Interim Decision 4t1509 

MATTER Or PERAVTA 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-4/62365 

Decided by Board October 4, 1965 

As respondent, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands who was admitted 

to the Vatted States for permanent residence in 1928, last his r. a nationality on July 4, 1946 when The Philippines became an independent country, he 

is deportable from the United States under section 241(a) (1), Immigration 

and Nationality Act, as amended, since at the time of his last entry in 1950 

as a returning resident he was an alien excludable under section 3 of the 

Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, because of his conviction in 1936 of 

the crime of robbery in the first degree. Although a II. S. national at the 

time of his conviction in 1936, pursuant to section 8(a) (1) of the Philippine Iniependence Act of March 24, 1934, respondent was to be considered 

as if he were an alien for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917. 

Crtencis: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (1) (8 1251(a) (1)1—Excludable 

at entry under sorties 3, Immigration Act of 1917 

II.S.C. 186(e), 1946 Ed.]—convicted of crime—

robbery in the first degree. 

This case is before us on the appeal of the trial attorney from the 

special inquiry officer's order of April 19, 1965, terminating the deportation proceeding. 

The respondent is a 56-year-old married male, native and citizen of 

the Philippines, who was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on September 19, 1928. He. last entered the United 

States on January 15, 1950 at which time he presented a reentry 

permit. Ile was convicted of robbery in the first degree on May 8, 

1936 and was sentenced to a term of five years to life, being paroled 

on February 5, 1940. 

On October 0, 1958, a special inquiry officer concluded that the 

respondent was deportable ton the charge stated above and directed 

his deportation. Subsequently, we dismissed his appeal. In 1961 

the respondent applied for adjustment of his immigration status 

under 8 U.S.C. 1255 but the application was denied by the District 

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Director, the denial being affirmed by the Regional Commissioner on 

appeal. Thereafter, counsel submitted a motion for the purpose of 

securing reconsideration of the respondent's' application under 8 

1255. On March 17, 1965, we reopened the deportation hearing. Following the reopened hearing, the special inquiry officer 

entered his above-mentioned order of April.19, 1965 terminating the 

proceeding. The sole issue is whether this action was correct. 

In his decision (pp. 2 and 3), the special inquiry officer stated that 

the respondent was 'a national of the United States when he last 

entered the United. States and that he is charged with deportability 

on the ground that he was wrelndable under section 212(a) (9) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (9)]. In 

quoting from the latter statutory provision, .the special inquiry officer emphasized the language reading "Aliens who have been convicted." Actually, the respondent last entered the United States.= 

January 15, 1950. He lost his United States nationality on July 4, 

1946 when the Philippines became an independent country. Hence, 

it is clear that he was an alien at the time of his last entry. In addition, deportability is not based on. excludability under 8 U.S.L. 

1182(a) (9) but on excludability under section 3 of the Immigration 

Act of 1917 which employs the language "persons who have been 

convicted." 

As a basis for terminating the deportation proceeding, the special 

inquiry- officer cited. 1?ab-ang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427 (1957) , and Costello v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 376 U.S. 120 

(1964). In the first case, it was held that a person who was a national of the United. States, by virtue of birth in the Philippine 

Islands, became an alien on July 4, 1946 regardless of the fact that 

he had permanent residence in continental United States on that 

date. The court concluded that Rabang was deportable, on the basis 

of a narcotic conviction in 1951. The Costello case involved a deportation proceeding under 8 U.S.O. 1251(a) (4) based on. two convictions after entry. The court held that this statutory provision 

did not apply to a person who was a naturalized citizen of the 

United States at the time he was convicted but -svho was later denaturalized. 

There is an important distinction between the Costello case and 

that of tint respondent in view of section, 8(a) (1) of the Philippine 

Independence Act of March 24, 1934 [48 Stet. 456; 48 U.S.C. 1238, 

1940 ed.], which became effective on May 1, 1934: It was there provided as follows: "For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 

1917, the Immigration Act of 1924 (except section. 13(c) ), this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the immi322 ' 
Interim Decision 44509 

gration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine 

Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered 

as if they were aliens." This statutory provision was in effect when 

the respondent was convicted. on May 8, 1936. At that time he was 

actually a national of 'the United. States. For the purpose of the 

Immigration Act of 1917, however, he was to be considered 'as if he 

were an alien. For that reason,' the Costello decision is not controlling in the respondent's case. 

We have also considered the possible applicability to the respondent's case of Mangaoang v. Boyd, 205 F.2d 553 (9th Cir., 1953), cert. 

den. 346 U.S. 876. When that case was before this Board;we had 

held that ho was deportable under the Act of 1918, as amended by 

the Internal Security Act of 1950, upon a finding that he had been 

a member of the Communist Party from about February 1938 to 

December 1939. Hatter of ill—, 4 I. &r. N. Dec. 569 (1051). Mangaoang arrived. in continental United States for permanent residence in 

1926 and hail never left this country. In concluding that Mangaoang was not deportable, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion 

that it was necessary, under the Act of 1918 as amended in 1950, 

for membership iii the Communist Party and alienage to exist 

simultaneously. Howevei, the decision was also based on other factors, that is, the possible doubt as to whether the referen& in ,the 

Act of March 24, 1934 to all other immigration laws would apply 

to the legislation enacted in 1950; the fact that the 1934 legislation 

became completely obsolete on. July 4, 1940; the question of whether 

the word "aliens" in the 1950 Act was broad enough to include persons who were actually nationals of the United States but who were 

to be considered as if they were aliens under the Act of March 24, 

1934; and did fact that Mangaoang's arrival in continental United 

States in 1926, being prior to the 1931 Act, did not constitute an' 

"entry" for immigratiii4 purposes since he was not then an. alien for 

any purpose but was iihational of the United States. In view of 

these other factors involved in the Mangaoang case, we do not consider that case to be analogous to that of the respondent. 

When the respondent last entered. the United States on January 

15, 1950, he was an alien for all purposes and he was then excludable 

under section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 as a person who had 

been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, 

we adhere to the conclusion. in our order of January 29, 1959 that 

the respondent is deportable on the charge stated above. In that 

order, we statecrihat the respondent met the statutory requirements 

under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) but that relief was denied in the exercise of 

discretion. Counsel's motion, seeks reconsideration of the respond- 

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ent'a application under 8 U.S.C. 1955. In view of the foregoing, we 

will withdraw the special inquiry officer's order terminating the deportation proceeding and will reopen the hearing in order that the 

respondent may be afforded a further opportunity to submit such 

applications as appropriate for relief from deportation. The Service and the respondent may present any pertinent evidence. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the special inquiry officer's order of 

April 19, 1965, terminating the deportation proceeding, be 

withdrawn. 

leis further ordered that the hearing,be reopened for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing and that the case be remanded to the special inquiry officer. 

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