspiracy the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt: (1) an agreement to commit a substantive offense; and (2) an overt act. See

Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63-64. The substantive offense of carjacking occurs when a person, “with the

intent to cause death or serious bodily harm[,] takes a motor vehicle that has been transported,

shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by

force and violence or by intimidation . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Defendant admits that evidence

exists to support the conclusion that he agreed to steal a motor vehicle but not to do so from the

person or presence of another or with the requisite intent. (Def.’s Mot. at 3.) 

To the extent Defendant is arguing that he lacked the requisite intent to cause death or serious

bodily injury at the time he agreed to steal the car, such argument is not compelling. The Supreme

Court has made clear that a defendant need have only the conditional intent to cause death or serious

bodily injury if the target of the carjacking declines to turn over the keys. See Holloway v. United

States, 526 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1999); see also United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 147 (3d Cir. 2005)

(explaining that to prove conspiracy the government must establish “at least the degree of criminal

intent necessary for the underlying substantive offense . . . .”). The testimony regarding the manner

in which Defendant and Jenkins carried out the home invasion and robbery provides substantial

circumstantial evidence of agreement to cause death or serious bodily harm had the Robinsons

resisted their demand for the keys to the minivan. Indeed, the government presented evidence that

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 7 of 16
8

Humbert brutally sexually assaulted Mrs. Robinson even though she did turn over the keys without

a struggle. The evidence that Humbert and Jenkins chose to steal the minivan from an attached

garage of a home not by hot-wiring it but by storming into the house with guns drawn and

demanding the keys directly from the owners is sufficient to establish their conditional intent to

cause death or serious bodily harm if necessary to obtain the vehicle. Thus, sufficient evidence

exists for the jury to have concluded that Defendant agreed with Jenkins to steal the car with the

requisite state of mind.

Reading Defendant’s motion broadly, he may also be asserting that he never agreed with

Jenkins to take the minivan “from the person or presence of another . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. This

argument is foreclosed, however, by Third Circuit precedent, which establishes that the “presence”

requirement is satisfied when a defendant goes into a victim’s house to obtain the keys to a vehicle

located outside. See United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction

for carjacking where defendantstook keys from owner inside her home); United States v. Lake, 150

F.3d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1998) (carjacking conviction upheld where keys forcibly taken from woman

whose van was parked on hilltop and not visible from location of robbery). Thus, substantial

evidence exists to support the jury’s determination that Humbert agreed with Jenkins to take the

minivan from the person or presence of another.

4. Carjacking

Defendant contends that the evidence as to “three of the prongs” required to prove carjacking

is insufficient to sustain his conviction on this count. (Def.’s Mot. at 4.) Specifically, Defendant

challenges the evidence as to the intent, presence, and interstate commerce requirements of 18

U.S.C. § 2119. (Id.)

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 8 of 16
9

With respect to the element of intent, the above discussion related to the conspiracy charge

confirms that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that Defendant acted with

the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm while committing the carjacking. This element is

satisfied provided the jury believed that Defendant had the intent to cause death or serious bodily

harm if the Robinsons had resisted Defendant’s and Jenkins’s efforts to obtain the keys to the

minivan. See Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11-12. In light of the evidence that Defendant and Jenkins

entered the house with guns drawn, Jenkins bound Mr. Robinson and put him in the tub, and

Defendant bound and sexually assaulted Mrs. Robinson even though the Robinsons complied with

Defendants’ demands, substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s conclusion that Defendant

acted with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury.

Defendant next attacks his carjacking conviction on the ground that insufficient evidence was

presented on the requirement that the vehicle be taken from the person or presence of another. This

argument, too, is unpersuasive. The presence requirement has been interpreted broadly by the Third

Circuit, see, e.g., Lake, 150 F.3d at 272, and the evidence regarding the proximity of the vehicle to

the victims (inside the attached garage of their home) as well as the victim’s effective control over

the vehicle amply supports the jury’s determination that the government satisfied the presence

requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 2119. 

Lastly, Defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the mandate that

the vehicle have moved in interstate or foreign commerce. The government presented direct

testimony on this point, providing substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the car

passed through interstate or foreign commerce. (Dec. 11, 2006 Tr. at 1.114-1.116.)

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 9 of 16
10

5. Using or Carrying a Firearm in Furtherance of Conspiracy to Commit

Carjacking and Carjacking

As with the previously discussed gun charge, the testimony from both Jones and Mrs.

Robinson that Defendant possessed a gun provided a substantial evidentiary basis for the jury’s

determination on this count. (Dec. 11, 2006 Tr. at 1.80; Dec. 12, 2006 Tr. at 2.65-2.67, 2.86-2.87.)

B. Defendant is Not Entitled to a New Trial Because the Verdict is Not Contrary

to the Weight of the Evidence

Among Defendant’s laundry list of asserted errors he includes a claim that the verdict is

“contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Def.’s Mot. at 1, ¶ 3.) As discussed above, a new trial

should be granted under this standard only if the court believes that “there is a serious danger that

a miscarriage of justice has occurred – that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.” Johnson,

302 F.3d at 151 (citations omitted). In assessing a defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground

that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, a district court exercises its own judgment as to the

weight of the evidence. Brennan, 326 F.3d at 189.

The Court declines to grant Defendant a new trial on this ground because there is not a

serious danger that an innocent person has been convicted. Jones testified at length about the plan

to drive to New Jersey, steal a van, and rob a bank. Moreover, the government presented evidence

that Defendant entered the Robinsons’ home and, along with his co-conspirator, obtained the keys

to their minivan using both force and threats. Jones and Mrs. Robinson also testified that Humbert

was carrying a gun throughout the events. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the

basis that the verdicts are against the weight of the evidence is denied. 

C. None of Defendant’s Additional Claims of Error Have Merit

At the outset of his motion Defendant alleges eleven bases upon which the Court should grant

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 10 of 16
 Three of Defendant’s claims are either unintelligible or so broad as to be impossible to 3

address:

(1) Defendant’s objection that the Court erred “in admitting [certain] evidence . . .

against him, in violation of his Constitutional rights.” (Def.’s Mot. at 2, ¶ 6.) 

(2) The claim that the “trial court erred in permitting a biased and prejudiced jury

to consider the merits of the case.” (Def.’s Mot. at 2, ¶ 9.) 

(3) Defendant’s argument, which appears to be a reiteration of point one above,

that the “trial court erred in its ruling on the admissibility of evidence as shown by

the objections taken at the trial.” (Def.’s Mot. at 2, ¶ 10.)

11

a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. (Def.’s Mot. at 1-2.) The Court has addressed several of them

in the preceding discussion and now turns to the remaining claims.

3

1. The Jury Charge

In two separate paragraphs Defendant objects to the jury charge. (Def.’s Mot. at 2, ¶¶ 5, 8.)

He directs the Court to the “grounds . . . set forth in the exceptions taken to the charge.” (Id. at 2,

¶ 8.) Accordingly, the Court will discuss each of Defendant’s objections in turn.

At trial, Defendant objected to the use of the word “impartial” in the following context: “So

the presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant unless the jury is satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. And this can be done only after careful and

impartial consideration of all of the evidence.” (Dec. 13, 2006 Tr. at 3.12.; Court’s Final Jury

Instructions at 8.) It is hard to imagine how this use of the word “impartial” is offensive to

Defendant. Suffice it to say that any such objection is frivolous. 

Defendant also objected to the portion of the jury charge instructing the jurors that they were

free to draw “reasonable inferences” from the evidence. (Dec. 13, 2006 Tr. at 3.12; Court’s Final

Jury Instructions at 15.) This argument is entirely without merit because drawing reasonable

inferences is a core responsibility ofthe jury and an activity expressly approved by the Third Circuit.

See United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 11 of 16
12

1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986)). 

Defendant further claimed that the jury should be instructed that if they believed a witness

to have testified falsely as to one issue, they should disbelieve the testimony of that witness in its

entirety. (Dec. 13, 2006 Tr. at 3.12.) As the Court explained to Defendant at the time, whether and

to what extent to credit the testimony of a witness is a matter entrusted solely to the jury. See Third

Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions §§ 3.04, 4.26 (2007); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210,

256 (3d Cir. 2004).

Defendant’s penultimate objection during the charging conference was related to the portion

of the instructions explaining that the government is not required to utilize any specific investigative

techniques in collecting evidence. (Dec. 13, 2006 Tr. at 3.13.) This instruction is consistent with

established law. See Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions §§ 3.05, 4.14; see also United

States v. Saldarriaga, 204 F.3d 50, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2000).

Defendant raised a final objection to the following instruction: 

You are here to determine the guilt or innocence of the

defendant from the evidence in this case. You are not called

upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of any

other person or persons. You may not draw any inference,

favorable or unfavorable, toward the government or the

defendant, from the fact that other persons were not named as

defendants in the indictment, and you should not speculate

about the reasons for this. So, if the evidence in the case

convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the

defendant, then you should find the defendant guilty, even

though you may believe one or more other persons are also

guilty.

(Court’s Final Jury Instructions at 36-37.) Defendant provided no explanation for why this

instruction was legally faulty. Moreover, it is entirely consistent with existing law. See United

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 12 of 16
 The Court notes that the only reason evidence of the sexual assault was admitted in this

4

case was that Defendant refused to stipulate to the existence of his DNA at the scene. 

Accordingly, in the course of introducing the DNA evidence (Defendant’s sperm) the

government was entitled to explain how Defendant’s DNA ended up in the Robinsons’ home.

 The decision of Defendant’s previous counsel not to contest venue was almost certainly

5

a strategic one. Defendant is from Philadelphia, and this represents his home district. Moreover,

by avoiding trial in New Jersey, Defendant bypassed the possibility that citizens from southern

New Jersey would be on the jury. 

13

States v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Panepinto, 430 F.2d 613, 615

(3d Cir. 1970).

In connection with the juryinstructions, Defendant also attempted before the final day of trial

to seek a limiting instruction with respect to the jury’s consideration of evidence involving the sexual

assault at the Robinson home. The Court did include such instruction: “The defendant is not on trial 4

for any act or conduct not charged in the indictment. Evidence that the defendant may have

committed an act at one time or on one occasion is not admissible to prove the character of the

defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity with that act in this case.” (Court’s Final Jury

Instructions at 38.)

2. Jurisdiction and Venue

Defendant asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case and that venue here is

improper. (Def.’s Mot. at 2, ¶ 7.) The Court has jurisdiction over this action because Defendant was

charged under federal statutes and appeared before the Court. See United States v. Harrison, Civ.

A. No. 03-430, 2006 WL 287857, at *3 n.16 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3231;

Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)).

Defendant’s objection as to venue also fails. Defendant raised venue as a possible issue prior

to trial. (Dec. 8, 2006 Tr. at 24.) After Defendant failed to request a venue instruction during the 5

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 13 of 16
 By the time of trial Defendant was acting pro se. Therefore, any failure to preserve this

6

issue lies entirely at his doorstep.

14

charging conference, however, the Court did not instruct the jury on venue. 

In United States v. Perez, the Third Circuit provided a lengthy discussion concerning the

procedural requirements for maintaining a venue objection and the circumstances under which a

district court should present the issue to the jury. 280 F.3d 318, 327-336 (3d Cir. 2002). With

respect to preserving the issue, Perez held that: 

[W]here the indictment alleges venue without a

facially obvious defect, the failure to instruct the jury

to determine whether that venue is proper is reversible

error only when (1) the defendant objects to venue

prior to or at the close of the prosecution’s case-inchief, (2) there is a genuine issue of material fact with

regard to proper venue, and (3) the defendant timely

requests a jury instruction.

Perez, 280 F.3d at 327. In the instant case, even assuming Defendant satisfied the first two prongs

of the Perez test, he failed to request a jury instruction on venue. (Dec. 13, 2006 Tr. at 3.8-3.14; 6

Dec.14, 2006 Tr. at 4.2-4.12.)

3. Evidence at Trial that Defendant was Incarcerated

Defendant’s final miscellaneous objection is that the jury heard from two different witnesses

that he was incarcerated and from one of those witnesses that he was involved, along with that

witness, in beating another prisoner. (Def.’s Mot. at 2, ¶ 11.) Defendant fails to note that he called

the witnesses in question and therefore opened the door to the nature of his relationship with those

witnesses as it pertained to their motives to lie for him. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 676 F.

Supp. 604, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1987).

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 14 of 16
15

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal or, in the

alternative, a new trial, are denied. 

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 15 of 16
 As part of this criminal case Defendant has filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of 1

Civil Procedure 65 seeking injunctive relief against certain individuals within the Federal

Detention Center. Defendant requests that the Court consolidate this motion with the instant

criminal proceeding. Not only has Defendant failed to property raise his Rule 65 motion, but it is

plainly inappropriate to “consolidate” such a civil action with his ongoing criminal case. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : 

: CRIMINAL ACTION

v. :

: No. 04-506-1

ERIC HUMBERT :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 27 day of July, 2007, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motions for a th

Judgment of Acquittal or, in the Alternative, a New Trial, and Defendant’s Motion for Ex Parte

Injunction and Restraining Order, and for the foregoing and following reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial (Document Nos.

167, 168, & 170) are DENIED.

2. Defendant’s motion for injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order

(Document No. 225) is DENIED.

1

3. Defendant’s sentencing is scheduled for August 27, 2007, at 10:30 a.m. in

Courtroom 5C. 

BY THE COURT:

Berle M. Schiller, J.

Case 2:04-cr-00506-BMS Document 227 Filed 07/27/07 Page 16 of 16