### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 13, 200 5 S es sio n WILLIAM E. CA STLE v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECT IO N, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Morgan County No. 6364C Russell E. Si m m ons, Jr., Jud ge

F iled Septem ber 27, 2005
No. E2005-00874-COA- R3-CV

This is a persona l injury

laws u it filed by

Wil liam E. Castle (“Plaintiff”) , an inmate at the Br ushy Mountain Correc tional Compl ex. As a trustee, Plaintiff w as allowed to w ork as a car penter for the defe ndant State of Te nnessee , De p ar t ment of Corre ction (the “ State”). Rick Cox C onstruction Company was a contra ctor building an addition to the Batley Ba ptist C hurch, a nd Plaintiff and other inm a te s a ssi ste d w ith thi s c on str uc tio n. P lai nt if

f was inj ur e d w he n h e fe ll f ro m a sc a ff oldwh ile working at the B atley

Ba ptist C hurch. Plaintiff boug ht this neg lige nce claim ag ainst the State, Rick Cox Construction Company , and Batley Ba ptist Church. The Trial Court g rante d the State’s motion to dismi ss based on sover eig n immunit y . The Trial Court later gr anted motions for summary jud g me nt f

ile d b y the re ma ini ng tw o d e fe nd a nts . Pl a int if f a pp e a ls, a ndwe a ff

ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circuit Court

Aff irm ed; Case R em anded.

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.
Wil liam E. Castle, pro s e Ap pe lla nt.
Pa ul G. Sum me rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r, Mic ha e l Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l, andPa me la S. L orch, Senior Counsel, N ashville, Tenne ssee, for the Appellee State of Tenne ssee, De partment of Corre ction.
Steve Erde ly , I V, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee B atley

Ba ptist C hurch.
Char le s F

. St e r c h i, I I I , a n d Jo s e p h W. B a ll ar d , K n o xv il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e A p p e ll e e Ri ck Cox C o n s t ru c t i o n C o mp a n y.-2- OP IN ION
Bac kgr ound
P l a i n t i f f, a n i n m a t e a tt h e B ru s h y M o u n t a i n C o r r e c t i o n a l C o mp l e x i nM o r g anC o u n t y, T en n es s ee , i s p ro ce ed i n g pro s e and appeals t he dis missal of hi s lawsuit ag ainst the State, Rick Cox Construction Company

(“Rick Cox”), and B atley Ba ptist C hurch ( collectively “De fenda nts”). Acc ording to the complaint, while an inmate at Br ushy Mountain, Plainti ff wa s a trustee and wor ked
a s a c arp e nte r f

or the Sta te e arn ing $6 8 to $7 2 p e r mon th. Pla int if f cl a ims that w hil e wo rking a s a car penter in March of

2003, he was order ed to climb a sca ffold at the B atley Ba ptist C hurch “ wher e Rick Cox Construction was contracted to construct an addition to the church.” Plaintiff alleg es that Def endants kn ew o r should have know n that the sca ffolding was in a da ng erous or defe ctive condition an d wet due to r ain. Plaintiff appar ently slipped and fe ll severa l fee t to the gr ound and landed on a concr ete slab, resulting in what he claims wer e severe personal injuries. When Plaintiff filed the law suit, he was re prese nted by attorney Cy nthia Fields Da vis (“Da vis”).
The State filed a

motion to di smiss claiming the M org an C ounty Circuit Court was without subject matter jurisdiction over ne g lige nce c laims broug ht ag ainst the State bec ause of the State’s sovere ign immunity . I n September of 2004, the Trial C o u rt enter ed an O rder g ranting the State’s motion to dis m i s s “o n the basis of sover eig n immunit y from suit and upon the c oncession of the [plaintiff’s attorne y ] t o said motion ....”

I n Jan ua ry of 20 05 , B a tle y

B apti st C hu rc h f

ile d it s mo ti on fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. This m o t ion for summary judgme nt was base d on the Church’ s claim that the sca ffolding was broug ht to the construction site by the g uards and prisoners from Br ushy Mountain and the g uards wer e in complete c ontrol of the sca ffolding . Batley Ba ptist C hurch f

iled t h e af

fi d av it of Pastor Luther Kidwe ll in support of its m otion fo r s u m m ar y judgme nt. A Notice of

Hea ring was filed informing all counsel o f rec ord that a he aring on this mot ion for summary judgme nt had bee n schedule d for Ma

rch 16, 2005.
I n Fe bruary

of 2005, Rick Cox filed its motion for summary judgme nt. Accor ding to this m otion a nd supporting a ffidavit, the undisputed mate rial fa cts showed Rick Cox di d not owe a duty of ca re to Plaintiff. Rick Cox also claimed tha t Plainti ff wa s not its employ ee, that the scaf folding was broug ht to the construction site b ythe prisoner s and g uards, the sc aff olding wa s ere cted by

the prisoner s, an d R i ck Cox had no involvement whatsoever w ith the use of the scaf folding from which Plaintiff f ell. The aff

idavit of Allan R. “ Rick” Cox was filed in support of thi s mo tio n. A N oti c e of He ari ng wa s f

ile d in fo rm ing all c ou ns e l of re c or d th a t a

he ari ng on thi s motion for summary

judgme nt likewise had be en sche duled for Ma rch 16, 2005.
Th e mot ion s for su mma

ry jud g me nt we re he ard on the sc he du le d d a te . N e ith e r D a vis
no r a ny on e e lse app e are d o n Pl a int if f’ s b e ha lf . F oll ow ing the he ari ng , the Tria l Court gr a nte d b oth motions. After all three Def endants had been dismissed, Plaintiff sent a letter direc tly to the Trial Cou rt Judg e statin g , in re le va nt p art :O u t o f an a b u n d a n c e o f ca u tio n , t h e A p p e llate C o u rt C le rk ’s O ff ic e se n t M s. M o re lo c k no tice tha t P la intiff 1 had f i l ed a n ot i ce of appeal

. M s
. M orel ock i nf ormed t he A pp el l at e Co ur t Cl er k t hat s he di d not r epre s ent P l ai nt i f f ei t her
a t t h e trial c o u rt lev e l o r o n this a p p e a l. -3-

F or so me re a so n I

ke e p g e tti ng no tic e s a

bout a he ari ng to g rant summary

judgme nt. On the Certificate of Servic e it sh o ws Cy nth ia F ie lds Da vis a s b e ing my a tto rn e y ; th is i s i nco rr e c t. M y a tto rn e y ’s na me is A ng e la R. Mor e loc k .... Si nc e Ms. F ie lds Da vis has left the case she proba bly should have filed notice with this very
c ou rt sh ow ing Ms. Mo re loc k a s my ne w at torne y
. An d li ke wi se Ms. Morelock should ha ve filed a notice of attendanc e with this court. I cannot be lieve that court w as held on Marc h 16, 2005 without notice to Ms. Morelock.
Th e Tria l Judg e re sp on de d to Pla int if f’ s le tte r. Th e Judg e ’s re sp on se wa s se nt t o a ll counsel of re cord, w hich still i ncluded Da vis. A copy of the re sponse also wa s sent to Ms. Morelock
e ve n th ou g h s he ha d n e ve r e nte re d a n a pp e aranc e in the c a se
. I n r e le va nt p art , th e Judg e ’s re sp on se 1 stated: On March 19, 2004, Cy nthia Fields Da vis, filed y our

complaint ag ainst the three defe ndants

.... Upon proper motion being fi l ed an order w as ente red Septe mber 28, 2004 dismissing the defe ndant, State of Te nnessee . Upon motions being filed and notice being proper ly

g iven a he aring was he ld on Ma rc h 16, 2005, and based upon that hearing the defe ndant, Rick Cox Constru ct ion Company , was dismissed by order filed on Mar ch 23, 2005 and the defe nd an t , Batley

Ba ptist C hurch, w as dismissed by order filed on April 6, 2005. Attorney C y n t h ia Fie lds Davis has bee n y our attorne y of
rec ord during this entire tim e. There is no pleading filed in the court file by which Mrs. Da vis a sks f

or permission to withdraw, nor is ther e any pleading or docume nt showing that Ang ela R. More lock has enter ed an a

ppear ance as y our attorne y of re cord.
This should answer the questions raised by y our lett er
.... Cop ie s o f y ou r le tte r to me are fo rw ard e d to a ll atto rn e y s o f r e c or d in this case, a nd also to Attorney Ang ela R. More lock who wa s mentioned in y our letter. Plaintiff appea ls raising three issues, which we quote:-4- I

. Whether the Court allowe d ex p arte communications which prejudice d the plaintiff.
I I

. Whether the Court had a conflict of inter est which assisted the defe ndants in this cause.
I I I

. Whe the r S umm ary Judg me nt w a s o btaine d b y frau d an d in violation of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

.

Discussion
Be cause the first two issues raised by Plaintiff do not c halleng e the suff iciency of the proof with re g ard to the s ummary judgme nt motions or the State’s motion to dismis s, we will revie w these two issues using the typical standa rd of r eview involving leg al issues. Our r eview of leg al issues is conducted “ under a pure de novo s tandar d of re view, ac cording no defe renc e to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Southern Constructors, Inc

. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Th e fi rs t is su e is P lai nt if f’ s c la im that th e Tria l Co urt a llo we d e x part e communications which we re pr ejudicial to Plaintiff. Prior t o t h e motions for summary judgme nt being filed, Plaintiff’s attorne y attempted to withdraw from the case but the Trial Court would not allow such withdra wal unless ag ree d to in writing by Plaintiff. Co u n s e l o b tained Plaintiff’s sig nature on an o r d e r o f w ith d r a w a l a n d th e o r d e r a ll e g e d ly w a s s e n t to th e T r ia l Co u r t, b u t it n e v e r wa s rec eived. A c ouple of months later w hen the he aring o n t h e m o t i o n s for summary judgme nt was held, Davis did not appea

r on Plaintiff’s behalf

, presumably beca

use she believed the or der a llowing her w ithdrawa l from t h e ca s e h ad been e ntere d by the Trial Court. The Trial Court, on the other ha nd , h a d n ot r e c e ive d the or de r an d a s f ar a s th e Tria l Co urt w a s c on c e rn e d, a ndc or re c tly so , D a vis was still Pl aintiff’s attorney of re cord. In any

event, Plaintiff ar g ues that bec ause he was or be lieved he wa s unrepr esente d at the time of the he aring and no one w as pre sent on his behalf, the motions “could not have been gr anted without ex parte communication between the trial court a nd these two defe ndants.” In making this arg umen t , P l ai ntiff re lies on Rule 10, Canon 3(B )(7) of the Code of Judic ia l Co nd uc t w hic h s ta te s, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: A judg e shall ac cord to e very person who h as a leg al intere st in a pr oc e e din g , o r tha t pe rs on ' s la wy e r, the ri g ht t o be he ard a c c or din g to la w. A j udg e sh a ll n ot i nit ia te , p e rm it, or c on sid e r e x part e communications, or consi d er othe r communica tions made to the judge outside the pres en ce o f t he parties conce rning a pending or impending pr ocee ding ....
L oo kin g a t matte rs fr om the Tria l Co urt’ s p e rs pe c tiv e : ( 1) the re we re tw o p ro pe rl y supported motions for summary judgme nt that had bee n filed; (2) Pl aintiff’s c ounsel had re ceive d notices stating when the motions would be heard by the Trial Court; (3) Plaintiff had time to respondP l ai nt i f f al s o ar gu es t hat t hi s al l ege d f r aud ent i t l es hi m t o r el i ef under T enn
. R. Ci v. P

. 60. 02

. Li ke t he conf l i ct 2 of i n t er es t i s s u e, t h i s i s s u e n ev er w as r ai s ed at t h e t r i al c ou r t l ev el a n d i s de eme d w ai v ed. E v en i f i t w as n ot w ai v ed, ha ving fo un d no f

rau d , P l ainti f

f wo uld no t b e e nti t l ed t o reli ef und er R ule 6 0 .02 o n thi s b asis.

-5- to the motions because the y wer e ser ved “at leas t t hirty (30) da y s befor e the time fixed for the he ari ng ,” a s r e qu ir e d b y

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4; ( 4) a t th e tim e of th e hear in g , D a vis wa s st ill Plaintiff’s attorney

of re cord; a nd (5) no r esponses ha d been f iled to the motions for summary judgme nt. Ba sed on these f acts, we do not be lieve the Trial Court in any way ran afoul of the Code of J udicial C onduct by allowing the hearing to proce ed. Cf. Mo ore v . M oo re , No. 01-A- 01-9210- CH-00389, 1993 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 175, at **12, 1 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 3, 1993) (Interpre ting a pre vious version of the Code of Judi cial Conduct and stating “[i] n the context of the cited rule , ex parte means without ade quate notice to all parties and opportunityof all parties to respond.”)

.

The ne x t issue is Plaintiff’s claim that the Trial Judge had a c onflict of intere st and sh ould h a ve re c us e d h ims e lf fr om the c a se . A c c or din g to P la int if f, the “ fi rs t c on fl ic t of

int e re st re la te s to Ric k Cox Con str uc tio n Compa ny , I nc
. in that the y did so me wo rk on the Mo rg a n Co un ty Courthouse. The se cond conflict of i ntere st involves the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection in that the y pr ov ide fr e e la

bo r f or bo th R ic k Cox Con str

uc tio n Co mpany , Inc . a ndthe Mo rg a n Co un ty Courthouse.”
Whil e we se ri ou sly do ub t wh e the r the fo re g oin g wo uldc re a te a c on fl ic t of

int e re st, much less one wa

rra nting r ecusa l, we nee d not decide this issue bec ause t h er e i s nothing in the
rec ord indicating that Plaintiff raised this as an issue be low or otherw ise broug ht the alleg ed conf lict to the Tria l Cou rt ’s a tte nti on
. We wi ll c on sid e r this iss ue wa ive d b e c a us e it w a s r a ise d f or the fi rs t time on appea l. See W

rig ht v . P ate , 117 S.W .3d 774, 777 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)( “This Court has held that motions to recuse ‘ must be filed promptly afte r t he facts forming the basis for the motion b ec o m e k n o wn
. . . an d t h e fa i l u re t o s ee k re cu s al i n a t i m el y m an n er re s u l t s i n a w ai v ero f ap ar t y 's ri gh tt o q u es t i o n a j u d ge's i m p ar t i al i t y
. ’" )( q u o t i n g Da v is v . D e pt. of E m p l oy me nt S e c ur ity , 23 S.W .3d 304, 31 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) ); Se e ge ne ra lly H e a th e r ly v
. M

e r r im a c k M

u tu a l F ire I

n s. Co. , 43 S.W. 3d91 1, 91 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) (" As a g e ne ra l matte r, ap pel lat e c ou rt s w ill de c lin e to consider issues r aised for the first time on appe al that wer e no t ra i s ed and considere d in the trial court." ).
Pl a i n t i f

f ’ s t h i r d i s s u e i s h i s c l a i mt h a tD e f e n d a n t s R i c k

C o x a n d B a t l e y

B ap tis t Church obtained summary judgme nt “by fraud.” Acc ording to Plaintiff, beca use he was no longe r repr esente d afte r he signe d t he orde r allowing his attorney to withdraw, “ [a] t that point any repr esentation by

Attorney Davis on beha lf of the plaintiff w ould have c onstitut ed fr aud.” Plaintiff further claims that the Tria l Court, Ri ck Cox , and B atley Ba ptist C hurch kne w he wa s unrepr esente d, and to “obtain Summary

J udg ment as a r esult of ex parte c ommuni ca t i o n s and/or without proper
re pr e se ntatio n is a fr a ud .” On c e a g a in, we e mph a size tha t no or de r ha d be e n e nte re d a llo wi ng Da vis to w ith dr a w f

rom th e case a ndbe c a us e Pla int if f s til l ha d a n atto rn e y

of re c or d, thi s a

rg ume nt i s wi tho ut m e ri t. 2-6- Plaintiff filed two reply

briefs in this appea l. I n both reply briefs, Plaintiff ra ises altog ether new issues not a ddresse d in his initial brie f or in Def endants’ briefs. We will not consider
a n is su e ra ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me in a

re ply brie f a s a n iss ue tha

t ha s be e n raise d p ro pe rl y on app e a l. Th e re a so n f

or thi s is simple : to al low app e lla nts to u se su c h a pr oc e du re wo uldle a ve app e lle e s w ith no opportunity

to file any

response to such new issues. Ha ving sa id that, in one of t he reply briefs Plain t i ff d o es ch all eng e the pr opriety of the g rant of summary judgme nt to Ri ck Cox and B atley Ba ptist C hurch, a nd beca

use this issue was touche d upon in Plaintiff’s orig inal brief, w e will now
e xami ne thi s is su e in m or e de ta il.

I n Bl air v . W e st To wn M

all , our Supreme Court r ece ntly reiter ated th e s t an d ards
app lic able wh e n app e llate c ou rt s are re vie wi ng a mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. Bl air v . W

e st To wn Ma ll , 130 S.W .3d 761 (Tenn. 2004) . I n Bl air , th e Cou rt state d:
The standa

rds g overning an appe llate court’s revie w of a motion for summary

judgme nt ar e we ll settled. Si nce our inquiry inv olv e s p ur e ly

a qu e sti on of

la w, no pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss a tta c he s to the low e r c ou rt ’s jud g me nt, a ndou r t a sk is c on fi ne d to revie wing the rec ord to de termine whether the require ments of Tenne ssee Rule of Civil P roce dure 56 ha ve bee n met. See Staples v

. C B L & Assoc., Inc

. , 1 5 S. W.3 d 8 3, 88 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; H u n te r v. Br own , 9 55 S.W. 2d49 , 50 -51 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; Cowden v. Sovran Ba nk /Ce ntr al S ou th , 816 S.W .2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991). Tenne ssee Rul e of Civ il Pr ocedur e 56 .0 4 p ro vid e s th a t su mma ry jud g me nt i s appropriate whe re: 1) the re is no g enuine issue with regar d to the materia l f

acts rele vant to the claim or defe nse containe d i n the motion, and 2) the moving party is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law on the undisputed fac ts. Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 88.
* * *
Whe n th e pa

rt y se e kin g su mma

ry jud g me nt m ake s a

pr op e rl y su pp orte d mo tio n, the bu rd e n s hif ts t o th e no nmo vin g pa

rt y to set forth spec ific fa cts establishing th e existence of disputed, material f

acts whic h must be resolved by the trier of fac t.
To pr op e rl y su pp ort its motio n, the mov ing pa rt y mus t either a ffirma ti v elyneg ate a n essential ele ment of the
n o n -moving party ’s claim or c onclusively establish an aff irmative d efe nse. I f the moving party fails to neg ate a c la ime d b a sis for the su it, the no n- mov ing pa rt y ’s bu rd e n to produce evidenc e esta

blishin g th ee xistence of

a g enuine issue for trial is not trigg ere d and the motion for summary judgme nt-7- must fail. I f t he moving party succe ssfully

neg ates a claimed ba sis fo r the a c tio n, the no n- mov ing pa rt y ma y no t si mpl y

re st upon the pleading s, but must offer pro of to establish the exis tence of the e ssential elements of the claim.
Bl air , 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 6 3 -6 4 , 7 6 7 (q u o t i n g Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 88-89).

Our S upreme Court also has provided instruction reg arding assessing the evidenc e wh en d ea l i n g wi th a m o t i o n fo r s u m m ar y j u d gm en t , s t at i n g:
The standa

rds g overning t h e assessment of evidence in the
su mma ry jud g me nt c on te xt a

re a lso we ll e sta

bli sh e d. Cou rt s must vie w the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the no nmo vin g pa

rt y and must also d ra w all reasonable inf ere nces in the nonmoving party ’s fa vor. See Robinso n v. Omer , 9 52 S.W. 2da t 42 6; Byrd v. Ha ll , 847 S

. W

. 2 d at 210-11. Courts should g rant a summary judgme n t o n l ywhen both the f acts a nd the infer ence s to be draw n from the fa ct s permit a re asonable person to re ach only one co n clus ion. See M

cCall v. W

ilder , 9 1 3 S. W. 2 d 1 5 0 , 1 5 3 ( T e n n. 19 95 ); Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995)

. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)

.

The motions for summary judgme nt filed by

Rick Cox and B at l ey Ba p tist C hurch wer e prope rly supported. There fore , the burden shifted to Plaintiff to se t f orth fac ts establishing the
e xis te n c e o f d is p u te d , mate r ia l f a c ts

. Pl a in ti f

f d id n o t me e t th is b u r d e n g iv e n th a t absolutelyno response s were filed. W ith Plaintiff having failed to establish the ex istence of a disputed material fac t, the Trial Court properly g rante d summary judgme nt to Rick Cox and B atley Ba ptist C hurch a s eac h entity

was e ntitled to a judgment a s a matter of law g iven the undisputed material fac ts.
An oth e r i ssu e no t se t ou t in Pla int if f’ s state me nt of the iss ue s bu t tou c he d u po n in his i n i t i a l b r i e f

s u rr o u n d s t h e g r a n t i n g o f t h e S t a t e ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s b a s e d o n s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y. Ou r sta nd ard of re vie w as to the g ra nti ng of a mot ion to d ism iss is s e t ou t in Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714 (Tenn. 1997) . I n Ste in , our Supreme Court e x plained:

A R ule 12

. 0 2 ( 6 ) , T e n n
. R

. C i v
. P

. , m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s f o r f a i l u r e to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d t ests only the leg al sufficie ncy

of the c omplaint, n o t the streng th of a plaintiff' s proof. Suc h a mot ion a dmi ts the truthof a ll r e le va nt andma te ri a l a ve rm e nts contained in the c omplaint, but asserts that such fa cts do not
c on sti tut e a

c aus e of act ion . In c on sid e ri ng a mot ion to d ism iss , courts should construe the complaint libera lly in favor of

the plaintiff, takin g a ll a lle g a tions of f a c t a s tr ue , a ndde ny

the mot ion un le ss i t-8- appears that the plaintiff can prove no se t of fac ts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Co o k v
. S

p in n a k e r 's of Rivergate, I

nc ., 87 8 S

. W

. 2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994) . I n considering thi s a pp e a l f ro m th e tr ia l c ou rt ' s g rant of th e de fe nd a nt' s mo tio n to dismiss , we take all alleg ations of fac t in the plaintiff' s complaint as true , a ndre vie w the low e r c ou rt ' s le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Owens v. Truckstops of America , 9 1 5 S. W. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 4 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 6 ); C o ok,
su pr a
. Stein v. Dav idson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997)

.

Plaintiff essentially

claims that this is not an appr opriate a ca se to apply the doctrine of sover eig n immunit y

beca use to do so would result in an unfair result. Not surprisingly , Plaintiff cites us to no case s which support this position. S overe ign immunity of the State c annot be waived at the discre tion of this C ourt. At the time of the he aring on the State’s motion to dism iss, Pl aintiff was re prese nted by

counsel who c o n ceded that the State wa s immune and that this action was pending in the wrong forum. We, theref ore, a ffirm the Trial Court’s g ranting of the State’s motion to d ism iss

. The last matter that must be addre ssed is Pl ain tiff’s motion to consider post-judg ment fac ts contai n ed in the middle of one of his reply briefs. In rele vant part, Tenn. R. App. P. 14(a) pr ov ide s th a t on mot ion , w e ma y “ c on sid e r f

a c ts c on c e rn ing the a c tio n th a t oc c ur re d a ft e r j ud g me nt. Consideration of such f

acts lies in the discre tio n o f t h e appellate court.” Be cause the under ly ing “fa cts” whic h Plaintiff asks us to consider did not occur afte r the judgme nt, and in the exercise of our discre tion, Pl aintiff’s motion is denied.
Conclusion

The judg ment of the Trial Court is aff irmed, and this cause is rema nded to the Tria l Court for collec tion of the costs below. Costs on a ppeal a re a ssessed ag ainst the Appellant Willi am E. Castle.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE