78026 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 

1More detailed information regarding this 

collection, including more detailed burden 

estimates, can be found in the OMB Supporting 

Statement posted at https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 

apps/reportingforms/home/review. On the page 

displayed at the link, you can find the OMB 

Supporting Statement by referencing the collection 

identifiers, FR 2835 and FR 2835a. 

1 Dodd-Frank Act section 111, 12 U.S.C. 5321. 

2 Dodd-Frank Act section 112(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. 

5322(a)(1). 

3 ‘‘Primary financial regulatory agency’’ is defined 

in section 2(12) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 

5301(12). 

4 88 FR 26305 (Apr. 28, 2023). In a rule codified 

at 12 CFR 1310.3, the Council voluntarily 

committed that it would not amend or rescind 

certain guidance regarding nonbank financial 

company determinations set forth in Appendix A to 

12 CFR part 1310 without providing the public with 

notice and an opportunity to comment in 

accordance with the procedures applicable to 

legislative rules under 5 U.S.C. 553. Section 1310.3 

does not apply to the Council’s issuance of rules, 

guidance, procedures, or other documents that do 

not amend or rescind Appendix A, and accordingly, 

it does not apply to the Analytic Framework. 

Nonetheless, in the interest of transparency and 

accountability, the Council chose to publish the 

Proposed Framework and provide an opportunity 

for public comment. 

5 88 FR 41616 (June 27, 2023). 

6The comment letters are available at https://

www.regulations.gov/docket/FSOC-2023-0001. 

data are also used to create aggregate 

statistics on consumer loan terms that 

are published in the Federal Reserve’s 

monthly statistical releases, G.19 

Consumer Credit and G.20 Finance 

Companies, and in the Federal Reserve 

Bulletin. Some of the aggregates are 

used by the Board in the calculation of 

the aggregate household debt service 

and financial obligations ratios for the 

Federal Reserve’s quarterly Household 

Debt Service and Financial Obligations 

Ratios statistical release and by the 

Bureau of Economic Analysis to 

calculate interest paid by households as 

part of the National Income and Product 

Accounts. 

Frequency: Quarterly. 

Respondents: The FR 2835 panel 

comprises a sample of commercial 

banks. The FR 2835a panel comprises a 

sample of commercial banks with $1 

billion or more in credit card 

receivables and a representative group 

of smaller issuers. 

Total estimated number of 

respondents: 200. 

Total estimated annual burden hours: 

274.1

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System, November 7, 2023. 

Michele Taylor Fennell, 

Deputy Associate Secretary of the Board. 

[FR Doc. 2023–25094 Filed 11–13–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6210–01–P 

FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT 

COUNCIL 

Analytic Framework for Financial 

Stability Risk Identification, 

Assessment, and Response 

AGENCY: Financial Stability Oversight 

Council. 

ACTION: Publication of analytic 

framework. 

SUMMARY: The Financial Stability 

Oversight Council (Council) is 

publishing an analytic framework that 

describes the approach the Council 

expects to take in identifying, assessing, 

and responding to certain potential risks 

to U.S. financial stability. 

DATES: Effective Date: November 14, 

2023. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric 

Froman, Office of the General Counsel, 

Treasury, at (202) 622–1942; Devin 

Mauney, Office of the General Counsel, 

Treasury, at (202) 622–2537; or Priya 

Agarwal, Office of the General Counsel, 

Treasury, at (202) 622–3773. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

Section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 

Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) established 

the Financial Stability Oversight 

Council (the Council).1 The statutory 

purposes of the Council are ‘‘(A) to 

identify risks to the financial stability of 

the United States that could arise from 

the material financial distress or failure, 

or ongoing activities, of large, 

interconnected bank holding companies 

or nonbank financial companies, or that 

could arise outside the financial 

services marketplace; (B) to promote 

market discipline, by eliminating 

expectations on the part of shareholders, 

creditors, and counterparties of such 

companies that the Government will 

shield them from losses in the event of 

failure; and (C) to respond to emerging 

threats to the stability of the United 

States financial system.’’ 2

The Council’s duties under section 

112 of the Dodd-Frank Act reflect the 

range of approaches the Council may 

consider to identify, assess, and respond 

to potential threats to U.S. financial 

stability, which include collecting 

information from regulators, requesting 

data and analyses from the Office of 

Financial Research (the OFR), 

monitoring the financial services 

marketplace and financial regulatory 

developments, facilitating information 

sharing and coordination among 

regulators, recommending to the 

Council member agencies general 

supervisory priorities and principles, 

identifying regulatory gaps, making 

recommendations to the Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System (the Federal Reserve) or other 

primary financial regulatory agencies,3

and designating certain entities or 

payment, clearing, and settlement 

activities for additional regulation. 

The Council’s Analytic Framework for 

Financial Stability Risk Identification, 

Assessment, and Response (the Analytic 

Framework) describes the approach the 

Council expects to take in identifying, 

assessing, and responding to certain 

potential risks to U.S. financial stability. 

The Analytic Framework is intended to 

help market participants, stakeholders, 

and other members of the public better 

understand how the Council expects to 

perform certain of its duties. It is not a 

binding rule and does not establish 

rights or obligations applicable to any 

person or entity. 

The Council issued for public 

comment the Proposed Analytic 

Framework for Financial Stability Risk 

Identification, Assessment, and 

Response (the Proposed Framework) on 

April 21, 2023.4 The comment period 

was initially set to close after 60 days; 

however, in response to public requests 

for additional time to review and 

comment on the Proposed Framework, 

the Council extended the comment 

period by 30 days,5 to July 27, 2023. 

Having carefully considered the 

comments it received, the Council voted 

to adopt the Analytic Framework at a 

public meeting on November 3, 2023. 

At the same time as the publication of 

the Proposed Framework, the Council 

also published proposed interpretive 

guidance (the Proposed Guidance) 

regarding its procedures for designating 

nonbank financial companies for 

prudential standards and Federal 

Reserve supervision under section 113 

of the Dodd-Frank Act. At its public 

meeting on November 3, 2023, the 

Council also adopted a final version of 

those procedures (the Final Guidance). 

In response to its request for public 

input, the Council received 37 

comments on the Proposed Framework, 

of which nine were from companies or 

trade associations in the investment 

management industry, two were from 

trade associations in the insurance 

industry, six were from other companies 

or trade associations, 10 were from 

various advocacy groups, five were from 

current or former state or federal 

government officials, two were from 

groups of academics, and three were 

from individuals.6 Most public 

comments submitted with respect to the 

Proposed Framework also commented 


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7The preamble to the Final Guidance contains a 

discussion of the Council’s reasons for removing a 

previous interpretation of ‘‘threat to the financial 

stability of the United States’’ from its nonbank 

financial company designation procedures and not 

including an interpretation of that phrase in the 

Final Guidance. 

8See Dodd-Frank Act sections 112 and 120, 12 

U.S.C. 5322 and 5330. 

on the Proposed Guidance. For the 

convenience of the public, the Council 

addresses many of the issues raised in 

such dual comments in the preamble to 

the Final Guidance. 

II. Adoption of the Analytic Framework 

Following Public Comment 

The Analytic Framework provides a 

narrative description of the approach 

the Council expects to take in 

identifying, assessing, and responding 

to certain potential risks to U.S. 

financial stability. Accordingly, this 

preamble omits a duplicative 

description of the Analytic Framework’s 

content and instead focuses on key 

changes from the Proposed Framework 

and on comments received in response 

to the Proposed Framework. Members of 

the public should refer directly to the 

Analytic Framework for greater detail 

regarding the Council’s approach. 

A. Key Changes From the Proposed 

Framework 

Following consideration of public 

comments on the Proposed Framework, 

the Analytic Framework reflects several 

key changes from the Proposed 

Framework, each as discussed further 

below: 

• Description of ‘‘threat to financial 

stability.’’ To provide additional 

transparency regarding how the Council 

expects to interpret the phrase ‘‘threat to 

the financial stability of the United 

States,’’ which is used in several 

instances in the Dodd-Frank Act related 

to the Council’s authorities, the Analytic 

Framework includes an interpretation of 

this term that is based on the 

interpretation of ‘‘financial stability’’ 

that was included in the Proposed 

Framework. 

• Additional sample metrics to assess 

vulnerabilities. To provide more public 

transparency on the Analytic 

Framework’s description of how the 

Council assesses vulnerabilities that 

contribute to risks to financial stability, 

the Council has added more examples of 

the types of quantitative metrics it may 

consider in its analyses. 

• Expanded discussion of 

transmission channels. To further 

clarify the Council’s consideration of 

the channels that it has identified as 

being most likely to transmit risk 

through the financial system, the 

Analytic Framework now identifies 

vulnerabilities that may be particularly 

relevant to each of four listed 

transmission channels and includes 

more detailed discussions of examples 

and analyses relevant to the 

transmission channels. 

• Emphasis on the Council’s 

engagement with regulators. To align 

more closely with the Council’s practice 

and expectations, the Analytic 

Framework includes additional 

emphasis on the Council’s extensive 

engagement with state and federal 

financial regulatory agencies regarding 

potential risks and the extent to which 

existing regulation may mitigate those 

risks. 

B. Consideration of Public Comments 

The Analytic Framework, like the 

Proposed Framework, describes the 

approach the Council expects to take to 

identify, assess, and respond to 

potential risks to U.S. financial stability 

and contains three substantive 

subsections addressing these steps. 

Approximately half of the comments 

on the Proposed Framework were 

generally supportive, noting that the 

Proposed Framework’s eight listed 

vulnerabilities, associated sample 

metrics, and four transmission channels 

were well chosen, were supported by 

expert research and analysis, and 

provide appropriate transparency. A 

number of commenters were supportive 

of the Council’s proposal to issue the 

Analytic Framework as a stand-alone 

document separate from procedures 

applicable to specific authorities such as 

nonbank financial company designation 

under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank 

Act. 

Other commenters were generally 

critical of the Proposed Framework, 

stating that its listed vulnerabilities and 

transmission channels, as well as the 

interpretation of financial stability, were 

overly broad or unclear. Several 

commenters stated that the Proposed 

Framework did not adequately describe 

how the Council intended to use the 

listed vulnerabilities, sample metrics, 

and transmission channels to assess 

nonbank financial companies, activities, 

or risks. Some commenters also noted 

that the 10 considerations that the 

Council is required to take into account 

in a nonbank financial company 

designation under section 113 of the 

Dodd-Frank Act differ from the 

Proposed Framework’s listed 

vulnerabilities. 

The Council appreciates and has 

considered the public comments as 

described below, organized by the 

relevant section of the Analytic 

Framework. 

1. Introduction 

The Analytic Framework’s 

introduction generally describes the 

Council’s statutory purposes and duties, 

explains the Analytic Framework’s role 

and purpose, and provides background 

information relevant to the sections that 

follow. This section of the Proposed 

Framework included an interpretation 

of ‘‘financial stability’’ but did not 

separately provide an interpretation of a 

‘‘threat’’ to financial stability. Public 

comments addressing the Proposed 

Framework’s introduction section 

focused on this element. 

The Analytic Framework interprets 

‘‘financial stability’’ as ‘‘the financial 

system being resilient to events or 

conditions that could impair its ability 

to support economic activity, such as by 

intermediating financial transactions, 

facilitating payments, allocating 

resources, and managing risks.’’ Some 

commenters were supportive of the 

Proposed Framework’s interpretation of 

financial stability, stating that it 

appropriately accounts for key ways in 

which the financial system supports 

economic activity and that it encourages 

financial regulators to take action before 

events or conditions undermine 

financial stability. Some commenters 

stated that the Analytic Framework (or 

the Final Guidance) 7 should include the 

Council’s interpretation of the phrase 

‘‘threat to the financial stability of the 

United States,’’ which is an element of 

the standard for designating nonbank 

financial companies for prudential 

standards and Federal Reserve 

supervision under section 113 of the 

Dodd-Frank Act, and which (or close 

variations of which) are also used 

elsewhere in the Dodd-Frank Act related 

to the Council’s other authorities.8 Some 

of these commenters stated that the 

Proposed Framework’s interpretation of 

‘‘financial stability,’’ read in isolation, 

implied that even insubstantial 

impairments to the financial system’s 

ability to support economic activity 

could constitute threats to financial 

stability. One commenter suggested 

adopting specific contrasting definitions 

of financial instability and financial 

stability. 

The Council continues to support the 

interpretation of ‘‘financial stability’’ as 

proposed, which accurately captures 

generally accepted aspects of this 

concept. However, the Council 

recognizes that the ‘‘financial stability’’ 

interpretation does not include an 

indicator of significance, which may be 

important in cases where the Council is 

considering that term in connection 

with a potential exercise of one or more 

of its authorities. Therefore, in response 


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9See Dodd-Frank Act section 112(a), 12 U.S.C. 

5322(a). 

10These comments are discussed further in 

section II.B.5 below. 

to public comments, the Analytic 

Framework includes an interpretation of 

‘‘threat to financial stability’’ that builds 

on the proposed interpretation of 

‘‘financial stability.’’ Specifically, the 

Analytic Framework interprets ‘‘threat 

to financial stability’’ to mean events or 

conditions that could ‘‘substantially 

impair’’ the financial system’s ability to 

support economic activity. This 

interpretation is consistent with the 

view of commenters who recommended 

that ‘‘threat to financial stability’’ 

should be interpreted consistently with 

the Council’s statutory purposes and 

duties, which direct it to respond to 

potential and emerging, not just 

entrenched or imminent, threats to 

financial stability.9

2. Identifying Potential Risks 

Section II.a of the Analytic 

Framework, like the Proposed 

Framework, describes how the Council 

expects to identify potential risks to 

financial stability and provides 

examples of the broad range of asset 

classes, institutions, and activities that 

the Council monitors for potential risks. 

A number of commenters expressed 

their support for the Proposed 

Framework’s discussion of risk 

monitoring, noting that the Proposed 

Framework is broad enough to cover a 

variety of events and conditions that 

may pose risks to the financial stability 

of the United States. Other commenters 

stated that the activities, products, and 

practices listed in the Proposed 

Framework were overly broad or 

overlapping and suggested changes to 

this section, including the incorporation 

of certain aspects of the Council’s 

guidance on nonbank financial 

company designations issued in 2019, 

more detail on how risk identification 

will be connected to the list of 

vulnerabilities in the Proposed 

Framework, and additional sectorspecific information. One commenter 

suggested specifically describing how 

the asset classes, institutions, and 

activities listed in the Proposed 

Framework relate to the identification of 

risk in the asset management industry. 

Additional commenters suggested that 

this section of the Analytic Framework 

should address in greater detail certain 

climate-related financial risks or risks to 

the credit needs of underserved 

communities.10

The Council’s statutory mission is 

broad: It encompasses risks to financial 

stability irrespective of the source of the 

risk or the specific sector of the 

financial system that could be affected. 

Therefore, the Council’s monitoring is 

similarly broad, and in response to 

comments suggesting the addition of 

further examples, the Council has added 

‘‘private funds’’ to its list of financial 

entities in this section. The list of asset 

classes, institutions, and activities in the 

Analytic Framework is not intended to 

be exclusive or exhaustive, but instead 

to reflect the Council’s broad statutory 

mandate. As discussed in section II.B.5 

below, the purpose of the Analytic 

Framework is to describe the Council’s 

overarching approach to financial 

stability risks, so sector-specific 

discussion would not provide useful 

clarity. The Council encourages 

members of the public who are 

interested in the Council’s specific areas 

of focus to review the Council’s regular 

public statements, including its annual 

reports, public meeting minutes, and 

other public reports, which describe in 

detail the Council’s analyses of various 

risks. 

3. Assessing Potential Risks 

The Analytic Framework describes 

how the Council expects to evaluate 

potential risks to financial stability to 

determine whether they merit further 

review or action. Section II.b of the 

Analytic Framework sets forth a nonexhaustive and non-exclusive list of 

vulnerabilities that most commonly 

contribute to risks to financial stability 

and sample quantitative metrics that 

may be used to measure these 

vulnerabilities. 

(a) Vulnerabilities and Sample Metrics 

The Council received a variety of 

feedback on the vulnerabilities and 

sample metrics described in Section II.b 

of the Proposed Framework. Some 

commenters supported the specified 

vulnerabilities and sample metrics, 

stating that they were well chosen, were 

supported by expert research and 

analysis, and provided appropriate 

transparency. One commenter 

supported the inclusion of the 

‘‘interconnections’’ and ‘‘destabilizing 

activities’’ vulnerabilities, noting that 

these vulnerabilities can arise even 

when the underlying activities are 

undertaken intentionally and permitted 

by law. Some commenters also 

supported the descriptions of the 

vulnerabilities in the Proposed 

Framework. Several commenters noted 

that the Proposed Framework offered 

the Council flexibility to conduct 

analyses of financial sectors and their 

interconnections as well as more 

focused assessments of risks related to 

individual firms. Some commenters 

commended the Council for issuing the 

Proposed Framework separately from 

the Proposed Guidance, as this 

approach allows the Council to decide 

which authority to exercise, if any, 

without committing itself in advance to 

a particular response. 

Other commenters stated that the 

listed vulnerabilities were vague or did 

not clarify the language of the DoddFrank Act. The Council believes that by 

describing the Council’s analytic 

approach without regard to the origin of 

a particular risk, the Analytic 

Framework provides new public 

transparency into how the Council 

expects to consider risks to financial 

stability. Several commenters addressed 

whether issuing the Proposed 

Framework separately from the 

Proposed Guidance was useful. The 

Council believes that separately issuing 

the Analytic Framework and the Final 

Guidance provides more clarity because 

they serve different purposes. The Final 

Guidance describes the Council’s 

procedures related only to nonbank 

financial company designations, while 

the Analytic Framework explains how 

the Council analyzes risks to financial 

stability across the range of risks that 

arise and the authorities the Council 

may use to respond to those risks. 

Several commenters recommended 

that the Analytic Framework establish 

specific thresholds at which 

vulnerabilities would be deemed to rise 

to the level of a threat to financial 

stability. One commenter suggested that 

the Analytic Framework include 

examples of how vulnerabilities will be 

assessed individually and in 

combination with each other. Other 

commenters proposed that the Council 

provide a sliding scale with minimum 

quantitative thresholds, where an 

assessment that results in a score closer 

to the minimum threshold would 

require a more rigorous qualitative 

assessment to determine whether a risk 

to U.S. financial stability exists than a 

higher score would. In contrast, some 

commenters expressed concern with the 

use of metrics generally to assess 

vulnerabilities, because systemic risk 

analysis methods rapidly evolve and 

specified metrics may become obsolete. 

One commenter suggested omitting the 

sample metrics and instead expanding 

the descriptions of the vulnerabilities in 

other ways. Some commenters stated 

that that the metrics in the Proposed 

Framework were tailored to banks and 

not appropriate for nonbank financial 

companies. 

The Council believes that the 

vulnerabilities and sample metrics in 

the Analytic Framework provide 

transparency regarding how the Council 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 78029 

assesses risks to financial stability 

across a range of issues and sectors. As 

described in the Analytic Framework, 

the Council routinely uses quantitative 

metrics and other data in its analyses, in 

addition to qualitative factors. Further, 

in some circumstances, such as 

evaluations of risks within a specific 

financial sector, the application of 

particular metrics, tailored to the 

relevant sector and to the risks under 

evaluation, can be beneficial. 

Accordingly, the Analytic Framework 

describes risk factors and sample 

quantitative metrics. However, the 

Council does not believe that uniform 

thresholds, ‘‘sliding scales,’’ or other 

weighting schemes adequately capture 

the wide range of potential risks to 

financial stability that can arise across 

the financial system. As some 

commenters noted, financial risks vary 

across sectors, and thresholds that 

provide helpful insight into risks in one 

sector may be irrelevant to another 

sector. While it would not be feasible to 

generate an exhaustive list of metrics to 

measure the full range of potential 

financial stability risks, the Council 

believes that the sample metrics in the 

Analytic Framework offer helpful clarity 

to understanding the listed 

vulnerabilities. Therefore, the Analytic 

Framework sets forth sample metrics 

and does not provide the types of 

thresholds suggested by some 

commenters. 

Some commenters raised issues 

regarding specific vulnerabilities 

addressed in the Proposed Framework. 

One commenter expressed concern that 

the ‘‘operational risks’’ vulnerability 

would capture risks associated with 

commercial companies. Another 

commenter questioned how the Council 

would determine that vulnerabilities 

were not related to normal market 

fluctuations. The Council is mindful of 

its purpose ‘‘to respond to emerging 

threats to the stability of the United 

States financial system,’’ and the 

vulnerabilities described in the Analytic 

Framework are intended to support the 

identification and assessment of 

potential risks to financial stability. 

Some commenters were critical of the 

‘‘destabilizing activities’’ vulnerability. 

Several commenters stated that this 

vulnerability was circular or conclusory. 

Other commenters recommended that 

the Council clarify this vulnerability. 

One commenter suggested that this 

vulnerability would be measured better 

by qualitative factors rather than 

quantitative measures. The Analytic 

Framework provides examples of 

‘‘destabilizing activities’’—trading 

practices that substantially increase 

volatility in one or more financial 

markets, or activities that involve moral 

hazard or conflicts of interest that result 

in the creation and transmission of 

significant risks—to provide insight into 

this vulnerability. As with other 

vulnerabilities, the Council expects its 

assessment of risks arising from 

destabilizing activities to be rigorous 

and analytical. 

One commenter stated that the 

‘‘liquidity risk and maturity mismatch’’ 

vulnerability did not explain how the 

mismatch between short-term liabilities 

and longer-term assets is relevant for 

different types of nonbank financial 

companies. While the Analytic 

Framework is not focused on the 

assessment of individual nonbank 

financial companies or sectors, the 

Council has further clarified this 

vulnerability by including two 

additional sample metrics: the scale of 

financial obligations that are short-term 

or can become due in a short period, 

and amounts of transactions that may 

require the posting of additional margin 

or collateral. 

Some commenters stated that the 

Council should provide more detail on 

how it considers other vulnerabilities 

listed in the Analytic Framework. In 

response, the Analytic Framework 

includes additional examples of the 

types of metrics the Council may 

consider with respect to complexity or 

opacity (the extent of intercompany or 

interaffiliate dependencies for liquidity, 

funding, operations, and risk 

management) and inadequate risk 

management (levels of exposures to 

particular types of financial instruments 

or asset classes). 

One commenter stated that the sample 

metrics may incentivize firms to manage 

their operations with respect to the 

metrics rather than mitigating risk. To 

the extent that the vulnerabilities, 

sample metrics, and transmission 

channels in the Analytic Framework 

provide insights that enable firms or 

other stakeholders to take action to 

mitigate potential risks to financial 

stability, those steps could help 

accomplish the Council’s statutory 

purposes of identifying risks to financial 

stability, promoting market discipline, 

and responding to emerging threats to 

financial stability. 

A number of commenters suggested 

additional metrics for inclusion in the 

Analytic Framework. For example, 

several commenters suggested 

additional sample metrics for the 

‘‘operational risks’’ vulnerability. The 

sample metrics included in the Analytic 

Framework are quantitative only, to 

provide further clarity as a supplement 

to the qualitative descriptions of the 

listed vulnerabilities. Some of the 

metrics recommended by commenters 

were not quantitative in nature and are 

not suitable for inclusion in the 

Analytic Framework. Other 

recommended metrics are not included 

because they would not be broadly 

applicable across the financial system. 

One commenter recommended that the 

Analytic Framework include a ‘‘metric’’ 

for existing regulatory frameworks. One 

commenter suggested adding specific 

mitigating factors as metrics. Both the 

Proposed Framework and the Analytic 

Framework note explicitly that the 

Council takes into account existing laws 

and regulations that have mitigated a 

potential risk to U.S. financial stability. 

Additionally, as the Proposed 

Framework noted, the sample metrics 

provided are indicative of how the 

Council expects to consider the 

vulnerabilities but are not meant to be 

an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors. 

While the Council expects to consider 

factors that are likely to mitigate 

potential risks to financial stability, it 

does not believe the inclusion of 

potential mitigants would enhance the 

Analytic Framework. To the extent that 

mitigating factors exist, they are 

reflected in the analysis of the risk itself, 

because they reduce vulnerabilities or 

the transmission of risks. 

Some commenters addressed the 

relationship between the vulnerabilities 

and sample metrics in the Proposed 

Framework, on one hand, and the 

statutory standard or considerations for 

designating nonbank financial 

companies under section 113 of the 

Dodd-Frank Act, on the other hand. As 

noted above, the Analytic Framework 

describes the Council’s analytic 

approach without regard to the origin of 

a particular risk, including whether the 

risk arises from widely conducted 

activities or from individual entities, 

and regardless of which of the Council’s 

authorities may be used to respond to 

the risk. With respect to nonbank 

financial company designations, the 

Dodd-Frank Act sets forth the standard 

for designations and certain specific 

considerations that the Council must 

take into account in making any 

determination under section 113. 

Consistent with the statutory 

requirements, the Council will apply the 

statutory standard and each of the 10 

statutory considerations in any 

evaluation of a nonbank financial 

company for potential designation. The 

vulnerabilities, sample metrics, and 

transmission channels described in the 

Analytic Framework will inform the 

Council’s assessment of the designation 

standard and mandatory considerations 

under section 113. Some commenters 


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also addressed whether the 

vulnerabilities, sample metrics, or 

transmission channels in the Analytic 

Framework take into account the 

likelihood of a nonbank financial 

company’s material financial distress 

(referred to by some commenters as a 

company’s ‘‘vulnerability’’ to financial 

distress), including in the context of a 

designation under section 113 of the 

Dodd-Frank Act. As also discussed in 

the preamble to the Final Guidance, the 

Council does not intend to construe any 

of the vulnerabilities, sample metrics, 

transmission channels, or other factors 

described in the Analytic Framework as 

contemplating or requiring an 

assessment of the likelihood of, or 

vulnerability to, material financial 

distress, including in the context of a 

potential designation under section 113 

of the Dodd-Frank Act. 

(b) Transmission Channels 

The Analytic Framework includes a 

detailed discussion, expanded from the 

Proposed Framework, regarding the 

Council’s consideration of how the 

adverse effects of potential risks could 

be transmitted to financial markets or 

market participants and what impact the 

potential risks could have on the 

financial system. The Analytic 

Framework notes that such a 

transmission of risk can occur through 

various mechanisms, or channels, and 

describes four transmission channels 

that the Council has identified as most 

likely to facilitate the transmission of 

the negative effects of a risk to financial 

stability. 

Some commenters stated that the 

Proposed Framework’s discussion of the 

four transmission channels provided 

insufficient detail to elucidate the 

Council’s analyses. For example, one 

commenter suggested adding a 

discussion that would map specific 

activities, products, and practices that 

may pose risks onto each of the 

identified transmission channels. 

Another commenter stated that the 

Council should specify the value of 

daily losses or asset sales that would 

give rise to a threat to financial stability. 

Other commenters stated that the 

relationship between the transmission 

channels and the vulnerabilities 

described above was unclear. Some 

commenters suggested adding more 

analyses or requirements to the 

Council’s consideration of the 

transmission channels, including to 

address how the transmission channels 

may spread risks to low-income, 

minority, or underserved communities; 

to mandate that the Council focus on 

some channels more than others; or to 

notify market participants when the 

transmission of risks becomes serious 

enough to pose a potential threat to 

financial stability. 

One commenter stated that the 

transmission channels do not relate to 

specific Council authorities under the 

Dodd-Frank Act and are therefore 

inappropriate for the Council to 

consider. However, under section 112 of 

the Dodd-Frank Act, one of the 

Council’s purposes is ‘‘to respond to 

emerging threats to the stability of the 

United States financial system,’’ and 

among the Council’s relevant duties is 

to ‘‘monitor the financial services 

marketplace in order to identify 

potential threats to the financial 

stability of the United States.’’ 

Accordingly, consideration of the 

channels most likely to transmit risk 

through the financial system is well 

within the Council’s remit. 

In response to the public comments, 

the Analytic Framework contains two 

types of additional information with 

respect to the transmission channels. 

First, to clarify the relationship between 

the vulnerabilities and the transmission 

channels described in the Analytic 

Framework, each of the four 

transmission channel discussions now 

highlights certain vulnerabilities that 

may be particularly relevant to that 

channel. These explanations are 

intended to further clarify, for the 

public, how the vulnerabilities and 

transmission channels will be 

considered together. Second, the 

Analytic Framework includes expanded 

discussions of the transmission 

channels, compared to the Proposed 

Framework, to provide further insight 

into the Council’s analyses under those 

channels. The ‘‘exposures’’ transmission 

channel discussion now includes 

additional examples of potentially 

relevant asset classes. Consistent with 

input from a number of commenters, the 

Analytic Framework also notes that 

risks arising from exposures to assets 

managed by a company on behalf of 

third parties are distinct from exposures 

to assets owned by, or liabilities issued 

by, the company itself. The discussion 

of the ‘‘asset liquidation’’ transmission 

channel now provides greater detail on 

the features of certain assets, liabilities, 

and market behavior that could affect 

the Council’s analysis and further 

describes how actions by market 

participants or financial regulators may 

influence the transmission of risks 

through asset liquidation. Finally, the 

Analytic Framework’s discussion of the 

‘‘critical function or service’’ 

transmission channel further elaborates 

on the Council’s analysis with respect to 

this channel. 

The Council recognizes that some 

commenters recommended that even 

further detail be included in the 

transmission channel discussion. The 

Council believes that this discussion in 

the Analytic Framework, including the 

additional descriptions compared to the 

proposal, provides the public with 

insight into the Council’s assessments of 

potential risks to financial stability, 

while maintaining the flexibility needed 

for the Council to be able to respond to 

diverse and evolving risks. 

4. Addressing Potential Risks 

Section II.c of the Analytic 

Framework describes approaches the 

Council may take to respond to risks 

and multiple tools the Council may use 

to mitigate risks. As described in the 

Analytic Framework, these approaches 

may include interagency information 

sharing and collaboration, 

recommendations to agencies and 

Congress, and designation of certain 

entities or activities for supervision and 

regulation. 

Some commenters suggested that the 

Council should add further detail to the 

Analytic Framework regarding how the 

Council intends to use the tools 

described in this section. However, the 

Analytic Framework is designed to 

describe how the Council evaluates and 

responds to potential risks to financial 

stability in general, rather than a process 

for using any specific authority. The 

Council has issued separate documents, 

such as the Final Guidance, that 

describe in detail the procedures the 

Council expects to follow when 

employing certain statutory authorities. 

Several commenters stated that the 

Analytic Framework should include a 

more detailed description of how the 

Council will collaborate with primary 

financial regulatory agencies to respond 

to risks to U.S. financial stability. Others 

stated that the framework should 

address how the Council considers the 

existing regulations that primary 

financial regulatory agencies administer 

and require that the Council only act 

when existing regulation is insufficient. 

The Council has a long history of 

close engagement with financial 

regulatory agencies and intends to 

continue to consult and coordinate with 

regulators. The Proposed Framework 

referred numerous times to the 

Council’s consultation and coordination 

with primary financial regulatory 

agencies, and noted that the Council 

works with relevant financial regulators 

at the federal and state levels. The 

Proposed Framework also noted that if 

existing regulators can address a risk to 

financial stability in a sufficient and 

timely way, the Council generally 


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11The Council rescinded the referenced guidance 

in 2019. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, 

Staff Guidance, Methodologies Relating to Stage 1 

Thresholds (June 8, 2015), available at https://

home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/ 

Staff%20Guidance%20Methodologies%20

Relating%20to%20Stage%201%20Thresholds.pdf; 

Minutes of the Council (Dec. 4, 2019), available at 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/ 

December-4-2019.pdf. 

encourages those regulators to do so. 

The Council routinely works with 

federal and state financial regulatory 

agencies to identify, assess, and respond 

to risks to financial stability, as noted in 

the Proposed Framework’s section on 

addressing potential risks. In response 

to the public comments, the Analytic 

Framework further emphasizes the 

importance of the Council’s engagement 

with state and federal financial 

regulators as it assesses potential risks. 

The Analytic Framework now includes 

an additional statement that the Council 

engages extensively with state and 

federal financial regulatory agencies, 

including those represented on the 

Council, regarding potential risks and 

the extent to which existing regulation 

may mitigate those risks. 

One commenter suggested that the 

Council clarify that the emphasis on 

engaging with existing regulators to 

address risks to financial stability does 

not require the Council to prioritize 

interagency coordination and 

information sharing over its other 

authorities, including under sections 

113 and 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The 

Council agrees that such engagement 

does not imply, much less require, 

prioritization of any of the Council’s 

authorities over others. The Council 

intends for all of its statutory tools to be 

available, as appropriate, to respond to 

risks to financial stability. 

5. Other Comments 

In addition to comments regarding 

specific sections of the Proposed 

Framework, the Council also received a 

number of more general or cross-cutting 

comments. Several commenters stated 

that the Analytic Framework should 

specifically address unique features of 

their industries, including traditional 

asset managers, alternative investment 

managers, life insurers, and payment 

and digital asset providers. The Council 

affirms that its analyses of potential 

risks to financial stability will account 

for relevant differences among various 

financial sectors. For example, as noted 

in the Analytic Framework, under the 

exposures transmission channel, risks 

arising from exposures to assets 

managed by a company on behalf of 

third parties are distinct from exposures 

to assets owned by, or liabilities issued 

by, the company itself. The Analytic 

Framework also notes that the Council’s 

analyses take into account market 

participants’ risk profiles and business 

models. But the Analytic Framework’s 

purpose is not to address such sectorspecific distinctions; instead, it 

describes the Council’s overarching 

approach to financial stability risks 

regardless of their origin. 

The Council also received comments 

commending the Proposed Framework 

for providing transparency and clarity 

with respect to the Council’s holistic 

and deliberative process for identifying, 

assessing, and addressing risks. Other 

commenters recommended greater 

transparency or detail, or stated that 

nonbank financial companies could not 

take informed action based on the 

Proposed Framework to avoid 

designation under section 113 of the 

Dodd-Frank Act. Commenters suggested 

that the Council provide nonbank 

financial companies with additional 

guidance on risk mitigants and 

corrective steps they could undertake to 

avoid designation. One commenter 

indicated that the Proposed Framework 

should take into account different 

accounting standards when applying 

metrics and, in particular, incorporate 

certain accounting standards described 

by the Council in the nonbank financial 

company designation context in 2015.11

The Council believes that the Analytic 

Framework provides the public and 

industry participants with considerable 

transparency into how the Council 

identifies, assesses, and addresses 

potential risks to financial stability, 

regardless of whether the risks stem 

from widely conducted activities or 

from individual entities. The Council 

also believes that nonbank financial 

companies, market participants, and 

other interested parties should be able 

to assess potential risks to financial 

stability based on the vulnerabilities, 

sample metrics, and transmission 

channels described in the Analytic 

Framework. For example, while the 

Analytic Framework does not seek to 

establish a bright-line test for the level 

of leverage or liquidity risk that could 

constitute a risk to financial stability, 

the Analytic Framework identifies these 

vulnerabilities, explains how the 

Council evaluates them, provides 

sample metrics for their quantitative 

measurement, and describes the 

channels through which those risks 

could create risks to financial stability, 

including through the exposures and 

asset liquidation transmission channels. 

The Council believes that the Analytic 

Framework provides a transparent and 

constructive explanation of how the 

Council considers risks to financial 

stability. 

Some commenters recommended that 

the Analytic Framework specifically 

address climate-related financial risk, 

such as by incorporating climate-related 

financial risk into the Council’s 

interpretation of financial stability, or 

explicitly accounting for climate-related 

risks among the Analytic Framework’s 

listed vulnerabilities, sample metrics, or 

transmission channels. The Council 

appreciates these comments and has 

published a number of analyses 

regarding the emerging and increasing 

risks that climate change poses to the 

financial system. However, the Council 

believes that potential risks related to 

climate change may be assessed under 

the vulnerabilities, sample metrics, and 

transmission channels in the Analytic 

Framework. For example, to the extent 

that climate-related financial risks could 

result in defaults on a company’s 

outstanding obligations, those risks may 

be considered, in part, through the 

‘‘interconnections’’ vulnerability and 

the ‘‘exposures’’ transmission channel. 

Similarly, some commenters 

recommended that the Analytic 

Framework discuss risks to the financial 

needs of underserved families and 

communities. As with climate-related 

financial risks, the Council agrees that 

risks to financial stability that affect the 

availability of credit to underserved 

populations are important, and the 

Council expects to consider such risks, 

as appropriate, as part of the approach 

described in the Analytic Framework. 

For example, the Council would expect 

to monitor markets for consumer 

financial products and services for 

potential risks under the Analytic 

Framework’s first section; in assessing 

potential risks, the ‘‘critical function or 

service’’ transmission channel may be 

particularly relevant to risks concerning 

the availability of financial services to 

underserved populations; and to 

respond to an identified risk, the 

Council could take an action described 

in section II.c of the Analytic 

Framework, including promoting 

interagency coordination or making 

recommendations to primary financial 

regulatory agencies. 

Some commenters suggested adding 

certain other factors to the Analytic 

Framework. These included 

assessments regarding the effects of 

existing regulations, statements 

prioritizing certain approaches to risk 

responses and statutory tools over 

others, and requirements to perform 

cost-benefit analyses when assessing or 

responding to certain risks to financial 

stability. Some of these suggestions 

were primarily directed at the Proposed 


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12See, for example, Dodd-Frank Act sections 

112(a)(2), 113, 115, 120, and 804, 12 U.S.C. 

5322(a)(2), 5323, 5325, 5330, and 5463. 

13Courts have recognized that ‘‘an agency 

charged with a duty to enforce or administer a 

statute has inherent authority to issue interpretive 

rules informing the public of the procedures and 

standards it intends to apply in exercising its 

discretion.’’ See, for example, Prod. Tool v. 

Employment & Training Admin., 688 F.2d 1161, 

1166 (7th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has 

acknowledged that ‘‘whether or not they enjoy any 

express delegation of authority on a particular 

question, agencies charged with applying a statute 

necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices.’’ 

U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). 

14See Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL–CIO 

v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

1 Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) section 

112(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. 5322(a)(1). 

2 Dodd-Frank Act section 112(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. 

5322(a)(2). 

Guidance and are addressed in the 

preamble to the Final Guidance. Some 

were already reflected in the Proposed 

Framework, including its discussions of 

the effects of existing regulation. Certain 

of these comments were beyond the 

scope of the Analytic Framework. 

III. Legal Authority of the Council and 

Status of the Analytic Framework 

The Council has numerous authorities 

and tools under the Dodd-Frank Act to 

carry out its statutory purposes.12 As an 

agency charged by Congress with broadranging responsibilities under the DoddFrank Act, the Council has the inherent 

authority to promulgate interpretive 

guidance that explains the approach the 

Council expects to take in identifying, 

assessing, and responding to certain 

potential risks to U.S. financial 

stability.13 The Council also has 

authority to issue policy statements.14

The Analytic Framework provides 

transparency to the public as to how the 

Council intends to exercise its 

discretionary authorities. The Analytic 

Framework does not have binding 

effect; does not impose duties on, or 

alter the rights or interests of, any 

person; and does not change the 

statutory standards for the Council’s 

actions. 

IV. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, 

14094 

Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 

14094 direct certain agencies to assess 

costs and benefits of available regulatory 

alternatives and, if regulation is 

necessary, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits 

(including potential economic, 

environmental, public health and safety 

effects, distributive impacts, and 

equity). Pursuant to section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866, as amended by 

Executive Order 14094, the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs 

within the Office of Management and 

Budget has determined that the Analytic 

Framework is not a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ 

Financial Stability Oversight Council 

Analytic Framework for Financial 

Stability Risk Identification, 

Assessment, and Response 

I. Introduction 

This document describes the 

approach the Financial Stability 

Oversight Council (Council) expects to 

take in identifying, assessing, and 

responding to certain potential risks to 

U.S. financial stability. 

The Council’s practices set forth in 

this document are among the methods 

the Council uses to satisfy its statutory 

purposes: (1) to identify risks to U.S. 

financial stability that could arise from 

the material financial distress or failure, 

or ongoing activities, of large, 

interconnected bank holding companies 

or nonbank financial companies, or that 

could arise outside the financial 

services marketplace; (2) to promote 

market discipline, by eliminating 

expectations on the part of shareholders, 

creditors, and counterparties of such 

companies that the government will 

shield them from losses in the event of 

failure; and (3) to respond to emerging 

threats to the stability of the U.S. 

financial system.1 The Council’s 

specific statutory duties include 

monitoring the financial services 

marketplace in order to identify 

potential threats to U.S. financial 

stability and identifying gaps in 

regulation that could pose risks to U.S. 

financial stability, among others.2

Financial stability can be defined as 

the financial system being resilient to 

events or conditions that could impair 

its ability to support economic activity, 

such as by intermediating financial 

transactions, facilitating payments, 

allocating resources, and managing 

risks. Events or conditions that could 

substantially impair such ability would 

constitute a threat to financial stability. 

Adverse events, or shocks, can arise 

from within the financial system or from 

external sources. Vulnerabilities in the 

financial system can amplify the impact 

of a shock, potentially leading to 

substantial disruptions in the provision 

of financial services. The Council seeks 

to identify and respond to risks to 

financial stability that could impair the 

financial system’s ability to perform its 

functions to a degree that could harm 

the economy. Risks to financial stability 

can arise from widely conducted 

activities or from individual entities, 

and from long-term vulnerabilities or 

from sources that are new or evolving. 

This document describes the 

Council’s analytic framework for 

identifying, assessing, and responding 

to potential risks to financial stability. 

The Council seeks to reduce the risk of 

a shock arising from within the financial 

system, to improve resilience against 

shocks that could affect the financial 

system, and to mitigate financial 

vulnerabilities that may increase risks to 

financial stability. The actions the 

Council may take depend on the nature 

of the vulnerability. For example, 

vulnerabilities originating from 

activities that may be widely conducted 

in a particular sector or market over 

which a regulator has adequate existing 

authority may be addressed through an 

activity-based or industry-wide 

response; in contrast, in cases where the 

financial system relies on the ongoing 

financial activities of a small number of 

entities, such that the impairment of one 

of the entities could threaten financial 

stability, or where a particular financial 

company’s material financial distress or 

activities could pose a threat to financial 

stability, entity-based action may be 

appropriate. The Council’s authorities, 

some of which are described in section 

II.c, are complementary, and the 

Council may select one or more of those 

authorities to address a particular risk. 

Among the many lessons of financial 

crises are that risks to financial stability 

can be diverse and build up over time, 

dislocations in financial markets and 

failures of financial companies can be 

sudden and unpredictable, and 

regulatory gaps can increase risks to 

financial stability. The Council was 

created in the aftermath of the 2007– 

2009 financial crisis and is statutorily 

responsible for identifying and 

preemptively acting to address potential 

risks to financial stability. Many of the 

same factors, such as leverage, liquidity 

risk, and operational risks, regularly 

recur in different forms and under 

different conditions to generate risks to 

financial stability. At the same time, the 

U.S. financial system is large, diverse, 

and continually evolving, so the 

Council’s analytic methodologies adapt 

to address evolving developments and 

risks. 

This document is not a binding rule, 

but is intended to help market 

participants, stakeholders, and other 

members of the public better understand 

how the Council expects to perform 

certain of its duties. The Council may 

consider factors relevant to the 

assessment of a potential risk or threat 

to U.S. financial stability on a case-bycase basis, subject to applicable 

statutory requirements. The Council’s 


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3References in this document to ‘‘financial 

regulatory agencies’’ may encompass a broader 

range of regulators than those included in the 

statutory definition of ‘‘primary financial regulatory 

agency’’ under section 2(12) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 

12 U.S.C. 5301(12). 

4See Dodd-Frank Act section 112(d), 12 U.S.C. 

5322(d). 

annual reports describe the Council’s 

work in implementing its 

responsibilities. 

II. Identifying, Assessing, and 

Addressing Potential Risks to Financial 

Stability 

a. Identifying Potential Risks 

To enable the Council to identify 

potential risks to U.S. financial stability, 

the Council, in consultation with 

relevant U.S. and foreign financial 

regulatory agencies,3 monitors financial 

markets, entities, and market 

developments to identify potential risks 

to U.S. financial stability. 

In light of the Council’s broad 

statutory mandate, the Council’s 

monitoring for potential risks to 

financial stability may cover an 

expansive range of asset classes, 

institutions, and activities, such as: 

• markets for debt, loans, short-term 

funding, equity securities, commodities, 

digital assets, derivatives, and other 

institutional and consumer financial 

products and services; 

• central counterparties and payment, 

clearing, and settlement activities; 

• financial entities, including banking 

organizations, broker-dealers, asset 

managers, investment companies, 

private funds, insurance companies, 

mortgage originators and servicers, and 

specialty finance companies; 

• new or evolving financial products 

and practices; and 

• developments affecting the 

resiliency of the financial system, such 

as cybersecurity and climate-related 

financial risks. 

Sectors and activities that may impact 

U.S. financial stability are often 

described in the Council’s annual 

reports. The Council reviews 

information such as historical data, 

research regarding the behavior of 

financial markets and financial market 

participants, and new developments 

that arise in evolving marketplaces. The 

Council relies on data, research, and 

analysis including information from 

Council member agencies, the Office of 

Financial Research, primary financial 

regulatory agencies, industry 

participants, and other sources.4

b. Assessing Potential Risks 

The Council works with relevant 

financial regulatory agencies to evaluate 

potential risks to financial stability to 

determine whether they merit further 

review or action. The evaluation of any 

potential risk to financial stability will 

be highly fact-specific, but the Council 

has identified certain vulnerabilities 

that most commonly contribute to such 

risks. The Council has also identified 

certain sample quantitative metrics that 

are commonly used to measure these 

vulnerabilities, although the Council 

may assess each of these vulnerabilities 

using a variety of quantitative and 

qualitative factors. The following list is 

not exhaustive or exclusive, but is 

indicative of the vulnerabilities and 

metrics the Council expects to consider. 

• Leverage. Leverage can amplify 

risks by reducing market participants’ 

ability to satisfy their obligations and by 

increasing the potential for sudden 

liquidity strains. Leverage can arise 

from debt, derivatives, off-balance sheet 

obligations, and other arrangements. 

Leverage can arise broadly within a 

market or at a limited number of firms 

in a market. Quantitative metrics 

relevant for assessing leverage may 

include ratios of assets, risk-weighted 

assets, debt, derivatives liabilities or 

exposures, and off-balance sheet 

obligations to equity. 

• Liquidity risk and maturity 

mismatch. A shortfall of sufficient 

liquidity to satisfy short-term needs, or 

reliance on short-term liabilities to 

finance longer-term assets, can subject 

market participants to rollover or 

refinancing risk. These risks may force 

entities to sell assets rapidly at stressed 

market prices, which can contribute to 

broader stresses. Relevant quantitative 

metrics may include the scale of 

financial obligations that are short-term 

or can become due in a short period, the 

ratio of short-term debt to 

unencumbered short-term high-quality 

liquid assets, amounts of funding 

available to meet unexpected reductions 

in available short-term funding, and 

amounts of transactions that may 

require the posting of additional margin 

or collateral. 

• Interconnections. Direct or indirect 

financial interconnections, such as 

exposures of creditors, counterparties, 

investors, and borrowers, can increase 

the potential negative effect of 

dislocations or financial distress. 

Relevant quantitative metrics may 

include total assets, off-balance-sheet 

assets or liabilities, total debt, 

derivatives exposures, values of 

securities financing transactions, and 

the size of potential requirements to 

post margin or collateral. Metrics related 

to the concentration of holdings of a 

class of financial assets may also be 

relevant. 

• Operational risks. Risks can arise 

from the impairment or failure of 

financial market infrastructures, 

processes, or systems, including due to 

cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Relevant 

quantitative metrics may include 

statistics on cybersecurity incidents or 

the scale of critical infrastructure. 

• Complexity or opacity. A risk may 

be exacerbated if a market, activity, or 

firm is complex or opaque, such as if 

financial transactions occur outside of 

regulated sectors or if the structure and 

operations of market participants cannot 

readily be determined. In addition, risks 

may be aggravated by the complexity of 

the legal structure of market participants 

and their activities, by the unavailability 

of data due to lack of regulatory or 

public disclosure requirements, and by 

obstacles to the rapid and orderly 

resolution of market participants. 

Factors that generally increase the risks 

associated with complexity or opacity 

may include a large size or scope of 

activities, a complex legal or operational 

structure, activities or entities subject to 

the jurisdiction of multiple regulators, 

and complex funding structures. 

Relevant quantitative metrics may 

include the extent of intercompany or 

interaffiliate dependencies for liquidity, 

funding, operations, and risk 

management; the number of 

jurisdictions in which activities are 

conducted; and numbers of affiliates. 

• Inadequate risk management. A 

risk may be exacerbated if it is 

conducted without effective riskmanagement practices, including the 

absence of appropriate regulatory 

authority and requirements. In contrast, 

existing regulatory requirements or 

market practices may reduce risks by, 

for example, limiting exposures or 

leverage, increasing capital and 

liquidity, enhancing risk-management 

practices, restricting excessive risktaking, providing consolidated 

prudential regulation and supervision, 

or increasing regulatory or public 

transparency. Relevant quantitative 

metrics may include levels of exposures 

to particular types of financial 

instruments or asset classes and 

amounts of capital and liquidity. 

• Concentration. A risk may be 

amplified if financial exposures or 

important services are highly 

concentrated in a small number of 

entities, creating a risk of widespread 

losses or the risk that the service could 

not be replaced in a timely manner at 

a similar price and volume if existing 

providers withdrew from the market. 

Relevant quantitative metrics may 

include market shares in segments of 

applicable financial markets. 


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• Destabilizing activities. Certain 

activities, by their nature, particularly 

those that are sizeable and 

interconnected with the financial 

system, can destabilize markets for 

particular types of financial instruments 

or impair financial institutions. This 

risk may arise even when those 

activities are intentional and permitted 

by applicable law, such as trading 

practices that substantially increase 

volatility in one or more financial 

markets, or activities that involve moral 

hazard or conflicts of interest that result 

in the creation and transmission of 

significant risks. 

The vulnerabilities and sample 

metrics listed above identify risks that 

may arise from broadly conducted 

activities or from a small number of 

entities; they do not dictate the use of 

a specific authority by the Council. 

Risks to financial stability can arise 

from widely conducted activities or 

from a smaller number of entities, and 

the Council’s evaluations and actions 

will depend on the nature of a 

vulnerability. While risks from 

individual entities may be assessed 

using these types of metrics, the Council 

also evaluates broader risks, such as by 

calculating these metrics on an 

aggregate basis within a particular 

financial sector. For example, in some 

cases, risks arising from widespread and 

substantial leverage in a particular 

market may be evaluated or addressed 

on a sector-wide basis, while in other 

cases risks from a single company 

whose leverage is outsized relative to 

other firms in its market may be 

considered for an entity-specific 

response. 

In addition, in most cases the 

identification and assessment of a 

potential risk to financial stability 

involves consideration of multiple 

quantitative metrics and qualitative 

factors. Therefore, the Council uses 

metrics such as those cited above 

individually and in combination, as 

well as other factors, in its analyses. 

The Council considers how the 

adverse effects of potential risks could 

be transmitted to financial markets or 

market participants and what impact the 

potential risk could have on the 

financial system. Such a transmission of 

risk can occur through various 

mechanisms, or ‘‘channels.’’ The 

Council has identified four transmission 

channels that are most likely to facilitate 

the transmission of the negative effects 

of a risk to financial stability. These 

transmission channels are: 

• Exposures. Direct and indirect 

exposures of creditors, counterparties, 

investors, and other market participants 

can result in losses in the event of a 

default or decreases in asset valuations. 

In particular, market participants’ 

exposures to a particular financial 

instrument or asset class, such as equity, 

debt, derivatives, or securities financing 

transactions, could impair those market 

participants if there is a default on or 

other reduction in the value of the 

instrument or assets. In evaluating this 

transmission channel, risks arising from 

exposures to assets managed by a 

company on behalf of third parties are 

distinct from exposures to assets owned 

by, or liabilities issued by, the company 

itself. The potential risk to U.S. 

financial stability will generally be 

greater if the amounts of exposures are 

larger; if transaction terms provide less 

protection for counterparties; if 

exposures are correlated, concentrated, 

or interconnected with other 

instruments or asset classes; or if 

entities with significant exposures 

include large financial institutions. The 

leverage, interconnections, and 

concentration vulnerabilities described 

above may be particularly relevant to 

this transmission channel. 

• Asset liquidation. A rapid 

liquidation of financial assets can pose 

a risk to U.S. financial stability when it 

causes a significant fall in asset prices 

that disrupts trading or funding in key 

markets or causes losses or funding 

problems for market participants 

holding those or related assets. Rapid 

liquidations can result from a 

deterioration in asset prices or market 

functioning that could pressure firms to 

sell their holdings of affected assets to 

maintain adequate capital and liquidity, 

which, in turn, could produce a cycle of 

asset sales that lead to further market 

disruptions. This analysis takes into 

account amounts and types of liabilities 

that are or could become short-term in 

nature, amounts of assets that could be 

rapidly liquidated to satisfy obligations, 

and the potential effects of a rapid asset 

liquidation on markets and market 

participants. The potential risk is 

greater, for example, if leverage or 

reliance on short-term funding is higher, 

if assets are riskier and may experience 

a reduction in market liquidity in times 

of broader market stress, and if asset 

price volatility could lead to significant 

margin calls. Actions that market 

participants or financial regulators may 

take to impose stays on counterparty 

terminations or withdrawals may reduce 

the risks of rapid asset liquidations, 

although such actions could potentially 

increase risks through the exposures 

transmission channel if they result in 

potential losses or delayed payments or 

through the contagion transmission 

channel if there is a loss of market 

confidence. The leverage and liquidity 

risk and maturity mismatch 

vulnerabilities described above may be 

particularly relevant to this 

transmission channel. 

• Critical function or service. A risk 

to financial stability can arise if there 

could be a disruption of a critical 

function or service that is relied upon 

by market participants and for which 

there are no ready substitutes that could 

provide the function or service at a 

similar price and quantity. This channel 

is commonly referred to as 

‘‘substitutability.’’ Substitutability risks 

can arise in situations where a small 

number of entities are the primary or 

dominant providers of critical services 

in a market that the Council determines 

to be essential to U.S. financial stability. 

Concern about a potential lack of 

substitutability could be greater if 

providers of a critical function or 

service are likely to experience stress at 

the same time because they are exposed 

to the same risks. This channel is more 

prominent when the critical function or 

service is interconnected or large, when 

operations are opaque, when the 

function or service uses or relies on 

leverage to support its activities, or 

when risk-management practices related 

to operational risks are not sufficient. 

The interconnections, operational risks, 

and concentration vulnerabilities 

described above may be particularly 

relevant to this transmission channel. 

• Contagion. Even without direct or 

indirect exposures, contagion can arise 

from the perception of common 

vulnerabilities or exposures, such as 

business models or asset holdings that 

are similar or highly correlated. Such 

contagion can spread stress quickly and 

unexpectedly, particularly in 

circumstances where there is limited 

transparency into investment risks, 

correlated markets, or greater 

operational risks. Contagion can also 

arise when there is a loss of confidence 

in financial instruments that are treated 

as substitutes for money. In these 

circumstances, market dislocations or 

fire sales may result in a loss of 

confidence in other financial market 

sectors or participants, propagating 

further market dislocations or fire sales. 

The interconnections and complexity or 

opacity vulnerabilities described above 

may be particularly relevant to this 

transmission channel. 

The presence of any of the 

vulnerabilities listed above may 

increase the potential for risks to be 

transmitted to financial markets or 

market participants through these or 

other transmission channels. The 

Council may consider these 

vulnerabilities and transmission 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 78035 

5See Dodd-Frank Act sections 112(a)(2)(A), (D), 

(E), and (F), 12 U.S.C. 5322(a)(2)(A), (D), (E), and 

(F). 

6 Dodd-Frank Act section 120(a), 12 U.S.C. 

5330(a). 

7 Dodd-Frank Act section 120(d)(3), 12 U.S.C. 

5330(d)(3). 

8 Dodd-Frank Act section 120(a), 12 U.S.C. 

5330(a). 9 Dodd-Frank Act section 120(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. 

5330(b)(2). 10See Dodd-Frank Act section 120(b)(1), 12 

U.S.C. 5330(b)(1). The Council also has authority to 

issue recommendations to the Board of Governors 

of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve 

Board) regarding the establishment and refinement 

of prudential standards and reporting and 

disclosure requirements applicable to nonbank 

financial companies subject to Federal Reserve 

Board supervision and large, interconnected bank 

holding companies (Dodd-Frank Act section 115, 12 

U.S.C. 5325); recommendations to regulators, 

Congress, or firms in its annual reports (Dodd-Frank 

Act section 112(a)(2)(N), 12 U.S.C. 5322(a)(2)(N)); 

and other recommendations to Congress or Council 

member agencies (Dodd-Frank Act sections 

112(a)(2)(D) and (F), 12 U.S.C. 5322(a)(2)(D) and 

(F)). 

channels, as well as others that may be 

relevant, in identifying financial 

markets, activities, and entities that 

could pose risks to U.S. financial 

stability. 

The Council may assess risks as they 

could arise in the context of a period of 

overall stress in the financial services 

industry and in a weak macroeconomic 

environment, with market 

developments such as increased 

counterparty defaults, decreased 

funding availability, and decreased asset 

prices, because in such a context, the 

risks may have a greater effect on U.S. 

financial stability. 

The Council’s work often includes 

efforts such as sharing data, research, 

and analysis among Council members 

and member agencies and their staffs; 

consulting with regulators and other 

experts regarding the scope of potential 

risks and factors that may mitigate those 

risks; and collaboratively developing 

analyses for consideration by the 

Council. As part of this work, the 

Council may also engage with market 

participants and other members of the 

public as it assesses potential risks. In 

its evaluations, the Council takes into 

account existing laws and regulations 

that have mitigated a potential risk to 

U.S. financial stability. The Council also 

engages extensively with state and 

federal financial regulatory agencies, 

including those represented on the 

Council, regarding potential risks and 

the extent to which existing regulation 

may mitigate those risks. The Council 

also takes into account the risk profiles 

and business models of market 

participants. Empirical data may not be 

available regarding all potential risks. 

The type and scope of the Council’s 

analysis will be based on the potential 

risk under consideration. In many cases, 

the Council provides information 

regarding its work in its annual reports. 

c. Addressing Potential Risks 

In light of the varying sources of risk 

described above (such as activities, 

entities, exogenous circumstances, and 

existing or emerging practices or 

conditions), the Council may take 

different approaches to respond to a 

risk, and may use multiple tools to 

mitigate a risk. These approaches may 

include acting to reduce the risk of a 

shock arising from within the financial 

system, to mitigate financial 

vulnerabilities that may increase risks to 

financial stability, or to improve the 

resilience of the financial system to 

shocks. The actions the Council takes 

may depend on the circumstances. 

When a potential risk to financial 

stability is identified, the Council’s 

Deputies Committee will generally 

direct one or more of the Council’s stafflevel committees or working groups to 

consider potential policy approaches or 

actions the Council could take to assess 

and address the risk. Those committees 

and working groups may consider the 

utility of any of the Council’s authorities 

to respond to risks to U.S. financial 

stability, including but not limited to 

those described below. 

Interagency coordination and 

information sharing. In many cases, the 

Council works with the relevant 

financial regulatory agencies at the 

federal and state levels to seek the 

implementation of appropriate actions 

to ensure a potential risk is adequately 

addressed.5 If they have adequate 

authority, existing regulators could take 

actions to mitigate potential risks to U.S. 

financial stability identified by the 

Council. There may be various 

approaches existing regulators could 

take, based on their authorities and the 

urgency of the risk, such as enhancing 

their regulation or supervision of 

companies or markets under their 

jurisdiction, restricting or prohibiting 

the offering of a product, or requiring 

market participants to take additional 

risk-management steps. If existing 

regulators can address a risk to financial 

stability in a sufficient and timely way, 

the Council generally encourages those 

regulators to do so. 

Recommendations to agencies or 

Congress. The Council may also make 

formal public recommendations to 

primary financial regulatory agencies 

under section 120 of the Dodd-Frank 

Act. Under section 120, the Council may 

provide for more stringent regulation of 

a financial activity by issuing 

nonbinding recommendations to the 

primary financial regulatory agencies to 

apply new or heightened standards and 

safeguards for a financial activity or 

practice conducted by bank holding 

companies or nonbank financial 

companies under their jurisdiction.6 In 

addition, in any case in which no 

primary financial regulatory agency 

exists for nonbank financial companies 

conducting financial activities or 

practices identified by the Council as 

posing risks, the Council can consider 

reporting to Congress on 

recommendations for legislation that 

would prevent such activities or 

practices from threatening U.S. financial 

stability.7 The Council will make these 

recommendations only if it determines 

that the conduct, scope, nature, size, 

scale, concentration, or 

interconnectedness of the activity or 

practice could create or increase the risk 

of significant liquidity, credit, or other 

problems spreading among bank 

holding companies and nonbank 

financial companies, U.S. financial 

markets, or low-income, minority, or 

underserved communities.8 The new or 

heightened standards and safeguards for 

a financial activity or practice 

recommended by the Council will take 

costs to long-term economic growth into 

account, and may include prescribing 

the conduct of the activity or practice in 

specific ways (such as by limiting its 

scope, or applying particular capital or 

risk-management requirements to the 

conduct of the activity) or prohibiting 

the activity or practice.9 In its 

recommendations under section 120, 

the Council may suggest broad 

approaches to address the risks it has 

identified. When appropriate, the 

Council may make a more specific 

recommendation. Prior to issuing a 

recommendation under section 120, the 

Council will consult with the relevant 

primary financial regulatory agency and 

provide notice to the public and 

opportunity for comment as required by 

section 120.10

Nonbank financial company 

determinations. In certain cases, the 

Council may evaluate one or more 

nonbank financial companies for an 

entity-specific determination under 

section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 

Under section 113, the Council may 

determine, by a vote of not fewer than 

two-thirds of the voting members of the 

Council then serving, including an 

affirmative vote by the Chairperson of 

the Council, that a nonbank financial 

company will be supervised by the 

Federal Reserve Board and be subject to 

prudential standards if the Council 

determines that (1) material financial 

distress at the nonbank financial 

company could pose a threat to the 


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78036 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 

11See 12 CFR part 1310. 

12 Dodd-Frank Act sections 113(a)(2) and (b)(2), 

12 U.S.C. 5323(a)(2) and (b)(2). 

13See Dodd-Frank Act section 804(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. 

5463(a)(1). 

14 Dodd-Frank Act section 803(7), 12 U.S.C. 

5462(7). 

15 Dodd-Frank Act section 804(c), 12 U.S.C. 

5463(c). 

16 Dodd-Frank Act section 805(a), 12 U.S.C. 

5464(a). 

17 Dodd-Frank Act section 805(b), 12 U.S.C. 

5464(b). 

18 Dodd-Frank Act section 805(c), 12 U.S.C. 

5464(c). 

19 Dodd-Frank Act section 804(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. 

5463(a)(1). 

20 Dodd-Frank Act section 803(6), 12 U.S.C. 

5462(6). 

21 12 CFR part 1320. 

22 Dodd-Frank Act section 804(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. 

5463(a)(2). See also 12 CFR 1320.10. 

23 Dodd-Frank Act section 805(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. 

5464(a)(1). 

24 Dodd-Frank Act section 805(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. 

5464(a)(2); see also Dodd-Frank Act section 803(8), 

12 U.S.C. 5462(8). 

25 Dodd-Frank Act section 805(b), 12 U.S.C. 

5464(b). 

26 Dodd-Frank Act sections 806(a) and (b), 12 

U.S.C. 5465(a) and (b). 

financial stability of the United States or 

(2) the nature, scope, size, scale, 

concentration, interconnectedness, or 

mix of the activities of the nonbank 

financial company could pose a threat 

to the financial stability of the United 

States. The Council has issued a 

procedural rule and interpretive 

guidance regarding its process for 

considering a nonbank financial 

company for potential designation 

under section 113.11 The Dodd-Frank 

Act requires the Council to consider 10 

specific considerations, including the 

company’s leverage, relationships with 

other significant financial companies, 

and existing regulation by primary 

financial regulatory agencies, when 

determining whether a nonbank 

financial company satisfies either of the 

determination standards.12 Due to the 

unique threat that each nonbank 

financial company could pose to U.S. 

financial stability and the nature of the 

inquiry required by the statutory 

considerations set forth in section 113, 

the Council expects that its evaluations 

of nonbank financial companies under 

section 113 will be firm-specific and 

may include an assessment of 

quantitative and qualitative information 

that the Council deems relevant to a 

particular nonbank financial company. 

The factors described above are not 

exhaustive or exclusive and may not 

apply to all nonbank financial 

companies under evaluation. 

Payment, clearing, and settlement 

activity designations. The Council also 

has authority to designate certain 

payment, clearing, and settlement (PCS) 

activities ‘‘that the Council determines 

are, or are likely to become, systemically 

important’’ under Title VIII of the DoddFrank Act.13 PCS activities are defined 

as activities carried out by one or more 

financial institutions to facilitate the 

completion of financial transactions 

such as funds transfers, securities 

contracts, futures, forwards, repurchase 

agreements, swaps, foreign exchange 

contracts, and financial derivatives. 

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, PCS 

activities may include (1) the 

calculation and communication of 

unsettled financial transactions between 

counterparties; (2) the netting of 

transactions; (3) provision and 

maintenance of trade, contract, or 

instrument information; (4) the 

management of risks and activities 

associated with continuing financial 

transactions; (5) transmittal and storage 

of payment instructions; (6) the 

movement of funds; (7) the final 

settlement of financial transactions; and 

(8) other similar functions that the 

Council may determine.14 Before 

designating a PCS activity, the Council 

must consult with certain regulatory 

agencies and must provide financial 

institutions with advance notice of the 

proposed designation by Federal 

Register publication. A financial 

institution engaged in the PCS activity 

may request an opportunity for a written 

or, at the sole discretion of the Council, 

oral hearing before the Council to 

demonstrate that the proposed 

designation is not supported by 

substantial evidence. The Council may 

waive the notice and hearing 

requirements in certain emergency 

circumstances.15 Following any 

designation of a PCS activity, the 

appropriate federal regulator will 

establish risk-management standards 

governing the conduct of the activity by 

financial institutions.16 The objectives 

and principles for these riskmanagement standards will be to 

promote robust risk management, 

promote safety and soundness, reduce 

systemic risks, and support the stability 

of the broader financial system.17 The 

risk-management standards may address 

areas such as risk-management policies 

and procedures, margin and collateral 

requirements, participant or 

counterparty default policies and 

procedures, the ability to complete 

timely clearing and settlement of 

financial transactions, and capital and 

financial resource requirements for 

designated financial market utilities, 

among other things.18

Financial market utility designations. 

In addition, the Council has authority to 

designate financial market utilities 

(FMUs) that it determines are, or are 

likely to become, systemically 

important.19 Subject to certain statutory 

exclusions, an FMU is defined as any 

person that manages or operates a 

multilateral system for the purpose of 

transferring, clearing, or settling 

payments, securities, or other financial 

transactions among financial 

institutions or between financial 

institutions and the person.20 The 

Council has issued a procedural rule 

regarding its authority to designate 

FMUs.21 In determining whether 

designation of a given FMU is 

warranted, the Council must consider 

(1) the aggregate monetary value of 

transactions processed by the FMU; (2) 

the FMU’s aggregate exposure to its 

counterparties; (3) the relationship, 

interdependencies, or other interactions 

of the FMU with other FMUs or PCS 

activities; (4) the effect that the failure 

of or a disruption to the FMU would 

have on critical markets, financial 

institutions, or the broader financial 

system; and (5) any other factors that the 

Council deems appropriate.22 A 

designated FMU is subject to the 

supervisory framework of Title VIII of 

the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 

805(a)(1)(A) requires the Federal 

Reserve Board to prescribe riskmanagement standards governing the 

FMU’s operations related to its PCS 

activities unless the FMU is a 

derivatives clearing organization or 

clearing agency.23 Specifically, section 

805(a)(2) grants the Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission or the Securities 

and Exchange Commission, 

respectively, the authority to prescribe 

such risk-management standards for a 

designated FMU that is a derivatives 

clearing organization registered under 

section 5b of the Commodity Exchange 

Act or a clearing agency registered 

under section 17A of the Securities Act 

of 1934.24 Such standards are intended 

to promote robust risk management, 

promote safety and soundness, reduce 

systemic risks, and support the stability 

of the broader financial system.25 In 

addition, the Federal Reserve Board may 

authorize a Federal Reserve Bank to 

establish and maintain an account for a 

designated FMU or provide the 

designated FMU with access, in unusual 

or exigent circumstances, to the 

discount window.26 A designated FMU 

is subject to examinations at least once 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 78037 

27 Dodd-Frank Act section 807, 12 U.S.C. 5466. 

annually by the relevant federal 

supervisory agency.27

Nellie Liang, 

Under Secretary for Domestic Finance. 

[FR Doc. 2023–25055 Filed 11–13–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–AK–P–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

GENERAL SERVICES 

ADMINISTRATION 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 

SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

[OMB Control No. 9000–0157; Docket No. 

2023–0053; Sequence No. 7] 

Submission for OMB Review; 

Architect-Engineer Qualifications (SF– 

330) 

AGENCY: Department of Defense (DOD), 

General Services Administration (GSA), 

and National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA). 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, the 

Regulatory Secretariat Division has 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) a request to review 

and approve an extension of a 

previously approved information 

collection requirement regarding 

architect-engineer qualifications 

(Standard Form (SF) 330). 

DATES: Submit comments on or before 

December 14, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments and 

recommendations for this information 

collection should be sent within 30 days 

of publication of this notice to 

www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. 

Find this particular information 

collection by selecting ‘‘Currently under 

Review—Open for Public Comments’’ or 

by using the search function. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Zenaida Delgado, Procurement Analyst, 

at telephone 202–969–7207, or 

zenaida.delgado@gsa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

A. OMB Control Number, Title, and 

Any Associated Form(s) 

9000–0157, Architect-Engineer 

Qualifications, SF–330. 

B. Need and Uses 

This clearance covers the information 

that offerors must submit to comply 

with the following Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) requirement: 

Standard Form (SF) 330, ArchitectEngineer Qualifications. As specified in 

FAR 36.702(b), an architect-engineer 

firm must provide information about its 

qualifications for a specific contract 

when the contract amount is expected to 

exceed the simplified acquisition 

threshold (SAT). 

Part I—Contract-Specific 

Qualifications. The information on the 

form is reviewed by a selection panel 

composed of professionals and assists 

the panel in selecting the most qualified 

architect-engineer firm to perform the 

specific project. The form is designed to 

provide a uniform method for architectengineer firms to submit information on 

experience, personnel, and capabilities 

of the architect-engineer firm to perform 

along with information on the 

consultants they expect to collaborate 

with on the specific project. Part I of the 

SF 330 may be used when the contract 

amount is expected to be at or below the 

SAT, if the contracting officer 

determines that its use is appropriate. 

Part II—General Qualifications. The 

information obtained on this form is 

used to determine if a firm should be 

solicited for architect-engineer projects. 

Architect-engineer firms are encouraged 

to update the form annually. Part II of 

the SF 330 is used to obtain information 

from an architect-engineer firm about its 

general professional qualifications. 

The SF 330 accomplishes the 

following: 

• Expands essential information 

about qualifications and experience data 

including: 

• An organizational chart of all 

participating firms and key personnel. 

• For all key personnel, a description 

of their experience in 5 relevant 

projects. 

• A description of each example 

project performed by the project team 

(or some elements of the project team) 

and its relevance to the agency’s 

proposed contract. 

• A matrix of key personnel who 

participated in the example projects. 

This matrix graphically illustrates the 

degree to which the proposed key 

personnel have worked together before 

on similar projects. 

• Reflects current architect-engineer 

disciplines, experience types and 

technology. 

• Permits limited submission length 

thereby reducing costs for both the 

architect-engineer industry and the 

Government. Lengthy submissions do 

not necessarily lead to a better decision 

on the best-qualified firm. The proposed 

SF 330 indicates that agencies may limit 

the length of a firm’s submissions, either 

certain sections or the entire package. 

The Government’s right to impose such 

limitations was established in case law 

(Coffman Specialties, Inc., B–284546. 

N–284546/2, 2000 U.S. Comp. Gen. 

LEXIS 58, May 10, 2000). 

The contracting officer uses the 

information provided on the SF 330 to 

evaluate firms to select an architectengineer firm for a contract. 

C. Annual Burden 

Respondents: 682. 

Total Annual Responses: 2,728. 

Total Burden Hours: 79,112. 

D. Public Comment 

A 60-day notice was published in the 

Federal Register at 88 FR 60209, on 

August 31, 2023. Two identical 

comments were received in 

Regulations.gov but not posted to be 

publicly viewable because they were not 

relevant or responsive to the request for 

comments. The identical comments 

seem to be unsolicited bulk email. 

Obtaining Copies: Requesters may 

obtain a copy of the information 

collection documents from the GSA 

Regulatory Secretariat Division, by 

calling 202–501–4755 or emailing 

GSARegSec@gsa.gov. Please cite OMB 

Control No. 9000–0157, ArchitectEngineer Qualifications (SF–330). 

Janet Fry, 

Director, Federal Acquisition Policy Division, 

Office of Governmentwide Acquisition Policy, 

Office of Acquisition Policy, Office of 

Governmentwide Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2023–25031 Filed 11–13–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6820–EP–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention 

[60Day-24–24AZ; Docket No. CDC–2023– 

0092] 

Proposed Data Collection Submitted 

for Public Comment and 

Recommendations 

AGENCY: Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS). 

ACTION: Notice with comment period. 

SUMMARY: The Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), as part of 

its continuing effort to reduce public 

burden and maximize the utility of 

government information, invites the 

general public and other federal 

agencies the opportunity to comment on 

a proposed information collection, as 

required by the Paperwork Reduction 

Act of 1995. This notice invites 

comment on a proposed information 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES