Testimony 

Before the Subcommittees on Cybersecurity, Science, and 

Research & Development and Infrastructure and Border 

Security, Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, April 21, 2004 CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION 

Establishing Effective 

Information Sharing with 

Infrastructure Sectors 

Statement of Robert F. Dacey 

Director, Information Security Issues 

GAO-04-699T 
 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-699T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robert F. 

Dacey at 202-512-3317 or Daceyr@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-699T, testimony 

before the Subcommittees on 

Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & 

Development and on Infrastructure and 

Border Security, Select Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION 

Establishing Effective Information 

Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors 

Federal awareness of the importance of securing the nation’s critical 

infrastructures—and the federal government’s strategy to encourage 

cooperative efforts among state and local governments and the private 

sector to protect these infrastructures—have been evolving since the mid1990s. Federal policy continues to emphasize the importance of the ISACs 

and their information-sharing functions. In addition, federal policy 

established specific responsibilities for the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and other federal agencies involved with the private sector in 

CIP. The ISACs themselves, although they have similar missions, were 

developed to serve the unique needs of the sectors they represent, and they 

operate under different business models and funding mechanisms. 

According to ISAC representatives and a council that represents many of 

them, a number of challenges to their successful establishment, operation, 

and partnership with DHS and other federal agencies remain. These 

challenges include increasing the percentage of entities within each sector 

that are members of its ISAC; building trusted relationships and processes to 

facilitate information sharing; overcoming barriers to information sharing, 

clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the various government and 

private sector entities that are involved in protecting critical infrastructures; 

and funding ISAC operations and activities. According to a DHS official, 

these issues are being considered, and the department is developing a plan 

that will document the current information-sharing relationships among 

DHS, the ISACs, and other agencies; goals for improving those informationsharing relationships; and methods for measuring progress toward these 

goals. 

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers by Sector 

Sector ISAC Established 

Banking and Finance Financial Services October 1999 

Chemicals & Hazardous Materials Chemical April 2002 

Emergency Services Emergency Fire October 2000 

Energy Electric October 2000 

Energy Energy November 2001

Food Food February 2002 

Government Multi-State January 2003 

Information Technology & Telecommunications IT December 2000

 Telecom January 2000 

 Research & Education Network February 2003 

Transportation Public Transit January 2003 

 Surface Transportation May 2002 

 Highway March 2003 

Drinking Water & Water Treatment Systems Water December 2002

Other Real Estate April 2003 

Source: GAO 

Critical infrastructure protection 

(CIP) activities that are called for 

in federal policy and law are 

intended to enhance the security of 

the cyber and physical public and 

private infrastructures that are 

essential to our nation’s security, 

economic security, and public 

health and safety. As our reliance 

on these infrastructures increases, 

so do the potential threats and 

attacks that could disrupt critical 

systems and operations. Effective 

information-sharing partnerships 

between industry sectors and 

government can contribute to CIP 

efforts. 

Federal policy has encouraged the 

voluntary creation of Information 

Sharing and Analysis Centers 

(ISACs) to facilitate the private 

sector’s participation in CIP by 

serving as mechanisms for 

gathering and analyzing 

information and sharing it among 

the infrastructure sectors and 

between the private sector and 

government. This testimony 

discusses the management and 

operational structures used by 

ISACs, federal efforts to interact 

with and support the ISACs, and 

challenges to and successful 

practices for ISACs’ establishment, 

operation, and partnerships with 

the federal government. 
Page 1 GAO-04-699T 

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of private-sector 

information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) and their efforts to help 

protect our nation’s critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructure 

protection (CIP) activities called for in federal policy and law are intended 

to enhance the security of cyber and physical, public and private 

infrastructures that are essential to national security, national economic 

security, or national public health and safety. Beginning with Presidential 

Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), issued in May 1998, federal policy has 

encouraged the voluntary creation of ISACs to facilitate private-sector 

participation and serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and 

appropriately sanitizing and disseminating information to and from 

infrastructure sectors and the federal government. Subsequent federal CIP 

policy, including several national strategies, has continued to emphasize 

the importance of the ISACs and their information-sharing functions.1

Further, CIP policy has established specific responsibilities for the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies with 

respect to public/private collaboration to help protect private 

infrastructure sectors. 

In my testimony today, I will discuss the management and operational 

structures used by the ISACs, including their estimated sector 

participation, business and funding models, and information sharing and 

analysis mechanisms. I will then discuss activities by DHS and other 

federal agencies with responsibilities for specific infrastructure sectors to 

interact and support the ISACs. Lastly, I will discuss some of the ISACidentified challenges to and successful practices for their establishment, 

operation, and partnership with the federal government. 

As agreed, this testimony includes initial results of our ongoing analysis of 

private-sector ISACs, which was requested by your subcommittees. In 

conducting this work, we contacted officials from the 15 different ISAC 

organizations that had been established at the time of our review: 

Chemical, Electricity, Energy, Emergency Management and Response, 

Financial Services, Food, Information Technology, Multi-State, Public 

 1

The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.: 

February 2003); The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, D.C.: February 2003); and Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 

Protection (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003). 
Page 2 GAO-04-699T 

Transit, Real Estate, Research and Education Networking, Surface 

Transportation, Telecommunications, Highway, and Water. Through 

structured interviews with these officials, we obtained and analyzed 

information to describe the ISACs’ current organization and operational 

models, funding mechanisms, sector representation and membership 

criteria, as well as their challenges and successful practices in establishing 

effective information-sharing relationships within their sectors and with 

the federal government. We also contacted officials of the Healthcare 

Sector Coordinating Council to discuss their efforts to establish an ISAC 

for the healthcare sector. Further, we contacted officials of the ISAC 

Council, which was created by 11 ISACs to address common issues, and 

we obtained and analyzed its series of white papers on a range of ISACrelated issues and challenges. Within the federal government, we obtained 

and analyzed information on efforts to work with the private sector by 

DHS and other agencies assigned responsibilities for specific industry 

sectors, including the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Health and 

Human Services, and the Treasury and the Environmental Protection 

Agency. We did not validate the accuracy of the data provided by the 

ISACs, DHS, or other agencies. We performed our work from November 

2003 to April 2004, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

Beginning with PDD 63, federal policy has encouraged the voluntary 

creation of ISACs as key information-sharing mechanisms between the 

federal government and critical infrastructures. While PDD 63 suggested 

certain ISAC activities, CIP policy has essentially left the actual design and 

function of the ISACs to the entities that formed them. As a result, 

although their overall missions are similar, the current ISACs were 

established and developed based on the unique characteristics and needs 

of their individual sectors. They operate under different management and 

operational structures and, among other things, have different business 

models and funding mechanisms. For example, most are managed or 

operated as private entities, and some, such as the Water and Chemical 

ISACs, are part of associations that represent their sectors. Others have 

partnered with government agencies, such as the Telecommunications 

ISAC, which is a government/industry operational and collaborative body 

sponsored by DHS’s National Communications Systems/National 

Coordinating Center (NCC). Different funding mechanisms used by the 

ISACs include fee-for-service, association sponsorship, federal grants, 

and/or voluntary or in-kind operations by ISAC participants. ISACs that 

use fee-for-service funding include the Financial Services, Information 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-04-699T 

Technology, and Water ISACs, that offer tiered memberships with fees 

based on the level of service provided. 

DHS and the sector-specific agencies have undertaken a number of efforts 

to address the public/private partnership called for by federal CIP policy 

and continue to work on their cooperation and interaction with the ISACs 

and with each other. For example, in January 2004, DHS held a 2-day 

conference to describe the information it is analyzing and its use in the 

partnership with the private sector and to discuss information sharing 

between the federal government and the private sector. Also, in February, 

the department established the Protected Critical Infrastructure 

Information (PCII) Program, which enables the private sector to 

voluntarily submit infrastructure information to the government that can 

be protected from disclosure according to provisions of the Critical 

Infrastructure Information Act of 2002. 

According to ISAC representatives and a council that represents many of 

the ISACs, a number of challenges to their successful establishment, 

operation, and partnership with DHS and other federal agencies remain. 

These challenges include increasing the percentage of sector entities that 

are members of the ISACs; building trusted relationships and processes to 

facilitate information sharing; overcoming barriers to information 

sharing—including the sensitivity of the information, legal limits on 

disclosure (such as Privacy Act limitations on disclosure of personally 

identifiable information), and contractual and business limits on how and 

when information is disclosed—and clarifying the roles and 

responsibilities of the various government and private-sector entities 

involved in protecting the critical infrastructures; and funding ISAC 

operations and activities. According to a DHS official, these issues are 

being considered and should be clarified through the department’s 

development of a plan that documents the current information-sharing 

relationships between DHS, the ISACs, and other agencies; goals for 

improving that information-sharing relationship; and methods for 

measuring progress. 

As reliance on our nation’s critical infrastructures grows, so do the 

potential threats and attacks that could disrupt critical systems and 

operations. In response to the potential consequences, federal awareness 

of the importance of securing our nation’s critical infrastructures, which 

underpin our society, economy, and national security, has been evolving 

since the mid-1990s. For example, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 

63), issued in 1998, described the federal government’s strategy for 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-699T 

cooperative efforts with state and local governments and the private 

sector to protect the systems that are essential to the minimum operations 

of the economy and the government from physical and cyber attack. In 

2002, the Homeland Security Act created the Department of Homeland 

Security, which was given responsibility for developing a national plan; 

recommending measures to protect the critical infrastructure; and 

collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information to government and 

private-sector entities to deter, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. 

More recently, HSPD-7, issued in December 2003, defined federal 

responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection, superseding PDD 63. 

Federal awareness of the importance of securing our nation’s critical 

infrastructures has continued to evolve since the mid-1990s. Over the 

years, a variety of working groups has been formed, special reports 

written, federal policies issued, and organizations created to address the 

issues that have been raised. Key documents that have shaped the 

development of the federal government’s CIP policy include: 

• Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), 

• The Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

• The National Strategies for Homeland Security, to Secure Cyberspace 

and for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 

Assets, and 

• Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7 (HSPD-7) and 9 (HSPD-9). 

Presidential Decision Directive 63 Established an Initial CIP Strategy 

In 1998, the President issued PDD 63, which described a strategy for 

cooperative efforts by government and the private sector to protect the 

physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of 

the economy and the government. PDD 63 called for a range of actions 

that were intended to improve federal agency security programs, improve 

the nation’s ability to detect and respond to serious computer-based and 

physical attacks, and establish a partnership between the government and 

the private sector. Although it was superseded in December 2003 by 

HSPD-7, PDD 63 provided the foundation for the development of the 

current sector-based CIP approach. 

To accomplish its goals, PDD 63 established and designated organizations 

to provide central coordination and support, including the National 

CIP Policy Has Continued 

to Evolve 
Page 5 GAO-04-699T 

Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), an organization within the FBI, 

which was expanded to address national-level threat assessment, warning, 

vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and response. 

To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, PDD 63 identified eight 

infrastructures and five functions. For each of the infrastructures and 

functions, the directive designated lead federal agencies, referred to as 

sector liaisons, to work with their counterparts in the private sector, 

referred to as sector coordinators. Among other responsibilities, PDD 63 

stated that sector liaisons should identify and access economic incentives 

to encourage sector information sharing and other desired behavior. 

To facilitate private-sector participation, PDD 63 also encouraged the 

voluntary creation of information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) to 

serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately sanitizing 

and disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and the 

federal government through NIPC. PDD 63 also suggested several key 

ISAC activities to effectively gather, analyze, and disseminate 

information—activities that could improve the security postures of the 

individual sectors and provide an improved level of communication within 

and across sectors and all levels of government. These activities are: 

establishing baseline statistics and patterns on the various infrastructures; 

serving as a clearinghouse for information within and among the various 

sectors; providing a library of historical data for use by the private sector 

and government, and reporting private-sector incidents to NIPC. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed by the President on November 

25, 2002, established DHS. To help accomplish its mission, the act 

established five undersecretaries, among other entities, with responsibility 

over directorates for management, science and technology, information 

analysis and infrastructure protection, border and transportation security, 

and emergency preparedness and response. 

The act made the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

(IAIP) Directorate within the department responsible for CIP functions 

and transferred to it the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of 

several existing organizations with CIP responsibilities, including NIPC 

(other than the Computer Investigations and Operations Section). 

IAIP is responsible for accessing, receiving, and analyzing law 

enforcement information, intelligence information, and other threat and 

incident information from respective agencies of federal, state, and local 

The Homeland Security 

Act of 2002 Established the 

Department’s CIP 

Responsibilities 
Page 6 GAO-04-699T 

governments and the private sector, and for combining and analyzing such 

information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats. 

IAIP is also tasked with coordinating with other federal agencies to 

administer the Homeland Security Advisory System to provide specific 

warning information along with advice on appropriate protective 

measures and countermeasures. Further, IAIP is responsible for 

disseminating, as appropriate, information analyzed by DHS, within the 

department, to other federal agencies, state and local government 

agencies, and private-sector entities. 

Moreover, as stated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, IAIP is 

responsible for (1) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing 

the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States and 

(2) recommending measures to protect the key resources and critical 

infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other federal 

agencies and in cooperation with state and local government agencies and 

authorities, the private sector, and other entities. 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies information 

sharing and systems as one foundation for evaluating homeland security 

investments across the federal government. It also identifies initiatives to 

enable critical infrastructure information sharing and to integrate sharing 

across state and local government, private industry, and citizens. 

Consistent with the original intent of PDD 63, the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security states that, in many cases, sufficient incentives exist 

in the private market for addressing the problems of CIP. However, the 

strategy also discusses the need to use all available policy tools to protect 

the health, safety, or well-being of the American people. It mentions 

federal grant programs to assist state and local efforts, legislation to create 

incentives for the private sector, and, in some cases, regulation. 

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides an initial framework 

for both organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect our nation’s 

cyberspace. It also provides direction to federal departments and agencies 

that have roles in cyberspace security and identifies steps that state and 

local governments, private companies and organizations, and individual 

Americans can take to improve our collective cybersecurity. The strategy 

warns that the nation’s private-sector networks are increasingly targeted 

and will likely be the first organizations to detect attacks with potential 

national significance. According to the cyberspace strategy, ISACs, which 

possess unique operational insight into their industries’ core functions and 

will help provide the necessary analysis to support national efforts, are 

National Strategies 

Establish InformationSharing Initiatives 
Page 7 GAO-04-699T 

expected to play an increasingly important role in the National Cyberspace 

Security Response System2

 and the overall missions of homeland security. 

In addition, the cyberspace strategy identifies DHS as the central 

coordinator for cyberspace efforts and requires it to work closely with the 

ISACs to ensure that they receive timely and threat and vulnerability data 

that can be acted on and to coordinate voluntary contingency planning 

efforts. The strategy reemphasizes that the federal government encourages 

the private sector to continue to establish ISACs and, further, to enhance 

the analytical capabilities of existing ISACs. Moreover, the strategy 

stresses the need to improve and enhance public/private information 

sharing about cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities and to encourage 

broader information sharing on cybersecurity among nongovernmental 

organizations with significant computing resources. The National Strategy 

to Secure Cyberspace also states that the market is to provide the major 

impetus to improve cybersecurity and that regulation will not become a 

primary means of securing cyberspace. 

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets provides a statement of national policy to 

remain committed to protecting critical infrastructures and key assets 

from physical attacks. It outlines three key objectives to focus the national 

protection effort: (1) identifying and assuring the protection of the most 

critical assets, systems, and functions; (2) assuring the protection of 

infrastructures that face an imminent threat; and (3) pursuing 

collaborative measures and initiatives to assure the protection of other 

potential targets. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 

Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets also states that further 

government leadership and intense collaboration between public- and 

private-sector stakeholders is needed to create a more effective and 

efficient information-sharing process to enable our core protective 

missions. Some of the specific initiatives include 

• defining protection-related information requirements and establishing 

effective, efficient information-sharing processes; 

 2

The National Cyberspace Security Response System is a public/private architecture, 

coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security, for analyzing and warning; managing 

incidents of national significance; promoting continuity in government systems and privatesector infrastructures; and increasing information sharing across and between 

organizations to improve cyberspace security. It includes governmental entities and 

nongovernmental entities, such as private-sector ISACs. 
Page 8 GAO-04-699T 

• promoting the development and operation of critical sector ISACs, 

including developing advanced analytical capabilities; 

• improving processes for domestic threat data collection, analysis, and 

dissemination to state and local governments and private industry; and 

• completing implementation of the Homeland Security Advisory System. 

The National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 

Key Assets reiterates that additional regulatory directives and mandates 

should be necessary only in instances where the market forces are 

insufficient to prompt the necessary investments to protect critical 

infrastructures and key assets. 

In December 2003, the President issued HSPD-7, which established a 

national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and 

prioritize critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them 

from terrorist attack. It superseded PDD 63. HSPD-7 defines 

responsibilities for DHS, sector-specific agencies (formerly referred to as 

lead agencies) that are responsible for addressing specific critical 

infrastructure sectors, and other departments and agencies. It instructs 

federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the 

protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate the 

effects of attacks. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security is assigned several responsibilities, 

including 

• coordinating the national effort to enhance critical infrastructure 

protection; 

• identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of critical 

infrastructure, emphasizing protection against catastrophic health effects 

or mass casualties; 

• establishing uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies 

for integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk management 

activities within and across sectors; and 

• serving as the focal point for cyberspace security activities, including 

analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, 

and recovery efforts for critical infrastructure information systems. 

Current Federal Agency 

CIP Responsibilities 
Page 9 GAO-04-699T 

To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, HSPD-7 designated sectorspecific agencies for the critical infrastructure sectors identified in the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security (see table 1). These agencies 

are responsible for infrastructure protection activities in their assigned 

sectors, which include 

• coordinating and collaborating with relevant federal agencies, state and 

local governments, and the private sector to carry out their 

responsibilities; 

• conducting or facilitating vulnerability assessments of the sector; 

• encouraging the use of risk management strategies to protect against and 

mitigate the effects of attacks against the critical infrastructure; 

• identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of critical 

infrastructure; 

• facilitating the sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, 

vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best 

practices; and 

• reporting to DHS on an annual basis on their activities to meet these 

responsibilities. 

Further, the sector-specific agencies are to continue to encourage the 

development of information-sharing and analysis mechanisms and to 

support sector-coordinating mechanisms. HSPD-7 does not suggest any 

specific ISAC activities. 
Page 10 GAO-04-699T 

Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Identified by the National Strategy for Homeland Security and HSPD-7 

Sector Description Sector-specific agency 

Agriculture Provides for the fundamental need for food. The infrastructure includes 

supply chains for feed and crop production. 

Department of Agriculture 

Banking and Finance Provides the financial infrastructure of the nation. This sector consists of 

commercial banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, governmentsponsored enterprises, pension funds, and other financial institutions that 

carry out transactions including clearing and settlement. 

Department of the Treasury 

Chemicals and hazardous 

materials 

Transforms natural raw materials into commonly used products benefiting 

society’s health, safety, and productivity. The chemical industry 

represents a $450 billion enterprise and produces more than 70,000 

products that are essential to automobiles, pharmaceuticals, food supply, 

electronics, water treatment, health, construction, and other necessities. 

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Defense industrial base Supplies the military with the means to protect the nation by producing 

weapons, aircraft, and ships and providing essential services, including 

information technology and supply and maintenance. 

Department of Defense 

Emergency services Saves lives and property from accidents and disaster. This sector 

includes fire, rescue, emergency medical services, and law enforcement 

organizations. 

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Energy Provides the electric power used by all sectors, including critical 

infrastructures, and the refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas. 

The sector is divided into electricity and oil and natural gas. 

Department of Energy 

Food Carries out the post-harvesting of the food supply, including processing 

and retail sales. 

Department of Agriculture and 

Department of Health and 

Human Services 

Government Ensures national security and freedom and administers key public 

functions. 

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Information technology 

and telecommunications 

Provides communications and processes to meet the needs of 

businesses and government. 

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Postal and shipping Delivers private and commercial letters, packages, and bulk assets. The 

U.S. Postal Service and other carriers provide the services of this sector. 

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Public Health and 

Healthcare 

Mitigates the risk of disasters and attacks and also provides recovery 

assistance if an attack occurs. The sector consists of health departments, 

clinics, and hospitals. 

Department of Health and 

Human Services 

Transportation Enables movement of people and assets that are vital to our economy, 

mobility, and security with the use of aviation, ships, rail, pipelines, 

highways, trucks, buses, and mass transit. 

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Drinking water and water 

treatment systems 

Sanitizes the water supply with the use of about 170,000 public water 

systems. These systems depend on reservoirs, dams, wells, treatment 

facilities, pumping stations, and transmission lines. 

Environmental Protection 

Agency 

Source: GAO analysis based on the President’s National Strategy documents and HSPD-7. 

In January, the President issued HSPD-9, which established a national 

policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, 

major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-9 defines responsibilities 

for DHS, lead federal agencies, or sector-specific agencies, responsible for 
Page 11 GAO-04-699T 

addressing specific critical infrastructure sectors, and other departments 

and agencies. It instructs federal departments and agencies to protect the 

agriculture and food system from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies by 

• identifying and prioritizing sector-critical infrastructure and key resources 

for establishing protection requirements, 

• developing awareness and early warning capabilities to recognize threats, 

• mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and processing nodes, 

• enhancing screening procedures for domestic and imported products, and 

• enhancing response and recovery procedures. 

In addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the 

Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and other 

appropriate federal department and agencies, are assigned responsibilities 

including 

• expanding and continuing vulnerability assessments of the agriculture and 

food sectors and 

• working with appropriate private-sector entities to establish an effective 

information-sharing and analysis mechanism for agriculture and food. 

We have made numerous recommendations over the last several years 

related to information-sharing functions that have been transferred to 

DHS. One significant area of our work concerns the federal government’s 

CIP efforts, which is focused on sharing information on incidents, threats, 

and vulnerabilities and providing warnings related to critical 

infrastructures both within the federal government and between the 

federal government and state and local governments and the private 

sector. Although improvements have been made in protecting our nation’s 

critical infrastructures and continuing efforts are in progress, further 

efforts are needed to address the following critical CIP challenges that we 

have identified: 

• developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate 

CIP information sharing that clearly delineates the roles and 

responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines interim 

Prior GAO 

Recommendations 
Page 12 GAO-04-699T 

objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for achieving objectives, and 

establishes performance measures; 

• developing fully productive information-sharing relationships within the 

federal government and among the federal government and state and local 

governments and the private sector; 

• improving the federal government’s capabilities to analyze incident, threat, 

and vulnerability information obtained from numerous sources and share 

appropriate timely, useful warnings and other information concerning 

both cyber and physical threats to federal entities, state and local 

governments, and the private sector; and 

• providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase 

information sharing with the federal government. 

PDD 63 encouraged the voluntary creation of ISACs and suggested some 

possible activities, as discussed earlier; however, their actual design and 

functions were left to the private sector, along with their relationships 

with the federal government. HSPD-7 continues to encourage the 

development of information-sharing mechanisms and does not suggest 

specific ISAC activities. As a result, the ISACs have been designed to 

perform their missions based on the unique characteristics and needs of 

their individual sectors and, although their overall missions are similar, 

they have different characteristics. They were created to provide an 

information sharing and analysis capability for members of their 

respective infrastructure sectors in order to support efforts to mitigate risk 

and provide effective response to adverse events, including cyber, 

physical, and natural events. In addition, the ISACs have taken several 

steps to improve their capabilities and the services they provide to their 

respective sectors. 

The ISACs have developed diverse management structures and operations 

to meet the requirements of their respective critical infrastructure sectors. 

To fulfill their missions, they have been established using various business 

models, diverse funding mechanisms, and multiple communication 

methods. 

Business model—ISACs use different business models to accomplish 

their missions. Most are managed or operated as private entities, including 

the Financial Services, Chemical, Electricity Sector, Food, Information 

ISAC Structures and 

Operations Reflect 

Sector Needs and 

Evolving Goals 

Management and 

Operational Structures 

Vary, but Provide Similar 

Basic Capabilities 
Page 13 GAO-04-699T 

Technology, Public Transit, Real Estate, Surface Transportation, Highway, 

and Water ISACs. Many are established as part of an association that 

represents a segment of or an entire critical infrastructure sector. For 

example, the Association of Metropolitan Water Authorities manages the 

contract for the Water ISAC and the American Chemistry Council manages 

and operates the Chemical ISAC through its CHEMTRAC.3 In addition, the 

North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), 4

 a nonprofit 

corporation that promotes electric system reliability and security, operates 

the Electricity Sector ISAC using internal expertise. 

The legal structure of the ISACs continues to evolve. The Financial 

Services ISAC has evolved from a limited liability corporation in 1999 to a 

501(c)6 non-stock corporation and is managed by a board of directors that 

is comprised of representatives from the Financial Services ISAC’s 

members. According to the Financial Services ISAC Board, the change to 

be a 501(c)6 non-stock corporation, as mentioned above, was made to 

simplify the membership agreement and to make the process for obtaining 

public funding easier. The Energy ISAC also changed from a limited 

liability corporation to a 501(c)3 nonprofit charitable organization to 

eliminate membership barriers. 

Also, government agencies have partnered with the private sector to 

operate certain ISACs. For example, DHS’s National Communications 

Systems/ National Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications 

sponsors the Telecommunications ISAC, which is a government/industry 

operational and collaborative body.5

 DHS provides for the 

 3

The American Chemistry Council represents the leading companies engaged in the 

business of chemistry. CHEMTREC® (Chemical Transportation Emergency Center) is the 

American Chemistry Council’s 24-hour emergency communications center. It was 

established in 1971 to provide emergency responders technical assistance in safely 

mitigating a distribution incident. 

4

The North American Electric Reliability Council’s (NERC) membership includes small and 

large electric utilities, regional utility companies, power marketers, and other entities 

responsible for power generation, transmission, control, and marketing and distribution in 

the United States, Canada, and a portion of Mexico. 

5

The National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications is open to companies that 

provide telecommunications or network services, equipment, or software to the 

communications and information sector; select, competitive local exchange carriers; 

Internet service providers; vendors; software providers; telecommunications professional 

organizations and associations; or companies with participation or presence in the 

communications and information sector. Membership is also allowed for National 

Coordinating Center member federal departments and agencies, and for national 

security/emergency preparedness users. 
Page 14 GAO-04-699T 

Telecommunications ISAC facilities, tools and systems, the NCC manager, 

and the 24x7 watch operations staff. The private sector provides 

representatives who have access to key corporate personnel and other 

resources. In addition, DHS’s United States Fire Administration operates 

the Emergency Management and Response ISAC. New York State, through 

its Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination, is 

coordinating efforts of the Multi-state ISAC. The New York State Office of 

Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination is currently 

studying best practices and lessons learned to assist in developing a 

structure that will include representation by member states. 

Six of the ISACs included in our study use contractors to perform their 

day-to-day operations. According to an Association of Metropolitan Water 

Agencies (AMWA) official, they chose a contractor to operate the Water 

ISAC because the contractor had the appropriate expertise. In addition, 

the contractor’s personnel had government clearances and the ability to 

operate a secure communication system and facility. In addition, ISACs 

use contractors to supplement their operations. For example, a formal 

contract provides for the daily staffing and performance of the Emergency 

Management and Response ISAC’s tasks. It chose this model because of 

federal requirements and the shortage of positions for federal full-time 

employees at the United States Fire Administration. The 

Telecommunications ISAC contracted for analysts to operate its 24 x 7 

watch operations under the management of a government official. 

ISACs also differ in the nature of the hazards that they consider: cyber, 

physical, or all hazards (including natural events such as hurricanes). For 

example, during events of the power outage in August 2003 and Hurricane 

Isabel in September 2003, the Financial Services ISAC was contacted by 

DHS to determine the Banking and Finance sector’s preparedness and the 

impact of those events. However, the Multi-state ISAC will remain focused 

on cyber threats because other state organizations are in place to address 

physical and natural disaster events. 

Funding—ISACs fund their activities using a variety of methods—feesfor-service, association sponsorship, federal grants, and voluntary, or inkind operations by existing participants. For example, the Financial 

Services, Information Technology, and Water ISACs use a tiered fee-forservice model for members. This model establishes different tiers of 

membership based on the level of service provided. These tiers typically 

include some basic level of service that is provided at minimal or no cost 

to the member and additional tiers that provide—for a fee—more 

personalized service and access to additional resources. To help ensure 
Page 15 GAO-04-699T 

that cost is not a deterrent to membership and that the ISAC’s coverage of 

its sector is extensive, the Financial Services ISAC recently, as part of its 

next-generation ISAC effort, shifted to a tiered fee-for-service approach. It 

offers five levels of service that vary in cost—Basic (no charge), Core 

($750 per year), Premier ($10,000 per year), Gold ($25,000 per year), and 

Platinum ($50,000)—for ascending levels of information and analytical 

capabilities. In addition, there is a partner-level license agreement for 

select industry associations ($10,000) for distribution to eligible 

association members of Urgent and Crisis Alerts. For example, the 

Information Technology ISAC recently started to work on a tiered basis 

with fees set annually at $40,000; $25,000; $5,000; $1,000; and free. The 

Water ISAC also uses a tiered approach, with membership fees ranging 

from $7,500 to $750 annually. The Surface Transportation ISAC assesses 

an annual fee from its Class I railroad members of approximately $7,500. 

Some industry associations that operate ISACs fund them from budgets. 

For example, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 

funds the Electricity Sector ISAC, and the American Trucking Association 

funds the Highway ISAC from their budgets. The American Chemistry 

Council fully funds the Chemical ISAC through the previously existing 

Chemical Transportation Emergency Center, known as CHEMTRAC. The 

ten trade associations that are members of it fund the Real Estate ISAC. 

In addition, some ISACs receive funding from the federal government for 

such purposes as helping to start operations, funding memberships, and 

providing expanded capabilities. Examples include the following: 

• The Public Transit ISAC initially received a $1.2 million grant from the 

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to begin operations. Members pay 

no an annual fee and there are no membership requirements from the 

association that started the ISAC—the American Public Transportation 

Association. 

• For FY 2004, the Water ISAC received a $2 million grant from EPA to cover 

annual operating costs, including the expansion of memberships to 

smaller utilities. 

• The Financial Services ISAC received $2 million dollars from the 

Department of the Treasury to enhance its capabilities, including 

technology to broaden membership service. 

• The Highway ISAC received initial funding from DHS’s Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) to start the ISAC. 
Page 16 GAO-04-699T 

• The Energy ISAC received federal grants to assist entities within its 

separate sectors to be members. 

• DHS provides funding for the operation of the Telecommunications ISAC 

that is combined with in-kind services provided by the corporate 

participants. DHS also fully operates the Emergency Management and 

Response ISAC. 

States also provide funding for ISACs. For example, the Multi-state ISAC is 

funded by and functions as part of the New York State Cyber Security 

Analysis Center. In addition, the Research and Education Networking 

ISAC is supported by Indiana University. 

Sharing mechanisms—ISACs use various methods to share information 

with their members, other ISACs, and the federal government. For 

example, they generally provide their members access to electronic 

information via e-mail and Web sites. For example, the Chemical ISAC 

members receive e-mail alerts and warnings in addition to the information 

that is posted to the ISAC’s Web site. The Highway ISAC provides 

members on its Web site with links to IT resources. 

Some ISACs also provide secure members-only access to information on 

their Web sites. For example, the Financial Services ISAC’s Web site offers 

multiple capabilities for members at the premier level and above, 

including, among other things, access to news, white papers, best 

practices, and contacts. The Energy ISAC offers its members access to a 

secure Web site. 

In addition, some ISACs hold conference calls for their members. For 

example, the Chemical ISAC holds biweekly conference calls with DHS. 

The Financial Services ISAC also conducts threat intelligence conference 

calls every two weeks for premier members and above with input from 

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and DHS. These 

calls discuss physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities and incidents that 

have occurred during the previous two weeks, and they provide 

suggestions on what may be coming. The Financial Services ISAC is 

capable of organizing crisis conference calls within an hour of the 

notification of a Crisis Alert, and it hosts regular biweekly threat 

conference calls for remediation of vulnerabilities (viruses, patches). 

ISACs also use other methods to communicate. For example, they may use 

pagers, phone calls, and faxes to disseminate information. In addition, the 

Telecommunications ISAC uses the Critical Infrastructure Warning 
Page 17 GAO-04-699T 

Information Network (CWIN).6 The Financial Services ISAC also sponsors 

twice yearly members’ only conferences to learn and share information. 

According to the ISAC Council, its membership possesses an outreach and 

connectivity capability to approximately 65 percent of the U.S. private 

critical infrastructure. However, the ISACs use various matrices to define 

their respective sectors’ participation in their activities. For example, the 

Banking and Finance sector has estimated that there are more than 25,000 

financial services firms in the United States. Of those, according to the 

Financial Services ISAC Board, roughly 33 percent receive Urgent and 

Crisis Alerts through license agreements with sector associations; these 

firms account for the vast majority of total commercial bank assets, the 

majority of assets under management, and the majority of securities/ 

investment bank transactions that are handled by the sector, but less than 

half the sector’s insurance assets. According to an American Public 

Transportation Association official, the Public Transit ISAC covers a little 

less than 5 percent of the public transit agencies; however, those agencies 

handle about 60 to 70 percent of the total public transit ridership. Further, 

according to NERC officials, virtually all members of NERC are members 

of the Electricity Sector ISAC. As for the Energy ISAC, officials stated that 

its 80-plus members represent approximately 85 percent of the energy 

industry. Membership in the Information Technology ISAC also represents 

85 to 90 percent of the industry, including assets of Internet equipment 

hardware, software, and security providers. For other ISACs, such as 

Chemical and Real Estate, officials stated that it is difficult to determine 

the percentage of the sector that is included. 

Table 2 provides a summary of the characteristics of the ISACs that we 

included in our review. In addition to these ISACs, the Healthcare sector is 

continuing to organize, including efforts to establish an ISAC. According to 

 6

CWIN provides connectivity and 24x7 alert and notification capability to government and 

industry participants. It is engineered to provide a reliable and survivable network 

capability, and it has no logical dependency on the Internet or the Public Switched 

Network. 

ISAC Coverage and 

Participation Varies 
Page 18 GAO-04-699T 

DHS officials, the Emergency Law Enforcement ISAC that was formally 

operated by the NIPC and transferred to IAIP is not currently staffed and 

will be considered in current efforts to organize the Emergency Services 

sector. 

Table 2: Summary of ISAC Characteristics 

Critical Infrastructures 

and their ISAC(s) Coverage Funding model 

Hazards 

covered Analysis capability 

Sharing 

mechanisms 

Agriculture 

None at this time. 

 

Banking & Finance 

Financial Services 

(est. Oct. 1999) 

200 members, 

including 

commercial banks, 

securities firms, and 

insurance 

companies. 

Represents 90% of 

the financial 

sector’s assets. 

Funded by and operated 

with tiered membership 

fees. 

Contractor operated. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Operates 24 hours 

a day, 7 days a 

week. 

Watch desk 

analyzes and 

categorizes threats, 

incidents, and 

warnings based on 

the sector’s needs. 

Text-based alerts, 

through a notification 

system, backed up by 

telephone. 

Biweekly threat 

intelligence 

conference call with 

DHS and SAIC. 

Chemicals & Hazardous 

Materials 

 

Chemical 

(est. April 2002) 

538 individual 

members 

representing the 

chemical industries. 

285 businesses. 

Represents 90% of 

chemical sector. 

Funded and operated by 

ACC’s Chemical 

Transportation 

Emergency Center. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Operates 24x7. 

Currently working to 

develop an analysis 

center. 

E-mails alerts and 

warnings. 

Chemistry ISAC Web 

site. 

Biweekly conference 

calls with DHS. 

Secure 

communications 

network with DHS. 

Defense Industrial Base 

None at this time. 

 

Emergency Services 

Emergency Management 

& Response 

(est. Oct. 2000) 

10 FEMA Regions 

6 major 

stakeholders of 

EMR sector. 

Represents 100% 

of the essential 

components of the 

EMR Sector. 

Funded by FEMA’s 

Office of Cyber Security 

with supplementation 

from USFA. 

Contractor operated. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Developing 24x7 

operations. 

Analyzes and 

disseminates 

actionable 

intelligence on 

threats, attacks, 

vulnerabilities, 

anomalies, and 

security best 

practices. 

Electronic messaging 

Telephone and when 

necessary, a secure 

telephone unit. 
Page 19 GAO-04-699T 

Critical Infrastructures 

and their ISAC(s) Coverage Funding model 

Hazards 

covered Analysis capability 

Sharing 

mechanisms 

Energy 

Electric 

(est. Oct. 2000) 

More then 90% of 

NERC members 

are members of the 

ISAC including 

large and small 

electric utilities, 

regional electric 

utility companies, 

and power 

marketers. 

Funded and 

managed/operated by 

NERC. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Operates 24x7. 

The ES-ISAC and 

NERC have created 

the Indications, 

Analysis, and 

Warnings Program 

(IAW) that provides 

a set of guidelines 

for reporting 

operational and 

cyber incidents that 

adversely affect the 

electric power 

infrastructure. 

Secure telephone, 

fax, and Web server 

E-mail 

Satellite telephones. 

Information such as 

incident reports and 

warnings, vulnerability 

assessments, and 

related documents 

are posted on the 

public Web site. 

Energy 

(est. Nov. 2001) 

80 plus members 

from the oil and gas 

sector. 

Represents 85% of 

the oil and gas 

sector. 

Funded by grants from 

DOE. 

Contractor operated. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Operates 24x7. 

Analyzes threats, 

vulnerabilities, and 

incident information. 

Provides security 

information and 

solutions. 

Conference calls 

Fax, Email, pager. 

Detailed information 

on warnings provided 

on a membership 

only, secure Web site.

Food 

Food 

(est. Feb. 2002) 

Over 40 foodindustry trade 

associations and 

their members. 

No current funding. 

Operated by volunteer 

labor from each member 

association. 

Physical Operates 24x7. 

No analysis 

capability, due to 

members’ privacy 

concerns. Depends 

on DHS for 

analysis. 

E-mail 

Watch Commander 

List 

Currently working to 

develop a secure email system. 

Government 

State Gov. 

(est. Jan. 2003) 

49 states (excluding 

Kansas) and the 

District of Columbia. 

Funded and operated by 

New York State. 

States provide time and 

resources as 

appropriate. 

Cyber 

Physical & 

Natural (as 

it relates to 

cyber). 

Operates 24x7. 

Issues bulletins, 

advisories, and 

alerts. 

Monthly conference 

calls 

E-mail 

Telephone 
Page 20 GAO-04-699T 

Critical Infrastructures 

and their ISAC(s) Coverage Funding model 

Hazards 

covered Analysis capability 

Sharing 

mechanisms 

Information Technology 

& Telecommunications 

 

IT 

(est. Dec. 2000) 

90% of all desktop 

operating systems. 

85% of all 

databases. 

50% of all desktop 

computers. 

85% of all routers. 

65% of software 

security. 

Funded and operated by 

foundational member 

contributions, will soon 

implement membership 

fees (tiered). 

Contractor operated. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Operates 24x7. 

Analyzes cyber 

alerts and 

advisories and 

reports physical 

issues. 

CWIN 

Encrypted e-mail 

SSL-protected Web 

sites 

Cellular phones 

VoIP telephony 

GETS7

 system for 

priority calls 

Telecom 

(est. Jan. 2000) 

95% of wireline 

providers. 

Over 60% of 

wireline vendors. 

95% of wireless 

providers. 

90% of wireless 

vendors. 

42% of Internet 

Service 

subscribers. 

90% of Internet 

Service networks. 

6 of the top system 

integrators in the 

U.S. Federal IT 

market. 

15% of Domain 

Name Service root 

and global Top 

Level Domain 

operators. 

Funded by NCS. 

Operated by NCC. 

Agencies bear the costs 

of their own personnel. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Natural 

Operates 24x7. 

Analyzes data to 

avoid crises that 

could affect the 

entire telecom 

infrastructure. 

E-mail 

Telephone 

Fax 

Meetings 

CWIN 

 7

Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) 
Page 21 GAO-04-699T 

Critical Infrastructures 

and their ISAC(s) Coverage Funding model 

Hazards 

covered Analysis capability 

Sharing 

mechanisms 

Research & Education 

Networking 

(est. Feb. 2003) 

200 Universities. 

All U.S. universities 

and colleges that 

are connected to 

national R&E 

networks have 

basic membership. 

Funded and operated by 

Indiana University. 

Cyber Operates 24x7. 

Receives and 

disseminates 

information 

regarding network 

security 

vulnerabilities and 

threats in the higher 

education 

community. 

Public information 

restricted to 

aggregate views of 

the network. 

Information identifying 

institutions or 

individuals not 

reported publicly. 

Detailed and sensitive 

information shared 

only with affected 

institutions. 

Postal & Shipping 

None at this time. 

 

Public Health & 

Healthcare 

HealthCare 

None at this time. 

Transportation 

Public Transit 

(est. Jan. 2003) 

Approximately 100 

of the major 

national transit 

organizations. 

Federally funded. 

Contractor operated. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Operations 24x7. 

Collects, analyzes, 

and disseminates 

security information. 

E-mail tree 

Secure e-mail 

Public Transit Web 

site 

Links to HSOC, and 

DOT and TSA’s 

Operation Centers. 

Surface Transportation

(est. May 2002) 

Includes the major 

North American 

freight railroads and 

Amtrak. 

Represents 95% of 

the U.S. freight 

railroad industry 

and Amtrak. 

Funded by membership 

fees and a grant from 

the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA). 

Contractor operated. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Natural 

Operates 24x7. 

Conducts mid- to 

long-term technical 

analysis on all 

threats. 

Surface 

Transportation Web 

site. 

Secure telephone. 
Page 22 GAO-04-699T 

Critical Infrastructures 

and their ISAC(s) Coverage Funding model 

Hazards 

covered Analysis capability 

Sharing 

mechanisms 

Highway 

(est. March 2003) 

Over 90% of the 

largest for-hire 

motor carriers. 

Represents 60% 

economic activity 

with over 50% of 

long haul. 

Funded and operated by 

the American Trucking 

Association (ATA). 

Cyber 

Physical 

Developing 24x7 

operations. 

Channels warnings, 

threat information, 

and advisories to 

the industry and to 

drivers through its 

call center. 

Highway ISAC Web 

site 

Highway watch center

Blast fax 

E-mail 

Print media 

communications 

Amber alerts 

Drinking Water & Water 

Treatment Systems 

 

Water 

(est. Dec. 2002) 

275-300 small and 

large water utilities. 

Represents 45% of 

water utilities with 

secure portals. 

Represents 85% of 

the water utilities 

that receive e-mail 

alerts. 

Funded by tired 

membership fees and a 

grant from EPA. 

Contractor operated. 

Receives contributions 

from AMWA. 

Cyber 

Physical 

Operates 24x7. 

Analyzes threat and 

incident information 

for its potential 

impact on the 

sector. 

Encrypted e-mail 

Secure portal 

Secure electronic 

bulletin boards and 

chat rooms 

Other Sectors That Have 

Established ISACs 

 

Real Estate 

(est. April 2003) 

10 trade 

associations 

representing hotels, 

realtors, shopping 

centers, and others. 

Funded by trade 

associations. 

Contractor operated. 

Physical Operates 24x7. 

Depends on DHS 

for threat analysis. 

2-way 

communications 

network and Web site 

Conference calls with 

top executives from 

various sectors as 

needed. 

As discussed earlier, federal CIP policy establishes the position of sector 

coordinator for identified critical infrastructure sectors to initiate and 

build cooperative relationships across an entire infrastructure sector. In 

most cases, sector coordinators have played an important role in the 

development of their respective infrastructure sectors’ ISACs. In many 

cases the sector coordinator also manages or operates the ISAC. 

• The North American Electric Reliability Council, as sector coordinator for 

the electricity segment of the energy sector, operates the Electricity Sector 

ISAC. 

Sector Coordinator Roles 

Differ 
Page 23 GAO-04-699T 

• The Association of American Railroads, as a sector coordinator for the 

transportation sector, manages the Surface Transportation ISAC. 

• The Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, as the sector coordinator 

for the water and wastewater sector, manages the Water ISAC. 

In addition, regarding the telecommunications ISAC, sector coordinators 

participate as members of the ISAC. For example, the Cellular 

Telecommunications and Internet Association, the United States Telecom 

Association, and the Telecommunications Industry Association are all 

members of the NCC, which operates the telecommunications ISAC. In the 

case of the Financial Services ISAC, no formal relationship exists between 

the Banking and Finance Sector Coordinator, the Financial Services 

Sector Coordinating Council, and the ISAC; however, according to 

Financial Services ISAC officials, there is a good relationship between 

them. 

Other ISACs were created and are operated without a formal sector 

coordinator in place, including the Chemical, Emergency Management and 

Response, and Food ISACs. 

Eleven ISACs created an ISAC Council to work on various operational, 

process, and other common issues to effectively analyze and disseminate 

information and, where possible, to leverage the work of the entire ISAC 

community. The ISACs initiated this effort without federal sponsorship. 

Currently, the participating ISACs include Chemical, Electricity, Energy, 

Financial Services, Information Technology, Public Transit, Surface 

Transportation, Telecommunications, Highway, and Water. In addition, the 

Multi-state and Research and Education Networking ISACs are 

participants. 

In February 2004, the council issued eight white papers to reflect the 

collective analysis of its members and to cover a broad set of issues and 

challenges, including 

• Government/Private-Sector Relations. Explains the need for DHS to 

clarify its expectations and to develop roles and responsibilities for the 

ISACs. 

• HSPD-7 Issues and Metrics. Describes specific issues related to the 

private sector that DHS should address when responding to HSPD-7. 

Council Established to 

Improve ISACs’ Efficiency 

and Effectiveness 
Page 24 GAO-04-699T 

• Information Sharing and Analysis. Identifies future goals that the 

ISACs may want to work on achieving, including developing an 

implementation plan. 

• Integration of ISACs into Exercises. Discusses the importance of the 

ISACs and the private infrastructure sectors being involved in government 

exercises that demonstrate responses to possible incidents. 

• ISAC Analytical Efforts. Describes the various levels of capabilities that 

individual ISACs may want to consider supporting, including cyber and 

physical analysis. 

• Policy and Framework for the ISAC Community. Identifies common 

policy areas that need to be addressed to provide effective, efficient, and 

scalable information sharing among ISACs and between ISACs and the 

federal government. 

• Reach of Major ISACs. Describes and identifies the degree of outreach 

that the ISACs have achieved into the U.S. economy. As of September 

2003, the ISAC Council estimated that the ISACs had reached 

approximately 65 percent of the critical infrastructures they represent. 

• Vetting and Trust. Discusses the processes for sharing information and 

the need to develop trust relationships among individual ISAC members 

and among the various ISACs. 

As outlined in HSPD-7 and presented in table 1, DHS and other federal 

agencies are designated as sector-specific agencies for the critical 

infrastructure sectors identified. In addition, DHS is responsible for 

coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the 

critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States and has 

established organizational structures to address its CIP and informationsharing responsibilities. DHS and the sector-specific agencies have 

undertaken a number of efforts to address the public/private partnership 

that is called for by federal CIP policy, and they continue to work on their 

cooperation and interaction with the ISACs and with each other. 

The functions DHS provides to each ISAC differ, and its coordination and 

levels of participation vary for each sector-specific agency. However, the 

department has undertaken a number of efforts with the ISACs and sectorFederal Efforts to 

Establish Cooperation 

and Interaction with 

the ISACs Continue 

DHS Actions to Improve 

Information-Sharing 

Relationships 
Page 25 GAO-04-699T 

specific agencies to implement the public/private partnership called for by 

federal CIP policy. 

DHS has established functions within the department to support the ISACs 

and other CIP efforts. IAIP, as the DHS component directly responsible for 

CIP activities, carries out many of these functions. The Infrastructure 

Coordination Division within IAIP plays a key role in coordinating with the 

ISACs concerning information sharing. Nonetheless, ISACs may interact 

with multiple components of the department. For example, the ISACs may 

discuss cyber issues with the National Cyber Security Division. According 

to a DHS official, the department does not intend to establish a single 

point of contact for ISACs within the department. Rather, the department 

plans to develop policies and procedures to ensure effective coordination 

and sharing of ISAC contact information among the appropriate DHS 

components. In addition, the Infrastructure Coordination Division is in the 

process of staffing analysts who are responsible for working with each 

critical infrastructure sector. The analysts would serve as the primary 

point of contact for the sectors and would address information sharing, 

coordination, information protection, and other issues raised by the 

sectors. 

Further, according to DHS officials, TSA, within the department’s Border 

and Transportation Security Directorate, is working with organizations in 

the private sector to establish information-sharing relationships. For 

example, Surface Transportation ISAC analysts stated that they have a 

good working relationship with TSA, and TSA’s Operations Center has 

office space designated for them. 

In addition, other DHS actions include the following: 

• Last summer, DHS, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 

Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) initiated efforts to organize the agriculture and food 

critical infrastructure sectors to raise awareness and improve security 

efforts. An introductory conference was held with about 100 leading sector 

corporations and associations to make the business case for participating 

in CIP efforts, including the importance of enhancing security and sharing 

information within the sectors. 

• In December, DHS hosted a 2-day CIP retreat with ISAC representatives, 

sector coordinators, and high-level DHS and White House Homeland 

Security Council officials. Participants discussed the needs, roles, and 

responsibilities of public- and private-sector entities related to information 
Page 26 GAO-04-699T 

sharing and analysis, incident coordination and response activities, critical 

infrastructure information requests, and level of DHS funding. During this 

retreat, DHS participated in the first meeting of the Operational Clarity and 

Improvement Task Group, which was formed by the ISAC Council and 

sector coordinators to address the need for a common conceptual 

framework and to clarify current and future efforts to protect the nation’s 

critical infrastructure. 

• In January, DHS’s IAIP Directorate held a 2-day conference to describe the 

information it is analyzing and the use of that information in the 

partnership with the private sector to discuss information sharing between 

the federal government and the private sector. 

• In February, the department established the Protected Critical 

Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program, which enables the private 

sector to voluntarily submit infrastructure information to the government. 

DHS’s IAIP Directorate is responsible for receiving submissions, 

determining if the information qualifies for protection and, if it is 

validated, sharing it with authorized entities for use as specified in the 

Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002. 

In addition to the efforts listed above, DHS officials stated that they 

provide funding to some of the ISACs. For example, DHS has agreed to 

fund tabletop exercises for the Financial Services, Telecommunications, 

and Electricity Sector ISACs. DHS anticipates that the tabletop exercises 

will be completed by August 2004. Also, DHS expects to fund a crosssector tabletop exercise. According to the Financial Services ISAC, 

funding for their tabletop exercise is $250,000. 

Another effort that DHS has undertaken is to maintain regular contact 

with the ISACs. For example, a DHS analyst specializing in the chemical 

sector stated that the Chemical ISAC is in daily contact with DHS and that 

it participates in DHS-sponsored biweekly threat meetings. The 

department also conducts weekly conference calls with several ISACs, 

other DHS components, and private-sector organizations to discuss threats 

and viruses. 

HSPD-7 designates federal departments and agencies to be sector-specific 

agencies. These federal agencies, among other things, are to collaborate 

with the private sector and continue to encourage the development of 

information-sharing and analysis mechanisms. In addition, sector-specific 

agencies are to facilitate the sharing of information about physical and 

cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and 

Sector-Specific Agencies 

Have Taken Action to 

Assist the ISACs 
Page 27 GAO-04-699T 

best practices. Another directive, HSPD-9, establishes a national policy to 

defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major 

disasters, and other emergencies. Some sector-specific agencies have 

taken steps to help the ISACs to increase their memberships and breadth 

of impact within their respective sectors and to improve their analytical 

and communications capabilities. 

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As noted earlier, EPA is 

the sector-specific agency for the water sector. According to EPA 

officials, its Office of Water (Water Security Division), which has been 

designated as the lead for drinking water and wastewater CIP efforts, 

is currently revising EPA’s Office of Homeland Security’s Strategic 

Plan. In addition, the division is working on a General Strategic Plan, 

to identify measurable goals and objectives and determine how the 

division will accomplish that work. Further, these officials stated that 

for fiscal year 2004, EPA issued a $2 million grant to the Water ISAC to 

enhance its capabilities, for example, to fund 24x7 operations and to 

increase and support ISAC membership. They also stated that EPA 

issued $50 million in grants to assist the largest drinking water utilities 

in conducting vulnerability assessments. There are also state grants to 

build communications networks for disseminating information, 

particularly to smaller utility companies. EPA’s Water Security 

Division also makes publicly available various resources related to 

water security including, among other things, emergency response 

guidelines, risk assessment and vulnerability assessment 

methodologies, and a security product guide. The division has also 

developed a “Vulnerability Assessment Factsheet” that gives utility 

companies additional guidance on vulnerability assessments. 

Moreover, the Water Security Division holds biweekly conference calls 

with water associations to promote communications between EPA and 

the private sector, and it provides EPA publications and other 

information to the Water ISAC through e-mail distribution lists. In 

addition, the division has 10 regional offices that work with the states. 

• Department of the Treasury (Treasury). As the sector-specific 

agency for the Banking and Finance sector, Treasury’s Office of CIP 

and Compliance Policy is responsible for CIP-related efforts. It has 

developed policy for its role as a sector-specific agency. The policy 

includes steps to identify vulnerabilities with the assistance of the 

institutions, identify actions for remediation, and evaluate progress in 

reducing vulnerabilities. A major effort by Treasury was having 

consultants work with the Financial Services ISAC’s board of directors 

to evaluate ways to improve the overall reach and operations of the 

ISAC. According to Treasury officials, this effort, in part, led to a 
Page 28 GAO-04-699T 

$2 million grant from Treasury to the ISAC for developing the “next 

generation” Financial Services ISAC. The one-time grant was 

earmarked for enhancing the ISAC’s capabilities. Regarding interaction 

with the Financial Services ISAC, Treasury informally shares high-level 

threat and incident information with the sector through the ISAC. The 

department also chairs the Financial and Banking Information 

Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC), a group of regulators who 

coordinate regulatory efforts to improve the reliability and security of 

financial systems. This group has done a number of things to raise 

awareness and improve the reliability of the institutions. For example, 

under the sponsorship of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 

there are regional outreach briefings that address why the private 

sector needs to partner with the federal government to improve its 

security. Moreover, FBIIC has sponsored the 3,600 priority 

telecommunications circuits for financial institutions under the 

National Communications System’s Telecommunications Service 

Priority and Government Emergency Telecommunications Service 

programs. 

• Department of Energy (DOE). As the sector-specific agency for the 

Energy and Electricity sectors, DOE’s Office of Energy Assurance is 

responsible for fulfilling the roles of critical infrastructure 

identification, prioritization, and protection for the energy sector, 

which includes the production, refining, and distribution of oil and gas, 

and electric power—except for commercial nuclear power facilities. 

However, DOE does not address situational threats such as natural 

disasters or power outages with its ISACs because, in part, the ISACs 

are determining whether it is their role to address these types of 

threats. Information sharing with the ISACs is an informal process, and 

no written policy exists. For example, DOE is collecting threat 

information related to hackers and computer security, but the 

department is not disseminating it to the ISACs or to private industry. 

The Office of Energy Assurance hopes to clarify and expand on this 

subject in its International Program Plan, which is currently in draft 

form. 

• Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). As mentioned 

earlier, HHS is the sector-specific agency for the public health and 

healthcare sector, and it shares that role with USDA for the food 

sector. Currently, there is no ISAC for the healthcare sector. Efforts to 

organize the healthcare sector have been ongoing. In July 2002, HHS 

officials and other government and industry participants were invited 

to the White House conference center to discuss how they wanted to 

organize the sector. A Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC) 
Page 29 GAO-04-699T 

was formed, and HHS requested that MITRE, its contractor, lend 

technical support to the new group as it continues to organize the 

sector and establish an ISAC. In addition, HHS officials stated that the 

department provided $500,000 for ISAC efforts in fiscal year 2003 and 

budgeted $1 million for fiscal year 2004. HHS officials stated that the 

department would likely be agreeable to continuing to provide funding 

for an ISAC. They also stated that an ISAC could be operational within 

the next year. In the meantime, HHS is sharing information with the 

industry through an e-Community group that MITRE has set up on a 

secure Web site. 

Agriculture and Food were only recently designated as critical 

infrastructure sectors and, as with the healthcare sector, efforts to 

organize the sectors are in the beginning stages. HHS has worked with 

the Food Marketing Institute-operated Food ISAC since it was 

established, but the department has focused more of its efforts on 

organizing the agriculture and food sectors. As we mentioned earlier, 

HHS helped initiate efforts to organize the sector by holding an 

introductory conference last summer for about 100 leading sector 

corporations and associations to make the business case for 

participating in CIP efforts. Recently, the department cohosted a 

meeting with DHS and USDA in which industry participants were 

asked how they wished to organize into an infrastructure sector, 

including addressing the existence and expansion of the current Food 

ISAC. As a result of this meeting, participants agreed to establish a 

council of about 10-15 private-sector food and agriculture 

organizations to represent the sector. A federal government council 

will be created to interact with the private sector and with state and 

local governments. The government council will initially include 

several federal government agencies and state and local entities. 

According to HHS officials, the timeframe for organizing the sector and 

setting up an expanded Food ISAC has not been determined, but 

officials anticipated this occurring by fall of 2004. 

• Department of Agriculture (USDA). As mentioned above, USDA 

shares with HHS the sector-specific agency designation for the food 

sector. USDA participated in a conference held last summer and a 

recent meeting with the industry. In addition to those events, USDA’s 

Homeland Security Council Working Group is involved in enhancing 

the agriculture sector’s information-sharing and analysis efforts, which 

may include replacing or improving the current Food ISAC. Another 

USDA effort uses training to reach out to the industry and raise 

awareness. For example, USDA is providing training to private-sector 
Page 30 GAO-04-699T 

veterinarians and animal hospitals on recognizing possible signs of 

bioterrorism activity. 

Although no longer a sector-specific agency for the transportation sector, 

DOT, through its Federal Transit Administration, has provided a grant to 

the Public Transportation ISAC to provide for memberships at no cost. 

Our discussions with the ISACs and the series of ISAC Council white 

papers confirmed that a number of challenges remain to the successful 

establishment and operation of ISACs and their partnership with DHS and 

other federal agencies. Highlighted below are some of the more significant 

challenges identified, along with any successful ISAC practices and related 

actions that have been taken or planned by DHS or others. 

Many of the ISACs report that they represent significant percentages of 

their industry sectors; at least one—the Electricity ISAC—reports 

participation approaching 100 percent. The ISAC Council estimates that 

the overall ISAC community possess an outreach and connectivity 

capability to reach approximately 65 percent of the private critical 

infrastructure. The Council also recognizes the challenge of increasing 

sector participation, particularly to reach smaller entities that need 

security support, but have insufficient resources to actively contribute and 

pay for such support. Officials in DHS’s IAIP acknowledge the importance 

of reaching out to critical infrastructure entities, and are considering 

alternatives to address this issue. 

The Financial Services ISAC provides a notable example of efforts to 

respond to this challenge. Specifically, officials for this organization 

reported that, as of March 2003, its members represented a large portion of 

the sector’s assets, but only 0.2 percent of the number of entities with 

small financial services firms and insurance companies, in particular, were 

underrepresented. To increase its industry membership, this organization 

established its next generation ISAC, which provides different levels of 

service—ranging from a free level of basic service to fees for value-added 

services—to help ensure that no entity is excluded because of cost. 

Further, it has set goals of delivering urgent and crisis alerts to 80 percent 

of the Banking and Finance sector by the end of 2004 and to 99 percent of 

the sector by the end of 2005. To help achieve these goals, the Financial 

Services ISAC has several other initiatives under way, including obtaining 

the commitment of the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council 

(FSSCC—the sector coordinator and primary marketing arm for this ISAC) 

to drive the marketing campaign to sign up its members for the 

Challenges to ISAC 

Establishment and 

Partnership with the 

Federal Government 

Increasing Sector 

Participation and Reach 
Page 31 GAO-04-699T 

appropriate tier of service; encourage membership through outreach 

programs sponsored by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and 

the FSSCC in 24 cities; and to work with individual sector regulators to 

include in their audit checklists whether a firm is a member of the ISAC. 

The Financial Services ISAC believes that its goals are attainable and 

points to its industry coverage, which it says had already increased to 30 

percent in March 2004—only three months after its new membership 

approach began in December 2003. 

Other issues identified that were related to increasing sector participation 

and reach included the following, 

• Officials at two of the ISACs we contacted considered it important that 

the federal government voice its support for the ISACs as the principal 

tool for communicating threats. 

• The ISAC Council has suggested that a General Business ISAC may need 

to be established to provide baseline security information to those general 

businesses that are not currently supported by an ISAC. 

• Many of the industries that comprise our nation’s critical infrastructures 

are international in scope. Events that happen to a private infrastructure 

or public sector organization in another country can have a direct effect in 

the United States, just as events here could have effects in other countries. 

Therefore, an ISAC may need to increase its reach to include the reporting 

and trust of international companies and organizations. 

A key element in both establishing an ISAC and developing an effective 

public/private partnership for CIP is to build trusted relationships and 

processes. From the ISAC perspective, sharing information requires a 

trusted relationship between the ISAC and its membership, such that 

companies and organizations know their sensitive data is protected from 

others, including competitors and regulatory agencies. According to the 

ISAC Council, the ISACs believe that they provide a trusted informationsharing and analysis mechanism for private industry in that they manage, 

scrutinize, establish, and authenticate the identity and ensure the security 

of their membership, as well as ensuring the security of their own data and 

processes. Other steps taken by ISACs to safeguard private companies’ 

information, which may help to foster trusted relationships, included 

sharing information with other entities only when given permission to do 

so by the reporting entity and providing other protections, such as 

distributing sensitive information to subscribers through encrypted e-mail 

and a secure Web portal. 

Building Trusted 

Relationships 
Page 32 GAO-04-699T 

Building trusted relationships between government agencies and the 

ISACs is also important to facilitating information sharing. In some cases, 

establishing such relationships may be difficult because sector-specific 

agencies may also have a regulatory role; for example, the Environmental 

Protection Agency has such a role for the Water sector and HHS’ Food and 

Drug Administration has it for portions of the Food and Agriculture 

sectors. 

Sharing information between the federal government and the private 

sector on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities continues to be a 

challenge. As we reported last year, much of the reluctance by ISACs to 

share information has focused on concerns over potential government 

release of that information under the Freedom of Information Act, 

antitrust issues resulting from information sharing within an industry, and 

liability for the entity that discloses the information.8

 However, our recent 

discussions with the ISACs—as well as the consensus of the ISAC 

Council—identified additional factors that may affect information sharing 

by both the ISACs and the government. 

The ISACs we contacted all described efforts to work with their sectorspecific agencies, as well as with other federal agencies, ISACs, and 

organizations. For example, the Public Transit ISAC said that it provides a 

critical link between the transit industry, DOT, TSA, DHS, and other ISACs 

for critical infrastructures and that it collects, analyzes, and distributes 

cyber and physical threat information from a variety of sources, including 

law enforcement, government operations centers, the intelligence 

community, the U.S. military, academia, IT vendors, the International 

Computer Emergency Response Community, and others. Most ISACs 

reported that they believed they were providing appropriate information to 

the government but, while noting improvements, still had concerns with 

the information being provided to them by DHS and/or their sectorspecific agencies. These concerns included the limited quantity of 

information and the need for more specific, timely, and actionable 

information. In particular, one ISAC noted that it receives information 

from DHS simultaneously with or even after news reports, and that 

sometimes the news reports provide more details. 

 8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Efforts of the 

Financial Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats, GAO-03-173 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 

30, 2003); and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for Selected Agencies and 

Industry Sectors, GAO-03-233 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003). 

Information Sharing 

Between the Private Sector 

and Government 
Page 33 GAO-04-699T 

In its recent white papers, the ISAC Council also has identified a number 

of barriers to information sharing between the private sector and 

government. These included the sensitivity of the information (such as law 

enforcement information), legal limits on disclosure (such as Privacy Act 

limitations on disclosure of personally identifiable information), and 

contractual and business limits on how and when information is disclosed 

(e.g., the Financial Services ISAC does not allow any governmental or law 

enforcement access to its database). But the Council also emphasized that 

perhaps the greatest barriers to information sharing stem from practical 

and business considerations in that, although important, the benefits of 

sharing information are often difficult to discern, while the risks and costs 

of sharing are direct and foreseeable. Thus, to make information sharing 

real, it is essential to lower the practical risks of sharing information 

through both technical means and policies, and to develop internal 

systems that are capable of supporting operational requirements without 

interfering with core business. Consequently, the technical means used 

must be simple, inexpensive, secure, and easily built into business 

processes. 

According to the Council, the policy framework must reduce perceived 

risks and build trust among participants. Further, the Council identified 

three general areas that must be addressed in policy for the informationsharing network to assure network participants that there is good reason 

to participate and that their information will be dealt with appropriately. 

These areas concern policies related to what information is shared within 

ISACs, across ISACs, and to and from government; actions to be 

performed at each node in the information-sharing network, including the 

kinds of analysis to be performed; and the protection of shared 

information and analysis in terms of both limitations on disclosure and use 

and information security controls. 

The white papers also described the processes that are believed to be 

needed to ensure that critical infrastructure and/or security information is 

made available to the appropriate people with reasonable assurance that it 

cannot be used for malicious purposes or indiscriminately redistributed so 

as to become essentially public information. These processes and other 

information-sharing considerations and tasks identified by the Council 

included the following: 

• The ISAC information-sharing process needs to recognize two types of 

information categories—classified and sensitive but unclassified. 

However, the majority of information sharing must focus on the 

unclassified “actionable element” that points the recipient to a problem 

and to remediation action. 
Page 34 GAO-04-699T 

• Each ISAC is responsible for initially validating the trust relationship with 

its member organizations and for periodically reassessing that trust 

relationship. The security structure must understand and continually be in 

dialogue with its vetted members and must manage this trusted 

relationship. 

• Each individual who receives shared information must have a background 

check completed by and at a level of comprehensiveness specified by the 

sponsoring organization. 

• Consequences and remediation must be developed and understood to 

address situations in which information is disclosed improperly—either 

intentionally or unintentionally. 

• The government’s data and information requirements for the sectors and 

the sectors’ requirements for the government need to be defined. 

• The government should establish a standing and formal trusted 

information-sharing and analysis process with the ISACs and sector 

coordinators as the trusted nodes for this dissemination. This body should 

be brought in at the beginning of any effort, and DHS products should be 

released to this group for primary and priority dissemination to their 

respective sectors. 

Building this trusted information-sharing and analysis process is also 

dependent on the protections the government provides for the sensitive 

data shared by ISACs and private companies. As discussed earlier, DHS 

recently issued the interim rule for submitting protected critical 

infrastructure information, which provides restrictions on the use of this 

information and exempts it from release under the Freedom of 

Information Act. However, it remains to be seen whether these protections 

will encourage greater private-sector trust and information sharing with 

the federal government. 

Federal CIP law and policies, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and HSPD-7, establish CIP 

responsibilities for federal agencies, including DHS and others identified 

as sector-specific agencies for the critical infrastructure sectors. However, 

the ISACs believe that the roles of the various government and privatesector entities involved in protecting critical infrastructures must continue 

to be identified and defined. In particular, officials for several ISACs 

wanted a better definition of the role of DHS with respect to them. 

Further, officials for two ISACs thought other agencies might more 

Identifying Roles and 

Responsibilities 
Page 35 GAO-04-699T 

appropriately be their sector-specific agencies. Specifically, the Energy 

ISAC would like its sector-specific agency to be DHS and not the 

Department of Energy, which is also the regulatory agency for this sector. 

On the other hand, the Highway ISAC thought its sector-specific agency 

should be the Department of Transportation—the regulatory agency for its 

sector—and not DHS. 

The ISAC Council also identified the need for DHS to establish the goals of 

its directorates and the relationships of these directorates with the private 

sector. The Council also wants clarification of the roles of other federal 

agencies, state agencies, and other entities—such as the National 

Infrastructure Advisory Council. 

Ten of the ISACs we contacted, plus the Healthcare sector, emphasized 

the importance of government funding for purposes including creating the 

ISAC, supporting operations, increasing membership, developing metrics, 

and providing for additional capabilities. According to ISAC officials, some 

have already received federal funding: the Public Transit ISAC initially 

received a $1.2 million grant from the Federal Transit Administration to 

begin operations, and the Water ISAC received a $2 million grant from 

EPA for fiscal year 2004 to cover annual operating costs and expand 

memberships to smaller utilities. In addition, the Financial Services ISAC 

received $2 million from the Department of the Treasury to help establish 

its next-generation ISAC and its new capabilities, including adding 

information about physical threats to the cyber threat information it 

disseminates. 

Despite such instances, funding continues to be an issue, even for those 

that have already received government funds. For example, the Healthcare 

Sector Coordinating Council, which is the sector coordinator for the 

healthcare industry, is currently looking to the federal government to help 

fund the creation of a Healthcare ISAC. Also, officials at the Public Transit 

ISAC noted that funding is an ongoing issue that is being pursued with 

DHS. Officials at the Financial Services ISAC, who notes that the ISAC’s 

goal is to become totally self-funded through membership fees by 2005, are 

also seeking additional government funding for other projects. 

The ISAC Council has also suggested that baseline funding is needed to 

support core ISAC functionalities and analytical efforts within each sector. 

The Council’s suggestions include that the government should procure a 

bulk license for the ISACs to receive data directly from some vulnerability 

and threat sources and access to analytical or modeling tools and that the 

Obtaining Government 

Funding 
Page 36 GAO-04-699T 

funding for an ISAC analyst to work at DHS to support analysis of sectorspecific information or intelligence requirements. 

According to the Financial Services ISAC, DHS has agreed to fund tabletop 

exercises for some ISACs. For example, according to DHS officials, 

exercises are occurring this week involving the Banking and Finance 

sector and exercises for other sectors are currently being explored. In 

addition, energy sector-related exercises were held earlier in the year. 

DHS officials also stated that funding considerations for the critical 

infrastructure sectors and the ISACs would be based on their needs. 

In our discussions with ISAC officials, several, such as officials from the 

Surface Transportation and the Telecommunications ISACs, highlighted 

their analysis capabilities and, in particular, their analysts’ sector-specific 

knowledge and expertise and ability to work with DHS and other federal 

agencies. The ISAC Council also emphasized that analysis by sectorspecific, subject matter experts is a critical capability for the ISACs, 

intended to help identify and categorize threats and vulnerabilities and 

then identify emerging trends before they can affect critical 

infrastructures. Sector-specific analysis can add critical value to the 

information being disseminated, with products such as 24/7 immediate, 

sector-specific, physical, cyber, all threat and incident report warning; 

sector-specific information and intelligence requirements; forecasts of and 

mitigation strategies for emerging threats; and cross-sector 

interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and threats. 

The Council also emphasized that although government analytical efforts 

are critical, private-sector analytical efforts should not be overlooked and 

must be integrated into the federal processes for a more complete 

understanding. The private sector understands its processes, assets, and 

operations best and can be relied upon to provide the required privatesector subject matter expertise. 

In a few cases, the integration of private-sector analytical capabilities with 

DHS does occur. For example, the Telecommunications ISAC, as part of 

DHS’s National Communication System, has watch standers that are part 

of the DHS operations center and share information, when the information 

owner allows it and when it is appropriate and relevant, with the other 

analysts. In addition, a Surface Transportation ISAC analyst also 

participates in the DHS operations center on a part-time basis to offer 

expertise and connection to experts in the field in order to clarify the 

impact of possible threats. 

Utilizing Sector Expertise 
Page 37 GAO-04-699T 

The ISAC Council highlighted the need for ISAC participation in the 

national-level homeland security exercises that are conducted by the 

federal government, such as DHS’s May 2003 national terrorism exercise 

(TOPOFF 2), which was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the nation’s 

domestic incident management capability. However, according to the 

Council, there has been little or no integration of active private industry 

and infrastructure into such exercises. For example, private industry 

participation in TOPOFF 2 was simulated. The Council believes that with 

such participation, both national and private-sector goals could be 

established during the creation of the exercise and then addressed during 

the exercise. 

The Council did identify examples where the private sector is being 

included in exercises, such as efforts by the Electronics Crime Unit of the 

U.S. Secret Service to reach out to the private sector and support tabletop 

exercises to address the security of private infrastructures. Further, 

according to a DHS official, the department has agreed to fund tabletop 

exercises for members of several ISACs, including Financial Services, 

Chemical, and Electricity, as well as a cross-sector tabletop exercise. 

Additional challenges identified by our work and/or emphasized by the 

ISAC Council included the following. 

• Obtaining Security Clearances to Share Classified Information. As 

we reported last year, several ISACs identified obtaining security 

clearances as a challenge to government information sharing with the 

ISACs. Seven of the 15 ISACs with which we discussed this issue indicated 

either that some of their security clearances were pending or that 

additional clearances would be needed. 

• Identifying Sector Interdependencies. Federal CIP policy has 

emphasized the need to identify and understand interdependencies 

between infrastructure sectors. The ISAC Council also highlighted the 

importance of identifying interdependencies and emphasized that they 

require partnerships between the sectors and the government and could 

only be modeled, simulated, or “practiced” once the individual sectors’ 

dynamics are understood sufficiently. The current short-term focus for the 

ISACs is to review the work done by the government and the sectors 

regarding interdependencies. Similarly, a DHS official acknowledged the 

importance of identifying interdependencies, but that it is a longer-term 

issue. 

Participation in National 

Homeland Security 

Exercises 

Additional Challenges 
Page 38 GAO-04-699T 

• Establishing Communications Networks. Another issue raised through 

the ISAC Council’s white papers was the need for a government-provided 

communications network for secure information sharing and analysis. 

Specifically, the Council suggested that although functionality would be 

needed to satisfy the ISAC s’ requirements, DHS’s Critical Infrastructure 

Warning Information Network (CWIN) could be used as an interim, firstphase communications capability. According to the Council, some of the 

ISACs are conducting routine communications checks at the analytical 

level in anticipation of expanded use of CWIN. In discussing this issue 

with a DHS official, he said that ISAC access to a secure communications 

network would be provided as part of the planned Homeland Security 

Data Network (HSDN). DHS recently announced a contract to initiate the 

implementation of HSDN, which is be a private, certified, and accredited 

network that provides DHS officials with a modern IT infrastructure for 

securely communicating classified information. According to DHS, this 

network will be designed to be scalable in order to respond to increasing 

demands for the secure transmission of classified information among 

government, industry, and academia to help defend against terrorist 

attacks. 

At the time of our study, the relationship and interaction among DHS, the 

ISACs, sector coordinators, and other sector-specific agencies was still 

evolving, and DHS had not yet developed any documented policies or 

procedures. As we discussed earlier, HSPD-7 requires the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to establish uniform policies for integrating federal 

infrastructure protection and risk management activities within and across 

sectors. According to a DHS official, the department is developing a plan 

(referred to as a “roadmap”) that documents the current informationsharing relationships among DHS, the ISACs, and other agencies; goals for 

improving that information-sharing relationship; and methods for 

measuring the progress in the improvement. According to this official, the 

plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of DHS, the ISACs, and other 

entities, including a potential overlap of ISAC-related responsibilities 

between IAIP and the Transportation Security Administration. Further, the 

official indicated that, in developing the plan, DHS would consider issues 

raised by the ISAC Council. 

In summary, since first encouraged by federal CIP policy almost 6 years 

ago, private-sector ISACs have developed and evolved into an important 

facet of our nation’s efforts to protect its critical infrastructures. They face 

challenges in increasing their sector representation and, for some, 

ensuring their long-term viability. But they have developed important trust 

relationships with and between their sectors—trust relationships that the 

federal government could take advantage of to help establish a strong 

DHS Information-Sharing 

Plan 
Page 39 GAO-04-699T 

public/private partnership. Federal agencies have provided assistance to 

help establish the ISACs, and more may be needed. However, at this time, 

the ISACs and other stakeholders, including sector-specific agencies and 

sector coordinators, would benefit from an overall strategy, as well as 

specific guidance, that clearly described their roles, responsibilities, 

relationships, and expectations. DHS is beginning to develop a strategy, 

and in doing so, it will be important to consider input from all 

stakeholders to help ensure that a comprehensive and trusted informationsharing process is established. 

Messrs. Chairmen, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittees may 

have at this time. 

If you should have any questions about this testimony, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3317 or Ben Ritt, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-6443. We can 

also be reached by e-mail at daceyr@gao.gov and rittw@gao.gov, 

respectively. 

Other individuals making key contributions to this testimony included 

William Cook, Joanne Fiorino, Michael Gilmore, Barbarol James, Lori 

Martinez, and Kevin Secrest. 

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