UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-1931

NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

GRACE M. HOH, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:07-cv-01693-CMC) 

Submitted: April 28, 2009 Decided: June 18, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

S. Jahue Moore, Sr., William H. Edwards, MOORE, TAYLOR & THOMAS, 

PA, West Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. David F. 

Schmidt, CHITTENDEN, MURDAY & NOVOTNY, LLC, Chicago, Illinois, 

for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Grace Hoh appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to North American Company for Life and Health 

Insurance (“North American”) on its action seeking a declaration 

that a life insurance policy issued to Hoh’s husband, William 

Hoh, was void or unenforceable. Hoh contends that the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment, as genuine issues of 

material fact exist as to when her husband accepted the policy 

and whether her husband was covered by the policy. Hoh also 

raises a claim of judicial bias on the part of the district 

court judge. We affirm. 

 We review de novo a district court’s order granting 

summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party. Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 555 

(4th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when no 

genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). 

 A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the 

choice of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 

Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). In South Carolina, 

all insurance contracts covering property, lives, or interests 

in South Carolina are to be interpreted by applying South 

Carolina substantive law. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-61-10 (2002); 

2 
Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 414 S.E.2d 127, 

130-31 (S.C. 1992). South Carolina courts employ general rules 

of contract construction when interpreting insurance policies. 

See Century Indem. Co. v. Golden Hills Builders, Inc., 561 

S.E.2d 355, 358 (S.C. 2002). Thus, courts will attach “plain, 

ordinary, and popular meaning” to policy language. B.L.G. 

Enters., Inc. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 514 S.E.2d 327, 330 (S.C. 

1999). “[I]nsurers have the right to limit their liability and 

to impose conditions on their obligations provided they are not 

in contravention of public policy or a statutory prohibition.” 

Id. Though coverage exclusions found within an insurance policy 

are to be construed against the insurer, see id., a court’s duty 

“is limited to the interpretation of the contract made by the 

parties themselves regardless of its wisdom or folly, apparent 

unreasonableness, or [the parties’] failure to guard their 

rights carefully,” C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. S. C. Health & Human 

Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 373 S.E.2d 584, 587 (S.C. 1988) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) 

 It is clear that North American imposed one such 

condition upon its life insurance obligations to the Hohs: that 

any policy issued as a result of the application submitted by 

William Hoh would not take effect “until the full first premium 

is paid and the contract is delivered to and accepted by the 

Owner during the lifetime of any person proposed for insurance 

3 
and while such person is in the state of health described in all 

parts of this application.” (emphasis added). Thus, in order 

for William Hoh to be covered under the terms of the insurance 

contract, the contract must have been delivered to Hoh and 

accepted by him while he was in the same state of health 

described in the insurance application. 

 Though the Appellant contends that William Hoh was in 

the same “state of health” on April 15, 2006, when he accepted 

the policy, as he described in the application on February 3, 

2006, this contention is belied by the record. When Hoh filled 

out his medical history on February 3, 2006, he indicated that 

he had never suffered from dizziness, shortness of breath, or 

chest pain. He also noted that he had never suffered from 

anemia or blood disorders. (J.A. 23). During his medical 

examination, blood was drawn, and no irregularities were noted. 

 However, on April 7, 2006, William Hoh visited a 

doctor complaining of chest pain, shortness of breath, and 

dizziness. Subsequent blood tests revealed an extremely low 

hemoglobin level, which doctors believed signified an underlying 

bone marrow disorder. From April 13 through April 14, 2006, Hoh 

underwent various cardiology tests and a bone marrow aspirate. 

As a result of these tests, Hoh was diagnosed with 

myelodysplastic syndrome on April 20, 2006. Therefore, it is 

clear that on April 14, 2006, the day before William Hoh 

4 
accepted the insurance policy, he was suffering from 

myelodysplastic syndrome, and his state of health had 

significantly changed from that described in the application. 

 Although Appellant argues that there is some question 

as to the date on which the policy was “delivered” to William 

Hoh, it is undisputed that William Hoh accepted the Policy on 

April 15, 2006, the day he completed and signed the amendment 

and Statement of Health. As the evidence is clear that William 

Hoh’s health had significantly changed between February 3, 2006, 

and April 15, 2006, the contract, by its own terms, did not take 

effect upon Hoh’s April 15, 2006 acceptance, by a failure of a 

condition precedent. Accordingly, we find Appellant’s first 

issue to be without merit. 

 We review questions of judicial bias de novo. People 

Helpers Foundation, Inc. v. City of Richmond, Va., 12 F.3d 1321, 

1325 (4th Cir. 1993). A judge must recuse herself in instances 

where “a person with knowledge of the relevant facts might 

reasonably question [her] impartiality.” United States v. 

Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003). However, a judge 

need not recuse herself due to “unsupported . . . highly tenuous 

speculation.” United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th 

Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant argues that the judge’s daughter’s prospective 

employment with one of the firms representing North American 

5 
6 

provides a reasonable basis to question the judge’s 

impartiality. However, we find that this is nothing more than 

the sort of “highly tenuous speculation” that fails to merit 

recusal. Therefore, this issue too is without merit. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED