COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons 

CHARLES FRANCIS CARTER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗

v. Record No. 2394-98-4 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 20, 1999 

ARLINGTON COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Charles Francis Carter, pro se, on briefs). 

 (Lisa A. Cay; Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & 

Boccarosse, on brief), for appellee. 

 Charles Francis Carter ("claimant") contends that the 

Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in finding 

that (1) he was not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of 

air conditioning repairs to any vehicles other than his 1989 

Plymouth Voyager; (2) he was not entitled to reimbursement for 

interest and other out-of-pocket costs; (3) his request for 

reimbursement for home air conditioning expenses was barred by 

the doctrine of res judicata; and (4) he was not entitled to 

reimbursement for certain mileage expenses.1 Upon reviewing the 

 ∗

Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

Claimant presented arguments and evidence in his thirty-five 

page brief which were either not before the commission or are 

irrelevant to the issues on appeal. We will only address those 

issues decided by the commission in its September 11, 1998 review 

opinion, and timely appealed by claimant. 
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record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this 

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence 

sustained his burden of proof, the commission's findings are 

binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael's 

Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 I. 

 In denying claimant's request for reimbursement for the 

cost of air conditioning repairs to vehicles other than his 1989 

Plymouth Voyager, the commission found as follows: 

 Deputy Commissioner Bruner, in his 

Opinion issued January 5, 1996, approved 

such repairs only on a Plymouth van, which 

the billing record shows to be a 1989 

Plymouth Voyager. In these proceedings, 

[claimant] asserted that Deputy Commissioner 

Bruner's Opinion authorized repairs of all 

his Plymouth vehicles, which is a 

misinterpretation of that Opinion, as well 

as of the Opinions issued on review and on 

appeal. . . . We agree with Deputy 

Commissioner Cummins that such additional 

repair costs are not the reasonable and 

necessary responsibility of the employer. 

This instant claim demonstrates the 

absurdity of the claimant's argument. 

Although he demanded air conditioning 

repairs on four vehicles, [claimant] 

admitted at the hearing that he had expenses 
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attributable only to three, but that he 

might make a later claim for the fourth 

vehicle. The award of medical benefits 

deemed necessary by the Commission must be 

balanced against a reasonableness standard 

that compels the employer to pay for such 

benefits. We agree with the Deputy 

Commissioner that the employer should be 

liable only for the cost of air conditioning 

repairs to the claimant's 1989 Plymouth 

Voyager, and also that the employer should 

be allowed to determine the necessity and 

reasonableness of future repairs before such 

costs are incurred. 

The commission further held that employer was liable to 

reimburse claimant in the amount of $942.90, which constituted 

the cost of a June 4, 1996 air conditioning repair to the 1989 

Plymouth Voyager, less amounts already paid by employer and less 

the cost of a state inspection of that vehicle. 

 In order to hold an employer liable for medical expenses 

pursuant to Code § 65.2-603, claimant bore the burden of proving 

that those expenses were reasonable, necessary, and causally 

related to his compensable injury. Claimant presented no 

evidence that air conditioning repairs to vehicles other than 

his 1989 Plymouth Voyager were medically reasonable, necessary, 

or causally related to his compensable injury by accident.2 

 2

We note that claimant's argument that employer was 

contractually obligated to reimburse him for the cost of air 

conditioning repairs to four vehicles is without merit. Such a 

contract, not approved by the commission, has no legal 

significance under the Workers' Compensation Act. Rather, 

employer's responsibility for medical expenses is judged under a 

reasonableness standard pursuant to Code § 65.2-603. 
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Accordingly, we cannot find as a matter of law that claimant's 

evidence sustained his burden of proof. 

 II. 

 Claimant contends that the commission erred in refusing to 

hold employer liable to reimburse him for interest, i.e., 

finance charges, and other "out-of-pocket" costs associated with 

pursuing his claim. The Workers' Compensation Act does not 

provide any basis for an award of such costs. Accordingly, the 

commission did not err in denying claimant's request. 

 III. 

 The July 25, 1995 home air conditioning repair expenses 

were addressed in the commission's January 5, 1996 opinion. In 

that opinion, Deputy Commissioner Bruner found those home air 

conditioning repair expenses noncompensable on the ground that 

they were not medically necessary. The full commission affirmed 

that opinion. Subsequently, this Court affirmed the 

commission's opinion. 

Res judicata applies "where there is a valid, personal 

judgment obtained by a defendant on the merits of an action. 

The judgment bars relitigation of the same cause of action, or 

any part thereof which could have been litigated between the 

same parties and their privies." K & L Trucking Co. v. Thurber, 

1 Va. App. 213, 219, 337 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1985). Because the 

issue of employer's liability for the cost of the July 25, 1995 
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home air conditioning expenses was previously decided against 

claimant and in favor of employer, the commission did not err in 

ruling that claimant could not seek to relitigate that issue. 

Thus, the commission properly denied claimant's request for 

reimbursement for the July 25, 1995 home air conditioning 

expenses as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

 IV. 

 In ruling upon claimant's request for mileage 

reimbursement, the commission found as follows: 

 [C]laimant's evidence did not limit his 

travel to direct routes to/from medical 

treatment or repair facilities. There was 

therefore no basis to assess travel costs 

against the employer, since the claimant 

essentially declined to present such 

evidence of reasonable travel, but only 

evidence of travel that was presumably 

inflated. The Deputy Commissioner 

acknowledged payment by the employer for 

some mileage, and she limited Carter's 

recovery for such reimbursement to amounts 

already paid. We find on review that this 

was a reasonable accommodation to inaccurate 

mileage evidence offered by the claimant. 

 The record amply supports the commission's findings. In 

light of the reasonableness standard applicable to this issue, 

we cannot say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence proved 

that employer was liable to reimburse him for any mileage 

expenses other than those it had already paid.3

 3

In affirming the commission's ruling on this issue, we 

cannot consider any evidence that was not properly before the 

commission when it rendered its decision. 
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 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.4

Affirmed.

 4

Appellant has filed a motion that appellee's brief not be 

considered by the Court. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss 

the appeal. We deny both motions.