Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Thursday, April 1, 2004 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Destruction Schedule 

Delays and Cost Growth 

Continue to Challenge 

Program Management 

Statement of Raymond J Decker, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

GAO-04-634T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-634T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Raymond J. 

Decker at (202) 512-6020 or 

deckerrj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-634T, testimony 

to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

April 1, 2004

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Destruction Schedule Delays and Cost 

Growth Continue to Challenge Program 

Management 

Since GAO testified in October 2003, the Chem-Demil Program continues to 

fall behind its schedule milestones, which were last extended in 2001. In the 

last 6 months, very little agent has been destroyed. While one site has closed, 

no new sites have started destroying agent (two were scheduled to start by 

March 2004). The delays stem from incidents during operations, 

environmental permitting issues, concerns about emergency preparedness, 

and unfunded requirements. If these delays persist, GAO continues to 

believe that program costs will rise substantially higher than the October 

2003 estimate of more than $25 billion. These rising costs have led to the 

need to reallocate funds within the program’s fiscal year 2005 budget. 

 

Due to schedule delays, the United States will not meet the CWC April 2004 

deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile. Although it has received an 

extension for this task to December 2007, it is questionable if the program 

will meet this deadline. DOD has said it will ask for an extension of the final 

deadline to destroy 100 percent of the stockpile beyond 2007. Unless the 

program resolves the problems causing program delays, the United States 

risks not meeting this deadline, if extended. 

One positive development in the program is that the leadership has been 

stabilized for over a year since the program was reorganized. However, 

several long-standing organizational and strategic planning issues remain. 

One problem is that the program's new management structure is complex, 

with multiple lines of authority within the Army and the separation of ACWA 

from the rest of the program. These complexities raise concerns about the 

roles and responsibilities of the different parts of the program. Program 

officials also told us that they are developing strategic and risk mitigation 

plans, as GAO recommended. 

Since GAO testified in October, there continues to be improvement in the 

preparation of state and local communities to respond to chemical 

emergencies. As of January 2004, 6 of 10 states near the stockpiles report 

they are fully prepared. This is a marked improvement from the status we 

reported in 2001 when three states reported they were far from being 

prepared. However, CSEPP costs continue to rise because some states have 

expanded their preparedness requests beyond their approved budgets. 

Since its inception in 1985, the 

Chemical Demilitarization 

(Chem-Demil) Program has been 

charged with destroying the 

nation’s large chemical weapons 

stockpile of over 31,000 tons of 

agent. The program started 

destroying the stockpile in 1990. As 

of March 2004, the program had 

destroyed over 27 percent of the 

stockpile. The program has 

recently reorganized into the 

Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) 

to manage seven of the nine sites. 

There are five sites using 

incineration to destroy the agent 

and two bulk agent only sites using 

neutralization. The Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Alternatives 

(ACWA) Program, in the 

Department of Defense (DOD), 

manages two sites using 

neutralization to destroy agent in 

weapons. 

This testimony updates GAO’s 

September 2003 report and October 

2003 testimony. As requested, it 

focuses on the following issues: 

(1) changes in the status of 

schedule milestones and costs at 

the sites, (2) recent developments 

that impact the Chemical Weapons 

Convention (CWC) deadlines, 

(3) the challenges associated with 

managing the program, and (4) an 

update on the status of the 

Chemical Stockpile Emergency 

Preparedness Program (CSEPP). 
Page 1 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing today on the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-Demil) 

Program. Since its inception in 1985, this program has been charged with 

destroying the nation’s large chemical weapons stockpile, second only to 

Russia’s in terms of its size. After years of planning and building new 

facilities, the program started destroying the stockpile in 1990. Since 1990, 

we have issued more than 25 reports on the Chem-Demil Program. Nearly 

half of the reviews have raised questions about the program’s growing 

costs, its inability to meet its schedule milestones, and its management 

weaknesses. 

As you requested, my statement updates GAO’s testimony from October 

2003 and focuses on the following issues: (1) changes in the status of 

schedule milestones and costs at the sites, (2) recent developments that 

impact the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines, (3) the 

challenges associated with managing the program, and (4) an update on 

the status of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 

(CSEPP). 

As of March 2004, the Chem-Demil Program had destroyed an estimated 

8,691 tons (27.6 percent) of the total 31,500 tons of the original agent 

stockpile stored at nine sites in the United States and the Pacific Ocean 

at Johnston Atoll. Since our testimony in October 2003, the program has 

destroyed very little additional agent (about 1.5 percent). Of the four sites 

that have begun agent destruction operations, Johnston Atoll has 

destroyed its entire stockpile and is closed; Tooele, Utah, has reduced its 

stockpile by about 47.1 percent; Anniston, Alabama, has destroyed 

5.1 percent of its stockpile; and Aberdeen, Maryland, has destroyed 

7.9 percent of its stockpile. Current schedule estimates show that the 

Army will not complete destruction of the entire stockpile until after the 

year 2012. 

For this testimony, we conducted work that included discussions with 

officials from DOD, the Army, and FEMA. We also drew on the work we 

conducted for our September 2003 report1

 and October 2003 testimony.2

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along 

with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD’s Destruction Program, 

GAO-03-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2003). 
Page 2 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

We performed our work in March 2004 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary, we found the following: 

• Since we testified in October 2003, the Chem-Demil Program continues to 

fall behind its schedule milestones, which were extended in 2001. These 

schedule delays led to increased program costs and very little agent 

destruction over the last 6 months. We testified that four incineration sites 

and one bulk agent site would miss their scheduled milestones. However, 

since then, one of the incineration sites has closed and an additional bulk 

agent site has missed its scheduled milestone, resulting in five sites 

remaining behind approved destruction schedules. The remaining three 

sites—two Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) sites and 

one incineration site have not yet missed schedule milestones, but they too 

have experienced delays. The delays stem from ongoing incidents during 

operations, environmental permitting issues, concerns about emergency 

preparedness, and unfunded requirements. If these delays persist, we 

continue to believe that program costs will rise substantially higher than 

the October 2003 estimate of more than $25 billion. These rising costs have 

led to the need to reallocate funds within the program’s fiscal year 2005 

budget. 

• Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC’s 

April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the chemical stockpile. The 

United States asked the governing body of the convention for and received 

an extension for this deadline to December 2007. Although it has received 

an extension for this task, it is questionable if the program will meet this 

deadline. Moreover, DOD has said it will ask for an extension of the final 

deadline to destroy 100 percent of the stockpile beyond 2007. Unless the 

Chem-Demil Program is able to resolve the problems that have caused 

schedule delays to destroy the stockpile, the United States also risks not 

meeting CWC’s deadline to destroy the entire stockpile, if extended to 

2012.3

• We previously testified that despite efforts to improve the management 

and reorganize the Chem-Demil Program, the program has suffered from 

 2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Better Management Tools Needed to 

Guide DOD’s Stockpile Destruction Program, GAO-04-221T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 

2003). 

3

 The CWC allows extensions of up to 5 years to the 2007 deadline. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

several long-standing and unresolved management, organizational, and 

strategic planning issues. Recently, under the new organization, the 

leadership of the program has stabilized. However, the program’s complex 

management structure, with multiple lines of authority within the Army 

and the separation of program components between the Army and DOD, 

raises concerns about the roles and responsibilities of the different parts 

of the program. For example, DOD manages two of the program’s nine 

sites separately from the Army’s management of the other sites. In 

addition, the absence of an overarching, comprehensive management 

strategy has resulted in a program without a clear road map to 

closely guide and integrate all of its activities and monitor its performance. 

Neither DOD nor the Army has adopted a comprehensive risk management 

approach that could help mitigate potential problems that affect program 

schedules, costs, and safety by anticipating problems and developing 

proactive plans. Program officials also told us that they are developing 

strategic and risk mitigation plans, as we have recommended. 

• Since our October 2003 testimony, states and communities have continued 

to improve their emergency preparedness to respond to chemical 

incidents. Based on the states’ self-assessments and FEMA’s reviews, 6 of 

the 10 states near the eight storage sites are fully prepared and the 

remaining 4 are close to being fully prepared. In addition, in response to 

recommendations in our 2001 report,4

 FEMA and the Army have 

implemented a number of actions to improve technical assistance and 

guidance, training, and compliance measures to assess preparedness. 

However, despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise 

because some state and local communities have expanded their 

emergency preparedness requests beyond their approved budgets. The 

requests for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 exceeded approved budgets by a 

total of $88 million. In a few communities, these requests have grown as 

the sites have moved closer to the agent operations phase. These unfunded 

requirements have caused further delays in overall program operations 

because funds have to be diverted from other sites approved budgets to 

pay for these communities’ requirements. To date, CSEPP has spent a total 

of $723 million in local communities. 

 4 Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for 

Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001). 
Page 4 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

Since our October 2003 testimony, the Chem-Demil Program continues to 

struggle to meet its schedule milestones and remain within its cost 

estimates. These schedule delays led to increased program costs and very 

little agent has been destroyed over the last 6 months. We testified then 

that most incineration sites would miss their scheduled milestones 

established in 2001. At that time Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Bluff had 

missed their 2001 milestones to begin agent destruction operations and 

Johnston Atoll had missed its milestone for shutting down the facility. 

However, since then, three of these sites have experienced further delays. 

Table 1 shows the delays at Umatilla, Pine Bluff, and Johnston Atoll 

incineration sites since October 2003. The delays stem from incidents 

during operations, environmental permitting issues, emergency 

preparedness, and unfunded requirements. If these delays persist, we 

continue to believe that program costs will rise substantially higher than 

the October 2003 estimate of more than $25 billion. These rising costs have 

led to the need to reallocate funds within the program’s fiscal year 2005 

budget. 

Table 1: Delays in Meeting Schedule Milestones, by Incineration Site 

Site 

Next schedule 

milestone 

October 2003 

estimate to 

begin next 

milestone 

Current 

estimates to 

begin next 

phasea

Difference 

between 2003 

status and 

current 

estimate 

(no. of months)

Umatilla Operations Mar. 2004 Juy 2004 +4

Pine Bluff Operations Apr. 2004 July 2004 +3

Johnston Atoll End of closure Nov. 2003 Dec. 2003 +1

Sources: DOD and the U.S. Army. 

a

 Actual date that Johnston Atoll closed and program manager’s official estimates for Pine Bluff and 

Umatilla to start operations. 

As of March 2004, the two bulk-agent only sites, Aberdeen and Newport, 

have experienced delays and Aberdeen has missed its scheduled milestone 

for draining the agent from the ton containers. In 2002, DOD approved 

using an accelerated method that was expected to increase the rate of 

destruction at these two sites. The Army estimated that this process would 

reduce the scheduled end of operations at both sites by 5 years, from 2008 

to 2003 at Aberdeen and from 2009 to 2004 at Newport. However, 

Aberdeen has encountered unanticipated problems with the processing of 

the mustard agent in the ton containers and has extended its planned 

completion date from October 2003 to December of 2004. The program has 

Most Sites Will Miss 

Schedule Milestones 

Due to Program’s 

Inability to Anticipate 

and Influence Issues 
Page 5 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

exceeded the 6-month period it estimated would be needed for accelerated 

destruction of the agent. Additionally, the site has only drained 152 of the 

1,817-ton containers as of March 2004. Even if finished by December 2004, 

this time frame only covers the first stage of the operation to remove the 

mustard agent from the containers. An added problem, the hardening and 

congealing of residual agent in the ton containers, will require a second 

stage of operation to remove the residual agent. In addition, Newport has 

faced construction delays and community resistance to offsite treatment 

of waste byproducts. As a result of these delays, Newport extended its 

planned start date for agent operations twice: first from October 2003 to 

February 2004, and again to August 2004. However, the current plan to 

ship the waste to a treatment facility in New Jersey from Indiana has not 

been finalized and faces opposition from residents, workers, and 

environmental groups. DOD has not programmed funds to treat the waste 

on-site or to store it there until a disposal location has been finalized. 

At the two ACWA sites, Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, DOD 

directed that they pursue accelerated destruction methods. According to 

program officials, the initial accelerated approaches proposed by the 

contractors exceeded DOD programmed funding and have to be 

reevaluated. Until the plans are approved, final schedule milestones 

cannot be set. This means both projects have been delayed while 

additional design work is completed. 

These delays and schedule extensions5

 have contributed directly to 

program cost growth, according to program officials. As a result, DOD’s 

total program cost estimate grew from $15 billion to $24 billion between 

1998 and 2001. (See fig. 1.) Because of delays encountered since the 2001 

revisions, the Army is now in the process of developing new milestones 

that will extend beyond those adopted in 2001. According to a DOD 

official, the program will use events that have occurred since 2001 in 

presenting new cost estimates to DOD for preparation of the fiscal year 

2006 budget submission. Program officials told us that they estimate new 

costs had increased by $1.4 billion as of October 2003, and this estimate is 

certainly going to rise further, given the information we obtained on 

schedule delays from fiscal year 2005 budget documents and from 

program officials. 

 5

 Schedule extensions or slippages are caused primarily by actual destruction rates being 

lower than planned. 
Page 6 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

Figure 1: Comparison of 1998, 2001, and 2003 Cumulative Program Cost Estimates 

As an example of the impact schedule delays have on the program, DOD’s 

fiscal year 2005 budget request includes a realignment of $147 million from 

the ACWA program to the rest of the program. Additional requirements 

have been identified that will likely delay the schedule further if future 

realignments are necessary. 

Although the United States met the first two chemical weapons treaty 

deadlines, the continuing delays in the schedule jeopardize its ability to 

meet the final two deadlines. (See table 2.) The program will not meet the 

April 2004 CWC deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile. Although 

it has received an extension for this task to December 2007, it is 

questionable if the program will meet this deadline. Unless the 

Chem-Demil Program is able to resolve the problems that have caused 

schedule delays to destroy the stockpile, the United States will likely risk 

not meeting the deadline, if extended to 2012, to eliminate 100 percent of 

the stockpile. 

Schedule Delays 

Required CWC 

Extension of 

Deadlines 
Page 7 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

Table 2: CWC Deadlines 

Sources: CWC and U.S. Army. 

Despite recent efforts to improve the management and change the 

organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program continues to falter 

because several long-standing management, organizational, and strategic 

planning weaknesses remain unresolved. While the program has lacked 

sustained leadership in the recent past, this situation has stabilized. 

However, the program’s complex structure, with its many lines of 

authority within the Army and between the Army and DOD, raises 

questions about the roles and responsibilities of its various offices. In 

addition, the program lacks strategic and risk management plans to guide 

and integrate its activities. 

Although the program has experienced turbulence in key leadership 

positions in the recent past, the current leadership has been in place for 

more than a year, and these leaders have a substantial history of 

involvement with the program. The new leadership team is clarifying its 

roles, responsibilities, decision-making authority, and accountability. 

However, despite the recent reorganization, this change has not 

streamlined the program’s complex organization, as we documented in our 

2003 report.6

 The establishment of the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) 

in January 2003 has left the Director reporting to two different senior 

Army organizations. The reorganization has also divided the responsibility 

for various program phases between two offices within CMA. One 

organization, the Program Manager for the Elimination of Chemical 

Weapons, will manage the first three phases (design, construction, and 

systemization) for each site, and a newly created organization, the 

Director of Operations, will manage the final two phases (operations and 

 6 GAO-03-1031. 

Required percentage of 

agent destroyed Deadlines for destruction 

Date United States 

met deadline 

1 April 29, 2000 September 1997 

20 April 29, 2002 July 2001 

45 April 29, 2004 Will not meet 

100 April 29, 2007 Will not meet 

Long-standing 

Management and 

Strategic Planning 

Weaknesses Hamper 

Program Progress 

Program Management 

Structure Remains 

Complex 
Page 8 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

closure). Moreover, the reorganization did not address the relationship 

between the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program 

and the Army’s CMA since DOD manages ACWA separately from the 

Army, as congressionally directed. 

In response to our recommendations in our September 2003 report, 

according to DOD officials, the Army is developing a strategic plan to 

address the goals, objectives, and performance measures of the program. 

DOD says it is now in the process of developing a risk management plan. 

In the past, because the program had used a crisis management approach, 

it was forced to react to, rather than control issues. We believe a risk 

management approach would allow DOD and the Army to proactively 

anticipate and address potential problems that could adversely affect 

program schedule, costs, and safety. 

FEMA and the Army continue to provide assistance to state and local 

communities to improve their emergency preparedness. Since our October 

2003 testimony, states and communities have continued to improve their 

emergency preparedness to respond to chemical incidents. Additionally, 

FEMA has provided software and training to state and local communities 

to help them simplify development of CSEPP financial reporting 

documents. FEMA also has published a Recovery Workbook.7

 The 

workbook fills a void in state and local guidance for emergency 

responders to follow in the event of a chemical emergency. FEMA also 

expanded its capability assessment readiness tool to assist local 

communities in quantifying benchmark scores. In January 2004, FEMA 

reported to Congress that these achievements have aided CSEPP 

communities in reaching 95 percent of their benchmark compliance. Six of 

10 states near the eight storage sites reported that they are fully prepared 

and the remaining 4 reported being close to fully prepared. 

Despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise because, 

according to Army and FEMA officials, some state and local communities 

continue to identify additional emergency requirements that exceed DOD’s 

 7

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive 

in Preparing States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001). 

Recovery plans refer to support activities that occur following a chemical event. The 

primary purpose is to protect the public health and safety while returning the community 

to normal conditions. 

Program Lacks Strategic 

and Risk Management 

Plans 

Emergency 

Preparedness 

Program Is Improving, 

but Costs Are Rising 
Page 9 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

programmed funding. This situation occurs because of the open 

interpretation of “maximum protection” concept that governs CSEPP. 

These unfunded requests have two effects. First, they cause the 

benchmarks showing how prepared each community is to change from 

fully compliant to not compliant from year to year. Second, they cause 

funds to be transferred from destruction activities to CSEPP and result in 

further delays in the destruction schedule. Army and FEMA officials 

explain that the states often identify and expand their requirements, 

especially as destruction facilities move closer to the start of the 

operations phase. For example, the states of Colorado, Alabama, and 

Oregon have requested additional funds for infrastructure support, 

including roads and bridges that exceed their CSEPP budgets. These 

requests follow a pattern that occurred at Anniston in 2001 when it 

received $40.5 million for additional CSEPP items. Currently, the 

communities around the Umatilla facility are demanding that substantial 

additional funding be provided as the onset of operations comes closer. 

Programwide, new requirements continue to exceed approved CSEPP 

funding levels. FEMA has little control over the additional funding 

requests made by the states. As of October 2003, FEMA had identified total 

$88 million in unfunded CSEPP requirements for fiscal years 2004 and 

2005. As of fiscal year 2004, the total cost for CSEPP has risen to 

$723.1 million. Funding for individual states ranges from $9.7 million to 

$259.6 million for the period of 1989 to 2004. (See table 4.) 
Page 10 GAO-04-634T Chemical Weapons 

Table 4: CSEPP Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989-2004 

State Fiscal years 1989-2004 Percent of total spending 

Alabama $259,612,223 35.9

Arkansas 80,311,665 11.1

Colorado 30,233,930 4.2

Illinois 9,724,039 1.3

Indiana 46,201,152 6.4

Kentucky 60,055,596 8.3

Maryland 30,472,755 4.2

Oregon 93,484,394 12.9

Utah 74,596,336 10.3

Washington 38,388,929 5.3

Total $723,071,019 100.0

Source: FEMA data. The Army and FEMA have recently recognized the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation as a 

separate funding entity. The confederated tribes have received $2.5 million to date. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments 

For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact me at (202) 

512-6020. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include 

Donald Snyder, Rodell Anderson, Bonita Oden, John Buehler, Nancy 

Benco, Rick Yeh, Susan Mason, and Mike Zola. 

(350517) 
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