IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

:

v. : CRIMINAL NO. 05-170-5

:

CHRISTOPHER BOOKER :

MEMORANDUM

Padova, J. December 7, 2012

Defendant Christopher Booker has filed an Amended Motion to Suppress Post-Arrest 

Statements. We held a Hearing on the Motion on November 14, 2012. For the following 

reasons, the Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Superseding Indictment No. 05-170 charges Booker with one count of conspiracy to 

commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count I); one count of committing 

and aiding and abetting the commission of armed bank robbery of the Citizens Bank located in 

Brookhaven, Pennsylvania on June 15, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 2 (Count 

IV); and one count of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and aiding and 

abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence on June 15, 2004, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Count V). On February 1, 2007, a jury convicted Booker 

of all three of these counts. On July 2, 2012, Booker’s conviction was vacated by the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for reasons unrelated to the instant Motion and this 

action was remanded for a new trial. On October 18, 2012, Booker filed the instant Amended 

Motion to Suppress, seeking the suppression of oral statements that he made to FBI Special 

Agent Vito Roselli on November 30, 2004, December 8, 2004 and December 22, 2004,

regarding the conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery and the June 15, 2004 armed bank 
2

robbery. These oral statements were memorialized by Agent Roselli on FD-302 forms. The 

Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting this case has indicated that he intends to introduce

these three statements at Booker’s new trial.

Booker filed a Motion to Suppress the same three statements prior to his first trial. A 

Hearing was held on that Motion on November 2, 2006, during which both Agent Roselli and 

Booker testified. We denied the Motion following the Hearing. (See 11/2/06 Order-Mem.) The 

parties have stipulated that the testimony taken during the November 2, 2006 Hearing should be 

part of the record of the instant Amended Motion to Suppress. (11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 2-3.)

The first two times that Agent Roselli met with Booker, Booker was detained at the 

Atlantic County Correctional Facility (“ACCF”) in connection with an October 29, 2004 arrest on 

charges of unlawful possession of firearms and cocaine base in Atlantic City, New Jersey. (Id. at 

6-7; 11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 13-14, 44-45, 54.) When Booker was arrested in Atlantic City, he was 

advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), refused to waive those 

rights, and invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 50-51.) Counsel was appointed to represent him on those charges,

and counsel had previously been appointed to represent him in another open case in New Jersey. 

(Id.) Booker was in custody and did not have counsel present when he spoke to Agent Roselli on 

November 30, 2004, December 8, 2004 and December 22, 2004. (11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 16-17.)

Agent Roselli went to the ACCF to meet with Booker on November 30, 2004, because he 

had been informed, by police officers from the Darby Borough Police Department, that Booker 

wanted to speak to someone in the FBI about bank robberies. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 12-13.) Agent 

Roselli, was, at that time, involved in the investigation of three bank robberies: the April 2004 

robbery of an Artisans’ Bank in Wilmington, Delaware; the June 15, 2004 robbery of a Citizens 
3

Bank in Brookhaven, Pennsylvania; and the September 2004 robbery of an M&T Bank in

Andalusia, Pennsylvania. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 10-12.) Prior to his first visit to Booker at the 

ACCF, Agent Roselli had not received any information that suggested that Booker had any 

involvement in any of those robberies. (Id. at 16, 47-48.) 

Before the Darby Borough Police Officers contacted Agent Roselli about Booker’s 

interest in speaking with the FBI, those officers, Detective Dominic Dellabarba and Lieutenant 

Gibbney,

1 were aware that Agent Roselli was a member of the FBI’s bank robbery squad and had 

spoken with Agent Roselli regarding several armed robbery investigations. (Id. at 45; 11/14/12 

Hr’g Tr. at 15.) In addition, Agent Roselli had spoken with either Detective Dellabarba or 

Lieutenant Gibbney in late October 2004 regarding information that Agent Roselli had received 

implicating Booker in the murder of Zaqi Logan. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 45-46; 11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 

4-5, 15.) Some time after he spoke with Agent Roselli about Booker’s possible involvement in 

the Logan murder, Detective Dellabarba learned that Booker was detained at the ACCF, and he 

and Lieutenant Gibbney went there to speak with Booker about the Logan murder. (11/2/06 Hr’g 

Tr. at 12, 47; 11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 5.) Shortly after they spoke with Booker, either Detective 

Dellabarba or Lieutenant Gibbney called Agent Roselli and told him “that they had gone out and 

talked to Mr. Booker, and that he had -- he wanted to talk to the FBI about some bank robbery 

activity.” (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 47; see also id. at 12; 11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 7.) 

Prior to speaking with Booker on November 30, 2004, Agent Roselli advised Booker of 

his Miranda rights and had him initial and sign an FD-395 Advice of Rights form, which was 

dated November 30, 2004, 9:18 a.m. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 13-14; Gov’t Hr’g Ex. 5.) By initialing 

 

1

The Lieutenant’s name is spelled Gibbney in the transcript of the 11/2/06 Hearing and 

Giveny in the transcript of the 11/14/12 Hearing. (See 11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 46; 11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. 

at 7.)
4

and signing the form, Booker affirmed that he understood his right to remain silent and right to an 

attorney and that he was “willing to answer questions without a lawyer present.” (Gov’t Hr’g Ex. 

5.) Booker’s signature and initials were witnessed by Agent Roselli and FBI Special Agent 

Joseph Fry at 9:20 a.m. (Id.) This Advice of Rights form was entered into evidence at the 

November 2, 2006 Hearing as Government Exhibit 5. (Id.) 

During their conversation on November 30, 2004, Booker told Agent Roselli that he 

wanted to get out of Atlantic County and asked Agent Roselli to adopt “the bank robbery case, 

and, if possible, the drug case, and bring them back to Philadelphia.” (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 17.) 

Booker wanted to be transferred from the ACCF to the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia. 

(Id. at 18.) At the conclusion of their November 30, 2004 meeting, Booker asked Agent Roselli 

to return. (Id. at 23.) 

When Agent Roselli returned to meet with Booker at the ACCF on December 8, 2004, he 

forgot to bring a blank FD-395 Advice of Rights Form. (Id. at 14.) Consequently, when Agent 

Roselli advised Booker of his Miranda rights before speaking with him on December 8, 2004, he 

had Booker initial and sign the November 30, 2004 FD-395 form for a second time. (11/2/06 

Hr’g Tr. at 14.) Government Exhibit 5 thus also contains the date 12/8/04, 9:52 a.m. and was 

initialed by Booker on both sides of each line of the form which lists his Miranda rights. (Gov’t 

Hr’g Ex. 5.) In addition, Booker’s signature appears twice underneath the following statement: 

“I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. At this time, I am 

willing to answer questions without a lawyer present.” (Id.) Agent Roselli and FBI Special 

Agent Tom Perzichilli witnessed Booker sign the Advice of Rights Form for the second time at 

9:53 a.m. on December 8, 2004. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 14; Gov’t Hr’g Ex. 5.) Booker admitted, 

during the November 2, 2006 Hearing, that the initials and signatures on Government Exhibit 5 
5

are his and that he initialed and signed that Advice of Rights form the first two times that Agent 

Roselli interviewed him. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 58.) At the conclusion of their December 8, 2004 

interview, Agent Roselli and Booker agreed to meet again at a later date and Agent Roselli told 

Booker that he was trying to “take [his] case federally.” (Id. at 30.) 

On December 22, 2004, Agent Roselli, accompanied by Darby Borough Police Detectives 

Pitts and Slowik, transferred Booker from the ACCF to the Federal Detention Center in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after the United States Attorney’s Office brought federal charges 

against Booker arising from his Atlantic City firearms and drug arrest. (Id. at 31-35.) Agent 

Roselli advised Booker of his Miranda rights, and Booker waived those rights, before they got in 

the car to drive to Philadelphia from the ACCF. (Id. at 31-32.) Booker made his December 22, 

2004 oral statement to Roselli during the car ride from Atlantic City, New Jersey, to Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, and once they arrived in Philadelphia, in the FBI office there. (Id. at 33-34.) 

Booker signed another FD-395 Advice of Rights Form in Philadelphia on December 22, 2004, 

before Agent Roselli interviewed him in the FBI’s Philadelphia office. (Id. at 37; Gov’t Hr’g Ex. 

6.) Booker admitted, during the November 2, 2006 Hearing, that he signed the Advice of Rights 

Form in front of Agent Roselli on December 22, 2004 at 12:14 p.m. and thereby indicated that he 

“read the statement of [his] rights and . . . understood what [his] rights were,” and was “willing to 

answer questions without a lawyer present.” (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 63-64.) Booker’s December 22, 

2004 FD-395 Advice of Rights Form was entered into evidence at the November 2, 2006 Hearing 

as Government Exhibit 6.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), provides that custodial interrogation must not 

take place in the absence of certain procedural safeguards. See Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 
6

1242 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “Miranda announced that police officers must warn a 

suspect prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, and a right to the presence of an 

attorney.” Maryland v. Shatzer, -- U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (citing Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 444). A police officer may not interrogate a suspect if, after he has been given his 

Miranda warnings, “the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent.” Id. (citing Miranda, 

384 U.S. at 473–74). “Similarly, if the suspect states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation 

must cease until an attorney is present.” Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). A suspect can, 

however, waive his Miranda rights. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475). “To establish a valid 

waiver, the [prosecution] must show that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary . . . 

.” Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475). The police may question a suspect outside the presence 

of counsel, and make substantive use of the resulting statements at trial, only if the suspect 

voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waives his right to remain silent and to the presence of 

an attorney. Alston, 34 F.3d at 1242 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479) (remaining citations 

omitted). If the defendant seeks the suppression of a post-arrest statement, “the Government has

the burden of proving the waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. 

Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1086 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-

69 (1986)). 

Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel under Miranda, there can be no further 

police-initiated interrogation until counsel has been made available to the suspect, “‘unless the 

accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’” 

Schatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)). The 

requirement that counsel be “made available” means that police may not initiate questioning in 

counsel’s absence (and not merely that they may not initiate questioning until the accused has 
7

met with an attorney). Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 152-53 (1990). “[I]t is presumed 

that any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own 

instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ [of custodial 

interrogation] and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 

U.S. 675, 681 (1988). Once properly invoked, the right to the appointment of counsel for 

interrogation does not disappear merely because the later interrogation regards a different 

offense, or different law enforcement authorities. Id. at 683-84, 687-88. Further, the 

government need not be aware of the invocation of the right; the burden is on law enforcement to 

determine whether the suspect has requested counsel. Id. at 687-88. The Edwards prohibition on 

further police-initiated interrogation applies, therefore, “when the subsequent interrogation 

pertains to a different crime, when it is conducted by a different law enforcement authority, and 

even when the suspect has met with an attorney after the first interrogation.” Schatzer, 130 S. 

Ct. at 1222 (citing Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678; Minnick, 498 U.S. at 148-49, 153-54). 

Edwards’s limitation on future uncounseled police interrogation is not, however, 

limitless. The Edwards prohibition on further police interrogation does not apply where the 

suspect initiates the conversation with law enforcement after requesting an attorney. See

Minnick, 498 U.S. at 156 (“Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment 

protections after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversation 

or discussions with the authorities . . . .”). A police officer may, therefore, interrogate a suspect

after that suspect has requested an attorney if: (1) the suspect initiates the conversation with the 

police and (2) the suspect makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel and to 

remain silent. Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1084 (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 

(1983)). The Third Circuit has explained that a suspect initiates the conversation with law 
8

enforcement when he “initiates a conversation ‘evinc[ing] a willingness and a desire for a 

generalized discussion about the investigation.’” Id. at 1085 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046). To determine whether a waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, 

and intelligently, the court must consider “‘the totality of the circumstances.’” Id. at 1086 

(quoting Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046). Whether a waiver is “knowing and intelligent” hinges on 

whether the suspect possessed “a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned 

and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. at 1087 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 

U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). The test for voluntariness is whether the statement is made as a result of 

“a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Moran, 475 U.S. 

at 421. 

III. DISCUSSION

In Booker’s previous Motion to Suppress the three oral statements he made to Agent 

Roselli, he argued that those statements should be suppressed because Agent Roselli interrogated 

him after he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel. After the November 2, 2006 Hearing, during which we heard the testimony of 

both Agent Roselli and Booker regarding the statements of November 30, December 8, and 

December 22, 2004, reviewed the Government’s exhibits, and observed the demeanor of both 

witnesses, we found that Agent Roselli was a credible witness. (11/2/06 Order-Mem. at 8-9.) 

We also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Booker initiated his conversations with 

Agent Roselli by asking to speak to the FBI about bank robberies and by asking to meet with 

Agent Roselli again at the conclusion of their November 30, 2004 meeting. We further found, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that Booker was given his Miranda rights and that he

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived those rights. (Id. at 9.) We therefore denied 
9

Booker’s Motion to Suppress his three oral statements to Agent Roselli. (Id. at 9.) Booker has 

not moved for reconsideration of that decision.

While Booker’s instant motion to suppress the three oral statements he made to Agent 

Roselli is also based on his refusal to waive his Miranda rights after his October 29, 2004 

Atlantic City arrest, and on the fact that counsel had been appointed on his behalf in connection 

with both that arrest and a previous arrest, his argument centers on the conduct of Lieutenant 

Gibbney and Detective Dellabarba when they visited him at the ACCF. Booker’s counsel states, 

in his “Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Post-Arrest 

Statements,” that the Darby Borough Police Officers who interrogated Booker while he was 

detained at the ACCF initiated their meeting with Booker, interrogated Booker without his 

counsel being present, and failed to give Booker his Miranda warnings prior to questioning him, 

thereby violating Booker’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel. (Booker Mem. at 3.) There is however, nothing in the record before us that 

supports any of these claims. Despite his failure to submit even a signed declaration by Booker 

attesting to these claims, counsel argues that, since the Darby Borough Police Officers violated 

Booker’s constitutional rights prior to informing Agent Roselli that Booker wanted to talk to an 

FBI agent, Booker’s voluntary statements to Agent Roselli, that he made after waiving his 

Miranda rights, should be “suppressed as the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree pursuant to Wong Sun v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1983) [sic]”. (Booker Mem. at 4.)

In Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court “held that evidence and witnesses 

discovered as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from 

evidence.” Oregon v. Elstad 470 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1985) (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471). 

“The Wong Sun doctrine applies as well when the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation is a 
10

confession.” Id. The Supreme Court has, however, rejected the application of the Wong Sun

fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to violations of Miranda. In Elstad, the Supreme Court 

explained that:

It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to 

administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other 

circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free 

will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed 

waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that 

the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent 

statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly 

and voluntarily made.

Id. at 309. As the Third Circuit has explained, “[i]n Elstad, the Court specifically rejected the 

proposition that the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, which in the fourth amendment context 

requires the exclusion of evidence or confessions obtained as a result of a constitutional 

violation, extends to violations of the Miranda decision.” United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 

918, 922 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309). Instead, the Supreme Court determined 

that “Miranda requires only that the circumstances surrounding a subsequent confession be 

evaluated to determine whether the confession was knowing and voluntary.” Id. Consequently, 

“a suspect’s subsequent choice to waive his or her rights after a proper administration of Miranda

warnings should ordinarily suffice to dissipate the coercive impact of the earlier [Miranda

violation] and to demonstrate knowledge and voluntariness.” Id. at 922-23 (citing Elstad, 470 

U.S. at 311). 

In determining whether a statement to police made after a Miranda violation is 

admissible, we “consider the totality of circumstances surrounding” that statement to “determine 

if that statement was the result of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the protections 

implicit in the Miranda warnings.” United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 1998) 

(citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1987)). Our inquiry includes the following 
11

factors: “‘who initiated the [initial] interrogation, the time that elapsed between the two 

interrogations, the extent to which the same police were involved in both interrogations, the 

manner in which the [initial] interrogation was conducted,’ and any other relevant factors.” 

United States v. Latz, 162 F. App’x 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Tyler, 164 F.3d at 158).

Assuming, arguendo, that the Darby Borough Police Officers who spoke to Booker at the

ACCF, and subsequently notified Agent Roselli that Booker would like to speak to an FBI agent, 

violated Booker’s Miranda rights, Booker’s oral statements to Roselli will be admissible only if, 

considering the totality of the circumstances, those statements were “the result of a knowing, 

voluntary and intelligent waiver of the protections implicit in the Miranda warnings.” Tyler, 164 

F.3d at 158. The evidence on the record before us2establishes that, before he spoke with Agent 

Roselli on November 30, 2004, December 8, 2004, and December 22, 2004, Booker was given 

Miranda warnings, reviewed the warnings, and executed knowing and voluntary waivers of those 

protections. (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 13-14, 37, 58, 63-64; Gov’t Hr’g Exs. 5, 6; 11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 

9-11.) The record evidence also establishes that the Darby Borough Police Department officers,

who allegedly failed to give Booker his Miranda warnings when he spoke to them at the ACCF, 

were not present when Booker met with Agent Roselli on November 30, 2004, December 8, 

2004 and December 22, 2004. The record shows that Agent Roselli was accompanied by Agent 

Furey when he met with Booker on November 30, 2004 (see 11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. at 13); Agent 

Roselli was accompanied by Agent Perzichilli when he met with Booker on December 8, 2004

(see id. at 14); and Agent Roselli was accompanied by Upper Darby Police Department 

 

2As we stated supra, we found Agent Roselli to be a credible witness during our 

November 2, 2006 Hearing. (11/2/06 Order-Mem. at 8-9.) We also found him to be a credible 

witness during our November 14, 2012 Hearing. 
12

Detectives Pitts and Slowik when he transported Booker from ACCF to Philadelphia on 

December 22, 2004 (see id. at 31). There is also evidence on the record of this Motion that at 

least a few days, and possibly a week, passed between Detective Dellabarba’s and Lieutenant 

Gibbney’s meeting with Booker and Agent Roselli’s visit to Booker on November 30, 2004.3 

(11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 12.) 

There is no evidence on the record of this Motion regarding who initiated Booker’s 

meeting with Detective Dellabarba and Lieutenant Gibbney.4 There is also no evidence 

regarding the manner in which that meeting was conducted. There is evidence that Booker 

initiated his first meeting with Agent Roselli by asking to speak with the FBI (11/2/06 Hr’g Tr. 

at 12, 47); that Booker initiated his December 8, 2004 meeting with Agent Roselli when he asked 

Agent Roselli to return at the conclusion of their November 30, 2004 discussion (id. at 23); and 

that Booker initiated his transfer to Philadelphia, and thus his car ride to Philadelphia with 

Roselli on December 22, 2004, when he asked Roselli to federally adopt his case on November 

30, 2004 (id. at 17-18).

Booker has not moved to suppress any statements he made to the Darby Borough Police 

Officers who he contends violated his Miranda rights. Rather, he has moved to suppress 

statements that he made to different law enforcement officers, at least a few days later, after he 

was given Miranda warnings, reviewed the warnings, and executed waivers of those protections. 

 

3Defense counsel suggested during the November 14, 2012 Hearing that Detective 

Dellabarba and Lieutenant Gibbney met with Booker at the ACCF on November 2, and 10, 2004. 

(11/14/12 Hr’g Tr. at 14.) However, there is no evidence on the record to support counsel’s 

suggestions.

4Defense counsel states, in his Memorandum of Law, that the Darby Borough Police 

officers “initiated the contact by just showing up out-of-the-blue at the ACCF on a day after 

October 29, 2004.” (Booker Mem. at 3.) However, there is no evidence on the record to support 

this assertion.
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Having considered the “totality of circumstances surrounding” Booker’s November 30, 

December 8, and December 22, 2004 statements to Agent Roselli, we conclude that the 

Government has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Booker initiated his 

conversations with Agent Roselli on those dates and that his statements resulted from his 

“knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver[s] of the protections implicit in the Miranda

warnings.” Tyler, 164 F.3d at 158 (citing Spring, 479 U.S. at 572-73); see also Velasquez, 885 

F.2d at 1084 (recognizing that a police officer may interrogate a suspect after he has requested an 

attorney if the suspect initiates the conversation and makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of 

the right to counsel and right to remain silent (citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46)). 

Consequently, we further conclude that Booker’s “subsequent choice to waive his . . . rights after 

a proper administration of Miranda warnings . . . suffice[s] to dissipate the coercive impact of the 

earlier [Miranda violation] and to demonstrate knowledge and voluntariness.” Johnson, 816 F.2d 

at 922-23 (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311). Booker’s statements to Agent Roselli on November 

30, December 8, and December 22, 2004, therefore cannot be considered the fruit of the 

poisonous tree and thus are not subject to exclusion from evidence at trial pursuant to Wong Sun, 

371 U.S. 471. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Amended Motion to Suppress is denied. An 

appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John R. Padova

_________________________

John R. Padova, J.