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Cover

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The Limits of Transformation

Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

Thomas G. Mahnken and

James R. FitzSimonds
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Number Seventeen

2003

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, U.S. Navy

Provost, Naval War College

Professor James F. Giblin

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Professor Alberto R. Coll

Naval War College Press

Editor: Professor Catherine McArdle Kelleher

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Associate Editor: Patricia A. Goodrich

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.3579

DSN exchange: 948

E-mail: press@nwc.navy.mil

Web: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the

President of the Naval War College consider of particular

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts. Candidates

for publication are considered by an editorial board under

the auspices of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies.

Published papers are those approved by the Editor of the

Press, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the President

of the Naval War College.

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect those of the Naval War College, the

Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.

Correspondence concerning The Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. To request

additional copies or subscription consideration, please direct

inquiries to the President, Code 32A, Naval War College,

686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207.

The Newport Papers are edited and prepared by Patricia A.

Goodrich, Associate Editor, Naval War College Press.

ISSN Pending
Contents iii

Foreword iv

Acknowledgments v

CHAPTER ONE Innovation and the U.S. Officer Corps 1

CHAPTER TWO Project Methodology 7

CHAPTER THREE Attitudes toward the Emerging RMA 17

CHAPTER FOUR Impact of the Emerging RMA on

Dominant Weapons 27

CHAPTER FIVE Emergence of New Ways of War 37

CHAPTER SIX Impact of the Emerging RMA on the

Character of War 45

CHAPTER SEVEN Impetus for Change 61

CHAPTER EIGHT Character and Depth of Change

Required 71

CHAPTER NINE Trends in Officer Attitudes 91

CHAPTER TEN Conclusions and Implications 105

APPENDIX A Survey Instrument 115

APPENDIX B Focus Group Survey Instrument 123

Notes 127

About the Authors 131

Titles in the Series 133
Foreword

In the shadow of the recent Iraq war, it is easy to accept that “growth and diffusion of

stealth, precision, and information technology” has truly heralded the long-awaited

revolution in military affairs. American leaders—from the President to the Pentagon

military and civilian leadership—have called for dramatic transformation of each of

the services to fit this revolution. In many ways, this is a far harder task.

It is the purpose of this Newport Paper to examine the views of military officers on

that prospect, a critical and unstudied factor in the implementation of transformation.

Its coauthors, Professors Mahnken and FitzSimonds, are members of the Naval War

College faculty—Dr. Mahnken in the Strategy and Policy Department and Captain

FitzSimonds (U.S. Navy, Retired) in the War Gaming Department’s Research and

Analysis Division.

The authors argue that the opinions of military officers on transformation are crucial,

and not just because these attitudes guide the transformation process. They are critical

also because receptivity to change in this group will affect innovation, both now and

when today’s mid-grade officers assume senior leadership posts. It is from some, but

not all, of today’s military officers that further transformation impulses will come.

Accordingly, Mahnken and FitzSimonds explore a number of questions fundamental in

the present and for the future of the American military establishment. What is the level

of enthusiasm among officers for transformation? How compelling do they perceive

the need for transformation to be? How extensive a change do they believe is necessary?

How confident are they in the ability of the U.S. military to carry out transformation?

We believe that this study is in itself as innovative as the military transformation that forms

its broad subject, and we are pleased to bring it to the attention of a broad range of naval,

academic, and policy readers. We are grateful for the generous support of the Smith

Richardson Foundation for this publication and wish specially to thank Jo-Ann Parks of JIL

Information Systems and David Chapman of Chapman and Partners for their skillful preparation of the many tables that undergird this most impressive analytic monograph.

CATHERINE MC ARDLE KELLEHER

Editor, Naval War College Press
Acknowledgments

We received a great deal of assistance in this project. First and foremost, we would like

to thank Captain Frank Petho, MSC, U.S. Navy, for his assistance in designing the survey instrument and analyzing the data. At the Naval Postgraduate School, Iliana Bravo

provided invaluable assistance in entering the data and beginning the literature review.

At the Naval War College, Commander Larry Flint and Christopher FitzSimonds assisted us in completing the literature review. We could not have administered the survey without the assistance of Dave Bitters, John R. Goss, Major John P. Klatt, U.S. Air

Force, Cheryl Monday, Colonel Dennis Pippy, U.S. Army, and Colonel Tom Smith, U.S.

Army. Eleanore Douglas, Stephen Downes-Martin, John Maurer, Andrew Ross, and

Commander Jeff Smith provided valuable comments on the draft of this monograph.

We would like to thank the Naval War College Foundation, particularly Rear Admiral

Joseph Strasser, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Sharyl Jump and Deb Marro, for their administrative

support of the project. Finally, this project would have been impossible without the

generous financial support of the Smith-Richardson Foundation in general, and of

Marin Strmecki and Nadia Schadlow in particular.

Innovation and the U.S. Officer Corps

Over the past decade, a significant number of defense analysts, government officials,

and military officers have argued that the growth and diffusion of stealth, precision,

and information technology will drastically alter the character and conduct of future

wars, yielding a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The idea that the emergence of

new technology, combined with innovative operational concepts and organizations,

would transform the conduct of war, first appeared in Soviet military writings in the

late 1970s.1It was, however, the seeming ease with which the U.S.-led coalition defeated

Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War that led many observers in the United States and elsewhere to conclude that significant changes in the character of warfare were underway.

2

Since the mid-1990s, exploiting the emerging RMA has been an explicit goal of the Defense Department.3

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated Joint Vision

2010 with great fanfare in 1996 as the “conceptual template” for how the armed forces

would “leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in warfighting.”

4

Each of the services has devoted considerable attention to developing new

technology as well as the concepts and organizations needed to employ it most effectively.

George W. Bush campaigned on a pledge to exploit the information revolution by skipping a generation of technology. In a September 1999 speech at the Citadel military

college, then-governor Bush noted that “our military is still organized more for cold

war threats than the challenges of the new century—for industrial-age operations,

rather than information-age battles.”

5

Transforming the U.S. armed forces became one

of the Bush administration’s top priorities when it took office. Speaking at the Norfolk

Navy Base in February 2001, President Bush promised to “move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy.” He called for

the development of ground forces that are lighter, more mobile, and more lethal, as well

as manned and unmanned air forces capable of striking across the globe with precision.6

Soon after assuming office, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed Andrew W.

Marshall, long time director of the Office of Net Assessment, to conduct a fundamental

CHAPTER ONE
review of U.S. strategy and force requirements. He also commissioned a panel of senior

experts to develop a transformation strategy for the Pentagon.

7

However, early proposals to reduce the size of the U.S. armed forces and cancel major acquisition programs to

fund the development of new weapon systems garnered opposition among members of

Congress and senior members of the armed services.8

The Defense Department’s 2001

Quadrennial Defense Review contained none of the radical changes that had originally

been discussed within the Pentagon.9

The seemingly unique demands of the war on terrorism led to renewed attention to the

issue of transforming the U.S. armed forces. In a second speech at the Citadel on 11

December 2001, President Bush repeated his call for military transformation. Arguing

that “the conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military

than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums,” Bush called upon

the military to field forces that would rely more heavily on unmanned air vehicles and

precision-guided munitions. He also warned that “every service and every constituency

of our military must be willing to sacrifice some of their pet projects. Our war on terror cannot be used to justify obsolete bases, obsolete programs, or obsolete weapons.

Every dollar of defense spending must meet a single test: It must help us build the decisive power we will need to win the wars of the future.”

10

While the proposition that the advent of the information age demands that we transform the U.S. armed forces has received considerable attention in the press and has

been discussed widely by academic experts and defense analysts, one of the elements

that has so far been lacking is a systematic analysis of the attitudes of military officers

toward the transformation. The purpose of this study is to fill this void. Specifically, it

addresses the following questions:

• Are officers enthusiastic, ambivalent, or skeptical toward the proposition that we are

today in an RMA?

• How compelling, in their view, is the need to transform the U.S. armed forces to

exploit the emerging RMA?

• What is the depth and character of change that they believe is required?

• How confident are they in the U.S. military’s ability to innovate?

Innovation and the Officer Corps

There are several reasons why an understanding of the attitudes of most officers would

seem to be very important to the process of transformation. First, they will be the ultimate practitioners of the new (or old) ways of warfare. The extent to which they approach change with a positive attitude may have much to do with the success or failure

2 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
of new technologies, operational concepts, and organizations. A second reason is that

although very few officers will likely emerge as true innovators, it would seem that the

existence of a general climate within the officer corps that is open to change will encourage individuals both to generate new ideas and to remain in the service to help

them come to fruition. A third reason is that a large percentage of career-oriented officers will rise to senior leadership positions within their services in the next 10 to 20 years.

In those roles, they will establish command climates that will either support or inhibit

risk-taking and innovation. Past research has demonstrated the importance to innovation

of senior officers who protect and nurture the careers of young innovators under their

command who are willing to take risks.

11Finally, military officers are the recognized experts in military affairs in the United States. They are, or should be, expected to take a

leading role in determining the need for adopting different approaches to warfare.

Strategic analysts differ over just how enthusiastic the U.S. armed forces are about

emerging warfare areas. In each case, however, judgments are the result of anecdotal

evidence rather than systematic study. Williamson Murray, for example, has portrayed

the current officer corps as wildly passionate about technology. He argues that “The

new generation of officers, with the exception of the Marine Corps, has proven far

more attracted by technological, mechanistic solutions to the complex problems raised

by war” than their predecessors.

12Citing public statements and articles written by

high-ranking officers, he concludes that the Army, Navy and Air Force more and more

see technology as a “silver bullet,” a development he characterizes as “dangerous.”

13

Andrew Krepinevich, by contrast, argues that the services are profoundly conservative,

and that their planning and acquisition are governed by questionable—and potentially

outmoded—assumptions drawn from the Gulf War. He argues that by preparing for

the last war, officers can avoid challenging existing cultures and the dominance they accord to armored combat on land, carrier battle groups at sea, and tactical fighters in

the air. They are reluctant to embrace new ways of war, such as unmanned aerial combat, which threatens the Air Force’s pilot culture. They also resist the growing role of

non-warfighters. As he puts it, “if history is any guide, the combat culture will prove

reluctant to accept a growing role for such nontraditional warriors.”

14

Similarly, Eliot Cohen paints a picture of services that are dominated by officers who

are wedded to technology and concepts that are of declining utility. He argues that

“the services cling to established ways of war, and to combinations of technology, organizations, and personnel systems that have come to acquire value in and of themselves—even if they are no longer entirely functional.” He notes, however, that each

service also contains groups of officers who are enthusiastic about new ways of warfare.

Some Air Force generals, for example, are eager to see uninhabited combat aerial

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 3
vehicles (UCAVs) supplement manned aircraft; some Army generals are interested in experimenting with light infantry and long-range precision strike systems; and some

Navy admirals are in favor of network-centric warfare. “Behind them are far greater

numbers of junior officers ready to experiment with the technologies and operational

concepts that can make such notions reality.”

15

The officer corps is hardly united over the implications of the information revolution

for the conduct of war. Rather, several schools of thought have emerged. Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, for example, divide the strategic

studies community into disciples of the technological enthusiast Admiral William

Owens, “Uncertain Revolutionaries,” “Gulf War Veterans,” and “Skeptics.”

16The authors

of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Survey, by contrast, view the

debate over the emerging RMA in terms of “Platform-Oriented Traditionalists” and

“Information-Oriented Modernists.”

17 Ian Roxborough and Dana Eyre argue that the

services are pursuing four radically different images of future war, ranging from a

high-technology “systemic war” dominated by precision-guided missiles and space

weaponry to a gritty “peacewar” characterized by constabulary missions among failed

states.18 Scholars who have studied foreign writings on future warfare have detected

contending schools of thought as well. In his study of Russian lessons of the Gulf War,

for example, Stuart Kaufman identified three different views of future warfare.

19Michael Pillsbury, for his part, has identified a major school of thought among Chinese

military theorists that advocates exploitation of the emerging RMA.

20

If significant differences in officer attitudes do exist, then what is their source? What, in

other words, accounts for an officer’s attitude toward innovation? Studies of past innovations indicate that an officer’s rank may influence his enthusiasm toward new ways

of war. In his study of innovation in the U.S. Navy, Vincent Davis concluded that the

small number of true service innovators come from officers from the middle ranks

with approximately 15 years commissioned service. He also observed that the innovation advocates are generally officers who possess unique, specialized knowledge and are

passionate zealots who subordinate concerns for their own professional careers to the

promotion of new concepts.21 It is worth noting, however, that Davis’ conclusions rest

upon a relatively small number of cases. Barton Hacker’s study of the attitudes of British army officers toward mechanization between the two world wars revealed that

lower- and middle-ranking officers were more enthusiastic about mechanization than

senior and retired officers.

22

An officer’s service affiliation may also influence his attitude toward innovation. Carl

Builder has argued that each service has its own personality, one that has been shaped

by its experience and in turn shapes its behavior. The Air Force, for example, places

4 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
greater emphasis on technology than do the other services. The Army and Marine

Corps, by contrast, place much greater emphasis on the human element of combat.

23 It

is reasonable to expect, therefore, that Air Force officers may be the most enthusiastic

and Army and Marine Corps officers the least enthusiastic about emerging warfare

areas. Robert Leonhard and Don Vandergriff—both Army officers—have argued that

the Army’s culture has led it to ignore the potential of new ways of war.

24Navy officers

may be more enthusiastic than Army and Marine Corps officers, but less enthusiastic

than Air Force officers.

An officer’s branch affiliation may similarly affect his attitude toward innovation.

Barton Hacker, for example, found that British army officers’ branch affiliation

strongly affected their views of armored warfare: an overwhelming number of officers

from the infantry and cavalry opposed mechanized forces, while many from the technical branches favored them.25 One should similarly expect that officers from combat arms

and branches would be less enthusiastic about emerging warfare areas than others.

Combat experience may also influence attitudes toward innovation. Cognitive research

shows that people learn most from firsthand experience, from events early in life, and

from events that have important consequences.

26 Combat experience provides one of the

most compelling sources of expectations about the character and conduct of future wars.

It is reasonable to expect that combat veterans of a given service may be less enthusiastic about the emerging RMA than non-veterans of equivalent rank. Ground combat in

particular has historically been characterized by considerable “fog” and “friction,” and

those who have experienced it firsthand may be more skeptical of claims of radical

change than those who have not. Veterans of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations such as Haiti and Somalia may be less enthusiastic about the promise of new ways

of war than veterans of more technology-intensive conflicts such as the Gulf War,

Bosnia, and Kosovo.

The history of military innovation indicates that the commissioned officer corps is

critical to the process of force transformation. It is hoped that the data from this survey

will offer better insight into the attitudes and motivations of those officers who will

bear a large part of the burden for creating and leading a U.S. military force that is fully

prepared for the challenges of the 21st century.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 5

Project Methodology

Our study of officer attitudes toward the emerging revolution in military affairs (RMA)

employed a variety of analytical techniques. First, between May and October 2000, we

conducted a survey of approximately 1,900 students attending seven U.S. professional

military education (PME) institutions. The survey provides an overview of officer attitudes toward the emerging RMA as of mid-2000—before the election of George W.

Bush and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Second, to explore issues that

emerged from the study in greater depth, in September-October 2001 we convened

four focus groups of 10–12 officer students attending the U.S. Naval War College.

These groups were held after the 11 September attacks but before the launch of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Finally, to explore trends in officer attitudes

over time, we analyzed 340 articles on innovation that appeared in eight military professional journals between 1990 and 2000. This chapter describes the methodology employed to carry out each of these tasks.

CHAPTER TWO

NAVY ARMY/AIR FORCE/MARINE CORPS

APPROX YEARS OF

SERVICE AT THAT GRADE

O-1 Ensign Second Lieutenant 1–2

O-2 Lieutenant (JG) First Lieutenant 2–4

O-3 Lieutenant Captain 4–8

O-4 Lieutenant Commander Major 8–14

O-5 Commander Lieutenant Colonel 14–20

O-6 Captain Colonel 20–30

O-7 Rear Admiral (Lower) Brigadier General 22–35

O-8 Rear Admiral (Upper) Major General 22–35

O-9 Vice Admiral Lieutenant General 22–35

O-10 Admiral General 22–35

Officer Grades or Ranks.
Survey

Between March and October 2000, we conducted a survey of students at seven premier

PME institutions: the Naval War College (the College of Naval Command and Staff and

College of Naval Warfare), Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, Army

Command and Staff College, Army War College, National War College, and National

Defense University’s Capstone Course. The survey focused upon officers’ attitudes toward the emerging RMA,

27 its perceived impact upon the character and conduct of war,

the perceived need for the services to change to exploit the information revolution, and

the character and depth of change required.

By surveying officers at these institutions, we were able to assess attitudes of junior officers (O-3 through O-4), senior officers (O-5 through O-6), and flag officers (O-7

through O-8), as well as foreign officers and U.S. government civilians (table 1). Responses from today’s senior and flag officers offer insight into the attitudes of those

who will be responsible for making decisions about how the armed forces transform

themselves over the next five to ten years. By contrast, today’s junior officers will occupy

the leadership of the U.S. armed forces in 2020–2025. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps

officers in particular are selected to attend PME institutions based upon their potential for

higher command. These officers represent the future leaders of their services.

The project utilized a written survey instrument. We developed a draft instrument, administered pilot surveys to students at the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School, and revised the instrument based upon feedback from the

respondents. The faculty of the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School also reviewed the instrument. We mailed written surveys to each PME

institution, where they were administered. Completed surveys were sent to the Naval

8 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

PME INSTITUTIONS PRIMARY STUDENT BODY*

Naval War College,

Newport, RI

Navy Lieutenant Commanders (O-4) to

Captains (O-6)

Air Command and Staff College,

Montgomery AFB, AL Air Force Majors (O-4)

Air War College,

Montgomery AFB, AL Air Force Lieutenant Colonels (O-5)

Army Command and Staff College,

Fort Leavenworth, KS Army Majors (O-4)

Army War College,

Carlisle, PA Army Lieutenant Colonels (O-5)

National Defense University,

Washington, D.C.

All service Lieutenant Colonel/Commanders (O-5) to

Major General/Rear Admiral (O-8)

TABLE 1

PME Institutions Surveyed.

* Each PME institution contains students drawn from all services. Most also include U.S. Government

civilians and international officers.
Postgraduate School where survey data were entered into a computer database and

analyzed.

The survey consisted of 36 statements. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree

with each on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated strong disagreement, 4 uncertainty,

and 7 strong agreement. For analytical purposes, we considered answers of 1, 2, or 3 to

indicate disagreement with the statement, and 5, 6, or 7 to indicate agreement. We also

adopted two different measures of uncertainty: we considered answers of 4 to reflect

genuine uncertainty, while those responses with values of 3, 4, and 5 were considered to

be tending toward uncertainty. The survey also included two sets of pair-wise comparisons. Finally, respondents were asked to provide demographic data, such as age, years

of commissioned service, service affiliation, designator/military operational specialty

(MOS), rank, highest degree received, and combat experience. The survey instrument is

presented as Appendix A.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 9

The vast majority of the officers surveyed had been commissioned prior to 1989. The decade of

the 1990s saw the introduction and popularization of the concept of a revolution in military af- fairs and the following major world events that likely served to shape officer attitudes:

1990: Sandanista regime turned out in Nicaragua

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

1991: Operation DESERT STORM; widespread use in combat of stealth aircraft,

cruise missiles, satellite navigation, and UAVs

Dissolution of the Soviet Union

1992: U.S. military intervention in Somalia

1993: Start of the eight-year Clinton administration

Terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York

The Battle of Mogadishu

1994: Russian military operations commence in Chechnya

U.S. military intervention in Haiti

Civil war in Rwanda

1995: Bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City

1996: Joint Vision 2010 issued by CJCS

1997: Hong Kong reverts to China

1998: U.S./U.K. air attacks into Iraq (Operation DESERT FOX)

Terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

Nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan

1999: Nato air operations in Kosovo and Yugoslavia (Operation ALLIED FORCE)

The survey was conducted before the terrorist attacks on USS Cole in Yemen (October 2000),

the start of the George W. Bush administration (January 2001), the terrorist attacks on the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon (September 2001), and U.S. military operations in Afghanistan

(2001–2002).
Several caveats are in order. First, we did not assume that the officers that we surveyed

would have expertise in new ways of war—or would even be familiar with many of

these concepts. We were interested in their attitudes, not their expertise or their education. Second, we cannot know the officers’ frame of reference in completing the survey.

Finally, although we tried to make the survey as self-explanatory as possible, we cannot

be certain how individual respondents interpreted individual statements. However, we

feel that the focus groups that we convened to discuss the individual statements did

provide us an adequate understanding of how most officers interpreted the language of

the survey instrument.

Description of Survey Population. The survey population consisted of 1,916 individuals

attending seven PME institutions.28 While it is not a fully representative cross-section of

the entire officer corps (that is, a proportional representation of all services and all

specialties within each service), it is representative of the subset of the officer corps

that gets an opportunity to attend military education institutions. Moreover, these

are career officers on track for future leadership roles.

As table 2 shows, the largest number of responses came from the Army’s Command

and General Staff College, followed by the Air Force Command and Staff College. The

survey instrument was provided to all of the students at each institution rather than a

statistical sampling. We considered using statistical sampling, but it proved impractical

because (with the exception of the Naval War College) we lacked access to the demographic data that would have been necessary to ensure that our sample was representative of the student body.

The response rate ranged from 27.9 percent at the Air War College to 81.6 percent at

the Army Command and General Staff College (see table 3). The overall response rate

was 66.7 percent, which is considered statistically adequate.

29

10 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

PME INSTITUTION

NUMBER OF

RESPONDENTS

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

SURVEY POPULATION

Army Command and

General Staff College 862 45.1

Air Force Command and Staff College 414 21.7

Naval War College 328 17.1

Army War College 134 7.0

National War College 77 4.0

Air War College 73 3.8

Capstone Course 22 1.1

TABLE 2

Responses by Institution.
The officers we surveyed ranged in age from 31 to 63; their median age was 38. Their

commissioned service ranged from 8 to 31 years (see figure 1). The largest segment—

70 percent—was composed of officers with between 11 and 15 years of commissioned

service.

The survey included officers ranging in rank from O-3 (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps

Captain; Navy Lieutenant) to O-9 (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps Lieutenant General;

Navy Vice Admiral). As table 3 shows, the largest portion of the survey population was

composed of O-4 and O-5 level officers.

Current Department of Defense regulations require officers to retire after thirty years

of commissioned service unless selected as flag officers. If current regulations remain

in force, then today’s field-grade officers, the largest proportion of the survey population, will be able to remain in uniform until 2020–2025 (see figure 2). Some portion of

this group will remain in the armed forces until 2025–2030.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 11

PME INSTITUTION

NUMBER OF

STUDENTS

NUMBER OF

SURVEYS RECEIVED

RESPONSE

RATE %

Army Command and

General Staff College 1057 862 81.6

Naval War College 448 328 73.2

Air Force Command and Staff College 596 414 69.5

Capstone Course 40 22 55

Army War College 264 134 50.8

National War College 195 77 39.5

Air War College 262 73 27.9

TABLE 3

Response Rates.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

10 and below 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 25 26 to 30

53

245

1213

193

31

FIGURE 1

Respondents’ Years of Commissioned Service.
The survey included officers from all services, their reserve components, and the National Guard. It also included international officers and U.S. Government civilians.

The survey population included 173 officers (9.8 percent) who served in Haiti, 158

(11.1 percent) who served in Somalia, 444 (25.2 percent) who served in the Balkans,

and 679 (38.6 percent) veterans of the Gulf War.

Focus Groups

To explore issues raised by the survey, we convened four focus groups—one each for

the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—at the Naval War College between 24

September and 1 October 2001. Each focus group consisted of 11–12 O-4 and O-5

officers drawn from the student body of the College of Naval Command and Staff and

the College of Naval Warfare. They were representative of their services’ combat and

combat support career fields.

12 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

RANK NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

O-3 8 0.4

O-4 1354 71.9

O-5 359 19.1

O-6 111 5.9

O-7 19 1.0

O-8 31 1.6

O-9 1 —

TABLE 4

Respondents’ Rank.

0

100

200

300

400

2000 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2021 2024 2027 2033

FIGURE 2

Maximum Retirement Age of Respondents.
Focus group participants filled out an abbreviated survey instrument. We then conducted a roundtable discussion of the questions in the instrument. The focus group instrument is presented as Appendix B.

Literature Review

To assess trends in officer attitudes over time, we analyzed articles on innovation,

transformation, the impact of the information revolution on warfare, and the military

exploitation of new technologies published in professional military journals from

1990–2000—the decade leading up to the officer attitude survey conducted as the first

part of the project.

We selected eight journals for analysis. These represent the primary venues for the

transmission of ideas by and for the officer corps of all four armed services.

• Military Review is a bimonthly publication prepared by the U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College as “the professional journal of the U.S. Army.”

• Joint Force Quarterly is a quarterly publication “published for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National

Defense University.”

• Proceedings is a monthly publication of the U.S. Naval Institute—an “independent

forum for the sea services.”

• Aerospace Power Journal is produced quarterly as “the professional flagship

publication of the United States Air Force.”

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 13

SERVICE

NUMBER OF

RESPONDENTS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

U.S. Army* 900 46.9

U.S. Air Force* 472 24.6

U.S. Navy* 249 13.0

U.S. Marine Corps* 79 4.1

International Officers 104 5.4

Civilians 54 2.8

Army National Guard 39 2.0

U.S. Coast Guard 7 —

Air National Guard 15 —

TABLE 5

Responses by Service.

* Includes reserve component.
• The Marine Corps Association publishes the Marine Corps Gazette as “the

professional journal of the U.S. Marine Corps.”

• Parameters is produced quarterly as “an official US Army periodical published by

the US Army War College.”

• Naval War College Review is published quarterly by the U.S. Naval War College as “a

forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services.”

• Strategic Review is a quarterly publication of the United States Strategic Institute in

association with the Center for International Relations, Boston University.

We reviewed every issue of each of the eight journals for the 11-year period. A total of

five individuals—four military and one civilian—were involved in the process. The references for each of the articles were cross-checked against the list to ensure the inclusion of nearly every relevant work that had been published during the time frame of

the study. During the review process, about 5 percent of the initial articles were discarded as not being relevant, and about an equal number were added as having missed

the first cut. A total of 345 articles were identified as meeting the survey criteria and

analyzed for content. We also collected data on the principal author of each article, including their affiliation (military, civilian, retired, or military reserve), country of citizenship, military rank, and service.30

Analysis of the content of the articles was intended to mirror, to the extent possible, the

survey of officer attitudes conducted in 2000. Each article was assessed in terms of

three perspectives:

• Attitude. The attitude of the article was considered Positive if the author concluded

that major change in warfare (e.g., the RMA) is attainable and will undoubtedly favor

the United States. It was considered Ambivalent if the author concluded that it was too

early to determine the outcome of such change. The attitude was considered Skeptical

if the author concluded that major change is unwise, unattainable, or irrelevant.

• Imperative. The primary catalyst for change was considered to be Threat if the

author concluded that the United States must take action to avoid an unacceptable

risk or penalty posed by major changes in warfare in the coming decades. It was

considered to be Opportunity if the author felt that change would provide the

United States significant future military advantages over an opponent. The

imperative was considered Both if the author concluded that future change offered

the prospect of both threat and opportunity.

• Call for Action. Articles were differentiated as to whether the author concluded that

Action is needed to achieve the desired technology-based future, or whether he felt

14 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
that such change is Inevitable (although may be attained sooner if the United States

acts to speed the process).

Finally, the appearance of the specific terms “revolution,” “innovation,” and “transformation” was recorded in order to track trends in terminology in the post-Cold War decade.

Several caveats are in order. Analysis of articles appearing in military professional journals, even over a period of more than a decade, is far less definitive than a direct officer

attitude survey and may offer only limited insight into dominant trends in professional

thinking. In the first place, the authors were self-selecting. Even among those officers

having worthwhile ideas with respect to the future of warfare, the articles only reflected

those who could communicate effectively in writing and who chose to devote their

own time to the task of having their ideas published. For the most part, they can be

considered to be individuals with very strong opinions on the subject. An interesting

feature of the officer attitude survey conducted in 2000 was the extent to which most

opinions were clustered in the middle of the response range, reflecting a good deal of

uncertainty among most officers with respect to the issues. Although we did not determine which, if any, of the authors of the professional articles participated in the survey,

it would probably be safe to conclude that they would be more likely to answer at the

extremes of most of the attitude survey questions.

Another limitation is the extremely small data set that is available for analysis. During

the last six years of the literature survey period, when the majority of the articles were

published, the average number of military officers publishing on such subjects probably did not exceed 30 per year—an almost inconsequential percentage of the overall officer corps. There were undoubtedly articles on this subject submitted to the journals

that were not selected for publication. But it would seem unlikely that the number of

well-written and well-reasoned articles that went unpublished would add considerably to

the totals. Nevertheless, the editorial selection process may very well have introduced biases in publication of articles that may skew the overall analysis. For instance, the nearly

even distribution of attitudes reflected in those articles appearing in Parameters over the

11-year period is at least suggestive of an effort to offer their readers a balanced number

of opinions on the subject. Although all of the journals profess editorial independence,

only the Strategic Review has no institutional ties to the U.S. military services.

Finally, the evaluation of the articles was necessarily subjective. Unlike the officer attitude survey, there is no common definition of terms in the professional literature. All

of the articles reflect a broad array of approaches and attitudes that cannot be strictly

categorized in a small set of criteria. Nevertheless, we consider the methodology employed in this study to have produced a data set as complete and objective as could reasonably be expected for a project of this scope.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 15

Attitudes toward the Emerging RMA

We presented respondents with six statements to measure their attitudes toward the

emerging revolution in military affairs (RMA). These were designed to determine whether

officers were skeptical, ambivalent, or enthusiastic about the proposition that we are experiencing an RMA, as well as how demographic variables affected their attitudes.

Statement 1: Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not.

Strategic analysts differ over the benefits that may accrue to the United States if it

transforms its armed forces through the widespread adoption of information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations. Joint Vision 2010 explicitly stated that the successful adaptation of new technologies through the application of new operational

concepts would enable the U.S. military to “dominate an opponent across the range of

military operations.”

32 RMA enthusiasts such as James R. Blaker argue that “The potency

of the American RMA stems from new military systems that will create, through their

interaction, an enormous military disparity between the United States and any opponent. Baldly stated, U.S. military forces will be able to apply military force with dramatically greater efficiency than an opponent, and do so with little risk to U.S. forces.”

33

Others are skeptical that information technology will give the United States a meaningful—or durable—advantage.34

CHAPTER THREE

1. Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a

substantial edge over those that do not.

2. The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will favor the

United States over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.

3. Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts.

4. Adversaries will exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts before the U.S.

can field similar capabilities.

5. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give adversaries an advantage

over the United States in future conflicts.

10.31 Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the conduct of war are

unrealistic.
The officers we surveyed believed strongly that information-age ways of war will give the

United States considerable leverage (see fig. 1). Eighty-five percent felt that forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations would enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not; only 10 percent felt they would not. The mean response

was 5.72 on a scale of 1 to 7. This represents the strongest positive response in the survey.

Air Force and Navy officers were more confident than their Army and Marine Corps

counterparts that information-age ways of war would confer a substantial battlefield

edge upon those possessing them (see table 1). While 93 percent of Navy officers and

18 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

50

297

85

619

700

72 73

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 1

Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 85% 5% 10%

Army 79% 6% 15%

Marine Corps 81% 5% 14%

Navy 93% 2% 5%

Air Force 92% 3% 5%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

82% 6% 12%

Senior Officers 91% 3% 6%

Flag Officers 86% 8% 6%

TABLE 1

Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not.
92 percent of Air Force officers agreed with the statement, only 81 percent of Marine

Corps officers and 79 percent of Army officers agreed. Similarly, senior officers were

more confident than junior officers. Ninety-one percent of senior officers agreed

with the statement, while only 82 percent of junior and field-grade officers agreed.

Whether or not an officer had served in combat did not appear to affect his attitude.

For example, 85 percent of Gulf War veterans and 83 percent of Somalia veterans

agreed with the statement.

Statement 2: The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts

will favor the U.S. over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.

This statement is an explicit theme of Joint Vision 2010. Moreover, RMA advocates argue that the exploitation of new ways of war will give the United States an edge across

the spectrum of conflict. William Owens has written “if we decide to accelerate the

[transformation] process by emphasizing those systems and weapons that drive the

revolution, we can reach our goals years—perhaps decades—before any other nation.” 35

Owens and Joseph Nye have argued that the emerging RMA will not only give the

United States a battlefield edge against regional powers, but will also bolster efforts to

deal with such dangers as international crime, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, and environmental damage.

36 Others have argued that informationage ways of war are likely to be irrelevant in a world dominated by ethnic hatred, terrorism, and transnational crime.37 As Commander William Toti put it, the:

RMA will have little impact on the kind of wars we see today. For example, RMA would

have done nothing to help us prevent the slaughter of 800,000 people in 100 days in

Rwanda. It would have done nothing to prevent a few thousand boys with rifles and

rocket-propelled grenades from overwhelming our best troops—Rangers and Deltas—

in Mogadishu. Nor would it have improved our capability to fight the kind of battle we

saw in 1995 in Bosnia, where 7,000 men were killed in 48 hours. All our improved sensors

would have allowed usto do there would have been to locate the gravesites more quickly.

38

Ralph Peters, at the time a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, feared that “our postRMA military may prove the most expensive white elephant in the history of mankind.”

39

The officers that we surveyed appear to be highly confident that the emerging RMA will

give the United States leverage over the full spectrum of potential adversaries. Seventyfive percent agreed that new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will give

the U.S. armed forces dominance over the full spectrum of potential adversaries; 18

percent disagreed, while 7 percent were unsure. The mean response was 5.19.

Officers’ confidence in the effectiveness of the emerging RMA is corroborated by their

lack of concern about potential threats, a subject we explore in chapter 7. However,

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 19
discussion during the focus group sessions suggests that the positive response to this

statement might be conditional. Focus group participants expressed strong confidence

that the United States would maintain significant technological superiority over any

potential adversary. They were also uncertain as to whether the United States will have

the political and military will to acquire and exploit these technologies. This might explain why 39 percent of the survey respondents tended toward uncertainty on this issue. Thus a more accurate interpretation of the responses to Statement 2 might be that

the United States will be favored if it actually chooses to exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts.

20 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 75% 7% 18%

Army 70% 10% 20%

Marine Corps 67% 9% 24%

Navy 74% 8% 18%

Air Force 80% 6% 14%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

74% 8% 18%

Senior Officers 74% 8% 18%

Flag Officers 75% 17% 8%

TABLE 2

The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will

favor the U.S. over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

53

425

143

603

392

115

167

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 2

The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will

favor the U.S. over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.
Air Force officers agreed most strongly with the proposition that the emerging RMA

will favor the United States over the full spectrum of adversaries; their Army and Marine Corps counterparts, by contrast, were more skeptical (see table 2). While 80 percent of Air Force officers agreed with the statement, only 70 percent of Army officers

and 67 percent of Marine Corps officers agreed. The fact that ground forces are involved in low-technology contingencies such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations more often than air forces may help explain this difference. An officer’s rank did

not appear to influence his response.

Statement 3: Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts.

Joint Vision 2010 justified the requirement of Full-Dimensional Protection as necessary

“to protect our own forces from the very technologies that we are exploiting,” thus suggesting not only an incentive, but a likelihood that other states would seek to compete

with us in the high technology arena.40 Many RMA critics, but also some RMA enthusiasts, echo this sentiment.41 They point out that most if not all of the technologies that

are central to information-age warfare are available on the open market. In addition, a

growing number of states are developing competence in information technology.

42 But

other RMA enthusiasts argue that potential adversaries have no incentive to compete

with the United States in emerging warfare areas. As Joseph Nye and William Owens

have written, “There is no particular incentive for [other] nations to seek the system of

systems the United States is building—so long as they believe they are not threatened

by it.”

43 As a result, they forecast a prolonged period of unchallenged U.S. dominance.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 21

0

200

400

600

800

1000

924

64

125

53 39

490

199

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 3

Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts.
The officers we surveyed disagreed strongly with the contention that other states have

no reason to exploit new technology, doctrine, and concepts. Indeed, they expressed

the overwhelming belief that potential adversaries have every motivation to compete

with the United States. Eighty-five percent agreed that adversaries have an incentive to

compete with the United States, while only eight percent disagreed and only one in five

showed any tendency toward uncertainty. The mean response was 2.07. This was one of

the strongest negative responses of the survey. However, while most officers felt that

potential adversaries will have an incentive to compete with the United States, the responses to other statements imply that they believe that adversaries will not in the end

be successful (see chapter 7).

Statement 4: Adversaries will exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts before the United States can field similar capabilities.

A slim majority of officers—54 percent—agreed that the United States would retain its

lead over potential adversaries in exploiting the emerging RMA, while a significant minority—27 percent—predicted that potential adversaries would be able to exploit new

ways of war before the United States. Nearly sixty percent of the respondents tended

toward uncertainty on this issue, suggesting that a relatively large percentage of the officer corps is essentially unsure how the emerging RMA will develop and who it will favor. The mean response was 3.53.

22 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

0

200

400

600

800

1000

140

278

365

150

80

412

476

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 4

Adversaries will exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts

before the U.S. can field similar capabilities.
Statement 5: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give adversaries an advantage over the U.S. in future conflicts.

Joint Vision 2010 promised the achievement of Full-Dimensional Protection against a

future enemy’s efforts to exploit vulnerabilities that will arise from our exploitation of

advanced technologies. Most officers—53 percent—agreed that the emerging RMA will

not give potential foes an advantage over the United States in future conflicts. However,

a significant minority—26 percent—felt that the RMA might favor adversaries. The

mean response was 3.52. Sixty-one percent of respondents tended toward uncertainty on

this issue, reflecting perhaps a high level of uncertainty as to whether the United States

has the political and military will to both field and protect its technological advantage.

Statement 10: Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the

conduct of war are unrealistic.

Some argue that it is unrealistic to expect information-age technology to yield a major

change in the conduct of war. Frederick W. Kagan, for example, has written that such a

view “is not merely wrong, it is highly dangerous. If put into practice along the lines

conceived by its proponents, it is likely to lead to embarrassments, defeats, high casualties, and the loss, at least temporarily, of America’s position in the world.”

44

This statement produced a bimodal response. A significant majority of officers—64

percent—were open-minded about technology-driven changes in warfare. Only 30 percent felt that those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the

conduct of warfare are unrealistic. Forty percent tended toward uncertainty. In other

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 23

0

140

305

391

147

55

397

462

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

200

400

600

800

1000

0

FIGURE 5

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give adversaries an

advantage over the U.S. in future conflicts.
words, there is a general expectation that new technology will substantially alter the

conduct of war. Nevertheless, more than forty percent of the respondents tended toward uncertainty on this issue, again reflecting a broader uncertainty about how the

emerging RMA will develop.

Air Force officers felt most strongly that those who believe that emerging technology

will substantially alter the conduct of war are realistic: only 22 percent agreed with the

statement, while 74 percent disagreed (see table 3). Similarly, only 18 percent of flag

24 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

0

375

280

125

184

100

475

365

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 6

Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the conduct

of war are unrealistic.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 30% 6% 64%

Army 32% 8% 60%

Navy 34% 5% 61%

Marine Corps 48% 5% 47%

Air Force 22% 4% 74%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

30% 7% 63%

Senior Officers 30% 8% 62%

Flag Officers 18% 2% 80%

TABLE 3

Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the conduct

of war are unrealistic.
officers agreed with the statement, while 80 percent disagreed. Marine Corps officers,

by contrast, felt most strongly that those who believe that emerging technology will

substantially alter the conduct of war are unrealistic: 47 percent disagreed with the

statement, while 48 percent agreed with it.

Summary

The survey revealed abstract enthusiasm among officers for the proposition that we are

experiencing an RMA, albeit heavily tinged with uncertainty. Most officers we surveyed

believed that the emerging RMA would give the United States considerable leverage over

potential adversaries. They felt that it would favor the United States over the full spectrum of potential adversaries. They also believed that the United States will maintain

its lead. While most officers are open to change, our survey revealed significant differences among members of different services. Air Force and Navy officers tended to be

more enthusiastic about new ways of war, while Army and Marine Corps officers were

generally more skeptical. As noted above, there is a good deal of uncertainty about all

of these issues, perhaps reflecting both uncertainty as to how the RMA may develop,

and some skepticism as to whether the United States will have the political and military

will to actually exploit its continuing technological advantage.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 25

Impact of the Emerging RMA on

Dominant Weapons

To a large extent, today’s armed forces resemble those that fought and won World War II.

Manned aircraft dominate war in the air, while on land the main battle tank is the king

of the battlefield. The aircraft carrier remains the capital ship. Joint Vision 2010, “the

conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will . . . leverage technological

opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting,” featured

prominent pictures of manned strike aircraft, the M-1 main battle tank, and the

Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in presentations of the “more capable” future force.

45 RMA

advocates argue, however, that the growth and diffusion of information technology

may erode the dominance of such weapon systems in favor of new ways of war.

46 Some

believe, for example, that over the next several decades unmanned systems could dominate air warfare, ground combat could become highly distributed and non-linear,

many naval combatants could be driven underwater, and space and the information

spectrum could emerge as increasingly important domains of military conflict.

47

We presented respondents with four statements to measure their attitudes toward the

impact of the emerging revolution in military affairs (RMA) on today’s dominant platforms. We were interested in learning how they felt the importance of current systems

might change over the next two decades.

Statement 7: Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they

are today.

Armored and mechanized formations have dominated the U.S. Army since World War

II. Some have argued, however, that their utility is declining. In particular, they argue

CHAPTER FOUR

7. Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.

8. Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.

20. Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become the predominant

means of conducting strike warfare.

9. Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
that heavy armored formations are poorly suited to humanitarian and urban operations.48 Moreover, in recent years the Army has begun to transform itself from a

tank-heavy force designed to protect Western Europe to one that is more versatile, mobile and lethal. In October 1999 the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, announced a goal of transforming the Army into a medium-weight force capable of

deploying a 5,000-man combat brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.

49 He designated two brigades at Fort

Lewis, Washington, as testbeds to explore new concepts and organizations. These units

have traded in their tracked M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles for

lighter vehicles. They are also examining innovative tactics and organizations. Beginning in 2012, the Army plans to begin replacing its 70-ton M1A1 Abrams main battle

tanks with the 20-ton Future Combat System (FCS), a network of light vehicles—possibly including unmanned systems.50 Some have argued for even more radical changes,

including the development of ground forces that are dramatically smaller and stealthier, with most of their combat power exported offshore.51

The officers we surveyed fell into two groups: a slim majority of the officers (51 percent) who believed that armored and mechanized formations will be as important in

twenty years as they are today, and a significant minority (34 percent) who felt they

would be less important. Fifteen percent were unsure (see figure 1). However, 53 percent of respondents fell into the middle categories of 3, 4, and 5, reflecting considerable

uncertainty about the future of armored forces. The mean response of 4.34 reflected

this. It is worth pondering whether the effectiveness of light special operations forces in

Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM will affect perceptions of the

28 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

0

200

400

600

800

1000

97

402

290

367

193

233

315

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 1

Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
future importance of heavy armored forces. Army Captain Bob Krumm, for example,

has argued that the U.S. Government dispatched Marines to Afghanistan because the

Army lacked units that were light yet lethal enough for the mission. As he put it, “The

Marines are doing what needs to be done in an ever-changing world—adapting. The

Army, meanwhile, is content to build a smaller version of its former self.”

52

Not surprisingly, Army officers believed in the enduring importance of armored and

mechanized formations more strongly than did their counterparts in other services

(see table 1 and figure 2). Fifty-six percent of Army officers believed that armored and

mechanized formations would be as important in 2020 as they are today. Navy and

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 29

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 51% 15% 34%

Army 56% 15% 29%

Marine Corps 53% 16% 31%

Navy 54% 19% 27%

Air Force 40% 16% 44%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

54% 15% 31%

Senior Officers 43% 17% 40%

Flag Officers 39% 20% 41%

TABLE 1

Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.

0

50

100

150

200

250

0

USA

Others

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 2

Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
Marine Corps officers were only slightly less confident in the future importance of armor. Only 40 percent of Air Force officers, by contrast, believed that armored and

mechanized formations would continue to be as important as they are today.

Not surprisingly, armor branch Army officers believed strongly in the enduring importance of armored forces (see figure 3). Indeed, 72 percent of armor officers felt that armored and mechanized formations would be as important in 2020 as they are today.

Such results corroborate anecdotal evidence of opposition from active-duty and retired

armor officers to General Shinseki’s attempts to replace armored and mechanized divisions with medium-weight units.53

Statement 8: Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.

Some RMA advocates have argued that air power will increasingly feature the use of unmanned systems, a trend that may challenge the Air Force’s institutional culture and

warrior ethos.54 UAVs have seen extensive use in all military operations since the 1991

Gulf War. Some have recommended cutting manned aircraft—particularly tactical

fighter forces—in favor of greater investment in UAVs and UCAVs, stealthy long-range

cargo aircraft, advanced precision-guided munitions, and satellites.

55

The officers we surveyed split into two distinct groups: 58 percent believed that

manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today, while 35 percent felt

they would be less important. Nine percent were unsure. As with the previous statement, however, a much larger percentage—48 percent in this case—tended toward uncertainty. This was reflected in the mean response of 4.55.

30 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Armor

Others

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

0

FIGURE 3

Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
While Army officers had the greatest confidence in the future of armored and mechanized formations, surprisingly, Air Force officers had the least faith in the continued

importance of manned aircraft. Only 43 percent of Air Force officers felt that manned

aircraft would be as important in 2020 as today (see table 2). By contrast, 66 percent of

Marine Corps, 61 percent of Army, and 57 percent of Navy officers believed in the enduring value of manned aircraft. The focus groups shed additional light upon these results. It appears that an officer’s attitude toward the future importance of manned

aircraft depends upon which types of aircraft he feels are most important. While many

Air Force and Navy officers who participated in the focus groups equated manned aircraft with reconnaissance and strike missions, Army and Marine Corps officers tended

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 31

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 58% 9% 33%

Army 61% 11% 27%

Marine Corps 66% 6% 28%

Navy 57% 7% 36%

Air Force 43% 7% 50%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

58% 11% 31%

Senior Officers 56% 8% 36%

Flag Officers 55% 16% 29%

TABLE 2

Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

94

421

173

421

264

206

321

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 4

Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
to think about transport and close air support—missions that are likely to require a

human operator for the foreseeable future.

Not surprisingly, aviators had greater confidence in the future importance of manned

aircraft than the general population. Sixty-five percent of the aviators in the survey

population believed that manned aircraft would be as important in twenty years as

they are today; only 29 percent believed they would be less important. An officer’s

combat experience did not appear to affect his attitude. Sixty-three percent of Gulf

War and 57 percent of Somalia veterans believed in the continuing importance of

manned aircraft; Haiti and Balkans veterans held similar views.

Statement 20: Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become

the predominant means of conducting strike warfare.

Recent years have seen the increasing use of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and surveillance. The Air Force operates squadrons of RQ-1 Predator medium altitude and endurance UAVs. It is also acquiring the RQ-4 Global Hawk

high-altitude, long-endurance UAV. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps use UAVs for reconnaissance and surveillance. They are also developing more advanced designs, including man-portable micro-UAVs for tactical reconnaissance and vertical-takeoff

systems. The services are also exploring the use of uninhabited combat aerial vehicles

(UCAVs) to suppress enemy air defenses and launch strikes. The Air Force is examining

the X-45A UCAV, an aircraft designed to fly as high as 40,000 feet, have a 1,000-mile

range, and carry 12 miniature bombs. It has also launched Hellfire anti-tank guided

32 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

0

102

451

332 299

130

207

382

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 5

Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become the predominant means of conducting strike warfare.
missiles from the Predator. RMA advocates argue that such vehicles will play an increasingly important role in future operations. 56

Forty-six percent of the officers we surveyed felt that UCAVs would become the predominant means of conducting strike warfare within the next twenty years. Thirty-six

percent disagreed, and 18 percent were unsure. However, 61 percent of respondents

tended toward uncertainty, indicating that most officers really don’t know what to

think about this possible development. This was reflected in the mean response of 4.18.

The highly touted use of UCAVs for strike missions in operations after the survey was

conducted may change this view.

Air Force officers were the most enthusiastic about UCAVs. Fifty-three percent of Air

Force officers believed that UCAVs would become the predominant means of conducting strike warfare within the next twenty years (see table 3). By contrast, only 42 percent of Army officers and 43 percent of Marine Corps officers held the same view.

Our focus groups indicated that an officer’s assumptions about the rate of technological development and cultural acceptance of unmanned systems conditioned his response. There was a general consensus that UAVs were increasingly important,

particularly for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Officers differed, however, as

to whether it would be feasible for unmanned systems to perform strike missions reliably within the next twenty years. Their assessments of the rate at which the culture of

the services would change to accept unmanned strike systems also diverged. These focus group findings likely explain much of the high degree of uncertainty that surrounds this issue.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 33

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 46% 18% 36%

Army 42% 21% 37%

Marine Corps 43% 11% 46%

Navy 47% 14% 39%

Air Force 53% 13% 34%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

47% 20% 33%

Senior Officers 47% 13% 40%

Flag Officers 43% 24% 33%

TABLE 3

Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become the predominant means of conducting strike warfare.
Statement 9: Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.

RMA advocates have predicted that carrier battle groups may decline in importance

over time. Andrew Krepinevich, for example, has argued that aircraft carriers are of decreasing utility due to their high cost and growing vulnerability, and because of the increasing availability of substitutes for carrier air power for presence and power

projection.57 He has argued that the Navy should reduce its carrier force while increasing its investment in concepts such as the “arsenal ship” and cruise missile carrying

submarines.58 Some envision the capital ship of the future to be a submersible vessel

armed with large numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles.59

34 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

66

450

197

514

333

122

220

0

250

500

750

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 6

Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 68% 11% 21%

Army 68% 12% 20%

Marine Corps 71% 7% 22%

Navy 80% 7% 13%

Air Force 63% 10% 27%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

69% 12% 19%

Senior Officers 64% 9% 27%

Flag Officers 63% 17% 20%

TABLE 4

Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
The responses to this statement exhibited a bimodal distribution, though skewed considerably to the right. Sixty-eight percent of the officers we surveyed believe that carrier battle groups will be as important in twenty years as they are today; 21 percent believe they

will be less important and 11 percent were unsure. Forty-six percent of the respondents

tended toward uncertainty on this issue, compared with nearly seven in ten in agreement,

indicating much more confidence in the continued viability of the carrier battle group

than with manned aircraft and armored formations. The mean response was 4.95.

Navy officers were the most enthusiastic about the future of carrier battle groups, with

80 percent arguing that carrier battle groups would be as important in 2020 as they are

today (see table 4). The prominent role of carrier-based tactical aircraft in major military operations since this survey was conducted may reinforce this view. Air Force officers were most skeptical. But even among Air Force officers, 63 percent believed in the

enduring importance of carrier battle groups.

Officers who participated in our focus groups argued that carrier battle groups would

continue to be important because they perform valuable roles such as presence. The

statement did not stipulate that the carrier battle group mission would not change in

the future, but focus group participants generally understood that to be implied. A

number of officers observed that the United States would still have a large number of

Nimitz-class aircraft carriers in 2020 in any event. Others, however, noted that they

represent lucrative targets and may be becoming increasingly vulnerable to long-range

targeting and attack.

Summary

The officers we surveyed believed that the emerging RMA would not reduce the utility

of today’s dominant platforms. In each case, a majority of officers felt that today’s

dominant systems would be as important in 2020 as they are today. However, a large

percentage of respondents tended toward uncertainty in each case as well. In addition,

we detected significant differences in attitudes among officers from different services.

Army officers tended to be the most enthusiastic about current systems. This included

not only armored and mechanized formations, but also manned aircraft and carrier

battle groups. Air Force officers, by contrast, were most willing to contemplate change,

even if it involved devaluing manned aircraft. An officer’s rank also appeared to influence his attitudes. In each case, the higher an officer’s rank, the less enthusiastic and

more uncertain he was likely to be about the continued importance of today’s dominant

systems. By contrast, an officer’s combat experience did not appear to affect his attitudes.

It should also be noted that the extent to which the officers surveyed were cognizant of

technological developments and proposals for change to today’s dominant weapons is

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 35
not clear. The focus groups indicated that most officers do not stay abreast of such developments outside of their narrow tactical-technical specialties, and therefore might

not be sensitized to the prospect for major change. This lack of information may explain the high degree of uncertainty evidenced in the responses to these statements.

36 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
Emergence of New Ways of War

Many of those who argue that we are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs

predict that the information revolution will not only change war on land, at sea, and in

the air, but also that it will bring war into space and cyberspace. Such a view is implicit

in Joint Vision 2010. We presented the respondents with four statements intended to assess their perceptions of the emergence of these domains as important venues for military operations.

Statement 17: Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or

from space.

Space systems have for decades supported terrestrial military operations. Ground, sea,

and air forces have relied upon satellites for reconnaissance and surveillance, communications, weather prediction, and navigation. Military and civilian experts alike have

long discussed the possibility of conducting combat operations in and from space.

Combat operations in space could include ballistic missile defense and antisatellite

warfare. Those conducted from space could include strikes launched from space on terrestrial targets. However, a number of arms control agreements currently constrain the

deployment and employment of weapons in space. Some argue that the deployment of

weapons in space would provoke an arms race that would ultimately hurt the United

States the most because we rely upon space the most. In addition, there are those who

question the maturity of space weapon technology.

RMA advocates have argued that space is likely to play an increasingly important role in

future conflicts. Indeed, some predict that it may be considered an independent theater

of military operations.60 Russian analysts have forecast that future conflicts will be

characterized by the dominance of aerospace and information warfare over traditional

CHAPTER FIVE

17. Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or from space.

18. Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central feature of

military operations.

6. Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures.

22d. Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information networks.
ground combat.61 Chinese military authors have accorded increased attention to combat in space as well.62 The report of the 1997 National Defense Panel cited the possibility that future adversaries may challenge the United States’ control of space.63 Similarly,

the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review argued that:

Space and information operations have become the backbone of networked, highly

distributed commercial civilian and military capabilities. This opens up the possibility

that space control—the exploitation of space and the denial of the use of space to adversaries—will become a key objective in future military competition.64

38 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

42

591

180

525

333

86

144

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 1

Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or from space.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 76% 10% 14%

Army 77% 11% 12%

Marine Corps 78% 7% 15%

Navy 71% 13% 16%

Air Force 76% 9% 15%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

76% 11% 13%

Senior Officers 76% 7% 17%

Flag Officers 80% 10% 10%

International Officers 71% 11% 18%

U.S. Officers 76% 10% 14%

TABLE 1

Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or from space.
The report also identified increasing the capability and survivability of space systems

and their support infrastructure as a key objective.

65

More than three-quarters of the officers that we surveyed believed that within the next

twenty years conflicts will include combat operations in or from space; only 14 percent

disagreed, and 10 percent were unsure (see figure 1). While 48 percent of respondents

tended toward uncertainty, the mean response of 5.16 shows at least some level of

agreement. This view held among officers of all services and ranks (see table 1). International officers were slightly less confident than their American counterparts that future wars will include combat operations in or from space. Still, more than seven out of

ten agreed with the proposition.

The responses of focus group participants shed additional light upon these responses.

Many viewed combat operations in space as inevitable, and nearly all interpreted the

statement as implying the actual movement of kill mechanisms into or out of outer

space. A number argued that potential U.S. adversaries would exploit the perceived vulnerability of U.S. military satellites to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects in an attempt

to counter the U.S. advantage in space. Others believed that the United States would station weapons in space to strike the Earth. They also acknowledged the barriers to combat

operations in space, including treaty limitations and less formal political constraints.

Statement 18: Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a

central feature of military operations.

The increasing use of information networks has increased their attractiveness as targets.66 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, for example, predicted that “states will

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 39

29

442

93

679

502

47

110

0

250

500

750

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 2

Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central

feature of military operations.
likely develop offensive information operations and be compelled to devote resources

to protecting critical information infrastructure from disruption, either physically or

through cyber space.”

67 Indeed, some argue that attacks upon information networks

may become a new form of strategic warfare.

68

A large majority of officers (85 percent) believed that computer network attack will become a central feature of military operations; 10 percent disagreed and 5 percent were

unsure. Only 34 percent of respondents tended toward uncertainty, compared to 48

percent of those who answered the previous statement. In other words, they seem to be

much more certain that computer network attack will be an important feature of future conflicts than they were of combat operations in or from space.

As with the previous statement, officers of all services and ranks shared this view (see

table 2). Moreover, the response of international officers was virtually indistinguishable

from that of their American counterparts.

Statement 6: Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy

countermeasures.

A large majority (76 percent) of the officers that we surveyed believe that information

systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures; 15 percent disagreed and 9 percent were unsure. While 46 percent of respondents tended toward uncertainty, the mean response of 5.26 shows considerable support for the proposition.

40 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 85% 5% 10%

Army 82% 7% 11%

Marine Corps 86% 4% 10%

Navy 86% 3% 11%

Air Force 88% 4% 8%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

85% 5% 10%

Senior Officers 85% 6% 9%

Flag Officers 90% 4% 6%

International Officers 84% 7% 9%

U.S. Officers 85% 5% 10%

TABLE 2

Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central

feature of military operations.
There was a consensus among officers of all services and ranks that information systems and networks are highly vulnerable (see table 3). International officers expressed

both a higher level of confidence in the resistance of networks to countermeasures and

a higher level of uncertainty than their American counterparts.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 41

200

400

600

800

1000

24

516

187

527

390

81

172

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 3

Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 76% 9% 15%

Army 74% 11% 15%

Marine Corps 77% 7% 16%

Navy 75% 11% 14%

Air Force 79% 8% 13%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

76% 10% 14%

Senior Officers 74% 11% 15%

Flag Officers 70% 10% 20%

International Officers 67% 22% 11%

U.S. Officers 76% 9% 15%

TABLE 3

Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures.
Statement 22d: Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information

networks.

Despite the fact that a large majority of officers felt that computer network attack was

becoming a central feature of warfare and a strong belief that information networks are

vulnerable to enemy countermeasures, 78 percent of the officers that we surveyed

42 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

450

81

142

52

143

634

387

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

0

250

500

750

1000

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 4

Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information networks.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 15% 7% 78%

Army 12% 9% 79%

Marine Corps 16% 5% 79%

Navy 14% 6% 80%

Air Force 14% 7% 79%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

13% 7% 80%

Senior Officers 20% 7% 73%

Flag Officers 18% 6% 76%

International Officers 45% 9% 46%

U.S. Officers 15% 7% 78%

TABLE 4

Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information networks.
argued that future adversaries will not be able to deny the United States the use of information networks. Only 15 percent believed that adversaries would be able to deny

us the use of information networks, and 7 percent were unsure. This result, which is

somewhat surprising, appears to indicate that officers believe that the United States

will be able to overcome any challenges that it will face. Such confidence is reflected in

responses to other survey statements exploring potential threats to U.S. forces (see

chapter 7), and was essentially confirmed by the focus groups.

Officers of all services expressed confidence that future adversaries will be unable to

deny the United States the use of its information networks (see table 4). Of note is the

fact that senior and flag officers were more concerned than junior officers, perhaps because they possessed a greater understanding of the information warfare threat. Most

significantly, however, international officers felt much more strongly than their American counterparts in the ability of future adversaries to disrupt U.S. information networks. While only 15 percent of American officers agreed with the statement, 45

percent of international officers agreed.

Summary

The survey revealed a consensus among officers of all services and ranks that military

operations in space and cyberspace will play an increasingly important role in warfare.

It also revealed a consensus that information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures. However, only 15 percent of the U.S. officers we surveyed believed that future adversaries will be able to deny the United States the use of

information networks in future conflict. International officers were much more concerned about the threat. Officers were more certain of their responses to this group of

statements than most others. In none of the statements did more than half of the respondents tend toward uncertainty.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 43

Impact of the Emerging RMA on the

Character of War

We presented the respondents with nine statements that were intended to assess their general perceptions of how the emerging RMA might change the character of future conflicts.

Statement 11: The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the need for the U.S. to field ground forces.

Some proponents of the emerging RMA argue that the ability to strike an enemy with

standoff weaponry may eliminate many requirements to engage enemy forces with

ground troops. Official publications of the mid-1990s tended to support this position.

Joint Vision 2010 predicted that “we will be increasingly able to accomplish the effects

of mass ... with less need to mass forces physically than in the past” while cautioning

that “this will not obviate the need for ‘boots on the ground’ in many operations [emphasis added].”

69 The implication, intended or not, is that there will be no need for

CHAPTER SIX

11. The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the need for the

U.S. to field ground forces.

16. Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology will allow the U.S.

armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited geographic area,

regardless of enemy countermeasures.

19. Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional precision-guided

munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

24a. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to engage in

high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S. casualties.

24b. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially reduce the duration

of future conflicts.

24c. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the U.S. to use

force.

24d. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the U.S. to

achieve decisive battlefield victories.

24e. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my

service relative to the other services.

24f. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my

branch relative to others in my service.
“boots on the ground” in many—if not most—instances in the future. James R. Blaker is

representative of a number of authors who predict that the RMA will alter the traditional

relationship between fire and maneuver. In Blaker’s view, “indirect fire—delivered largely

from non-organic sources—[would become] the primary means of destroying the opponent, while maneuver would be seen as essentially the means of directing fire.”

70

The officers we surveyed strongly disagreed with the contention that long-range precision strike would diminish the need for the United States to field ground forces (see

figure 1). More than 70 percent disagreed with the statement, and more than half (51

46 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

528

271

85

135

80

451

352

0

250

500

750

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 1

The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the

need for the U.S. to field ground forces.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 26% 4% 70%

Army 19% 4% 77%

Marine Corps 9% 1% 90%

Navy 21% 1% 78%

Air Force 42% 6% 52%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

25% 5% 70%

Senior Officers 26% 5% 69%

Flag Officers 35% 2% 63%

TABLE 1

The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the

need for the U.S. to field ground forces.
percent) leaned toward strong disagreement. Indeed, this statement garnered one of

the strongest negative responses in the survey, as reflected in the mean response of 2.92.

As might be expected, Marine Corps and Army officers were strongly opposed to the

proposition that striking an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the

need to field ground forces; Air Force officers made up the largest proportion of those

who tended toward a positive view of this statement (see table 1). Of note is the fact

that the survey was conducted shortly after U.S. operations in Kosovo. Ground officers

may have interpreted the outcome of that conflict as a clear indication of the need for

boots on the ground, and air officers may have interpreted it as ultimately a vindication of standoff strike.

Statement 16: Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology

will allow the U.S. armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited geographic area, regardless of enemy countermeasures.

Virtually all advocates of the RMA argue that great advances in the ability to detect,

identify, and track enemy forces on the battlefield will place those enemy forces at increased risk of attack. Joint Vision 2010 predicted an enhanced detectability of both enemy and friendly forces that would render the battle space “considerably more

transparent.”

71 Admiral William Owens (retired), former Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, is one of the primary proponents of the idea of “dominant battlespace

knowledge” and has predicted an ability to detect all activity of military interest in an

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 47

119

566

242

305

120

191

358

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 2

Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology will allow

the U.S. armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited

geographic area, regardless of enemy countermeasures.
area as large as 200 by 200 nautical miles.72 Critics argue that promises of dominant

battlespace knowledge are illusory.

73

Fifty-two percent of the officers surveyed agreed with this position (see figure 2). However, responses also reflected a bimodal distribution with 35 percent in disagreement

and 61 percent tending toward uncertainty. The mean response of 4.23 reflected this

uncertainty. This may reflect the perception of a tremendous challenge in moving from

current surveillance capabilities to a battle space that is effectively “transparent.” It also

may suggest considerable uncertainty with respect to prospective enemy capabilities to

deny U.S. forces targeting information.

Again, the survey was conducted just after U.S. operations in Kosovo, which may have

influenced many opinions about the current challenges of identifying and targeting

dispersed forces on the ground (see table 2). Air Force officers were most enthusiastic

about the ability of the United States to achieve dominant battle space knowledge,

while Marine Corps officers were most skeptical. In addition, enthusiasm increased

with an officer’s rank.

Statement 19: Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional

precision-guided munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S.

nuclear stockpile.

Many RMA advocates predict an increasing ability to achieve “strategic effects” with

conventional weapons. Perhaps foremost among these is John Warden, who has opined

that modern standoff munitions will provide the ability to strike directly at the enemy’s

strategic center of gravity while depriving him of the ability to respond. In his view,

48 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 52% 13% 35%

Army 51% 15% 34%

Marine Corps 35% 6% 59%

Navy 47% 11% 42%

Air Force 56% 11% 33%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers 51% 15% 34%

Senior Officers 53% 11% 36%

Flag Officers 55% 10% 35%

TABLE 2

Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology will allow

the U.S. armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited

geographic area, regardless of enemy countermeasures.
this capability for “parallel attack” can “render the enemy impotent” by imposing “strategic paralysis” on the enemy state, and make a rational enemy leadership prone to

concessions.74 Others, such as Seth Cropsey, have gone on to predict that conventional

cruise missiles alone can “decimate an enemy’s military, providing an effective deterrent against or meaningful punishment for a smaller nation’s use of nuclear force.”

75

The implication is that advanced conventional weaponry can take on both the deterrence and warfighting missions of nuclear weapons, and thus reductions in the U.S.

nuclear stockpile might not be imprudent.

Others go farther. Andrew Krepinevich and Stephen Kosiak, for example, have argued

that smarter conventional bombs will mean fewer nuclear weapons. This is so, they assert, because advanced technology offers the military “the ability to locate, identify, and

track a far greater number of targets over a far greater area for far longer periods of

time and to engage those targets with far greater lethality, precision, and discrimination than has ever before been possible.”

76 This will, in their view, allow the United

States to reduce substantially its nuclear arsenal. Others have noted that the ability of

precision-guided munitions to substitute for nuclear weapons is limited.77

Forty-two percent of the officers surveyed agreed with the statement, but more than

one-third (35 percent) tended to disagree (see figure 3). Perhaps most interesting is

that nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the officers surveyed tended toward uncertainty

on this issue. The mean response of 4.05 corroborates this view. Strategic nuclear sufficiency was not a major topic of discussion or consideration by the broad officer

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 49

126

434 445

270

83

224

320

0

250

500

750

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 3

Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional precisionguided munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S. nuclear

stockpile.
population during the 1990s. The uncertainty of the respondents may reflect the fact

that most had simply never thought about the issue.

Statement 24a: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the

ability to engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.

casualties.

The idea that the American public has developed a low tolerance for combat casualties,

whether true or not, has become an axiom of the post–Cold War military mindset.

Joint Vision 2010 states that “the American people will continue to expect us to win any

engagement, but they will also expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives and resources,” and that “commanders will be expected to reduce the costs and adverse effects

of military operations.”

78 Joseph Nye and William Owens opined that the risk of casualties must be kept “low enough to maintain the American public’s support for the use

of force.”

79 Among the explicit goals of the Joint Vision 2010 force is a reduction in risk

to U.S. troops by making it more difficult for them to be found and attacked, and by

providing them “Full-Dimensional Protection” through multi-layered defense.

80

Nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the officers surveyed agreed that the attributes of the

RMA force will allow the U.S. to engage in high-intensity combat operations with substantially reduced risk of casualties (see figure 4). The mean response was 4.59. It is not

clear whether this positive response reflects a true belief that reduced risk will be provided by the future RMA force, or the conviction that future commanders and the

50 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

0

250

500

750

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

76

614

175

397

180 165

280

FIGURE 4

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to

engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.

casualties.
American people will simply find anything else unacceptable. In addition, the context

within which this statement was interpreted is not known. Compared with earlier wars,

the U.S. suffered relatively few casualties in the conflicts of the 1990s. It is not known if

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 51

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 63% 9% 28%

Army 52% 12% 36%

Marine Corps 59% 8% 32%

Navy 69% 8% 23%

Air Force 74% 7% 19%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

59% 11% 30%

Senior Officers 69% 10% 21%

Flag Officers 71% 5% 24%

International Officers 80% 12% 8%

U.S. Officers 62% 9% 29%

TABLE 3

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to

engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.

casualties.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

International

U.S.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

0

FIGURE 5

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to

engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.

casualties.
the average officer was thinking of Vietnam, or Desert Storm, or Kosovo as the benchmark when considering the term “substantially reduced.” All of these unknowns are

likely reflected in the fact that more than half of the officers (57 percent) tended toward uncertainty in their response to this statement.

While in substantial agreement, Army officers tended to be least positive about this

statement in each response category. Air Force and Navy officers were considerably

more positive (see table 3). In addition, the proportion of officers agreeing with the

statement increased with the rank of the respondents. Most interesting was the disproportionately positive response of international officers to this statement (see figure 5).

Indeed, while 62 percent of U.S. officers agreed with the statement, more than 80 percent of foreign officers agreed. At face value this reflects the foreign belief that the future U.S. force will face substantially reduced battlefield casualties. However, it also

may reflect a general foreign perception of reduced U.S. tolerance for combat losses

based upon the seeming unwillingness of the United States to commit ground forces to

recent conflicts.

Statement 24b: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially reduce the duration of future conflicts.

Joint Vision 2010 forecast that the future force will enable “a more rapid transition

from deployment to full operational capability” as well as an ability to more rapidly

achieve military objectives.81 John Warden’s vision of modern warfare includes the

“near-simultaneous attack on every strategic- and operational-level vulnerability of the

52 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

0

250

500

750

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

90

321 296

123

184

344

526

FIGURE 6

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially

reduce the duration of future conflicts.
enemy” leading to his rapid collapse.

82 Increased speed of command and execution are

also key features of Network Centric Warfare, which predicts the ability to rapidly

“lock out” the enemy’s strategic options and leave him “no viable courses of action.”

83

Forty-nine percent of the officers agreed with the notion that exploitation of advanced

technology would substantially reduce the duration of future conflicts, while 32 percent disagreed (see figure 6.) As with the previous statement, Marine Corps and Army

officers were more skeptical than their Air Force counterparts, while flag officers

tended to be more enthusiastic than junior, field-grade, or senior officers.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 53

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 49% 17% 32%

Army 46% 19% 33%

Marine Corps 44% 11% 42%

Navy 49% 12% 37%

Air Force 54% 15% 28%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

49% 17% 32%

Senior Officers 48% 17% 32%

Flag Officers 65% 14% 20%

TABLE 4

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially

reduce the duration of future conflicts.

0

250

500

750

1000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

77

566

246

433

183

141

242

FIGURE 7

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for

the U.S. to use force.
Statement 24c: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it

easier for the U.S. to use force.

There were few explicit arguments in the professional literature of the 1990s that the

exploitation of advanced technologies would make it easier for the United States to use

military force. However, highly touted forecasts of the U.S. military being able to more

54 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 63% 13% 24%

Army 57% 15% 28%

Marine Corps 59% 13% 28%

Navy 63% 13% 24%

Air Force 69% 12% 19%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

59% 16% 25%

Senior Officers 69% 11% 20%

Flag Officers 67% 15% 18%

International Officers 74% 12% 14%

U.S. Officers 62% 13% 25%

TABLE 5

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for

the U.S. to use force.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

100

200

300

400

500

600

International

US

FIGURE 8

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for

the U.S. to use force.
rapidly project power, and then more rapidly achieve a strategic victory, tended to imply that the use of military force might become an increasingly attractive option.

Nearly two-thirds of the officers surveyed (63 percent) agreed with the statement,

while 24 percent disagreed (see figure 7). Nevertheless, more than half (56 percent)

tended toward uncertainty, as reflected in the mean response of 4.65. It is not known

whether the respondents believed that the perceived ease of using force would be more

beneficial to the United States and the attainment of its strategic objectives.

Higher percentages of Army and Marine Corps officers disagreed with the statement,

while higher percentages of Navy and Air Force officers agreed (see table 5). This probably reflects some level of differing confidence in the future capabilities of air power.

Senior and flag officers agreed with the proposition more than junior officers. Most interesting was the disproportionately positive response of international officers to this

statement (see figure 8). While 62 percent of the U.S. officers agreed with the proposition, 74 percent of the international officers agreed. It is not known whether they see an

increasing ease of use of force by the U.S. translating into a more frequent use of force.

Statement 24d: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it

easier for the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.

An explicit prediction of Joint Vision 2010 is that new technology, doctrine, and organizations “will provide America with the capability to dominate an opponent across the

range of military operations.”

84 Most professional literature of the 1990s that supported

pursuit of the RMA tended to imply similar beneficial results.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 55

66

628

274

376

129 137

276

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 9

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for

the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.
More than half of the officers surveyed (60 percent) agreed with this statement (see figure 9). However a higher percentage (62 percent) of the responses tended toward uncertainty on this issue. The mean response was 4.65. It is interesting to compare these

responses to those of Statement 24b in which most officers opined that the duration of

future conflicts would not be substantially reduced. In responding to this statement,

the officers might have been thinking of a much narrower set of high-intensity conflicts where the adversary would be very vulnerable to U.S. approaches that relied on

56 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 60% 15% 25%

Army 56% 17% 27%

Marine Corps 44% 18% 38%

Navy 57% 17% 26%

Air Force 68% 13% 19%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

60% 16% 24%

Senior Officers 59% 15% 26%

Flag Officers 73% 12% 15%

International Officers 73% 15% 12%

U.S. Officers 60% 15% 26%

TABLE 6

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for

the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

International

U.S.

0

FIGURE 10

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for

the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.
advanced technology. The high level of uncertainty in the responses to this statement

may indicate a perception that the answer depends upon the type of conflict and the

character of the opponent. Again, U.S. operations in Kosovo might have had a major

influence on the responses.

Marine Corps officers were most skeptical of the proposition that new technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the United States to

achieve decisive battlefield victories; Air Force officers were most enthusiastic (see table

6). Flag officers were more enthusiastic than their juniors. As in the previous questions

in this series, the most interesting aspect of the responses was the disproportionately

positive views of the international officers (see figure 10). While 60 percent of U.S. officers agreed with the statement, 73 percent of international officers agreed. This suggests that foreign officers have much more confidence in the U.S. ability to exploit

technology than do their U.S. counterparts.

Statement 24e: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase

the importance of my service relative to the other services.

A common theme within the RMA literature of the 1990s was that long-range strike

would take on some of the missions that had previously required ground forces. This

was also narrowly implied in Joint Vision 2010.

85 Another common theme was that exploitation of advanced technology would allow the United States to field a smaller but

more lethal force to provide the post–Cold War “peace dividend” demanded by the

American public. Analysts like James Blaker proposed significant restructuring of the

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 57

198

319

495

223

106

191

346

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 11

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my service relative to the other services.
forces within each of the services that could conceivably lead to a major change in the

relative importance of the services.86

Officers were about evenly split in their response to this statement, with 35 percent in

agreement and 39 percent opposed (see figure 11). Most significantly, 62 percent

tended toward uncertainty regarding this issue (as reflected by the mean response of

3.87). This uncertainty tracks with responses to other statements dealing with relative

service efforts and priorities, indicating that most officers felt they did not know

enough about what was going on in services other than their own to make any

58 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 35% 26% 39%

Army 27% 30% 43%

Marine Corps 29% 24% 47%

Navy 22% 31% 47%

Air Force 56% 17% 27%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

36% 27% 37%

Senior Officers 29% 28% 43%

Flag Officers 33% 21% 46%

TABLE 7

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my service relative to the other services.

197

315

473

233

148

210

295

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 12

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my branch relative to others in my service.
definitive statement about relative trends. However, it is interesting to compare these

responses with those to Statement 11, in which 70 percent of the officers surveyed expressed the opinion that long-range strike would not diminish the need for ground

forces. One could conclude that officers tend to be open to the idea that the relative importance of the services might change, but not that naval or air power will be able to

substitute for ground troops. It is not known what other types of relative force changes

they may have had in mind when responding to this statement.

Responses indicate that Air Force officers believed most strongly that new technology,

operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of their service

relative to the other services (see table 7). Officers from the other services were considerably more skeptical.

Statement 24f: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase

the importance of my Branch relative to others in my service.

This question sought to elicit an evaluation of whether branch or warfare specialties

would change in relative importance within each of the services. Scholars have argued

that revolutions in military affairs frequently alter the relationship between existing

services and combat arms and have triggered the rise of new elites while witnessing the

decline of previously dominant ones.87 During the first half of the twentieth century,

for example, naval aviation assumed a central role in war at sea. As the aircraft carrier

displaced the battleship as the centerpiece of modern navies, naval aviators challenged

the traditional dominance of surface warfare officers. During the same period, armored forces usurped the cavalry in armies across the globe, and the advent of aircraft

created new elites within armies and eventually spawned new military services.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 59

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 37% 25% 38%

Army 27% 30% 43%

Marine Corps 29% 24% 47%

Navy 22% 31% 47%

Air Force 56% 17% 27%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

40% 26% 34%

Senior Officers 29% 26% 45%

Flag Officers 28% 26% 46%

TABLE 8

New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my Branch relative to others in my service.
The responses are nearly identical to those of Statement 24e, with 37 percent positive,

38 percent negative, and a large proportion (58 percent) tending toward uncertainty.

Again, this seems to reflect a great deal of uncertainty within the officer corps as to

how advanced technologies might impact very specific warfare areas.

Air Force officers believed most strongly that new technology, operational concepts,

and organizations will increase the importance of their branch relative to others in

their service (see table 8). The other services were considerably more skeptical. Junior

and field grade officers agreed more strongly with the proposition than did senior and

flag officers.

Summary

Most officers tended to believe that the emerging RMA will make it easier for the U.S. to

use force and for the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories (at least in some scenarios). Most officers also believed that it will allow the United States to engage in

high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of casualties and that it will

substantially reduce the duration of future conflicts. They also tended to believe that

the U.S. will have a greatly enhanced ability to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces

in limited geographic areas. In general, Army and Marine Corps officers tended to be

somewhat more skeptical than Air Force and Navy officers about the desirable impact

of technological change.

They tended to be much more uncertain in their evaluation of the impact of the RMA

on existing forces. There was substantial uncertainty as to whether the emerging RMA

will allow deep reduction in nuclear forces, or whether the relative importance of their

service or specialty branch will see significant change. Nevertheless, there was a general

consensus that the increasing capability of long-range strike ordnance will not diminish the need for U.S. ground forces.

Of particular interest is the difference of opinion between U.S. and international military officers regarding the impact of the RMA on U.S. military capabilities. International officers tended to believe much more strongly than their U.S. counterparts that

the U.S. will find it easier to use force and to achieve decisive battlefield victories—and

will be able to do so with substantially reduced risk of U.S. casualties.

60 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
Impetus for Change

There is strong historical evidence to support the contention that a common perception of future threat is required for major transformation to occur. Key decision makers in the military services, as well as the executive and legislative branches, must

acknowledge that the ultimate cost and risk of maintaining the current force exceeds

the cost and risk of changing to a new operational concept. To this end, we presented

respondents with three statements intended to elicit their views of the future threat to

U.S. power projection forces. We also asked the respondents to rank the relative importance of six future military challenges.

The most compelling case for a potentially untenable threat to current and future U.S.

forces arises from the proliferation of missiles with both increasing range and accuracy.

The continued spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies presents a

threat of mass destruction to fixed and relatively immobile forces, while the growing

availability of precise targeting information also increases the threat of very precise delivery of conventional explosives out to ranges in the hundreds of kilometers.88 Given that

the United States has yet to field an effective defense against the ballistic missile, many see

these weapons as the leading edge of a general “anti-access” capability intended to deny

U.S. forces the forward staging needed for regional power projection.89 Foreign developments in ballistic missile technology were highlighted in the 1990s by such events as the

series of Chinese ballistic missile launches to positions off the coast of Taiwan in 1995

and 1996, and the unexpected launch by North Korea of the Taepodong-1 ballistic missile

over Japan in 1998. The U.S. press provided wide coverage of a series of test failures of

CHAPTER SEVEN

22a. Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and

cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.

22b. Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and

cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.

22c. Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and

cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites.

Relative importance of six future challenges: Peer Competitor, Humanitarian Operations,

Emerging Regional Power, Information Warfare, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Terrorism.
the U.S. Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system and

cost overruns and delays in other theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) programs.

The 1998 “Rumsfeld Commission” report on the ballistic missile threat to the United

States contained a number of stark conclusions. The commission found that the ballistic missile “has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target compared to

other means of delivery,” especially with the ongoing incorporation of spaced-based

global positioning guidance.90 It went on to conclude that such missiles in the hands of

hostile nations posed a “serious threat to the Unites States, to its forward-based forces

and their staging areas and to U.S. friends and allies.” The report specifically cited the

potential missile threat to ports, airfields, communications centers, urban areas, and

industry, noting that attacks on “ports and airfields the U.S. might use could severely

hamper operations and could undercut the military advantages U.S. technological superiority provides.”

Statement 22a: Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.

Given the widespread press coverage of missile defense issues during the 1990s, the

survey responses to statements regarding the potential missile threats to U.S. power

projection were somewhat surprising. Nearly 8 in 10 officers (78 percent) disagreed

with the statement that future adversaries would be able to attack (not destroy or degrade) large ground formations with ballistic or cruise missiles (see figure 1). Slightly

better than half (51 percent) tended toward uncertainty, but less than one in ten officers (9 percent) expressed any agreement with the statement—and less than 6 officers

62 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

349

109

250

54 14

505

618

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

FIGURE 1

Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as

ballistic and cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.
in 1,000 strongly agreed. The mean response of 2.71 reflects the respondents’ disagreement with the statement.

Reasons for the apparent discounting of the threat may include a disagreement about

the severity of the threat, and a simple lack of knowledge among the broad population

of officers with respect to ballistic and cruise missiles, and U.S. missile defenses.

Among the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission was that the threat “posed by these

emerging capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than has

been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.”

91 These

conclusions have been contested. Nevertheless, the U.S. military imposes no formal

requirements for knowledge about military threats outside of an officer’s tacticaltechnical specialty, so a widespread lack of understanding of foreign ballistic and cruise

missiles should not be surprising.

92

Another reason for this seeming lack of concern may arise from official statements of

confidence in the ability of the U.S. military to deal with these threats. Joint Vision

2010, for instance, acknowledges a growing foreign threat from advanced technologies,

but concludes that our forces “will achieve [the] required level of protection [emphasis

added]” through “multi-layered defenses of our forces and facilities at all levels.”

93

Both of these themes were evident in the focus group surveys. Most officers admitted

that they did not have a full understanding of the potential threat to U.S. power

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 63

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 9% 13% 78%

Army 8% 13% 79%

Marine Corps 9% 18% 73%

Navy 9% 12% 79%

Air Force 9% 15% 76%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

8% 14% 78%

Senior Officers 13% 14% 73%

Flag Officers 12% 15% 73%

International Officers 23% 15% 62%

U.S. Officers 9% 13% 78%

TABLE 1

Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as

ballistic and cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.
projection forces, but also expressed great confidence that the United States would

build and field whatever was needed to protect existing forces.

We detected no significant differences in the attitudes of officers from different services

(see table 1). Senior and flag officers were marginally more concerned about the ability of

adversaries to attack large ground formations with ballistic or cruise missiles than junior

officers. More significant was the difference between the attitudes of U.S. and international officers. While only 9 percent of American officers agreed with the statement, 23

percent of all international officers we surveyed agreed. It thus appears that America’s

friends and allies see U.S. forces as more vulnerable than do our own officers.

Statement 22b: Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.

RMA advocates have argued that aircraft carriers will be increasingly vulnerable to attack by ballistic and cruise missiles. Andrew Krepinevich, for example, has argued that

future adversaries will have an increasing capability to attack U.S. carrier battle groups.94

In one much-publicized war game conducted by the Department of Defense, for example, Chinese forces equipped with long-range cruise missiles and satellite reconnaissance

and surveillance reportedly inflicted heavy damage on U.S. carrier battle groups.95

The response to this statement was also somewhat surprising. Nearly three out of four

officers (73 percent) disagreed with the statement that future adversaries would be able

to attack carrier battle groups with such weapons as ballistic and cruise missiles (see

figure 2). The mean response was 2.83. Significantly, the statement posed the problem

in terms of a group of ships and not specifically an aircraft carrier. Moreover, it did not

64 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

337

135

272

73

25

503

549

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 2

Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as

ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.
use the terms “sink,” “destroy,” or “damage,” but only the term attack—which could

also be construed to include unsuccessful attacks. Half of the respondents tended toward uncertainty on this issue (50 percent), but only 12 percent of the officers expressed any agreement with this statement, and less than 2 percent strongly agreed.

Navy officers were marginally more concerned about the threat posed by ballistic and

cruise missiles to carrier battle groups than officers of other services (see table 2). Senior and flag officers were slightly more worried than junior officers. Nevertheless, the

consensus among officers of all services and ranks was that carrier battle groups would

continue to be invulnerable from these types of weapons. As with the previous statement, international officers were considerably more concerned about the threat to U.S.

carrier battle groups than were their American counterparts. While only 11 percent of

American officers agreed with the statement that future adversaries would be able to

attack carrier battle groups with ballistic and cruise missiles, 34 percent of international officers agreed.

Interestingly, the same question was posed to the service focus groups with a very different response. More than 86 percent of those officers (38 of 44) agreed with the statement and only three officers (all Navy officers) disagreed. However, most of the focus

group participants tended to take the term attack at face value and were very skeptical of

a future adversary’s ability to find and sink, or even seriously damage, an aircraft carrier.

The reason for such high confidence in the security of carrier battle groups among the

broad officer population can only be speculated upon. The focus group participants

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 65

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 12% 15% 73%

Army 9% 14% 77%

Marine Corps 9% 18% 73%

Navy 16% 14% 70%

Air Force 13% 15% 72%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

11% 15% 74%

Senior Officers 16% 15% 69%

Flag Officers 12% 19% 69%

International Officers 34% 13% 53%

U.S. Officers 11% 15% 74%

TABLE 2

Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as

ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.
indicated a general lack of understanding of the current and future threats, but generally felt that the inherent mobility of the carrier would continue to offer it a high level

of security from being targeted and attacked. The focus groups also expressed tremendous confidence that the technological superiority of the United States would provide

whatever defenses are necessary to protect critical military assets. Responses from the

focus group members indicate that the “aircraft carrier” has achieved tremendous status as an icon of U.S. military power worldwide that the United States must, and will,

preserve and protect.

Statement 22c: Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as

ports, airfields, and logistical sites.

Recent years have also seen increasing concern over the threat ballistic and cruise missiles pose to the infrastructure that the United States requires to project power.

96 As former Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogelman put it, “Saturation ballistic

missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, airfields, storage facilities, and staging areas

could make it extremely costly to project U.S. forces into a disputed theater, much less

carry out operations to defeat a well-armed aggressor. Simply the threat of such enemy

missile attacks might deter the U.S. and coalition partners from responding to aggression in the first place.”

97

The Rumsfeld report specifically singled out ports and airfields necessary for U.S.

power projection as being at risk to foreign missile attack, yet nearly 8 out of 10 officers

(79 percent) surveyed disagreed with this statement (see figure 3). Indeed, more

66 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

436

114

233

46 13

565

487

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 3

Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as

ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports,

airfields, and logistical sites.
officers felt strongly about the security of fixed facilities (53 percent responding in

blocks 1 and 2) than about the security of carrier battle groups (44 percent responding

in the same blocks)—despite the fact that focus group participants attributed the security of a carrier battle group largely to its mobility. The mean response was 2.59.

One major reason for the disparity is likely the use of the term destroy rather than attack. Focus group participants expressed almost universal skepticism that a port or airfield could be destroyed in the sense that such a facility could be “put out of existence”

or rendered “totally unusable.” However, participants commonly said that they tended

to interpret the term destroy to simply mean “deny use” for a significant period of time.

Whether the broader survey participants had the same interpretation is unknown.

Again, the responses of the focus group participants were almost the opposite to those of

the survey, with 36 of 44 officers (nearly 82 percent) agreeing with the statement, and

only 6 of 44 (under 14 percent) in disagreement. However, the consensus view of the focus group respondents was that the United States would assuredly field adequate defenses

to ensure that U.S. forces would not be denied the use of critical bases overseas.

We found no significant differences in response among officers of different services

(see table 3). Senior and flag officers were slightly more concerned about the threat

than were junior officers. More interesting was the disproportionately positive response

of foreign officers to this statement. While only 8 percent of American officers agreed

with the statement, 29 percent of international officers agreed. At face value, this

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 67

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 9% 12% 79%

Army 8% 13% 79%

Marine Corps 8% 12% 80%

Navy 7% 13% 80%

Air Force 8% 13% 79%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

8% 13% 79%

Senior Officers 12% 13% 75%

Flag Officers 10% 17% 73%

International Officers 29% 8% 63%

U.S. Officers 8% 13% 79%

TABLE 3

Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as

ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports,

airfields, and logistical sites.
reflects a belief among America’s friends and allies that U.S. forward bases are at risk of

being destroyed or being put out of service by ballistic and cruise missiles. The potential

operational and strategic implications of this disparity of opinions between U.S. and foreign officers with respect to U.S. force vulnerability are worthy of deeper exploration.

Relative importance attributed to six future challenges by service

We asked respondents to provide a relative ranking of the importance of six different

challenges. These were presented as a series of pairs, with the respondents asked to

identify which of the two challenges is more important.

Several general insights can be drawn from the overall rankings (see table 4). The first

is that virtually all officers see the emergence of a “peer competitor” as the least important future challenge. This is likely due to a perceived low probability of a military

challenge of comparable power to the U.S. arising in the foreseeable future.

The second insight is that officers seemed to equate lesser importance to those missions that they had been doing or preparing for in the 1990s—perhaps because of a

greater confidence in their understanding of these challenges and their ability to deal

with them. The missions ranking higher in importance are probably ones that most of

the officers in the survey had not yet had to confront in their operational assignments:

information warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. Officers may thus be

concerned that the consequences of failure in these so-called “asymmetric” missions

may be quite severe, and yet they are not able to adequately gauge the likely effectiveness of their forces to deal with them.

Finally, the relative rankings seem to correlate with the degree of individual control

that an officer might feel that he has over his “enemy” in each of these missions. Other

research strongly indicates that individuals tend to perceive an increasing level of personal risk with a sense of decreasing personal control over future events. The fact that

traditional military tools are often seen to be ill-suited to the demands of terrorism,

WMD, and information warfare might make these appear to be exceptionally risky, and

therefore exceptionally challenging and important operations.

68 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

PEER

COMPETITOR

HUMANITARIAN

OPERATIONS

MAJOR

THEATER WAR

INFORMATION

WARFARE WMD* TERRORISM

Army 0 0.443 0.523 0.761 0.724 1.05

Marine

Corps

0 0.321 0.582 0.713 0.825 1.168

Navy 0 0.656 0.701 0.862 0.788 1.277

Air Force 0 0.686 0.761 1.102 1.094 1.349

TABLE 4

Relative importance attributed to six future challenges by service.

*Weapons of Mass Destruction
Summary

The survey results suggest that, at least in the area of potential threats posed by ballistic

and cruise missiles, the vast majority of officers see no imperative for major changes to

the operational concepts and principal platforms currently used to project U.S. power

abroad. They would seem to have a very high level of confidence in the technological

prowess of the United States to provide “full-dimensional protection” to our critical

warfighting capabilities. This corroborates the confidence most officers expressed in

the United States’ ability to project its information networks against hostile attack, as

shown in chapter 5.

By contrast, the survey indicated that international military officers have much less

confidence that force defenses will be adequate, and tend to believe that major U.S.

ground formations, groups of ships, and fixed infrastructure will be at increasing risk

of attack, and perhaps destruction, by missile attack.

Finally, officers tend to attribute much higher importance to the so-called “asymmetric” challenges by a potential enemy—terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and information warfare—than to the more traditional challenges of high intensity combat

and humanitarian operations. This may reflect a great deal of uncertainty with respect

to the consequences of asymmetric warfare and the ability of our military to deal with

these missions.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 69

Character and Depth of Change Required

Most analysts of the emerging Revolution in Military Affairs believe that major

changes in operational concepts and organizations will be required to achieve the full

benefits of this technology-driven revolution. We presented the respondents with

twelve statements intended to assess their views with respect to the character and depth

of change that might occur within the U.S. military over the coming decades.

Scholars argue that a revolution in military affairs is composed of four basic elements:

the emergence of new technologies, the incorporation of those technologies in new

military systems, operational innovations that fully exploit those systems, and finally,

organizational adaptation to a new character of warfare. Andrew Krepinevich is among

those who have called for “radical” changes in both military doctrine and organization

if the RMA is to be realized.98 Eliot Cohen has suggested that “today’s military organizations—divisions, fleets, and air wings—could disappear or give way to successors that

would look very different.”

99 He has gone on to predict that “if the forces themselves

CHAPTER EIGHT

14. The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete effectively

with future adversaries.

15. The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead to a radical change

in military technology, doctrine, and organization.

12. It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.

13. The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.

25c. Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service roles and missions.

25d. The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space operations.

25e. The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information

operations.

25a. My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches to warfare.

25b. My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare.

25g. My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.

25h. Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare.

25f. The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010—dominant

maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—

by 2010.
change, so too would the people, as new career possibilities, educational requirements,

and promotional paths became essential.”

100 Among other developments, he suggested the

possible emergence of “new elites” such as “information warriors,” and a breakdown in

traditional service distinctions. Joint Vision 2010 prescribed no specific changes, but did

state that “new operational procedures and organizations” would be required for implementing the basic concepts of the Vision.

101 It went on to suggest that more agile organizations and processes might be called for, including “increased organizational flexibility

and further reductions in supervision and centralized direction.”

102

Statement 14: The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to

compete effectively with future adversaries.

The responses to this statement resulted in a bimodal distribution, with the largest

number in agreement (47 percent), but with a nearly as large percentage in disagreement (41 percent). A critical unknown is the respondents’ interpretation of the term

“radical.” Lack of definition of this point may have been a major factor in nearly

two-thirds of the respondents (64 percent) leaning toward uncertainty (the second

largest response in this category throughout the survey). The mean response of 4.14

further illustrates this uncertainty. By contrast, focus group participants leaned much

more strongly toward the positive categories (71 percent) than the unsure categories

(44 percent)—with only 29 percent in disagreement.

An important aspect of this statement is that it does not portray radical change as an

opportunity for the United States to increase its relative dominance, but rather as a

72 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

62

512

219

258

126

237

481

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 1

The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete

effectively with future adversaries.
necessity for the U.S. military to simply remain competitive with future adversaries.

The implication is that if the U.S. military does not change radically, it will cease to be

competitive in the future. It is significant that more than half of the officers (59 percent) either agreed with this conclusion or were uncertain. Less than half of the officers

surveyed believed that the U.S. military could remain competitive without radical

change, and only one in five (20 percent) believed strongly that radical change was not

required. This would appear to contradict earlier responses indicating that officers

were not concerned with the ability of adversaries to deny the United States the use of

information networks or interfere with U.S. power projection capabilities.

We noted significant differences in attitude among officers of the various services (see

table 1). Marine Corps officers believed most strongly that the U.S. armed forces must

radically change to remain competitive; Navy officers saw the least need to change.

There were no significant differences in the attitudes of officers of different ranks.

Statement 15: The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead

to a radical change in military technology, doctrine, and organization.

Nearly half of the officers surveyed (48 percent) believed that the U.S. armed forces

were currently undergoing “radical” change—nearly the same number as those who

believed that radical change was required. Only a third of the officers (33 percent) disagreed with this statement. The highest percentage of respondents (71 percent) leaned

toward uncertainty on this issue—the highest response in this category throughout the

entire survey. The mean response of 4.21 obviously suggests that most officers are very

unsure about this issue.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 73

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 47% 12% 41%

Army 48% 13% 39%

Marine Corps 56% 6% 38%

Navy 41% 9% 50%

Air Force 43% 13% 44%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

46% 13% 41%

Senior Officers 48% 11% 41%

Flag Officers 45% 16% 39%

TABLE 1

The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete

effectively with future adversaries.
A comparison of the responses to statements 14 and 15 suggests that a large number of

the respondents believed that unnecessary radical change may be underway. More importantly, nearly half of the officers surveyed (48 percent) believed that what the services were doing, or were planning to do, in mid-2000 could be characterized as a

“radical” departure from the systems, operational concepts, and organizations that

were dominant in the decade of the 1990s. This suggests something of a “dialogue of

the deaf ” between advocates of truly radical change—that is a major departure from

existing systems, concepts, and organizations—and the large percentage of officers

74 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

52

577

354

255

73

164

418

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 2

The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead to a radical

change in military technology, doctrine, and organization.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 48% 19% 33%

Army 52% 20% 28%

Marine Corps 46% 15% 39%

Navy 36% 22% 42%

Air Force 44% 15% 41%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

50% 19% 31%

Senior Officers 41% 20% 39%

Flag Officers 37% 30% 33%

TABLE 2

The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead to a radical

change in military technology, doctrine, and organization.
(two-thirds of those surveyed) who believed that radical change either was, or might

be, ongoing. This helps explain the reported friction between Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld and other civilian leaders of the Defense Department, on the one hand, and

military leaders, on the other, regarding the Bush administration’s plans to transform

the U.S. armed forces.

103

Army officers expressed the greatest confidence that the U.S. armed forces were embarked upon a path that will lead to radical change (see table 2). Navy officers were

least convinced. There was also a correlation between an officer’s rank and his view of

whether the U.S. armed forces are currently in the midst of radical change: the higher

an officer’s rank, the less confident and more uncertain he tended to be.

Among focus group participants, Army officers were most strongly in agreement with

this statement, Navy officers fell squarely in the mid-range, and Air Force and Marine

Corps officers were predominantly in disagreement. The Army officers tended to believe that “radical” change could be accomplished with current dominant ground

systems (such as the M-1 Abrams MBT)—or with new types of manned, armored vehicles (such as the Future Combat System). Marine Corps officers tended to believe

that “radical” change implied a much higher degree of jointness than had yet been

achieved, or was likely. Air Force officers tended to equate “radical” change to developments that substituted technology for human functions (such as “100 percent

man-out-of-the-loop”). Most saw such developments as inevitable, but characterized the current pace as slow evolution (one termed it “glacial”) rather than rapid

revolution. Navy officers were decidedly ambivalent on this issue, with some seeing

ongoing plans for major crew reductions on surface ships as “radical,” while others

deeming as radical only some future, widespread substitution of unmanned for

manned systems.

Statement 12: It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.

“Jointness” has been a major theme of U.S. military doctrine for nearly two decades,

and was enshrined in law by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Joint Vision 2010 refers

to the “Imperative of Jointness,” driven primarily by “flat budgets” that will require us

to “wring every ounce of capability from every available source.”

104 It goes on to conclude that this outcome

can only be accomplished through a more seamless integration of service capabilities.

To achieve this integration while conducting military operations, we must be fully

joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.105

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 75
Other analysts of the RMA predict that emerging technological capabilities will serve to

break down the distinction between the different regimes of warfare—sea, air, and

land—and thus the traditional differentiation between the services.106

This statement elicited an overwhelmingly positive response from the survey participants, with 85 percent of the officers in agreement with the statement, and nearly seven

in ten (69 percent) leaning toward strong agreement. The mean response of 5.73 reflects this. This of course begs the question of what these officers construed “truly

joint” to mean—and how that might differ from the current organizational relationships. The responses to subsequent statements provide some indication that most officers do not foresee what might be termed “radical” change to the status quo. It is also

76 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 85% 3% 12%

Army 85% 3% 12%

Marine Corps 71% 2% 27%

Navy 80% 4% 16%

Air Force 88% 4% 8%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

84% 4% 12%

Senior Officers 84% 5% 11%

Flag Officers 86% 4% 10%

TABLE 3

It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.

50

310

61

547

755

71 100

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 3

It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.
unknown what the respondents considered to be the “imperative” for jointness (e.g.

budget constraints or military effectiveness), and whether they believed the U.S. military was moving toward or away from a more joint force.

A substantial majority of officers of all services believed that it is imperative that the

U.S. armed forces become truly joint (see table 3). Still, there were noticeable differences: while 71 percent of Marine Corps officers agreed with the statement, 88 percent

of Air Force officers agreed. We detected no meaningful differences in responses by officers of different ranks.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 77

295 315

203 214

178

355 336

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 4

The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 37% 11% 52%

Army 42% 13% 45%

Marine Corps 18% 2% 80%

Navy 29% 6% 65%

Air Force 33% 9% 58%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

37% 13% 50%

Senior Officers 38% 8% 54%

Flag Officers 24% 17% 59%

TABLE 4

The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.
Statement 13: The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.

More than half of the respondents (52 percent) disagreed with the notion that there

will be a diminished need to maintain separate services. Nevertheless more than one in

three officers (37 percent) agreed with the statement, and nearly half (45 percent)

leaned toward uncertainty. The mean response was 3.68. It is interesting to compare

these responses with those to Statement 12. Although an overwhelming majority believed that true jointness was an imperative, only a third of the officers responding

equated this to a diminished need for separate services.

Army officers believed most strongly that the need to maintain separate services will

diminish over time, with 42 percent agreeing with the statement (see table 4). By contrast, only 18 percent of Marine Corps officers agreed. Junior and senior officers—who

have spent most if not all of their careers under the system put in place by the 1986

Goldwater-Nichols Act—felt much more strongly than flag officers that the need for

separate services would diminish.

Statement 25c: Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service

roles and missions.

More than half of the survey respondents (59 percent) agreed that significant changes

were required to traditional service roles and missions. However, only slightly more

than one in four officers (28 percent) tended to strongly agree with this statement, and

nearly as many officers (58 percent) leaned toward uncertainty as agreed with the statement. The mean response was 4.47. Nevertheless, less than one in three officers (32

percent) responded that significant change was not required. It is not known how the

78 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

105

594

161

324

205

162

333

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 5

Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service roles and missions.
officers interpreted the term “significant,” nor what specifically they might have characterized as significant changes to existing service roles and missions.

Sixty percent of Army officers and 57 percent of Air Force officers agreed with the

proposition that modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service

roles and missions (see table 5). By contrast, only 37 percent of Marine Corps officers

agreed with the statement. The percentage of officers that believed that significant

changes to traditional service roles and missions were warranted increased with the respondent’s rank. Whereas 57 percent of junior and field grade officers felt that a change

in service roles and missions was needed, 62 percent of senior officers and 73 percent

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 79

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 59% 9% 32%

Army 60% 11% 29%

Marine Corps 37% 6% 57%

Navy 51% 7% 42%

Air Force 57% 8% 33%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

57% 11% 32%

Senior Officers 62% 7% 31%

Flag Officers 73% 8% 19%

TABLE 5

Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service roles and missions.

539

208

347

138 113

282 261

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 6

The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space operations.
of flag officers agreed. When combined with responses to the previous question, it appears that flag officers think that while the roles and missions of individual services

should change, there is still a strong need to maintain separate services.

Statement 25d: The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for

space operations.

More than half (57 percent) of the officers surveyed disagreed with the notion of creating

a new service responsible for space operations. Only one in four (25 percent) expressed

support for the concept. However, just about the same number of respondents (43 percent) leaned toward uncertainty as did those who tended toward strong disagreement

(blocks 1 and 2). The mean response was 3.14. Overall though, the responses tend to

track with those to Question 12, which showed very strong support for increased

“jointness” and, by implication, a reduction in service or functional specialization.

Army officers were most supportive of the proposition that the Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space; Marine Corps officers were

least supportive (see table 6). These responses track closely with attitudes toward

changing service roles and missions. In contrast with responses to that statement,

however, here we detected no significant difference in the attitudes of officers of

different ranks.

Statement 25e: The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information operations.

Some RMA advocates have argued that information is so central to military operations

and so highly specialized as a discipline that the Defense Department should consider

forming an “information corps”—a new armed service that would be responsible for

80 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 25% 18% 57%

Army 25% 25% 50%

Marine Corps 19% 11% 70%

Navy 20% 11% 69%

Air Force 21% 13% 66%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

24% 22% 54%

Senior Officers 23% 14% 63%

Flag Officers 22% 9% 69%

TABLE 6

The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space operations.
managing and coordinating all defense information needs.

107 Others counter that information is so integral to all military functions that all military personnel should be “information warriors.”

108 Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62 percent) expressed

disagreement with the idea of creating a new service for information operations. The

number in favor of such a new service (25 percent) was about the same as those who

expressed agreement with the idea of a new service for space (Statement 25d.), but

more of those who were unsure about a space service expressed opposition to an information service. The mean response was 3.06. The overall reason for the strong level of

opposition to a new service focused on information is not known. One can only

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 81

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 25% 13% 62%

Army 27% 18% 55%

Marine Corps 14% 11% 75%

Navy 19% 10% 71%

Air Force 16% 12% 72%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

25% 17% 58%

Senior Officers 19% 11% 70%

Flag Officers 18% 13% 69%

TABLE 7

The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information

operations.

558

204

273

137 113

308 302

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 7

The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information

operations.
speculate that officers either felt that information is so integral to all aspects of military

operations that it would not be prudent to establish a separate organization, or they

were expressing opposition to the idea that their own services might cede important

prerogatives to a new and separate bureaucracy.

As with the previous item, Army officers were most supportive of the creation of a new

service responsible for information operations; Marine Corps officers were least supportive (see table 7). The percentage of officers that advocated the formation of an information service decreased with the respondent’s rank. Whereas 25 percent of junior

and field grade officers supported such a move, only 19 percent of senior officers and

18 percent flag officers agreed.

Statement 25a: My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches

to warfare.

Joint Vision 2010 reflected the predominant climate of the post–Cold War era in predicting that the military budget would remain “flat,” while readiness and modernization would be “increasingly more costly.”

109 The implication was that investments in

new approaches to warfare could be achieved only by reducing force structure or current

readiness. James Blaker, for his part, has argued that transforming the U.S. armed forces

would allow the U.S. government to reduce the defense budget by $40 billion per year.

110

As responses to this statement demonstrated, more than three out of four officers (77

percent) opposed reductions in the force structure of their own service to invest in future capabilities. More than half of the officers (57 percent) leaned toward strong disagreement, while only about a third (35 percent) tended toward uncertainty on the

82 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

703

164

127

82 58

373 373

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 8

My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches to warfare.
issue. The mean response was 2.55. The statement did not provide for any reduction in

missions or current commitments, and so a reduction in force structure might have

been interpreted as simply infeasible. Nevertheless, these responses track with those to

Statement 15, which indicates that nearly half of the officers believed that radical change

was already ongoing—without any reduction, or need for reduction, in force structure.

Marine Corps officers were most adamantly opposed to reducing force structure to invest in new ways of war: only 6 percent favored the proposition and 94 percent opposed it; none was unsure (see table 8). This is understandable, given that the Marine

Corps’ force structure of three active and one reserve division is enshrined in law.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 83

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 16% 7% 77%

Army 15% 7% 78%

Marine Corps 6% 0% 94%

Navy 16% 4% 80%

Air Force 16% 9% 75%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

12% 2% 79%

Senior Officers 26% 6% 68%

Flag Officers 24% 9% 67%

TABLE 8

My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches to warfare.

978

80 86

32 45

404

253

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 9

My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare.
Junior and field grade officers were more strongly opposed to reductions in force structure than senior and flag officers. They may equate cuts in force structure with reduced

opportunities for promotion and command; post-command senior and flag officers are

presumably less motivated by such concerns.

Statement 25b: My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to

warfare.

Respondents were even more adamant in their rejection of reducing current readiness

to invest in new approaches to warfare, with almost nine out of ten (87 percent) in disagreement. In fact, this statement elicited the strongest negative response of any in the

survey, with more than half of the officers (52 percent) responding in extreme disagreement (block 1). Nearly three quarters of the officers (74 percent) leaned toward strong

disagreement, while less than one in four (22 percent) tended toward uncertainty. The

mean response of 2.02 illustrates the level of disagreement with the statement.

A similar statement was put to the focus group participants, but with the stipulation

that commitments would be reduced commensurate with a reduction in readiness.

111

Focus groups still rejected the proposal overwhelmingly. Respondents indicated that

they tended to equate readiness to basic unit training and equipment availability across

their service—and did not feel that there was any margin for reductions in these areas

regardless of the level of force commitment. Moreover, these responses track with those

to Statement 15 which indicated that nearly half of the officers surveyed believed that

radical change was already ongoing without any need for a reduction in force readiness.

84 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 9% 4% 87%

Army 9% 5% 86%

Marine Corps 5% 1% 94%

Navy 6% 3% 91%

Air Force 9% 4% 87%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

8% 2% 86%

Senior Officers 9% 5% 86%

Flag Officers 11% 11% 78%

TABLE 9

My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare.
Marine Corps and Navy officers were particularly averse to reducing readiness to invest

in new approaches to warfare (see table 9). Flag officers were slightly more willing to

contemplate such trades than junior or senior officers.

Statement 25g: My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.

This statement was intended to determine the level of confidence officers had in their

own services’ efforts to innovate. Nearly three-quarters of the officers (72 percent)

agreed with the statement, suggesting a high level of confidence in their own service.

However, more than half of the officers (52 percent) leaned toward uncertainty, with a

mean response of 4.97. The implication is that most officers were confident that their

own service was serious about innovation, but there was a relatively high level of uncertainty as to what would be required for a “new approach” to warfare, what their own

service was doing in this area, and how serious it really was about change.

At least two-thirds of the officers of each service believed that their service was serious

about exploring new approaches to warfare (see table 10). Marine Corps officers were

convinced that their service was committed to exploring new ways of war: 95 percent

agreed with the statement, and 5 percent disagreed; none were unsure. By contrast, 67

percent of Navy officers believed their service was serious about examining new approaches to combat.

In general, these results confirm those of the Military Climate-Culture Survey conducted

by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The latter survey, which consisted

of Army staff officers and the broader Army population, included two related statements:

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 85

39

597

182

488

265

111

201

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 10

My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.
• “Our organization can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.

• Our leaders consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment

and procedures.”

112

Respondents reacted quite positively to the first statement, as they did to the similar

statement contained in our survey. Indeed, their response ranked in the top twenty

most favorable responses in the survey. However, the CSIS survey revealed a significant

split between Army leaders and the broader Army population regarding the willingness

of Army leaders to adapt to such changes. Specifically, the survey’s results showed that

while Army leaders believe they are adapting to the RMA, soldiers do not feel that their

86 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

182

237

647

112

57

240

409

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 11

Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare.

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 72% 9% 19%

Army 73% 8% 19%

Marine Corps 95% 0% 5%

Navy 67% 11% 22%

Air Force 71% 9% 20%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

71% 10% 19%

Senior Officers 71% 11% 18%

Flag Officers 72% 15% 13%

TABLE 10

My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.
leaders are changing fast enough.113 Our survey, by contrast, did not yield a sharp difference in attitudes between senior and junior officers.

Statement 25h: Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare.

This statement was intended to determine how officers felt about their own service’s efforts at innovation relative to those of the other services. More than four in ten officers

(44 percent) expressed confidence that their own service was no less serious about innovation than any of the others. However more than one-third of the officers (34

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 87

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 22% 34% 44%

Army 25% 40% 35%

Marine Corps 5% 14% 81%

Navy 25% 32% 43%

Air Force 14% 26% 60%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

22% 37% 41%

Senior Officers 21% 28% 51%

Flag Officers 11% 37% 52%

TABLE 11

Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare.

197

339

402

146

50

286

475

Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0

250

500

750

1000

FIGURE 12

The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010—dominant

maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—

by 2010.
percent) expressed complete uncertainty (block 4), and nearly seven in ten leaned toward that category, with a mean response of 3.57. The implication is that there was a

great deal of uncertainty as to what other services are doing with respect to innovation,

but also a good deal of confidence among officers that their own service could not be

less innovative than any of the others.

A large majority of Marine Corps officers were convinced that no service was more serious about exploring new ways of warfare than theirs (see table 11). Only 5 percent

agreed that other services were more committed than the Marine Corps, while 81 percent disagreed. Army officers were the most uncertain about the commitment of other

services. Also of note is the fact that flag officers—who presumably know the most

about other services—had more confidence that their service was most serious about

exploring new ways of war than did junior or senior officers.

Statement 25f: The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision

2010—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and fulldimensional protection—by 2010.

Published in 1996, Joint Vision 2010 was presented as the “conceptual template” for

achieving “full spectrum dominance” by the end of the first decade of the 21st

century. It stated that, by 2010, the U.S. military should be able to exploit advanced technologies to transform the traditional functions of maneuver, strike, protection, and

logistics into the four new operational concepts, or “pillars,” of dominant maneuver,

precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. By contrast,

others argue that Joint Vision 2010’s dependence upon information superiority makes

it unrealistic.114

88 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE

Overall 28% 21% 51%

Army 26% 25% 49%

Marine Corps 24% 11% 65%

Navy 22% 20% 58%

Air Force 29% 16% 55%

Junior/Field Grade

Officers

28% 23% 49%

Senior Officers 27% 18% 55%

Flag Officers 43% 20% 37%

TABLE 12

The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010—dominant

maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—

by 2010.
Of the officers surveyed, only 28 percent agreed with this statement—and only 10 percent leaned toward strong agreement (blocks 6 and 7). By contrast, more than half of

the officers (51 percent) disagreed. The mean response was 3.54. The reason for such a

high level of skepticism is not known. The focus group participants indicated that organizational change (rather than technology) would likely be the biggest impediment

to this type of force “transformation,” and seriously questioned the “political will” of

both the military and Congress to actively support the changes that would be required.

Nearly two-thirds of the officers (64 percent) in the broad survey leaned toward unsure

categories (blocks 3, 4, and 5), suggesting a good deal of uncertainty about the specifics

of Joint Vision 2010, the prospects of achieving its goals, or both.

Air Force officers believed most strongly that the U.S. armed forces would achieve fully

the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010 by 2010; Marine Corps officers were most skeptical

(see table 12). Flag officers believed more strongly than did junior or senior officers.

Summary

The survey results indicate that nearly half of the officers believed that “radical” change

is required if the U.S. is to compete effectively with future adversaries. Perhaps more

significantly, two-thirds of the officers believed that “radical” change in military technology, doctrine, and organization was, or might have been, underway (they either

agreed with the statement or were unsure). These findings support the contention that

there was something of a “dialogue of the deaf ” between advocates of truly radical

change—that is a major departure from existing systems, concepts, and organizations—and the large percentage of officers who believed that radical change either already was, or might have been, ongoing.

Strong support was expressed for the achievement of “true” jointness among the services

and significant changes to traditional service roles and missions. However, most officers

did not believe that the need for separate services would diminish, nor did they support

creation of new military services responsible for space or information operations.

Officers expressed a very strong opposition to reducing the force structure or readiness

of their own service to invest in new approaches to warfare, but most believed that

their own service was nevertheless serious about innovation.

Finally, there was widespread skepticism that the goals of Joint Vision 2010—the “conceptual template” for future joint warfighting—would actually be achieved by the end

of this decade.

A significant insight from this section of the survey was the high level of uncertainty

among most officers regarding the character and depth of change that is required for

the U.S. military to compete effectively with future adversaries. This uncertainty is

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 89
especially strong over the issue of whether “radical” change is required, and whether

such change is currently underway. This suggests that a very large percentage of the officer corps is not confident about its understanding of how technology might change

the conduct of warfare—and what changes to systems, concepts, and organizations

might be desirable or necessary.

90 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
Trends in Officer Attitudes

While the survey provided insight into officer attitudes at a point in time, we used an

analysis of articles on innovation, transformation, revolution in warfare, and the military exploitation of new technologies appearing in the primary U.S. military professional journals between 1990 and 2000 to assess trends in attitudes over time.

Findings

Authors. Figures 1 and 2 depict the affiliations of the authors by grade and service. Because some authors wrote multiple articles, there were 257 different principal authors

of the 345 articles. Authors were primarily field grade or senior officers (i.e. O-4, O-5,

and O-6). Of note, there was only one relevant article authored by an enlisted person.

Five of the 257 authors were females—two civilians and three military officers. The female authors were all senior Air Force officers.

CHAPTER NINE

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

O10 O9 O8 O7 O6 O5 O4 O3 O2 O1 ENL

0

FIGURE 1

Authors by grade.
The vast majority of authors were officers from the four active services and civilians.

Some of the civilians were known to be military retirees, although we could not accurately determine the exact numbers from the biographical information provided in the

journals. Likewise, some authors who were civilians might also have had an unrevealed

affiliation with the military Reserves. Three of the articles were written by international

officers from India, Brazil, and the United Kingdom.

Attitude. Figure 3 depicts the attitudes of the authors toward the revolution in military affairs (RMA) for each year of the survey. Figure 4 shows the same data presented

92 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

ARNG

USAFR

ANG

F

USMCR

OREIGN

USN

USAF

USMC

USNR

USAR

USA

CIV

0

FIGURE 2

Authors by service.

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0

Positive Ambivalent Skeptical Total

19901991199219931994199519961997

19981999

2000

FIGURE 3

Attitude by year.
as a percentage of the total articles. After 1990, articles expressing a positive attitude toward the RMA consistently outnumbered those that were either ambivalent or skeptical.

Moreover, those with a positive tone outnumbered both skeptical and ambivalent articles in all years except 1990 and 1998.

Figure 5 shows the attitudes of the authors by service affiliation. Figure 6 depicts the

same data as a percentage of authors by service. As can be seen, more than two-thirds

of the authors from the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps characterized the RMA as

attainable and favoring the United States. Army authors were less enthusiastic, but

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 93

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Skeptical Ambivalent Positive

19901991199219931994199519961997199819992000

0%

FIGURE 4

Attitude by year as a percentage of articles.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

USN MARINE USAF ARMY CIV

0

Positive Ambivalent Skeptical

FIGURE 5

Attitude by service.
more than half were nonetheless positive about the RMA’s impact. Only civilian authors

demonstrated a preponderance of skepticism or ambivalence.

These results are somewhat at variance with the results of the 2000 survey. The latter

indicated that Army and Marine Corps officers were consistently more skeptical of the

RMA than were Navy and particularly Air Force officers. Of course, the survey involved

the full range of officers attending professional military education (PME) courses, while

the literature analysis involved only those officers and civilians who felt passionately

enough about the subject to write about it.

94 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

USN MARINE USAF ARMY CIV

Positive Ambivalent Skeptical

0%

FIGURE 6

Attitude by service as a percentage of articles.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

FLAG O6 O5 O4 JO CIV 0

Positive Ambivalent Skeptical

FIGURE 7

Attitude by grade.
Figure 7 depicts the attitudes of the authors by grade. Figure 8 shows the same data as a

percentage of authors by grade. Of note, there was an inverse relationship among the

non-flag officers between positive attitude and rank—with positive attitude declining

steadily from the most junior officers through O-6. However, the highest positive response, nearly 80 percent, was in the flag ranks. Although we did not specifically analyze the content of flag-authored articles to determine a possible reason for the positive

tone, many tended to promote specific current military systems or programs that the

author sought to associate with the positive attributes of “revolutionary” change.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 95

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

FLAG O6 O5 O4 JO CIV

Skeptical Ambivalent Positive

0%

FIGURE 8

Attitude by grade as a percentage of articles.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

NWC REVIEW

JFQ

PARAMETERS

STRAT REVIEW

MIL REVIEW

MC GAZETTE

PROCEEDINGS

0

Positive Ambivalent Skeptical

AEROSPACE

FIGURE 9

Attitude by journal.
Nevertheless, at least 50 percent of all officer grades exhibited a decidedly positive attitude toward the RMA. The lowest positive response among major groupings of authors,

and the only one to fall below 50 percent, came from civilians.

Here too, the results of the literature analysis differ from those of the 2000 survey. The

latter found a less pronounced relationship between rank and attitude. To the extent

that one did exist, it was senior rather than junior officers who tended to be most enthusiastic about the RMA. The fact that authors are self-selecting would appear to account for this discrepancy. In other words, while the vast majority of field-grade

96 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

5

10

15

20

25

0

Opportunity Threat Both

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

FIGURE 10

Imperative by year.

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Opportunity Threat Both

19901991

1992

19931994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

0%

FIGURE 11

Imperative by year as percentage of articles.
officers may be more skeptical about the RMA than their seniors, those field-grade officers who feel passionately about the subject are more positive than seniors who feel the

same way.

Figure 9 depicts the attitude of the articles broken out by journal. Of interest is the

high level of uncertainty that characterized the articles in the Joint Force Quarterly

(published by the National Defense University for the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the

nearly even breakdown of attitudes appearing in the pages of the Army War College’s

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 97

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

CIV USA USAF USMC USN 0

Opportunity Threat Both

FIGURE 12

Imperative by service.

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

CIV USA USAF USMC USN

Opportunity Threat Both

0%

FIGURE 13

Imperative by service as a percentage of articles.
journal, Parameters. We could not determine whether these outcomes were random or

were the result of the journals’ editorial policy.

Imperative. Figure 10 depicts the primary catalyst for change reflected in each of the

articles over the period of the survey. Figure 11 shows the catalyst as a percentage of articles for a given year. Only in 1990 (the year with the fewest articles on this subject)

was threat alone portrayed as the predominant reason for pursuit of the RMA. However,

opportunity alone was at or above 50 percent in only three years of the survey (1992,

98 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

5

10

15

20

25

30

CIV FLAG O6 O5 O4 JO

0

Opportunity Threat Both

FIGURE 14

Imperative by grade.

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

CIV FLAG O6 O5 O4 JO

Opportunity Threat Both

0%

FIGURE 15

Imperative by grade as percentage of articles.
1993, and 2000), indicating that most authors in most years felt that the United States is

compelled to take action to avoid some risk or penalty posed by the changing character

of warfare.

The results of the literature analysis provide an interesting contrast with those of the survey. As noted in chapter 8, more than half of the officers that we surveyed felt that the

U.S. armed forces needed to change radically to compete with future adversaries or were

uncertain. On the other hand, large majorities of officers were unconvinced that future

foes would be able to hold at risk major elements of our national power projection

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 99

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

19901991

199219931994199519961997

19981999

2000

0

Action Required Inevitable

FIGURE 16

Call to action by year.

10

20

30

40

50

60

CIV USA USAF USN USMC

Action Required Inevitable

0

FIGURE 17

Call to action by service.
capability or information infrastructure. In other words, it appears that authors are more

concerned about the penalty for not transforming than are the overall officer population.

Figure 12 shows the imperative by service, and figure 13 the same data presented as a

percentage of authors in each service. As can be seen, authors in the Navy were most

prone to see opportunity alone as the primary reason for change—and this was the

only group of authors in which opportunity was seen as the predominant catalyst in

more than 50 percent of the articles. Opportunity as the primary imperative drops

steadily in articles by the Marines, Air Force officers, Army officers, and finally

100 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

USMC

USN

USAF

CIV

USA

Action Required Inevitable

0%

FIGURE 18

Call to action by service as percentage of articles.

10

20

30

40

50

60

Action Required Inevitable

CIV FLAG O6 O5 O4 JO

0

FIGURE 19

Call to action by grade.
civilians. However, only among the civilian authors did threat exceed opportunity, and

in none of these groups was threat alone seen as the predominant catalyst for change.

Figures 14 and 15 depict the imperative for change by grade of author. For all groups,

threat alone was seen as a minor catalyst—not rising above one in three. In contrast to

the officer attitude survey, the flag-grade authors showed the least concern for the

threat aspects of the RMA, with only one in ten seeing threat alone as the primary reason for change. As noted above, this may stem from the fact that many of the flagTHE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 101

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1998

1999

2000

0

Revolution Innovation

1997

Transformation

FIGURE 21

Terminology.

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Action Required Inevitable

CIV FLAG O6 O5 O4 JO

0%

FIGURE 20

Call to action by grade as a percentage of articles.
written articles were seeking to promote specific future capabilities or systems that

were perhaps touted as representative of an RMA as a marketing technique rather than

an objective assessment of the impact of revolutionary change.

Call to Action. Figure 16 depicts the trend by year for those authors who concluded

that action is required to achieve an RMA, and for those who concluded that such an

outcome is inevitable (thus the only challenge being how we are to deal with such

change). Those seeing a need for action consistently outnumbered by more than two to

one those who believed that the U.S. military is inexorably evolving into an RMA capability. Moreover, the call to action has continued to rise as a percentage of all articles

since 1997. Figures 17 and 18 show the call to action broken out by service affiliation.

Figures 19 and 20 depict the call to action by grade. As can be seen, there is no major

variation among the services or grades of the authors.

Use of Terms. Finally, figure 21 shows the number of articles using the terms “revolution,” “innovation,” and “transformation” (with each term counted only once per article). The terms appeared in sequence in the early 1990s, as subsequent articles dealing

with RMA issues began to focus more on the processes required to achieve revolutionary goals. All three terms reached a peak appearance in 1997, with the term “revolution”

dropping off steadily in subsequent years, while “innovation” and “transformation”

continued to hold strong. This may reflect a general perception in the literature that

the term “revolution” had perhaps become so widely employed in the mid-1990s that

it was losing both its impact and a consistent definition—while the need for innovation and transformation were undiminished. Nevertheless, articles using the term

“revolution” continued to outnumber those using either of the other terms through

the year 2000.

Conclusions

One must be careful in attempting to draw definitive conclusions from a literature

analysis such as this. The attitudes of the authors of these professional journal articles

do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the officer corps as a whole. Moreover, this

study covered an eleven-year period when each of the services was transitioning out of

its Cold War force justification and undergoing a dramatic drawdown in personnel.

Thus the articles represent an evolving series of attitudes of a small number of selfselected individuals who were conversant in this subject and felt compelled to put their

ideas in print.

Since many of the authors in the survey published more than one article, an interesting

question is whether a change in attitude could be tracked among those who published

at different promotion levels over a sequence of years. Only 10 of the 257 different

102 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
principal authors in the survey were commissioned officers who published at different

grades. Most of these (a total of six) published at both the O-5 and O-6 level. Only one

officer published at three different grade levels (O-3, O-4, and O-5).

Nevertheless, there are some general insights that might be drawn from the literature

survey:

First, the call for action remained very strong, but threat alone was seen as a minor catalyst for change. Most journal articles portrayed future opportunity as the primary reason that the U.S. military should transform itself.

Second, junior officers and enlisted personnel published the least among all grades on the

subject of technology-driven change, yet these were the individuals who were most likely

to be directly operating those future technologies with potentially revolutionary impact.

Third, the consistent call for action in the military’s primary professional journals over

the past decade was not reflected in the officer attitude survey conducted in 2000. It is

possible that most officers do not find the argument for change compelling. On the

other hand, it would appear that most officers simply do not read their own professional journals. Focus group participants were queried on the extent to which they subscribe to, or read, the eight principal journals. About half stated that they “occasionally”

read articles from at least one of the journals, but less than one in ten Army and Navy

officers, and less than three in ten Air Force officers said that they regularly read most

or all of any one journal. This low level of readership suggests that the military professional journals are a poor venue for the promotion of new ideas within the military

officer corps.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 103

Conclusions and Implications

As we noted at the beginning of this monograph, analysts have characterized the attitudes of the U.S. officer corps toward innovation in various ways. Some have asserted

that the culture of the U.S. armed forces emphasizes technology over other, less tangible, determinants of battlefield success, such as training and leadership.

115 To them, the

U.S. armed forces have embarked upon a quest for the Holy Grail of “dominant battlespace knowledge,” while ignoring the persistence of friction on the modern battlefield.

116

Others have argued, with equal force, that the U.S. military is reluctant to embrace new

ways of war, particularly those that threaten existing weapons, doctrine, and organizations. Rather than adapt to the information age, they see the services as perpetuating

increasingly outmoded approaches to combat.

117

While our study yielded some evidence to support each view, it also revealed how simplistic such characterizations may be. On the one hand, our survey found that the U.S.

armed forces are highly supportive of information-age ways of war, at least in the abstract. For example, 85 percent of the officers we surveyed believed that forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations would enjoy a substantial

edge over those that do not. Seventy-five percent felt that new ways of war would give

the United States dominance over the full range of adversaries. A majority of officers

predicted that information-age ways of war would make it easier to use force with decisive results and a reduced risk to U.S. casualties. They also believed strongly in the

growing importance of space and cyberspace. Seventy-six percent felt that within the

next twenty years conflicts would include combat operations in or from space. Eightyfive percent believed that within the same period computer network attack would become a central feature of military operations. A large number felt that we either are, or

may be, undergoing “radical” change to information age ways of warfare.

What exactly “radical” change is, however, is open to interpretation. The officers we

surveyed tended to equate transformation with marginal improvements to current

weapons and doctrine rather than the development of fundamentally new capabilities.

CHAPTER TEN
A majority believed that today’s dominant systems—tanks, manned aircraft, and aircraft carriers—would be as important in twenty years as they are today. And the vast

majority of officers were unwilling to reduce force structure or readiness to invest in

new approaches to warfare. In fact, such statements garnered the strongest negative responses of the survey. Perhaps the fact that many officers believe that “radical” change

is already underway explains why they see no reason to reduce force structure or readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare.

Our reading of past cases of transformation suggests that change is often triggered by

the recognition of a pressing strategic or operational problem that cannot be handled

through improvements to the existing force, but rather requires a new approach. During the 1920s and 1930s, for example, the expectation of a two-front war helped prod

the German army into exploring the potential of combined-arms armored warfare and

tactical aviation.118 During the same period, the possibility that the United States would

have to cross the Pacific to defend or re-conquer the Philippines from Japan drove the

U.S. Navy to explore offensive carrier warfare and the U.S. Marine Corps to develop

amphibious landing doctrine.119 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, for its part, argues that the Defense Department’s transformation efforts should focus upon overcoming six emerging strategic and operational challenges:

• Protecting critical bases of operations, including the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies,

and friends, and defeating weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

• Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective

information operations;

• Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial

environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats;

• Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid

engagement with high-volume precision strike against critical mobile and fixed targets;

• Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting

infrastructure; and

• Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop an

interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a joint

operational picture that can be tailored to user needs.

120

The officers whom we surveyed expressed great confidence in the ability of the U.S.

armed forces to deal effectively with such threats. They did not believe that adversaries

would be able to hold at risk the primary elements of U.S. power projection. Only 9

percent felt that future adversaries would be able to use ballistic or cruise missiles to

destroy fixed infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites. Twelve percent

106 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
predicted that they would be able to attack carrier battle groups. They were also skeptical of the ability of future adversaries to deny the United States the use of information

networks. In each case, they may be unaware of current and projected threats or may

believe that current programs are sufficient to deal with these challenges.

Understanding Officer Attitudes

What accounts for these attitudes? Where do they come from, and what might cause

them to change? Two major explanations seem plausible. The first is that the culture of

the armed services plays a dominant role in shaping officer attitudes. Even in an era of

jointness, an officer derives his primary identity from his service. Moreover, each service

has a unique personality, one shaped by its history, traditions, mission and operational

environment.121 If this hypothesis is correct, then the views of an Army major are likely to

resemble those of an Army colonel more closely than those of an Air Force major.

Another explanation is that an officer’s experiences play a prominent role in shaping

his views. Today’s junior and field-grade officers entered the armed forces at the very

end of the Cold War, if not after. To them, the U.S.-Soviet competition is an increasingly remote and abstract historical event. Rather, they have spent the majority of their

military career in a period of unquestioned U.S. military, political, and economic dominance. They have witnessed or participated in a series of conflicts in which American

technological superiority appears to have played a central role. Senior and flag officers,

by contrast, joined the U.S. armed forces either during or immediately after the Vietnam War. They lived through the demoralization that followed the U.S. withdrawal

from Southeast Asia, the hollow armed forces of the mid- to late-1970s, and a string of

failed or partially successful military operations, such as the 1980 failed Iran hostage

rescue mission and the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. It is reasonable

to suppose that these experiences have produced officers with different attitudes toward innovation and transformation. If this view is correct, then the attitudes of our

hypothetical Army major are likely to resemble those of a major in the Air Force or

Marine Corps or a lieutenant commander in the Navy more closely than those of an

Army colonel.

Another source of experience is combat. War is one of the most intense events that a

human can face. It seems plausible that those who have seen combat will have attitudes

markedly different from those who have not. In particular, one might expect officers who

have witnessed the friction of combat—particularly in low intensity combat operations—

to be more skeptical of technology-driven changes in war than those who have not.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 107
Service Affiliation

In chapter one we hypothesized that an officer’s service affiliation might influence his

attitude toward innovation. Specifically, we predicted that Air Force officers would be

the most enthusiastic about, and Army and Marine Corps officers the most skeptical

of, emerging warfare areas, with Navy officers in the middle. The results of this project

support this hypothesis. Indeed, it is telling that more than fifteen years after the

Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was designed to make the U.S. armed forces more

“joint,” service affiliation remains the strongest determinant of officer attitudes that we

could identify.

Army and Marine Corps officers were consistently more skeptical of the proposition

that we are experiencing a revolution in warfare than their Navy and Air Force counterparts. Army officers who chose to write about innovation issues were the least enthusiastic of any group of military officers. Army and Marine Corps officers who

participated in the survey tended to feel most strongly that today’s dominant weapon

systems and organizations would be as important in the future as they are today. Conversely, they tended to be more skeptical than their Navy and Air Force counterparts

that the information revolution is changing the character of warfare. They believed less

strongly than other officers that the United States was embarked upon a path to radical

change. Indeed, they were the most doubtful of the need for the U.S. armed forces to

change radically.

Air Force officers, by contrast were as a group the most supportive of the notion that we

are experiencing an RMA. Air Force authors of articles on innovation and transformation

were more enthusiastic than their counterparts in the other services. Many Air Force officers who participated in our survey believed that coming years would witness a reduction

in the importance of currently dominant systems. Indeed, half predicted that manned

aircraft would become less important—and unmanned systems such as the UCAV more

important—over time. They tended to feel most strongly that the information age would

allow the United States to use force more easily, with greatly reduced chance of incurring

U.S. casualties, and with a greater chance of achieving a decisive victory.

Navy officers were more skeptical than Air Force officers but more enthusiastic than Army

and Marine Corps officers. Not surprisingly, they held the strongest belief in the enduring

importance of the carrier battle group. However, they also felt strongly that informationage ways of war would make it increasingly easy for the United States to use force and

achieve decisive victories with substantially reduced risk of American casualties.

While we detected significant service differences throughout most of the survey, several

areas were marked by consensus. For example, officers of all services believed that

space and cyberspace would play an increasingly important role in combat. They felt

108 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
that future adversaries would not be able to hold at risk the U.S. power projection infrastructure and information networks. They also were unwilling to support tradeoffs

between force structure and readiness, on the one hand, and investment in transformation, on the other.

Enthusiasm toward the revolution in military affairs appears to be related to the service’s reliance upon advanced technology. In absolute terms, of course, the U.S. armed

forces utilize more information-age technology than many foreign militaries. However,

not all services rely upon hardware (and software) to the same extent. The U.S. Air

Force relies most heavily upon technology, followed by the Navy. The Army and Marine

Corps are less technology-intensive services. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Air

Force and Navy officers are more enthusiastic than Army and Marine Corps officers

about the ability of information-age systems, doctrine, and organizations to change the

character and conduct of warfare.

The conduct of recent conflicts may have reinforced these tendencies. Throughout the

1990s, the United States relied heavily upon standoff, air-delivered weapons in combat.

Air power—in the form of manned aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles—was the

weapon of choice. Moreover, the United States’ advantage in high-technology arms appeared to play a major role in its lopsided victories in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans

in the 1990s. By contrast, conflicts with more ambiguous outcomes, such as Somalia

and Haiti, involved ground forces. It is therefore hardly surprising that Air Force—and

to a lesser extent Navy—officers believed more strongly than their Army and Marine

Corps counterparts that the information revolution is changing the character of war.

Branch Affiliation

While service affiliation was a major determinant of officer attitudes, we found no

overall correlation between an officer’s attitudes and branch affiliation. Officers did,

however, strongly believe in the enduring importance of their branches. For example,

while 51 percent of all officers felt that armored and mechanized formations would be

as important in 2020 as they were in 2000, 72 percent of Army armor branch officers

agreed with the statement. Similarly, 58 percent of the overall survey population, but

65 percent of aviators, believed that manned aircraft would be as important in 20 years

as they are today. And 45 percent of space officers were in favor of the establishment of

a separate space service, compared to 25 percent of the general survey population.

These findings imply that civilian and military leaders should exercise care in finding

organizational homes for innovative weapons, organizations, and concepts. Rather

than trying to turn fighter pilots into unmanned aerial vehicle operators, for example,

it might be worthwhile to look to other communities, such as intelligence personnel, to

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 109
fill these roles. Rather than turning tank drivers into operators of light armored vehicles, it might be worthwhile to consider vehicle operators.

Combat Experience

While we hypothesized that the attitudes of veterans would differ from those of

non-veterans, we found no correlation between an officer’s combat experience and his

attitudes toward transformation. Rather, combat veterans and non-veterans displayed

similar attitudes toward the emerging RMA, its impact on today’s dominant weapons,

its effect on the character of war, and the depth of change that is required to exploit the

information revolution. Nor did veterans of a particular conflict have views that differed from non-veterans. It may be that the veterans’ combat experience did not prove

particularly compelling. Or it may have affected different people in ways that on average offset one another. In either case, combat experience did not make officers noticeably more enthusiastic or skeptical toward innovation.

Rank

We hypothesized that an officer’s rank would influence his attitude toward innovation.

In particular, we speculated that lower- and middle-ranking officers were likely to be

more enthusiastic about new ways of war than senior officers. In fact, we found that an

officer’s rank had a much less pronounced impact upon his attitudes toward innovation than his service affiliation. Moreover, the influence of rank was not clear-cut. On

the one hand, our analysis of articles on innovation revealed flag officers to be the most

enthusiastic of any group of respondents. This was particularly true when they were

advocating a particular program. Below the flag ranks, however, we detected an inverse

relationship between an officer’s rank and his enthusiasm toward innovation; the

higher an officer’s rank, the less enthusiastic he tended to be.

The results of the survey revealed a somewhat different picture. In many cases there

were no significant differences in attitude among officers of various ranks. In those instances where there were significant differences, senior officers tended to be more enthusiastic than junior officers. The higher an officer’s rank, for example, the less his

enthusiasm and the greater his uncertainty regarding the continued importance of today’s dominant weapons.

The relationship between an officer’s rank and his attitude toward innovation is thus a

complex one. Having spent less time in uniform than their superiors, junior officers

are likely less influenced by service culture. However, junior officers have a narrow base

of experience upon which they can draw. While they are experts in their specialty, they

have little experience outside their branch or community. Moreover, most are quite

110 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
naturally concerned with promotion, something that their service and branch controls.

Such concerns moderate any desire to challenge the conventional wisdom.

The picture is just as mixed when it comes to senior officers. On the one hand, they

have had more time to become indoctrinated into their service’s culture. On the other,

they have served longer in the military and have had the opportunity to witness more

change throughout their careers. They also have much greater experience outside their

branch or service than junior officers.

It appears that junior officers do not see transformation as something that is important

to them. Our focus groups show that while some junior officers think about new ways of

war, few read professional journals and very few are sufficiently motivated to actually

write about emerging ways of war. While junior and field-grade officers make up the majority of the officer corps, they wrote only one-third of the articles that we examined.

In short, we found that both culture (expressed through service affiliation) and experience (expressed through rank) affected officer attitudes. One way to judge the relative

importance of these factors would be to examine how, if at all, the 11 September 2001

terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and subsequent events

have changed officer attitudes. If organizational culture is more important than experience, then one should expect service attitudes to remain relatively stable despite these

developments. Conversely, if experience plays a more dominant role, then one would expect

the post-911 events to trigger attitude changes that would overwhelm service culture.

Implications for Policy

The results of this project should give policy makers pause. They reveal an officer corps

that is confident in the ability of the United States to control the terms of an engagement in a war against a competent adversary. While we should wish that that would be

the case, officers seem generally uninformed regarding future threats outside of their

own tactical specialties, particularly those involving ballistic and cruise missiles and information warfare. Indeed, in these areas officers appear to have confidence bordering

on complacency. While the officers who participated in our survey expressed great faith

in their service’s commitment to innovation, their understanding of current Defense

Department initiatives was tempered by their limited exposure to professional military

journals. In addition, by their own admission, they lacked an understanding of developments outside their service.

This lack of broad knowledge about future threats and the capabilities and limitations

of emerging weapon systems and doctrine may not present a problem so long as officers are not required to make operational or programmatic decisions beyond their own

tactical-technical expertise. However, as officers become more senior, they tend to be

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 111
assigned to both service and joint positions with responsibilities that extend well across

many tactical specialties. This raises the questions of what specifically senior officers,

and especially flag officers, need to know about warfare to be fully effective in such assignments—and how they are to gain this knowledge.

It is worth emphasizing that the officers we surveyed were students at professional military education institutions. The remainder of the officer corps is, if anything, less well

informed. It would seem prudent for the military to seriously question the adequacy of

our officer training and education programs in the areas of future threats and joint

warfighting capabilities. Moreover, the Defense Department needs to consider ways to

disseminate critical information outside of an officer’s relatively infrequent assignment

to formal training and education programs. The fact that officers pay little attention to

professional military journals implies that this will be a challenge.

The results of this study also highlight the need for the Defense Department leadership

to define what is meant by “transformation.” The Quadrennial Defense Review notes

that “Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational

concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic challenges and

opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate.”

122While a reasonable starting point, such a definition lacks a specific articulation of the missions and attributes of the transformed force, how those attributes are

to be measured, and the relevance of existing systems, concepts, and organizations to

that goal. The latter is a particularly difficult problem. The leadership of the Defense

Department has so far avoided the programmatic and budgetary implications of defense transformation. Early suggestions of force structure changes and program cancellations yielded a firestorm of objections from the services, Congress, and the defense

industry. Since then, there has been an absence of open discussion of transformation,

particularly those elements that could threaten existing programs. However, it seems

unlikely that any meaningful debate over the merits of transformation can occur without a serious discussion of the viability of current systems. This includes a realistic discussion of emerging threats that might render current approaches untenable over the

long term—thus requiring new approaches. This is obviously difficult, because it is

hard to determine combat outcomes in the absence of combat. Moreover, it is difficult

to discuss the threat objectively without moving rapidly into programmatic issues.

In short, advocates of major change have their work cut out for them. They must formulate a compelling rationale for transformation, one that will resonate with the broad

officer corps. They also must develop a strategy for educating the officer corps about

transformation. Our analysis suggests that most officers are open to the prospect of

112 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
change if they are provided a good rationale, but that they have yet to hear a compelling

argument for adopting significant alternatives to existing forces. Efficient and timely

transformation requires a clear rationale and an effective means to communicate that

message.

Topics for Further Research

The results of this project suggest several avenues for future research. First, they demonstrate the need for additional research and analysis to refine further our understanding of military officer attitudes toward transformation. In particular, are there any

threats or opportunities that might justify truly major force changes? What would they

define as major or “radical” changes? How confident are they in their own ability to

make such assessments? How concerned are those who are not confident in their

knowledge/abilities? How much confidence do they have in those they believe are

charged with those decisions? What do they see as the most significant attributes of the

future transformed force? Why do or might they discount some of the threats posed by

the QDR? How much confidence do they have in those assessments? Can they conceive

of any future problems/threats that cannot be countered directly with superior U.S.

technological “know-how”? Do they have confidence in advanced technological solutions to very thorny problems like defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, mines,

torpedoes, submarines, and information attacks?

We would also like to know more about how officers get their information. Do they

read professional journals? What do they think of them? Why do they not read journals? Do they read books? Do they read anything outside of tactical-technical manuals?

A second, related, task would be to measure the impact of the war on terror on officer

attitudes toward transformation. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and

Pentagon may, for example, have affected officer attitudes toward the type and severity

of threats that the United States is likely to face in the future. Similarly, the conduct of

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM may

have altered officers’ attitudes toward the utility of current weapon systems, the desirability of emerging ways of war, or the character of information-age warfare. It would

therefore be desirable to conduct a post–September 11 survey of the officer corps.

Third, this project has uncovered several areas where the attitudes of U.S. officers diverge markedly from those of America’s friends and allies. International officers see the

United States as more capable of using force to achieve decisive battlefield results with

a substantially reduced chance of incurring casualties than their U.S. counterparts.

However, they also see the United States as more vulnerable to anti-access and

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 113
information warfare threats than American officers. It would therefore be useful to survey foreign officers more systematically and in greater depth.

Finally, it would be useful to survey officers assigned to “innovative” units within the

U.S. armed forces, including the Army’s medium-weight Interim Brigade Combat

Teams (IBCTs) and Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadrons. Such a survey

could help determine whether hands-on experience with innovative systems, doctrine,

and organizations increases enthusiasm for transformation. It would also reveal how

members of these organizations perceive their status within their respective services.

114 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
Survey Instrument

A Survey of Attitudes Toward Future Warfare

In recent years, a number of observers in the military, government, and academia have

argued that we are experiencing a revolution in military affairs brought on by the

growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology. They argue

that emerging technology, coupled with innovative operational concepts and organizations, will substantially alter the conduct of war on land, at sea, and in the air. War may

also expand into outer space and the information spectrum.

Emerging technology and concepts may alter the character and conduct of war in at

least two ways. The first is that long-range precision strike weapons, coupled with very

effective sensors and command and control systems, will become a dominant factor in

future warfare. The second is that protection of the effective and continuous operation

of one’s own information systems, and being able to degrade, destroy, or disrupt the

function of the opponent’s, will become a priority. Other concepts may emerge as well.

This survey is designed to evaluate your attitudes about future warfare. After you answer a few background questions, you will find that the majority of items ask you to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with a statement by simply placing a

mark at the corresponding location on a seven point rating scale. Two additional items

ask you to indicate which factor in a pair of factors is most important.

APPENDIX A
116 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

• Did you receive the Kuwait Liberation Medal for participation in

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM?  Yes  No

• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in the

BALKANS?  Yes  No

• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in

SOMALIA?  Yes  No

• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in HAITI?  Yes  No

• Have you completed a resident PME course?  Yes  No

INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU

AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH

STATEMENT BY PLACING A MARK ON

THE SCALE TO THE RIGHT OF IT.

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



• Military forces employing

information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a

substantial edge over those

that do not.

• The exploitation of new

technology, doctrine, and

organizational concepts

will favor the U.S. over the

full spectrum of potential

adversaries.

• Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and

organizational concepts.

• Adversaries will exploit

new technology, doctrine,

and organizational concepts before the U.S. can

field similar capabilities.

• New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give

adversaries an advantage

over the U.S. in future

conflicts.

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

What is your age?

How many years of commissioned service do you have? Years

What is your designator/MOS/specialty?

Your Rank?

O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 O-7 O-8 Other

Your service?

USA/

USAR

USN/

USNR

USMC/

USMCR

USAF/

USAFR

USCG ARNG ANG InternationalCivilian

Your highest degree received?

BA/BS MA/MS Ph.D/

MD/JD

Other College Major?

Citizenship (if other than U.S.)
THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 117

• Those who believe that

emerging technology will

substantially alter the con- duct of war are unrealistic.

• The ability to strike an adversary with precision from

a distance will diminish the

need for the U.S. to field

ground forces.

• It is imperative that the

U.S. armed forces become

truly joint.

• The need to maintain separate services will diminish

over time.

• The U.S. armed forces

must radically change their

approach to warfare to

compete effectively with

future adversaries.

• The U.S. armed forces are

currently embarked upon a

path that will lead to a radical change in military technology, doctrine, and

organization.

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



• Information systems and

networks are highly vulnera- ble to enemy

countermeasures.

• Armored and mechanized

formations will be as im- portant in 2020 as they are

today.

• Manned aircraft will be as

important in 2020 as they

are today.

• Carrier Battle Groups will

be as important in 2020 as

they are today.

WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



• Sensor and command and

control technology will allow the U.S. armed forces

to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a

limited geographic area,

regardless of enemy

countermeasures.
118 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

SAMPLE “FACTOR A” OR  “FACTOR B”

 or 

Which is more important? Technology  or  Doctrine

Which is more important? Technology  or  Manpower

Which is more important? Technology  or  Training

Which is more important? Doctrine  or  Manpower

Which is more important? Doctrine  or  Training

Which is more important? Manpower  or  Training

WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



• Conflicts will include com- bat operations in or from

space.

• Attacks upon computer

networks will become a

central feature of military

operations.

• The continued incorpora- tion of conventional

precision-guided munitions

into U.S. forces will permit

deep reductions in the U.S.

nuclear stockpile.

• Uninhabited combat aerial

vehicles will become the

predominant means of

conducting strike warfare.

• Four factors that play a role in the conduct of war are paired against each other below. For

each pair, check the box adjacent to the factor you think is the more important of the two.

While it may be difficult to choose between one factor or another, for the purposes of this

survey, consider which factor in each pair is more important “after all things are considered” or “in the final analysis.” In the “sample” below, the box checked adjacent to “A”

indicates “A” was considered more important than “B” after all things were considered.

FUTURE ADVERSARIES WILL BE

ABLE TO . . . NOW



IN 5

YEARS



IN 10

YEARS



IN 15

YEARS



IN 20

YEARS



IN > 20

YEARS



NEVER



a. Use long-range precision strike weapons

such as ballistic and

cruise missiles to attack

large ground

formations.

b. Use long-range precision strike weapons

such as ballistic and

cruise missiles to attack

U.S. carrier battle

groups.
THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 119

“Challenge A” or  “Challenge B”

 or 

Which will be

more challenging?

Humanitarian Operations  or  Weapons of Mass Destruction

Humanitarian Operations  or  Terrorism

Humanitarian Operations  or  Information Warfare

Humanitarian Operations  or  Expansionist Regional Powers

Humanitarian Operations  or  Peer Competitors

Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Terrorism

Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Information Warfare

Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Expansionist Regional Powers

Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Peer Competitors

Terrorism  or  Information Warfare

Terrorism  or  Expansionist Regional Powers

Terrorism  or  Peer Competitors

Information Warfare  or  Expansionist Regional Powers

Information Warfare  or  Peer Competitors

Expansionist Regional Powers  or  Peer Competitors

FUTURE ADVERSARIES WILL BE

ABLE TO . . . NOW



IN 5

YEARS



IN 10

YEARS



IN 15

YEARS



IN 20

YEARS



IN > 20

YEARS



NEVER



c. Use long-range preci- sion strike weapons

such as ballistic and

cruise missiles to de- stroy fixed military in- frastructure, such as

ports, airfields, logisti- cal sites.

d. Deny the U.S. the use

of information

networks.

• Six challenges that confront the U.S. are paired against themselves below. For each pair of

challenges, place a check in the box next to the challenge you feel is more important of the

two. For example, in the “sample” below, if you thought “A” was more of a challenge

than “B,” you’d place a check in the box next to “A.”
120 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

NEW TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONAL

CONCEPTS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

WILL . . .

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



a. Offer the ability to engage

in high-intensity operations

with substantially reduced

risk of U.S. casualties.

b. Substantially reduce the

duration of future

conflicts.

c. Make it easier for the U.S.

to use force.

d. Make it easier for the U.S.

to achieve decisive battle- field victories.

e. Increase the importance of

my service relative to the

other services.

f. Increase the importance of

my Branch relative to oth- ers in my service.

SERVICE IMPLICATIONS

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



a. My service should reduce

its force structure to invest

in new approaches to

warfare.

b. My service should reduce

its readiness to invest in

new approaches to

warfare.

c. Modern conditions require

significant changes to traditional service roles and

missions.

d. The Defense Department

should create a new service

responsible for space

operations.

e. The Defense Department

should create a new service

responsible for information

operations.

f. The U.S. armed forces will

achieve fully the four pillars

of Joint Vision 2010—

dominating maneuver,

precision engagement,

focused logistics, and

full-dimensional protection—by 2010.
Further Discussion

Would you be willing to participate in a focus group discussing your views regarding

future warfare at greater length? If so, please provide your name, home phone number,

and e-mail address below.

Name: ________________________________________

Home Phone: ________________________________________

E-mail: ________________________________________

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 121

SERVICE IMPLICATIONS

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



g. My service is serious about

exploring new approaches

to warfare.

h. Other services are more se- rious than mine about ex- ploring new approaches to

warfare.

Focus Group Survey Instrument

In recent years, a number of observers in the military, government, and academia have

argued that we are experiencing a revolution in military affairs brought on by the

growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology. They argue

that emerging technology, coupled with innovative operational concepts and organizations, will substantially alter the conduct of war on land, at sea, and in the air. War may

also expand into outer space and the information spectrum.

Emerging technology and concepts may alter the character and conduct of war in at

least two ways. The first is that long-range precision strike weapons, coupled with very

effective sensors and command and control systems, will become a dominant factor in

future warfare. The second is that protection of the effective and continuous operation

of one’s own information systems, and being able to degrade, destroy, or disrupt the

function of the opponent’s, will become a priority. Other concepts may emerge as well.

This survey is designed to evaluate your attitudes about future warfare. After you answer a few background questions, you will find that the majority of items ask you to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with a statement by simply placing a

mark at the corresponding location on a seven point rating scale. Two additional items

ask you to indicate which factor in a pair of factors is most important.

APPENDIX B
124 THE NEWPORT PAPERS

INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH

YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH

EACH STATEMENT BY PLACING A

MARK ON THE SCALE TO THE RIGHT

OF IT.

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



• Manned aircraft will be as

important in 2020 as they

are today.

• Carrier Battle Groups will

be as important in 2020 as

they are today.

• Conflicts will include combat operations in or from

space.

• Future adversaries will be

able to deny the U.S. the

use of information

networks.

• Future adversaries will be

able to use long-range precision strike weapons such

as ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as

ports, airfields, logistical

sites.

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

What is your age?

How many years of commissioned service do you have? Years

What is your designator/MOS/specialty?

Your Rank?

O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 O-7 O-8 Other

Your service?

USA/

USAR

USN/

USNR

USMC/

USMCR

USAF/

USAFR

USCG ARNG ANG InternationalCivilian

Your highest degree received?

BA/BS MA/MS Ph.D/

MD/JD

Other College Major?

Citizenship (if other than U.S.)

• Did you receive the Kuwait Liberation Medal for participation in

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM?  Yes  No

• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in the

BALKANS?  Yes  No

• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in

SOMALIA?  Yes  No

• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in HAITI?  Yes  No

• Have you completed a resident PME course?  Yes  No
THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 125

INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH

YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH

EACH STATEMENT BY PLACING A

MARK ON THE SCALE TO THE RIGHT

OF IT.

I

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

 

I

AM

UNSURE

 

I

STRONGLY

AGREE



• Future adversaries will be

able to use long-range pre- cision strike weapons such

as ballistic and cruise mis- siles to attack U.S. carrier

battle groups.

• The U.S. armed forces

must radically change their

approach to warfare to

compete effectively with

future adversaries.

• The U.S. armed forces are

currently embarked upon a

path that will lead to a rad- ical change in military tech- nology, doctrine, and

organization.

• My service should reduce

its force structure to invest

in new approaches to war.

• My service should reduce

its readiness to invest in

new approaches to war.
Of the following professional journals: Parameters, Naval War College Review, Proceedings, Joint Force Quarterly, Aerospace Power Journal, Military Review, Marine Corps Gazette, and Strategic Review:

• To which, if any, do you subscribe?

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

• Which, if any, do you read every issue?

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

• Which, if any, do you read occasionally (i.e., more than once per year)

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

• Do you ever discuss articles in these journals with your colleagues? How often?

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

• Give the subject of two articles from any of the journals published in the past year

that you have found particularly noteworthy.

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

126 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
Notes

1. Stephen J. Blank, “The Soviet Strategic View:

Ogarkov on the Revolution in Military Technology,” Strategic Review (Summer 1984), p. 3.

2. See, for example, William J. Perry, “Desert

Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs (Fall

1991), pp. 66–82; Andrew F. Krepinevich,

“Cavalry to Computer,” The National Interest

(Fall 1994), pp. 30–42; and Eliot A. Cohen, “A

Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs

(March-April 1996) pp. 37–54.

3. In the words of former Secretary of Defense,

William Cohen, “The information revolution

is creating a Revolution in Military Affairs

that will fundamentally change the way U.S.

forces fight. We must exploit these and other

technologies to dominate in battle.” William

S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense

Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of

Defense, 1997) p. iv.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1996).

5. Frank Bruni, “Bush Vows Money and Support

for Military,” The New York Times, 24 September 1999, p. A22.

6. David E. Sanger, “Bush Details Plan to Focus

Military on New Weaponry,” The New York

Times, 14 February 2001, p. 1.

7. Sharon Weinberger, “Joint Force Critical for

Transformation, Says Head of Rumsfeld

Study,” Aerospace Daily, 29 August 2001, p. 1.

8. Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld on High Wire of

Defense Reform,” Washington Post, 20 May

2001, p. 1.

9. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001).

10. Remarks by the President at the Citadel,

Charleston, South Carolina, 11 December

2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html.

11. In particular, Stephen Peter Rosen has shown

the importance of senior officers in providing

professional support to proponents of change.

Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991) pp.

20 and 251.

12. Williamson Murray, “Does Military Culture

Matter?” Orbis (Winter 1999) p. 37.

13. Ibid., p. 38.

14. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Why No Transformation?” Joint Force Quarterly (AutumnWinter 1999–2000) p. 98.

15. Eliot A. Cohen, “Defending America in the

Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs

(November-December 2000) p. 52.

16. Eliot A. Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel’s Security Revolution (Washington,

D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), ch. 1.

17. International Institute for Strategic Studies,

Strategic Survey 1995/96 (Oxford: Oxford

Univ. Press, 1996) pp. 32–35.

18. Ian Roxborough and Dana Eyre, “Which Way

to the Future?” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 22

(Summer 1999) pp. 29–30.

19. Stuart Kaufman, “Lessons from the 1991 Gulf

War and Russian Military Doctrine,” Journal

of Slavic Military Studies (September 1993)

pp. 375–396.

20. Michael Pillsbury, “China and the Revolution

in Military Affairs,” report prepared for the

Office of Net Assessment, n.d. See also June

Teufel Dreyer, The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College,

2000).

21. Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases (Denver: Univ. of Denver,

1966–67) pp. 33–36.

22. Barton C. Hacker, “The Military and the Machine: An Analysis of the Controversy over

Mechanization in the British Army, 1919–

1939” (Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Chicago, 1969).

23. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American

Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989) pp. 3,

19–20.

24. Robert R. Leonhard, “A Culture of Velocity”

and Don Vandergriff, “The Culture Wars,” in

Robert L. Bateman, ed., Digital War: A View
from the Front Lines (Novato, Calif.: Presidio

Press, 1999) pp. 136, 140, 147.

25. Hacker, “The Military and the Machine.”

26. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in

International Politics (Princeton: Princeton

Univ. Press, 1976) p. 239.

27. Because the term “revolution in military affairs” means so many things to so many people, it never appeared in the survey

instrument. The survey instead referred to

“information-age technology, doctrine, and

organizations” throughout.

28. The Marine Corps Command and Staff College and Marine Corps University agreed to

participate in the survey, were sent survey instruments, but did not—despite repeated requests—submit their completed surveys.

29. Earl Babbie, Survey Research Methods, second

edition (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1990),

p. 182.

30. Many of the articles had more than one author listed, and in many cases multiple authors. One article gave credit to more than a

dozen individuals. For the purpose of simplicity, data was collected only on the first author

listed for each article.

31. The numbers of the statements correspond to

their order in the survey instrument. They are

grouped in similar categories for analysis

which results in some of them appearing out

of sequence in the text.

32. Joint Vision 2010, p. 2.

33. James R. Blaker, “The American RMA Force:

An Alternative to the QDR,” Strategic Review

(Summer 1997), p. 22.

34. Richard J. Harknett et al., “The Risks of a Networked Military,” Orbis (Winter 2000), pp.

127–143.

35. Admiral William A. Owens, U.S. Navy, “The

Emerging System of Systems,” Proceedings

(May 1995).

36. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and William A. Owens,

“America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs

(March-April 1996), p. 22.

37. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “21st Century Land

Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths,” Parameters

(Autumn 1997); Colonel T.X. Hammes, U.S.

Marine Corps, “War Isn’t a Rational Business,”

Proceedings(July 1998); Ralph Peters, “After the

Revolution,” Parameters(Summer 1995).

38. CDR Bill Toti, “Stop the Revolution; I Want

to Get Off,” Proceedings (July 2000), p. 32.

39. Ralph Peters, “After the Revolution,” Parameters (Summer 1995), p. 8.

40. Joint Vision 2010, p. 22.

41. See, for example, John Arquilla and Solomon

M. Karmel, “Welcome to the Revolution . . .

In Chinese Military Affairs,” Defense Analysis

(December 1997).

42. Alvin H. Bernstein and Martin Libicki in

“High-Tech: The Future Face of War? A Debate,” Commentary (January 1998), p. 30.

43. Nye and Owens, p. 28.

44. Frederick W. Kagan in “High-Tech: The Future Face of War? A Debate,” Commentary

(January 1998), p. 31.

45. Joint Vision 2010, p. 1.

46. Eliot A. Cohen, “Defending America in the

Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs

(November-December 2000), p. 52; Andrew

F. Krepinevich, “Why No Transformation?”

Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn-Winter

1999-2000); Transforming Defense: National

Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National Defense Panel (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997), pp. 33–41.

47. Michael G. Vickers, Warfare in 2020: A Primer

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, 1996), p. i.

48. Ralph Peters, “The Future of Armored Warfare,” Parameters 27 (Autumn 1997), pp. 50–59.

49. Jason Sherman, “Dream Work,” Armed Forces

Journal International (May 2000), p. 25.

50. Ibid., 28.

51. Vickers, p. 8.

52. Captain Bob Krumm, U.S. Army, “Why Are

the Marines in Afghanistan?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2002), p. 112.

53. Rowan Scarborough, “Generals Not Fans of

Lighter Army,” Washington Times, 30 May

2000, p. 1.

128 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
54. Vickers, p. 7.

55. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Air Force of

2015 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic

and Budgetary Assessments, 1996), pp. 33–34.

56. Vickers, p. 7.

57. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., A New Navy for a

New Era (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996), pp.

37 and 45.

58. Ibid., p. 41.

59. Vickers, p. 10.

60. Vickers, pp. 11–12.

61. Mary C. FitzGerald, The New Revolution in

Russian Military Affairs (London: RUSI,

1994).

62. Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future

Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National Defense

Univ. Press, 1997).

63. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 12–14.

64. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 7.

65. Ibid., 30.

66. See, for example, John Arquilla and David

Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” Comparative Strategy (April-June 1993); Martin

Libicki, “The Emerging Primacy of Information,” Orbis (Spring 1996); and Richard

Szafranski, “A Theory of Information Warfare: Preparing for 2020,” Airpower Journal

(Spring 1995).

67. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 7.

68. Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and

Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND Corporation, 1996).

69. Joint Vision 2010, p. 18.

70. Blaker, p. 23.

71. Joint Vision 2010, p. 13.

72. Admiral Bill Owens, with Ed Offley, Lifting

the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus,

Giroux, 2000), pp. 119–138; and Nye and

Owens.

73. See, for example, Toti.

74. Col. John A. Warden III, USAF, “The Enemy

as a System,” Airpower Journal (Spring 1995).

75. Seth Cropsey, “The Only Credible Deterrent,”

Foreign Affairs (March-April 1994) p. 18.

76. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Steven M. Kosiak,

“Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes,” The Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists (November-December

1998) at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/

1998/nd98/nd98kosiak.html.

77. Dennis M. Gormley and Thomas G.

Mahnken, “Facing Nuclear and Convention

Reality,” Orbis (Winter 2000).

78. Joint Vision 2010, p. 8.

79. Nye and Owens, p. 25.

80. Joint Vision 2010, pp. 18–22.

81. Joint Vision 2010, pp. 13–14.

82. Warden, p. 54.

83. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick

P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing

and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd ed.

(revised), (C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, Washington, D.C.: 1999) p. 165.

84. Joint Vision 2010, p. 2.

85. Explicitly the reference that “boots on the

ground” will still be required in “many” operations, suggesting that certain military operations would no longer require ground forces.

Joint Vision 2010, p. 8.

86. Blaker.

87. See for example, Rosen, pp. 19–21.

88. See, for example, National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, unclassified

summary of a National Intelligence Estimate

(Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence

Council, 2002) at http://www.cia.gov/nic/

pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballistic

missilefinal.htm.

89. Paul Bracken, “America’s Maginot Line,” The

Atlantic Monthly (December 1998) is representative of the more cogent, open-press analyses of the impact of ballistic missile

proliferation.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 129
90. Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to

the United States, 15 July 1998 (The Rumsfeld

Commission) at http://www.fas.org/irp/

threat/missile/rumsfeld/index.html.

91. Ibid.

92. The requirements for joint professional military education are contained in Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01A

(Officer Professional Military Education Policy) which contains no specific requirements

for joint officer knowledge of threat issues.

93. Joint Vision 2010, p. 22.

94. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., A New Navy for a

New Era (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996).

95. Barbara Opall, “China Sinks U.S. in Simulated

War,” Defense News, 5 February 1995, p. 26.

96. See, for example, John Stillion and David T.

Orlesky, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional

Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks:

Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,

1999).

97. Bill Gertz, “The Air Force and Missile Defense,” Air Force (February 1996), p. 72.

98. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,”

The National Interest (Fall 1994), p. 31.

99. Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs (March-April 1996), p. 37.

100. Ibid.

101. Joint Vision 2010, p. 32.

102. Ibid., p. 31.

103. Ricks, p. 1.

104. Ibid., p. 8.

105. Ibid., p. 9

106. See for instance Cohen, p. 47.

107. See, for example, Martin C. Libicki and James

A. Hazlett, “Do We Need an Information

Corps?” Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1993).

108. See, for example, Lauren D. Kohn, “Information Warriors,” Letter to the Editor, Joint

Force Quarterly (Winter 1993–94), p. 100.

109. Joint Vision 2010, p. 8.

110. Blaker, p. 29.

111. “Assuming commitments are reduced, should

your service reduce its readiness to invest in

new approaches to warfare?”

112. Joseph J. Collins, American Military Culture in

the Twenty-First Century: A Report of the CSIS

International Security Program (Washington,

D.C.: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, February 2000).

113. James A. Blackwell, “Professionalism and

Army Doctrine: A Losing Battle?” in Don M.

Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, and Lloyd J.

Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), p. 115.

114. Hammes.

115. Warren Calwell, “Promises, Promises,” Proceedings (January 1996); Hammes; Murray.

116. Mackubin T. Owens, “Technology, the RMA,

and Future War,” Strategic Review (Spring

1998), pp. 63–70.

117. Eliot A. Cohen, “Defending America in the

Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs 79, No.

6 (November-December 2000); Andrew F.

Krepinevich, “Why No Transformation?”

Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn-Winter 1999–

2000); Don Vandergriff, “The Culture Wars,”

in Robert L. Bateman, ed., Digital War: A

View from the Front Lines (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1999).

118. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans

von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992).

119. George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea

Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford:

Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), ch. 7.

120. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 30.

121. Builder.

122. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 29.

130 THE NEWPORT PAPERS
About the Authors

Thomas G. Mahnken is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. He served

formerly in the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment as a member of the

Secretary of the Air Force’s Gulf War Air Power Survey and as a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. Professor

Mahnken is a graduate of the University of Southern California with degrees in history

and international relations, and he earned his MA and Ph.D in international affairs

from The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International

Studies. He is the author of Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941 (Cornell University Press, 2002) and co-editor of The Journal of Strategic Studies. He has written numerous journal articles on strategy,

intelligence, and military transformation.

James R. FitzSimonds is a research professor with the War Gaming Department of the

U.S. Naval War College, where he holds the EMC Corporation Chair of Information

Technology. Professor FitzSimonds retired from the U.S. Navy as a captain in 2001 after

a 27-year career in surface line and intelligence. His sea service included duty in USS

Blakely (FF-1072), USS Enterprise (CVN-65), and the staff of Cruiser-Destroyer Group

Two/USS America (CV-66) Battle Group. His shore assignments included tours with

the Chief of Naval Operations Current Intelligence Division, the Navy Operational Intelligence Center Detachment (Newport), the CNO Strategic Studies Group, and the

Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment. He is a graduate of the United States

Naval Academy and earned his MS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 131

Titles in the Series

“Are We Beasts?” Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II “Area Bombing,” by

Christopher C. Harmon (December 1991).

Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for the

1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (April 1992).

The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, by Horace B. Robertson, Jr. (October 1992).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (June 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, by Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (August 1993).

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of

the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (October 1993).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States,

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (June 1994).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenberg

(December 1994).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) (December 1995).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James, U.S.

Air Force (October 1996).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strategy:

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (April 1997).

What Color Helmet? Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates, by Myron H.

Nordquist (August 1997).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, with David G. Freymann (March 1998).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (August 1998).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions

during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen (December 2000).

THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 133
The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet

Submarines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. (2003)

Forthcoming in 2003

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial

Implications of Network-centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and

Andrew L. Ross

Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988, by Robert H. Gile

134 THE NEWPORT PAPERS