NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HARNEK SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-981

Agency No.

A205-935-145

MEMORANDUM*

HARNEK SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-1850

Agency No.

A205-935-145

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 8, 2023**

San Francisco, California

Before: CHRISTEN and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON, District 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 10 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Judge.

***

Harnek Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a 

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an 

Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Singh 

also petitions for review of the BIA’s later denial of his motion to reopen his 

removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the 

petitions.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and 

withholding of removal based on the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See 

Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (standard of review for 

asylum and withholding of removal); Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“We review factual findings, including adverse credibility 

determinations, for substantial evidence.”). Under the substantial evidence 

standard, the agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

To support an adverse credibility finding, “[t]he [agency] must have a 

legitimate articulable basis to question the petitioner’s credibility, and must offer 

*** The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle 

District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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a specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.” Martinez v. Holder, 557 F.3d

1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Valderrama v. INS, 260 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th 

Cir. 2001)). “There is no bright-line rule under which some number of 

inconsistencies requires sustaining or rejecting an adverse credibility 

determination . . . .” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en 

banc). Instead, “we must look to the ‘totality of the circumstances[ ] and all 

relevant factors.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). One such factor is “the consistency between the 

[petitioner’s] written and oral statements.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

Credibility determinations may be made “without regard to whether an 

inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the [petitioner’s]

claim.” Id. 

Here, the BIA found that Singh’s testimony was not credible because it was 

inconsistent with his prior sworn statement and declaration. In particular, Singh 

was inconsistent about whether he had been beaten by members of the Congress 

Party; whether his injuries required professional medical attention; and whether 

his political involvement with the Mann Party went beyond just voting for its 

candidates. During cross-examination, Singh acknowledged all of these 

inconsistencies.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Singh’s testimony was 

credible. Singh’s “inability to consistently describe the underlying events that 

gave rise to his fear was an important factor that could be relied upon by the IJ in 
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making an adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 

1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010). And his embellishment of his account of persecution

further undermined his credibility. See Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that adverse credibility determinations can be 

supported based on the petitioner offering new allegations that “tell a much 

different—and more compelling—story of persecution than [the] initial 

application” (alteration in original) (quotations omitted)). Although Singh tried 

to explain the inconsistencies, the BIA could conclude that his explanations were 

not persuasive. And absent credible testimony, substantial evidence supports the 

denial of asylum and withholding of removal.

2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. See 

Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066 (standard of review). Singh’s evidentiary support for his 

claim that he would likely be tortured in India consisted of his discredited 

testimony and general background country condition information, which the BIA 

considered. This generalized evidence does not compel the conclusion that Singh 

will more likely than not be tortured if he is removed to India. See Delgado-Ortiz 

v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that 

“generalized evidence of violence and crime” in the country of origin was “not 

particular to Petitioners” and wasthus “insufficient to meet” the standard for CAT 

relief); Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 

that discredited testimony and general country reports of torture did not compel 

a grant of CAT protection).
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3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to 

reopen to pursue adjustment of status following his marriage to a U.S. citizen and 

his related filing of a visa application. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 

794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022) (standard of review). Singh offered no evidence that his 

visa application was approved. And “[w]hen an alien enters into a marriage 

following the completion of removal proceedings, it is presumed that the purpose 

is to ‘procur[e] the alien’s admission as an immigrant.’” Sharma v. Holder, 633 

F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1255(e)(3)). “To overcome this presumption, an applicant filing a motion with 

the Board to reopen removal proceedings must ‘present[ ] clear and convincing 

evidence indicating a strong likelihood that the [petitioner’s] marriage is bona 

fide.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Malhi v. INS, 336 F.3d 989, 994 (9th 

Cir. 2003)). 

Here, as the BIA noted, there was no “direct evidence showing joint 

tenancy of a common residence,” no evidence “as to when this couple met, how 

they met, or the exact nature of their relationship,” and “no affidavits from third 

parties having knowledge of the bona fides of the relationship.” Because Singh 

has not demonstrated that his “motivation for marriage” was “based on an actual 

and legitimate relationship,” Malhi, 336 F.3d at 994, the BIA did not abuse its 

discretion by denying the motion to reopen. Nor has Singh demonstrated any 
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other error in the BIA’s decision.1

PETITIONS DENIED.

1 Singh’s motion for stay of removal is denied as moot.