1

A CLASH OF MILITARY CULTURES:

GERMAN & FRENCH APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGY

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

A Paper for the USAF Academy Symposium

September 1994

By James S. Corum

USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies

Introduction

The First World War was a period of extraordinarily rapid

technological development. Military technology had changed

dramatically in the decades before World War I, but even the

most perceptive pre-war military thinkers of 1914 were

unable to predict the pace of wartime technical development.

The militaries of World War I had to adapt to the emergence

of the airplane, motor vehicle, tank and poison gas as major

new weapons. Commanders, general staffs and war departments

had to try to master the variety of new technology and adapt

technology to operations.

The period in between the world wars was a time of

extraordinary technological development for the world's

militaries. World War I had proven to be a technological

catalyst. Such weapons as the tank, which was introduced in

the war, enjoyed rapid development in the 1920s and 1930s.

Accelerated by the war, motor vehicle development

progressed, while every army engaged in motorization

experiments. Radios and electronics passed out of their

infancy as Britain and Germany developed radar. Most

dramatic of all was the evolution of the airplane from a

useful auxiliary weapon into a very powerful and decisive

arm of the military.

The French military was extremely successful in adapting to

technology during World War I. In many respects, the French

effort in this regard equalled, and in several instances

surpassed, the German. Deficient in heavy artillery at the

start of the war, by 1917-1918 the French Army had created a

superb heavy artillery arm.1 French vehicle production

exceeded the German, and by 1918, the French Army was more

advanced in motorization.2 The most dramatic difference 

1 In 1917, the French Army deployed the Canon de 155mm GPF as

the standard heavy gun. With a range of 19,500 meters and a

43kg shell, it was highly respected by the Germans and the

Allies. See Peter Chamberlain and Terry Gander, Heavy

Artillery, N.Y.: ARC (1975), p. 17. On other French guns,

see pages 14-19.

2 Werner Oswald, Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr,

Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr, Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag
2

between the two armies was in the development of armored

forces. The French General Staff initiated development of a

French tank program in 1914.3 During the war, the French

produced 4,300 tanks, more than any other power.4 In

contrast, the Germans never deployed more than a few dozen

tanks, and of these, only 20 were of German manufacture.5 

Another French success story was their effectiveness in

designing and producing high-quality aircraft. The military

leadership and civilian industrialists demonstrated a high

degree of innovation in effectively standardizing aircraft

types and engines. France led the world in aircraft engine

production and quality.6 By 1918, the French had designed

and built the first supercharged engine.7 In design, the

French equalled the Germans, with such rugged, effective and

swift aircraft as the Spad VII, Spad XIII fighters and the

Breguet 14 bomber.8 Indeed, the quality and quantity of

French aircraft design and production enabled the Allies to

gain air superiority in the latter part of the war. Due to

the inefficiency of British aircraft design and production,

the British had to rely upon the French for many aircraft

and engines. As late as 1918, British squadrons on the

Western Front flew Spads and Nieuports into action.9 

By the final year of the war, the French military

demonstrated considerable skill in utilizing new technology

 

(1975), pp. 10-11. In 1918, the French Army employed

100,000 motor vehicles, not including tanks, on the West

Front, The German army motor vehicle total during the war

did not exceed 40,000 in use.

3 On Col. Estienne, See Kenneth Macksey, ed., The Guinness

Book of Tank Facts, Enfield: Guinness Publishing (1980),

p. 28.

4 Ibid., p. 45.

5 Werner Oswald, Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer, pp. 36-39. 6 John Morrow, The Great War in the Air, Wash., D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press (1993), pp. 369-371. In World

War I, the French built 52,000 planes and 88,000 engines.

The Germans built approximately 48,000 planes and 43,000

engines.

7 Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History of

French Military Aviation, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian

Institute Press (1986), p. 117.

8 On French aircraft at the end of the War, see John Morrow,

The Great War in the Air, pp. 363-371, and Charles

Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, History of French

Military Aviation, pp. 117-122 and 155-157. 9 In 1918, Squadrons 1, 19, 23, 29 and 60 of the Royal Flying

Corps and RAF flew Nieuport 17s, Spad VIIs and Spad XIIIs on

the Western Front. See Christopher Shore and Norman Franks,

Above the Trenches, London: Grub Street Publishers (1990),

pp. 30-36.
3

on the battlefield. The French Army demonstrated

operational finesse in the successful counterattack at

Soissons on July 18 and 26, 1918. French forces, supported

by 571 tanks and masses of aircraft, drove a deep wedge into

the German drive on Paris.10 French infantry and tanks also

took part in the attack at Amiens on August 8, 1918: the

Allied Offensive that decisively broke the German Front.

During the last two months of World War II, the American

offensive at St. Mihiel and the Meuse Argonne relied upon

the French for tank, air and artillery support.11 

Twenty-two years later, the French had lost the

technological edge they had enjoyed in 1918. The French

ground forces were well-equipped, but their commanders'

inability to effectively use the weapons was apparent. In

the field of aviation, the technological disparity was

significant, with the Germans fielding a force which was

both qualitatively and quantitatively superior. In numerous

aspects of technology, the German military had shown itself

far more innovative and effective in the development and

employment of equipment.

My purpose in this paper is to explore the background of two

contrasting military cultures, the French and the German,

and compare their approaches to the development and

adaptation of technology. I will first outline the state of

comparative technological development of the French and

German armies and their forces in 1939-1940, and investigate

some of those factors that brought those forces to their

relative positions. The specific lines of investigation

will follow: first will be the influence of doctrine upon

technology; second, the influence of military organizational

systems upon technology; finally, the influence of the

general staff cultures upon technical development.

The State of French and German Military Technology in 1940.

In the 1920s, the French had a clear lead in motorization

and tank development. The French motor industry was one of

the larger motor industries, and was highly innovative.12 

 

10 Kenneth Macksey, The Guinness Book of Tank Facts, p. 37. 11 At the St. Mihiel Offensive of the U.S. Army in September

1918, the French provided 185 tanks and the U.S., 174 tanks.

The French supported the U.S. Offensive in the Meuse-Argonne

in September/October 1918 with 750 tanks. See Kenneth

Macksey, The Guinness Book of Tank Facts, p. 231. 12 See Patrick Fridenson, "Les relations entre les industries

automobiles française et allemande des anneés 1880 aux

anneés 1960", in Frankreich und Deutschland: Forschung,

Technologie und industrielle Entwicklung im 19. und 20.

Jahrhundert, Yves Cohen and Klaus Manfrass, eds. Munich:

C.H. Beck'schen Verlag (1990), pp. 334-342, especially
4

For example, in the 1920s, Citroen produced the world's

first practical half-track vehicles.13 The military,

following the success of French motor production and

employment in the World War, had numerous commissions

devoted to studying and implementing motorization.14 In

tank development, the French capitalized upon their

advantage gained in World War I, and several commissions

were given a mandate to develop tanks. French tank design

in the 1920s was clearly at the cutting edge, with the

design for the Char B heavy tank. The Char B would

eventually be deployed in the 1930s, carrying a 75mm and a

47mm gun.15 

In the air, the French also enjoyed a significant

technological advantage. In the 1920s, the French air force

was the largest in the world.16 The French air motor

industry led the world, and in the mid-1920s, the French

held many world records in aviation. The National

Aeronautical Institute, founded in 1909, was nationalized

and put under the direction of the Air Ministry in 1928.

The Institute continued to produce highly qualified

aeronautical engineers.17 

Both in ground forces motorization and in aviation

technology, the French lost their edge in the late 1920searly 1930s. In Germany, the auto industry--which had been

far smaller than the French auto industry of the 1920s--

forged ahead. By the early 1930s, with subsidies and

incentives from the new Nazi regime, the German auto

 

pp. 335-336.

13 The French half-track technology of the 1920s was so

admired by the Germans that the German Maffei Company

licensed the French half-track system in 1927, and produced

a German model by 1930. See Walter Spielberger, Die

Motorisierung der deutschen Reichswehr 1920-1935, Stuttgart:

Motorbuch Verlag (1979), pp. 145-151.

14 For a detailed review of French motorization efforts 1919-

1939, see Ministère de la Defense, Les Programmes d'Armament

de 1919 à 1939, Château de Vincennes (1982), pp. 260-329. 15 By 1940, 365 Char B Tanks were built. See Christopher

Foss, ed., An Illustrated Guide to World War II Tanks and

Fighting Vehicles, N.Y.: Arco Publishing (1981), pp. 16-19. 16 In 1923, France was rated as the strongest aeronautical

power. It had an Air Force of 123 squadrons, with 1,050

modern aircraft. See Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of

America, Aircraft Year Book 1924, N.Y. (1924), pp. 185-193. 17 The National Aeronautics Institute produced about 100-150

aeronautical engineers a year in the 1920s and 1930s,

although many only had a 2-year course in engineering. See

l'École Nationale Supérieure de l'Aéronautique, Livre d'Or

de l'École Nationale Supérieure de l'Aéronautique: Cinquante

anneés d'existence (1909-1959), pp. 59-60 and 65-66.
5

industry became larger than the French.18 The French were,

however, able to keep a high standard in developing tank

technology. For example, the French tanks of the mid-1930s

were fitted with the world's first cast turrets, and the

French tanks of the 1930s had the most sophisticated

steering systems of the era.19 The Germans, however, were

able to match the level of French tank technology. For

example, in 1936 the Panzer II and III were designed with

the world's first torsion-bar suspension system.20 In

artillery, both countries demonstrated a rough parity in gun

quality by 1940. In the post-World War I era, both the

French and the German armies had developed medium and heavy

guns which were efficient and effective upon the battlefield

in 1940.21 In other aspects of motorization, the French

fell behind. Having once led the world in half-track

production, the French virtually ended development of the

half-track in 1933. Starting behind the French, the Germans

licensed their technology and then forged ahead with their

own, innovative designs. By 1940, a wide variety of halftrack vehicles was assigned to their armored and motorized

divisions.22 The Germans took the lead in other areas, as

well, including armored cars, armored command vehicles, and

tracked assault guns, while French development in these

areas remained relatively static.

The greatest disparity in ground forces equipment between

the French and the Germans was in communications equipment.

The French developed relatively few radio systems in the

interwar period, and devoted very little money to developing

 

18 Maurice Larkin, France Since the Popular Front, Oxford:

Clarendon Press (1988), p. 389. Between 1925-1929, France

produced an average of 207,000 motor vehicles per year to

Germany's 90,000. Between 1930-1934, France produced

193,000 per year to Germany's 101,000. From 1935-1939, the

French produced 200,000 motor vehicles per year to Germany's

304,000.

19 R.M. Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, N.Y.: Arco Publishing

(1970), pp. 177-178 and 336.

20 Ibid., p. 343. 21 On German and French artillery of the interwar period, see

Peter Chamberlain and Terry Gander, Light and Medium Field

Artillery, N.Y.: Arco Publishing (1975), pp. 13-30, also

Peter Chamberlain and Terry Gander, Heavy Artillery, N.Y.:

Arco Publishing (1970), pp. 14-26.

22 The German Army began development of half-tracked vehicles

in 1926. By 1937, mass production of the highly-effective

Sdkfz 250 and Sdkfz 251 had begun. See Duncan Crow, ed.,

Armored Fighting Vehicles of Germany, N.Y.: Arco Publishing

(1978), pp. 161-172, and John Milsom, German Half-Tracked

Vehicles of World War II, N.Y.: Hippocrene Books (1975),

pp. 6-7.
6

communications equipment.23 Yet, a high priority was

assigned to the development of communications equipment

which would be set in fixed installations along the Maginot

Line.24 The Germans, on the other hand, placed a very high

priority upon developing communications equipment, and

produced a wide variety of effective radios for ground

forces, infantry, artillery, aviation and tanks.25 As of

1940, only French heavy tanks had radios, whereas all German

tanks had radios, and numerous other armored cars and

vehicles, as well.

With the exception of communications, however, the French

Army was not badly equipped in 1940. In fact, they

possessed good guns, good tanks for the era, and several

armored and motorized divisions. The French Army of 1940

can be said to have had a modern level of motorization. In

their approach to motorization, the German and French armies

were actually very similar. Both armies were supportive of

motorization, and studied it intensively. Both were

influenced by national strategic considerations, for both

countries were net importers of oil, and were concerned

about assuring a supply of oil in case of war.26 This

 

23 Between 1923 and 1939, the French military devoted only

0.15% of their military budget to communications equipment.

See Robert Doughty, "The French Armed Forces, 1918-40", in

Military Effectiveness, vol. II, Boston: Unwin Hyman (1988),

pp. 39-69, especially p. 58. The French had commercial

technology which could have been exploited for the military.

In 1931, a commercial UHF link was opened between Britain

and France. The UHF frequencies, however, though used

extensively by the Germans, were not developed by the

French. See Tony Devereux, Messenger Gods of Battle,

London: Brasseys (1991), p. 84.

24 In the interwar period, one of the largest of the French

radio procurement programs was for the OCTF, and for the R

and F type radios and receivers (650 radios) for the Maginot

Line fortifications. Only a handful of radios were planned

for the Char B and R 35 tanks. See Ministère de la Defense,

Les Programmes d'Armament, p. 416. 25 During the 1920s and early 1930s, the Weapons Office and

Communications Inspectorate developed a broad family of

effective radios for the tactical use of the Army. See

Adolf Reinicke, Das Reichsheer 1921-1934, Osnabrück: Biblio

Verlag (1986), p. 196.

26 On oil and French strategic planning in the interwar

period, see R. Nayberg, "La Problématique du revitaillement

de la France en carburant dans l'Entre-deux-guerres:

naissance d'une perspective géostratégique", in Revue

Historique des Armées, No. 4 (1979), pp. 5-28. For a good

overview of the strategic effect of the oil supply on German
7

concern for oil, as well as the high cost of motorization,

ensured that both armies would motorize gradually, and would

still use primarily horse-drawn transport for their infantry

divisions in 1940.

One interesting aspect of the French and German concern

about oil imports was that Germany and France were the only

nations in the interwar period to develop diesel aircraft

engines. Neither the French nor German diesel aircraft

engines were effective, though they did have the virtue of

using considerably less fuel than the high-performance

engines of the era.27 Both armies, employing common sense,

chose the artillery branches as the first priority for army

mobilization. The overall effect was a practical approach

to motorization by France and Germany.

While the disparity of technology between ground forces in

1940 was serious, in the air this disparity was, for the

French, catastrophic. As to aircraft types, in 1940 the

majority of the French aircraft in service were far inferior

to their German counterparts. For example, the Bloch 152,

the Morane Saulnier 406, and the Curtis Hawk P 36 fighter

aircraft were all inferior to the German Me 109 in 1940, and

the French bomber force, the Amiot and Farman Bombers, did

not come close in performance to the German bombers.28 The

 

motorization, see Richard DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut or

Military Anachronism?, Westport: Greenwood Press (1991),

pp. 7-9.

27 By the 1930s, the Germans had developed the Mercedes-Benz

DB 602, a 16 cylinder diesel aircraft engine rated at 1,320

horsepower. The French developed the Clerget 16H, a 16

cylinder diesel aircraft engine rated at 2,000 horsepower.

See Paul Wilkinson, Aircraft Engines of the World: 1941;

N.Y.: Paul Wilkinson (1941), pp. 104-105 and 168-169. The

Germans took the world lead in diesel aircraft engines. The

Ju 86 bomber, which first flew in 1934, was powered by the

Jumo 205 Diesel Engine. It had a low power-to-weight ratio,

but low fuel consumption. See Green, Warplanes of the Third

Reich, p. 414. 28 The Bloch 152 Fighter, a mainstay of the Armeé de l'Air in

1940, had a maximum speed of 316 Mph., and an armament of 2,

20mm cannon and 2 machine guns. It was slower than even the

German Me 110 Heavy Fighter. See Kenneth Munson, Fighters

1939-45, London: Blandford (1969), p. 39. The Amiot 143

Bomber, used by the French in 1940, was designed in the late

1920s, and had a maximum speed of 193 Mph. and a bombload of

1,300 Kg. The Bloch 210 was designed in 1932, had a maximum

speed of 200 Mph. and a bombload of 1,600 Kg. The primary

German bombers of 1940 were the Heinkel He 111 and the

Dornier Do 17. The Heinkel He 111 had a maximum speed of

252 Mph. and a bombload of 2,500 Kg. The Do 17 was faster,

at 255 Mph. Both clearly outclassed most of the French
8

only French bomber relatively equal to its German

counterparts in 1940 was the Loire 45, roughly equivalent to

the German Heinkel 111, Dornier 17 and Junkers 88 bombers.29 

The Dewoitane 520 Fighter, which entered production in 1940,

was the only aircraft that could hope to match the Me 109.30 

The French Portez 633 heavy fighter was inferior in speed

and reliability to the Me 110 of the Germans.31 In the

field of dive bombers, the French belatedly manufactured and

bought a mere handful of dive bombers by 1940, in contrast

to the large German dive bomber program, which enabled the

Luftwaffe to employ over 300 Ju 87s for the campaign in

France.32 As an overall assessment, the French Air Force in

1940 was approximately 3 years behind the Germans in

aircraft development and deployment. The Loire 45 only

entered serial production in 1940, whereas the German

Heinkel 111s and Dornier 17s had entered serial production

in 1937. The Dewoitane 520, a project initiated at the same

 

bomber force. See Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi,

Combat Aircraft of World War II 1933-1937, N.Y.: Military

Press (1987), pp. 22 and 30.

29 The LO 45 (also known as the Leo 451) was a good medium

bomber, with a maximum speed of 250 Mph. and a bombload of

1,500 Kg. Although it compared well with German aircraft in

1940, only 5 were operational as of September 1939, and

perhaps only 110 were operational by June 1940. See Enzo

Angelucci, Rand McNally Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft,

N.Y.: Gallery Books (1990), pp. 281-282.

30 The Dewoitane D 520 had a maximum speed of 326 Mph. and

carried a 20mm gun and four machine guns. The Me 109 E

aircraft it faced was faster, at a maximum speed of 357

Mph., and had two 20mm cannon and two machine guns. See

Kenneth Munson, Fighters 1939-45, pp. 56 and 64. 31 See Kenneth Munson, Fighters 1939-45, pp. 82 and 88. The

Portez 63, a twin-engine fighter/attack aircraft, had a top

speed of 264 Mph., 6 machine guns and a 180 Kg. bombload.

The Me 110 Fighter was better-powered than the Portez 63,

with a top speed of 336 Mph., and carried heavier armament:

2, 20mm cannon and 5 machine guns. The Me 110 also had a

longer range, and a much heavier bombload of 1,000 Kg. See

also Hans Redemann, Innovations in Aircraft Construction,

West Chester, Penn.: Schiffer Military History (1991),

pp. 58-65.

32 Peter Smith, Dive Bomber! An Illustrated History, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press (1982), pp. 92 and 101. In

May 1940, the French Navy possessed five squadrons, 60

aircraft each, of Loire LN 410 and Vought Vindicator Dive

Bombers. Both the Vindicators and Loires were far inferior

in bombload and performance to the Ju 87; for example, the

LN 410 had only a 500 lb. bombload to the Ju 87-B's 1,100

lbs.
9

time as the Me 109, only entered production in 1940,33 while

the Me 109 entered serial production in 1937. In almost

every case, it took the French two to four years longer to

develop and deploy an aircraft model in the 1930s.

In the establishment of a basic aviation infrastructure, the

French Air Force was as much as ten years behind that of the

Luftwaffe. In 1939, France possessed only one paved runway

in the entire country.34 In 1933, France had only 2 radio

beacons for aerial navigation.35 The French got off to a

very late start in developing a modern infrastructure in

1936, when they initiated a program to improve aerial

navigation for civil and military aviation; however, little

was accomplished by 1940.36 In contrast, even in the 1920s,

the Germans had developed the most sophisticated aviation

infrastructure in Europe. By 1927, Lufthansa was, by far,

the largest passenger and cargo carrier in Europe.37 In

1927, Lorenz all-weather landing systems were introduced for

airport operations.38 By 1931, 17 airports had Lorenz

systems.39 German development of aviation instruments,

including gyroscopic instruments, in the 1920s and early

1930s was equal to that of the United States.40 Germany in

1940 possessed numerous paved runways.41 

 

33 Enzo Angelucci, The Rand McNally Encyclopedia of Military

Aircraft, N.Y.: Gallery Books (1990), p. 222. 34 See Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History

of French Military Aviation.» 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ernst Kredel, "Der deutsche Luftverkehr", in Luftfahrt ist

Not!, ed. Ernst Jünger, Leipzig: Deutschen Luftverbandes

(1931), pp. 264-277.

38 Helmuth Schmidt-Reps, "Das Funkwesen in der Luftfahrt", in

Luftfahrt ist Not!, pp. 278-289, esp. p. 282.

39 Ibid., p. 283. 40 See Martin Mäder, "Technische Hilfsmittel für die

Navigation und Steuerung an Bord neuzeitlicher

Verkehrsflugzeuge", in Luftfahrt ist Not!, pp. 305-322. By

1930, it was common for German civil aviation to use

artificial horizons, gyrocompasses, ADF and Lorenz beam

navigation systems.

41 By 1937, German civil aviation had a network of 29 ADF

beacons and 29 radio control stations, as well as 18

illuminated civilian airports. Heinz Orlovius, ed., Die

Deutsche Luftfahrt Jahrbuch 1937, Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag

Fritz Knapp (1938), pp. 94. By 1938, the network of

directional beacons had grown to 34, while 16 airports had

ultra short wave instrument landing systems--and these

figures do not include the navigation systems of the

Luftwaffe. See Heinz Orlovius, ed., Die Deutsche Luftfahrt
10

The only aspect of aviation where a rough equality existed

was in aircraft engine development. The French had always

had a strong engine industry, and in 1940, had some

effective 2,000-horsepower engines in development.42 In

other areas, however, the French declined even to compete

with the Germans. The most dramatic examples of this were

in the development of radar, and of the jet aircraft. At

the outbreak of the war, the French navy had developed radar

technology, but the French air force had no radar program.43 

In contrast, the Germans in 1939 were already producing

advanced radar sets, and were deploying radar for air

defense.44 

During the interwar period, perceiving that the piston

engine had specific speed limitations which were rapidly

being approached by the major powers, Heinkel initiated

production of both jet engines and jet aircraft. With

little government financing and only a handful of

engineers, Heinkel developed the first jet engine program in

Germany in the mid-1930s.45 The culmination of their

efforts came in August 1939, when the Heinkel 178 became the

first jet aircraft to fly.46 

Finally, in the matter of operational forces, there are

other notable disparities between the French and the German

interwar forces. In 1935, the Germans--following the lead

set by the Soviet Union--began to develop airborne forces.47 

 

Jahrbuch 1938, Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Fritz Knapp (1939),

pp. 108-124.

42 Paul Wilkinson, Aircraft Engines of the World, pp. 120-

121. By 1940, the French Air Ministry had developed the

Hispano-Suiza 24Y, rated at 2,200 horsepower.

43 In 1939, the French had developed seaborne radar for the

Liner Normandie. See Kenneth Macksey, Technology in War,

N.Y.: Prentice-Hall Press (1986), p. 120.

44 Werner Niehaus, Die Radarschlacht 1939-1945, pp. 29-34 and

73-75. The German radar program started under a naval

contract in 1929. By 1934, primitive radar sets had been

tested and in 1936, the Luftwaffe initiated the radar that

would become the "Freya". An early Freya was tested in the

1937 Wehrmacht maneuvers. By 1939, Freya radars had been

deployed to detect British bomber raids against

Wilhelmshafen.

45 Walter Boyne, Messerschmidt Me 262, Wash., D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press (1980). A small research team

led by von Ohain began developing a jet engine, the He S-3B,

in April 1936, and completed and ran the engine in March

1937. The total cost was approximately $20,000.

46 Hans Redemann, Innovations in Aircraft Construction, esp.

pp. 106-109.

47 Volkmar Kuhn, German Paratroops in World War II, London:

Ian Allan, LTD. (1978), pp. 8-14.
11

By the outbreak of the war in 1939, a full airborne division

had been formed by the Luftwaffe, and other large units were

in the process of formation.48 In contrast, by 1939 the

French Air Force had formed a small group of 175 airborne

soldiers, and employed them on one maneuver. Otherwise, the

French Army and Air Staff exhibited little interest in

airborne or air-landing troops.49 

In anti-aircraft technology, France and Germany, which had

been approximately equal at the end of World War I,

developed a family of light anti-aircraft guns of 20-37mm.

In production, however, the French placed little emphasis

upon the anti-aircraft arm, and by the outbreak of the war,

the French possessed a mere handful of light anti-aircraft

guns, relative to the Germans. In the field of heavy antiaircraft guns, the French in 1922 had developed an excellent

high-powered 90mm gun, but had then halted further

development of heavy anti-aircraft guns and stayed with the

low-velocity, obsolete 75mm.50 As for the Germans, by 1932,

Krupp and Rheinmetall had developed the famous 88mm antiaircraft gun. By the beginning of World War II, the French

Army had only 4,000 anti-aircraft guns of all types versus

over 3,000 heavy, and 10,000 light anti-aircraft guns for

the German forces.51 

The Influence of Doctrine on French and German

Interwar Technology.

Both the French and the German armies of the interwar period

provide useful illustrations of the dominance of doctrine in

the process of developing military technology. Both the

French and the Germans developed a clear and explicit

doctrine, and in both cases, the armies successfully

developed the technologies that fit their own doctrines.

The interwar French operational doctrine, as expressed in

the Provisional Instructions On the Tactical Employment of

 

48 In 1938, the German paratroop units were organized as the

7th Air Division. In 1939, the 22nd Infantry Division

started retraining as an air landing division. In 1940,

these two airborne divisions would lead the German assault

on the Netherlands. See Volkmer Kuhn, German Paratroops,

pp. 17-19.

49 P. Buffotot, "La Perception du Rréarmement Allemand par

les Organismes de Reseignements Français de 1936 à 1939", in

Revue Historique des Armeés, No. 3 (1979), pp. 173-184. 50 Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History of

French Military Aviation, p. 310. 51 Michel Forget, "Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Luftwaffe und

Heer bei den französichen und deutschen Luftstreitkräften im

Zweiten Weltkrieg", in Luftkriegführung im Zweiten

Weltkrieg, ed. Horst Boog. Herford: E.S. Mittler Verlag

(1993), pp. 479-526, esp. pp. 510-511.
12

Large Units (1921),52 is described as the battaille

conduite, or the methodical battle. In the 1921

Regulations, the French General Staff expressed the view

that technology had so changed the battlefield that

firepower was now the primary element in warfare.53 

Firepower made the defense extremely powerful. The French

Army, however, also determined that only the offense could

bring victory and a successful conclusion to the campaign.

Therefore, a great part of the French doctrinal thought was

tied up in the methodical battle, which is in essence an

offensive doctrine. The French offensive doctrine of the

interwar period had the following characteristics:

_ Strict, centralized control by the core and the

 army, with little room for initiative of junior

 commanders;

_ Since firepower dominated the battle, artillery

 support would be massive, centralized and

 concentrated;

_ The infantry would move forward by short bounds of

 5 kilometers or so, under massive artillery support,

 and at that point, the advance would halt in

 accordance with specific phase lines, so that the

 artillery could deploy forward, and the battle could

 be rejoined, on successive days.

Under the terms of the methodical battle, commanders such as

Gamelin, Petain and Weygand believed that the correct

employment of doctrine could ensure victory.

The methodical battle had its origins in the campaigns and

methodology of 1918. After the disasters of 1916 and 1917,

it seemed that the French Army had finally discovered the

secret of success on the battlefield, by carefully planned

offensives with massive firepower. These forerunners of the

methodical battle proved their effectiveness in the Summer

and Fall of 1918. In its essence, the tactics of late 1918

were geared to the minimization of casualties of the French

Army. Tanks, in fact, played a very large role in the

French methodical battle. In the interwar period, studies

on the armor force developed the corollary to the French

 

52 Ministère de la Guerre, Instruction Provisoire sûr

l'Emploi Tactique des Grande Unités, October 6, 1921. 53 Ibid., Chapter III, Paragraph 115: "Fire is the most

important factor in battle. It destroys or cripples the

enemy. Attack means carrying the fire forward. Defense is

fire that stops."
13

dogma: namely, that infantry would not in fact be able to

successfully advance without strong tank support.54 

The French Army doctrine was couched in the terminology of

science, or more accurately, pseudo-science. Articles and

discussions within the Army concerning the methodical battle

contained numerous tables and formulae, which were published

as appendices to the doctrine.55 For example, various

attacks required specific gun frontages per square kilometer

before an attack could be initiated.56 The effectiveness of

the Maginot Line defenses, in another case was illustrated

by tables demonstrating the number of rounds from German

heavy guns that were necessary to knock out each armored

casement. In this example the number of rounds was so

large, one could conclude that the Maginot Line was

effectively unbreakable.57 In yet another case,

mathematical formulae were used to prove the effectiveness

and superiority of anti-tank guns defending against a German

armored attack.58 

The French Army spent considerable time, effort and money

during the interwar period to develop the necessary

artillery and tank arms which would support the methodical

battle. The Army, in 1940, given the high priority of the

anti-tank gun in French doctrine, was equipped with good

 

54 E. C. Kiesling, "Reform?--Why?: Military Doctrine in

Interwar France.", Paper presented to the SMH, April 8,

1994, p. 11.

55 A typical product of the French scientific approach to war

is found in the 1930s writings of General Narcisse

Chauvineau. An attack on a continuous front required a 3:1

superiority in infantry, a 6:1 superiority in artillery and

15:1 superiority in shells. See Alvin Coox, "General

Narcisse Chauvineau: False Apostle of Prewar French Military

Doctrine", in Military Affairs, February (1973), pp. 15-19,

especially p. 16.

56 Robert Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster, pp. 102-103. 57 The French calculated the destruction of each point of a

fortress' outer works would require 100-150 rounds of 280-

400mm artillery shells. An armored strongpoint in a

fortress required 400 rounds of 320, 370 or 400mm mortar

shells to be destroyed. See "Französiche Anschauungen über

Angriff und Verteidigung an Festungsfronten", in

Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Issue 5 (December 1939),

p. 702.

58 E. C. Kiesling cites a 1937 French study that

overestimated the range and stopping power of a 25mm gun.

The French posited a 1,000 meter effective range, and a rate

of fire of 15 rounds per minute, with a 25% hit rate. Thus,

the French estimated, 19 of 30 German attacking tanks would

be destroyed by a single French antitank gun in a model

battle. See E. C. Kiesling, "Reform?--Why?", pp. 14-15.
14

anti-tank guns.59 Since rapid movement and maneuver were

not part of the French interwar doctrine, however, very

little effort was devoted to developing radio communications

for the Army.

The development of French motor vehicles provides a useful

illustration of the superiority of doctrine over technology.

The Army used early model half-tracks in experiments of the

1920s, and these greatly impressed the German observers.60 

Half-tracks were most suitable for rapid operational

maneuver and motorized units, however, which at the time

were not emphasized in French doctrine. Thus, deployment of

half-tracks was dropped for lack of interest. Armored cars

played a relatively minor role in French doctrine as well,

because reconnaissance had less importance in the French

doctrine. As a result, the high-quality Panhard armored

cars of the 1930s were given a low priority, although the

quality of the product was technically equal to that of the

Germans.61 

Yet another case of the primacy of doctrine over technology

is the example of antiaircraft guns. Anti-aircraft was the

responsibility of the army's Artillery Directorate. The

army placed little confidence in airpower as having a

decisive effect upon the battlefield. Gamelin himself

believed that the losses of aircraft in the first few weeks

of the war would be so heavy, that airpower would cease to

be an important factor in the battle.62 Therefore, the

 

59 On the French antitank gun program, see Ministère de la

Defense, Les Programmes d'Armament, pp. 342-351. General

Gamelin made production of the 25mm anti-tank gun a top

priority in the 1938 army armaments budget. See Henry

Dutailly, "La Puissance Militaire de la France en 1938", in

Revue Historique des Armeés, No. 3 (1983), pp. 5-9. See

also Franz Kosar, Panzerabwehrkanonen 1916-1917, Stuttgart:

Motorbuch Verlag (1980), pp. 55-60.

60 German officers observing the 1922 and 1924 French

maneuvers were impressed by the new French vehicles and

equipment, but held a low opinion of the French tactics for

the equipment. See T-3 Truppenamt, "Die französischen

Herbstmanöver 1922", September 11, 1923, in BA/MA, RH

2/1547, also T-3 Truppenamt, "Die französischen

Herbstmanöver, 1924", December 10, 1924, in BA/MA, RH

2/1547.

61 In 1940, the Germans had about twice as many armored cars

as the French: 350 French to 600+ German. See R.M.

Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces, pp. 432-434. 62 In 1938, General Gamelin commented, "The role of aviation

is apt to be exaggerated, and after the early days of war

the wastage will be such that it will more and more be

confined to acting as an accessory to the army", as cited in
15

French lagged behind in the development of antiaircraft

guns.63 

French Air Force Doctrine and Technical Development.

The technological development of the French ground forces

was limited by the rigid doctrine of the army; the French

air force suffered from the opposite situation: a lack of

clear doctrine providing consistent paradigms for the

development of technology.

In the decade after World War I, French air doctrine

developed little from the operations of 1918. Until 1933,

the French air force was part of the army, and the army was

primarily interested in reconnaissance, observation, close

interdiction and air defense. The use of airpower was not a

priority in the army doctrine of 1921; indeed, aviation was

scarcely mentioned in the army regulations. In the 1930s

the Commanders in Chief, Generals Weygand and Gamelin,

demonstrated little knowledge or informed interest in

military aviation.

The French air force was largely left to its own devices in

developing doctrine, but even after it became an independent

service, the air force generals lacked the status both

within the military and within the French political system

to further specific doctrines or approaches to technology.

The army commander, as the military's supreme commander, had

the status to establish doctrinal and strategic guidelines

for all the services, but showed a lack of interest in

aviation doctrine. This meant that the French air doctrine

of the 1920s and 1930s became, by default, the

responsibility of civilian air ministers, and with changes

in air ministers, doctrine changed dramatically.64 

 

Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second

World War, London: Frank Cass (1977), p. 162. 63 Robert Frankenstein, Le Prix du Réarmament Français 1935-

1939, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne (1982). In the 14-

billion-Franc rearmament program of September 1936, only

4.3% of the equipment funds were devoted to anti-aircraft

defense. Up to 1940, the mainstay of the French antiaircraft force was a slightly improved 75mm gun from World

War I. The armament programs of 1937-1939 funded only 356

new 75mm anti-aircraft guns. See Ministère de la Defense,

Les Programmes d'Armament, pp. 182-183. 64 General Gamelin, appointed as Supreme Commander of the

armed forces in 1938, was unsure of the parameters of his

authority to command the air force. In 1938-1939, he

requested, but did not receive, clarification from the

government. See Martin Alexander, The Republic in Danger:

General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defense,

1933-1940, Cambridge University Press (1992), p. 168.
16

Though the French air arm had mainly an army support

function in the late 1920s, the strategic bombing theories

of the Italian General, Douhet, gained a wide acceptance

among the air force officer corps. In the late 1920s, a

program to produce a "battle plane" in accordance with

Douhet's doctrine was initiated. Known as the "BCR"

(Battle, Combat, Reconnaissance) aircraft, this multiseater, two-engine craft would carry out army support

functions and also be able to reinforce the heavy bomber

force in carrying out long-range, strategic operations.

This attempt to apply Douhet's doctrine to technology

resulted in a series of thoroughly inferior multi-purpose

aircraft, which proved to be mediocre in each mission.

In January 1936, Pierre Cot became French Aviation Minister,

and inaugurated a series of major rearmament programs for

the Air Force. Due to the poor performance of the aviation

industry in developing and manufacturing aircraft, Cot

initiated a program to nationalize and rationalize French

aviation production. By infusing the aviation industry with

large amounts of new capital, he hoped to create the large

air force France needed. From 1936 to 1938, under Cot's

Ministry, the primary focus of the French Air Force was in

building a strategic bomber force. Cot firmly believed in

the offensive mission of the air force, and was an

enthusiast for Douhetian doctrine.65 In 1938, however, when

the government changed and Cot was removed, the new Air

Minister, Guy LeChambre, began a new armaments plan for the

Air Force, known as "Plan 5". Plan 5 rejected the emphasis

on bomber production, and instead placed the production and

development emphasis upon fighter planes.66 Guy LeChambre's

vision of airpower was essentially the same as General

Gamelin's, in that the priority of the French Air Force was

 

65 On the influence of Douhet upon Pierre Cot and the French

Air Force, see Thierry Vivier, "Pierre Cot et la Naissance

de l'Armeé de l'Air", in Revue Historique des Armeés, No.

181 (December 1990), pp. 108-115, esp. pp. 109-110. Pierre

Cot's views on strategic bombing and nationalization are

explained in his Book, L'Armeé de l'Air, Paris: Éditions

Bernard Grasset (1939).

66 This was a regression to the French combat doctrine of the

1920s. The 1928 Air Service Operational Doctrine stressed

the need to gain air superiority. Air Superiority would

not, however, be gained by bombing enemy airfields or

infrastructure, as in German doctrine. Air superiority

would be gained by masses of fighter planes over the front,

in French doctrine. See Ministère de la Guerre, Règlement

Provisoire de Manoeuvre de l'Aeronautique, vol. II (1928),

paras. 1-4 and 6-7.
17

to form a defensive line to protect army operations.67 

Bombing became a secondary mission. Thus, by the outbreak

of the war, the French had in one decade undergone three

major changes in operational doctrine, all instituted by the

Air Ministry. The nationalization program by the war's

outbreak had produced results in increased aircraft

production. Nevertheless, French aircraft production

continued to lag behind that of the Germans. The German

policy tended toward the standardization of a few kinds of

aircraft for specific missions. For example, the Germans

built only one, single-engine fighter in quantity before

World War II: the Me 109. The French, however, distributed

aircraft production among the various aircraft companies,

and ordered small quantities of many different aircraft

models. The French were unable to achieve anything

resembling economies of scale in the 1930s, so that by the

war's outbreak, the French were flying a half dozen

different single-engine fighters to Germany's one. The same

situation existed for bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.68 

Naturally, this resulted in far more complicated logistics,

supply and procurement problems for the French Air Force,

and consequently low operational rates.

On the military side, the French Air Force chiefs of staff

in the 1930s showed little interest in operational

innovation. The two French Air Force Chiefs of Staff prior

to World War II: General Philippe Frequant (October 1936 to

February 1938) and General Joseph Vuillemin (February 1938

to July 1940) initiated no programs for the air force beyond

traditional technologies of standard bombers, fighters and

reconnaissance models. Thus, in 1940, the French Air Force

had no radar and little in the way of radio navigation

equipment. In particular, after little serious study or

experimentation, the French Air Force rejected the concept

of the dive bomber.

What is especially remarkable about the French Air Force is

that, even in fields of aviation where doctrine demanded

specific technical solutions, very little effort was taken

 

67 General Gamelin referred to the Air Force in the 1930s as

"The Shield of the Army." See Martin Alexander, The

Republic in Danger, p. 150. Air Minister Guy LeChambre

reported to the Aeronautical Commission in February 1938,

"In the initial phase of the war, however, what we'll need

above all is to put our airspace under lock and key, as

we've done for our frontiers." See Martin Alexander, The

Republic in Danger, p. 163. 68 According to Emmanuel Chadeau, De Blériot à Dassault:

Histoire de l'Industrie Aéronautique en France 1900-1950, Paris: Fayard (1987), p. 343, "In May 1940....the French

forces employed 23 aircraft types, 38 models in 42

versions...."
18

to link the aircraft with the doctrine, with the exception

of the ill-fated BCR Program. In a nation that has a

strategic bombing doctrine, as France had until 1938, one

might expect an emphasis upon long-range navigation and

instrument flying, yet the French in the 1930s were far

behind the Germans, Americans and British in developing

basic navigational instruments.

The Effect of Technology on German Doctrine.

The Germans, like the French, firmly believed that doctrine

should ideally help guide technological development. In the

German case, both ground-force and air-force technology

demonstrated the impact of operational doctrine upon

equipment development and procurement.

Immediately after World War I, the German Army, led by Hans

von Seeckt as Chief of the General Staff, instituted a

massive study of the lessons of World War I, and to develop

new operational doctrine for the army and the air force. In

the period of 1919-1921, five hundred German officers--

commanders, General Staff officers and technical experts--

were put to work on committees analyzing every aspect of the

operations of the war, from mountain operations to tanks, to

bombing operations, to fighter defense. By 1921, the five

hundred officers, including 130 airmen, had completed their

thorough study of the war's lessons, and out of this was

distilled the German operational doctrine, Army Regulation

487, Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms.69 

Von Seeckt, who coordinated the post-war study of doctrine,

took an entirely different position from the French

military. Von Seeckt believed that maneuver, not firepower,

was the dominant element in warfare, and that to execute

maneuver, mobility was essential. Unlike the French, the

Germans believed much more strongly in the offense. The

Germans sought the means to get the armies out of the

trenches and static battles, which were seen as ultimately

to Germany's strategic disadvantage, and to win campaigns

and decisions quickly, by maneuver and mobility. In

contrast to the French, who affirmed the essential unity of

the army,70 von Seeckt and the Reichswehr maintained a

doctrine of warfare which essentially relied upon the

establishment of two, different armies. One army would be

an elite force, heavily armed with the latest weaponry and

 

69 James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, University Press of

Kansas (1992), pp. 37-43 and 144-155.

70 In response to DeGaulle's 1934 book advocating a separate,

elite mechanized army, General Weygand replied, "Two armies,

not at any price....We already have a mechanized, motorized,

organized reserve. Nothing need be created." Cited in

Paul-Marie De la Gorce, The French Army: A MilitaryPolitical History, N.Y.: George Braziller (1963), p. 273.
19

highly mobile. This army would be the offensive force,

which would seek the decisive battle and out-maneuver its

opponents. The second army would be primarily infantry,

would not be as well-armed, and would primarily consist of

reservists. This second army would act mainly in a

defensive capacity.71 

Again in contrast to the French, Army Regulation 487

emphasized in its preface that war was an art--albeit, a

rational art--and not a science. There was little of the

pseudo-scientific emphasis upon tables and formulae to be

found in the French operational regulations of 1921 and

1936. Army Regulation 487 outlined a number of general

principles to be followed, but no formulae. For example,

the German operational doctrine de-centralized the

operational leadership, and not only allowed, but insisted

that junior officers would possess considerable initiative

in command. Artillery, which in France was highly

centralized, was decentralized in the German Army. The

emphasis was not upon deploying large numbers of guns, as

with the French Army, but rather upon rapidly deploying

smaller numbers of guns. Army Regulation 487 emphasized

combined arms operations, and airpower played an important

part in the German Army operational regulations. In

addition, due to the emphasis upon offensive maneuver, tanks

were given an important role in German doctrine of the

1920s.72 

This operational doctrine led the German Army in a number of

technological directions. For instance, the mobile

battlefield required mobile communications. Accordingly,

the Germans set about in the 1920s to develop an entire

family of army and air force radios for rapid communication.

German doctrine also implicitly emphasized coordination of

the air and ground forces at the operational level, as well

as the use of tanks and armored vehicles. Finally, the

doctrine of maneuver warfare pushed the German Army toward

an intensive study of motorization. By 1926, the first

table of organization and equipment for a motorized

division, and tables of organization and equipment for

mechanized brigades, had been set out in detail by the

General Staff.73 

Technological Development and German Air Doctrine.

 

71 James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 28-34 and

pp. 200-201.

72 Ibid., Chapter 6. 73 Organization of Motorized Division and Motorized Brigades,

in Truppenamt T-4, Winterkriegsspiel 1926-1927, BA/MA RH

2/2822. On TOEs for armor regiments, see

Heeresdienstvorschrift 487 Part II (1923), paragraphs

524-525.
20

In the 1920s, within the German Army, a secret air staff was

set up to perform the functions of an air force general

staff, in the expectation of eventual rearmament, and the

creation of an independent air force. Between 1919 and

1921, the Air Staff carried out a comprehensive study of

World War I, and established a number of principles of air

war, which would form the basis for German air doctrine in

the interwar period.

The German air doctrine of the 1920s was set out in the

Directives for the Operational Air War, written in 1926.74 

The conclusion of the Air Staff from their study of World

War I was that airpower was intrinsically most effective in

the offense, not the defense. Even though German airmen had

fought a defensive air war during World War I, and had

enjoyed an extremely high kill ratio versus the Allies, they

discovered that a strong aerial defense did not lend itself

to decision in war.75 Therefore, the Germans concluded that

bombers were the primary weapon of the air arm. In an air

campaign, the first priority of the air force would be to

gain air superiority. The air superiority battle would be

won by taking the war to the enemy and destroying his air

force, preferably on the ground, in his airfields. Once air

superiority had been gained, the air force would move to the

interdiction and strategic bombing missions. Like the

army, the air force doctrine essentially outlined the

creation of two air forces: one air force would be an army

support force, flying short-range reconnaissance missions,

observation missions, providing fighter defense for the

army, and carrying out ground attacks. The second air force

would be an independent air force serving under the

strategic but not operational direction of the High Command.

The independent air force had a strategic mission. The

operational air force's strategic mission was not solely to

bomb cities or industries deep in the enemy heartland--

although this was a possible mission. The German concept

of strategic air war was based upon strategic effect. The

independent air force, essentially a bomber force and a

long-range force, would be directed toward those targets

that would produce the most decisive effect. This could

sometimes entail bombing the enemy armaments industry, but

in other cases, it could entail direct bombing the enemy

army or his transportation.76 

German air doctrine of the 1920s applied some of the

Prussian Army's most traditional principles to the new

 

74 Richtlinien für die Führung des Operativen Luftkrieges, May 1926.

75 Ibid., paragraphs 1-7. Ibid., para. 40: "A delaying

action in the air or a purely defensive approach does not

describe the true character of the air force."

76 Ibid., paras. 83-85 and 91-95.
21

aerial weapon. First of all, airpower would be used in

mass, and not distributed in small packets. Second, the

strategic air force would maintain a large operational

reserve, ready to exploit opportunities. Third, airpower

would be used at the decisive point.

In 1935, the reestablished Luftwaffe published a new

operational regulation, Luftwaffe Regulation 16: Conduct of

the Air War. The essential principles of air war that had

been developed in the 1926 were outlined in greater detail.

However, the basic lines of doctrinal evolution remained

unchanged. This doctrinal stability was of great benefit in

developing weapons and equipment. The Luftwaffe that went

to war in 1939-1940 was the bomber-heavy force that was

called for by the doctrine of the interwar years.77 The

dive bomber, under study and development since the mid1920s, was available for the CAS mission and also to hit

strategic targets. The German doctrine called for fighter

escort of the bombers so the Me 110 long-range fighter was

developed for this purpose. Army/Air Force cooperation was

an important part of doctrine so a considerable organization

equipped with mobile communications systems was created.78 

Consistently, the deficiencies in the German doctrine also

resulted in deficiencies in equipment development and

procurement. The best illustration of this principle in the

Luftwaffe is found in the lack of interest in doctrine for

naval aviation before World War II. At the outbreak of the

war modern combat aircraft designed for long range antishipping strikes and torpedo attacks were not available.

The naval air arm had to make do with relatively obsolete,

low performance seaplanes.It was a deficiency that would

hurt the Germans considerably when they went to war against

Britain.79 

 

77 In April 1940, the combat forces of the Luftwaffe included

a total of 1,620 fighters, 1,726 bombers, 419 dive bombers

and 46 ground attack planes, for a ratio of 1.4:1

bomber/attack aircraft to fighters. See Williamson Murray,

Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945, Maxwell AFB:

Air University Press (1983), pp. 32-33.

78 Michael Forget, "Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Luftwaffe und

Heer bei den Französischen und deutschen Luftstreitkräften

im Zweiten Weltkrieg", in Luftkriegführung im Zweiten

Weltkrieg, ed. Horst Boog, Herford (1993), pp. 497-525, esp.

pp. 511-512.

79 In October 1939, Navy Commander Admiral Raeder wrote to

Reichsmarschall Göring to complain of the poor performance

and capabilities of the Do 18 and He 115 Seaplanes, which

were the backbone of the Naval Air Arm. Raeder argued that

the Navy urgently needed aircraft with effective range, plus

torpedo and bombing capability. See Admiral Raeder to

Göring, Letter of October 31, 1939, in BA/MA RM 7/168.
22

The Influence of Organization upon Technical Development.

The French Army and Air Force were poorly organized to

develop and oversee the production of modern equipment.

From the end of World War I until the early 1930s the French

Army possessed no centralized office specifically charged

with the responsibility for developing and evaluating new

technology. In the post war era, each of the major branches

of the army (infantry, cavalry, engineers, artillery etc.)

had its own technical office and was responsible for

developing the equipment that pertained to that branch. The

infantry branch, for example, had responsibility for tank

development as tanks were considered to be an auxiliary of

the infantry. Development of other armored vehicles such as

armored cars were, however, the responsibility of the

cavalry branch. No section of the General Staff carried the

authority to coordinate branch weapons programs or to ensure

an objective program of testing.80 While each branch

technical office contained some officers who were qualified

and even highly talented in technical matters there existed

no comprehensive or systematic program of cooperation

between the branches. Development in the French Army was

carried out in a fragmented, compartmentalized manner.

In the early 1930s under the initiative of General Weygand,

then Vice-President of the Conseil Superieur de Guerre, some

attempt was made to bring order to the process. A

Consultative Council on Armament was created consisting of

the senior branch inspectors, General Staff department heads

and the Chief of the General Staff. A Technical Cabinet was

created to act as a central office for research, testing and

manufacture. Yet, the reform had only a partial effect.

The actual development of weapons and the establishment of

the specifications for the equipment still resided within

the branches of the army. In 1933, the energetic and

capable war minister Eduard Daladier created a new

department for the manufacture of armaments which would

execute the armaments plans formulated by the branches, but

supervision over the departments themselves was still

lacking.81 Finally, in 1935, the Technical Cabinet was

replaced by a new section for armaments as a permanent

office of the General Staff. However, this new section

carried relatively little formal authority to coordinate the

development and procurement process.

 

80 Eduard Daladier complained in May 1937 of the extreme

delays in equipment development and production caused by the

Army branch inspectorates. The Armaments Council lacked

both a proper staff, and audit powers. See Martin

Alexander, The Republic in Danger, pp. 118-119. 81 See Robert Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster.
23

The French Air Force's development of equipment suffered

from organizational problems within the French aviation

industry and especially within the Aviation Ministry. The

first problem of the air force was one of command authority.

In wartime, the air force was subordinate to the army. In

peacetime, however, the air force operated under the

Ministry of Aviation. In 1928, when the Aviation Ministry

was created, the air force was still a branch of the army

and the French aviation industry was in a state of decline.

In the 1920s the aviation industry lived primarily from

small orders from the military. Although in the 1920s into

the 1930s the French commercial air lines received the

highest subsidies in Europe,82 the French aviation industry

made little progress in developing modern and competitive

transport planes or an infrastructure of modern airfields.83 

Indeed, waste, mismanagement, and even criminal fraud seems

to have soaked up funds provided to French civilian

aviation. The Aeropostale scandal of 1933, in which airline

officials were found guilty of graft and theft, was one of

the scandals that triggered the nationalization of the

aircraft industry in the mid-1930s.

While there were good arguments for nationalizing the

aircraft industry, there are many examples of the negative

effect that the nationalization had upon production and

development of aircraft. Ministry politics seems to have

played as large a role in the development and production of

aircraft as the requirements of national defense. Marcel

 

82 Ronald Miller and David Sawers, The Technical Development

of Modern Aviation, London: Routledge (1968), p. 15. The

French airlines, while the most heavily subsidized, were

also the most inefficient. In 1928, the French airlines

received only 10.6% of their income from purely commercial

activities. Lufthansa, which carried far more traffic than

French airlines, earned 30% of its income from purely

commercial activities, not including mail service, in 1929.

83 French commercial aircraft design of the interwar period

lagged far behind that of the other major powers. The

Germans made great advances in the use of metal and in the

construction of wings, in such aircraft as the Junkers F 13,

W 33 and W 34. The Junkers trimotors, G 24 and Ju 52, were

very popular outside of Germany. By the 1930s, the Ju 86

and Focke Wulf Condor were in use in German commercial

aviation, and were sought by other countries. The only

French commercial transport of note was the Bloch 220--and

only 16 of these were built before World War II. See Peter

Brooks, The Modern Airline: Its Origins and Development,

London: Putnam (1961), pp. 52-57 and 88-93, also Enzo

Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi, World Aircraft: Commercial

1935-1960, Chicago: Rand McNally (1979), pp. 188-189, on the

Bloch 220.
24

Bloch-Dassault, owner of Bloch Aircraft Company and one of

the leading aircraft designers in France (Bloch-Dassault

would later design the Mirage Jet) was removed as director

of his company when nationalization came. A year later,

Bloch was asked to return but he was dismissed again in

1939.84 The Air Ministry, a bloated and poorly-organized

agency (When it was established in 1928 there were over

1,000 ministry employees in the Paris headquarters alone)

had notoriously poor relationships with manufacturers and

commercial organizations.

While the Air Ministry performed poorly in its duty to

further development of aviation technology, the French Air

Force leadership deserves much of the blame for France's

position in 1940. While the Air Force carefully followed

the development of aircraft there was little planning in the

Air Staff for the materiél and personnel requirements of

maintaining the aircraft and equipment required for a modern

air force. At the outbreak of the war, the French Air Force

had only 40% of their required radiomen and 23% of the

required mechanics. A special commission was set up by the

air force to determine personnel needs on 26 September,

1939--almost a month after the outbreak of war.85 Other

examples of poor industrial planning by the staffs abound.

At the outbreak of the war, French production plummeted due

to the call-up of skilled aircraft factory technicians to

serve as reserve infantrymen at the front. Later in 1939,

many soldiers were released from duty in the army to return

to war production.86 Numerous similar occurrences happened

in the for the manufacture of armaments for the army.

Renault's largest tank plant was almost closed in September,

1939 due to the call-up of skilled workers.87 With decades

to plan for a major war, neither the French Air Force or the

French Army had developed a staff or adequate plans for

coordinating the economic side of warfare.

The failure of the French Air Staff to plan or organize for

the broader requirements of technology was directly

translated into extremely low readiness rates for French

aircraft in May, 1940. Exact figures for aircraft

operational rates are not available (another sign of French

disorganization) for May, 1940 but a fair estimate from the

numbers of aircraft that flew on missions is an average

operational rate of about 50-60% for fighter units and no

 

84 Jack Gee, Mirage, London: MacDonald (1971), p. 8. 85 See Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History

of French Military Aviation, p. 335. 86 Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940, London:

Penguin Books (1969), pp. 127-128.

87 Martin Alexander, The Republic in Danger, p. 371.
25

more than 40% for bomber units.88 Even today, no one is

sure of how many aircraft were grounded for lack of

bombsights, radios, machine guns or other basic equipment--

but even the official histories imply that the numbers were

in the hundreds.89 The Germans began the campaign in 1940

with significant aerial superiority.90 The lack of

coordination and planning by the French Air Force ensured

the Germans a decisive margin of superiority.

German Organization and Technology.

The Reichswehr's approach to developing equipment in the

1920s and 1930s was almost opposite to the French

methodology. General von Seeckt, as Army Commander in Chief

from 1920-1926, reorganized the Army Headquarters and

General Staff to provide clear lines of responsibility for

technical development as well as a centralized agency for

technology within the army. As with the French Army, the

German General Staff (Truppenamt) consisted of the normal

departments; Army Organization, Training, Intelligence,

Operations and Logistics. Under the General Staff came the

inspectorates for the various branches of the army. A

parallel organization to the Truppenamt, the Waffenamt or

"Weapons Office" was created . The Waffenamt, which had as

its chief a general of equal rank to the chief of the

Truppenamt, had approximately as many personnel as the

Truppenamt.91 Under the Waffenamt stood inspectorates for

 

88 Williamson Murray in Strategy for Defeat, p. 36, estimates

a French operational rate of no more than 40% for many

squadrons before May 1940. French historians indicate a

very low operational rate during May 1940. Group attacks

were consistently made with 40-50% of the group's official

strength. See Pierre Paquier, l'Aviation de Bombardement

Française en 1939-1940, Paris: Berger-Levrault (1948),

pp. 8-9 and 208-235, for a log of French air activity

between May 10-20, 1940.

89 See Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, History of

French Military Aviation, pp. 336-370.

90 In May 1940, the French Air Force had over 2,200 aircraft

available. See Lucien Robineau, "Die französiche Luftpolitik

zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen und die Führung des

Luftkrieges gegen Deutschland (September 1939 bis Juni

1940)", in Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Horst

Boog, Herford: E.S. Mittler & Sohn (1993), pp. 723-756, esp.

p. 739. In May 1940, the RAF in France had about 400

aircraft. See Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow

Margin, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press

(1990), p. 126. The German Air Force had approximately

3,600 aircraft to oppose the Allies in May 1940.

91 In the mid-1920s, the Waffenamt employed 64 officers,

including 2 major generals, two colonels and 12 lieutenant
26

weapons development which corresponded to the Truppenamt's

inspectorates. It was the duty of the General Staff

inspectorates to develop ideas, doctrine and training

programs for new equipment as well as requests for research

and specifications for new weapons. The inspectorate worked

together with its corresponding Waffenamt inspectorate which

would develop prototypes and conduct testing. The

responsibility for the development of weapons and equipment

lay directly in the hands of the Chief of the Waffenamt who

reported directly to the Army Commander in Chief and the

Defense Minister.92 

Unlike the compartmentalization of the French system, the

development of technology was seen as a coordinated whole

and several inspectorates would cooperate on the development

of some items of equipment. For example, the chief

responsibility for the development of tanks lay with the

motor vehicle section of the Waffenamt which worked together

with the Inspectorate of Motor Vehicles in the Truppenamt.

However, representatives from the Inspectorate of

Communications Troops were also assigned to the armor

projects in order to ensure radios were developed for the

tanks. The artillery inspectorates were assigned the

responsibility for developing tank guns and also had members

assigned to tank development projects.

Realizing the importance for production planning in modern

warfare, a war economics office was created in 1926 and

reported to the Army Commander. the assignment of the war

economics office was to maintain contact with armaments

industries, collect information and carry out planning for

industrial mobilization.93 

This system, which the Nazis inherited in 1933, worked

fairly rationally to create prototypes of equipment which

matched doctrinal requirements with considerably less

duplication of effort than the programs of the French

General Staff. The French, for example, had two sets of

tank programs in the 1930s--one in the Infantry inspectorate

and the other in the Cavalry Inspectorate. The economics

planning office was never able to effectively meet the

enormous task given to it. However, again in contrast to

 

colonels. An additional 21 officers worked at test sites

for the Waffenamt. See Wehrministerium, Rangliste des

Deutschen Reichsheeres, Berlin (1925).

92 A good overview of the Waffenamt operations can be found

in Erich Schneider's "Waffenentwicklung: Ehrfahrungen im

deutschen Heereswaffenamt", in Wehrwissenschaftliche

Rundschau, vol. 3. (1953), pp. 24-35.

93 On the economic mobilization plans of the German Army, see

George Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr und

Rüstungswirtschaft (1919-1943/45), Boppard am Rhein: Harold

Boldt Verlag (1966), pp. 53-57.
27

the French, by the outbreak of the war at least a

rudimentary personnel plans had been set which exempted

skilled civilian workers in the armaments industries from

military service. The Germans in the early months of the

war experienced only minor reductions in some areas of

production due to the call-up of reservists.94 For the

development of military aviation technology, the Germans had

to rely upon a more awkward organizational system due to the

ban on military aviation required by the Versailles Treaty.

The shadow air staff had representatives spread throughout

the General Staff. For example, the Intelligence Section

contained one or two airmen who specialized in air

intelligence. Sections for aviation were distributed within

the Weapons Office. Also involved in development of

aviation technology was the aviation department of the

Ministry of Transportation. The Aviation Department was

responsible for regulating all aspects of German civil

aviation.

Despite this awkward system, which did not provide for any

single agency for development of aviation, the Germans

managed to forge ahead in development and, by 1927, develop

aircraft technology superior to France's.95 The cause for

the successful rebirth of German aviation in the 1920s was

the extraordinary level of cooperation between the armed

forces, the Aviation Department of the Transportation

Ministry and the civilian manufacturers. The German

Undersecretary for Aviation from 1923-1934 was Captain Ernst

Brandenburg, wartime commander of the 1st Bomber Wing which

had carried out the strategic campaign against London with

Gotha bombers in 1917-18. Brandenburg, who was appointed at

the insistence of the Army Commander von Seeckt, worked to

develop German civil aviation as a basis for later aerial

rearmament.96 

Civilian aviation was staffed throughout by former pilot

officers who retained a reserve status with the shadow

Luftwaffe. Information on all the latest developments in

 

94 See Richard Overy, The Air War: 1939-1945, N.Y.:

Scarborough House (1980).

95 By 1928, Germany had taken from France numerous official

aviation world records, for altitude, distance and duration.

A German-crewed Junkers W 33 aircraft crossed the Atlantic

before a French team in 1928. See L. Hirschaier, ed.,

l'Anneé Aéronautique 1928-1929, Paris: Dunoud (1929),

pp. 98-100, 167, and 245. In 1929-1930, the Germans

developed the 4-motor Junkers G 38 aircraft, the largest

commercial aircraft of the time, with 3,200 horsepower and

38-passenger capacity. See Peter Supf, Das Buch der

deutschen Fluggeschichte, vol. II, p. 613. 96 Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt: Aus seinem Leben, Leipzig:

Koehler Verlag (1940), p. 529.
28

aviation, navigation, equipment and foreign aircraft types

was collected by the Air Staff. Ehrhard Milch, a wartime

captain of the Air Service and a director of Lufthansa,

carried on an extensive correspondence with the Air Staff in

the 1920s providing Lufthansa's experience in long-range

navigation, aircraft engines, new instruments etc.97 

Manufacturers such as Ernst Heinkel worked closely with the

air staff to develop new aircraft at a time when the InterAllied Control Commission had shut down German aviation.98 

In 1926, senior Lufthansa manager (and wartime air officer)

Dr. Robert Knauss made a pioneering long-distance flight

from Berlin to Peking. Upon his return to Berlin, he

delivered his flight logs to Lt.Col. Wilberg, chief army

staff officer for aviation.99 

With a smaller budget than the French, the civil aviation

department used its money wisely to develop the necessary

basic infrastructure for modern aviation.100 The level of

research on aviation carried out in German institutes of the

1920s and early 30s was equivalent to the level of French

research. By the late 1920s, the Germans had planned for a

limited rearmament and the secret air staff accelerated work

in developing prototypes for a reborn German air force.

With a realization that the air staff system of the

Reichswehr General Staff was diluted among too many offices,

General Blomberg in 1932 prepared and won approval for a

plan to consolidate all the Reichswehr air activities into

one department which would be called the "Air Defense

Office".101 Colonel Wilhelm Wimmer, active in the

development of military prototypes since the 1920s, became

head of the Technical Office under the new organization.102 

 

97 The German military archives contain numerous letters and

reports written by Milch, as Lufthansa Director, to the

Chief Air Staff Officer. For example, in 1928 Milch wrote

air staff officer Major Sperrle a friendly report on

Lufthansa's experience with the reliability of various radio

models. See BA/MA RH 2/2222, Correspondence File of 1928. 98 Ernst Heinkel, He 1000, London: Hutchinson (1956),

pp. 78-79.

99 Interview by Author with Hansgeorg Wilberg, son of General

der Flieger Helmuth Wilberg, June 18, 1992.

100 Between 1926 and 1932, the German aviation industry

received 321 million Reichsmarks in government subsidies,

investment, research funds, et al. According to the

exchange rate of the time, this amounted to $12.42 million

per year. See Ralf Schabel, Die Illusion der Wunderwaffen, Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, p. 103.

101 Mathew Cooper, The German Air Force 1933-1945, London:

Jane's (1981), pp. 2-3.

102 Edward Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe, University of Nebraska

Press (1976), p. 59.
29

Under the new Air Ministry, established in 1933, Wimmer and

the Army's aviation experts argued for building up the very

small German aviation industry (battered by the depression,

German aircraft manufacturers had only 3,200 workers in

1932)103 by contracting for moderate numbers of relatively

mediocre aircraft already developed such as the He 51 and

Arado 68 fighters and Ju 52 and Do 23 bombers. While the

aircraft industry expanded to fill the initial orders, a

second generation of high performance aircraft were

developed. This second generation developed under the

tenure of Wimmer as chief of the Technical Office included

the Me 109, Me 110, Do 17, He 111 and Ju 87--all aircraft on

the cutting edge of technology of the era.

There were numerous inefficiencies in the Luftwaffe's prewar

rearmament program, not least the appointment of Udet to

serve as chief of the Technical Office. Whereas the second

generation of German aircraft was developed with great

rapidity the third generation was plagued by delays caused

by constant redesigns. In one case, a very effective

bomber, the Ju 88, was delayed by Udet's insistence that it

be capable of dive bombing. With the exception of the FW

190 fighter, the third generation of Luftwaffe aircraft (Hs

129, Me 210, He 177) were disappointing aircraft. The

problem with over-centralized control is that when the

person at the center is incompetent, the damage can be

great. However, with the exception of Udet's appointment,

Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering, who had little understanding

of modern aviation, interfered little with the technical

decisions made by his generals in the prewar period. Even

Udet could make some technical decisions more astute than

those of the French leaders. For example, in 1936 Udet

decided that the Me 109 would be Germany's only singleengine fighter. This ensured that mass production and

economies of scale would give the German fighter force

superiority over the French in 1940.

Military Culture and Technology. The tradition and culture of the German General Staff

enabled it to adapt at a rapid pace of technical development

and experimentation in the interwar period. The tradition

of the General Staff, which was maintained and strengthened

under the tenure of Hans von Seeckt, emphasized a logical

and critical approach to questions of operational doctrine,

military organization and equipment. The General Staff

Corps had great prestige within the army and the officers

selected for the General Staff were allowed a considerable

degree of freedom to question, criticize and propose new

ideas. While the senior commanders of the army were

expected to have strategic and operational vision, even the

 

103 Edward Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe, p. 73.
30

junior officers of the General Staff were allowed and

encouraged to make modifications and contributions to the

ideas proposed by their seniors. In short, the General

Staff Corps saw itself as a collective body which had the

responsibility to develop ideas.

One of the most characteristic expressions of the German

military culture was the Denkschrift, literally "Thought

Paper". Officers would propose ideas or critique ideas in

essays circulated throughout the General Staff. The

tradition of the General Staff was such that these essays

were read by the senior commanders, and often acted upon.

At the very least, the Denkschrift would provide a framework

for debate.

In the immediate aftermath of World War I, two important

Denkschriften concerning war and technology were circulated

among the High Command. The first was von Seeckt's proposal

for a small, elite and highly mobile professional army.

Maneuver warfare, von Seeckt argued, required a professional

force because only a highly-trained elite force could hope

to effectively use the complex modern weapons and move with

rapidity to gain the decision.104 The second influential

Denkschrift was "The Technical and Tactical Lessons of the

World War", written by Colonel Kurt Thorbeck in 1920. In

it, Thorbeck ruthlessly criticized the General Staff for not

having officers conversant with the technical and material

demands of war. He called the General Staff's lack of

technological familiarity "the basic mistake of the war."105 

Thorbeck's critique would lead to a major reform of military

education and culture under von Seeckt.

The tradition of the Denkschrift, combined with a tradition

of critical examination, meant that the role of technology

was emphasized in the comprehensive study of the lessons of

the war carried out in 1919-1920.106 One of the most

important, and also the most overlooked, reforms that von

Seeckt made in the German General Staff was a new program to

provide technological expertise to the General Staff.

Before World War I, entry into the General Staff had been by

competitive examination and the three-year course at the

Kriegsakademie. Starting in the early 1920s, officers could

 

104 Hans von Seeckt, Denkschrift an der Heeresleitung,

February 18, 1919. U.S. National Archives German Records.

Von Seeckt Papers, File M-132, Roll 21, Item 110.

105 Colonel Kurt Thorbeck, "Die Technische und Taktische Lehre

des Krieges", April 12, 1920, BA/MA RH 12-2/94.

106 Erich von Manstein, who worked in the General Staff

Operations Section after World War I, recorded that the top

priority of the Operations Section in the 1920s was

developing new weaponry, especially armored vehicles and the

motorization of the army. See Erich von Manstein, Aus Einem

Soldatenleben, Bonn: Athenäum Verlag (1958), p. 110.
31

enter the General Staff by attending a civilian university

or technical college, and earning a technical degree.

Approximately 10 officers per year (out of a total officer

corps of 4,000) were selected by the Reichswehr for

attendance at civilian engineering programs, their fees paid

by the army. When the course was completed, the officer

would return to regular duty, usually serving as a

specialist with the Waffenamt.107 Many of the officers,

however, were also given the opportunity for troop commands.

Some of the most senior Wehrmacht leaders of World War Two

took engineering degrees in lieu of the Kriegsakademie--

notably, Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen, who earned a

doctorate in engineering at Reichswehr expense.108 

Along with the program in technical education, von Seeckt

also insisted upon an informal system of technical education

within the officer corps. Dissatisfied with the level of

knowledge of technology and foreign weapons demonstrated by

the General Staff officers, von Seeckt instituted a program

of bimonthly seminars for the officers in the Truppenamt,

who would spend the morning or afternoon being briefed on

the latest technical developments by experts from the

Waffenamt.109 Through his insistence upon technological

literacy, and by encouraging the serious study of

engineering by the officer corps, von Seeckt helped ensure

that the officer corps as a whole would be infused with an

interest in, and appreciation for, technology.

One example of technology being developed within the General

Staff tradition is the effort of Erich von Manstein toward

promoting the concept of the assault gun, or Sturmgeschütze

for the German infantry divisions. In 1935, von Manstein

wrote a Denkschrift outlining his idea for creating an

assault gun: a heavy gun mounted without a turret on a

tracked chassis, that could provide limited armored support

for infantry divisions which were faced with fixed enemy

defenses. Such a gun would be cheaper and simpler to build

than a tank, and would be of enormous value to the infantry

in defense or offense. Manstein argued that a detachment of

such guns should be assigned to each infantry division,

while tanks should remain concentrated in the panzer

 

107 Adolf Reinicke, Das Reichsheer, p. 312. 108 Some of the notable German senior officers who were sent

to receive engineering degrees by the Army in the interwar

period include: Field Marshal von Richthofen (Engineering

PhD.); Maj. Gen. Robert Fuchs, Commander, 1st Air Division;

Gen. der Flieger Johannes Fink, Commander, II Air Corps;

Maj. Gen. Friedrich Deutsch, Commander, 16 Flak Division;

Lt. Gen. Gerhard Conrad, Air Commander, XI Air Corps; and

Lt. Gen. Richard Schimpf, Commander, 3rd Paratroop Division.

109 Hans von Seeckt to Waffenamt, and Inspektionen, January

21, 1924, BA/MA RH 12-2-21.
32

divisions. Guderian and the staff of the Inspectorate of

Panzer Troops strongly opposed the idea of putting assault

guns in the infantry divisions, but the infantry and

artillery inspectorates saw merit in the idea.110 By 1937,

development and testing of the assault guns was underway,

and trials proved their feasibility. By the outbreak of the

war, production of the assault guns was underway, and a

detachment of the first models, with a 75mm gun mounted on

the chassis of a Panzer III tank, proved their worth in

battle.111 The assault gun, developed in many versions,

would become one of the most valuable battlefield weapons of

the German Army in World War II.

Examples such as the assault gun demonstrate the importance

of open and honest debate within the General Staff, and the

possibilities for non-technical specialists to develop

innovative solutions to operational problems. The interest

of von Manstein in the details of new weaponry also

illustrate the wide dissemination of technical knowledge and

interests throughout the army in the interwar period.

The Luftwaffe: Leadership and Technology. The Luftwaffe was the most technologically-oriented of the

German services in the interwar period. The nature of the

ban on military aviation during this period meant that the

Luftwaffe had to be created in the early 1930s from a small

corps of airmen retained by the Reichswehr after World War

I. By necessity, the Luftwaffe had to rely upon the former

officers and pilots of the wartime air service, who had

served in civil aviation from 1919-1934. When rearmament

came, there were several hundred wartime officers with

combat experience, working for Lufthansa, for the aircraft

companies, for the Air Department of the Transportation

Ministry and in the civilian flight schools, who were eager

to reenter the military and join the new Luftwaffe. Just

how important these reserve officers were to aerial

rearmament is demonstrated by the proportion of senior

leaders of the Luftwaffe who came from interwar civil

aviation: of the 600+ generals of the Luftwaffe serving

between 1935 and 1945, approximately 150 had been involved

with civil aviation between 1920 and 1934.112 Erhard Milch,

 

110 Erich von Manstein, Aus Einem Soldatenleben, pp. 246-249.

Manstein's account of the Sturmgeschütze also provides a

good picture of debate within the General Staff, and how the

Army Weapons Office could move efficiently and quickly to

develop an effective new weapon.

111 Walter Spielberger and Uwe Feist, Sturmartillerie, Part I, Fallbrook, Calif.: Arco Publishers (1967).

112 Information from: Karl Friedrich Hildebrand, Die Generale

der deutschen Luftwaffe 1935-1945, vols. I-III, Osnabrück:

Biblio Verlag (1990). Hildebrand has published the official
33

State Secretary for Aviation and Field Marshal, served as a

Director of Lufthansa before rejoining the military.

General der Flieger Robert Knauss, later to be Commander of

the Luftwaffe General Staff College, also came from the

Lufthansa Board of Directors.113 Colonel General Alfred

Keller, Commander of the First Air Fleet from 1940-1943,

worked for Junkers and ran a flight school before 1934.114 

Lt. General Werner Junck, wartime Commander of Jagdkorps II,

worked for Heinkel before joining the Luftwaffe.115 Lt.

General Osterkamp, a World War I pour le Mérite holder,

managed a seaplane station prior to returning to the

Luftwaffe. Osterkamp would become the Air Commander for

North Africa in 1941-1942.116 Officers with a specialized

technical background in civil aviation were enlisted into

the technical and special staffs of the new Luftwaffe, and

many rose to high rank.

Several historians, including Richard Overy, have suggested

that the Luftwaffe suffered from serious leadership

problems, since such a large proportion of the Luftwaffe

officers were brought in from civil aviation.117 Other

writers, noting the several hundred officers transferred

from the army in 1934-35--Wever, Kesselring, and Stumpf, to

name a few--refer to the senior leadership of the Luftwaffe

as "amateur aviators."118 Overy argues that there was a

clash between the "Prussians", the regular officers who had

remained with the Reichswehr, and the "Outsiders", who had

 

service records of all 688 men who reached the rank of

General in the Luftwaffe.

113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Overy asserts that the inclusion of so many reactivated

officers and officers from the army "had the unfortunate

consequence of dividing the air officer corps into those who

regarded themselves as heirs of the Prussian tradition, and

those who came from an unorthodox, particularly technical

background. Part of the hostility felt between regular

soldiers and the parvenues arose from the fact that the

newcomers were given high military office without having

followed the normal army channels." See R.J. Overy, The Air

War 1939-1945, Chelsea, Mich.: Scarborough House (1980),

p. 137.

118 "The result of all this was that the Luftwaffe was shaped

by aviators who were amateur soldiers, and soldiers who were

amateur aviators." From Telford Taylor, The March of

Conquest, Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Press (1991

Reprint), pp. 25-26.
34

reentered the military in 1934-1935. This clash of cultures

and viewpoints seriously damaged the Luftwaffe.119 

Of course, there were serious personality clashes between

senior officers of the Luftwaffe--as with any military

service--but there is no evidence of animosity on the basis

of "Prussian" or "Outsider" status. That Milch was disliked

by many was more a function of his own personality than his

service with Lufthansa. Even those who disliked him

regarded him as highly competent.120 Wever came from the

army, but was nevertheless highly respected by the

professional airmen of the Reichswehr.

I would argue that the influx of hundreds of reserve

officers from civil aviation in the first stages of the

German aerial rearmament was one of the great advantages

that the Germans enjoyed in the interwar period. The

officers from Lufthansa or Junkers were probably better

informed about the nature of modern aircraft technology and

the conditions of long-distance flying than regular French

officers, who had led an air force garrison life of staff

and flying jobs during this same period. The Luftwaffe's

superior use of human resources is one factor which enabled

the Germans to gain the technical advantage over the French

in 1940. The director of airfield construction for the

Luftwaffe was brought in from civilian life as an airfield

construction engineer and professor of architecture at a

civilian university.121 No professional military airmen knew

more about the management side of aviation, nor had they

achieved the same degree of success, as Erhard Milch. As to

the amateur status of officers brought from the Army--many,

like Kesselring, learned to fly and later proved themselves

to be excellent operational air commanders.

The French Military Culture.

The French General Staff tradition was significantly

different from that of the Germans. In the French

tradition, the staff was no more than an organization to

assist the commander. The direction, ideas and vision all

flowed from the commander. Open debate of operational

 

119 Richard Overy, The Air War, p. 136. 120 Field Marshal von Richthofen disliked and distrusted Milch

for his "love of intrigue", but respected him as highly

competent in aviation. From the Author's interview with

Götz Freiherr von Richthofen, son of Field Marshal Wolfram

von Richthofen, June 21, 1992.

121 Chief of construction operations for the Luftwaffe was

Ministerialdirigent Professor Doktor Ingineur Heinrich

Steinmann, a World War I pilot who taught construction

engineering at the Technische Hochschule in Braunschweig

from 1926-1934. See Steinmann's record in Karl Friedrich

Hildebrand, Die Generale der deutschen Luftwaffe.
35

concepts was not part of the French military culture. In

contrast to the comprehensive and critical effort of the 500

officers who worked to develop German operational doctrine

after World War I, the French operational regulation was

drawn up by a committee of 13 officers.122 When Charles

DeGaulle initiated a debate about the organization of a

large armored force in 1934, he was punished by having his

promotion to colonel delayed.

Professor Jenny Kiesling has argued that the French interwar

army discouraged debate because, in an army dependent upon

large numbers of reserve officers, bringing the doctrine of

the army into question would indicate a lack of confidence

and thus undermine morale.123 Other factors may also have

ensured a less critical approach by the French officer

corps. If the French Army had initiated a comprehensive

examination of the lessons of World War I, they would have

had to discuss, and attempt to come to grips with, the

scandalous mass mutinies of 1917, when half the divisions of

the army were incapacitated by their refusal to attack.

Although these mutinies were quelled by hundreds of secret

executions, the French Army has, to this day, refused to

examine those events.124 An honest evaluation of the

performance of the army and its senior officers would have

probably crippled the army in its relations with the

government.

Thus, in the interwar period, the French Army was dependent

upon the understanding of technology possessed by its senior

officers. The two most important commanders of the interwar

period: Marshal Petain, Vice President of the War Council

from 1920 to 1931, and General Gamelin, Army Commander from

1935 to 1940 and Chief of the Defense Staff from 1938 to

1940, were knowledgeable about most aspects of ground forces

 

122 Report to Ministère de la Guerre, October 6, 1921, from

Preface to Ministère de la Guerre, Instruction Provisoire

sur l'Emploi Tactique des Grandes Unites, Report of October

6, 1921. The committee that wrote the report consisted of

General Georges (Chairman); ten army generals, three

colonels, one lieutenant colonel and one major. Only one

officer of the board, General Pujo, was an airman.

123 E.C. Kiesling, "Reform? Why?: Military Doctrine in

Interwar France", Paper read before the Society for Military

History, April 8, 1994, p. 7.

124 Between April and September 1917, serious mutinies broke

out in 54 French divisions. The French Army was temporarily

crippled. Over 20,000 men were found guilty of crimes by

military courts. Hundreds of French soldiers were secretly

executed--even today, the French will not release details.

For an account of the mass mutinies in the French Army, see

Richard Watt, Dare Call It Treason, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster

(1963), esp. pp. 299-303.
36

equipment. Neither, however, had any understanding of

aviation technology, and accordingly the French air weapon

suffered from the senior commanders' neglect. Such German

Army commanders as von Seeckt, Beck, von Blomberg and von

Fritsch, on the other hand, demonstrated a strong interest

in, and support of, military aviation.

The French also suffered from the lack of vision displayed

by its commanders regarding motorization. To be sure, from

the 1930s on,Gamelin placed a high priority upon the

creation of motorized divisions, but his concept of

motorization was essentially flawed. Gamelin was interested

in motorization as a purely strategic concept: the creation

of a motorized reserve force which could move quickly to

Belgium in order to deploy against the Germans. Gamelin,

moreover, had no concept of operational mobility:

motorization helped infantry divisions move quickly by

truck; once they arrived, they would dismount and fight like

any other line infantry division.125 Due to this lack of an

operational concept, the French did not develop

communications, armored carriers, self-propelled guns, etc.

like the Germans--though the French did have the required

expertise, and the industrial base.

The culture of the French Air Force command played a central

role in that force's poor position in 1940. During the

interwar period, the French Air Force had the aspect of a

pilots' club. Commanders were interested in developing

aircraft types, but little thought was given to creating the

infrastructure of an operational force, or in planning for

industrial mobilization. Like the Germans, the French

possessed a large reserve of experienced airmen from the

First World War who had entered civil aviation. As

rearmament accelerated in the 1930s, however, the only

interest that the regular air force officers had in their

reserve officers was in their flying proficiency.126 There

was no search for skills outside the narrow field of

piloting. France produced as many skilled aircraft

engineers in the interwar period as Germany, but the French

Air Staff had little interest in recruiting such men. The

French interwar air force is one of the best examples in

 

125 On French concepts of motorized armor forces, see Jean

DeLaunay, "Chars de Combat et Cavalerie (1917-1942): la

naissance de l'arme blindeé", in Revue Historique des

Armeés, No. 155 (June 1984), pp. 2-18, esp. pp. 10-11. The

concepts of mobility of Gamelin, Weygand and other senior

generals is well-described in Paul Reynaud's Memoirs, In the

Thick of the Fight 1930-1945, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster (1955),

pp. 158-161.

126 See Thierry Vivier, "Les Réservistes de l'Air (1919-1939),

Revue Historique des Armeés, No. 174 (March 1989), pp. 63-

76.
37

history of the misuse of excellent human resources. If

Marcel Bloch-Dassault had been a German, instead of being

fired he would have likely ended up a general in the

Luftwaffe.

CONCLUSION

Many elements contribute to the technology of an armed

force. The economic base of a nation, its educational

system, its financial position, all are decisive factors and

their importance should not be underrated. A comprehensive

approach to the study of interwar technology would require a

hefty volume. I have therefore confined myself to a few

factors concerning the effect of military doctrine,

organization and culture upon technology. My conclusion is

that these factors have as much bearing upon the

development, procurement and employment of weapons as the

objective economic and scientific factors. Further, the

comparison of the French and Germans in this period

illustrates the importance of the individual military

commanders upon the development of technology. One can

plausibly assign some of the blame for the poor state of the

French Army and Air Force in 1940 to the politicians and to

the economy, but this does not absolve the commanders from

failing in their duty to oversee the development of an

effective doctrine, and effective weapons to match that

doctrine. Despite the complaints of the official French

histories concerning the lack of funding for the military in

the interwar period, this was not the major cause for

technological deficiency.127 In those areas where the French

provided higher funding than the Germans--notably, civil

aviation--they still went to war with inferior technology.

It is certainly not my intention to claim that the German

approach was foolproof, or even particularly efficient. The

Germans built their share of bad weapons and aircraft. As

Richard Overy points out in War and Economy in the Third

Reich, the war economy of 1939-1940 was extremely

inefficient.128 Volumes have already been written on the

technological mistakes the Germans made before and during

 

127 General Wegand, French Commander in Chief after Gamelin's

relief in June 1940, argued that the ineffective armament of

the French Army in 1940 was the responsibility of the

military commanders--not just the politicians. See General

Maxim Wegand, Histoire de l'Armeé Française, Paris: Ernest

Flammarion (1953), pp. 418-420.

128 Richard Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford:

Clarendon Press (1994), esp. chapters 8 and 9. Edward

Homze, in Arming the Luftwaffe pp. 262-265, concludes that

the German aviation industry was poorly managed in the

1930s.
38

the war.129 The purpose of this paper is to compare the two

approaches to technology, and the German approach still

comes across by far as the most successful. It was

primarily successful due to a military culture that

encouraged innovation, discussion, debate and a

comprehensive approach to the study of war.

 

129 A useful recent work outlining many of the inefficiencies

of German aircraft production is Willi Boelcke, "Stimulation

und Verhalten von Unternehmen der deutschen

Luftrüstungsindustrie während der Aufrüstungs und

Kriegsphase", in Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed.

Horst Boog, Herford: E.S. Mittler Verlag (1993),

pp. 81-112.