UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

GRACE LAWRENCE ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 vs. ) 

 ) Civil Action No. 02-CV-4440 

TRANS UNION, LLC ) 

 ) 

 and ) 

 ) 

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 )

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF GRACE LAWRENCE’S 

SUR-REPLY TO DEFENDANT TRANS UNION, LLC’S REPLY 

IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 Plaintiff Grace Lawrence, through undersigned counsel, submits this Sur-Reply to 

Defendant Trans Union, LLC’s (“TU”) Reply is Further Support of Its Motion for Summary 

Judgment to respond to several arguments and assertions made by TU for the first time in its 

Reply. As set forth more specifically below, this Court should deny Defendant’s Motion on all 

grounds. 

I. ARGUMENT

A. This Is Not A Case Against Superior Information Services: TU’s Attempt To 

Pass The Buck Fails 

In its Reply Brief, TU relies upon two new declarations from agents of Superior 

Information Services (“Superior”), a furnisher of public records who sold to TU judgment 

information concerning Ms. Lawrence and who, at the direction of TU, purportedly investigated 

Ms. Lawrence’s disputes for $5. Ironically, these declarations do not suggest that TU did not err 

in reporting a $2,951 judgment against Ms. Lawrence, when that judgment was actually in her 

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favor. Rather, the Superior declarations indicate that Superior employs the highest standards and 

provides accurate information regarding public records to TU. (See Cerbus Declaration at ¶¶3, 

6-8 and Palmer Declaration at ¶¶ 6-8, both of which are attached to TU’s Reply Brief). Thus, 

based on these declarations one may surmise that the obvious mistake of reporting the judgment 

against Ms. Lawrence, instead of in her favor, was a result of TU’s faulty procedures, and not 

Superior’s conduct. This conclusion is especially likely since TU has already admitted that it has 

no knowledge as to the whether Ms. Lawrence has ever had a judgment against her and has never 

seen any records concerning this judgment. (See Little Dep. in Lawrence at 69-70, which is 

attached to Plaintiff’s Opposition at the end of Exhibit H). 

More importantly, however, this is not a case against Superior. Plaintiff does not claim

here that Superior owed her some duty that it breached. Rather, Plaintiff claims that TU’s owes 

her the duties of (1) using procedures that assure “maximum possible accuracy” in reporting her 

credit information (15 U.S.C. § 1681(e)(b)) and (2) investigating her deputes of any alleged 

inaccuracy on her credit report (15 U.S.C. § 1681i). The face of the FCRA makes clear that both 

of these duties belong to TU, the “consumer reporting agency.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(e)(b) and 

1681i. Although TU may be able to hire a third party to do some of its work, it cannot delegate 

its duties under the FCRA.1

 

 

1

 In a recent Eastern District of California case, TU lost its summary judgment motion arguing the exact 

same thing that its is arguing here – namely, that it acted reasonably by relying on a third party vendor to verify

certain public records information, in that case tax liens. See Soghomonian v. Unites States, et al., No. CV F 99-

5773 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2003) (a courtesy copy is attached hereto as Exhibit A). In denying TU’s motion for 

summary judgment, the Soghomonian court found that “[t]here is no FCRA exception to the reinvestigation 

requirement that automatically excuses a credit reporting agency from liability simply because the agency relies 

upon some other company to do the very thing the agency is required by law to do – i.e., reinvestigate and verify the 

status of disputes information.” Id. at 6 n.3. Moreover, the Soghomonian court held that “the caselaw is clear that a 

credit reporting agency does not act reasonably under the FCRA by deferring entirely to another source of 

information.” Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 

 

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Nor is there any doubt in this case that it was TU, and not Superior (or any other party), 

that was reporting the patently erroneous judgment information against Ms. Lawrence to the 

credit world for a period of approximately six years. Finally, there is no doubt here that TU (1) 

received and processed Ms. Lawrence’s disputes, (2) chose not to forward to Superior the docket 

information that Ms. Lawrence provide with her disputes, and (3) misleadingly communicated to 

Ms. Lawrence that the original source (i.e., the Philadelphia Municipal Court) had confirmed for 

TU that the judgment was correctly entered against her. 

In sum, Plaintiff has placed before this Court sufficient fact to support her claim that TU 

violated the FCRA. Accordingly, this Court should discount the Superior declarations and TU’s 

attempt to pass the buck. This Court should allow Plaintiff’s claims against TU to proceed to 

trial.2

B. TU’s Harping On The Statute Of Limitation Issue Is Only A Desperate And 

Misleading Attempt To Avoid The Merits 

In addition to trying to pass the buck to Superior, in its Reply TU tries to avoid the merits 

of this case (for the transparent reason that it has no defense on the merits) by misleadingly 

suggesting that Ms. Lawrence’s claims are not timely. For the sake of clarity, Plaintiff must 

reinforce two simple put important points. 

1. The Six-Year Statute Of Limitations Applies To Plaintiff’s 

Pennsylvania CPL Claim Only 

First, TU claims that it will be prejudiced if this Court were to apply a “nebulous six year 

state law” to Plaintiff’s “FCRA claim.” (TU’s Reply at 1). This is simply a desperate attempt to 

 

2

 Plaintiff subpoenaed Superior’s deposition in this matter on May 1, 2003. Superior responded to Plaintiff 

on May 20, 2003 that its client TU would coordinate the deposition. TU’s counsel, however, has repeatedly 

procrastinated in producing a Superior representative for deposition despite numerous requests by Plaintiff’s 

counsel. Although TU’s counsel have been unable for almost three months to produce such a witness to Plaintiff, 

they have apparently had no difficulty in getting two Superior representative to prepare declarations in support of 

TU’s motion for summary judgment. 

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convince the Court that Plaintiff is trying to recover for damages dating back to 1997 under the 

FCRA. That is false. 

Plaintiff’s FCRA claims seeks damages for only the two years prior to the filing of the 

lawsuit. Plaintiff has also asserted a Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law (“CPL”) claim,

however, which has a six-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5527(6); Gabriel v. 

O’Hera, 534 A.2d 488 (Pa. Super. 1987). This CPL claim is properly pled and TU has cited to 

no authority in support of its contention that Plaintiff may not recover under the CPL under the 

facts of this case. For that claim alone, a consideration of damages dating back to 1997 would be 

appropriate. Id. 

Initially, TU contended that the CPL has only a two-year statute of limitations – but cited 

only to cases where the CPL was applied in the fraud context. (See TU’s Brief in Support of its 

Motion for Summary Judgment at 13). Now, after Plaintiff pointed out to this Court in her 

Opposition the appropriate six-year statute of limitation for Plaintiff’s CPL claim, TU has 

retracted from that position. Nevertheless, TU would like to avoid the fact that its misreporting 

of the civil judgment has been causing harm to Plaintiff since 1997 by confusing Plaintiff’s CPL 

claim with her FCRA claim. TU’s argument lacks merit and must be rejected. 

2. The Two-Year Statute Of Limitations For Plaintiff’s FCRA Claims 

Has Still Not Run, And Will Not Expire Until May 1, 2004 

Second, TU insinuates that none of Plaintiff’s claims for damages are cognizable under 

the FCRA’s two-year statute of limitations. This contention also is false. 

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the present matter on July 3, 2003. She has come forward 

with facts that TU did not remove the judgment from her credit report until July of 2002, that she 

disputed the judgment with TU in February of 2001 and that she has suffered damage in 2000-

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2002 (e.g. July 2001 Chase credit denial and humiliation and anxiety throughout the entire period 

of the misreporting of the judgment). This evidence supports her timely FCRA claim. 

Interestingly, although TU harps on the statute of limitations, it fails to cite the only

authority within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that squarely addresses how to measure the 

statute of limitations under the FCRA. See Jaramillo v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 

155 F. Supp.2d 356, 359-61 (E.D. Pa. 2001). In Jaramillo, Chief Judge Giles concluded that the 

two-year FCRA statute of limitations begins to run anew from the date of each violation. He 

held that “each transmission of the same credit report is a separate and distinct tort to which a 

new statue of limitation applied.” See Jaramillo, 155 F. Supp.2d at 359-61 (citing Hyde v. 

Hibernia, 861 F.2d 446, 450 (5th Cir. 1988)). Thus, since TU’s own records show that it 

continued to report the judgment to creditors until at least May of 2002,3 the FCRA statute of 

limitations has still not run – and would not expire until May 1, 2004. TU’s contention, 

therefore, that Plaintiff does not have a timely FCRA claim is without any merit and must be 

rejected. 

C. Recent Authority From The Eastern District Of Pennsylvania (Sheffer v. 

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Trans Union, LLC et al.) Supports 

Plaintiff’s Claim For Punitive Damages 

On July 24, 2003, in Sheffer, Judge Berle M. Schiller issued a Memorandum and Order 

denying a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Trans Union, LLC. See Sheffer v. 

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., C.A. No. 02-7407, 2003 WL 21710573 (E.D. Pa. Jul 24, 

2003). TU’s motion in Sheffer presented several of the identical arguments it has asserted in its 

instant motion regarding its general procedures for reporting credit information and responding 

 

3

 TU’s own records of June 24, 2002, show that TU sold to Wells Fargo Financial Plaintiff’s credit report on 

“05/2000.” See Exhibit C to Plaintiff’s Opposition (attaching 6/24/02 TU credit report at end of that Exhibit). 

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to disputes received from consumers, as well as the types of damages available under the FCRA. 

Sheffer specifically addresses these issues, citing statutory authority and caselaw. 

 Importantly, Sheffer allowed the plaintiff’s punitive damages claim to proceed to trial on 

the basis of substantially similar deposition testimony from TU’s Consumer Relations Manager, 

Eileen Little, that Plaintiff has placed before this Court in the instant case. (See Plaintiff’s 

Opposition at Exhibit H). Given the Sheffer Court’s disposition of these same legal arguments, 

in addition to the reasons Ms. Lawrence has present to this Court in her Opposition, Plaintiff 

submits that this Court should also find that punitive damages are available in this case. 

 II. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, as well as the reasons set forth in Plaintiff’s Opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion, Defendant Trans Union LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be 

denied. 

Respectfully submitted, 

 FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C.

 BY: ____________________________

 JAMES A. FRANCIS, ESQUIRE 

MARK D. MAILMAN, ESQUIRE 

JOHN SOUMILAS, ESQUIRE 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff 

 Land Title Building, 19th Floor 

 100 South Broad Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19110 

 (215) 735-8600 

Date: August 21, 2003 

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