U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

92–186PDF 2004

UNITED STATES AND THE IRAQI MARSHLANDS:

AN ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND CENTRAL ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 24, 2004

Serial No. 108–74

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairwoman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

YLEEM POBLETE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

GREGG RICKMAN, Senior Professional Staff Member 

DAVID ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MATT ZWEIG, Staff Associate 

AMY SERCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Gordon West, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near 

East, U.S. Agency for International Development ............................................ 4

John Wilson, Senior Environmental Officer, Bureau for Asia and the Near 

East, U.S. Agency for International Development ............................................ 6

Fernando R. Miralles–Wilhelm, Assistant Professor, Departments of Civil, 

Architectural and Environmental Engineering, University of Miami ............. 18

Azzam Alwash, Senior Project Advisor, Eden Again ............................................ 46

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Letter addressed to Azzam Alwash from Dott. Corrado Cline, Ministry for 

the Environment and Territory .......................................................................... 3

Gordon West and John Wilson: Prepared statement ............................................ 8

Fernando R. Miralles–Wilhelm: Prepared statement ........................................... 22

Azzam Alwash: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 47

(1)

UNITED STATES AND THE IRAQI

MARSHLANDS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL

RESPONSE 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND CENTRAL ASIA, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(Chairwoman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Thank you so much. 

I want to thank the witnesses who will be testifying this morning 

and during this hearing on the ecological disasters that have taken 

place in southern Iraq. Thank you so much for being here, and I 

thank the audience members as well. 

What is important to understand about this situation is that this 

disaster was manmade. It was the product of the corrupt, terrorridden government of Saddam Hussein. This region, known as the 

‘‘Eden of Iraq,’’ was destroyed. Saddam’s regime built dams, dikes, 

and canals to drain these ancient marshes to punish the Marsh 

Arabs for their support of the Shi’ites who rebelled against his 

forces immediately after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Because 

they were accused of hiding rebels, deserters, and other opponents 

of Saddam, all Marsh Arabs were punished. Their way of life, their 

homes, and their very existence was pushed to the edge of extinction. 

Yet, Saddam did more than evict thousands of people from their 

homes. He brought ecological devastation to this ancient area. 

These once thriving wetlands were drained by over 90 percent. Entire habitats were ruined, water quality was drastically diminished, 

and climate conditions were affected. Health conditions resulting 

from this slaughter are yet to be fully known. The economy of the 

region that depended on the marshlands was also ruined. Fishing 

in the Persian Gulf has suffered as well. 

Now that Saddam Hussein and his criminal regime are part of 

an unhappy history, attention must turn to restoring the marshlands. 

While Congress chose not to fund this important effort last year when the Administration asked for a total of $100,000,000, today 

we must reexamine the issue. There are several projects under way 

toward reconstructing the area, and I understand the USAID is 

2

asking for $4,000,000 this year to conduct studies of the needs of 

this area. 

Those needs are many. They include an alleviation of the soil salinity, restoration of the vegetation and habitat areas for wildlife 

and, if possible, a restoration of the homes for the Marsh Arabs, 

so many of whom remain as refugees in their own countries and 

neighboring ones as well. 

I am interested in learning what efforts will be made to restore 

the refugees to their homes. I would also like to know what are the 

needs for the reestablishment of the wildlife that was chased from 

the area with the destruction of the marshlands. 

Among our witnesses today, two in particular are working on 

projects to restore this vital area to its former condition: 

Dr. Azzam Alwash is the Senior Project Adviser of the Eden 

Again Project, which is part of the Iraq Foundation. He has been 

working on various methods and strategies to restore this region, 

and he has brought us a letter to include in the record. I will ask 

that this letter from the Iraq Foundation to the Italian Minister of 

the Environment be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

3


92186a.eps
4

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will also hear from Dr. Fernando 

Miralles-Wilhelm from the University of Miami’s Department of 

Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering, he is also 

working on a project for restoration of the marshlands. 

Additionally, we will hear from Mr. Gordon West, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the United States Agency for International 

Development. Mr. West is responsible for all USAID programs for 

the Asia region. 

Thank you, Mr. West. 

USAID has taken a clear lead in working in restoring the marshlands. I know that your administrator has taken a particular interest in the marshlands, and we thank Andrew for that. 

Also from USAID, Doctor John Wilson, the Senior Environmental 

Officer for USAID’s Bureau for Asia and Near East, will testify. 

All of our witnesses today will explain to the Subcommittee not 

only what needs to be done for the restoration of the marshlands 

but what the costs, both human and material, will be to bring this 

restoration to reality. 

Saddam Hussein’s wanton destruction of the marshlands and the 

lives of so many has left lasting damage to the environment and 

to society. His actions here were yet one more sign of a brutal dictatorship that had been left to weave its evil intent on the land of 

Iraq. 

An area this vital to so many people spread over such a wide 

area needs to be brought back to life in order to erase the scars 

of a dictator. As our witnesses relate their findings and recommendations to the marshlands, I hope that they will further detail the extent of the destruction and particularly the human price 

paid for this horrific punitive act. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses today, 

and we will begin with Mr. West. 

Thank you. All of your statements will be made a part of the 

record, and you will feel free to summarize as you wish. Thank you. 

Mr. West. 

STATEMENT OF GORDON WEST, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. WEST. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, distinguished experts and 

guests, I thank you very much for this opportunity to present to 

the Subcommittee on behalf of USAID concerning work in the Iraqi 

marshlands. 

First, just for clarification on the record, although I do oversee 

Asia, for the last year my primary responsibilities have been directly overseeing all work in Iraq. So that has been my overwhelming task for the past months. 

I must say I am not an environmentalist, so I am going to leave 

the details and the specifics on the scientific end to Dr. Wilson and 

other experts today. 

To echo your statement, our Administrator, Mr. Natsios, is passionately concerned of the status of the Marsh Arabs and the 

marshlands themselves as represented by the pictures all over his 

office walls. 

5

I, too, in a general sense, although not knowing the specifics of 

the environmental side, have followed closely the concerns and the 

initiatives that have been undertaken over the past year. 

I would note that many of the factors that impact on the marshland areas are really external to itself—in other words, they are 

captive to many upstream actions which, in his case, were vicious 

in nature in cutting people off from the source of their livelihood, 

also work in the opposite trend. 

Currently, there are several billions of dollars invested in the 

area of water, irrigation, wastewater management. For instance, 

the health impact of the pollution of the water of the Tigris and 

Euphrates is having a tremendous impact on the health of the peoples of the marshlands. 

One of the primary causes of that is the fact that raw sewage 

from Baghdad is put into the rivers. That is a major challenge to 

clean up the waters of the rivers, and that really starts with Baghdad, where a large percentage of the population lies. We are hoping 

that by this summer most of the large-scale, direct dumpage of 

sewage will be curtailed and that new facilities will be online for 

the majority of the population of Baghdad. 

Similarly, other types of ongoing activities, many of which, unfortunately, we do not read about very often in the papers, are ongoing at the local government level, involving health, involving education, the development of local government structures, civil action 

programs that involve communities in the resolution of their own 

problems. We are very encouraged by the cooperation among military, USAID, communities, local governments, and the people 

themselves, to resolve problems at the local level. 

That said, there are very specific factors that are internal to the 

marshlands. They were very well highlighted, the challenges we 

face, in an article in The New York Times, the other day, very interesting. It does highlight the complexity of the issues involved. 

To begin addressing these issues, USAID has already committed 

$4 million—they were really taken from fiscal year 2003 funding—

to begin an environmental study on the problems in the marshlands. 

We are doing that in cooperation with the State Department 

OES Bureau, and we are initiating an international effort to examine and find common solutions to some of the issues in the marshlands. 

Some of the areas that we have focused on, first, is analyzing the 

extent of damage to the marshlands areas. Up to recently we really 

were only able to get satellite and remote sensing photography to 

analyze the issues. We have had teams that have been going in 

now, that are able to take water, soil samples and other scientific 

studies to begin to examine on the ground the exact extent of the 

damage. 

A lot of what we have been able to do is to also establish relations with the people themselves, to understand what they have 

been through. 

We have been able to reinitiate contact with the scientific community. This includes institutions like the University of Basra and 

many other of the local institutions and the government themVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:57 Apr 19, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MECA\022404\92186 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

selves, the various ministries who have oversight in this multi-sectorial area. 

Beyond that, we also have been able to lead the development of 

a framework for international cooperation. In addition to United 

States interests, we note that Canada, Italy, Australia and Japan, 

to mention a few, have already stepped up and are very interested 

in becoming actively involved in trying to find solutions and provide resources toward the problems faced in the marshlands. 

I would like to now turn to Dr. Wilson for a more detailed examination of both findings of our initial research and the best means 

for helping to restore the marshlands, Doctor John Wilson. 

Thank you so much, Ms. Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. West. 

Dr. Wilson. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN WILSON, SENIOR ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. WILSON. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, distinguished members of 

the audience, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss and testify 

before the Subcommittee on USAID’s efforts to restore the Iraqi 

marshlands. 

The Mesopotamia marshlands once comprised more than 20,000 

square kilometers of interconnected lakes, mudflats, and wetlands. 

These marshes were spread over an area twice the size of the Everglades, and they served as home for the Marsh Arabs for the past 

5,000 years. 

As we just heard from you and Gordon West, over the course of 

the past decade the regime of Saddam Hussein systematically and 

maliciously drained and destroyed these globally important wetlands. By 1999, the drainage of the marshlands was largely over. 

The only marshland left of any note was the northern port of the 

al Hawizeh marsh, which straddled the Iraq-Iran border. 

By the beginning of 2003, just 7 percent of the marshland remained. The marshlands had been dispersed and decimated. An 

area once known for its cultural richness and biodiversity had 

largely been destroyed. 

Although the situation is dire, there are signs of hope. There has 

been recent reflooding throughout the marshlands. This reflooding 

is due to a combination of heavier than normal snowfalls in the 

North, the deliberate destruction of structures by the people in the 

area, the opening of gates by the Ministry of Water Resources, and 

the release of water by Iran to the east. Recent imagery from 

NASA shows that what was once 7 percent of the remaining wetlands is now 30 percent, so there are signs of hope. 

The dynamic scale and complexity of any effort to assist the 

Marsh Arabs and rehabilitate the marshlands will require an international partnership of donors, humanitarian groups, technical experts and direct stakeholders working toward a common vision of 

what is both desirable, realistically achievable and sustainable. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the State 

Department, in close collaboration with the Coalition Provisional 

Authority and the Iraq Ministry of Water Resources, are leading an 

interagency effort to develop this vision and framework for action. 

7

Indeed, this effort is intended to foster and support the growing 

international effort for the restoration of the Iraqi marshlands and 

the livelihood of the Marsh Arabs who reside in and around them. 

The rehabilitation of Iraq’s marshlands has been treated by some 

as a largely technical problem that can be dealt with through specialized expertise. USAID’s perspective is that restoration of Iraq’s 

marshlands will require a complicated multi-party collaboration 

that brings stakeholders such as the Marsh Arabs together to express their own goals in order to move toward reaching shared 

goals and strategies. 

It is already apparent, as that New York Times article mentioned, that what seemed like a simple matter of reflooding the 

marshes has turned into an endeavor as tangled as the aquatic 

plants taking root there. Some of the Marsh Arabs look forward to 

reflooding depending on fishing and water buffalo. Others do not, 

preferring to pursue dry lands agriculture. 

To set the stage for this complex wetlands rehabilitation effort, 

USAID supported a rapid assessment of the marshlands last June. 

For the most part, the team returned with promising initial findings. 

After visiting existing flooded and drained marshes, early concerns due to elevated soil salinity levels seemed less serious than 

originally anticipated. The water levels also showed lower 

salinities. In addition, the team established relations at local institutions, such as staff from both district and national level of Ministry of Water resources and the University of Basra, who will be 

key counterparts for the marshland restoration effort. 

Any program dealing with the management and rehabilitation of 

the Iraqi marshland will need to address the increasing competition for water. While they have undergone drastic and irreversible 

change, other areas upstream have been undergoing transformation. The situation is compounded by dam building. By 2001, 

32 dams were already built on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, 

with another 21 planned or under construction, including on the 

Karke River in Iran. 

These findings and constraints, including the availability of 

water, are being incorporated into the design of the marshland restoration program which will proceed along two tracks. At the national level, the Ministry of Water Resources is receiving assistance 

with hydrological modeling and strategic planning. Serious planning must be grounded on an understanding of water availability 

within the basin. 

Development of hydrological models for the entire basin is already under way by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and by the 

Ministry of Water Resources, and the results of this modeling will 

be used in conjunction with strategic planning by the Ministry of 

Water Resources to inform water resources management decisionmaking at national and local levels. 

At the local level, the marshlands restoration program seeks to 

extend social and economic assistance to the marsh dwellers, introducing in quick order carefully targeted interventions to improve 

the livelihood of the Marsh Arabs and others residing around the 

marshes. 

8

Key areas of opportunity currently being investigated include rehabilitation of date palm orchards, looking at livestock support, 

and fisheries reclamation. We are also looking at ways to address 

the chronic health needs in the marshlands where the lack of clean 

drinking water in the area is a problem. 

The field of marshland restoration is unfamiliar to Iraq’s educational and scientific communities. Environmental science is also 

poorly understood. An essential challenge to the marshland restoration program is to change the previous record of destruction to 

a spring boom for environmental protection and rejuvenation. 

Given limited resources, USAID’s marshland program will not be 

able to undertake ambitious, long-term institution-building, but 

rather we will focus on providing targeted opportunities for Iraqis 

in government, universities, and in research centers to learn about 

and adopt marshland management approaches through short 

courses, international study tours, and complementary laboratory 

work. For example, we are proceeding with a study of the Everglades to better understand wetland management. A scoping team 

is currently in Basra conducting data collection, identifying sites 

for restoration activities, and identifying intervention for economic 

assistance. 

How much of the original marshland can be restored remains to 

be determined. Water availability will be a limiting factor, and it 

is unlikely the marshlands can ever be restored to their full glory. 

Nevertheless, restoration of the marshlands deserves a high priority in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq due to their importance 

to the economy, security, and ecology of the region. 

I look forward to the successful implementation of the marshland 

restoration program. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. West and Mr. Wilson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GORDON WEST, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, AND

JOHN WILSON, SENIOR ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE

NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Summary: In the highly dynamic, post-war situation, the U.S. Agency for International Development is leading an interagency effort with the U.S. State Department’s Bureau for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 

(OES) to develop an action plan for marshland restoration. The $4 million program 

intends to integrate economic development and ecosystem marsh management, implement restoration and social economic assistance programs, collect and monitor 

data for reflooded sites, and develop capacity in Iraqi government and universities 

in marshland management and restoration. 

From June 15–28, 2003, USAID project staff met with marsh dwellers to assess 

social and economic conditions. The team visited a wide range of tribesmen and 

women throughout the marshes from the traditional floating islands populations to 

rice growers living on the periphery. They extensively visited the existing, reflooded, 

and drained marshes on the ground and in helicopter flyovers. Foreign and Iraqi 

experts have collected soil and water samples from the natural and reflooded 

marshes. All of the USAID-financed activities have involved scientists from the University of Basra and established working relationships with national and district 

level Ministry of Water Resources officers. 

Preliminary conclusions on the status of the marshes note that some portions of 

Hawizeh and Hammar marsh still retain native vegetation and good water quality. 

Some of the formerly drained wetlands have recently been reflooded. These regions 

may be a seed source and faunal population base for restoring the drained marshes. 

By contrast, Central marsh has suffered massive drainage, and little wetland remains. Vast areas of former marsh are now barren or are sparsely covered with 

9

Tamarix and other desert species. Dust storms are now prevalent in the former 

marsh areas. 

The next steps in the marsh assistance program include more on-the-ground investigation and discussions with Iraqi officials to understand the drainage system 

and develop a precise inventory of all structures. People in the marshes want clean 

drinking water, mosquito control, jobs, health care, and improved security. Marshbased activities alone will probably not provide an adequate economic base. The previous regime’s aggressive policies draining the marshes and promoting unsustainable wheat-growing as a monoculture undermined the region’s economic base. 

I. INTRODUCTION

Historical Background: The Iraqi Marshlands 

In little more than a decade, Saddam Hussein’s regime systematically destroyed 

one of the world’s largest wetlands ecosystems. This environmental disaster, perpetrated in the roughly 20,000 square kilometer marshlands of southern Iraq, an 

area more than twice the size of the Florida Everglades, has been compared in scale 

to the drying up of the Aral Sea in Central Asia and the deforestation of the Amazon. The area was once famous for its cultural richness and biodiversity. The 

marshes were the permanent habitat for millions of birds and a flyway for billions 

more migrating between Siberia and Africa. Sixty-six bird species may now be at 

risk. Other populations are thought to be in serious decline. Coastal fisheries in the 

Persian Gulf used the marshlands for spawning migrations, and they served as 

nursery grounds for shrimp and fish. Now fish catches have been significantly decreased. The marshlands also once served as a natural filter for waste and other 

pollutants in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, protecting the gulf which has now become noticeably degraded along the coast of Kuwait. 

The indigenous marsh dwellers already have a special place in the anthropological 

and travel literature for their alluring way of life, living in harmony with the environment on manmade reed islands and along the periphery of the marshes in relative isolation. They may have numbered a half a million in the 1950s and a quarter of a million in the early 1990s. In 1991, a populist Shi’a uprising at the end 

of the Gulf War brought down the full and brutal weight of the Baghdad regime. 

The military raided settlements, killed tens of thousands of Marsh Arabs—although 

the actual number may be higher, burned settlements, and killed livestock, destroying the core of the local economy. 

The period from 1991 to 1997 was marked by engineering programs which 

drained the marshes through the construction of manmade rivers and canals of massive proportions and overblown names. They diverted water from the marshes to irrigate vast areas for uneconomical and unsustainable wheat production, fill huge depressions or ponds to evaporate, or drain into the Shatt Al Arab. A disproportionate 

share of the country’s limited resources was channeled into these works. By 1999, 

the draining of the marshes was largely over. The only remaining marsh of any note 

was the northern portion of Hawizeh which straddles the Iran-Iraq border. The 

other two marshes, Hammar and Central to the west, were totally desiccated. 

At the beginning of 2003, only seven percent of the original marshlands remained. 

However, there has been some recent reflooding throughout the marshes. This water 

appears to be from a combination of heavier than usual snows in the north, the deliberate destruction of structures by people in the area after the war, the opening 

of gates by local government officers, and the release of water by Iran to the east. 

Marsh Dwellers: Identity, Settlement and Rights 

As recently as the 1970s, there was a limited government presence in the marshlands. The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s brought the Saddam Hussein regime in full 

military strength, and the displacement of tribes closest to the border began. Marsh 

dwellers were moved from Hawizeh in 1984 so that a dike for gun emplacements 

and a large army base could be built. The dike effectively drained large areas of 

the marsh and started the people on a series of forced moves over the succeeding 

15 years. It was also the most sustained contact with the government to date. The 

marsh dwellers were said to have strongly supported the Iraq government during 

that war. The situation became more unstable with the Gulf War, and there are reports that both marsh dwellers and outsiders escaped into the marshes for refuge, 

this time earning the wrath of the Iraqi army. 

Following the Gulf War in February 1991, the Shi’a population rebelled against 

the regime after active outside encouragement, apparently taking control of most of 

the South. In March, the government brought in tanks and helicopters and regained 

control through the brutal killing of 100,000 or more people and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns. The drainage of the marshes was then put into high 

10

gear, becoming one of the highest government priorities, despite the huge investment required. The period also marked an expanded effort to force the marsh dwellers into internal displacement or foreign exile. Roughly 100,000 southern Iraqis are 

in border refugee camps in Iran; an uncertain number are in Saudi Arabia. No one 

is certain how many marsh dwellers live within the former or still existing marshlands, but estimates suggest 100,000 to 150,000 other marsh dwellers have moved 

farther outside the area, usually to the cities in the South. 

Given the social upheaval during the past 20 years, intensifying over the last 12, 

the team was particularly interested in better understanding the extent to which 

this treatment was uniform across the marshes, the degree of displacement and social disorder, and strategies for economic assistance in such a war-torn environment. 

Diversity within the Marsh Dweller Population 

Marsh Arabs are members of nine major indigenous tribes and live within and 

on the margins of the marshes. Initial findings of a USAID-funded demographic census and public health survey, indicate that there are roughly 85,000 people who are 

Marsh dwellers still living in or residing on the margins of the marshes. This number is roughly double what people generally have believed to still be in the area and 

a third of population 20 years ago. In addition to the Marsh Arabs there are peripheral dwellers, not members of those nine tribes, who utilize the marshes directly or 

indirectly. 

There are five major patterns of settlement and economic use of the marshes for 

those who are living in marsh, on its periphery, or were forced into internal or external exile. These differences have important implications for deciding who are to 

be the beneficiaries of the marshlands program.

1. Marsh Arabs living inside the marshes in traditional patterns, having a long 

history of living on small, isolated islands.

There are marsh dwellers still residing in the interior of Hammar marsh in 

small communities. This is an area written about the earlier travelers’ accounts. The one settlement visited, named Al bu Ajaj in Al Chibayish, was 

first displaced in 1991 and moved as a group eight times in nine years, only 

to be brought back by the army to within a kilometer of where they began. 

They spoke of burned houses and killed livestock. They now live in both reed 

and unbaked mud brick houses and have boats for fishing, water buffalo for 

a major part of their diet, and minor agricultural productivity. These people 

are suffering from malnutrition and water-borne diseases and drinking untreated and unfiltered water directly out of the marsh. They have neither 

schools nor primary health care.

2. Marsh Arabs who had lived in the marshes but were displaced to drained 

areas on the margin of the present marshes.

Displaced dwellers were moved between six and sixteen times during a nine 

year period. Among the early displaced people were the dwellers in Turaba 

in Hawizeh marsh on the Iran border, who were relocated in 1984 when the 

army built a dike and large base on their village site. Many more were displaced in 1991after the Shi’a uprising.

3. People living stably on the edge of newly reflooded marshes with a mixed 

economy.

Villages of people who have historically lived in cement-surfaced brick houses 

now reside along the periphery of Hammar marsh. These people were never 

displaced during the Saddam Hussein regime. They practiced a mixed economy, working in agriculture with palm trees intercropped with other crops, 

growing wheat, and tending sheep and goats. They also exploited the 

marshes with boats: fishing, birding, and collecting reeds. Those activities 

ceased with the drainage of the marsh in 1991, but the population quickly 

returned to marsh activities in mid-April with the reflooding.

4. People living stably on the margin of the newly reflooded marshes who previously did not use the marsh as part of their economy.

Villages which were equally stable historically, its residents not having been 

displaced during the years of drainage, also reside along the western periphery of Hammar marsh. Here, the people grew palms, intercropped with winter wheat and summer rice. This season is the first time in 12 years that 

they have been able to grow rice, a good income earner, because of the reflooding of Hammar. These people have never exploited the marshes, except 

by drawing its water for field crops. They do not fish, hunt, have boats, collect reeds, or make mats.

11

5. Former marsh dwellers who were internally displaced and live in the towns 

and cities not working in agriculture or marsh-related occupations.

A number of sub-tribes and individual marsh dwellers voluntarily left the 

marshes for cities and towns in the south. Others are said to be in Najaf and 

Baghdad or might have moved to the north as part of an Arabization of the 

Kurdish north. We do not know how many are in this category. People we 

met in Basra had moved from Hammar marsh in 1991. Many were working 

in occupations removed from the marshes, with the apparent exception of a 

sheikh who was a prominent importer of nylon nets from Thailand, which are 

widely used in the marshes by fisherman. They would consider returning to 

the marshes, where they spoke of large landholdings with orchards of date 

palms, but they demanded compensation for past mistreatment, new seed varieties, and a reliable water supply. 

Public Health Conditions and Concerns 

People in the marshlands suffer from an absence of primary health care, malnutrition, and contaminated drinking water. There are no government services. 

Schistosomiasis, worms, and cholera are prevalent. Clean drinking water is a problem throughout the area. Some people purchase tanker water, having some access 

to treated water, but those within the marshes drink directly from the untreated 

source. Drinking water quality was consistently mentioned by people as their first 

priority. Mosquitoes, which plagued people throughout the marshes, are the second 

priority heard from the marsh dwellers. The mosquito problem may have been worsened by the reflooding of the marshes which do not have adequate fish in number 

to eat the larvae. 

Economic Assistance: Local Economy and Opportunities 

The marshlands witnessed massive government investment over the past two decades to first drain the area and second develop an irrigation infrastructure for the 

cultivation of wheat. But there has been no investment to improve the lives of the 

local population for decades. All government policies and actions were directed toward making the people more subservient to and dependent upon the ruling clique. 

As a result, there is little economic opportunity within the marshes and on their 

periphery. The large numbers of displaced people were almost wholly dependent on 

monthly food allocations. Even those people who were not displaced and depended 

on wheat growing sold their harvests at a crippling loss to the government. The traditional economic pursuits, including commercial fishing and birding, were brought 

to a standstill. Mat-making continued in the larger towns of Al Chibayish and 

Hammar City, but was severely undermined by the drying of the marshes. 

Today, economic activity in the marshlands revolves around subsistence and limited market wheat-growing. Agricultural activity in the region is largely a 

monoculture, although there are a few pockets date palm orchards and vegetables 

grown on the river banks. 

Marshlands Status: Vegetation, Soil and Water 

Water and soil samples were taken along with field measurements at 36 sites for 

salinity, conductivity, pH, water temperature, total dissolved solids, and redox and 

oxygen to assess the ecological and biogeochemical status of marshes that had remained flooded, were recently flooded, or were totally drained and dried out since 

the early 1990s. Samples were also taken at selected locations along the Tigris and 

Euphrates rivers, the Shatt al Arab, and selected canals, in order to determine current water quality conditions as well as assess the nutrient and chemical status of 

waters that are flowing to either the Persian Gulf or in some cases into the 

marshes. In addition, drinking water samples were taken at selected locations including in the marsh Arab villages to determine the quality of water that people 

were drinking. The detailed results of the soil and water samples are available and 

will be published soon. 

Water Resources: Drainage Structures and Flow Data 

During the past twenty years, much of what was known about the drainage structures came from analyses of remote sensing photographs. The previously inaccessible area has been the battleground for three major wars and for a massive drainage effort which the Saddam Hussein regime characterized as the physical infrastructure for an irrigation network. The USAID scoping team made the first on-theground assessment of this massive drainage system to date. 

12

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Based on the historical background and recent research conducted regarding the 

marshlands and the local residents, USAID has reached the following preliminary 

conclusions. These conclusions inform the Agency’s program objectives and approach.

• After twenty years of almost continuous wars, sanctions, and persecution of 

the local people, the area is bereft of a stable economy and desirable employment opportunities. Marsh-based activities will probably not provide an adequate economic base to this savaged area.

• Despite their ethnic homogeneity, there are a number of distinct patterns of 

economic utilization of the marsh dwellers, both voluntary and involuntary. 

The most surprising pattern is by those living on the periphery: some practiced a mixed economy of agriculture and marsh use, while others only practiced agriculture, despite their physical proximity. With the reflooding of 

areas of the marshes, people often moved quickly to re-exploit the areas, taking up boating, fishing, and reed harvesting where sufficient reeds were available.

• Although there has been considerable physical and social upheaval during the 

past twenty years in the marshes, there is also a remarkable degree of social 

continuity, given that tribes or sub-tribes usually moved as a group from location to location by the government. The key role of tribal elders has remained 

largely intact.

• People in the marshes are requesting clean drinking water, mosquito control, 

employment opportunities, health care, and improved security. Many internally displaced people and external refugees are expected to return to the 

marshes in the coming months and years. They ask for social services that 

have never been accessible to them in the past but ought to be expected of 

any representative civil society in the future.

• More on-the-ground investigation and discussions with the Ministry of Water 

Resources district offices are needed to understand the drainage system and 

develop a precise inventory of all structures.

• Some portions of Hawizeh and Hammar marsh still retain native vegetation 

and good water quality. These regions may be a seed source and faunal population base for restoring the drained marshes. By contrast, Central marsh has 

suffered massive drainage, and little wetland remains.

• Vast areas of former marsh are now barren or are sparsely covered with 

Tamarix and other desert species. Dust storms are now prevalent in the 

former marsh areas. Larger than expected quantities of water were present 

in southern Iraq, and some of the formerly drained wetlands have recently 

been reflooded 

II. USAID PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

In response to the human and ecological conditions described above, USAID, in 

concert with international and local Iraqi stakeholders, has developed the following 

objectives for its 12-month program.

• To construct an accurate environmental, social, and economic baseline of the 

remaining and former marshlands to plan interventions and measure their 

success;

• To assist with the repatriation and resettlement of marshland dwellers in the 

region, who will require viable economic opportunities and social institutions 

that are fair and equitable and give them a voice;

• To improve the management of existing marshlands and explore options to 

restore adjacent drained marshes; and

• To develop and reach a broad consensus on a long-term comprehensive wetland restoration strategy integrated with a regional social and economic development program. 

Elements of the Program Approach 

The major elements of the program’s approach are to:

Integrate economic development and ecosystem marsh management;

Implement restoration and social economic assistance programs through priority pilot projects;

Collect and monitor data for reflooded sites; and

13

Develop local capacity in government and universities in marshland management and restoration. 

U.S. Agency and International Donor Participation 

In the highly dynamic, post-war situation, the U.S. Agency for International Development is leading an interagency effort with the U.S. State Department’s Bureau 

for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) to develop 

an action plan for marshland restoration. USAID and State/OES work closely with 

other government entities through the Interagency Marshlands Subgroup, the first 

of many anticipated special task forces addressing major environmental issues in 

Iraq. The subgroup includes representatives from the State Department, Army 

Corps of Engineers, U.S. Geological Survey, Environmental Protection Agency, Fish 

and Wildlife Service, and other agencies. 

The subgroup meets regularly to explore technical issues, review donor participation, and monitor progress. It is an aim of the U.S. government to internationalize 

the program, recognizing that the program’s ultimate success depends on both Iraqi 

and international participation and consensus. Thus far, the following bilateral donors have expressed an interest in supporting or directly participating in the program:

• Great Britain—supplied a technical expert on the second field trip to the 

marshlands;

• Australia—provide technical experts on marshlands and agricultural soil salinity problems and develop desalination strategies through the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), a recognized 

leader in the field;

• Canada—will provide technical expertise in biological monitoring and wildlife 

conservation to the second field visit and work in partnership in program design as the lead into a larger funded program; and

• Italy—fund modeling, water budgeting, and environmental assessments 

through the Iraq Foundation for a long-term program design.

• Japan—has expressed interest in providing equipment and funding rural infrastructure in the marshes

On the multilateral side, we have engaged the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, which draws upon a roster of internationally recognized experts 

in wetlands and marshlands for technical support. United Nations and other international agencies that have shown an interest in becoming involved in as yet to be 

determined roles include: the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the International Organization for Migration 

(IOM). The World Conservation Union (IUCN) has also expressed an interest in participating, particularly in working on water flow issues with other countries in the 

region. 

Accomplishments of USAID Program 

Implementation of USAID’s marshland restoration and management program was 

initiated with the fielding of a small technical team to conduct a rapid assessment 

of the current situation in the marshlands from June 15–28, 2003. This visit to the 

marshlands in southern Iraq was the first on-the-ground scientific assessment in 

two decades. Their goals were to begin data collection to develop an action plan for 

the program. 

Despite the security and communications concerns, the team’s work exceeded expectations. There was virtually no scientific database covering the past 30 years in 

the marshes. The few studies during the previous regime were politically motivated 

to give credence to the repressive actions. No social or economic information appear 

to exist for half a century. During the scoping trip, the team:

• Extensively visited the existing, reflooded, and drained marshes on the ground 

and in helicopter flyovers. This scoping team was the first scientific/development effort in the Iraq marshlands for at least two decades and the first to 

begin the systematic canvassing of the region. Previously, all information 

about the draining of the marshes and its impact was gleaned through remote 

sensing photography, never on the ground and analyzed from a distance. The 

team found several areas of healthy regrowth of reeds and other freshwater 

vegetation and wildlife, and others with serious salinity and only salt plants. 

Early concerns about endangered seed banks because of highly saline water 

and soils may be less serious than anticipated, but further investigation is required.

14

• Collected soil and water samples from the natural and reflooded marshes. The 

team collected approximately 60 marsh and drinking water and 20 soil samples in the three marshes in existing and reflooded sites and in the drained 

marshes. The samples are being analyzed for a full range of parameters, including salinity, toxicity, pesticides, heavy metals, and water vector diseases. 

The team also did immediate data analyses on salinity, conductivity, total dissolved solids, dissolved oxygen, and pH. An interesting finding was that salinity was far lower than had been anticipated. The salinity of most of the water 

was 1.0 part per thousand (PPT) or less, rather than the 3.0–5.0 ppt expected. 

This level will support new freshwater plant growth. However, one site was 

17.5 ppt, half of seawater, in a reflooded area of high soil salinity, with virtually no vegetative growth and no flowing water.

• Met with marsh dwellers to assess social and economic conditions. The team 

visited a wide range of tribesmen and women throughout the marshes from 

the traditional floating islands populations to rice growers living on the periphery. Many told horrific stories of repeated displacement, persecution, and 

destruction, eking out a minimal existence on wheat-growing and government 

handouts of basic foodstuffs. Others lived stably on the edges of the marshes, 

even during the entire time they were drained. Some never exploited the 

marshes directly, despite their proximity. Others had a mixed economy, and 

returned to the marshes, using boats for fishing and reed collecting when the 

waters returned two months ago. Initial conversations reveal diverse economic niches of the marsh dwellers. In general, they suffer from an absence 

of public heath services and lack clean drinking water. Many are drinking untreated water directly out of the marshes. Both illness and malnutrition are 

endemic.

• Involved scientists from the University of Basra. The previous regime systematically destroyed an independent, intellectual community in the country. The 

research centers and universities acted as Baathist havens. The College of 

Agriculture and the Marine Science Center are now shells of the well-known, 

highly regarded institutions they were once. Staff have been isolated from 

new developments in their fields for the past 20 years and lack any knowledge of environmental science and wetlands ecology, but they are well trained 

in their narrow technical fields. They are eager to participate in the program, 

which can offer training and research opportunities. The center was badly 

looted, although some faculty were able to hide equipment in their homes before the war ended. The center and other research entities will serve as partners on the program so that skills are transferred and wetlands management 

approaches can be institutionalized in Iraq.

• Established working relationships with national and district level Ministry of 

Water Resources officers and obtained some flow data. The team worked closely with the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) officers at the national and 

district levels. Both accompanied the team during its visits, collecting data, 

conducting interviews, and discussing program options actively. We see this 

as the first step toward their full participation. The team was able to collect 

some flow data during the visit from one district office. Visits to the district 

MWR offices in Al Amarah and Al Nasiriyah indicate the need for different 

strategies for partnering. The Al Amarah office had been entirely stripped, 

while the Al Nasiriyah office was completely intact, due to the quick thinking 

and effective actions of its director. As such, they are likely to play different 

program roles, at least in the short run. 

III. NEXT STEPS

USAID’s $4-million Marshlands Restoration and Management Program will provide social and economic assistance to the marsh dwellers integrated with wetlands 

restoration, and build the capacity of the Iraqi counterpart agencies including Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Environment. On-going interventions include:

• Implementing a river basin and hydraulic model of the marshes to improve 

water allocation and management through the Ministry of Water Resources 

and the US Army Corps of Engineers

• Equipping a soil and water quality lab at the newly established Center for 

Iraq Marshlands Restoration

• Implementing pilot projects in reconstructed wetlands focusing on improved 

waste drinking water and sewage treatment.

15

• Providing social economic assistance through job creation and income generating activities in agriculture/agribusiness; fisheries/aquaculture, livestock/

dairy production, and date palm reproduction

• Monitoring of water quality in reflooded sites.

• Extending health care services to the marsh dwellers in collaboration with 

AMAR Charitable Trust Foundation

• Arranging study tours for Iraq specialists and decision-makers to visit wetlands in the US and Europe in early 2004. Short courses on wetlands reconstruction and management will be offered for ministry officials and local decision-makers.

• Building local capacity by partnering with Iraqi institutions such as the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of the Environment and the University 

of Basrah, College of Agriculture as well as international NGO’s.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let’s talk about Iraq’s neighbors. What countries are helping out in trying to fix up the marshlands, if any, and 

what water projects taken up by neighboring countries following 

Saddam’s destruction of the marshes would impact or prevent further efforts to restore the region. 

Mr. WILSON. The neighboring countries are aware of the competing demands for water resources. The Ministry of Water resources has already approached Turkey to discuss water issues. 

These are issues we talk about internally at the State Department 

and USAID. We know it is going to take time, but the dialogue has 

begun. 

Indeed, the Iranian government has released information to help 

restore the marshland there. We think we need to focus on smallscale interventions and encourage that dialogue. That is where we 

are playing the game, right now. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Administration has asked for—did you 

want to say something, Mr. West—has asked for $50 million in the 

supplemental to build two regulators controlling the outflow from 

the marsh. These regulators are considered a first step and part of 

our larger effort that you were talking about. What are the other 

components of this effort, what is the estimated cost of those components, and what is the proposed time line being put forth for the 

complete restoration, if that is ever possible, of the marshes? 

Mr. WEST. Really, I think there is no complete picture or plan 

yet. We are really at the beginning stages. 

As noted, we are one of many countries, I believe, that are going 

to be stepping up later this month. There will be the first of the 

donor coordination sessions in Abu Dhabi. I believe the marshlands 

will be one of the major causes that does attract international 

funds. There is no long-term plan nor cost estimates yet, but we 

are optimistic that hearings such as this, publicity, the crying need 

of this situation, will attract the attention and the funding that it 

requires over the long term. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But are you depending on other countries to 

put forth that money, or do you think the Congress will do it? 

Where are those funds coming from? 

Mr. WEST. Right now, we are hopeful they will be forthcoming 

within the existing supplemental or future allocations. 

We note there are reserves that are unprogrammed currently 

from the existing supplemental, but as of this moment there are 

not additional commitments of funds within the U.S. Government 

resources. 

16

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What are the projected costs? In an ideal 

world, what would you think that it would cost? 

Mr. WILSON. What our approach has been is to develop a framework of action. 

In terms of projected costs, nobody has estimated that. All we 

can do is turn to the Everglades, and we know how much that cost. 

We can invite other donors, the Japanese, the Canadians, to join 

in partnership, and that is something that is actively being pursued by the Deputy Assistant Secretary Bud Rock in working with 

the administrator of USAID. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But if it seems it is going to cost so much 

and it seems like you could never really restore it, is it financially 

possible to undertake this project? What makes it worthwhile, if 

you are saying you do not know how much it is going to cost and 

you do not know where the money will come from and you do not 

know if it can ever be restored? 

Mr. WEST. What we can say is we believe life is better there now 

than it was a year ago. There is never perfection in life, and this 

will continue to be the case. 

There are many trade-offs. Clearly, the supply of water—if you 

look across the whole area, the Asia Near East runs from the Middle East to the south area to the Mekong region. There is tremendous competition for water from the upstream and downstream 

countries in subregions of countries, and, clearly, the marshland is 

sort of at the end of the food chain and is going to face tremendous 

pressures on water. So this is going to be a continuing issue, not 

only near-term, in restoring at whatever level. It is a long-term 

issue. 

We do believe that incremental changes can and will be positive, 

so we will continue to put all the resources that we can bring to 

bear on this, attract others, but there is no final solution that leads 

to a specific number or a target that we have right now. We can 

continue to improve, though. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Why is this project so needed? Why is it important for the United States and for our allies to contribute toward this effort? Why are the marshlands important? 

Mr. WEST. Well, there are ecological reasons, the bird life, the 

migration paths. There is the injustices of the past to these persons. There is also the need to bring closure to the divisions between the Shi’a, the South and the North; and this is a significant 

component. So there are a host of reasons, I think. You and the 

Committee understand this well, and hopefully the world in general starts to understand better. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And what was the extent of the damage to 

the various species that were evicted from the region? 

Mr. WILSON. It is difficult to document that in entirety because 

of the lack of information, lack of baseline information from the 

previous regime. 

We do know that the fisheries in the Gulf, for example, have suffered tremendously; and that is due in large part to the destruction 

of marshlands. 

The documented rich biodiversity of fauna and bird life has also 

been recognized but not terribly well-documented. It has suffered, 

17

too. So one of the intentions of our efforts was initially to establish 

that baseline and then to follow the changes over time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What about the reintroduction of animals to 

the area? How is that going to be done, if it is possible? 

Mr. WILSON. We are being careful to make sure that such reintroduction is done of native species to the best of our ability. For 

example, in the fisheries we do not want to encourage exotics, but 

we have no intent to pursue active reintroduction of species into 

the area. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I know we will have another witness to talk 

about the impact on human beings, but can you elaborate what—

the extent of the damage done to the marshlands in terms of 

human lives, if that area can be restored to its condition prior to 

the damage done by Saddam Hussein? Will Marsh Arabs return to 

live in this area? 

Mr. WILSON. We had supported a survey of the population in the 

area. It is known that the previous population was 200 to 500,000 

people, Marsh Arabs. We know that the number was terribly reduced during the destructive and malicious interventions of the regime and went down to perhaps 40,000 or so. That number has 

now been recently documented and has gone back up to 70,000. We 

know there are about 100,000 people who are refugees who will 

probably be returning. 

It is also true that, given the destruction of the marshlands and 

the lack of availability of the water and the social and complex dynamics of the region, that you are going to have people coming 

back. Some of them do want to go back to life the way it was, and 

many do not, and they already have expressed that, so one of the 

challenges is to work with the Marsh Arabs to engage with the dialogue and see what kinds of economic opportunities do you want to 

see, where should the water come back to, et cetera, and that is 

what we are working on. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And can you expand on climate changes that 

may have been brought about with the destruction of the marshlands? 

Mr. WILSON. We have not really deeply investigated the impact 

of climate changes. Certainly you have changes in flux of methane 

by the drying of the marshlands, but we have not documented the 

extent to which that has happened. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And what about the health concerns for either humans or animals living in the area resulting from the damage occurred from draining the marshes? 

Mr. WEST. We know that, in general, as indicated by infant and 

child mortality, health situations certainly over the last decade in 

Iraq broadly has degenerated rapidly. 

We are at the beginning of a restoration of the public health 

services. Clearly, the marshlands will be not only included but 

highlighted in terms of the restoration of services because they 

were so cut off during the Saddam regime. 

Specifically, the population there is more cut off from water resources. We note within a week or so we do expect the restoration 

of the Sweetwater Canal to the Basra region, which will make a 

tremendous difference in terms of water supply. So there are things 

18

that are going on right now, but the health situation is critical in 

this area and is being paid attention to. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you. 

Do you have any summary of statements that you would like to 

make? 

We know that you have addressed the agricultural problems, the 

health concerns, but certainly the impact on human lives is the 

most important part of this, and that is what we will hear from our 

second panel. We congratulate your administrator for taking this 

issue on so passionately, and I hope that in the United States Congress we are able to put forth the money that you need to bring 

this project to fruition. 

Would you like to make any summary statements? 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

We just want to thank you, again, for your leadership on this 

issue. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I knew I wanted you to say something. 

Thank you so much, and please give the best to the Administrator for us. Thank you so much. 

We would now like to introduce the second panel. 

We are going to have Dr. Fernando Miralles-Wilhelm, the Assistant Professor of the Department of Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering at the University of Miami. Also, Doctor 

Azzam Alwash, the Senior Project Advisor for Eden Again; and as 

I said, we have put your letter as part of the record. 

Dr. Miralles-Wilhelm, I note that Dr. Shalala, the wonderful 

president of the University of Miami, was in the marshlands during her time in the Peace Corps and now she has witnessed their 

value firsthand. I appreciate President Shalala’s interest in your 

work, Doctor, in restoring this very valuable area of the world; and 

I am glad that we are looking at the Everglades for a model of both 

what could be done and should be done in restoring the marshlands. I look forward to hearing you compare both projects and understanding better what interest the University of Miami has and 

what expertise you can lend into this project. Of course, Dr. 

Alwash, you know this firsthand; and we very much look forward 

to hearing your testimony this morning. 

So we will begin with Dr. Miralles. Muchas gracias. 

STATEMENT OF FERNANDO R. MIRALLES–WILHELM, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENTS OF CIVIL, ARCHITECTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY 

OF MIAMI 

Mr. MIRALLES-WILHELM. Madam Chairwoman and distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Fernando Miralles-Wilhelm. I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering at the University of 

Miami, with concurrent academic appointments at the Rosenstiel 

School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences and the University’s 

Center For Ecosystems Science and Policy. My academic and professional background is in water resources and environmental engineering. I graduated with a Ph.D. degree from MIT in 1992. 

For the past 12 years, I have combined my career in academia 

with a consulting practice, working with engineering firms and 

19

water resources projects on all five continents. My research and 

professional activities have been focused on the hydrology of vegetated projects, such as wetlands, and on water use for competing 

purposes in the context of sustainable development. 

I am honored and privileged today to have the opportunity to address you to discuss a matter of great importance to the future of 

the Iraqi people, an enterprise to which we Americans find ourselves deeply committed, which is the restoration of the southern 

Iraqi marshlands. 

Since I was asked to participate in this hearing, I struggled with 

the focus of my testimony because of my background as an academic, a practicing professional, as well as an environmentally concerned citizen. I decided I would present these three components of 

the southern Iraqi marshlands, since it is difficult to disassociate 

one from the other and since they are intertwined with what the 

problems are and how they can be fixed, and hopefully I will be 

able to do this under 5 minutes. 

The Mesopotamia Marshlands, Ahwar in Arabic, associated with 

the Tigris and Euphrates, once inundated 20,000 square kilometers 

in southern Iraq and Iran. These complex ecosystems consisted of 

marshes and lakes that provided diverse populations of fish and 

wildlife as well as the wetlands-dependent people known as the 

Madaan or Marsh Arabs. 

Some consider this vast marsh the site of the biblical Eden. 

Water management during the later years of the Baath regime was 

based on water diversion actions directed toward punishing the resistance movement that sought refuge in the Ahwar in the early 

1990s. They have dried up to approximately 5 percent of their 

former extent, causing extensive salination of the soils in this arid 

climate. Endangered species of birds are also threatened along 

major flyways. Saltwater also has intruded into waterways, adversely affecting local fresh water fisheries. The Madaan culture 

has essentially been destroyed, in violation of its members’ human 

rights. 

Ecological and water resource management changes in the Tigris 

and Euphrates River watershed have had and will continue to have 

profound political, economic, environmental and cultural/ethical 

consequences in the countries composing the watershed: Turkey, 

Syria, Iran, and Iraq. 

The Euphrates originates in Turkey, passes through Syria and 

ends in Iraq and has been a matter of contention for a long time. 

The Tigris flows through Turkey and Iraq. It is developed on the 

Turkish side of the border, though not as extensive as the Euphrates, and has caused strife in Iraq. 

Iraq and Iran collectively share the al Alwar in Arabic and literally translates to the marshes in English. 

The Alwar contain social and political resources. Beneath the 

marshes lies one of the largest contiguous oil reserves in the world. 

This reserve is mostly undeveloped by the Iraqis, but the Iranians 

have a large number of oil fields on their sides of the marshes. 

Iran and Iraq also share the Shatt al-Arab estuary formed by 

conjoining of the Tigris and Euphrates and the Karun River which 

flows from Zagros Mountains in Iran into the estuary. Control of 

20

this important waterway for maritime traffic was one of the factors 

that led to the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980s. 

Increasing pressures for water supply and agriculture and the 

rise of the petroleum industry in Iraq has resulted in the situation 

where the demand for water exceeds the hydrologic capacity of the 

watershed. This pressure has resulted in the rapid degradation of 

the Tigris and Euphrates ecosystem. The primary cause of this loss 

of the habitat is the alteration of natural processes essential to sustaining them. Such processes has been altered by anthropogenic activities, the pollution of tributary streams and construction of 

drainage canals for oil and gas exploration and production. 

The continued loss of these marshes threatens to collapse the entire Ahwar ecosystem and impede its many functions, particularly 

fishing and the protection of a large urban population and infrastructure. The marshlands serve as the wintering grounds for migratory birds. They are also nursing grounds for shrimp migrating 

up from the Arabian Gulf, important for states such as Iraq, Iran, 

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; and, of course, the marshes also provide 

sustenance and livelihood to the Marsh Arabs. 

During the regime of Saddam Hussein, the water policy was 

dominated by three objectives: One, destroy the marshlands and 

kill off the Marsh Arabs, who had been a major source of political 

opposition to his regime; two, expand short-term agricultural production by draining wetlands and making more water available for 

irrigation; and, three, close down the shallow Arab waterway to 

maritime traffic by diverting the flow through canals, thus lowering water depth in the width of the estuary. 

The first of these was a crime against humanity designed to remove political opposition to Saddam’s regime against the Marsh 

Arabs. 

The second objective was undertaken despite major socioeconomic and environmental consequences inherent in the loss of 

so much prime wetlands and despite the likely long-term adverse 

economic consequences. 

The third objective was undertaken toward the end of the IranIraq war to deprive Iran of the Shatt al-Arab, disrupting the ecosystem and causing damage to the fragile marine lagoon system of 

Khor al-Zubayr. It is essential these be reversed in the economic 

security and in the environmental interests of the Iraqi people and 

to allow the Marsh Arabs to resume their way of life in any way 

they choose. 

The Iraq marshlands have also had a high impact on the education sector, a condition that has been exacerbated by the unstable economic and political climate that has plagued the country for 

the past 25 years. A week ago, I had the privilege of discussing in 

person the situation of Iraqi universities with the President of the 

University of Basra, Dr. Salman D. Salman. 

Years of inflicted state control in Iraq have left the university severely deteriorated, not only physically with aging infrastructure, 

but also morally, with academic isolation taking its toll on the capacity of the country to provide solutions in all areas of knowledge. 

The university is in great need of reconstruction and refurbishing 

of facilities on its various campuses, as well as equipment and materials necessary for education and research. The reconstruction of 

21

the higher education sector in Iraq, which has been the focus of recent funding activities by USAID, needs to be driven by a common 

theme that will act as a catalyst and thread together different 

parts of the university and its interaction with society. 

I am convinced, based on my experience in Miami with the Everglades and from other cases around the world, that the restoration 

of the Iraqi marshlands is that common theme that can spark the 

building of capacity necessary to help reconstruct the higher education sector in southern Iraq. 

The marshlands will give these universities a mission, a purpose 

to focus their rebuilding. Rebuilding the higher education sector in 

Iraq is a key component of Iraq reconstruction in my view, because 

research and education are the link between Iraq and the rest of 

the world. It is the key to the advancement of democracy in the 

country and its long-term sustainability. 

So what can we do? 

Several agencies and institutions present at this hearing, such as 

USAID and the Iraq Foundation, have specific proposals and 

projects ongoing to address the restoration of the southern Iraqi 

marshlands. In the case of the University of Miami, in my full testimony you will find a specific proposal, Iraq-AWARE, advancing 

watershed research and education in the southern Iraqi marshlands. 

The building plan is to be undertaken by United States participating higher education institutions in close collaboration with our 

Iraqi counterparts. The primary objective of Iraq-AWARE is to develop a program which will address the scientific, technological and 

policymaking aspects of the Ahwar wetland restoration. This program will build a pool of environmental, ecological, and social 

sciences. This will be capable of addressing the competing problems 

of water supply, energy generation, socioeconomic development and 

degradation within the Tigris and Euphrates watershed. We have 

already started the implementation of this program with some limited funding at the University of Miami. 

It is really a joint effort between the Center for Ecosystems 

Science and Policy at UM, the Center for Wetlands at the University of Florida, and the following institutions in southern Iraq: The 

University of Basra, the Basra Institute of Technology, and the 

Basra Museum of Natural History. 

We propose to continue working jointly with Iraq-AWARE in 

country to build the policymaking capacity that will enable the development of a comprehensive restoration plan for the Ahwar 

marshlands. This will be sustained through an in-country knowledge base at the higher education level with a higher education 

plan. It is anticipated this plan will be similar to other experiences 

of our team, including the restoration of the Florida Everglades, 

which essentially is our team’s backyard. 

The proposed research and infrastructure building plan will include a suite of viable approaches, developed at a programmatic 

level, to develop procedures for further implementation of specific 

restoration projects. 

I want to point out that the costs of inaction on our part are incalculable. In this case, as in other complex situations, there is a 

22

short window of opportunity where positive action can go a long 

way to determine the sincere intentions of our government. Limited funding, just $4 million, have been provided to date 

through USAID and ancillary activities. In the context of what is 

needed, this amount, although seemingly generous in the eyes of 

some, provides for limited relief compared to the extent of destruction brought about by the Saddam Hussein regime. 

More funding is required to fund the efforts continuing ongoing, 

such as USAID, the Iraqi Foundation, and the University of Miami. 

Absent of this funding, the Ahwar ecosystem as we know it today 

will continue to deteriorate. Without our contributions, the marshlands are likely to experience future water shortage, vegetation dieoffs and reducing nursery functions. Southern Iraq will experience 

water shortage problems. The continued deterioration of the 

marshlands will lead to social unrest and political instability in the 

region. The democracy we are striving to forge in the country will 

be threatened. 

This project cannot just be about the environment. It is also 

about the people in Iraq and the democratic stability in the region. 

My conclusion: In the southern Iraqi marshlands we have a historic opportunity to correct past mistakes and save it for future 

generations while at the same time nurturing Iraq’s democratic viability. The reconstruction effort in Iraq enjoys an unprecedented 

level of broad-based bipartisan support, reflecting a partnership of 

which we are very proud among the State of Florida, the Federal 

Government and concerned citizens. 

We appreciate your leadership and commitment, Madam Chairwoman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. In order 

to truly succeed, this commitment must continue; and we look forward to working with the Subcommittee in the restoration of the 

marshlands. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concluded my statement. Thank you 

for the opportunity to address the Committee, and I will be pleased 

to answer questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, and we thank the University of Miami for its leadership on this issue. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miralles-Wilhelm follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FERNANDO R. MIRALLES–WILHELM, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENTS OF CIVIL, ARCHITECTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Madam Chair, my name is Fernando Miralles-Wilhelm. I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering at 

the University of Miami, with concurrent academic appointments at the Rosenstiel 

School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences and the Center for Ecosystems Science 

and Policy at the University. My academic and professional background is in water 

resources and environmental engineering; I graduated with a PhD degree in this 

discipline from MIT in 1992, and for over the past 12 years, I have combined my 

career in academia with a consulting practice working with engineering firms in 

water projects in all five continents. My research and professional activities have 

been focused on the hydrology of vegetated environments, such as wetlands, and on 

water use for competing purposes in the context of sustainable development. I am 

pleased to have the opportunity to address you today to discuss a matter of great 

importance to the future of the Iraqi people, an enterprise to which we Americans 

we find ourselves deeply committed, the restoration of the southern Iraqi marshlands. 

Since I was asked to participate in this hearing, I’ve struggled with the focus of 

this testimony because of my background as an academic, a practicing professional, 

23

as well as an environmentally-concerned citizen. I decided I would present these 

three components of my vision of the southern Iraqi marshalands, since it is very 

difficult to dissociate one from the other, and they are all intertwined in my articulation of what the problems are and how they can be fixed, all in under 5 minutes. 

The Mesopotamian Marshlands (Ahwar in Arabic), associated with the Tigris and 

Euphrates rivers, once inundated 20,000 square kilometers in southern Iraq and 

Iran. These complex ecosystems consisted of marshes and lakes that provided habitat for diverse populations of fish and wildfowl as well as the homeland of the ancient wetlands-dependent people known as the ‘‘Ma’dan ‘‘, or ‘‘Marsh Arabs’’. Some 

consider this vast marsh the site of the biblical ‘‘Eden’’. Water management during 

the later years of the Baathist regime was based on water diversion actions directed 

towards punishing the resistance movement that sought refuge in the Ahwar in the 

early 1990s. As a result of such actions, the marshes have dried up to less than 5% 

of their former extent, causing extensive salination of the soils and an extensive unsaturated zone in this arid climate. Endangered species of birds are threatened by 

the marshland loss along major flyways. Salt water has also intruded into waterways, adversely affecting local freshwater commercial fisheries. The Ma’dan culture 

has essentially been destroyed, in violation of its members’ human rights. 

Ecological and water resources management changes in the Tigris-Euphrates watershed have had, and will continue to have, profound political, economic, environmental and cultural/ethnical consequences in the countries composing the watershed: Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. The Euphrates originates in Turkey, passes 

through Syria and ends in Iraq, and has been a matter of contention for all three 

nations. The Tigris flows through Turkey and Iraq; its development on the Turkish 

side of the border, though not as extensive as on the Euphrates, has caused strife 

between Turkey and Iraq. Iraq and Iran share the extensive marshes, collectively 

called ‘‘Al Ahwar’’ in Arabic and literally translates to ‘‘The Marshes’’ in English, 

at the southern reaches of the Tigris-Euphrates watershed. The Ahwar contain important ecological, social, and mineral resources. Beneath the marshes lies one of 

the largest contiguous oil reserves in the world. This reserve is mostly undeveloped 

by the Iraqis, but the Iranians have a relatively large number of oil fields on their 

side of the marshes. Iran and Iraq also share the Shatt al-Arab estuary formed by 

the joining of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the Karun river that flows from the 

Zagros mountains in Iran into the Shatt al-Arab north of Abadan. Control of this 

important waterway for maritime traffic was one of the factors that led to the IranIraq conflict of the 1980s. 

During the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, water policy was dominated by 

three objectives: (i) expand short-term agricultural production by draining wetlands 

and making more water available for irrigation; (ii) destroy the marshlands, and 

with them the ability of the Marsh Arabs (who had been a major source of political 

opposition to Saddam Hussein) to maintain a degree of independence from the regime; and (iii) close down the Shatt al-Arab waterway to maritime traffic by diverting the flow through canals to Khor al-Zubayr, thus lowering water depth and width 

of the estuary. 

The first of these objectives was undertaken despite major environmental consequences inherent in the loss of so much prime wetlands, and despite the likely 

long-term adverse economic consequences. The second was a massive human rights 

violation. The third was undertaken toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war to deprive 

Iran of the Shatt al-Arab, disrupting the estuarine ecosystem, and causing catastrophic damage to the fragile marine lagoon system of Khor al-Zubayr. It is essential that these actions be reversed in the economic and environmental interests of 

the Iraqi people, and to allow the Marsh Arabs to resume their way of life if they 

so choose. 

Increasing pressures for water supply and the rise of the petroleum industry have 

added to the agricultural demand, resulting in a situation where the demand for 

water exceeds the hydrologic capacity of the watershed. This pressure has resulted 

in a rapid degradation of the Tigris-Euphrates watershed ecosystem. The primary 

cause of this massive loss of wetland habitat is the alteration of natural processes 

essential to sustaining them. Such processes have been altered by anthropogenic activities, such as the construction of levees, the pollution of tributary streams, and 

construction of drainage canals for oil and gas exploration and production. The continued loss of these marshes threatens to collapse the entire Ahwar ecosystem and 

impede its many functions. These functions include the provision of habitat to support commercial fishing and the protection of a large urban population and critical 

infrastructure (e.g., energy, transportation, industrial) from damaging floods and 

storm surges. The marshlands act as wintering grounds for migratory birds along 

the West Siberian-Caspian-Nile flyway. They are also nursery grounds for shrimp 

migrating up from the Arabian Gulf, which are of commercial importance to Gulf 

24

states such as Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The marshes also provide sustenance and livelihood to the Marsh Arabs. 

The Iraqi marshlands have also had profound impacts on the education sector, a 

situation that has been exacerbated by the general economic and unstable political 

climate that has plagued the country for the past 25 years. Just one week ago, I 

had the privilege to discuss in person the situation of Iraqi universities with the 

President of the Universty of Basrah, Dr. Salman D. Salman. Years of inflicted 

state-control in Iraq have left the universities severely deteriorated, not only physically with aging infrastructure, but also morally, with academic isolation taking its 

toll on the capacity of the country to provide solutions to its problems in all areas 

of knowledge. The university is in great need of reconstruction and refurbishing of 

facilities on its various campuses, as well as equipment and materials necessary for 

education and research. The reconstruction of the higher education sector in Iraq, 

which has been the focus of recent funding activities by USAID, needs to be driven 

by a common theme that will act as a catalyst and thread together different parts 

of the university, and its interaction with society. I am convinced, based on our experience in Miami with the Everglades, and from other cases around the world, that 

the restoration of the Iraqi marshlands is the common theme that can spark the 

building of capacity necessary to help reconstruct the higher education sector in 

Iraq. The marshlands will give these universities a mission, a purpose to focus their 

rebuilding. Rebuilding the institutions of higher education in Iraq is a key component of Iraq reconstruction, as research and education are the link between Iraq and 

the rest of the world, a key to the advancement of democracy and its long term sustainability in the country. 

What can we do? 

Several agencies and institutions present in this hearing (USAID, the Iraq Foundation) have specific proposals to address the restoration of the southern Iraqi 

marshlands. In the case of the University of Miami, in my full testimony you will 

find a specific proposal: Iraq-AWARE, Advancing Watershed Assessment, Research 

and Education in the southern Iraqi marshlands. Iraq-AWARE is a comprehensive 

research and education infrastructure and capacity building plan to be undertaken 

by US participating higher education institutions, in close collaboration with our 

Iraqi counterparts. The primary objective of Iraq-AWARE is to develop a long-term 

program that will address, for the first time in Iraq, the scientific, technological and 

policy/decision-making aspects of the Ahwar wetland restoration. This program will 

build an indigenous base of expertise in wetland ecology, hydrology, environmental 

engineering and social sciences. This built in-country expertise will be capable of addressing the competing problems of water supply, energy generation, socioeconomic 

development and ecosystem degradation within the Tigris-Euphrates watershed. We 

have already started the implementation of this program with some limited in-house 

funding at the University of Miami. 

We propose to continue working jointly with our Iraq-AWARE in-country team 

members to build the human, scientific, technological and policy making capacity 

that will enable the development of a comprehensive restoration plan for the Ahwar 

marshlands. This capacity building will be developed and sustained through an incountry knowledge base seeded at the higher education level through a carefully designed research and education plan. It is anticipated that this plan will be similar 

to other experiences of our team, including the restoration of the Florida Everglades 

(our team’s ‘‘backyard’’), the largest ecosystem restoration program ever funded. The 

proposed research and education capacity and infrastructure building plan will include a suite of viable alternative restoration approaches, developed at a programmatic level, as well as recommended processes and procedures for further evaluation and implementation of specific restoration projects. 

Iraq-AWARE is a joint effort among the Center for Ecosystems Science and Policy 

at the University of Miami, the Center for Wetlands at the University of Florida, 

and the following institutions in southern Iraq: the University of Basrah, the 

Basrah Institute of Technology and the Museum of Natural History. 

I want to point out that the costs of inaction by our part are incalculable. Limited 

funding, just four million dollars, have been provided to date through USAID for 

marshland restoration work and ancillary activities. In the context of what is needed, this amount, although seemingly generous in the eyes of some, can only get us 

so far. More funding is required to continue the efforts already ongoing, such as 

those by USAID, the Iraqi Foundation and the University of Miami. Absent of this 

funding, the Ahwar ecosystem as we know it today will continue to deteriorate and 

eventually disappear. Without our contribution, the Ahwar marshlands are likely to 

experience future water shortages. The Shatt-al-Arab estuary will experience increased algae blooms, vegetation die-offs and hypersalinity, reducing its fisheries 

25

and critical nursery functions. The ability to recover endangered species will be seriously impaired and as the natural environment suffers, so too will the human environment. The population of southern Iraq will experience water shortage problems 

as the water supply system, under pressure of continued population growth, becomes impossible to administer adequately. The continued deterioration of the 

marshlands will lead to social unrest and political instability in the region; the democracy we strive to forge in the country will be threatened. This project is not just 

about the environment, it is about the people in Iraq and the democratic stability 

in the region. 

Conclusion 

In the southern Iraqi marshlands we have an historic opportunity to correct past 

mistakes and save an international treasure for future generations while at the 

same time nurturing Iraq’s democratic viability. The reconstruction effort in Iraq 

enjoys an unprecedented level of bipartisan support, reflecting a partnership of 

which we are very proud, among the State of Florida, the Federal government and 

concerned citizens. 

We appreciate your leadership and commitment, Madam Chair, and that of the 

subcommittee and other members in the United States House of Representatives in 

bringing us this far today. If we are to truly succeed, that commitment must continue, and we look forward to working with the Subcommittee as the restoration of 

the Ahwar marshlands and the Iraqi universities proceed. 

Madam Chair, that concludes my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee on this important effort and I will be pleased to answer any 

questions you may have.

26


92186b.eps
27


92186c.eps
28


92186d.eps
29


92186e.eps
30


92186f.eps
31


92186g.eps
32


92186h.eps
33


92186i.eps
34


92186j.eps
35


92186k.eps
36


92186l.eps
37


92186m.eps
38


92186n.eps
39


92186o.eps
40


92186p.eps
41


92186q.eps
42


92186r.eps
43


92186s.eps
44


92186t.eps
45

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I look forward to asking you some questions 

about the Everglades model, how it can be used and not used. 

Thank you for pointing out how Saddam Hussein used these 

marshes in order to have political gain on his own population, and 

that is why I am so pleased to have Dr. Alwash here with us. 

We know about the impact that the draining of the marshes has 

had on the environment, on the species, on animals, vegetation, 

fishing, but most especially on the population that has lived there 


92186u.eps
46

and the internal displacement of thousands and thousands of people; and we look forward to your testimony Dr. Alwash. 

STATEMENT OF AZZAM ALWASH, SENIOR PROJECT ADVISOR, 

EDEN AGAIN 

Mr. ALWASH. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for 

giving me the opportunity to address you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Push that little button there. 

Mr. ALWASH. Sorry. This is my first time addressing Congress. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are doing great. 

Mr. ALWASH. I was born in Iraq at the edge of the Mesopotamia 

Marshlands and became a citizen of the United States in 1990. 

During the 1990s, stories began to drift around about the draining 

of my marshlands, but we could not comprehend that such a vast 

area could be dry. 

In 2001, the United Nations Environmental Program published 

satellite images demonstrating what they termed ‘‘a major environmental catastrophe that will be remembered as one of humanity’s 

worst engineered disasters,’’ the disappearance of Iraq’s marshlands. 

Why is this a catastrophe? Before 1990, the Mesopotamia Marshlands consisted of the largest wetland ecosystem in the Middle 

East, covering an area larger than the State of Massachusetts. 

Scholars consider these marshlands as the biblical Garden of Eden 

and as the birthplace of Abraham and the cradle of western civilization, the ancient Sumerian culture. In 1998, it was estimated 

there were a half million of marsh dwellers carrying on these ancient traditions within and around the marshlands. 

Following the Gulf War in 1991, rebel forces used the marshlands as a safe haven within the southern no fly zone. In a few 

short years, Saddam’s regime systematically drained them to establish control over the area. After they were dried, the marshlands 

were burned and villages were destroyed. During the 1990s, up to 

300,000 marsh dwellers died, fled the country, or were internally 

displaced. 

In 2001, the Iraq Foundation initiated Eden Again. We assembled a team of experts, our International Technical Advisory Panel, 

to begin planning for the day after Saddam. Many are on the National Research Council, and they provided us with excellent advice. In the summer of 2003, following the liberation of Iraq, I returned to Iraq to begin implementation of those plans in coordination with USAID. 

Ladies and Gentlemen, in 2003, you saw troops move through 

blinding dust storms. They were rolling across the dried marshlands. None of the water you see in those photographs was there 

at the time. But almost immediately after liberation, the marsh 

dwellers began to breach the embankments that held back the precious water. They opened the sluice gates and heaven poured back 

in. Acting largely on their own local initiatives, five separate areas 

have been reflooded, nearly doubling the areas before liberation. 

Most areas remain dust bowls. 

It is often said that environmental conservation is a luxury of a 

wealthy people. But the marsh dwellers are people who want to 

desperately restore their ecosystem, a habitat they are dependent 

47

for their survival. They do not want to be busboys or living in city 

slums. They want to live in the clean fresh air of the marshland. 

They want to hunt, fish, raise water buffalo, vegetables and fruit, 

follow their own traditions. They cannot do that in the city or in 

the desert that the marshlands have become. 

The U.S. has helped. The U.S. Agency For International Development has brought some renowned scientists to the area to help 

evaluate their condition. I just returned from their second expedition, and they are beginning a series of projects within the next 

year. 

The Ministry of Water has declared that the restoration is the 

Ministry’s highest priority and has established a center. 

The good news from Iraq is that restoration is completely within 

the realm of possibility. The difficulty lies in creating a just and 

equitable plan. We want help, but we cannot plan Iraq’s environment. Only Iraqis can. 

The goal for the next year is the preparation of a sustainable restoration plan. To attain this goal, the Iraq Foundation’s International Advisory Panel recommended that three activities take 

place concurrently: One, implement demonstration projects to observe how the ecosystem responds to rehydration; two, conduct a 

series of comprehensive environmental surveys, to be conducted by 

Iraqi scientists with the assistance of experts, to provide a scientific basis for making wise land-use decisions; and, three, to obtain input from stakeholders to allow for decision-making to provide for a participatory process within Iraq. We estimate it will require $10 million for a sustainable restoration plan. Over the past year, the Italian Ministry of Environment 

and Territory has provided over 2 million Euros to the Iraq Foundation in support of marshland restoration, and Italian experts 

have given generously of their own time in the marshes. I have a 

letter from the Italian Ministry of the Environment stating they 

are eager to work with the Iraq Foundation and the United States 

for a sustainable restoration plan. 

With the assistance of the Italian experts, USAID, the Army 

Corps of Engineers and others, we are confident that the plan will 

be developed that is equitable and effective. Once that plan is in 

place, Iraq can become eligible for significant funds for its implementation. 

I would like to conclude by thanking the United States and the 

Coalition for the most important contribution of all, giving Iraqis 

freedom from tyranny and the liberty to make their own decisions. 

Despite what you hear in the press, have no doubt in your mind 

that the vast majority of Iraqis join me in expressing this deep 

gratitude. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Alwash follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AZZAM ALWASH, SENIOR PROJECT ADVISOR, EDEN AGAIN

Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, honorable congressmen, thank you very much 

for giving me this opportunity to address you. 

I was born in Iraq at the edge of the Mesopotamian Marshlands and became a 

citizen of the United States in 1990. During the 1990s, stories began to drift around 

about the draining of my marshlands, but we could not comprehend that such a vast 

48

area could be dried. In 2001, the United Nations Environmental Program published 

satellite images demonstrating what they termed ‘‘a major environmental catastrophe that will be remembered as one of humanity’s worst engineered disasters’’—

the disappearance of Iraq’s marshlands. 

Why is this a catastrophe? Before 1990, the Mesopotamian Marshlands constituted the largest wetland ecosystem in the Middle East, covering an area larger 

than the state of Massachusetts. Scholars consider these marshlands to represent 

the Biblical Garden of Eden, the birthplace of Abraham, and the cradle of western 

civilization, the ancient Sumerian culture. In 1988, it was estimated that there were 

half a million Marsh Dwellers carrying on these ancient traditions within the 

marshlands. 

Following the Gulf War in 1991, rebel forces used the marshlands as a safe haven 

within the southern ‘‘no fly zone.’’ In a few short years, Saddam’s regime systematically drained them to allow access for his tanks and to establish control. After they 

were dried, the marshlands were burned and the villages destroyed. During the 

1990s, up to 300,000 Marsh Dwellers died, fled the country, or were internally displaced. 

In 2001, the Iraq Foundation initiated the Eden Again Project. We assembled a 

team of experts, our ‘‘International Technical Advisory Panel,’’ to begin planning for 

restoration—for the day after Saddam’s regime fell. Many of the scientists on this 

panel are on the National Research Council, and they provided us with excellent 

advice. In the summer of 2003, I returned to Iraq to implement those plans. 

Ladies and gentlemen, in 2003 you saw Coalition troops moving through blinding 

dust storms; those tanks were rolling across the dried marshlands. None of the 

water that you see in these photographs was there at the time. But almost immediately after liberation, the Marsh Dwellers began to breach the embankments that 

held back the precious water. They opened the sluice gates and heaven poured back 

in. Acting largely on their own local initiatives, five separate areas have been reflooded, nearly doubling the area of wetlands that were left before liberation. But 

that’s only a small fraction of the former marshlands, most of which remain 

dustbowls. 

It is often said that environmental conservation is a luxury of a wealthy people. 

But the Marsh Dwellers are a desperately poor people who desperately want to restore their ecosystem, a habitat upon which they are dependent for survival. These 

people don’t want to be busboys or factory workers living in city slums. They want 

to live in the clean fresh air of the marshes; they want to hunt and fish and raise 

water buffalo, vegetables and fruit. They want to practice their own culture, follow 

their own traditions. They can’t do that in the city and they can’t do that in the 

desert that the marshlands have become. 

The U.S. has helped. The U.S. Agency for International Development has brought 

some renowned restoration scientists to the marshlands to help us evaluate their 

condition. I just returned from their second expedition, and I can report that USAID 

is planning a series of very beneficial projects within the next year. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has provided extremely capable assistance to 

Iraq’s Ministry of Water Resources. With their guidance, the Ministry has declared 

restoration of the marshes their number one priority, and has established a Center 

for Restoration of the Iraqi Marshlands, abbreviated ‘‘CRIM.’’

The good news from Iraq is that restoration is completely within the realm of possibility; the difficulty lies in creating a just and equitable plan. The international 

scientists can help with the technical work—and we want their help—but they can’t 

plan Iraq’s environment. Only Iraqis can. 

CRIM’s goal for the next year is preparation of a Sustainable Restoration Plan. 

To attain this goal, the Iraq Foundation’s International Technical Advisory Panel 

recommended that three activities take place concurrently: 1) implement demonstration projects to observe how the ecosystem responds to re-hydration; 2) conduct a 

series of comprehensive environmental surveys, to be accomplished by Iraqi scientists with the assistance of international experts, to provide a scientific basis for 

making wise land-use decisions; and 3) obtain input from stakeholders to allow for 

decision-making through a participatory process within Iraq. 

We estimate that CRIM will require $10 million to complete this process and prepare a Sustainable Restoration Plan. Over the last year, the Italian Ministry of the 

Environment and Territory has provided over two million Euros to the Iraq Foundation in support of marshland restoration, and Italian experts have given generously 

of their time in the marshes. I have a letter from the Italian Ministry of the Environment stating that they are eager to work with the Iraq Foundation and the 

United States to provide support for developing the Sustainable Restoration Plan. 

With the assistance of the Italian experts, USAID, UNEP, the Army Corps of Engineers, and others, we are confident that a plan will be developed that is equitable 

49

and effective. Once the plan in place, Iraq can become eligible for more significant 

international funds for its implementation. 

I would like to conclude by thanking the United States and the Coalition for the 

most important contribution of all: giving Iraqis freedom from tyranny and the liberty to make their own decisions. Despite what you hear in the press, have no doubt 

in your mind that the vast majority of Iraqis join me in expressing this deep gratitude. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Doctor, if you could elaborate on the political 

reasons that Saddam Hussein had for draining the marshlands. 

Mr. ALWASH. Madam Chairwoman, the marshlands, I like to 

refer to them as Iraq’s Sherwood Forest. They have been a place 

where people who did not want to be under the control of the central government went to hide because you cannot find them. They 

are big wetlands, if you see them. 

After the Gulf War, when Iraqi rebels went and controlled the 

south, following the crushing of that rebellion, a lot of the rebels 

went into the marshlands to hide, Iraq south being virtually ungovernable between ’92 and ’95. So what he tried to do was to deprive 

the rebels of a place to hide, where they could easily live off the 

land and to come out at night to challenge his authority over the 

towns. 

It is obvious as to why he did that, but the declared reason by 

Iraq is that the drying was to reclaim agricultural land, as if Iraq 

was devoid of agricultural land. 

You can drive and take pictures of Iraq. Iraq is full of areas that 

can be cultivated rather easily. One did not need to spend billions 

and billions of dollars to dry the marshlands to reclaim agricultural 

land. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Now, there were about 300,000 marsh——

Mr. ALWASH. Estimated between 300 to 500,000 people that have 

been displaced. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And some have been displaced, some to 

neighboring countries or internally displaced. 

How much unity is there in this group? We are talking about 

such a large number of people. Would they come back, first of all, 

if the marshes were restored? Would they hope to become fishermen of that area, again? 

What is their attitude, also, of this restoration effort? You say 

that they want to make sure that they are the ones who decide 

their future, but is there unity in this, such a large number of people, about how it should be restored? 

Mr. ALWASH. Unity is difficult to achieve, but in the sample that 

I have from Nasiriyah area, the people that I met, 1-in-10 basically—they would like to maintain their marshlands—sorry, they 

would like to maintain their farmlands. The vast majority of the 

people who I interviewed want their marshes back. 

Obviously, other areas differ. It depends on how you put the 

question to them, too: Would you like to go back to your way of life? 

Well, their way of life was, you know, idyllic. It is beautiful, it 

is nice, we see in pictures, but it is rather harsh. So do they want 

to go back to their old way of living? 

They have seen the Internet. They want electricity. They want 

also what we term modern needs. They do need that. But if you 

put the question to them in the proper form: Do you want your 

marshes returned while providing health services, education, potaVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:57 Apr 19, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\022404\92186 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
50

ble water, all the things we take for granted—to date, they still do 

not have it. Obviously, if I put the question to them that way, they 

will answer in the positive. 

If you ask, do you want your marshlands or farms, the answer 

will be different. So I would leave it up to the people themselves. 

The way I deal with it is through the tribal leaders and the tribal 

elders. That is the way to reach consensus within the community. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And although this project is now going, taking place, we really don’t have much of a track record about restoring this marshland. How satisfied are you that the efforts so far 

have included Iraqi cooperation, that the Iraqi voices are being 

heard, listened to by USAID and all of the different agencies that 

are involved in the restoration efforts? 

Mr. ALWASH. Iraq Foundation is a part of USAID’s efforts, so to 

that extent, you know, they are including Iraqis in the decision. I 

would like to see a little bit more Iraqi NGOs’ participation. I 

would like to see, you know, what we predicted back last March, 

is that the Iraqis are not going to wait for us to come up with this 

plan. They are in fact going to vote with their own hands, and they 

did: The beach embankments, and the beach real estate—and they 

have returned water to many areas, in fact, in some places in a 

haphazard way. So to that extent, you know, we are kind of—we 

need to act faster, Chairwoman. We can’t be waiting since last 

March till now. We should have developed the plan by now, in my 

opinion. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. How optimistic are you that if the funding is 

there, and if Iraqi voices are listened to, and if the interagency cooperation is there and the countries cooperate, that these marshes 

can be restored; or is it too late for certain areas? 

Mr. ALWASH. You can see the pictures. Mother Nature is quite 

wonderful. A lot of areas, all it took was return the water, and nature started restoring herself. As you heard from USAID, the challenge is in sustainable restoration: How do you make sure that 

there is enough water in the long term to sustain the areas that 

have been restored? 

I keep on saying that the plan, overall restoration plan, should 

have three major phases: 

One is the initial phase, and restore whatever can be restored 

given the available water resources today. 

The medium term is widen the area of restoration by achieving 

efficiencies of stream. Iraq is still using the old Sumerian technology of irrigating the land. There are over 50 percent losses in 

delivery of water, an even 50 percent, and even more than that 

through inefficient irrigation methods. A lot more water can be 

made available only for restoration through achieving the efficiencies of stream. That is what I would term as the midterm. 

Now the long term, obviously, is a political realm. Obviously it 

is going to require achieving some sort of political decision between 

Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran about the equitable sharing of the 

water resources of the basin of the Tigris and the Euphrates. That 

can be achieved, though it must be done in a wise way. We cannot 

get into a situation sort of like the Israeli-Palestinian problem. 

These are my people and I know Iraqis very well. If the discussion 

ever becomes a question of whose water is this, we are not going 

51

to get a solution. Fifty years from now we are still talking about 

whose water this is. We need to find a solution and in the realm 

of free market economy. 

And what I advocate is for Iraq to not buy water from Turkey, 

but rather buy electricity. I live in Baghdad. I live in Basra. And 

for every 2 hours of electricity, we are rewarded with 4 hours without electricity. We definitely need a lot of electricity, and Iraq is 

bankrupt. Iraq cannot buy all the generation equipment that is 

needed to generate electrical current that is needed for Iraq’s current situation, even in the future as the economy develops. So if, 

in fact, we purchase electricity from Turkey, Turkey may need to 

generate or release a lot of the water that they are holding. 

You know, I am told that that plan is in fact within the realm. 

You know, it can be discussed; but it is obviously beyond what the 

Iraq Foundation can do. It is something that is up to the future 

Iraqi Government, the Government of Turkey, Government of 

Syria, and Government of Iran to discuss. But I have positive feelings about the future. Whatever we can restore today will be maintained. And don’t forget, Iraqis of the south have learned now that 

it is their right to speak. They can speak out for themselves. And 

these areas that are restored are going to be very difficult to drive 

back. They are going to demand their fair share of the water. And 

I am optimistic, very optimistic. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Wonderful. It is good to hear. Well, as Mark 

Twain said, water flows upstream toward money. So that is at the 

root of it. But thank you for your testimony. 

And, Dr. Miralles, I had asked Dr. Alwash that question about 

whether it is possible to turn back the hands of time, because I am 

honored to represent the entire coastline of southern Florida, from 

Bal Harbor, North Miami Beach, all the way down to Key West. 

And as you know, we have some precious coral reefs especially in 

the Keys, and many scientists, wonderful scientists at the the 

Rosenstiel School, for example, have said that there are areas there 

that cannot be restored. They will never—we don’t have enough 

money to restore the damage that has been done to our coral reef. 

When you compare the ecosystem of the Iraqi marshlands, how 

optimistic are you that with enough resources and enough cooperation they can be restored? 

Mr. MIRALLES-WILHELM. Well, I think I am optimistic as well. It 

is just a matter of defining where is it that you want to go with 

the restoration of the Iraqi marshlands, as was the question that 

was posed on the Everglades many years back. You know, we probably can’t turn around time and restore it back to where it was, 

but we can probably restore it to something that is still going to 

be very valuable. 

And in the context of sustainable development, we have many 

things going on in the case of south Florida. You have development, 

you have agriculture, you have highly urbanized region population 

growth that needs water. These things need to be considered together. It is really difficult to say we are going to return the Everglades to what they were 100 years ago or 1,000 years ago. I would 

suggest the same thing with the Iraqi marshlands. 

So it is a matter of defining where is it that you want to take 

the Iraqi marshlands. Certainly it is going to be a better place than 

52

where they are today, but it is probably not going to be the same 

place where they were before this all happened. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. When you mentioned the Everglades in your 

testimony and your answer now, how does that compare? How can 

we use the Everglades restoration as a model? What are the similarities, the differences, and how does it fit or not fit in terms of 

restoration of the marshlands? 

Mr. MIRALLES-WILHELM. You know, in strictly science terms, in 

terms of both ecosystems, there are a lot of similarities. I think, 

though, that the lessons learned in the Everglades were not so 

much on the signs but on actually the process of bringing about the 

restoration. How is it that we can take some ideas of restoration, 

building consensus for it, getting the funds to do it, and actually 

start executing it? That is a long learning process and involves not 

only scientists like myself, but also involves water management 

agencies, industrial representatives, and a whole host of stakeholders. I think that our colleagues in Iraq may benefit from using 

the Everglades as an example of that process. 

I did mention specifically how the Everglades has been used in 

south Florida to essentially—it is the cornerstone, the centerpiece 

of development. When I think of Basra and southern Iraq, I keep 

calling Basra the Miami of Iraq, and it is essentially a very similar 

situation. I can see Basra turning into a Miami with all the 

positives and the not-so-positives. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I know that this is a USAID map and some 

of the photos and layout of the marshlands, but can any of you explain what we are looking at, and what Iraq—where your project 

would be, or some of the restoration efforts that are underway? 

Mr. MIRALLES-WILHELM. Well, I will do part of the explanation. 

I am sure Dr. Alwash will be happy to add something. It is essentially a concurrent set of satellite pictures. If you look at the—probably the easiest ones to read are the ones, the row below. The purplish indicates regions where there were marshes, vegetative 

marshes with water. That shows essentially a time line degradation of the marsh over time. You can see that the purple has significantly been reduced. My guess is that the right corner picture 

is probably a 2000, 2001 picture. That was going to be my guess. 

Essentially the idea is we can’t really turn the clock back and go 

back to the first picture, but there are many opportunities within 

existing resources to turn around the situation into a place where 

people can live and breathe. It is not going to be the Eden again, 

but it might be a place where southern Iraqis can live and build, 

and live with their families and have a healthy ecosystem, free of 

disease, environmentally benign, and all these things. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Alwash. 

Mr. ALWASH. Yeah. These pictures are——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Push that little button. 

Mr. ALWASH. The pictures are essentially what Dr. Fernando 

has—Dr. Miralles has described. The latest satellite picture from 

the marshlands as of a week ago, from NASA site shows the area 

above the Euphrates. It is kind of difficult here to do this without 

a laser pointer. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I have one here so I can know what you are 

talking about. 

53

Mr. ALWASH. It shows a good proportion of the Hammar 

marshes. The Hammar marshes are the marshes below the Euphrates. They are the southerly-most marshes. Those satellite pictures show that the majority of those marshes are in fact covered 

with water now, and a good proportion of the central marshes, 

about 30 kilometers to 40 kilometers north of the Euphrates, is 

now inundated with water. 

I can tell you that over 1,000 people have come back to the 

marshes and they are fishing. The marshes are full of fishermen. 

They are, in fact, overstressing the system by using some fishing 

technology that would not be legal in the United States. But these 

are poor people, these are hungry people, and when I asked, you 

know, this is really forbidden, you shouldn’t be doing this, they 

said, No, it is halal. What else do you want us to feed our children? 

These people are not stressing the system, the ecosystem, because they are bad people; they just want to feed their children. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. They want to survive. 

Mr. ALWASH. They just want to survive. And what our job should 

be is to help them survive by increasing the area where they can 

ply their ancient trade by providing health services, by providing 

potable water. Things of that nature will make their life. 

And you know, let me add that it is in the United States’ national security interest to do this. The people of the south are for 

now very happy to be liberated, but if their economic situation does 

not improve they may turn against us. We need to help them 

achieve a better state of living. We need—they are now grateful 

and I can assure you—I mean, wherever I go, Bush, Bush, good, 

okay. 

So the point I am trying to make is the United States should be 

committed to this project, specifically to maintain this gratitude, to 

build upon it, and to help create an Iraq that is friendly to the 

United States. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I agree. It is so difficult with a country that 

has been under such brutal dictatorship for decades, to build and 

educate a population on how the environment, and the protection 

of the environment is important to their daily lives. And I think 

that making the connection to economic livelihood is the most important thing that we can do, so that people know why it is in their 

best interest to ensure that the environmental beauty of this area 

continues; that it is for their own livelihood that is at stake. 

How is it that you plan, Dr. Miralles, with the Iraq-AWARE, 

project to build that level of cooperation with the population of this 

area and how much input will they have into your project IraqAWARE? How much interplay will you have with the university 

that you mentioned, as well as the population, so that they know 

what you are doing and they have a stake in it as well? 

Mr. MIRALLES-WILHELM. Yes. I mean we are at the very initial 

stages. Essentially what we try—the first stage is essentially to 

link peers in both countries, United States and Iraq, working on 

similar research and on educational activities. So that there is already a collaboration of sorts going on. And, you know, we have a 

series of activities that have been planned that have been started 

with full participation of Iraqi colleagues at the University of Basra 

and with our colleagues at the University of Miami. I think that 

54

is going to be a very good first stage, because I think rebuilding 

or helping rebuild the Iraqi universities will eventually translate, 

will eventually move downstream to the population of the southern 

Iraqi area. 

I mean, I keep seeing a vision of getting more and more students 

from Basra involved in these activities. And these activities range 

from scientific research activities to joint education as courses on 

wetlands restoration capacity building. I think we are at the very 

initial stage. We have done this with a stringent, limited, in-house 

funding, and we really need to move to the next level to actually 

continue moving along this level. And it is really imperative, and 

I will echo what our colleagues of USAID said. It is really about 

getting—the limiting step now is funding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is just incredible that this is an area that 

is so historical. It is a population that can be traced back thousands of years, and who have lived in this area and sustained 

themselves just by fishing and the wildlife and their environment 

right around them. And now, to see what the destruction of—in 

just a few decades, what a man has done in an area that was so 

beautiful and so lively for thousands of years. 

Why is it in our interest to make sure that these marshlands are 

restored? What can we say to our constituents who are paying 

taxes to let them know why it is needed for U.S. interests to build 

these marshlands to what they were, or restore them as much as 

we could? Can both of you make that statement to my constituents, 

why they should pay taxes for such an effort? 

Mr. MIRALLES-WILHELM. Well, I am going to echo what Dr. 

Alwash mentioned earlier. I think it is really about building political—continued political stability in the region. I think the Iraqi 

people are very grateful now, and I will echo again what Dr. 

Alwash said. All the people that I have talked to in Iraq, the Iraqis, 

they are very grateful that this has happened. But it won’t be long 

before, if things don’t start happening, there is going to be political 

instability in the region or there may be generated social unrest 

that may be carried out against the United States’ interests in the 

region as a whole. So in terms of that, I think it is a matter of national security to some extent, more even than an environmental 

problem. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Alwash. 

Mr. ALWASH. You know, that is the main reason for the United 

States to help this. But let me also bring back the parallels with 

the Everglades. 

Number one, the restoration of the Iraqi marshes I don’t think 

is going to be the responsibility of the United States to sponsor. 

But I just want to allay your fears. This is not going to be a $9 

billion project. For one, we are not going to hire lawyers. For two, 

we don’t have to buy real estate. And even if we have to buy real 

estate, the real estate is very, very cheap in Iraq. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The comparison to Miami made me a little 

nervous. 

Mr. ALWASH. Once we have the plan, Madam Chairwoman, I 

think that there are many many countries that would be willing to 

sponsor the construction projects that are associated with the reVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:57 Apr 19, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\022404\92186 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
55

stored managed wetlands. And we are not going to return the wetlands to the way it was. There are going to be managed wetlands. 

But I can say that I have been in discussions with many, including the Japanese, including Kuwait. We understand that there is 

a lot of interest to actually put the plan in action and construct. 

Canada is also very much interested. I went to Canada to discuss 

it. So first of all, the cost is not going to be this humongous $9 billion cost. And, more importantly, it is for the benefit of the region 

itself to have the restoration be sponsored by them. 

For example, I mean the restoration of the marshes will act to 

cleanse these waters that, as Mr. West suggested, all the sewage 

is being dumped raw in the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris 

in Iraq. Previously the marshlands acted as a kind of a liver for 

these waters before they delivered to the marshlands. And, in fact, 

restoring the marshlands may act as a way of helping the environment of the Gulf, thereby helping the Gulf countries. 

So there is a positive direction or a positive impact on the Gulf 

by the restoration. Therefore, they should be one of the countries 

or one of the regions that we should target for sponsoring the actual construction and the actual implementation of the plan that 

the CRIM should come up with. I should also say that I have detailed proposal for the CRIM to detail this $10 million, 5 million 

of which—a portion of it—is in fact going to be supported by the 

Italian Minister of the Environment. What we are looking for 

is——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And they are not going to hire any lawyers 

either, are they? 

Mr. ALWASH. I certainly hope not. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much, gentlemen. We 

definitely agree with you that this restoration of the Iraqi marshlands is important in terms of national security, in terms of being 

a model for the entire region about what other countries can do. 

And it certainly highlights the problem of Saddam Hussein and 

how one madman had destroyed an area that had been a vibrant 

wetland for over 5,000 years and provided a livelihood for 300,000 

people and what displacement of the refugees has created. 

So, thank you so much. I hope that Congress steps up to the 

plate, I hope that we are able to get funding for this project, and 

I thank you both for your wonderful testimony. 

And Dr. Alwash, you did a great job. I think it is the cape. Please 

explain that beautiful cape you have. 

Mr. ALWASH. Oh, that is what a marsh—well not every marsh 

Arab. This is a tribal sheikh robe, and the golden embroidery is 

typical of Chibayish area of the Hammar marsh area. This is one 

of the very first things that I purchased. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is beautiful. Analogous to the Everglades, 

the Miccosukee Indians have their own jackets as well. So we have 

a similar model. 

But thank you so much and I thank the audience for participating as well. And the Subcommittee is now adjourned. Thank 

you, gentlemen. 

[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ