CHAPTER T

L AUNCH SYSTE

19

CHAPTER TWO

L AUNCH SYSTEMS

Introduction

Launch systems provide access to space, necessary for the major

NASA’s activities. During the decade from 1989–1998, NASA used two 

of launch systems, one consisting of several families of expendable l

vehicles (ELV) and the second consisting of the world’s only partially reu

launch system—the Space Shuttle. A significant challenge NASA faced d

the decade was the development of technologies needed to design 

implement a new reusable launch system that would prove less expensiv

the Shuttle. Although some attempts seemed promising, none succeeded. 

This chapter addresses most subjects relating to access to space and 

transportation. It discusses and describes ELVs, the Space Shuttle in its l

vehicle function, and NASA’s attempts to develop new launch systems. T

relating to each launch vehicle’s characteristics are included. The 

functions of the Space Shuttle—as a scientific laboratory, staging area for 

missions, and a prime element of the Space Station program—are discus

the next chapter, Human Spaceflight. This chapter also provides a brief r

of launch systems in the past decade, an overview of policy relating to l

systems, a summary of the management of NASA’s launch systems prog

and tables of funding data. 

The Last Decade Reviewed (1979–1988)

From 1979 through 1988, NASA used families of ELVs that had 

service during the previous decade. NASA also introduced new models of 

and began using the fleet of Space Shuttles to launch satellites into 

NASA used three families of ELVs: the Scout, Delta, and Atlas. These 
were increasingly acquired from the private sector and were used to 

commercial as well as scientific and other research satellites into spa

compliance with national space policy. The success rate for ELV launche

high during this decade; there were only three ELV launch failures: 1984, 

and 1987.

Figure 2–1. NASA’s Fleet of Launch Vehicles (1989–1998). Not Pictured: the Scout and 

Conestoga. The Scout stood 75 feet (23 meters) tall, placing it between the Pegasus and Taur

Conestoga stood 50 feet (14 meters), making it about the same height as the standard Pega

This decade marked the Space Shuttle’s debut as the world’s first Reu

Launch Vehicle (RLV). The Space Shuttle fleet consisted of four orbiter

Columbia, Challenger, Discovery, and Atlantis. An earlier orbite

Enterprise, was used as a test vehicle before the Space Transportation Sy

first spaceflight in 1981, but it did not fly in space. 

The Space Shuttle flew 26 successful missions before January 28, 

when the Challenger exploded only a few seconds into flight, taking the li

its crew. This single tragedy defined the decade and greatly obscure

program’s achievements. It would be more than two years before the 

Shuttle returned to flight in 1988. 

*Space Shuttle shown for size (height) comparisons only
Government policy had initially stated its intention to replace ELVs w

Shuttle as the country’s prime launch vehicle. However, as early as 1984, Co

had expressed reservations about relying solely on the Shuttle. During th

years following the Challenger accident, NASA used ELVs exclusively to l

the Nation’s satellites. When Shuttle flights resumed in 1988, NASA implem

a “mixed fleet strategy.” This strategy reserved the Shuttle for those 

requiring a human presence or where only the Shuttle could handle the paylo

Overview of NASA’s Launch Systems (1989–1998)

During 1989–1998, 281 U.S. launches occurred. Of these, 215 were 

launches, and 66 were Space Shuttle missions.1

 Twenty-seven Shuttle missio

not deploy a payload, and several other Shuttle missions were used to deplo

quickly retrieve payloads sent into space to conduct experiments. All Shutt

most ELV launches took place from Cape Canaveral, Florida. Polar mission

ally launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. ELV launche

place using Athena; Atlas; Conestoga; Delta; Pegasus; Scout; Taurus; and 

launch vehicles. The Conestoga launch took place from Wallops Flight F

on the Eastern Shore of Virginia. Figure 2–1 shows NASA’s launch vehicles

A wide range of payload types was launched. Most were either comm

or DOD payloads and had communications or navigation purposes, alt

some were reconnaissance satellites. Some of the launches carried satellit

other countries, among them Japan, the Philippines, the United King

Spain, India, Korea, Canada, and various international groups of sa

owners. A smaller number of launches deployed scientific satellites; these 

usually NASA missions. The success rate for all types of launches durin

decade was very high. All Shuttle launches succeeded. For ELVs, the 

success rate was almost 94 percent.

National space policy and legislation, either in place by 1989 or promu

during the decade, greatly determined the direction of space launch develo

and activities. During the administration of President George H. W. Bush, an

Vice President Dan Quayle’s special interest in space policy, NASA and 

agencies and organizations undertook a large number of space transpor

studies. These studies grew partly out of Congress’s desire to reduce the f

budget and, in particular, NASA’s budget, and partly out of the view tha

launch technologies were needed.2

 These studies, and the policies and legis

reflecting them, had three primary themes: a new heavy launch system was n

to augment or replace the Shuttle; an RLV needed to be developed; and 

launches and launch services should largely be commercial enterprises.3

1 One joint U.S.-French launch took place from an Ariane launch vehicle. 2 Andrew Butrica, “X-33 Fact Sheet #1, Part I: The Policy Origins of the X-33,” The X-33 History 

Home Page (December 7, 1997), http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/x-33/facts_1.htm (a

February 29, 2005).

3 Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, “Report of the Advisory Comm

the Future of the U.S. Space Program,” December 17, 1990, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/

augustine/racfup1.htm (accessed March 14, 2005). 
Executive policy statements and legislation emphasized the role o

private sector. Legislation took the government out of the business of bu

ELVs and supplying launch services for its primary payloads and req

NASA to purchase them from commercial providers whenever possible. P

and legislation directed the government to make national launch fac

available for private use and encouraged development of new launch syste

the private sector.4

 National policy also emphasized the importance of ha

resilient and balanced launch capability so launch operations could co

even if any one system failed. 

Further, restating policy set forth during President Ronald Rea

administration,5

 Bush’s policy dictated that the Shuttle would be reserv

launches requiring a human presence or the special capabilities of the Sh

It also stated that U.S. payloads must be launched from U.S. launch ve

unless excepted by the President or a person designated by the President

In January 1993, William J. Clinton became President. In January 199

NASA Office of Space Systems Development released a study titled “Acc

Space,” undertaken in response to a congressional request in the NAS

1993 Appropriations Act. The goal of this study was to identify alter

approaches to space access that would reduce the cost of space transpor

and increase safety for flight crews. The study concluded that the best o

was “to develop and deploy a fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit pure-

launch vehicle fleet incorporating advanced technologies” and to phas

current systems “beginning in the 2008 time period.”7

On August 5, 1994, President Clinton released a National 

Transportation Policy splitting the responsibility for space transpor

between DOD and NASA. The policy gave DOD lead responsibili

improving ELVs and NASA lead responsibility for upgrading the Space S

and developing and demonstrating new RLVs to replace the Space Shutt

response, DOD initiated the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program

NASA initiated the RLV program to develop and flight-test experimental R

4 A Bill to Facilitate Commercial Access to Space, and for Other Purposes, 100th Congress, 2n

H.R. 4399, (October 14, 1988); National Space Policy Directive, NSPD-1,“National Space 

Directives and Executive Charter,” November 2, 1989, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/n

nspd1.htm (accessed March 1, 2005); NSPD-3, “U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines,” Febr

1991, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/nspd3.htm (accessed March 1, 2005). 5 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Directive on National Space 

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1998 Activities (Washington, DC: National Aer

and Space Administration, 1990), p. 190.

6 National Space Policy Directive, NSPD-2, “Commercial Space Launch Policy,” September 5

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codez/new/policy/pddnspd2.html (accessed March 1, 2005). 7 Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, “Access to Space Study, Summary 

January 1994, p. i (NASA History Office file 009830).

8 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Presidential Decision Directive 

National Science and Technology Council-4 (NSTC), National Space Transportation Policy (A

1994), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nstc4.htm (accessed February 28, 2005).
Clinton’s policy also set guidelines for the use of foreign launch system

components and excess ballistic missile assets for space launches. His 

also encouraged an expanded private sector role in space transportation re

and development. 

In September 1996, the White House released a National Space P

stating that NASA would work with the private sector to develop 

demonstrators to make a decision about the development of a new reu

launch system. The policy also stated that NASA would acquire launch ve

from the private sector unless the Agency’s special technical abilities 

needed.9

 Legislation passed in 1998 stated that the federal government 

acquire space transportation services from commercial providers, except 

there was a reason to use the Space Shuttle or because it was not cost eff

or in the best interests of the mission. The legislation also allowed the F

Aviation Administration (FAA) to license firms to fly vehicles back from 

Since the 1980s, private firms had been able to acquire licenses for comm

space launches; but the licenses had not provided for return from space, 

had been too expensive for all but government agencies. This bill also obl

NASA’s Administrator to prepare for transferring operation and managem

the Space Shuttle to the private sector.10

Management of NASA’s Launch Systems 

In the decade from 1989 through 1998, NASA’s launch systems inc

both ELVs and the Space Shuttle. NASA’s launch system programs also fo

on developing new ways to provide access to space by using RLVs and 

advanced technologies. As in the past, the offices managing these v

activities frequently shifted among organizations as NASA reorganized 

effort to more efficiently achieve its objectives. At times, management of 

the Space Shuttle, and developing launch programs were all in the 

organization. At other times, they were spread among different areas 

Agency.11 For part of NASA’s fourth decade, management of NA

expendable launch systems remained with the Office of Space Flight (Cod

although it did not receive the prominence it had in past decades be

providing ELV services became more of a commercial function. Manag

of Space Shuttle activities always remained in the Office of Space F

9 The White House National Science and Technology Council, “Fact Sheet–National Space Policy

NSTC-8 (September 19, 1996), http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/nstc-8.htm (a

March 15, 2005).

10 Commercial Space Act of 1998, 105th Congress., 1st sess., Public Law 105-303, Title II, (Oct

1998).

11 NASA assigned letters (called codes) as a quick way to refer to its top-level offices. The off

codes applicable to launch systems during this decade were:

• Office of Space Flight–Code M

• Office of Space Systems Development–Code D

• Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology–Code C

• Office of Space Access and Technology–Code X

• Office of Space Science and Applications–Code E, later changed to Code S
Development programs were frequently located in other organizations

sections that follow correspond to the major reorganizations and changes 

management structure of NASA’s launch systems activities.

Figure 2–2. Office of Space Flight (Code M), February 1989.

Phase I: 1989–1990

The year 1989 and the first part of the 1990s saw three rapid reorganiz

of the Office of Space Flight and changes in its leadership. In February 

the Office of Space Flight, led by Admiral Richard Truly, reorganized fr

post-Challenger structure into an office consisting of three major divi

1) Institutions, headed by Richard J. Wisniewski; 2) Flight Systems, l

Joseph B. Mahon, and 3) the National Space Transportation System pro

(soon renamed the Space Shuttle program), headed by Arnold D. Aldric

Figure 2–2). Charles R. Gunn led the Unmanned Launch Vehicles and 

Stages office in the Flight Systems Division. Aldrich left his post as head 

Shuttle program in October 1989 to become Associate Administrator 

Office of Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology and was replac

Capt. Robert L. Crippen, initially as acting Director of the Space S

program and as Director from February 1990. 

Dr. William B. Lenoir, a former Space Shuttle astronaut, became Ass

Administrator of the Office of Space Flight in July 1989, leaving his posit

head of the Office of Space Station, a position he had held only since May 

In May, he had also been asked by Truly to develop a plan for consolidati

Offices of Space Flight and Space Station.12 When President George H. W

named Truly NASA Administrator, Lenoir took over leadership of the Off

Space Flight. 

12 “Space Station Program Leadership Selected by Truly,” NASA News Release 98-77, May 19

(NASA History Office Folder 009610).
The February 1989 structure lasted less than a year because the 

reorganized again in December and then made another small change in M

1990. The December 1989 reorganization consolidated the Office of 

Flight and Office of Space Station into a single organization consisting o

divisions that retained the name the Office of Space Flight (see Figure 

Richard H. Kohrs took over the leadership of Space Station Freedom; Cr

Wisniewski, and Mahon continued to head the Space Shuttle, Institution

Flight Systems divisions, respectively. Gunn continued as Direct

Unmanned Launch Vehicles and Upper Stages. The March 1990 reorgani

added a second Deputy Associate Administrator to the Office of Space F

In late 1990, Mahon was replaced by Michael T. Lyons as head of 

Systems, and I. Duke Stanford became head of Institutions when Wisni

retired from NASA. Around the same time, the heads of the divisions ass

the title of Deputy Associate Administrator of their respective organizatio

Figure 2–3. Office of Space Flight, December 1989.

Phase II: 1991–1992

The 1989 organizations remained in place until September 1991, 

Administrator Truly followed the guidance of the Advisory Committee o

Future of the U.S. Space Program of December 1990, headed by Norm

Augustine, and created a new Office of Space Systems Development (Cod

13 NASA press release for September 13, 1991, that announced the formation of the new office ref

it as the Office of Space Flight Development; “New Office of Space Flight Development Anno

NASA News Release 91-148, September 13, 1991, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1991/91

(accessed March 2, 2005). Beginning with an October 3, 1991, press release, the office was referr

the Office of Space Systems Development.” “NASA Administrator Announces Key Appointments

News Release 91-161, October 3, 1991, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1991/91-161.txt (a

March 2, 2005). This name also appears on the NASA organization chart dated October 20, 1991

future references.
This reorganization moved several organizations from the Office of Space 

to the new organization (see Figure 2–4). This new Space Systems Develo

office was responsible for Space Station Freedom development; large prop

systems development, including the new National Launch System and it

space transportation main engine; other large spaceflight development; an

advanced transportation systems program planning function. Aldrich le

Office of Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology to lead the new 

Systems Development office. Dr. C. Howard Robins, Jr. was named D

Associate Administrator for the new office in October. The Flight Sy

Division moved to the Office of Space Systems Development, with Lyons 

head. Kohrs was named head of the Space Station Freedom Division. 

Figure 2–4. Office of Space Systems Development (Code D).

The scaled-down Office of Space Flight continued to focus on 

Shuttle operations and also retained responsibility for Space Station Fre

Spacelab operations and utilization, ELV operations, and upper stage

December, Leonard S. Nicholson was named Director of the Space S

program in the Office of Space Flight, replacing Crippen, who became Di

of Kennedy Space Center. Lenoir remained as Associate Administrator 

Office of Space Flight until May 1992, when he resigned his leadership po

left NASA. 

14 “New Office of Space Flight Development Announced,” NASA New, Release 91-148, Septem

1991, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1991/91-148.txt (accessed March 1, 2005).
In April 1992, Daniel S. Goldin replaced Truly and became NASA’

Administrator. Among his first hiring decisions was the appointment of 

Gen. Jeremiah W. Pearson, III as Associate Administrator of the Off

Space Flight. Bryan D. O’Connor, a former NASA astronaut, was n

Deputy Associate Administrator for programs within the Office of 

Flight. In June, Pearson named Thomas Utsman, who had been servi

Deputy Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight since 

1990, as Program Director for the Space Shuttle. In March 1993, Pe

named Brewster Shaw, Deputy Director of Space Shuttle Operations, 

position of Space Shuttle Program Manager, replacing Nicholson, who 

take the position of acting Director of Engineering at Johnson Space Ce

In the summer of 1992, management of ELVs and upper stages, still 

the leadership of Gunn, moved to the Office of Space Science 

Applications (OSSA) Launch Vehicles Office. This was done largely be

ELVs launched space and Earth science missions, and it seemed 

efficient for all aspects of these missions to be in the same organization

Launch Vehicles Office was responsible for managing the ELV and 

stages launch services program. It maintained the NASA ELV manife

served as the primary interface with the U.S. Air Force, foreign governm

and the ELV industry.15

In November 1992, NASA moved the Space Technology program, l

Gregory Reck, out of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology 

R) and merged it with the Office of Commercial Programs (Code C), crea

reformulated Code C, the Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology, 

Reck’s leadership (see Figure 2–5). The Transportation Division within th

Code C, led by Earl VanLandingham, included several space transpor

technology efforts, among them the Solid Propulsion Integrity Program (S

the Advanced Launch Technology effort, and Advanced Programs.16

15 NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 1102.1H, “Role and Responsibilities—Associate Admi

for Space Science and Applications,” July 30, 1992; NASA Management Instruction 1102.1I, “R

Responsibilities—Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications,” June 28, 1993; 

Announces Changes in NASA Organization To Focus and Strengthen Programs and Management

News Release 92-172, October 15, 1992, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1992/92-172.txt (a

March 2, 2005).

16 “General Statement,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Fiscal Year 1995 

Estimates, p. AS-9.
Figure 2–5. Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology (Code C).

Phase III: 1993–1996

In October 1993, Administrator Goldin announced that the Office of 

Flight would again assume responsibility for managing the Space S

Program because Space Shuttle flight activities were becoming increa

more involved with Space Station planning.17 This change moved the 

Station out of the Office of Space Systems Development, leaving that 

without a major program to manage. O’Connor, Director of the Space S

transition since July 1993, became acting Space Station Program Dir

replacing current Program Director Richard Kohrs, who retired in Sept

1993.18 O’Connor remained in the position until January 1994, when Wil

Trafton accepted the position. 

Further changes in the Office of Space Flight took place in spring of 

Utsman left the position of Deputy Associate Administrator for Space S

to return to Kennedy Space Center and become special assistant t

Associate Administrator in the Office of Space Flight. O’Connor, the O

of Space Flight Deputy Associate Administrator, replaced Utsman an

became the Space Shuttle Program Director, responsible for managin

Space Shuttle program. Wisniewski, who retired from NASA in 

returned to NASA and replaced O’Connor as Deputy Associate Adminis

in the Office of Space Flight. He was responsible for resources, polic

plans, human resources, and management of the human space

installations: Kennedy Space Center, Johnson Space Center, Marshall 

Flight Center, and Stennis Space Center.19

17 “Goldin Announces Key Space Station Management Moves,” NASA New, Release 93-191, Oct

1993, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1993/93-191.txt (accessed March 1, 2005). 18 See chapter 3, Human Spaceflight, for a description of space station transition to Johnson Space 

19 “NASA Announces Space Flight Personnel Changes,” NASA News Release 94-66, April 28, 199

ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1994/94-066.txt (accessed March 1, 2005).
A reorganization in September 1994 consolidated the Advanced Con

and Technology Office (Code C) and Office of Space Systems Develo

(Code D) into a new Office of Space Access and Technology (Code X), h

by John E. Mansfield. The divisions within Code X and their heads were: 

Integration, Jack Levine; Advanced Concepts, Ivan Bekey; Launch Veh

Charles Gunn; Commercial Development, Robert Norwood; Space Sy

Samuel Venneri; Space Processing, Edward Gabris; Space Transportation

Gary Payton; and Management Operations, Martin Stein (see Figure 2–6)

Figure 2–6. Office of Space Access and Technology (Code X), September 1994.

The Space Transportation organization in Code X managed transpor

technology, advanced technology development for ELVs and the Space S

and NASA’s efforts to develop an RLV. It also functioned as the single int

with DOD and other outside interests.20 The Launch Vehicles 

consolidated NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administ

(NOAA), and international cooperative ELV mission requirem

Management and acquisition of launch services moved from the Office of 

Science and Applications to the Launch Vehicles Office as did acquisit

upper stages. Administration, procurement, and technical oversight of l

service delivery in the small and medium performance classes (Atlas E, Ti

Pegasus, and Delta II) were handled by Goddard Space Flight Center. L

services for the intermediate and large performance classes (Atlas I/IIA

Titan IV/Centaur) were managed by Lewis Research Center. Kennedy 

Center had responsibility for technical oversight of vehicle assembly and t

at the launch site and for launch site spacecraft processing. Marshall 

Flight Center was responsible for managing upper stage missions.21

20 “NASA Space Access and Technology Office Functions,” Aerospace Daily (September 26, 1994

21 “Office of Space Access and Technology,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fis

1996 Estimates, pp. SAT 5–37.
In November 1994, Pearson resigned as Associate Administrator 

Office of Space Flight. He was replaced by NASA Chief Engineer and v

manager Dr. Wayne Littles, who continued a review of the Shuttle work 

begun by Pearson a few months earlier. At Administrator Goldin’s dire

Littles was looking for any “unnecessary requirements” in the S

program that could be cut and “to make sure that recent budget cuts hav

affected safety.”22

When Gunn retired in the spring of 1995, Charles J. Arcilesi took o

acting head of the Launch Vehicles Office. By summer, the Launch Ve

Office had moved to the Office of Space Flight, and Karen Poniatowsk

appointed to head the Expendable Launch Vehicles Office. 

Later in the year, in October 1995, the Office of Space Flight reorga

with the goal of increasing efficiency and reducing the number of people 

organization (see Figure 2–7). In January 1996, Trafton, Director of the 

Station program, assumed additional responsibilities as the acting Ass

Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, replacing Littles, who be

Director of Marshall Space Flight Center. Trafton was formally named 

position in March. The position also placed Trafton in charge of the H

Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) Enterprise, one of NASA

Strategic Enterprises, whose mission was to “open the space fronti

exploring, using, and developing space; and to expand the human expe

into the far reaches of the universe.”23 Andrew Allen became acting head 

Space Station program until Gretchen McClain took over in January 19

January 1996, the decision was made to transfer the ELV program fro

Office of Space Access and Technology (Code X) back to the Office of 

Flight (Code M). In February 1996, O’Connor left his position of Space S

Director, which he held since 1994.

22 Ben Iannotta, “Littles Takes Over Space Flight Post as Pearson Quits,” Space News (Novem

December 4, 1994): 29.

23 Sharon M. Wong, “Strategic Management: Opening the Space Frontier,” NASA HQ Bulletin (A

1996): 5.
Figure 2–7. Office of Space Flight, October 1995.

Figure 2–8. Office of Space Flight, July 1998.
Phase IV: 1996–1998

In April 1996, NASA announced plans to accelerate the downsizi

NASA Headquarters. Agency officials had previously identified more 

200 positions that could be moved from Headquarters to NASA’s 

Centers; about half of the positions had already moved or were in the pr

of moving. In October 1996, a major Agency-wide restructuring took 

that aimed to reduce NASA Headquarters staffing and transfer 

technology development and commercialization activities to indiv

program offices and Field Centers.24 The Office of Space Communic

(Code O) merged into the Office of Space Flight, becoming another di

at the same level as the Space Station program, Space Shuttle program

Advanced Projects office.25 The new Communications Division was h

by David W. Harris, who had previously led the Program Integration Di

in the Office of Space Communications. 

At the same time, the Office of Space Access and Technology (Cod

where the RLVs program was located, was disbanded. Work into 

research and technology returned to Code R, now renamed the Off

Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology. A Space Transpor

Technology organization was created as well as a Space Transpor

Division, both headed by Payton, who had headed the Space Transpor

division in Code X. The Advanced Space Transportation office, charged 

NASA’s X-33 and X-34 launch vehicle technology development prog

was relocated to Code R. 

Trafton resigned as Associate Administrator of the Office of Space 

in November 1997. Joseph H. Rothenberg, Director of Goddard Space 

Center, was appointed to the position in January 1998, becoming NA

fourth Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight in little 

than three years. In July 1998, the Office of Space Flight reorganize

four functional offices: 1) Operations, headed by William Readdy, w

included ELVs, led by Karen Poniatowski; Space Communications, h

by Robert Spearing; and Space Operations Utilization, led by Rob

Elsbernd; 2) Enterprise Development, led by Darrel Branscome, w

included Advanced Projects, Strategic Planning, and Outreach 3) Bu

Management, led by Michael Reilly; and 4) Development, led by Gre

McClain; (see Figure 2–8).

24 Anne Eisele, “Restructuring Would Slash Headquarters,” Space News (July 1–7, 1996): 4. 25 Charles T. Force, Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Communications (Code 

resigned from NASA in May 1996, before the announcement of the merger of Code O into Code M

To Leave NASA,” NASA News Release 96–88, May 3, 1996, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressr

96-88.txt (accessed March 3, 2005).
Money for NASA’s Launch Systems

Budget Structure

The federal appropriation categories funding NASA space transpor

and launch programs and activities changed in the mid-1990s. For the firs

years of the 1989–1998 decade, they were funded by R&D and SFC

appropriations. With the FY 1993 budget year, NASA changed its appropr

categories to HSF, which included all Space Shuttle activities, and SAT, 

included experimental or development initiatives.26 ELVs also fell with

SAT appropriation until 1998, when it moved to HSF. 

When NASA began using HSF and SAT appropriations, the name

descriptions of many of the subordinate programs and budget cate

remained as they had been with the R&D and SFC&DC budget stru

Exceptions are noted below each table. If it is unclear whether a new b

category was merely a name change or whether it indicated a new or mo

program, the new name is treated as a new budget category. 

A large portion of NASA’s budget went to fund Space Shuttle activitie

most space transportation budget categories in the annual budget relate 

Space Shuttle. Expendable launch systems received relatively little att

because NASA obtained most expendable launch services from the comm

sector. The main focus of non-Shuttle launch services in the annual b

related to the mission is to develop new and alternative reusable launch sy

and reduce the cost of access to space.

In most cases, the authorization and appropriations bills funding NA

programs addressed only major budget categories and did not provide 

detail regarding where funds should be spent. Authorization bills provided 

detail than appropriations bills, at least showing amounts for 

Transportation Capability and Development in the R&D appropriation a

Space Shuttle Production and Operational Capability and Space S

Operations in the SFC&DC category. When the appropriation cate

changed to HSF and SAT, the authorization bills typically provided amoun

Payload and Utilization Operations; Space Shuttle Safety and Perform

Upgrades; Shuttle Production and Operational Capability; and Space S

Operations in the HSF appropriation. In the SAT appropriation, Con

provided amounts for Advanced Concepts and Technology (Space Acce

Technology). Congress only occasionally indicated that a particular amoun

authorized for a specific project. Amounts for ELVs and launch services 

occasionally provided separately, but many were not budgeted separately 

the larger categories.

26 These appropriations funded additional NASA programs.
Authorization bills provided more detail than appropriations bills, 

provided almost no detail. Appropriations bills generally gave a total am

only for R&D and another for SFC&DC. After the change in appropr

categories, they gave an amount for HSF and one for SAT. 

Congress based total authorized and appropriated funding on NA

annual budget estimates provided to the President and presented to Con

These detailed estimates formed the basis for NASA’s operating plan an

amounts each program would actually spend. The House and S

subcommittees and committees used these budget estimates for 

discussions and often prepared reports dealing with the estimated amoun

except where specific amounts were included in the authorizatio

appropriations bills, these reports did not legally require NASA to spend 

in a certain way except in very broad categories.

Phase I: FY 1989–FY 1992

During this period, the R&D and SFC&DC appropriations funded NA

launch systems, as well as other NASA programs. The R&D appropr

funded Space Shuttle programs in the Space Transportation Cap

Development category. These included activities such as the Tethered Sa

System; Spacelab; development and procurement of upper stages; engin

and technical base support at the human spaceflight NASA Centers (Jo

Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center

Stennis Space Center); payload operations and support equipment; studie

advanced launch systems; and other advanced programs and develo

activities. Space Transportation Capability Development also funded all 

Station activities (discussed in chapter 3). 

The SFC&DC appropriation funded the operational activities of the 

Transportation System. The system’s two major elements were S

Production and Operational Capability and Space Transportation (Sh

Operations. Shuttle Production and Operational Capability provided f

fleet of orbiters; main engines; launch site and mission operations requirem

spares; production tooling; and related supporting activities. The appropr

also provided funds for development of an Advanced Solid Rocket M

Space Transportation Operations included standard operational support se

for the Space Shuttle and the procurement of ELVs. This budget cat

funded the production of flight hardware, overhaul and repair of equipmen

labor and materials needed for flight and ground operations. The SFC

appropriation also was used to fund the tracking and communication sy

used for all NASA flight projects.
Phase II: FY 1993–FY 1998

In FY 1993, R&D and SFC&DC budget items involving 

transportation were placed into a new HSF appropriation or into the Sc

Applications and Technology appropriation. The HSF appropriation inc

the on-orbit infrastructure (Space Station and Spacelab), transpor

capability (Space Shuttle program, including operations, program suppo

performance, and safety upgrades), and the Russian Cooperation pro

(which included flight activities associated with the cooperative res

flights to the Russian Mir Space Station). HSF appropriation activities 

funded in the following major budget line items: 1) Space Station, 2) Ru

Cooperation, 3) Space Shuttle, and 4) Payload Utilization and Opera

The Space Shuttle budget had two major categories: Safety and Perform

Upgrades and Space Shuttle Operations. Safety and Performance Upg

corresponded most closely with the old SFC&DC Shuttle Productio

Operational Capability budget category. Payload Utilization included fu

to support payloads flying on the Shuttle and Spacelab, as well as adv

technology projects and engineering technical base support for the 

Centers supporting HSF flight activities. Space Station, Russian Cooper

and Spacelab are discussed in chapter 3. Space Shuttle and the Pa

Utilization and Operations activities are discussed in this chapter. 

The new SAT appropriation provided funding for NASA’s researc

development activities, in particular, “to extend knowledge of the Ear

space environment, and the universe; and to invest in new technol

particularly in aeronautics.”27 The two categories in the SAT appropriation 

directly related to space transportation or launch systems were 1) Adv

Concepts and Technology (as it was called in FY 1995) or Space Acce

Technology (beginning in FY 1996), and 2) Launch Services, cons

primarily of the ELV budget formerly included in the SFC&DC appropr

Launch Services sometimes appeared in budget documents as a separate b

category under the SAT appropriation. At other times, it was shown 

subcategory in the Office of Space Science and Applications. Notes belo

funding history tables that follow identify items funded from the 

appropriation. 

Funding History

For the 1989–1991 fiscal years, funding increased for launch system

in particular, the Space Shuttle. Payload operations and support de

slightly as did upper stages. Space Transportation Capability Developm

the R&D appropriation peaked in 1991 at $763,400,000. In the SFC

appropriation, Space Shuttle Production and Operational Capability reach

27 “General Statement,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Science, Aeronaut

Technology, Fiscal Year 1995 Estimates, p. SAT SUM-1.
high of $1,364,000,000 in 1991. Funding for Space Transportation Oper

continued to rise for two more years, reaching its high of $3,085,200,0

1993. ELV funding, which had dropped in 1993, rose in 1994 to $300,300

In 1992, the downward slide for Space Shuttle operations began as 

costs for the Space Station drained the budget. The SFC&DC Space S

Production and Operational Capability authorization dropped 

$1,364,000,000 in FY 1991 to $1,328,900,000 in FY 1992. The am

authorized for Space Transportation Capability Development dropped 

$763,400,000 in the FY 1991 authorization to $679,800,000 in FY 1992; 

somewhat in FY 1993 to $733,700,000 and almost to its FY 1991 level 

1994, reaching $7,509,300,000. The amount for Space Shuttle Oper

continued to rise until FY 1994, when it dropped from $3,085,200,0

$3,006,500,000.

In FY 1995, appropriated amounts used the new HSF appropr

categories, which covered the operational end of launch systems, and SA

developmental areas of space transportation. It was clear that, beginning 

FY 1995, the HSF budget dropped considerably. Between FY 1995 an

1997, the appropriated amount decreased from $5,592,900,00

$5,362,000,000. This included a $94 million general reduction taken 

Space Shuttle operations.28 The decline reflected a concerted C

administration effort to reduce the deficit while dealing with greater co

the Space Station. The FY 1996 appropriation, coming at the end of an ar

six months of discussions that included 14 continuing resolutions an

government shutdowns, allotted HSF 1 percent less than NASA’s reque

1.1 percent less than its FY 1995 amount. This decrease took place even t

the Space Station received 1.1 percent more than it had in FY 1995, maki

cuts to the Space Shuttle program even more pronounced.29 The am

appropriated to SAT, which handled work on new RLVs, rose in FY 199

dropped in FY 1998 from $711,000,000 to $696,000,000. At the same tim

FY 1998, the appropriation for HSF rose again to $5,506,500,000.

The following tables reflect the budget categories as broken dow

NASA and authorized by Congress. Table 2–1 shows congressional a

Notes below the table indicate when amounts were appropriated rathe

authorized. Table 2–2 shows programmed amounts. These amounts fo

NASA’s operating plan, i.e., what NASA budgeted for particular act

during a fiscal year. On both these tables, the reader should not assum

subordinate amounts below a major budget category equal the amount s

above in the major budget category. Some subordinate budget categories a

launch-related and are not included in these tables. 

28 “Senate Appropriators Approve $14.4 Billion for NASA,” Aerospace Daily (July 15, 1994): 79. 29 “Results of FY 1996 Appropriations Process,” The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of 

Policy News, no. 86 (May 30, 1996), http://www.sdsc.edu/SDSCwire/v2.12/FY96results.html (a

March 14, 2005).
The following series of tables show the amounts NASA submitted 

annual budget estimates (see Tables 2–3 through 2–57). NASA subm

budget estimate two years before the start of each fiscal year and then a r

estimate a year later. The tables show both the original and revised estim

separated by a forward slash. If only one amount is shown (either before o

the forward slash), NASA’s budget estimate documents referenced that b

category only once—either in its original budget estimate, shown befo

forward slash. or in the revised budget estimate, shown after the forward 

If a category was mentioned in an authorization bill, that amount is shown

Authorized and appropriated amounts come from the appro

authorization or appropriations bill.30 If no authorized or appropriated amo

shown for a particular category, then the bills did not address that cat

Submitted and programmed amounts come from the annual NASA b

estimates. NASA appropriations were included with the Department of Ve

Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Ag

appropriations bills for the fiscal year. If no programmed amount is show

year’s budget did not include a programmed amount for the particular b

category. See the individual budget tables for details.

Expendable Launch Vehicles 

Overview

By NASA’s fourth decade, America’s ELVs were obtained either fro

DOD stockpile of retired rockets and modified for space launch purpo

were procured from the private sector according to criteria in NASA’s FY 

Authorization Act and Launch Services Purchase Act (LSPA) of 1990.

LSPA required NASA to purchase launch services for its primary payload

commercial providers. This legislation quickly opened up a new mar

American industry as the government no longer competed as a launch se

provider. Within six months after its passage, one launch services pro

General Dynamics, had decided to fund the construction of 60 new Atlas l

vehicles although it did not yet have a single buyer for the vehicles. 

launch vehicle providers followed suit. In November 1990, NASA sig

contract with McDonnell-Douglas to provide at least three Delta I

September 1991, a contract with Orbital Sciences Corporation was sign

seven Pegasus vehicles. NASA contracted with Martin Marietta in 199

intermediate-class launch services on Atlas vehicles, and Orbital Science

selected to provide ultra-lite ELV launch services the same year. 

30 Authorization and appropriations bills are available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 31 The Launch Services Purchase Act of 1990 was Title II of the FY 1991 Authorization Act. N

Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 101st Congress, 2n

Public Law 101-611 (November 16, 1990).
In the first years following NASA’s 1988 return to flight, NASA ac

ELVs noncompetitively for the scientific missions remanifested onto ELVs 

the Space Shuttle. NASA acquired all subsequent ELV launch se

competitively from the private sector in the small, medium, and interme

performance classes, which could launch payloads up to 30,000 pounds (1

kilograms). Larger payloads up to 39,000 pounds (17,690 kilograms) 

launched aboard the Titan IV/Centaur launch vehicle, developed by M

Marietta Corporation (later Lockheed Martin). These were acquired from th

Air Force by means of a contract the Air Force had with Martin Marietta 

large class launch services were not available directly from the private secto

During NASA’s fourth decade, 215 launches on American ELVs an

joint U.S.-French ELV launch on a European Ariane rocket took place. A

94 percent of these launches succeeded. Eight families of ELVs: Athena; 

Conestoga; Delta; Pegasus; Scout; Taurus; and Titan were used. They eac

impressive success rates with very few failures. The large majority carried 

DOD or commercial payloads. Launch vehicle performance is shown in F

2–9 and Table 2–58. ELV activities are summarized in the following se

Some references use the term “partial failure” to discuss specific launch

allow inclusion in this table and in the graph that follows, each laun

classified as either a success or failure. Partial failures are explained in foo

below the table.

Figure 2–9. Expendable Launch Vehicle Success Rate.

32 “Space Transportation Operations,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fiscal Ye

Budget Estimates, pp. SF 2–11.
1989

In 1989, there were 13 U.S. ELV launches on known launch vehic

Deltas, 4 Titans, and 1 Atlas. All were successful. One was a NASA scie

spacecraft and one a commercial launch. The remaining launches were 

satellites. 

1990

In 1990, there were 21 U.S. ELV launches: 11 Deltas, 5 Titans, 3 Atla

Scout, and 1 Pegasus. One Titan launch failed. The launches included on

NASA–Germany space science satellite, and two joint NASA–

environmental research satellites. The remaining satellites were either 

satellites or commercial communications satellites.

1991

Twelve satellites launched on ELVs in 1991: 5 Deltas, 2 Titans, 4 Atla

Scout, and 1 Pegasus. One was a NASA launch of a meteorological sa

The remaining satellites were either DOD or commercial spacecraft. One 

launch failed.

1992

Twenty-one satellites launched on American ELVs in 1992: 11 De

Titans, 5 Atlases, and 2 Scouts. Four payloads were science missions

others were DOD or commercial payloads. One Atlas launch failed. In add

a joint U.S.–French scientific spacecraft launched on a European Ariane 

from the Kourou launch complex in French Guiana. 

1993

Eighteen satellites launched on American ELVs in 1993: 7 on De

Atlases, 2 Titans, 2 Pegasus, and 1 Scout. One launch was a Departm

Energy science payload, two were NASA earth science payloads, and th

were DOD or commercial payloads. Both Titan launches failed.

1994

In 1994, 20 spacecraft launched on American ELVs: 3 Deltas, 5 Tit

Atlases, 1 Taurus, 1 Scout, and 3 Pegasus. One was a NASA meteorol

satellite, one a space science satellite, and the remainder either DO

commercial satellites. There was one Pegasus launch failure and one Pe

that inserted its payload into a lower-than-specified orbit.
1995

In 1995, 23 spacecraft were launched on American ELVs—3 were De

Titans, 12 Atlases, 2 Pegasus, 1 Athena, and 1 Conestoga. Payloads inc

one NASA meteorological satellite, one Canadian remote sensing satellit

NASA science satellites, and the remainder DOD or commercial satellite

Athena I, Conestoga, and one of the Pegasus XL launches failed.

1996

There were 26 ELV launches in 1996: 10 Deltas, 7 Atlases, 4 Titans, 

Pegasus launches. There were eight science payloads including one 

Italian–Dutch telescope. The rest were DOD or commercial satellites

Pegasus XL launch failed.

1997

In 1997, 30 spacecraft were launched on ELVs: 11 Deltas, 8 Atla

Titans, 5 Pegasus, and 1 Athena. These included three Earth science pay

and two space science missions. The remainders were DOD or comm

satellites. One Delta launch failed.

1998

There were 31 ELV launches in 1998: 13 Deltas, 6 Atlases, 3 Tit

Athena, 2 Taurus, and 6 Pegasus. These included five space science pay

and one meteorological payload. The rest were DOD or commercial sate

One Titan and one Delta, the first Delta III, failed.

Expendable Launch Vehicle Characteristics

The following sections describe each family of U.S. ELVs used 

1989 through 1998. It should be noted that the figures cited in the L

Characteristics tables are approximations and may not be accurate f

vehicles within a particular model of launch vehicle. Many factors infl

detailed specifications. Each payload is different, and the payload size a

as its ultimate orbit will determine the launch vehicle configuration, incl

the number of stages and strap-on motors, the size of the selected fairin

the nature of the attach fittings. Variations in payloads also determin

amount of propellant, the burn rate, thrust levels, and other param

Source material, although dependable, does not always state under 

conditions a particular value is true. For instance, a value for thrus

indicate nominal, maximum, or average force and can exist during lift

sea level or in a vacuum. Different payloads and different orbits can 
determine performance parameters. The maximum payload for a l

vehicle to low-Earth orbit may be different for a launch from Cape Cana

Florida, than for a launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 

are also variations in what is considered low-Earth orbit. The Aeronautic

Space Report of the President and the Federal Communications Comm

use a 185-kilometer (100-nautical-mile) orbit; other sources range from 

kilometers to 196 kilometers (78 nautical miles to 106 nautical mil

consider low-Earth orbit to be the orbit flown by the Space Shuttle.33

Measurements are stated in the original units used in the source ma

Some measurements will appear as English units and some as metric unit

conversion to the other unit of measure follows in parentheses.

This chapter uses the following abbreviations for propellants: LH2 = 

hydrogen, LOX = liquid oxygen, N2H2 - = hydrazine, N2O4 = nitrogen tetr

RJ-1 = liquid hydrocarbon, and RP-1 = kerosene.

Athena Launch Vehicle

The Athena launch vehicle was a privately funded solid-propellant l

vehicle developed by Lockheed Martin beginning in 1993 to carry sm

medium payloads into low-Earth, geostationary transfer, and interpla

orbits. It was initially called the Lockheed Launch Vehicle (LLV) and th

Lockheed Martin Launch Vehicle (LMLV) after Lockheed merged with M

Marietta in 1994. The core launch vehicle was called LMLV-1, later ren

Athena I. A larger version, the LMLV-2, was renamed Athena II. 

Both vehicle models used a 92-inch (234-centimeter)-diameter fairin

both used solid motors and a small liquid injection stage called the orbit 

module as its top stage. The top stage contained the altitude control and av

subsystems. The Athena I and Athena II both had a Castor 120 first st

commercial motor made by Thiokol derived from the Peacek

intercontinental ballistic missile first-stage motor and modified for space l

use. The Athena II’s second stage was another Castor 120. The second and 

stages of the Athena I were the same as the third and fourth stages of the A

II: a Pratt & Whitney Orbus 21D motor and an orbit adjust module power

four Primex MR-107 engines using hydrazine fuel. The orbit assist modu

available with four or six propellant tanks, depending on mission requirem

Figure 2–10 shows the Athena I and Athena II configurations.

The first Athena I launch took place on August 15, 1995. This launch 

when the thrust vector control system failed. The first successful launch w

August 23, 1997, from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Its payload, the 

satellite, failed shortly after launch. Later launches of Athena I were plan

take place from the Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska.

33 “Glossary,” NASA Life Sciences Data Archive, http://lsda.jsc.nasa.gov/kids/L&W/gloss

(accessed February 9, 2005). Also “Genesis: Search for Origins,” Jet Propulsion Laboratory

www.genesismission.org/glossary.html (accessed February 9, 2005).
Figure 2–10. Athena I and Athena II. (Lockheed Martin)

Athena II successfully launched NASA’s Lunar Prospector into orbit 

Cape Canaveral Air Station on January 7, 1998. The Athena II’s third 

enabled it to launch larger payloads. Table 2–59 lists Athena launches. Tab

2–60 and 2–61 list Athena I and Athena II characteristics.

The Atlas Family

The Atlas rocket was America’s first intercontinental ballistic m

(ICBM). The Air Force used the missile only briefly as an ICBM, howeve

made its surplus rockets available for use as space launch vehicles in the 

after adding an upper stage allowing the modified rockets to place various 

of payloads into low-Earth orbit. 
The surplus rockets were used quickly in their new role, and only 

Atlas E and Atlas G Centaur launch vehicles remained in the surplus inve

by the end of the 1980s. NASA used these remaining rockets and then s

using new Atlas I, II, IIA, and IIAS launchers. 

The production of Atlas rockets was government-initiated throug

production of the Atlas G Centaur. The commercial sector took over l

services in June 1987. The first commercial launch took place in July 199

the first Atlas I rocket.34

The Convair Division of General Dynamics built Atlas rockets 

beginning of the program. Martin Marietta acquired Convair’s launch v

division in 1994 and took over Atlas production until Martin Marietta m

with Lockheed in 1996 to form Lockheed Martin, the current Atlas pro

All Atlas models, except the Atlas E, used the liquid-fueled Centaur as 

upper stage to provide added thrust. This upper stage, developed by G

Dynamics for NASA, had been used since the 1960s. The Atlas E used 

fueled apogee kick motors to supply extra power. 

The Atlas I was the first Atlas product using a new naming conve

initiated when Lockheed began using the Atlas for commercial launches 

late 1980s. Rather than use the old letter designation for its rockets (Atla

and G, for example), Lockheed began using Roman numerals. A letter af

Roman numeral designated different variations in each family, such as Atl

and Atlas IIAS, in which “S” indicated a strap-on motor. 

The Atlas has been a dependable launch vehicle with only a few l

failures. Table 2–62 lists all Atlas launches between 1989 and 1998.

Atlas Characteristics

The Atlas launch vehicle system consisted of the Atlas booster (com

of a booster and a sustainer section), the Centaur upper stage, the pa

fairing, and an interstage adapter located between the booster/sustainer 

and the Centaur stage. The launch vehicle was typically called a “one-a

half”-stage vehicle. The booster stage engines flanked the smaller sus

engine and did not carry any propellant. The sustainer section con

propellant tanks for both the booster and sustainer burns. All engines ign

liftoff, and the two smaller vernier engines on the Atlas E and G and A

models ignited seconds later.35 This differed from later rockets in whic

stages fired sequentially. 

34 “Atlas,” Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, http://www.lockheedmartin.co

findpage.do?dsp=fec&ci=14917&5c=400 (accessed July 18, 2006). 35 The “I” in Atlas I refers to the Roman numeral “one,” not the letter “I.”
Atlas E

Atlas E was first used as a launcher in 1960. The last Atlas E launch 

place on March 24, 1995, when it launched a military weather satellit

orbit. All Atlas E launches during this period took place from Vandenbe

Force Base in California. The Atlas E was the only Atlas launch vehicle d

this period not using a Centaur upper stage. It obtained additional bo

power from its apogee kick motor (AKM). Dimensions stated in Table 2–

approximate because more than one AKM model was used and fairings 

in length.

Atlas G Centaur

The Atlas G Centaur, used primarily to launch communications sate

was an improved version of the earlier Atlas Centaur launch vehicle. It w

inches (2.06 meters) longer than its predecessor to allow greater fuel ca

and had increased booster thrust of 7,500 pounds (33.36 kilonewtons), le

to a total liftoff thrust of 438,877 pounds (1,950 kilonewtons).36

The Atlas G Centaur was first used in 1984 with an Intelsat satellite

final Atlas G Centaur launch took place on September 25, 1989, wi

launch of Fltsatcom-8. This launch marked the last NASA-managed 

launch. From then on, NASA purchased launch services from a ser

contractors. Table 2–64 shows Atlas G Centaur characteristics.

Atlas I

The Atlas I was the first of a new family of launch vehicles that could 

payloads into low-Earth orbit, geosynchronous-Earth orbit, an

interplanetary trajectories. The launch vehicle was very similar to the A

Centaur, and it included two boosters, a sustainer, two vernier singl

engines, and a Centaur upper stage. An interstage adapter separated the 

stage from the Centaur. The vehicle had two new payload fairings, incorp

significant improvements in the guidance and control systems, and rep

analog flight control components with digital units interconnected with a d

data bus. Figure 2–11 shows an Atlas I. Table 2–65 lists Atlas I characteri

The first Atlas I flight took place on July 25, 1990, with the launch 

Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES), a joint NASA

Air Force project. The final Atlas I launch took place on April 25, 1997, w

launch of GOES-10 into geosynchronous orbit. Although launch param

varied slightly depending on launch date, launch time, and payload weight, 

2–66 presents a typical launch sequence for a geosynchronous mission. 

36 “Atlas,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/atlas.htm (accessed 

26, 2005).
Figure 2–11. Atlas I Components.

General Dynamics produced eleven Atlas I ELVs before the pro

shifted to Atlas II production. Three Atlas I launches failed to propel 

payloads into orbit.

Atlas II Series

The Atlas II series consisted of the Atlas II, the Atlas IIA, and the 

IIAS models. Development of the first of these vehicles began in June 

They were originally developed to launch the Air Force Defense Sa

Communications System satellites, part of the Air Force Medium L

Vehicle II program.

The Atlas II launch vehicles were an improved version of the Atlas-C

rockets. They provided higher performance by using engines with greater 

and longer fuel tanks for both the Atlas and Centaur stages. This resul

increased payload capability. The Atlas II replaced the MA-5 propulsion s

used in the Atlas I with the improved MA-5A system. The Atlas II also rep

the vernier engines of Atlas I and earlier Atlas vehicles with a hydrazin

control system located on the Atlas II interstage that had lower-cost elect

and an improved flight computer. 
The Atlas II had a longer booster than the Atlas I for greater fuel 

one capacity and used upgraded MA-5A engines, improved structures, 

new stabilization system. It also featured a lengthened Centaur upper 

that held more fuel and thus had better upper-stage performance.37 The 

II was the only Atlas to use two R-4D attitude control thrusters for at

and orbit adjustments. 

The first Atlas II flew December 7, 1991, launching Eutelsat II F3

last Atlas II launch took place March 16, 1998, with the launch of USA 

(UHF-8), a communications satellite for DOD that replaced th

FLTSATCOM satellites. 

With Atlas II, the manufacturers changed the terminology referring 

number of stages although the configuration remained essentially the sa

earlier vehicles. The vehicle was then referred to as having “two-and-a

stages. These stages consisted of the booster, sustainer, interstage, and C

upper stage.

A total of 10 Atlas II launches took place; all were successful. Table 

lists Atlas II characteristics.

The Atlas IIA was the commercial version of the Atlas II. It incorpo

higher performance RL10 engines and optional extendible nozzle

provided added thrust to the Centaur upper stage. The first Atlas IIA 

took place on June 8, 1992, with the launch of Intelsat-K. Through the e

1998, 15 Atlas IIA launches took place; all were successful. Table 2–6

Atlas IIA characteristics.

The Atlas IIAS was similar to the earlier Atlas IIA launch vehicle e

that this model used four additional strap-on Castor IVA solid rocket bo

(SRB), which provided an average thrust of 433.7 kilonewtons (9

pounds) each. These SRBs fired two at a time. The first pair fired at liftof

second pair fired during flight after the first pair had burned out, approxim

54 seconds after liftoff. Both pairs were jettisoned soon after each pair b

out. The structure of the first stage was stronger to accommodate the S

Table 2–69 lists Atlas IIAS characteristics. Figure 2–12 shows the Atlas 

configuration for the launch of the Solar and Heliospheric Observ

(SOHO) on December 2, 1995.

The first Atlas IIAS launched Telstar 401 on December 15, 1993. Th

the end of 1998, 14 Atlas IIAS launches had taken place; all were success

37 “The Evolution of Commercial Launch Vehicles,” Fourth Quarter 2001 Quarterly Launch Repo

/ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/q42001.pdf (accessed January 17, 2005).
.

Figure 2–12. Atlas IIAS Launch Vehicle–SOHO Configuration, December 2, 1995. (NA

Conestoga Launch Vehicle

The Conestoga was a solid-propellant commercial launch vehicl

attempted to launch the Multiple Experiment Transporter to Earth Orb

Return (METEOR 1) payload originally known as COMET for Comm

Experiment Transporter into low-Earth orbit in 1995. The privately f

launcher was designed to answer a need by the civilian and m

community for a vehicle to launch small size orbital and suborbital pay

(500 pounds to 5,000 pounds) into low-Earth orbit. In 1982, Space Sy

Inc. (SSI), managed by Mercury astronaut Donald “Deke” Sl
successfully launched a single-stage, solid-fueled rocket as a test, ejecti

payload as planned.

38 The rocket was based on an Aerojet M56-A

second stage of a Minuteman ICBM. The company was the first to ob

commercial launch license, in 1985 receiving Department of Transpor

mission approval. In 1986, SSI signed the industry’s first agreement to 

U.S. Government launch range, Wallops Flight Facility on the Eastern 

of Virginia, as a commercial launch site.39

In November 1990, EER Systems purchased SSI, integrating it into E

Space Systems Group. In 1991, NASA selected EER to provide Con

launch services for its METEOR satellite, a microgravity carrier pro

METEOR was to be a recoverable payload, designed for on-orbit microg

experiments that advanced commercial applications of materials processin

medical research.40

The Conestoga launch vehicle had a modular design, which provi

wide range of configurations for various purposes. It’s Thiokol booster 

rockets consisted of one core Castor IVB surrounded by a combination o

to six more strap-on Castor IVA or IVB solid rocket motors. A Star 37, 48

upper stage motor sat immediately above the core booster motor. Four str

motors ignited at launch; they were followed by two more, and final

central Castor. A cold gas reaction control system, located within the pa

attach fitting, controlled pitch, yaw, and roll during fourth stage coast, bur

payload separation. The hydrazine maneuvering and attitude control syste

above the Star motor upper stage and provided velocity augmentatio

control of pitch, yaw, and roll. The avionics power, electronics, and gui

equipment were within the payload attach fitting. An aerodynamic pa

fairing available in several sizes covered all components from the payload 

to and including the Star motor. Varying the number of strap-on motor

selecting the appropriate upper stage extended the Conestoga’s perform

range from 500 pounds to 5,000 pounds to low-Earth orbit.41

METEOR was originally planned as a three-mission project with th

launch initially scheduled for September 1992. However, late delivery 

solid rocket motors delayed completion of the launch vehicle. Manag

difficulties with the Center for Space Transportation and Applied Re

(CSTAR) at the University of Tennessee (the commercial center tha

proposed the mission and which provided oversight), as well as rising 

forced NASA to reduce the project to a single mission. Agency review 

38 Deke Slayton was one of the original Mercury astronauts but was relieved of his assignment and 

fly because of a heart condition. After he was cleared to resume full flight status in 1972, he made 

spaceflight as Apollo docking module pilot of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project mission, July 15–24, 

39 Isakowitz and Samella, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2nd ed., p. 220

40 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, “Special Report: U.S

Launch Vehicles,” Commercial Space Transportation Quarterly Launch Report, 1st Quarter 1996

ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/sr_96_1q.pdf (accessed November 2, 2005). 41 M. Daniels and B. Saaverdra, “The Conestoga Launch Vehicle—A Modular Approach to Meeti

Requirements,” AIAA-94-0893, 15th American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronauts Inter

Communications Satellite Systems Conference, February 27–March 3, 1994.
project continued into 1994 as NASA Administrator Goldin announce

NASA would refuse to continue funding the project. There also wa

question of liability if the reentry module landed outside the sparsely pop

Great Salt Lake desert in Utah. Congress, however, released the needed 

on condition that the contractors agreed to waive NASA’s legal liability. N

also insisted that CSTAR depart from the program. After further discussio

the three contractors providing elements of the vehicle, NASA signed 

source, fixed-price contract with EER Systems.42

After further delays, launch finally took place on October 23, 1995. 

the first orbital flight from Wallops Flight Facility in 10 years.43 A

promising liftoff, the rocket went off course when its first stage st

mechanism ran out of hydraulic fluid and became inoperable. Forty-six se

after liftoff, 23 kilometers off Virginia’s coast at an altitude of 10 kilomete

Conestoga broke apart. The destruction resulted in the loss of the METEO

the 14 microgravity experiments on board. EER Systems left the l

business and abandoned the project. See Table 2–70 for characteristics 

Conestoga 1620, the model that carried the METEOR.

The Delta Family

NASA has used the Delta launch vehicle since 1960 and has reg

upgraded the vehicle as the need for payload capacity grew. The vehicle 

high success rate. In the decade from 1989–1998, 82 Delta launches took 

with only two failures. Table 2–71 lists all Delta launches.

The 2900 series was planned as the last Delta series. However, be

the Space Shuttle was not yet ready to become an operational space lau

and NASA needed a vehicle with heavier payload capacity, the Delta 

series was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s for payloads that 

too heavy for Delta 2000s but did not require the Atlas-Centaur. Becau

3000 series was considered an interim vehicle for medium-weight pay

NASA not did finance its development and production but instead b

completed vehicles for its civilian and commercial launches from McDo

Douglas, which obtained private financing for the series. Table 2–72 

Delta 3920 characteristics.

Delta production formally ended at the end of 1984 when its productio

at Huntington Beach, California, closed. But when the Challenger exp

brought out the need for launch alternatives, NASA decided to resume 

ELVs and reactivated the Delta production line. At the same time, Pre

Ronald Reagan announced that the Space Shuttle would stop ca

commercial payloads. 

42 Andrew Butrica, “The Commercial Launch Industry, Technological Change, and Government-

Relations,” http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/x-33/butr02.htm (accessed November 3, 200

43 “Conestoga,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/conestoga.htm (a

November 3, 2005).
The commercial Delta era began in January 1987 when the U.S. Air 

announced its selection of McDonnell Douglas to produce seven Deltas 

launch its NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, orig

manifested for the Space Shuttle. The initial contract expanded to 20 ve

in 1988 when the Air Force exercised two contract options. In the interim

remaining stock of older Deltas was modified for three missions: the 

4925 combined the earlier MB-3 engine with enhanced Castor IVA str

motors to launch the BSB-R1 and Insat 1-D satellites, and the Delta 5925 

Castors with the RS-27 engine to launch the Cosmic Background Explor

NASA. On July 1, 1988, the Air Force officially received custody of L

Complex 17, located at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, 

NASA and took over East Coast launch operations, ending 28 years of 

launches managed by NASA.44

McDonnell Douglas built on its successful Delta 3920/PAM-D mo

produce the Delta II. The first Delta II, the 6925, flew on February 14, 

launching the first of nine Air Force GPS satellites into orbit 20,200 kilom

(10,900 nautical miles) above Earth. NASA first contracted commercial

the Delta II in December 1990 for launch of its Geotail, Wind, and Polar sc

satellites, which launched in 1992, 1994, and 1996, respectively. NASA w

first U.S. government agency to procure commercial launch services.45

The first stage of the Delta 6925 was an 85.6-foot (26-meter)-long 

Extended Long Tank powered by an RS-27 engine and augmented by 

Castor IVA strap-on motors. The second stage used an Aerojet AJ10-

engine that delivered approximately 9,645 pounds (42.4 kilonewtons) of 

The third stage payload assist module (PAM)-D, equipped with a Thioko

48B solid rocket motor, delivered approximately 15,100 pound

kilonewtons) of thrust and made the vehicle suitable for geosynchronou

Earth-escape missions. Table 2–73 lists Delta II 6925 characteristics.

The versatile Delta II could be configured as a two-stage or three

vehicle and could launch with three or four strap-on motors as well as wi

more common nine strap-ons. Both two-stage and three-stage Deltas 

support 9.5-foot (2.9-meter) and 10-foot (3.05 meter)-diameter fairings. 

nine strap-ons were used, six were ignited at launch and the remaining 

ignited in flight. The 9.5-foot fairing was primarily designed for the three

Delta.46 The 10-foot (3.05-meter) fairing was lighter than the one it replace

was also available in a longer version for taller payloads. Typically, two

Deltas launched satellites to low-Earth orbit, while three-stage Delta IIs del

payloads to geosynchronous transfer orbit or were used for deep-space mis

44 “Delta Launch Complex Transferred to Air Force,” NASA News Release 88-99, July 15, 1988. 

History Office Folder 010241).

45 “Review notes from Charles Gunn September 1, 2005. 46 “Boeing Delta II Medium Launch Vehicle,” Delta II Backgrounder, http://www.boei

defensespace/space/delta/delta2/contour/mission_info/backgrounders/delta_2_backgrounder.htm

(accessed January 31, 2005).
Also, the Delta II could launch one or more payloads on the same launch v

by using a variety of payload attachments. Figure 2–13 shows the Delta I

nine strap-ons.

Several other Delta IIs were developed that eventually replaced the 

the 7326, 7420, 7425, the 7920, and the most powerful, the 7925. All De

the 7000 series were equipped with an improved engine designated th

27A that boosted engine performance. Also, more power and longer He

(later Alliant Techsystems) graphite epoxy motors (GEMs) replace

Thiokol Castor IVA solid rocket motors. Each GEM was 42.5 feet (13 m

long and provided 446 kilonewtons (100,300 pounds) of thrust at liftof

Table 2–74 and Figure 2–14).47 The 7925 first flew in November 19

launch a NAVSTAR GPS satellite. Other Delta missions launched satell

Mars, toward asteroids and comets, and were used for Earth-observatio

astronomy missions. Figure 2–15 compares the Delta 3920, Delta II 692

Delta II 7925.

In 1995, McDonnell Douglas began Delta III development to 

growing customer needs for a higher capacity commercial launch ser

With a payload delivery capacity to geosynchronous transfer orbit of 

kilograms (8,400 pounds), the Delta III effectively doubled the performa

the Delta II. The first Delta III launch took place in 1998, but a succ

launch did not occur until August 2000. Table 2–75 lists the sequence of 

for a typical Delta launch to geosynchronous orbit. 

Pegasus Booster

The Pegasus was the first all-new U.S. space launch vehicle since the 

and the only air-launched space booster vehicle attempted in the United 

in approximately 30 years when the U.S. Navy attempted the unsucc

Project Pilot. Considered the operational successor to the long-lived 

launch vehicle in the small-payload, solid-propellant-motor category

Pegasus was developed jointly by Orbital Sciences Corporation and He

Aerospace Company (later Alliant Techsystems of ATK Thiokol Prop

Company).49 Hercules was responsible for the design and production 

new solid rocket motors and the payload fairings. Orbital was responsib

the remaining mechanical and avionics systems, ground and flight sof

the carrier aircraft interface, mission and vehicle integration, overall sy

engineering, and program management. The development cost of mor

$50 million was split evenly between the two partners.50

47 Mark Cleary, “Delta II Overview,” in Delta Space Operations at the Cape, 1993–2001, 

www.patrick.af.mil/heritage/DELTA%20II%20Overview.htm, (accessed January 31, 2005). 48 Boeing acquired the launch organization from McDonnell Douglas in 1997 and transferred produ

the Delta to its facilities.

49 Matt Bille, Pat Johnson, Robyn Kane, and Erika R. Lishock, “History and Development of U.S

Launch Vehicles,” in To Reach the High Frontier, A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles, Roger D. Lau

Dennis R. Jenkins, ed. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002), p. 214.

50 Isakowitz et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., p. 279.
Figure 2–13. Delta II Components. (The Boeing Company)
Figure 2–14. Delta II 7925. (The Boeing Company)
Figure 2–15. Delta 3920/PAM-D, Delta II 6925, and Delta II 7925.

(The Boeing Company)

Figure 2–16. Delta II Mission and Launch Sequence Profile for a Typical 

Geosynchronous Mission. (The Boeing Company)
Orbital established the Pegasus program in 1987. In 1988, the De

Advanced Research Projects Agency awarded a contract to Orbital for on

and five options for the rocket. In July 1990, NASA and Orbital Sc

signed an agreement in support of Orbital’s commercial launch vehicl

grams. This agreement allowed Orbital to enter into sub-agreements 

NASA installations in which NASA would provide access to its launch su

property and services on a cost-reimbursable basis.51 In 1991, Goddard 

Flight Center selected the Pegasus to supply Small Expendable Launch V

Services for its Small Explorer program, and on June 4, the Pegasus wa

sen for up to 40 more launches under the Air Force Small Launch V

program.52 The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization awarded another l

contract to Orbital in July 1992. In 1994, NASA selected Orbital for its 

light launcher, and Spain selected the Pegasus in October 1994 to l

Minisat 01, the first West European orbital launch.53 There have bee

Pegasus models: the Standard Pegasus, which first flew on April 5, 199

the Pegasus XL, which was conceived in 1991 and first flew on June 27, 

The first Pegasus booster rocket was launched on April 5, 1990, 

Edwards Air Force Base, California, from underneath NASA’s B-52 airplan

mission originating at Dryden Flight Research Center.54 Other launches th

1998 took place from the Canary Islands in Spain and Wallops Flight Fa

Virginia, as well as from Edwards and Vandenberg Air Force Bases, b

California, and Cape Canaveral, Florida. The B-52 launched the Pegasu

1995, when a modified Lockheed L-1011 aircraft, the Orbital “Starg

replaced it. The Pegasus XL, an upgraded Pegasus that was longer, heavie

able to boost larger payloads than the standard Pegasus, used only the L

aircraft. The Pegasus’s best-known achievement was its launch o

ORBCOMM communications satellites. Between 1997 and 1999, five Pe

launches sent 32 satellites into orbit, forming the world’s first private, low

orbit communications network.55 See Table 2–76 for the Pegasus flight histo

Unlike ground-launched rockets, the Pegasus was launched at an altitu

more than 40,000 feet (12,192 meters) from beneath a flying aircraft at an 

speed of Mach 0.8. This air launch offered several advantages. First, becau

rocket did not require a launch pad, just a runway from which the aircraft 

take off and land, it could be launched from almost anywhere around the w

Second, the booster derived a slight gain in performance (one percent t

percent) from the speed of the carrier aircraft. Third, its trajectory was 

51 “NASA, Orbital Sciences Corporation Sign Agreement,” NASA News Release 90-92, July 3, 199

ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1990/90-092.txt (accessed February 2, 2005). 52 “Milestones,” Orbital, http://www.orbital.com/About/Milestones/90_99/ (accessed February 2

Also Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1991 Activities (Washingto

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1992), p. 70; Bille et al., To Reach the High Fro

History of U.S. Launch Vehicles, p. 216. 53 Andrew Wilson, ed., Jane's/Interavia Space Directory, 1999–2000 (Alexandria, VA: 2000)

Information Group (2000), p. 237.

54 This B-52 was the same aircraft used for the X-15 test flights in the 1960s. 55 Bille et al., in To Reach the High Frontier, A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles, p. 216.
than the trajectory for ground-launched vehicles, so less power was dissipa

achieving the correct attitude for injection into orbit. Fourth, because the c

aircraft served the same function as the first stage of a ground-launched ve

the rocket itself needed to carry less propellant.56 Fifth, the fact that the l

took place above 75 percent of Earth’s atmosphere reduced the energy nee

reach orbit. Finally, its air launch reduced the amount of stress the l

vehicle faced when compared with ground-launched vehicles.57 Figure 

shows a Pegasus mated to its B-52 mothership.

Figure 2–17. Pegasus Mounted Under B-52 Wing. (NASA-DFRC Photo No. EC91-34

A 22-foot (6.7-meter) delta wing mounted on top of Stage 1 provided 

lift. There were three solid rocket motors in its three stages; a payload fa

an avionics assembly; a lifting wing; an aft skirt assembly, including 

movable control fins; and a payload interface system. It also could be equ

with a liquid-propellant fourth stage, the hydrazine auxiliary propulsion s

(HAPS), to boost the payload into a higher orbit. The vehicle’s blunt pa

fairing blended into a cylindrical fuselage and ended in a flared exhaust n

The wing was made of graphite composite structure, and 94 percent 

structural weight of the original model Pegasus was also graphite comp

Three control fins electromechanically actuated provided pitch, roll, an

control while the vehicle was still in Earth’s atmosphere. When the v

reached the upper atmosphere, small rockets mounted in the base of ea

helped control the vehicle. Figure 2–18 shows the Pegasus vehicle.

56 “Pegasus Launch Vehicle,” Space & Missile Systems Center (AFMC), Department of the Ai

http://www.te.plk.af.mil/factsheet/pegfact.html (accessed February 8, 2005). 57 Matt Bille et al. in To Reach the High Frontier, A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles, p. 215.
Figure 2–18. Pegasus Vehicle. (Orbital Sciences Corp.)

The standard payload fairing consisted of two graphite composite h

with a nosecap bonded to one of the halves and a separation system

fairing separated when sequentially actuating pyrotechnic devices releas

right and left halves of the fairing from a closed position and move

halves away from either side of the payload. Pegasus could accomm

multiple payloads on the same mission. The standard fairing had a 1.17-

(3.8-foot) diameter and was 2.13-meters (7-feet) long. If the optional H

was used, the fairing was 1.76-meters or 1.79-meters (5.8-feet or 5.9

long. Table 2–77 lists Standard Pegasus characteristics, and Table 2–7

Pegasus XL characteristics.

The typical launch sequence begins with release of the Pegasus fro

carrier aircraft at an altitude of approximately 11,900 meters (39,000 feet) 

speed of Mach 0.80. Approximately 5 seconds after its drop from the ai

when Pegasus had cleared the aircraft, Stage 1 is ignited. The vehicle q

accelerates to supersonic speed while beginning a pull-up maneuver. Max

dynamic pressure is experienced about 25 seconds after ignition

approximately 20 to 25 seconds, a maneuver begins to depress the traje

and the vehicle’s angle of attack quickly approaches zero.

Stage 1 burnout occurs at approximately 77 seconds, and Stage 2 ig

follows quickly. The payload fairing is jettisoned during Stage 2 burn as q

as fairing dynamic pressure and payload aerodynamic heating limitations 

about 110,000 meters (361,000 feet) and 112 seconds after drop fro

aircraft. Stage 2 burnout occurs at approximately 168 seconds and is fol

by a long coast, during which the payload and Stage 3 achieves o

altitude. Stage 3 then provides the additional velocity needed to circulari

orbit. Stage 3 burnout typically occurs approximately 10 minutes after l

and 2,200 kilometers (1,200 nautical miles) downrange of the launch p

Figure 2–19 shows the Pegasus XL mission profile.

58 Pegasus User’s Guide, Release 5.0, August 2000 (Orbital Sciences Corporation, 2000), p. 2-1

www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/Publications/peg-user-guide.pdf (accessed February 4, 2005). 
Figure 2–19. Pegasus XL Mission Profile to 741 km (400 nmi) Circular, Polar Orbit w

227 kg (501 lb) Payload. (Orbital Sciences Corp.)

Scout Launch Vehicle

The standard Scout launch vehicle was a solid propellant, four

booster system.59 It was the world’s first all-solid-propellant launch v

and one of NASA’s most reliable launch vehicles. The Scout was the sm

of the basic NASA launch vehicles. It was used for orbit, probe, and re

Earth missions. Unlike most of NASA’s larger ELVs, the Scout 

assembled and the payload integrated and checked-out in the hori

position. The Scout’s first-stage motor was based on an earlier version 

Navy’s Polaris missile motor. It’s second-stage motor was developed fro

Army’s Sergeant surface-to-surface missile. The third-stage and fourth

motors were adapted by Langley Research Center from the Navy’s Van

missile.60 The Scout G1 was the last Scout model. See Table 2–79 for a 

its characteristics. 

Since the first Scout launch in 1960, 118 Scout launches had taken 

during almost 34 years of service. In the period 1989–1998, six mi

successfully launched from Scout ELVs, all from Vandenberg Air 

Base (see Table 2–80). In addition to one NASA payload, Scout 

59 Scout was an acronym for Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test. 60 “Scout Launch Vehicle To Retire After 34 Years of Service,” NASA News Release 94-72, May 

ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1994/94-072.txt (accessed March 22, 2005). Also “Scout–

Vehicle,” http://www.vought.com/heritage/special/html/sscout8.html (accessed November 4, 2005).
launched DOD payloads. The last Scout launched a military satelli

May 9, 1994. The air-launched Pegasus rocket was considere

operational replacement for the Scout.

Langley Research Center managed the Scout project from its beginn

1958 until January 1, 1991, when management of the Scout moved to Go

Space Flight Center. Since 1958, LTV had manufactured the NASA-deve

Scout rocket under a series of government contracts that procured flight ve

in support of NASA science missions. In December 1988, NASA and 

signed an agreement granting the company exclusive rights to produc

market the Scout commercially. This agreement also enabled LTV to 

access to and use of Scout launch support facilities at Wallops Flight F

and at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Taurus Launch Vehicle

The ground-launched Taurus, developed by Orbital Sciences Corpor

was created by adding the three stages of a Pegasus booster (without the 

and fins) atop a Peacekeeper or Castor 120 first-stage solid-propellant 

referred to as “Stage 0.” An aluminum skin and stringer construction inte

extended from the forward skirt of the Castor 120 Stage 0 motor to the aft 

the Stage 1 motor. The lower part of the interstage remained with Stage 

the upper part of the interstage flew with the next stage. A field joint be

the two sections allowed the Taurus upper stage stack to be mated to the C

120 Stage 0 (see Table 2–81 and Figure 2–20).

The Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency (DARPA) cont

with Orbital Sciences in 1989 to build the Taurus rapid response launch v

using the Pegasus as a baseline.61 It was designed for easy transport an

quick-reaction launch vehicle that could be launched from minimally pre

locations in just a few days.62 The first Taurus launch took place on Mar

1994 for a DOD mission. The commercial Taurus, developed afte

successful demonstration of the military “ARPA” Taurus, used the Casto

first stage rather than the Peacekeeper missile, a slightly larger Orion 5

second stage, and a larger fairing.63 For geosynchronous transfer orbit or 

space missions, the third stage could be replaced by a spin-stabilized Th

Star 37 perigee kick motor. 

61 Wilson, ed., Jane’s/Interavia Space Directory, p. 240. 62 “Taurus,” http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/taurus.htm (accessed February 9, 2005). 63 “ARPA” Taurus was another name for the military Taurus configuration that used the Peacekee

stage. Isakowitz et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., p. 437.
Figure 2–20. Taurus Launch Vehicle Configuration. (Orbital Sciences Corp.)
The Taurus successfully used payload fairings of 63 inches (160 cen

ters) and 92 inches (234 centimeters) diameter to encapsulate the pa

Vermont Composites manufactured the 63-inch fairing, while R-C

Composites manufactured the 92-inch fairing. Both were bisector shell

structed of graphite/epoxy facesheets with an aluminum honeycomb 

With the addition of a structural adapter, either fairing could accomm

multiple payloads.

From 1994 through 1998, three Taurus launches took place, all 

Vandenberg Air Force Base and with multiple payloads (see Table 2–82). 

The Titan Family

From the earliest days of the space program, the U.S. Air Force w

primary user of the Titan, first as an intercontinental ballistic missile and la

a space launch vehicle. With its several configurations and enhanced ver

the Titan launched a wide range of military and civilian spacecraft. For a 

in the mid-1980s, DOD prepared to launch its payloads exclusively fro

Space Shuttle, and it seemed as if the Titan was reaching the end of its 

life. But some felt that a backup vehicle was needed, and in 1985, the Air 

placed an order with Martin Marietta for 10 launch vehicles calle

complementary expendable launch vehicle (CELV) or Titan 34D-7, nam

its seven-segment solid motor designed for the earlier, unsuccessful Titan 

To be compatible with Shuttle payload capacity, the Titan payload fairin

increased to 5.1 meters (16.7 feet) in diameter. The 34D-7 included a C

upper stage and launched exclusively from Cape Canaveral. Afte

Challenger accident and the removal of DOD payloads from the Space S

the 34D-7 program grew from 10 to 41 vehicles with a mix of upper stage

vehicles were renamed the Titan IV, and they would eventually be lau

from both West and East Coast launch pads. 

The Titan IV was the Nation’s largest and most powerful ELV. It pro

primary access to space for the heaviest and most important DOD and 

payloads. The first Titan IVA launch occurred successfully on June 14, 

Eventually, 22 Titan IVAs were launched, the last in August 1998. Figure 

shows the first stage of the Titan IV ELV used to send NASA’s C

spacecraft to Saturn.

Even before the first Titan IVA launch, the Air Force began lookin

ways to upgrade the Titan. In October 1987, the Air Force awarded He

Aerospace a contract for upgraded solid rocket boosters that would have 

propellant formulation, new graphite-composite cases, and hydrau

gimbaled nozzles to replace the system used since the first Titan IIIC

upgraded Titan motors had three segments rather than seven for g

reliability. This upgrade not only increased payload capability by 25 perce

also used fewer components, resulting in a more reliable Stage 0 booster

model used a more efficient programmable aerospace ground equipment s
to control the vehicle before launch and an improved guidance and c

system, based on more accurate and lighter ring gyroscopes, manufactur

Honeywell. Mechanical and electrical interfaces to the payload were 

standardized, and the design of the core vehicle could be fitted with variou

to adapt to specific payloads. Production processes were redeveloped to 

“factory-to-launch” approach. The goal was to deliver problem-free har

requiring a minimal amount of launch site assembly and reserving the l

site for final stacking, checkout, countdown, and launch. 

Development of the new motors took longer than expected, how

partly because of an explosion during the first test firing. The first flight 

new Titan IV with its new motors, now designated Titan IVB, did not 

until February 23, 1997. The new Titan IV stood 61 meters (200 feet) ta

had a lift capability of 21,680 kilograms (47,796 pounds) to low-Earth 

and 5,760 kilograms (12,700 pounds) to geosynchronous orbit. Loc

Martin provided overall program management, system integration

payload integration for the program. It also built the first and second 

and the Centaur upper stage.64

The Air Force found a use, too, for old Titan II ICBMs. As the techn

for nuclear deterrence changed, the Air Force began in July 1982 to deac

its Titan II missiles, removing its last ICBM from its silo in Arkans

June 23, 1987. In January 1986, the Air Force decided to begin converting 

of its deactivated Titan II ICBMs for use as medium-lift space launch veh

From its fleet of 54 deactivated Titan IIs, the Air Force selected Martin M

to modify 14 for space launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base into 

orbit. Modification entailed replacing the core vehicle’s warhead interfac

a space payload interface and a 3-meter (9.8-foot) payload fairing 

upgrading the electronics, avionics, and guidance systems using Tit

technology. An attitude control system was added for stabilization durin

coast phase after second-stage shutdown and before payload separation.65 

for launches into polar orbit, the space launch complex at Vandenberg Air 

Base was also modified. The resulting Titan II space launch vehicle was 

stage, liquid-fueled booster designed to provide a small-to-medium weigh

capability. It could lift approximately 4,200 pounds (1,905 kilograms) into 

low-Earth circular orbit.66 The first launch of a Titan II 23G space l

vehicle took place on September 5, 1988, from Vandenberg Air Force 

when it sent a classified payload into low-Earth orbit. 

64 Isakowitz et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., p. 470. Also 

Lockheed Martin, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=15525&rsbci=131

=0&ti=0&sc=400 (accessed December 14, 2004). 65 Art Falconer, “Epic Proportion: The Titan Launch Vehicle,” Crosslink (Aerospace Corporation

2002/2003): 35 (NASA History Office Folder 16680). Also Isakowitz et al., International Referenc

to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., p. 470. 66 “Titan II Space Launch Vehicle,” Lockheed Martin (NASA History Office Folder 16680).
.

Figure 2–21. The first stage of the Titan IV ELV that sent NASA’s Cassini Spacecraft to 

and its moon. Titan is Llowered into a high bay in the Vertical Integration Building at 

Canaveral Air Station to begin stacking operations, April 14, 1997. 

(NASA Photo No. KSC-97PC-640)

During 1989–1998, the Titan launched only a few civilian spacecra

but one were converted Titan ICBMs; the final nonmilitary Titan pa

during this decade launched NASA’s Cassini spacecraft to Saturn on 

Titan IVB Centaur. Table 2–83 lists all Titan launches during this p

Table 2–84 lists Titan II characteristics.
The Space Shuttle 

By 1989, regular Space Shuttle flights had resumed, and 66 Shuttle f

took place in the decade from 1989–1998. Because NASA policy dictate

the Space Shuttle could be used for launches only when a human presenc

required or when an ELV was not appropriate to deploy a payload, mo

board science missions took place and the Shuttle deployed fewer payload

in the years before the Challenger accident. Among the Shuttle payloads 

some of the most important space science projects, including the Hubble 

Telescope, the Galileo spacecraft, and the Gamma Ray Observatory. 

A new orbiter, the Endeavour, joined the fleet of Discovery, Columbi

Atlantis and began flight operations on May 7, 1992, when it blasted off 

STS-49 Intelsat VI repair mission. Table 2–85 lists all Space Shuttle mi

from 1989 to 1998

In 1995, the Space Shuttle program demonstrated a new capabili

preparation for construction of the International Space Station, the crews 

Space Shuttle carried out a series of docking missions with the Russian 

Station Mir. U.S. astronauts lived aboard Mir, sometimes for several mont

time, while they acclimated themselves to living and working in space. A

end of the decade, the first Space Station mission took place when STS-8

materials for construction of the Station. 

In November 1995, in an effort to reduce costs and increase effic

NASA announced its intention to pursue a non-competitive contract wi

United Space Alliance (USA) that would consolidate contracts for 

Shuttle processing and operations in a single contract. USA was a joint v

between Rockwell International and Lockheed Martin Corporation. Tog

these two companies held 69 percent of the dollar value of all Shuttle-r

prime contracts. The consolidation virtually ensured that NASA 

negotiate with the new company.67 In April 1996, NASA signed two agree

designating USA the prime contractor for Shuttle processing work perfo

by Lockheed at Kennedy Space Center and Shuttle operations work perfo

by Rockwell at Johnson Space Center.

In September 1996, NASA entered into a contract with USA as the 

contractor for Space Shuttle and International Space Station activities to e

that all NASA missions were successfully accomplished according t

applicable flight definition and requirements, schedule, and implemen

plan. The original six-year contract ran from October 1996 through Sept

2002 and consisted of two phases for consolidating the existing prime con

During the first phase, USA assumed overall responsibility for the fl

orbiters. During the second phase, which began in September 1997

contracts for Kennedy Space Center base operations, the waste coll

system, flight software, flight equipment, and solid rocket boosters 

67 “NASA To Pursue Non-Competitive Shuttle Contract With U.S. Alliance,” NASA News Release 

November 7, 1995, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1995/95-205.txt (accessed April 17, 2005
consolidated in the USA contract. As of early 2000, the remaining 

contracts—external tanks, Space Shuttle main engines, and reusable 

rocket motors—remained to be consolidated.68

Space Shuttle Characteristics

The Space Shuttle that NASA flew in the decade beginning in 

consisted of four primary elements: an orbiter spacecraft, two SRBs, an ex

tank to house fuel and an oxidizer, and three Space Shuttle main en

(SSMEs). Rockwell International built the orbiters. Rockwell’s Rocke

Division built the main engines.69

Thiokol Corporation produced the SRB motors/ Martin Marietta Corpo

built the external tank. Johnson Space Center directed the orbiter and integ

contracts, while Marshall Space Flight Center managed the solid rocket bo

external tank, and Space Shuttle main engine contracts.70 Rockwell also w

contractor for Space Shuttle operations at Johnson Space Center that inc

maintenance and operation of Space Shuttle facilities, flight preparation

sustained engineering support. Lockheed Martin was responsible for S

processing at Kennedy Space Center.

External Tank

The external tank held the liquid hydrogen fuel and liquid oxygen ox

in separate pressurized tanks and supplied them under pressure to the three 

engines in the orbiter during liftoff and ascent. The main engines cons

approximately 64,000 gallons (242,266 liters) of fuel each minute. Wh

main engines were shut down, the external tank was jettisoned into E

atmosphere where it broke up and fell into a remote ocean area. The ex

tank was not recovered. When loaded with fuel, the external tank was the l

and heaviest element of the Space Shuttle. Built from aluminum, it also ac

the backbone for the orbiter and solid rocket boosters. The external tan

composed of three major components: the forward liquid oxygen tan

unpressurized intertank containing most of the electrical components, an

aft liquid hydrogen tank. Characteristics of the external tank are sho

Table 2–86. Figure 2–22 shows a cutaway drawing.

68 NASA Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Space Flight Operations Contract Phase 

Benefit Analysis, IG-00-015, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (March 14, 2000), pp

69 In December 1996, Boeing purchased the Space and Defense divisions of Rockwell Internatio

renamed them Boeing North American. Rocketdyne had been part of Rockwell when the SSME 

was awarded. It was bought by Boeing in December 1996 when Boeing bought Rockwell. Roc

became the Rocketdyne Division of Boeing North American.

70 Detailed descriptions of all Space Shuttle components can be found in the NSTS 1988 News R

Manual, September 1988, at http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/stsref-toc.h

recovery (accessed February 25, 2005) and in the Shuttle Crew Operations Manual, SFOC-FL0884

CPN-3, January 13, 2003. See also a summary in Judy Rumerman, compiler, NASA Historical Da

1979–1988, Volume V (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Publication 4012, 1999), pp. 33–47 and pp. 123–147. Also available at http://history.nasa.gov/S

vol5/cover5.html. 
Figure 2–22. Drawing of Space Shuttle External Tank. (NASA)

Solid Rocket Booster

The solid rocket boosters were the largest solid-propellant motor

flown and the first designed for refurbishment and reuse. The two bo

provided the main thrust to lift the Space Shuttle up off the launch pad 

altitude of about 150,000 feet (45.7 kilometers) or 24 nautical miles. Th

solid rocket boosters carried the entire weight of the external tank and o

and transmitted the weight load through their structure to the mobile lau

platform. The solid rocket boosters were ignited after the thrust levels 

three main engines were verified. During flight, the solid rocket b

nozzles swiveled up to 6 degrees, redirecting the thrust and steerin

Shuttle toward orbit. Seventy-five seconds after booster separation, 

apogee occurred at an altitude of approximately 220,000 feet (67 kilom

or 35 nautical miles. Impact in the Atlantic Ocean occurred approxim

122 nautical miles (226 kilometers) downrange. Table 2–87 lists solid r

booster characteristics. Figure 2–23 shows an exploded view.

Space Shuttle Main Engine

The three Space Shuttle main engines were clustered at the tail end 

orbiter. These high-performance liquid-propellant engines were the w

first reusable rocket engines with each designed to operate for 7.5 hours 

lifespan of 55 starts. They operated with variable thrust levels in a s

combustion cycle. The engines burned liquid hydrogen as the propellan

and liquid oxygen as the oxidizer in a 6:1 ratio. The propellant was carr

separate tanks in the external tank and supplied to the main engines 

pressure. The main engines could be throttled over a range of 65 perc
109 percent of their rated power level in 1 percent increments. A value o

percent thrust corresponded to a thrust level of 375,000 pounds (

kilonewtons) at sea level and 470,000 pounds (2,091.7 kilonewtons) 

vacuum. A thrust value of 104 percent (called full power) was typically u

launch, although each engine could be throttled to its maximum of 109 p

if necessary. (This power level has never been used on a Shuttle flight). Al

engines received the same throttle command at the same time, normally 

the orbiter general-purpose computers, although manual control of e

throttling was possible during certain contingency situations. 

Firing of the three main engines began 6.6 seconds before launch

three engines were fired at intervals of 120 milliseconds. If all three en

failed to reach at least 90 percent thrust over the next 3 seconds, a main e

cutoff command was issued automatically, followed by cutoff of all 

engines. If launch proceeded normally, the engines were throttled back 

26 seconds after launch to protect the Shuttle from aerodynamic stres

excessive heating. The engines returned to full power about 60 seconds 

launch and typically continued at full power for about 8.5 minutes 

shortly before the Shuttle entered orbit. At about 7 minutes, 40 seconds 

launch, the engines were throttled down so the vehicle and crew we

subject to forces more than 3g. The main engines operated in parallel wi

solid rocket boosters during the initial ascent. After the boosters separate

main engines continued to operate. During ascent, each engine cou

gimbaled plus or minus 10.5 degrees around the yaw and pitch axes to 

steer the Shuttle.71

The Shuttle’s main engines were upgraded twice during this decade

Block 1 SSMEs first flew on STS-70 on July 13, 1995. These engines u

new high-pressure liquid oxidizer turbopump that increased safety margin

the reliability of the Shuttle’s main engines. In 1998, the Block IIA S

were first used on STS-95. These upgrades increased safety and reliabili

simplified manufacturing and maintenance.72 The design had a larger n

throat that resulted in decreased operating pressure and temperature. To ac

the same performance as the earlier engines, the Block IIA engines typ

operated at 104.5 percent thrust at launch. Figure 2–24 shows the S

components. Table 2–88 lists SSME characteristics.

71 David Darling, “Space Shuttle,” The Encyclopedia of Astrobiology, Astronomy, and Spacefligh

www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/S/Space_Shuttle.html (accessed February 28, 2005). 72 Susie Unkeless, Jack Vautin, Boeing Rocketdyne, telephone conversation, February 28, 200

“STS-95 Space Shuttle Mission Chronology,” http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/chron/sts

(accessed February 28, 2005).
Figure 2–23. Exploded View of Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster.
Figure 2–24. Space Shuttle Main Engine Components. (Rocketdyne)

Two orbital maneuvering system engines, mounted on either side of the 

aft orbiter fuselage, provided thrust for major orbital changes. For more p

motions in orbit, 44 small rocket engines, clustered on the Shuttle’s nose a

either side of the tail, were used. Together, they were known as the reaction c

system and helped Shuttle astronauts retrieve, launch, and repair satellites in 

Launch and Operations

All Space Shuttle missions launched from Kennedy Space Center

majority also landed there although, during this decade, about 39 p

landed at Edwards Air Force Base in California. See the individual S

mission tables in chapter 3 for specific launch and landing information.

All satellites released from a Space Shuttle initially entered low-Earth 

Some remained in that orbit throughout their working lives. Many spac

however, operated in geosynchronous orbit, approximately 35,790 kilom

(19,325 nautical miles or 22,300 miles) above Earth and aligned with the eq

with a speed in orbit that matched the speed of Earth’s surface below. Spac

reached this altitude by firing an upper stage, an attached propulsion unit s

an IUS or PAM, after deployment from the Shuttle orbiter. Interpla

explorers launched from the Space Shuttle also used an IUS. They left low

orbit on trajectories that sent them out into our solar system and beyond.
Upper Stages

Upper stages were used to boost ELV and Shuttle payloads from a 

Earth orbit to geostationary transfer orbit, geosynchronous orbit, or in

interplanetary trajectory. During 1989 to 1998, NASA used three types of 

stages: the PAM, the Centaur Upper Stage, and the IUS.

Payload Assist Module

The PAM was designed to boost satellites deployed in low-Earth orbit 

higher operational orbit. Different types of PAMs were used depending 

weight of the satellite it needed to boost. A special PAM, known as PA

was adapted for use with Delta launch vehicles. The PAM-DII was desig

boost Shuttle payloads into an elliptical transfer orbit after a satellit

deployed from the Shuttle’s cargo bay. A specially designed PAM-S wa

on the Ulysses mission for the first time in combination with an IUS to p

the spacecraft toward Jupiter. The PAM’s expendable stage consisted of a 

stabilized, solid-fueled rocket motor; a payload attach fitting to mate wi

satellite; and timing, sequencing, power, and control assemblies.73 Th

launch of the PAM as the top stage of a Delta took place in 1980. The 

made its debut flight from the Space Shuttle in 1982. Figure 2–25 show

Ulysses spacecraft with the PAM and IUS. 

Centaur Upper Stage

The Centaur was a powerful, liquid-propellant rocket—this country

high-energy, upper-stage launch vehicle. It was developed under the direct

Lewis Research Center in the 1960s and assembled by General Dynam

used a liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen propellant combination in two resta

Pratt & Whitney RL10 engines that produced more thrust for each pou

propellant burned per second than rockets using only kerosene-

hydrocarbon fuels (see Figure 2–26). The rocket was first developed to be 

with the Atlas ELV, and in the decade from 1989–1998, was used on alm

Atlas launches. In the 1970s, the Centaur had been combined with the Ti

to launch larger spacecraft. Later, NASA had planned to use the Cent

boost Shuttle payloads into higher orbits. But with the increased empha

safety following the Challenger accident, NASA determined that even 

modifications, it was too dangerous to carry a liquid-propellant rocket in

crewed spacecraft. In June 1986, the Shuttle/Centaur program was canc

eliminating the Centaur for use on the Shuttle.

73 “Space Transportation System Payloads: Payload Assist Module,” http://science.ksc.nasa.gov

technology/sts-newsref/carriers.html (accessed March 17, 2005).
Figure 2–25. Ulysses Sits atop the Payload Assist Module-S and IUS Combination in 

Vertical Processing Facility at Kennedy Space Center. (NASA/JPL-Caltech)

Figure 2–26. Pratt & Whitney RL10 Engine used on the Centaur Upper Stage. 

(Pratt & Whitney)
In the wake of the Challenger accident, the country’s space pro

returned to using ELVs for all missions suitable for those launchers, and 

tion focused on improving the Centaur for use as an ELV upper stag

General Dynamics began developing new Atlas launch vehicles in th

1980s, it also improved the Centaur as its “engineers dusted off NASA s

for Centaur improvements never implemented . . . .” A pressure-fed s

replaced its boost pumps, reducing complexity and cost, and its avionics s

was upgraded. Designers developed a new 14-foot (4.3-meter)-diameter 

nose fairing to accommodate larger payloads. A computer-controlled pr

ization system with redundant sensors was adopted, making the system 

versatile and reliable.74 This updated Centaur was first used on July 25, 

for the Atlas I launch of the Combined Release and Radiation Effects Sa

See Figure 2–27 for a diagram of the Atlas-Centaur upper stage.

The Centaur G model, originally developed for launching Shuttle pay

was updated for use on the Titan IV. Martin Marietta delivered the first Tit

Centaur in December 1990. It had a bare metal tank, like that of the 

Centaur. However, the upper fuel tank was stretched to 5 meters (16.4 fe

diameter. Most Titan IV Centaurs were used for classified DOD pay

However, one model launched the Cassini/Huygens probe for NASA 

interplanetary trajectory in October 1997. Characteristics of the Titan C

are given in Table 2–89.

Inertial Upper Stage

The two-stage, solid-fueled IUS delivered a satellite to a high

operational orbit or to an escape trajectory for an interplanetary mission 

low-Earth orbit. It extended the reach of the Space Shuttle and was also use

the Titan launch vehicle, particularly the Titan 34D and Titan IV. The IU

two solid rocket motors, an aft skirt, an interstage, and an equipment su

section where the avionics were located. It could lift 5,000 pounds 

kilograms) from low-Earth to geosynchronous orbit. Figure 2–28 shows a

being attached to the Magellan spacecraft, which launched from STS-30 in 

In a typical Titan IV-IUS launch into geosynchronous orbit, the 

separated from the Titan’s second-stage booster approximately 9 minute

launch. Then, for the next 6 hours, 54 minutes, the IUS autonomously perf

all functions to place the payload into its proper orbit. The first IUS rocket 

which placed the payload into geosynchronous transfer orbit, occurred a 

more than 1 hour into the IUS booster flight. The IUS second solid rocket 

ignited about 6.5 hours into the flight, followed by a coast phase, and 

separation of the payload from the IUS after placing it into geosynchronous 

74 Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles, Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage 

1958-2002 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Publicatio

4230, 2004), pp. 242–243.
Figure 2–27. Atlas-Centaur Upper Stage. (NASA-GRC Photo No. C-1998-02814)
In a typical Shuttle-IUS launch to geosynchronous orbit, after reaching 

Earth orbit, the Shuttle opened its payload doors and the IUS tilted ou

extending the IUS and its payload into space. After satellite and IUS checko

Shuttle astronauts ejected the IUS and its cargo from the orbiter. The IUS on

computers then directed a series of maneuvers and fired the first-stage mo

approximately 140 seconds to propel the IUS and spacecraft toward the d

geosynchronous position. After a coast period of several hours, the second

motor ignited and burned for approximately 100 seconds, injecting the IUS 

final circularized orbit. The IUS then separated from the satellite and move

position where it neither collided with nor contaminated the satellite.75 Table 

lists IUS characteristics. Table 2–91 lists missions using an IUS.

Advanced Programs and Projects

Advanced Programs conducted studies and selected development effo

support potential new programs, system improvements, and expanded cap

ties for space transportation systems. The objectives were to increase relia

cost effectiveness, and capability of spaceflight systems; continue enha

crew safety for the Space Shuttle and Space Station; implement fligh

ground systems improvements to substantially reduce the cost of space

operations; and pursue technology developments to meet future human 

flight requirements. Development efforts focused on advanced transpor

advanced operations, and satellite servicing. The two program elements 

advanced operations and advanced space systems.

Tethered Satellite System

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) program was a cooperative 

between the government of Italy and NASA. The TSS program was to e

science to be performed in the upper atmosphere and ionosphere fr

satellite connected to the Space Shuttle by means of a tether up to 100-kilom

(62-miles) long. The effect of the tether passing through space also 

expected to generate an electric current that could be conducted to the o

The first attempt at performing the TSS experiment took place on ST

launched on July 31, 1992. Due to problems with the deployment mechanis

Atlantis crew could deploy the tethered satellite only 256 meters (840 feet) i

of the goal of 20 kilometers (12.4 miles).

75 “Inertial Upper Stage: IUS Team,” Boeing, http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/ius/ius_t

(accessed March 18, 2005).
Figure 2–28. The Magellan Spacecraft with its attached Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) Boo

in the Orbiter Atlantis Payload Bay prior to closure of the doors at T-3 days to launch. L

of Magellan and STS-30 took place on May 4, 1989. (KSC Photo No. 89PC-0469

A second attempt to deploy a tethered satellite from the Shuttle was ma

STS-75, launched February 22, 1996. This second attempt also failed to s

all the mission objectives. Although the tether unreeled smoothly for alm

full length of 13 miles (21 kilometers), the 0.1-inch (0.25-centimeter)-dia

tether broke about three-fourths of a mile before reaching full length, an

Italian satellite drifted away. There was a low-power current of 3,500 vol

500 milliamps generated by the unreeling tether in Earth’s magnetic field, 

satisfied the test’s scientific objective.76

76 David M. Harland, The Story of the Space Shuttle (Chichester, UK: Springer, Praxis Publishing

pp. 123, 137. Also Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transp

System, The First 100 Missions (Cape Canaveral, FL: Dennis R. Jenkins, 1996), p. 309.
.

Figure 2–29. First Test Flight of the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced 

(DC-XA), May 18, 1996. (NASA-MSFC Photo No. MSFC-9607854)

A series of less complex tethered experiments took place in 199

1994 from Delta II launch vehicles. They were designed to complement 

TSS deployer when retrieval of the tether was not required. The 

Expendable Deployer System (SEDS-1) was the first of three 

experiments managed by NASA’s Office of Space Systems Develop

Flight Demonstration Program. These experiments were more successfu

the Shuttle-based attempts. 

On March 29, 1993, about 63 minutes after launch, the first SEDS diag

payload was ejected from the Delta by springs. The tether was deployed at a

tude of 720 kilometers (447 miles) above Earth and pointing toward Earth

tether unreeled smoothly for its full 20-kilometer (12.4-mile) length, and s

recorded its damping motion for 14 minutes. Then the tether was cut a

30-kilogram (66-pound) cargo floated away, ending the experiment. A secon

cessful experiment took place from a Delta on June 26, 1993. Called the P
Motor Generator, this experiment assessed the ability of a space tether to ge

an electric current. The tether generated about 0.3 amp of current as it m

through Earth’s magnetic field.77 A third experiment took place on Marc

1994, when the SEDS-2 payload unreeled to its maximum length of 19.8 ki

ters (12.3 miles) in 1 hour and 48 minutes. Unlike SEDS-1, when the tethe

severed, the tether on this mission remained attached to the Delta rocket, a

payload at the end of the tether transmitted for 10 hours until its battery died

Shuttle-C

Shuttle-C (cargo) was a concept for a large, uncrewed launch vehicle 

cargo canister in place of the orbiter that would make maximum use of ex

Space Shuttle systems. This proposed cargo-carrying launch vehicle wou

able to lift approximately 100,000 pounds to 170,000 pounds (45,300 kilo

to 77,000 kilograms) to low-Earth orbit, two to three times the capability 

Shuttle’s orbiter. It could reduce by 50 percent the number of launche

length of assembly time for Space Station components. It could also 

scientific spacecraft into orbit. The vehicle would use the same type of ex

tank, solid rocket boosters, and main engines as the crewed Space S

Although the U.S. House Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Ag

authorized $1.1 billion on a heavy-lift space cargo vehicle in FY 199

vehicle never moved past the study stage and was replaced by the Na

Launch System, another short-lived initiative. 

Advanced Launch System

The Advanced Launch System (ALS) was a joint NASA-DOD progr

the late 1980s that was a product of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 

Wars” ballistic missile defense system. The program was to define concep

develop technology for a family of uncrewed launch vehicles that would r

the cost of putting payloads into orbit. Initially, it was projected that new h

lift launchers would be needed to deploy payloads of 10,000 pounds to 20

pounds (4,500 kilograms to 90,700 kilograms) to low-Earth orbit for the 

based elements of the SDI program. Three basic booster concepts 

proposed. The least costly vehicle would use a hydrogen core and from 6 

solid rocket boosters. A more costly vehicle used a liquid core and from 

six strap-on liquid rocket engines. The most expensive and most advanced 

alternative, and the least likely because of technological uncertainty, 

winged, fully reusable booster.79 NASA managed development of the adv

liquid cryogenic propulsion system and the advanced development progra

77 Joel W. Powell, “Satellite Tethers Unwind,” Spaceflight, 36 (March 1994): 97–99. 78 “Jonathan’s Space Report,” no. 188 (March 14, 1994), http://www.planet4589.org/space/j

news.188 (accessed March 21, 2005). 79 Mark Cleary, “Future Space Operations: The Space Transportation Architecture Study and A

Launch System (ALS) Studies,” Military Space Operations, 1971–1992, 45th Space Wing History 

https://www.patrick.af.mil/heritage/Cape/Cape4/cape4-2.htm (accessed March 24, 2005).
However, by late 1989, the Cold War was waning, and the SDI ini

was greatly reduced in scope. In October 1989, funding cutbacks s

emphasis to lightweight weapons, which reduced payload require

dramatically. On December 7, 1989, the Secretary of the Air Force direct

ALS program office to terminate design efforts “as soon as possible

suspend any new spending. The three ALS contractors, Boeing, G

Dynamics, and a Martin Marietta-McDonnell Douglas team, were direc

transfer ALS technology to the existing fleet of ELVs, which all stood to b

from technologies developed for the ALS program.80 In January 199

program was downscaled to focus on propulsion technologies, particular

Space Transportation Main Engine, although little funding was provided 

for the project at the time.

National Launch System 

One of the recommendations in the December 1990 report of the Ad

Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, headed by No

Augustine, was that the U.S. Space Program end reliance on the Shut

stated that the Administration should provide funds for a “firm progra

development of an evolutionary, unmanned but man-rateable, heavy-lift l

vehicle” that “should reach operational capability in time to support all b

initial phase of the Space Station deployment.”81 On January 2, 1991

President Daniel Quayle directed NASA and the DOD to jointly develop 

for a new space launch system. On April 16, 1991, the Vice President an

National Space Council directed the two organizations to “pursu

development of a new space launch system with the objective of ach

significant improvements in reliability, responsiveness, and opera

efficiency.”82 This plan would meet civil and military space needs and ac

consider commercial space requirements; costs would be shared equa

NASA and the Defense Department.83

The ensuing program, the National Launch System, sometimes call

New Launch System, replaced and combined elements of the pre

Advanced Launch System and NASA’s Shuttle-C programs. As stat

NASA, program goals were to: 1) develop a modular launch system w

medium-lift to heavy-lift capability, 2) facilitate evolutionary chang

requirements evolved into the 21st century, 3) use existing components fro

Shuttle and ELVs to expedite initial capability and reduce development 

80 Cleary, Military Space Operations,” https://www.patrick.af.mil/heritage/Cape/Cape4/cape4-2.ht

Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Space 

Program Report to Congress, (March 14, 1989), p. 20. 81 Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, “Report of the Advisory Comm

the Future of the U.S. Space Program,” December 17, 1990, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/

augustine/racfup1.htm (accessed March 15, 2005). 82 Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1992 Activities, p. 18. 83 David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, “Epilogue: ‘To the Very Limit of Our Ability,’” in Lau

Jenkins, To Reach the High Frontier, p. 488.
and 4) develop a system that, while being uncrewed initially, could be 

rated” in the future.84 The proposed heavy-lift space cargo vehicle 

support the logistics requirements of Space Station Freedom. Evoluti

vehicles that could support the Nation’s return to the Moon and mission to 

was also envisioned.85 NASA’s Office of Space Systems Development ma

the program. 

In August 1991, NASA awarded study contracts for the NLS, each v

at $500,000, to Lockheed Missiles and Space, McDonnell Douglas, and 

Inc. The NASA FY 1992 budget request for the NLS increased the es

from $23.9 million for the ALS and Shuttle-C to $175 million for NASA’s 

of the funding. It was anticipated that activities in FY 1992 would foc

beginning development of the Space Transportation Main Engine (S

prototype, conducting definition and design studies of vehicle componen

elements, and assessing requirements and design options for supporting l

facilities.86

Initially, the system comprised three different-sized launch vehicles 

varying payload capacities to low-Earth orbit. They would be derived f

common core element consisting of the Space Shuttle external tank and 

STME. In 1992, NASA eliminated the largest rocket from the original 

when a study determined that the needed modular family of vehicles s

span the medium launch vehicle class up to a booster capable of supporti

Space Station’s resupply missions. One of the proposed vehicles would b

to deliver 50,000 pounds (22,680 kilograms) to low-Earth orbit; the se

smaller vehicle, could deliver 20,000 pounds (9,000 kilograms). 

The program continued into 1992, although funding for FY 199

reduced by $137 million consistent with a first launch in 2002. The rem

$28 million was earmarked to support development of the STME. Howev

early 1993, the program was terminated, and no funding was included 

FY 1994 budget.

Reusable Launch Vehicles

Developing an RLV, either to supplement or replace the Space S

received a great deal of attention and significant resources during the d

beginning in 1989. The National Aerospace Plane (the X-30), a pro

supported strongly by President Ronald Reagan, had been initiated in 198

DARPA project. Planned as a new reusable, air-breathing, single-stage-to

84 “New Launch System,” NASA Fact Sheet, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, M

Space Flight Center, August 29, 1991 (NASA History Office Folder 010274). Also, “National 

System–NLS,” FAS Space Policy Project, Military Space Programs, http://www.fas.org/spp/m

program/launch/nls.htm (accessed March 24, 2005). 85 “NASA Awards Study Contracts for National Launch System,” NASA News Release C91-gg, Au

1991 (NASA History Office Folder 010274).

86 “New Launch System,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration FY 1992 Budget Estim

RD 2-18–2-19.
hypersonic vehicle, the X-30 became a joint NASA-DARPA program in 

Although the project produced some important technological advanc

became too costly in a time of competing priorities, and the program 

cancelled in 1994 while still in the technology development phase. 

NASA Administrator Goldin joined NASA in April 1992, a time wh

Shuttle and other NASA programs were under attack from Congress fo

high costs. Taking advantage of the change in presidential administratio

1993, and also to put his mark on the Agency, Goldin initiated the “Acc

Space” study to identify alternative, less expensive approaches to gain acc

space that would also increase safety for flight crews. Released in January 

the study report was followed later that year by the first executive 

specifically recommending development of an RLV. On August 5, 

President William Clinton issued the National Space Transportation P

making NASA “the lead agency for technology development and demonst

of next generation reusable space transportation systems,” while the DOD 

given responsibility for improving ELVs.87 The policy statement led direc

the formation of NASA’s RLV Technology program. 

NASA’s RLV Technology program was a partnership among NASA, th

Air Force, and private industry to develop a new generation of single-sta

orbit launch vehicles. The program consisted of the Delta Clipper-Experim

Advanced (DC-XA), X-34, X-33, and related long-term technology develo

efforts. RLV program managers committed themselves to developing 

operations and component technologies, as well as producing an ind

Government relationship that would change the space launch industry world

DC-X

The Delta Clipper-Experimental (DC-X) program, initiated b

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) in 1990, supported NA

RLV program. It successfully tested an experimental suborbital launch v

in a series of flight tests beginning in 1993. The early RLV efforts 

conducted by the U.S. Air Force Phillips Laboratory at Kirtland Air 

Base, New Mexico, under the auspices of the BMDO Single Stage R

Technology program. This program’s charter was to demonstrat

practicality, reliability, operability, and cost efficiency of a fully reusable 

turnaround single-stage rocket, with the ultimate goal of aircra

operations of RLVs. The program focused on using existing technologie

systems to demonstrate the feasibility of building RLVs for suborbita

orbital flight that could fly into space, return to the launch site, a

serviced and ready for the next mission within three days. 

87 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Presidential Decision Directive, N

Science and Technology Council-4, National Space Transportation Policy, August 5, 1994

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nstc4.htm (accessed March 20, 2005).
A design and risk reduction competition awarded McDonnell Dou

$60 million contract in August 1991 to build the DC-X. The DC-X d

emphasized simplified ground and flight operations and vehicle mainten

rapid turnaround, and operational characteristics also relevant to future o

vehicles. Table 2–92 lists its characteristics.

The flight test program took place in mid-1993. It started with 

altitude hover flights gradually increasing in altitude and duration 

eventually leading to suborbital flights to approximately 18,000 feet (

meters). The DC-X flew a total of eight test flights in 1993, 1994, and 

the 1995 flights supported NASA’s RLV program. The test flight on Jun

1994, experienced an on-board fire and successfully demonstrate

vehicle’s autoland capabilities. On the July 7, 1995, flight, follow

successful flight that demonstrated the vehicle’s ability to turn itself a

and reverse direction, the aeroshell cracked during landing, damagin

vehicle and ending the tests. At the conclusion of this test, the DC-X 

officially turned over to NASA. The vehicle was returned to McDo

Douglas for conversion into the DC-XA.88

The DC-XA was a modified DC-X with technology intended for use 

X-33 or X-34 RLVs being developed by NASA and industry partners. The D

had a lightweight graphite-epoxy liquid hydrogen tank and an advanced gra

aluminum honeycomb intertank built by McDonnell Douglas; an aluminum

ium liquid oxygen tank built by Energia; and an improved reaction control s

from Aerojet. These improvements reduced dry vehicle mass by 620 kilo

(1,367 pounds). NASA and the DOD operated the DC-XA under NASA’s 

program. The flight vehicle was tested at White Sands, New Mexico, duri

summer of 1996. It demonstrated a short 26-hour turnaround time between i

ond and third flights, a record for any rocket. 

The DC-XA flew until it was destroyed. During its fourth demonst

flight on July 31, 1996, a landing strut failed to extend, causing the unbal

vehicle to tip over on the landing pad. The liquid oxygen tank exploded and 

were indications of secondary explosions in the liquid hydrogen tank

ensuing fire damaged large sections of the vehicle. An investigation board 

determined that an unconnected helium pressurant line supplying hyd

pressure to extend the landing strut caused the explosion. The program ende

to lack of funding to build a new vehicle. All flight tests are listed in Table 2

88 “DC-X Fact Sheet,” BMDOLINK, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/x-33/dcx-f

(accessed March 22, 2005). 
Figure 2–30. The X-34 Testbed Demonstrator being delivered to Dryden Flight Resea

Center, April 16, 1999. (NASA-DFRC Photo No. EC99-44976-31)

X-34

The X-34 program was to bridge the gap between the earlier subsoni

XA vehicle and the larger and higher performance X-33 demonstrator. 

structured originally as a cooperative agreement between NASA and O

Sciences Corporation signed in March 1995. The government team inc

Marshall Space Flight Center, responsible for the main propulsion sy

including the Fastrac engine; Langley Research Center, responsible for 

tunnel testing and analysis; Ames Research Center, responsible for the th

protection system; Dryden Flight Research Center; Holloman Air Force 

White Sands Test Facility; and White Sands Missile Range, responsib

testing and flight support operations.

The proposed winged, reusable, single-stage vehicle, propelled by a ker

liquid oxygen engine, was expected to demonstrate key technologies. 

included 1) composite primary and secondary airframe structures; 2) cryo

insulation and propulsion system elements; 3) advanced thermal prot

systems and materials; 4) low-cost avionics, including differential G

Positioning and inertial navigation systems; and 5) key oper

technologies such as integrated vehicle health-monitoring and auto

checkout systems. It was expected to significantly reduce mission cos

sending 1,000-pound to 2,000-pound (454-kilogram to 907-kilo

payloads into low-Earth orbit. The vehicle would be air-dropped from be

Orbital’s L-1011 aircraft, reach speeds of Mach 8, and fly at altitud
approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers). The vehicle would also demon

the ability to conduct subsonic flights through rain or fog and autono

landings in crosswinds of up to 20 knots (23 miles per hour or 37 kilomete

hour). Characteristics of the technology demonstrator are listed in Table 2

Figure 2–31. Aerospike Engine. (NASA-MSFC)

Originally, the X-34 was to progress rapidly through hardware design, 

tests planned for late 1997, and a launch expected by mid-1998. Orbital, how

withdrew from the cooperative agreement in less than a year partly beca

changes in the projected profitability of the venture. NASA subseq

structured a new NASA Research Announcement in March 1996 focusing 

technology demonstration flight tests rather than on the commercial poten

the vehicle. NASA awarded the restructured fixed-price contract to Orbital i

1996. This 30-month contract had a value of approximately $49.5 mill

included two powered test flights scheduled to begin in late 1998. NASA 

spend an additional $10 million in direct support of the X-34. The contract h

option for up to 25 additional test flights after the initial contract period end

In August 1997, a critical series of tests on the Fastrac engine wer

cessfully completed at Marshall Space Flight Center. The Fastrac engine

the second U.S.-made engine developed in the last 25 years, was to be th

mary propulsion system for the X-34 demonstration vehicle when it beg

flight tests.90 The following May, a government-Orbital review was held 

89 “NASA Finalizes X-34 Contract With Orbital Sciences Corp.,” NASA Marshall Space Fligh

News Releases, Release 96-161, August 30, 1996, http://www.msfc.nasa.gov/news/news/releases/1

161.html (accessed March 23, 2005).
izing the design of the vehicle. This allowed the program to proceed 

fabrication and manufacturing of systems such as structures; guidance; n

tion and control; avionics; thermal protection; and main propulsion syste

To reduce program risk, NASA decided in January 1998 to mod

contract with Orbital to provide for a second flight vehicle. The modifi

also would allow for additional unpowered tests and more flexibil

demonstrating various technologies. The change increased the contract va

$7.7 million to purchase long lead-time hardware. NASA committed $2 m

more for wind tunnel testing, additional testing and analysis, and a s

leading-edge thermal protection system. An $8.5 million option calle

purchase of shorter lead-time hardware, while a $1.8 million option was 

for assembly.

In July 1998, the program passed a critical milestone as the first 

assembly completed qualification tests and was shipped to Orbital Scienc

mated to the X-34 test vehicle under construction. It was ultimately 

aboard one of the two flight vehicles under construction at Orbital.

At the end of 1998, NASA exercised its option with Orbital f

additional test flights during a 12-month period beginning immediately 

completion of the initial contract. Flights were to take place at the U.S. A

White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The option was valued at 

than $10 million, with government organizations performing an additiona

million in work.92

The first of three planned X-34 technology demonstrators “rolled-ou

April 30, 1999, at Dryden Flight Research Center. The vehicle took its fir

flight locked underneath the L-1011 carrier aircraft in June 1999. In A

1999, an $11 million contract for the Fastrac engine was awarded to S

Technology. Assembly and preflight tests continued through 2000. Howe

2001, NASA decided not to add funds to the X-34 program from m

dedicated to the Agency’s Space Launch Initiative because the gover

determined that “the benefits to be derived from continuing the X-34 pro

did not justify the cost.” This action coincided with the end of NASA’s co

with Orbital Sciences Corporation. At the project’s end, NASA had spent 

million on the X-34 since its inception in 1996.

90 “X-34 Fastrac Engine Passes Critical Tests,” NASA News Release 97-232, August 14, 1997

www.msfc.nasa.gov/news/news/releases/1997/97-232.html (accessed March 23, 2005). 91 “X-34 Systems Design Freeze Completed,” NASA News Release 97-107, May 22, 1997

www.qadas.com/qadas/nasa/nasa-hm/0872.html (accessed March 25, 2005). 92 “NASA Exercises X-34 Contract Option for 25 Test Flights,” Marshall Space Flight Cente

Releases, Release 98-251, December 18, 1998, http://www.msfc.nasa.gov/news/news/releases/1

251.html (accessed March 23, 2005).
X-33

The X-33 program, the third RLV program, was to demonstrate a half-

single-stage-to-orbit vehicle that could go from launch to orbit without 

multiple stages like ELVs or dropping rocket motors and fuel tanks lik

Space Shuttle. Flying as fast as Mach 15, it was to decrease the per-poun

of putting payloads into space from $10,000 to $1,000, while at the sam

dramatically increasing launch vehicle safety and reliability. Ultimatel

goal of the full-size vehicle, named the “VentureStar,” was to resupply the 

Station more quickly and cheaply than the Space Shuttle. 

The program was a high-risk venture with unproven technologie

challenged its developers. In particular, the design required developm

linear aerospike rocket engines, which had never been used in flight an

been rejected by Space Shuttle developers 25 years earlier. The pro

required the development of a wingless “lifting body” airframe that 

keep the vehicle flying smoothly during launch and return to Earth

program also required composite fuel tanks that could withstand the pre

of a space launch while filled with pressurized liquid hydrogen 

temperature of -423°F (-253°C).93

NASA initiated this NASA-industry partnership through a Coope

Agreement Notice for Phase I concept definition and design of a techn

demonstrator vehicle, the X-33, issued in January 1995. In March, N

signed cooperative agreements with three companies—Lockheed Adv

Development Company (the Skunk Works), McDonnell Douglas Aero

and Rockwell International Corporation—to design the vehicle. The agre

called for NASA to work with each of these companies over the next 15 m

on vehicle concept definition and design. The government would pr

approximately $7 million to each of the companies, and each compan

expected to match the investment. 

Each company produced a design concept: all the vehicles would ta

vertically, but only the McDonnell Douglas concept would land vertically

others landed horizontally like an airplane.

At the beginning of April 1996, NASA issued another Coope

Agreement Notice for Phase II of the project: the design, fabrication, and 

test of the X-33 demonstrator. It was planned that Phase II of the project 

culminate in flight demonstration testing of the X-33 to begin in early 

NASA and industry would share costs during this phase. This was the firs

a cooperative agreement rather than a conventional contract was used 

program of this size.

After a selection process of only a few months (due to an inno

paperless procurement process), on July 2, 1996, amid much fanfare

President Albert Gore announced that NASA had selected Lockheed M

93 “NASA’s Billion-Dollar Shuttle Replacement May Never Fly,” CNN.com/Space (September 25

http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/space/09/25/troudledspaceship.ap/index.html (accessed March 24
to build the X-33 test vehicle. According to the terms of the agreeme

March 1999, Lockheed Martin would design, build, and conduct the fir

flight of the remotely piloted demonstration vehicle and would cond

least 15 flights by December 1999. Major components would include a 

robust metal heat shield in place of the Space Shuttle’s tiles and an up

aerospike engine. The X-33 design was based on a lifting body shap

would be launched vertically like a rocket and land horizontally li

airplane. NASA had budgeted $941 million for the effort. Lockheed M

initially invested $220 million of its own funds in the design. Figure 

shows an artist’s concept of the X-33 and VentureStar. Table 2–95 lists 

characteristics.

In 1997, the project successfully passed two important milestones

Critical Design Review (CDR), held in October, ended 51 subsystem 

component CDRs that had been held earlier that year. It allowed the pro

to proceed with fabrication of the remaining components, completi

subsystems, and assembly of the subscale prototype launch vehicle. Ear

the year, the project had needed to resolve issues regarding aerody

stability and control and vehicle weight by modifying the design o

vehicle’s canted and vertical fins. The project also planned to reduce w

by using composite materials and densified propellants.94 In Nove

NASA completed the environmental impact statement process, which al

all 15 test flights to proceed from the launch site at Haystack Butte o

eastern part of Edwards Air Force Base, California, and land at Michael 

Air Field, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and Malmstrom Air Force 

near Great Falls, Montana.95

The next major milestone was completion of flight-testing of the th

protection system (TPS) materials. The tests took place in June 19

Dryden Flight Research Center on its F-15B Aerodynamic Flight Fa

aircraft. The plane reached an altitude of 36,000 feet (10,973 kilometer

a top speed of Mach 1.4 during the tests. The materials in the TPS inc

metallic Inconel tiles, soft Advanced Flexible Reusable surface insu

tiles, and sealing materials.

94 “X-33 Program Successfully Completes Critical Design Review,” NASA News Release 97-250, 

31, 1997, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1997/97-250.txt (accessed March 15, 2005). 95 “NASA Completes X-33 Environmental Impact Statement Process,” NASA News Release 

November 5, 1997, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1997/97-254.txt (accessed March 15, 200
Figure 2–32. Artist’s concept showing the relative size of the X-33 (left) and the prop

operational VentureStar. The VentureStar was to be twice the size of the half-scale X

(NASA-DFRC Photo No. ED97-43938-1)

Meanwhile, NASA’s Office of Inspector General was investigating th

gram. The first inquiry examined whether NASA’s use of a cooperative agre

on the X-33 program was appropriate for the program and “whether the agre

effectively defined roles, responsibilities, and rights of the government and in

partners.” A secondary objective was to determine whether NASA implem

and managed the program consistent with congressional guidance. An audit 

mined that obligated funds for Lockheed Martin had not been recorded in a 

manner, a potential violation of federal law. Consequently, the Inspector G

concluded that reports and financial statements “did not accurately reflect the 

cial status” of the program.96 The next year, another audit from the Off

Inspector General examined whether the government had adequately address

cost of the project and its cost risk and cost estimate. The audit concluded that 

ter risk analysis “would have alerted NASA decision-makers to the probabi

cost overruns” that “put NASA’s investment . . . at risk.”97

96 Office of Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Audit Repor

Funding Issues,” IG-99-001, November 3, 1998, pp. 1–3, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oig/h

001es.htm (accessed March 19, 2005). 97 Office of Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Audit Report: X-

Estimating Processes,” IG-99-052, September 24, 1999, pp. i–ii, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oi

99-052es.htm (accessed March 15, 2005).
In 1999, the X-33 program experienced a setback when the com

materials used for its liquid hydrogen fuel tank failed during testin

investigation into the cause of the failure determined that the com

technology was not “mature enough” for such a use. Lockheed M

proposed replacing the composite tanks with aluminum tanks, which N

agreed to if Lockheed Martin could obtain Space Launch Initiative fun

However, it was determined that the benefit did not justify the cos

NASA cancelled the program in 2001 before proceeding to the next ph

NASA investment in the X-33 program totaled $912 million, staying w

its 1996 budget projection for the program. Lockheed Martin orig

committed to invest $220 million in the X-33 and, during the life o

program, increased that amount to $357 million. In response t

cancellation, Lockheed Martin chose not to continue developin

VentureStar. A criticism of both the X-34 and X-33 programs was that N

had not developed risk management plans until well after the program

begun. Table 2–96 lists the chronology for NASA’s RLV development.

98 Leonard David, “NASA Shuts Down X-33, X-34 Programs,” Space.com, http://www.spa

missionlaunches/missions/x33_cancel_010301.html (accessed March 22, 2005).
Table 2–1. Authorized/Appropriated Budget (FY 1989–FY 19

1989 1990 199

R&Da 4,191,700 5,366,050 5,600,Space Transportation Capability Developmentb 606,600 651,500 763,4Upper Stages 156,200

—

Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

—

—

45,4

0

0,0

Shuttle-C

—

— 40,000,0

SFC&DCg 4,364,200 4,614,600 6,319,Space Shuttle Production and Operational 1,335,500 1,340,300 1,364,0CapabilityAdvanced Solid Rocket Motor 51,000 35,000Safety Enhancements

— 75,0

0

0

Space Transportation (Shuttle) Operations 2,365,400 2,544,900 2,831,4Expendable Launch Vehicles (Launch Services)

— 169,500 229,2

1995 1996 1997

Human Space Flightn 5,573,900o 5,456,600 5,362,Payload and Utilization Operationsp 346,200q 315,000 271,Space Shuttle Safety and Performance Upgrades 3,309,000r 837,000 636,0Space Shuttle Production and Operational 

—

—

CapabilitySpace Shuttle Operations

— 2,341,800 2,514,

Launch Services 313,700

—

Science, Aeronautics and Technologys 5,901,200 5,928,900 5,762,Advanced Concepts and Technology/Space Access 623,000t 639,800 711,and TechnologyAdvanced Space Transportation

— 193,000 324,7

databk7_collected.book Page 89 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–1. Authorized/Appropriated Budget (FY 1989–FY 1998) (i

1995 1996 1997

X-33 Advanced Technology Demonstration Vehicle

—

—

— 

Follow-on to X-33 Focused Technology 

—

—

— 

DemonstrationExperimental Vehicle Procurement

—

—

— 

databk7_collected.book Page 90 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Total R&D amounts were stated in the appropriations bills, not in the authorization bills. R&D amounts show

subordinate categories were from authorization bills unless otherwise noted.

b Amounts authorized for Space Transportation Capability Development included the Spacelab category, addresc Includes $40 million authorized for propulsion technology development and $10 million authorized for launch d Specified $30 million for development of the Space Transportation Main Engine.e Included $21million to develop improvements in existing ELVs (including development of a single-engine ver

development of advanced launch technologies, including single-stage-to-orbit technologies and components.

f Required in FY 1991 authorizations bill. Does not appear in programmed amounts in NASA’s budget.g Amounts for SFC&DC were stated in appropriations bill, not in authorization bills. Amounts for subordinate ch Of such funds, $45 million for FY 1991 was to be used for the Space Shuttle main engine, solid/rocket booste

Availability program.

i For termination of program.j Of these funds, $4 million was to be made available for the provision of launch services for eligible satellites 

Amendments of 1988, Public Law 100-657.

k Launch Services (ELVs) transferred to Office of Space Science and Applications under the R&D appropriatiol In the FY 1997 and FY 1998 authorization, Congress included NASA’s authorization in a bill titled the Omnibu

House. It was referred to Senate committee but was not acted upon by the Senate.

m Authorization bill H.R. 1275 passed by House. Referred to Senate committee but was not acted upon by Senan Beginning with the FY 1995 estimate, and computation of FY 1993 programmed amounts, many R&D and SF

new appropriation called Human Space Flight.

o Appropriated amount per Conference Committee.p Formerly Space Transportation Capability Development.q Included $40,000,000 to develop improvements in existing ELVs (including the development of a single-eng

support development of advanced launch technologies, including single-stage-to-orbit technologies and Development/Payload and Utilization Operations budget categories.

r Amount included total Space Shuttle category: Production and Operational Capability and Operations.s SAT appropriation used for some launch systems items. t Included $40 million for single-stage-to-orbit technology development program, $13.6 million for University 

Spacecraft Technology Initiative.

u Called Advanced Space Transportation Technology in H.R. 1275.
Table 2–2. Programmed Budget (FY 1989–FY 1998) (

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993a 

R&D/SAT Human 

Space 

Flightb

Space transportation capability 674,000 558,142 602,467 739,711 442,300 

Development/payload and utilization operationsc

Upper stages 131,600 79,700 82,467 41,200 47,700e 

Engineering and technical base 160,600 181,600 208,500 210,800 214,200 Payload operations & support 60,700 65,461 101,200 130,100 95,200 

equipmentTethered satellite system 26,400 27,300 21,900 16,400 4,000 

Orbital maneuvering vehicle 73,000 75,681

—

—

—

Advanced programs 52,700 34,700 35,200 34,700

—

Advanced projects

—

—

—

— 16,100 

Advanced space transportationg —

—

—

— 114,600h 

Advanced concepts and technology

—

—

—

— 464,900 

Advanced transportation technologyj 81,400

— 23,900k 28,000 10,000l 

Reusable launch vehicle–systems 

—

—

—

—

— 

engineering and analysisReusable launch vehicle–technology 

—

—

—

—

— 

programReusable launch vehicle–initial flight 

—

—

—

—

— 

demo program (FDP)

databk7_collected.book Page 91 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–2. Programmed Budget (FY 1989–FY 1998) (in thou

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993a 

X-33 advanced technology — — — — — 

demonstratorX-34 technology demonstration — — — — — 

programTransportation technology support — — — — — 

SFC&DC/HSFShuttle production and operational 1,121,600 1,194,949 1,313,945 1,296,400 1,131,000 capability/safety and performance upgradeso

Orbiter 159,000 148,300 186,300 158,800 — 

Orbiter improvements — — — — 235,000 

Systems integration 34,500 15,000 10,700 7,200 — 

Extended duration orbiter 20,000 23,700 25,000 10,700 — 

Structural spares 20,300 22,900 66,000 57,600 — 

Orbiter spares 48,000 28,200 26,800 13,800 — 

Flight operations upgrades — — — — 121,100 

Launch site equipment 104,100 105,700 101,200 93,100 80,100p 

Mission operations and support 153,500 177,349 136,045 148,100 — capabilityq

Space Shuttle main engine upgrades — — — — 320,300 

Solid rocket boosterr 121,000 72,500 50,400 34,900 — 

Solid rocket booster improvements — — — — 1,400 External tank 7,000 2,700 — — — 

databk7_collected.book Page 92 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–2. Programmed Budget (FY 1989–FY 1998) (in thou

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993a 

Super lightweight tank

—

—

—

—

— 

Construction of facilitiess —

—

—

— 178,100 

Advanced solid rocket motor 51,000 160,400 309,100 315,000 195,000 

Assured Shuttle availabilityu —

—

— 104,600

—

Space transportation operations/ 2,612,700 2,632,400 2,752,400 3,029,300 2,857,200 

Space Shuttle operationsv

Mission supportw 230,900 252,600 275,000 295,900 361,000x 

Integration 285,000 303,200 317,900 315,400 200,000 

Support 182,500 194,900 194,300 196,600

—

Orbiter 314,100 397,800 414,500 430,700 477,000 

Space Shuttle main engine 403,200 438,200 402,400 322,100 239,900 

Solid rocket booster 704,100 458,600 577,400 542,000 172,000 

Redesigned solid rocket motor

—

—

—

— 409,400 

External tank 295,000 344,600 378,100 354,100 300,200 

Launch and landing operations 534,600 541,000 595,200 642,900 697,100z 

Launch operations 481,600 484,000 539,200 578,600

—

Payload and launch support 53,000 57,000 56,000 64,300

—

Expendable launch vehicles and 66,500 139,700 229,200ab 155,800 180,801 

services Small class 13,900 11,900 14,100 32,600 25,272ah 

Medium class 45,000 75,400 97,300 58,100 61,451ai 

databk7_collected.book Page 93 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–2. Programmed Budget (FY 1989–FY 1998) (in thou

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993a 

Intermediate class 6,300 49,600 108,100 45,000 41,100aj Large class 1,300 2,800 9,700 20,100 5,278ak 

Launch services mission support — — — — — 

databk7_collected.book Page 94 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Beginning with the FY 1995 estimate, and computation of FY 1993 programmed amounts, all R&D and SFC

new appropriation called Human Space Flight.

b HSF appropriation except where noted otherwise.c Budget for Space Transportation Capability Development includes Spacelab category. This is addressed with bd Became Payload and Utilization Operations under HSF appropriations category.e SAT appropriation, Office of Space Science.f Renamed Payload Processing and Support.g SAT appropriation within budget category Advanced Concepts and Technology. Items include Advanced Tran

Advanced Technology Maturation, In-Space Transportation, and Single Engine Centaur.

h SAT appropriation.i Part of Office of Space Access and Technology.j Called Advanced Launch Systems in FY 1989 and FY 1990. Called Advanced Launch Technology in FY 19

advanced launch system–-civil needs, advanced launched system-–propulsion, Shuttle-C studies (funding pro

line item), and heavy-lift vehicle studies.

k Called New Launch System beginning in FY 1993.l SAT appropriation.m Advanced Space Transportation Technology was also supported by $15 million in FY 1996 and $12 millio

program of the Office of Space Flight.

n Renamed Advanced Space Transportation Program.o Changed to Safety and Performance Upgrades in FY 1993.p Included Launch Site Equipment upgrades (HSF appropriation) from FY 1993.q Called Mission Support Capability beginning with FY 1992 estimate.r Included safety upgrades and improvements to solid rocket booster and redesigned solid rocket motor.s Construction of Facilities funding for Space Shuttle projects was provided to refurbish, modify, replace, a

performance, address environmental concerns of the older facilities, and to ensure their readiness to support Sp

t Termination funding.u Name changed to Safety and Obsolescence Upgrade beginning with FY 1994 budget estimate.v Name changed to “Space Shuttle Operations” beginning in FY 1993.
w Name of category changed to “mission operations” in FY 1992. Description of function was unchanged.x Called Mission and Crew Operations.y Name changed to Reusable Solid Rocket Motor. Description of activity remained the same.z Not broken down into smaller budget categories. Includes payload and launch support.aa Combined with Mission Support.ab Expendable Launch Vehicles and Services were officially transferred to the Office of Space Science and Appli

in FY 1991.

ac Space Science ELVs and launch support.ad Earth Science ELVs and launch support.ae Moved to HSF appropriation.af Space Science launch support.ag Earth Science launch support.ah SAT appropriation.ai SAT appropriation.aj SAT appropriation.ak SAT appropriation.

databk7_collected.book Page 95 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–3. Space Transportation Capability Developmen

Operations Funding History (in thousands 

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authori

1989 631,300/681,000 606,1990 639,000/562,381 651,1991 773,400/602,500 763,1992 879,800/731,456 679,8

1993 863,700/649,216 733,71994 649,200/412,600 751,6

1995d 356,200/320,100 819,

1996 315,600/315,000 315,1997 271,800/275,300 271,

1998 227,400/205,400 247,

a Included $40,000,000 authorized for propulsion technology development and $10,000,000 authorized for launb Specified $30,000,000 for development of the Space Transportation Main Engine for use with the Advanced/c Included $21,000,000 to develop improvements in existing ELVs (including development of a single-engin

support development of advanced launch technologies, including single-stage-to-orbit technologies and comp

d Payload and Utilization Operations budget category (beginning FY 1995) included same subcategories as S

Satellite System, Payload Processing and Support, Advanced Projects, and Engineering and Technical Base).

e No programmed amount shown.

databk7_collected.book Page 96 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–4. Upper Stages Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 146,200/138,800 131,600

1990 88,600/84,600 79,700

1991 91,300/82,200 82,467

1992 108,500/62,256 41,200

1993a 56,500/47,700 47,700b

1994 51,100/43,600 6,900

1995 31,800/15,200 —

1996 18,300/—c —

a Moved to Expendable Launch Vehicle category in FY 1993, which had been relocated to O

FY 1993; was a SAT appropriation. b SAT appropriation, Office of Space Science. c Funding for mission-unique launch services was now included under the budget request 

benefiting program. Funding support for management oversight of the entire Launch Services p

rested with the Launch Vehicles Office (LVO), which was now part of the newly formed Office o

Access and Technology. The LVO aggregated NASA, NOAA, and international cooperati

mission requirements. The administration, procurement, and technical oversight of launch ser

the small and medium performance classes were managed by Goddard Space Flight Center (

XL, Med-lite, and Delta II). Intermediate launch services (Atlas I/IIAS) were managed b

Research Center. Upper stages were managed by Marshall Space Flight Center. Kennedy Spac

was delegated responsibility for technical oversight of vehicle assembly and testing at the launc

Goddard and Lewis and was responsible for spacecraft processing at the launch site.

Table 2–5. Engineering and Technical Base Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 158,900/155,400 160,600

1990 189,800/181,600 181,600

1991 218,500/208,500 208,500

1992 235,200/215,800 210,800

1993 224,200/214,155 214,200

1994 203,400/180,400 180,400

1995 176,400/165,600 165,600

1996 171,700/171,700 169,700

1997 151,500/148,600 144,600

1998 102,900/102,900 102,900
Table 2–6. Payload Operations and Support Equipmenta Fundi

History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 67,300/64,700 60,700

1990 81,100/66,700 65,461

1991 122,500/101,500 101,200

1992 144,500/119,100 130,100

1993 153,600/92,100 95,200

1994 95,400/92,100 85,100

1995 62,600/36,300b 44,000

1996 30,300/40,600 40,600

1997 42,700/41,700 45,900

1998 51,600/43,900 46,700

a Name of category changed to Payload Processing and Support in FY 1995. b Reduction reflected closing of four of the 10 payload processing facilities before the end of the 

Table 2–7. Advanced Programs Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 45,000/52,700 52,700

1990 48,700/33,600 34,700

1991 53,200/35,200 35,200

1992 53,800/39,300 34,700

1993 57,700/32,897 —

1994 60,700a/— —

a Most elements moved to Advanced Space Technology.

Table 2–8. Advanced Projects Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed

1993 —a 16,100

1994 7,200/— 7,200

1995 15,200/12,200 12,200

1996 12,200/12,200 24,200

1997 15,200/34,700 34,700

1998 58,700/46,700 46,700

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission.
Table 2–9. Tethered Satellite System Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 23,800/26,400 26,400

1990 19,900/24,000 27,300

1991 17,900/21,900 21.900

1992 12,600/16,400 16,400

1993 3,400/3,400 4,000

1994 —7,400a 7,400

1995 9,700/7,400 7,400

1996 3,800/3,800 1,800

a The Tether mission was flown on STS-46 in August 1992. No further Tether missions were ma

when the initial budget estimate was prepared. In 1993, it was determined that a reflight c

readily accomplished and several improvements to enhance the probability of succe

recommended. The reflight was manifested for early 1996.

Table 2–10. Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 96,500/73,000 73,000

1990 107,000/76,281 75,681

1991 85,400/—a —

a A decision was made to terminate the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle program in June 1990. Co

with congressional direction, no FY 1991 funding was provided. 
Table 2–11. Advanced Concepts and Technology/Space Access a

Technology Funding History (in thousands of dollars)a

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Programm

1993 —b — 464,900

1994 495,300/495,300 — 562,400

1995 608,400/642,400 623,000c 605,400

1996 705,600/641,300 639,800 —

1997 725,000/— 711,000 —

1998 —d 696,600e —

a Funding categories dealing with advanced transportation varied frequently. Included Advance

Transportation, Launch Vehicle Support, and other budget categories not relevant to Launch Sy

b Budget category not established at time of budget submission. c $40,000,000 for single-stage-to-orbit technology development program, $13,600,000 for Un

Space Engineering Research Centers, and $12,500,000 for Small Spacecraft Technology Initiat

d Budget category not shown in budget submission or programmed amount. e Called Advanced Space Transportation Technology in H.R. 1275, “Civilian Space Authorizat

Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999.”

Table 2–12. Advanced Space Transportation Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)a

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Programm

1993 — — 114,600

1994 —b/121,900 — 109,100

1995 103,100/162,100 — 162,100

1996 193,000/188,500 193,000 234,000

1997 324,700/336,700 324,700 336,700

1998 396,600/417.100 — 417,100

a Categories varied depending on year and active projects. At times they included Advanced 

Technology, Reusable Launch Vehicles, Transportation Technology Support, New Launch 

Single-Stage Centaur, and other categories. b Budget category not established at time of budget submission.
Table 2–13. Advanced Transportation Technology/New Launch Sy

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)a

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Programm

1989 13,000/81,400b 6,500 81,400

1990 5,000/(10,500)c — —d

1991e 53,900/23,900f 40,000g 23,900h

1992 175,000i

/38,000j — 28,000

1993k 125,000l

/10,042m — 10,000n

1994 — — 20,000

a Called Advanced Launch System in congressional documents. b Renamed Advanced Launch Systems. This was a joint NASA–DOD program with the obje

defining a new heavy-lift capability based on advanced technology that would reduce the cost of 

payloads in space. NASA had responsibility for the civil requirements not addressed by the jo

baseline design. The original FY 1989 budget estimate of $13 million, reflected only t

requirements. The revised estimate of $81.4 million reflected both a reduced civil requirement 

million and the propulsion element estimated at $74.9 million. c Funding was deleted in FY 1990 legislation. Total funding for Advanced Launch Systems, in

NASA-managed elements, was included in the DOD budget request. NASA’s Advanced 

Systems propulsion advanced development effort was provided through reimbursable fundin

than appropriation transfers. d No programmed amount shown. e Included Advanced Launch Systems, Shuttle-C, Heavy Lift Vehicle Studies. f This revised estimate was consistent with congressional direction. It was accommodated p

through deferral of the Assured Crew Return Vehicle Phase B study and other program realignm

g Amount specified for Shuttle-C. Other uses for funds not listed. h Called New Launch System beginning in FY 1993. i Increase reflected plans to proceed with the initial stages of a new launch system. Program plan

FY 1992 was not completed when the estimate was prepared. It was thought that the focus of F

activities would be initiating development of the Space Transportation Main Engine pr

conducting definition and design studies of vehicle components and elements, and a

requirements and design options for supporting launch facilities. Technologies and ope

approaches that could reduce per-flight costs and increase system robustness would also be pur

j The budget reduction supported a change to a 2002 first launch schedule. An equal amo

budgeted by DOD. k Called New Launch System beginning in FY 1993. l Funding level (along with an equal amount from DOD) allowed completion of the preliminary 

effort for the New Launch System. m The New Launch System (formerly Advanced Transportation Technology) was to be a joint p

with the DOD to develop a new family of launch vehicles that would improve national launch ca

with reductions in operating costs and improvements in launch system reliability, responsiven

mission performance. Initial efforts focused on developing the Space Transportation Main 

(STME) since this was the common element of all configuration. The reduction in the FY 1993 

estimate terminated the effort on the NLS while retaining options to develop the STME and/or 

alternative engine technologies. n SAT appropriation.
Table 2–14. Reusable Launch Vehicle–Systems Engineering an

Analysis Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1994 —a 3,500

1995 —/4,600 3,800

1996 4,700/500 —b

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b No programmed amount shown.

Table 2–15. Reusable Launch Vehicle–Technology Program Fund

History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1994 —a 28,400

1995 —/76,900 75,500

1996 59,300/49,500 —b

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b No programmed amount shown.

Table 2–16. Reusable Launch Vehicle–Initial Flight Demonstrat

Program (FDP) Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1994 —a 2,300

1995 —/47,000 49,200

1996 60,000/109,000 —b

1997 266,100/—c —

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b No programmed amount shown. c No revised budget submission for this category.

Table 2–17. X-33 Advanced Technology Demonstrator Fundin

History (in thousands of dollars)a

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization

1996 —b 157,500

1997 —/246,800 262,000

1998 333,500/318,300 319,300

a Part of Reusable Launch Vehicle Program. b Budget category not established at time of budget submission.
Table 2–18. X-34 Technology Demonstration Program Fundin

History (in thousands of dollars)a

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1996 —b 30,000

1997 —/36,700 20,500

1998 43,100/26,700 26,700

a Part of Reusable Launch Vehicle Program. b Budget category not established at time of budget submission.

Table 2–19. Transportation Technology Support Funding Histo

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1994 —a 54,900

1995 —/33,600 33,600

1996 34,000/29,500 29,500b

1997 16,600/53,200 34,400

1998 43,100/26,100 62,100

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b Renamed Advanced Space Transportation Program.

Table 2–20. Space Shuttle Production and Operational Capabil

Safety and Performance Upgrades Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)a

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Programm

1989 1,400,500/1,128,200 1,335,500 1,121,600

1990 1,305,300/1,119,500 1,340,300 1,194,949

1991 1,302,000/1,327,800 1,364,000b 1,313,945

1992 1,288,900/1,276,400 1,328,900 1,296,400

1993 1,021,800/1,053,016 1,315,800 1,131,000

1994 1,189,600/978,700 1,069,200 1,009,700

1995 903,900/739,800 3,309,000c 710,000

1996 837,000/663,400 837,000 658,400

1997 636,000/636,000 636,000 496,000

1998 483,400/553,400 483,400 568,400

a Included orbiter improvements, propulsion upgrades (SSME upgrades, SRB improvement

lightweight tank), flight operations and launch site equipment upgrades, advanced solid rocke

and construction of facility budget categories are displayed separately below. b $45 million to be used only for 1) SSME, 2) SRB/SRM, 3) ET, 4), orbiter, and 5) assured 

availability. c Amount for total Space Shuttle budget category, including both Production and Operational Ca

and Operations.
Table 2–21. Orbiter (Orbiter Operational Capability) Funding Hi

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 181,000/155,800 159,000

1990 157,500/125,900 148,300

1991 113,400/144,900 186,300

1992 143,300/162,100 158,800

1993 196,900/179,516 —a

a No programmed amount shown.

Table 2–22. Systems Integration (Orbiter Operational Capabili

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 17,000/30,500 34,500

1990 9,000/15,400 15,000

1991 11,100/11,400 10,700

1992 19,900/9,100 7,200

1993 26,900/13,400 —a

1994 14,400/—b —

a No programmed amount shown. b No revised budget submission in this category.

Table 2–23. Orbiter Improvements Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1993 —a 235,000

1994 215,500/127,100 204,300

1995 191,800/194,800 194,800

1996 227,900/258,700 271,400

1997 169,900/169,900 159,900

1998 137,300/232,500 232,500

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission.
Table 2–24. Extended Duration Orbiter (Orbiter Operationa

Capability) Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 10,000/20,000 20,000

1990 157,500a/125,900 23,700

1991 15,000/25,000 25,000

1992 18,500/10,500 10,700

1993 21,700/22,600 —b

1994 67,700c/—d —

a Funding increase reflected expectations of development of a 28-day extended duration orbiter. b Budget category not established at time of budget submission. c Funding was to cover the payback costs to the prime contractor for use of the cryogenic pall

extend on-orbit stay time capability from the baseline 7 to 10 days to 14 to 16 days. It also 

initiate the required modifications on Endeavour and Atlantis. d No revised budget request submitted in this category.

Table 2–25. Structural Spares (Orbiter Operational Capability

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 57,300/20,300a 20,300

1990 15,200/25,200 22,900

1991 52,400/71,000 66,000

1992 78,300/50,600 57,600

1993 51,000/35,000 —b

1994 35,000/—c —

a Reduction in funding reflected slower start of structural spares program than expected. b Programmed amount not shown. c No revised budget request submitted.

Table 2–26. Orbiter Spares (Orbiter Operational Capability) 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 54,000/55,200 48,000

1990 30,300/27,100 28,200

1991 21,700/23,300 26,800

1992 13,800/13,800 13,800

1993 9,000/9,000 —a

1994 —b —

a No programmed amount shown. b Activity was concluded in FY 1993.
Table 2–27. Flight Operations Upgrades 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1993 —a 121,000

1994 —/107,700 109,900

1995 110,900/63,900 54,300

1996 89,000/69,400 73,400

1997 69,500/89,000 66,000

1998 51,500/70,600 40,300

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission.

Table 2–28. Launch Site Equipment (Launch and Mission Suppo

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed

1989 142,000/109,400 104,100

1990 98,500/89,400 105,700

1991 114,900/110,400 101,200

1992 79,400/85,100 93,100

1993 86,000/69,000 80,100a

1994 81,700/68,500 81,700

1995 76,100/40,600 50,200

1996 43,800/21,100 24,200

1997 45,50026,000 58,600

1998 40,800/67,500 115,400

a Launch site equipment upgrades.

Table 2–29. Mission Support Capability (Launch and Mission Supp

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmeda

1989 93,500/42,100b —c

1990 75,600/—d —

a Combined into Mission Operations and Support Capability. b Mission support decreased as program reserves were deleted to comply with the FY 

appropriations general reduction. c No programmed amount shown. d Combined with Mission Operations Capability into Mission Operations and Support Capability
Table 2–30. Mission Operations Capability (Launch and Missi

Support) Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed

1989 108,200/112,700 —a

1990 166,900/—b —

a Combined into Mission Operations and Support Capability. b Combined with Mission Support Capability into Mission Operations and Support Capability.

Table 2–31. Mission Operations and Support Capability (Launch 

Mission Support) Funding History (in thousands of dollars)a

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 —b 153,500

1990 242,500/169,900 177,349

1991 150,600/142,600 136,045

1992 190,700/176,600 148,100

1993 124,700/109,100 —c

1994 105,400/—d —

a Combined Mission Support Capability and Mission Operations Capability. b Budget category not established at time of budget submission. c No programmed amount shown. d No revised request submitted.

Table 2–32. Space Shuttle Main Engine Upgrades 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed

1993 —a 320,300b

1994 —/287,900c 355,500

1995 380,500/354,200 318,900

1996 357,200/251,300 234,100

1997 309,500/324,500 196,000

1998 231,200/170,700 170,100

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b Unclear where this programmed amount originated. Some activities, e.g., the alternate turbopu

the large throat main combustion chamber, were specifically named in the SFC&DC SSME bud

item. However, “other upgrades” were not specified, so it is not clear where the costs f

previously resided since the amount was larger than the entire amount budgeted for SSME u

SFC&DC appropriation. c New budget category under HSF appropriation.
Table 2–33. Solid Rocket Booster (Propulsion Systems) 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 105,000/123,700 121,000

1990 106,700/75,300 72,500

1991 82,900/50,400 50,400

1992 48,600/38,200 34,900a

1993 43,100/30,200 —b

a Included SRB safety upgrades. b No programmed amount shown.

Table 2–34. Solid Rocket Booster Improvements 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1993 43,100/30,200 1,400

1994 52,500a/23,200 23,500

1995 51,600/34,400 39,100

1996 69,000/1,400 7,200

1997 2,100/800 800

1998 6,600/3,500 1,200

a Included improvements to redesigned solid rocket motor.

Table 2–35. External Tank (Propulsion Systems) 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 7,000/7,000 7,000

1990 2,700/2,700a 2,700

a Closeout of production funding for external tank tooling and equipment to support manufactur

capability requirements took place in FY 1990.

 Table 2–36. Super Lightweight Tank 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1994 —a/49,500 50,800

1995 80,700/39,600 41,200

1996 32,700/44,100 30,700

1997 31,200/17,500 6,000

1998 9,200/1,800 700

a Budget category not established at initial time of budget submission.
Table 2–37. Construction of Facilities 

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1993 —a 178,100

1994 —/33,500 34,300

1995 12,300/12,300 12,300

1996 17,400/17,400 17,400

1997 8,300/8,300 8,300

1998 6,800/6,800 8,200

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission.

Table 2–38. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (Propulsion System

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Programm

1989 88,000/51,000 51,000 51,000

1990 121,300/125,400 35,000 160,400

1991 309,100/309,100 —a 309,100

1992 200,000/315,000b 375,000 315,000

1993 —c/195,000 315,000 195,000

1994 280,000/179,700 150,000d 149,700e

a Not stated in authorization bill. b Funding for the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor was increased $115 million based on congr

direction. However, the program was terminated. c Due to the tight budget environment, the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor was not included in th

FY 1993 budget request. Congress reinstated funding in the FY 1993 appropriation at a lower 

level than for the previous year. d For termination of program. e Reflected program termination.

Table 2–39. Assured Shuttle Availability Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1992 122,300/104,600 104,600

1993 138,900/89,500a —

1994 140,200/— —

a Name changed to Safety and Obsolescence Upgrades. Included items that moved to other Sa

Performance Upgrades categories in next fiscal year, e.g., alternative turbopump, large thro

combustion chamber, hardware interface module replace, cable plant upgrades, and multi

electronic display system.
Table 2–40. Space Transportation (Space Shuttle) Operations Fun

History (in thousands of dollars) 

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Programm

1989 2,405,400/2,390,700 2,365,400 2,612,700

1990 2,732,200/2,636,036 2,544,900 2,632,400

1991 3,118,600/3,019,200 2,831,400a 2,752,400

1992 3,023,600/2,943,400 2,970,600 3,029,300

1993 3,115,200/3,015,953 3,085,200 2,857,200

1994 3,006,500/2,570,600 3,006,500 2,549,000

1995 2,420,100/2,415,297 3,309,000b 2,444,300

1996 2,394,800/2,485,400 2.341,800 2,485,400

1997 2,514,900/1,514,900 2,514,900 2,464,900

1998 2,369,400/2,494,400 2,494,400 2,344,400

a In accordance with the Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, less than or 

$4 million was made available for the provision of launch services for eligible satellites. Commerci

Launch Act Amendments of 1988, 100th Congress., 1st sess., Public Law 100-657 (November 15, 1

b Amount was for total Space Shuttle costs, including both Shuttle Operations and Produc

Operational Capability.

Table 2–41. Mission Support (Flight Operations) Funding Histo

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 215,400/230,500 230,900

1990 247,500/253,700 252,600

1991a 280,500/276,500 275,000

1992 318,800/260,400 295,900

1993 338,400/329,117 361,000b

1994 330,900/322,800 316,000

1995 298,400/253,700 287,700

1996 284,600/358,900 358,900

1997 289,700/289,700 46,200c

1998 289,100/94,500 814,700d

a Name of category changed to Mission Operations. b Called Mission and Crew Operations. c Reflected transfer of flight operations to consolidated United Space Alliance contract from Boe

Lockheed Martin contracts. d Renamed Mission and Launch Operations. Included costs for Launch and Landing Operations.
Table 2–42. Integration (Flight Operations) Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 264,100/268,800 285,000

1990 300,300/314,100 303,200

1991 335,600/319,900 317,900

1992 342,300/315,400 315,400

1993 163,000/146,000 200,000

1994 151,700/211,200 199,000

1995 190,500/168,400 169,500

1996 152,200/142,500 142,500

1997 141,200/141,200 124,700

1998 126,200/107,000 —a

a Combined with Orbiter budget category.

Table 2–43. Support (Flight Operations) Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 180,600/186,400 182,500

1990 224,800/191,000 194,900

1991 199,500/205,100 194,300

1992 251,400/214,500 196,600

1993 239,000/277,000 —a

1994 285,200—b —

a No programmed amount shown. b No revised budget request submitted.

Table 2–44. Orbiter (Flight Hardware) Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 339,400/301,300 314,100

1990 351,800/370,200 397,800

1991 397,800/442,900 414,500

1992 441,700/390,400 430,700

1993 522,700/540,853 477,000

1994 508,900/364,100 387,900

1995 292,800/359,800 358,700

1996 352,700/378,500 378,500

1997 375,400/375,400 367,900

1998 376,700/356,100 507,900a

a Included both orbiter and integration budget categories.
Table 2–45. Space Shuttle Main Engine (Propulsion Systems) Fun

History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 511,800/400,500 403,200

1990 496,600/438,200 438,200

1991 430,900/388,300 402,400

1992 374,100/362,200 322,100

1993 314,600/263,200 239,900

1994 245,400/191,800a 189,200

1995 144,400/149,200 163,300

1996 145,600/185,000 185,000

1997 172,300/182,300 208,300

1998 184,900/204,600 173,400

a Change to HSF appropriation from SFC&DC took place with budget estimate for FY 1995 and 

FY 1994 budget request. Old SFC&DC SSME budget category included both production of SS

upgrades and safety. New budget category under HSF appropriation was only for shuttle operat

did not include upgrades and safety, which was budgeted separately.

Table 2–46. Solid Rocket Booster (Flight Hardware) Funding His

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 382,500/516,800 704,100

1990 537,000/487,500 458,600

1991 691,300/572,900 577,400

1992 592,400/541,300 542,000

1993 556,700/559,100 172,000

1994 515,700/156,400a 158,200

1995 144,900/162,200 163,000

1996 164,200/153,300 153,300

1997 174,800/150,400 151,200

1998 157,700/135,500 152,200

a Reduction reflected creation of new budget category: Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor.
Table 2–47. Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (Flight Hardware

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1993 — 409,400

1994 —a/368,900 396,400

1995 373,100/365,997 370,000

1996 355,400/395,700 395,700

1997 402,900/427,000 412,800

1998 434,600/380,400 360,200

a No initial FY 1994 budget request for Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor

Table 2–48. External Tank (Flight Hardware) Funding Histor

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 313,300/294,600 295,000

1990 347,700/347,500 344,600

1991 378,100/377,500 378,100

1992 382,900/365,400 354,100

1993 375,900/298,200 300,200

1994 340,000/305,300 252,200

1995 379,600/329,600 305,000

1996 328,000/327,500 327,500

1997 348,700/339,000 352,400

1998 359,700/341,300 336,000

Table 2–49. Launch and Landing Operations Funding History 

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 514,600/506,800 534,600

1990 492,500/471,500 541,000

1991 606,600/596,200 595,200

1992 694,400/628,300 642,900

1993 639,900/690,800 697,100a

1994 696,400/650,100 650,100

1995 596,400/626,400 621,400

1996 612,100/544,000 544,000

1997 609,900/609,900 801,400

1998 605,300/720,200 —b

a Included launch operations and payload and launch support. b Combined with Mission Support.
Table 2–50. Launch Operations (Launch and Landing Operatio

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 456,600/452,800 481,600

1990 492,500/471,500 484,000

1991 546,400/537,500 539,200

1992 629,300/567,500 578,600

1993 581,100/632,000 —

1994 637,500/—a —

a No revised estimate submitted for this budget category.

Table 2–51. Payload and Launch Support (Launch and Landin

Operations) Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 58,000/54,000 53,000

1990 61,100/58,700 57,000

1991 60,200/57,700 56,000

1992 64,800/60,800 64,300

1993 58,800/58,800 —

1994 58,900/—a —

a No revised estimate submitted for this category.
Table 2–52. Expendable Launch Vehicles and Servicesa

Funding History (in thousands of dollars) 

Year (Fiscal) Submission Authorization Programme

1989 195,500/85,500 —b 66,500

1990 169,500/141,836 169,500 139,700

1991 229,200/229,200 229,200 229,200

1992 341,900/195,300 291,000 155,800

1993 217,500/180,801d 207,500 180,801

1994 300,300/313,500 300,300 84,600

1995 340,900/95,800 313,700 255,600

1996 74,200/254,300 —e 245,300

1997 253,500/240,600 — 240,600

Space Science

84,700

Earth Science

1998 236,300/215,900: 

Space Science

34,800: 

Earth Science

— 212,900

27,600

Space Science

39,400

Earth Science

a Included funds for upcoming missions in all classes of ELVs. b Not stated in authorization bill. c Expendable Launch Vehicles and Services was officially transferred to the OSSA. 

(appropriated) costs were charged to OSSA (SAT) in FY 1991. d Included amounts budgeted for upper stages. e Not stated in authorization bill. f Moved to HSF appropriation from SAT.

Table 2–53. Small Class (Expendable Launch Vehicles and Servi

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 —a 13,900

1990 26,300/12,100 11,900

1991 15,000/14,800 14,100

1992 33,700/33,100 32,600

1993 27,900/25,272 25,272

1994 26,200/16,800b 10,400

1995 31,400c/4,000 —

1996 10,800/—d —

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b SAT appropriation from revised budget estimate. c SAT appropriation. d Budget category no longer appeared in budget.
Table 2–54. Medium Class (Expendable Launch Vehicles and Serv

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 —a 45,000

1990 86,200/76,036 75,400

1991 102,90098,700 97,300

1992 81,500/61,100 58,100

1993 67,300/61,451 61,451b

1994 77,500/93,500c 43,000

1995 116,200d/35,600 —

1996 31,000/—e —

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b SAT appropriation. c SAT appropriation from revised budget estimate. d SAT appropriation. e No revised estimate submitted for this budget category.

Table 2–55. Intermediate Class (Expendable Launch Vehicles a

Services) Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 —a 6,300

1990 54,900/50,400 49,600

1991 101,100/106,000 108,100

1992 156,500/85,000b 45,000c

1993 54,800/41,000 41,100

1994 63,200/63,200d 43,000

1995 70,200e/26,000 —

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b Funding was decreased partially because the launch of TDRS-7, originally scheduled to take pla

an ELV, was assigned to the Shuttle. c SAT appropriation. d SAT appropriation from revised budget estimate. e SAT appropriation.
Table 2–56. Large Class (Expendable Launch Vehicles and Servi

Funding History (in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1989 —a 1,300

1990 2,100/3,300 2,800

1991 10,200/9,700 9,700

1992 70,200/16,100b 20,100

1993 11,000/5,278 5,278c

1994 82,300d/86,400e —

1995 91,300f

/— —

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b Funding reduction due to deferral of the Cassini launch to October 1997, thereby reducing the 

requirements for the Titan IV/Centaur vehicle. c SAT appropriation. d Increase in large-class ELV funding requests was for Titan IV vehicle needed to support the 

mission, scheduled for an October 1997 launch. These funds also supported the required Centa

stage, with both vehicle elements purchased as a package from the U.S. Air Force. e SAT appropriation from revised budget estimate. f SAT appropriation.

Table 2–57. Launch Services Mission Support Funding Histor

(in thousands of dollars)

Year (Fiscal) Submission Programmed 

1994 —a 37,100

1995 —/37,000 —b

1996 37,600/— —

a Budget category not established at time of budget submission. b No programmed amount shown.
Table 2–58. Expendable Launch Vehicle Success Rate by 

Year Athena Atlas-G Atlas I/IIA/ Conestoga Delta Pegasus 

Centaur/E IIAS 1989 1/1 8/8 

1990 2/2 1/1 11/11 1/1 

1991 2/2 1/2 5/5 1/1 

1992 4/5 11/11 

1993 1/1 4/5 7/7 2/2 

1994 2/2 5/5 3/3 1/3a 

1995 0/1 1/1 11/11 0/1 3/3b 1/2 

1996 7/7 10/10 4/5 1997 1/1 8/8 10/11 5/5 1998 1/1 6/6 12/13 6/6 

Totals 2/3 9/9 47/50 0/1 79/82 21/25 

a The Pegasus launch on May 19, 1994 did not reach its intended orbit and was classified in most sources as a “b The Delta launch on August 5, 1995 placed the Koreasat spacecraft in a lower than expected orbit. It still 

shortened the satellite’s useful life. It is counted as a success in this table.

databk7_collected.book Page 118 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–59. Athena Launches (1989–1998)

Launch Date Mission Vehicle Type Commen

August 15, 1995 Gemstar 1 Athena I Failed

August 23, 1997 Lewis Athena I Launch 

successful b

spacecraft f

January 7, 1998 Lunar Prospector Athena II Successful 

mission
Table 2–60. Athena I Characteristi

Stage 1 Stage 2 Orbit Assist Mod

Length 10.7 m (35.2 ft) 3.0 m (10.0 ft) 1.0 m (3.3 ft) 

Diameter 2.3 m (7.7 ft) 2.3 m (7.7 ft) 2.3 m (7.7 ft) 

Inert mass 4,375 kg (9,650 lb) 1,030 kg (2,280 lb) 360 kg (790 lb) Gross mass 53,100 kg (117,100 lb) 10,810 kg (23,840 lb) 596 kg or 715 kg 

(1,310 lb or 1,570 

Propulsion Castor 120 Motor Orbus 21D motor Four Primex MR-1Propellant HTPB HTPB Hydrazine Propellant mass 48,700 kg (107,400 lb) 8,780 kg (21,560 lb) 236 kg or 354 kg (520 lb or 780 lb) Avg. thrust Sea level: 1,450 kN 187 kN (42,400 lb) Initially 890 N 

(325,900 lb) (200 lb), decreases Vac.: (1,604 kN (360,500 lb) with time Nominal burn time 83.4 sec 150 sec 1,500 sec (depend

mission) Max. payload 545 kg–820 kg (1,200 

lb–1,805 lb) to lowEarth orbit depending on launch inclination 

Contractor Thiokol Pratt & Whitney Primex Technolog

databk7_collected.book Page 120 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Steven Isakowitz, Joseph P. Hopkins, Jr., and Joshua B. Hopkins, International Reference Guide to Space 

Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999), pp. 40–47. 
Table 2–61. Athena II Characterist

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Orb

M

Length 10.7 m (35.2 ft) 10.7 m (35.2 ft) 3.0 m (10.0 ft) 1.0 m (3Diameter 2.3 m (7.7 ft) 2.3 m (7.7 ft) 2.3 m (7.7 ft) 2.3 m (7

Inert mass 4,375 kg 4,375 kg 1,030 kg 360 kg (

(9,650 lb) (9,650 lb) (2,280 lb)

Gross mass 53,100 kg 53,100 kg 10,810 kg 596 kg o

(117,100 lb) (117,100 lb) (23,840 lb) (1,310 l

1,570 lb

Propulsion Castor 120 Motor Castor 120 Motor Orbus 21D motor Four Pri

MR-107

Propellant HTPB HTPB HTPB Hydrazi

Propellant mass 48,700 kg 48,700 kg 8,780 kg 236 kg o

(107,400 lb) (107,400 lb) (21,560 lb) (520 lb 

Avg. thrust Sea level: 1,450 kN Sea level: 1,450 kN 187 kN Initially 

(325,900 lb) (325,900 lb) (42,400 lb) lb), decr

Vac.: (1,604 kN Vac.: (1,604 kN time (360,500 lb) (360,500 lb)

Nominal burn time 83.4 sec 83.4 sec 150 sec 1,500 se

on miss

Max. payload 1,575 kg to 2,065 kg (3,470 lb to 4,520 lb) to low-Earth orbit dependiContractor Thiokol Thiokol Pratt & Whitney Primex 

Technol

databk7_collected.book Page 121 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Isakowitz, et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., pp. 40–47.
Table 2–62. Atlas Launches (1989–1

Vehicle Numbera Mission Launch Date Veh

(Based on GMT) AC-68 Fltsatcom F-8 September 25, 1989 Atlas 

S/N 28 USA 56, 57, 58 April 11, 1990 Atlas 

AC-69 Combined Release July 25, 1990 Atlas 

and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES) S/N 61 USA 68 (DMSP-10) December 1, 1990 Atlas 

AC-70 Yuri 3H (BS 3H) April 18, 1991 Atlas 

S/N 50 NOAA-12 May 14, 1991 Atlas 

S/N 53 USA 73 (DMSP-11) November 28, 1991 Atlas 

AC-102 Eutelsat II F3 December 7, 1991 Atlas 

AC-101 USA 78 February 11, 1992 Atlas 

(DSCS III-06) 

AC-72 Galaxy 5 March 14, 1992 Atlas 

databk7_collected.book Page 122 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–62. Atlas Launches (1989–1998) (

databk7_collected.book Page 123 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Vehicle Numbera Mission Launch Date Veh

(Based on GMT)

AC-105 Intelsat-K June 10, 1992 Atlas 

AC-103 USA 82 July 2, 1992 Atlas 

AC-71 Galaxy 1R August 22, 1992 Atlas 

AC-74 UFO 1 (UHF-1) March 25, 1993 Atlas AC-104 USA 93 July 19, 1993 Atlas 

(DSCS III F8)

S/N 34 NOAA-13 August 9, 1993 Atlas 

AC-75 UHF-2 September 3, 1993 Atlas AC-106 DSCS III November 28, 1993 Atlas 

AC-108 Telstar 401 December 16, 1993 Atlas AC-73 GOES-8 April 13, 1994 Atlas 

AC-76 UFO 3 (UHF-3) June 24, 1994 Atlas AC-107 DBS-2 August 3, 1994 Atlas S/N 20 DMSP F-12 August 29, 1994 Atlas 

AC-111 Intelsat 703 October 6, 1994 Atlas 
Vehicle Numbera Mission Launch Date Veh

(Based on GMT) AC-110 Orion 1 November 29, 1994 Atlas 

S/N 11 NOAA-14 December 30, 1994 Atlas 

AC-113 Intelsat 704 January 10, 1995 Atlas AC-112 UFO-4 (USA 108) January 29, 1995 Atlas AC-115 Intelsat 705 March 22, 1995 Atlas 

S/N 45 USA 109 March 24, 1995 Atlas 

(DMSP-F13) 

AC-114 AMSC-1 (MSAT) April 7, 1995 Atlas 

AC-77 GOES-9 May 23, 1995 Atlas 

AC-116 UHF 6 (USA 111) May 31, 1995 Atlas 

AC-118 USA 113 July 31, 1995 Atlas 

(DSCSIII B5)

AC-117 JCSat 3 August 29, 1995 Atlas 

AC-119 UFO-6 (USA 114) October 22, 1995 Atlas 

Table 2–62. Atlas Launches (1989–1998) (

databk7_collected.book Page 124 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–62. Atlas Launches (1989–1998) (

databk7_collected.book Page 125 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Vehicle Numbera Mission Launch Date Veh

(Based on GMT)

AC-121 Solar and December 2, 1995 Atlas 

Heliospheric Observatory 

AC-120 Galaxy 3-R December 15, 1995 Atlas 

AC-126 Palapa C-1 February 1, 1996 Atlas AC-122 Inmarsat 3 F1 April 3, 1996 Atlas 

AC-78 Beppo-SAX April 30, 1996 Atlas 

AC-125 UFO 7 (USA 127) July 25, 1996 Atlas 

AC-123 GE-1 September 8, 1996 Atlas 

AC-124 Hot Bird 2 November 21, 1996 Atlas AC-129 Inmarsat 3 F3 December 18, 1996 Atlas 

AC-127 JCSat 4 February 17, 1997 Atlas 

AC-128 Tempo 2 March 8, 1997 Atlas AC-79 GOES-10 April 25, 1997 Atlas 

AC-133 Superbird C July 28, 1997 Atlas 
Table 2–62. Atlas Launches (1989–1998) (

databk7_collected.book Page 126 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Vehicle Numbera Mission Launch Date Veh

(Based on GMT)

AC-146 GE-3 September 4, 1997 Atlas AC-135 EchoStar 3 October 5, 1997 Atlas 

AC-131 USA 133 (Lacrosse October 25, 1997 Atlas 

3)/USA 135 (Defense Satellite Communications System 3 and Falcon Gold)

AC-149 Galaxy 8i December 8, 1997 Atlas AC-109 USA 137 

(Capricorn)

January 29, 1998 Atlas 

AC-151 Intelsat 806 February 28, 1998 Atlas 

AC-132 USA 138, UHF F8 March 16, 1998 Atlas 

AC-153 Intelsat 805 June 18, 1998 Atlas 

AC-134 Hotbird 5 October 9, 1998 Atlas 

AC-130 UHF F9 October 20, 1998 Atlas 

a Atlas Centaur vehicle numbers from Jean-Jacques Serra and Gunter Krebs, “Atlas Centaur, Atlas Centaur Laun

online/lanc_atlas_centaur.html (accessed January 24, 2005).

b “Atlas Launches,” International Launch Services Launch Archives, http://www.ilslaunch.com/launches (access
Table 2–63. Atlas E Characteristi

1-1/2 Stages (Booster and Sustainer) Star Apogee K

Motor (AKM

Length 21.3 m (69.8 ft) 0.94 m (3.1 ft

Diameter 3.05 m (10 ft) 0.94 m (3.1 ft

Gross mass 121,000 kg (266,759 lb) 47.7 kg (105 l

(weight of mo

Propulsion MA-3 system consisting of two LR 89-NA-5 TE-M-364-15 

boosters, one LR 105-NA-5 sustainer, and motortwo LR 101-NA-7 vernier engines (VE)

Propellant LOX-RP-1-1 Solid

Propellant mass 112,900 kg (248,902 lb) 666 kg (1,468 

Liftoff thrust Booster: 1,470 kN (330,000 lb) 42.4 kN 

Sustainer: 267 kN (60,000 lb) (9,532 lb)b 

Each vernier engine: 3.0 kN (670 lb)

Burn time (average) Booster: 120 sec, Sustainer: 309 sec 45 sec

Max. payload 2,090 kg (4,608 lb) to 195-km (105-nmi) orbit from polar launc

1,500 kg (3,307 lb) to 195-km orbit from polar launch with sing

Contractors Rocketdyne Thiokol 

Remarks Atlas E in this decade was used primarily to launch meteorologi

databk7_collected.book Page 127 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Steven J. Isakowitz and Jeff Samella, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2nd ed., (Wa

1991), pp. 206–211. 

b “NOAA-D,” Friends and Partners in Space, (downloaded to Friends and Partners from NASA Spacelink), http

January 25, 2005).
Table 2–64. Atlas G Centaur Characte

Atlas G Booster and Sustainer Centaur Stage 

Length 22.2 m (72.8 ft) 9.15 m (30 ft) Diameter 3.05 m (10 ft) 3.05 m (10 ft) Gross mass 145,700 kg (321,200 lb) 15,600 kg (34,300 lb

Propulsion MA-5 system consisting of two Two RL10A-3-3Ac m

LR-89-NA-7 boosters, one start engines and 12 LR-105-NA-7 sustainer, and two hydrogen peroxide tvernier engines Propellant Oxidizer: LOX Oxidizer: LOX Fuel: RP-1 Fuel: LH2 Propellant mass 138,300 kg (305,000 lb) 13,900 kg (30,600 lb

Liftoff thrust Booster: 1,680 kN (377,500 lb) 146.8 kN (33,000 lb

Sustainer: 269 kN (60,600 lb) Each vernier engine: 3 kN (670 lb) Nominal burn time Booster: 174 sec, Sustainer: 266 sec 402 sec Max. payload 6,100 kg (13,448 lb) to 185 km (100 nmi) orbit; 2,360 kg (5,203 l

Contractors Rocketdyne Pratt & Whitney 

Remarks The lower booster and sustainer stage was integrated electronical

databk7_collected.book Page 128 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Isakowitz and Samella, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2nd ed., pp. 206–210. The 

Atlas G specifications, and Atlas I specifications are used in this table unless a different reference specific to A

b Federal Aviation Administration, “The Evolution of Commercial Launch Vehicles,” Fourth Quarter 2001 

January 25, 2005). Also “Atlas G,”

Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/atlasg.htm (ac

c According to Pratt & Whitney records, the RL10-3-3A engine was used on the launch of Fltsatcom F-8 on S

R

L10-3-3 engine.

d Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1988 Activities, (Washington, D

C: National Aeronautics and S
Table 2–65. Atlas I Characteristic

Atlas I First Stage Centaur Stage 

Length 22.2 m (72.8 ft) 9.15 m (30 ft) 

Diameter 3.05 m (10 ft) 3.05 m (10 ft)

Gross mass 145,700 kg (321,200 lb) 15,600 kg (34,000 lb

Propulsion MA-5 propulsion system consisting Two RL10A-3-3A m

of two LR-89-NA-7 boosters, one engines and 12 smal

LR-105-NA-7 sustainer, and two peroxide thrustersvernier single-start engines

Propellant Oxidizer: LOX Oxidizer: LOX

Fuel: RP-1 Fuel: LH2

Propellant mass 138,300 kg (305,000 lb) 13,900 kg (30,600 lbLiftoff thrust Booster: 1,680 kN (377,500 lb) 146.8 kN (33,000 lb

Sustainer: 269 kN (60,600 lb)Each vernier engine: 3 kN (670 lb)

Nominal burn time Booster: 174 sec, Sustainer: 266 sec 402 secMax. payload 6,580 kg (14,500 lb) to low-Earth orbit; 2,610 kg (5,754 lb) to ge

4,300 kg (9,480 lb) to sun synchronous orbitc

Contractors Rocketdyne Pratt & Whitney 

Remarks An aluminum interstage adapter with a length of 3.96 m (13 ft), d

lb) supported the Centaur until separation took place.

a Isakowitz and Samella, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2nd ed., pp. 206–210.b Liftoff thrust refers only to thrust produced by the Atlas stage. Thrust produced by the Centaur upper stage is c Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1992 Activities (Washington, DC: National Aeron

databk7_collected.book Page 129 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–66. Typical Atlas Launch Events Sequence for a 

Event Time After Liftoff Altitude Miles (Km) Do

Liftoff T-0 Atlas booster engine cutoff 2 min 35 sec 37 (60) 

Jettison Atlas booster 2 min 38 sec 38 (61) engine Jettison Centaur insulation 3 min 0 sec 50 (80) panel Jettison nose fairing 3 min 36 sec 67 (108) 

Atlas sustainer/ vernier 4 min 27 sec 85 (137) engines cutoff Atlas/Centaur separation 4 min 29 sec 86 (138) 

First Centaur main engine 4 min 40 sec 89 (143) 

start Centaur main engine cutoff 9 min 53 sec 94 (151) Second Centaur main 24 min 53 sec 212 (341) 

engine start Second Centaur main 26 min 29 sec 241 (388) 

engine cutoffCentaur/payload separation 28 min 44 sec 334 (538) 

databk7_collected.book Page 130 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a “CRRES Press Kit,” Press Kit, July 1990, (from NASA Spacelink), http://www.flyaria.com/document/html/mi
Table 2–67. Atlas II Characteristi

Atlas II Stage Centaur II Upper S

Length 24.9 m (81.7 ft) 9.15 m (30 ft) 

Diameter 3.05 m (10 ft) 3.05 m (10 ft)

Gross mass 165,700 kg (365,300 lb) 15,600 kg (34,300 lb

Propulsion MA-5A system with one two- Two 10A-3-3A cryog

chamber RS-27 booster engine and multiple start engineone RS-56SA sustainer engine 

Propellant Oxidizer: LOX Oxidizer: LOX

Fuel: RP-1 Fuel: LH2

Propellant mass 155,900 kg (345,500 lb) 13,900 kg (30,000 lb

Avg. thrust Booster: 1,840 kN 146.8 kN (33,000 lb) 

(414,000 lb)Sustainer: 269 kN (60,500 lb)

Nominal burn time Booster: 172 sec, Sustainer: 283 sec 402 sec Max. payload 6,580 kg (14,500 lb) to low-Earth orbit from Cape Canaveral; 5,51

AFB; 2,810 kg (6,200 lb) to geosynchronous transfer orbit

Contractors Rocketdyne Pratt & Whitney 

Remarks The Atlas was integrated with the Centaur vehicle by an interstag

3.05 m (10 ft) in diameter and 4 m (13 ft) long

databk7_collected.book Page 131 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Isakowitz and Samella, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2nd ed., pp. 206–210.
Table 2–68. Atlas IIA Characterist

Atlas IIA Stage Centaur IIA Upper Stage P

Length 24.9 m (81.7 ft) + 4-m 10 m (33 ft) Large: 

(13-ft) interstage extende

Diameter 3.05 m (10 ft) 3.05 m (10 ft) 4.2 m (Inert mass 9,800 kg (21,605 lb) + 2,200 kg (4,850 lb) 545-kg (1,202-lb) interstage Gross mass 166,700 kg (367,510 lb) 18,980 kg (41,844 lb) Large: 2

(includes interstage) extende

Propulsion MA-5A system with Two RL10A-4 cryogenic one two-chamber RS-27 multiple start engines booster engine and one RS-56SA sustainer engine Propellant Oxidizer: LOX Oxidizer: LOX Fuel: LH2 Fuel: RP-1 Propellant mass 156,400 kg (344,800 lb) 16,780 kg (37,000 lb) Avg. thrust Booster: 1,854 kN 185.2 kN (41,635 lb) 

(416,000 lb) sea level Sustainer: 266 kN (59,800 lb) sea level 

Nominal burn time Booster: 165 sec, 370 sec

Sustainer: 274 sec

Max. payload 6,192 kg (13,651 lb)–7,316 kg (16,129 lb) to low-Earth orbit with lar

(6,760 lb) to geosynchronous transfer orbit with large fairing

Contractors Rocketdyne Pratt & Whitney 

Remarks The operational Atlas IIA had uprated RL10 engines with optional n

databk7_collected.book Page 132 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Isakowitz, et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., pp. 54, 68–73. Also, Inter

Guide, Rev. 7 (December 1998), pp. 1–6, A9, http://www.ilslaunch.com/missionplanner/pdf/ampg_r7.pdf (acc
Table 2–69. Atlas IIAS Characteris

Atlas IIAS Stage Centaur IIAS Upper Stage 

Length 24.9 m (81.7 ft) + 4-m 10 m (33 ft) Large

(13-ft) interstage ExtenSRB: 13.6 m (44.6 ft)

Diameter 3.05 m (10 ft)

SRBs: 102-cm (40 in)

3.05 m (10 ft) 4.2 m 

Inert mass 9,800 kg (21,605 lb) + 

545-kg (1,202-lb) interstage

2,200 kg (4,850 lb)

Gross mass 166,700 kg (367,510 lb) 18,980 kg (41,850 lb) Large

(includes interstage) Exten

SRBs: 11,567 kg (25,500 lb) (each fueled)

(4,970 

Propulsion MA-5A system with one Two 10A-4 cryogenic 

two-chamber RS-27 booster engine, and one RS-56SA 

multiple-start engines

sustainer engine augmented with four Castor IVA SRBs

Propellant Oxidizer: LOX, Fuel: RP-1 Oxidizer: LOX, Fuel: LH2

Propellant mass 156,400 kg (344,800 lb) 16,780 kg (37,800 lb)Thrust Booster: 1,854 kN 

(416,000 lb) sea level 

185.2 kN (41,635 lb) 

Sustainer: 266 kN (59,800 lb) sea level SRBs: 433.7 kN (97,500 lb) each

databk7_collected.book Page 133 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–69. Atlas IIAS Character a istics (C

Atlas IIAS Stage Centaur IIAS Upper Stage 

Nominal burn time Booster: 163 sec 370 sec Sustainer: 289 sec Max. payload 6,192 kg (15,900 lb) to 7,360 kg (19,000 lb) to low-Earth orbit depen

geosynchronous transfer orbit Contractors Rocketdyne Pratt & Whitney Thiokol: SRBs

databk7_collected.book Page 134 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Isakowitz, et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., pp. 54, 68–73. Also, Inter

Guide, Rev. 7 (December 1998), pp. 1–6, A–9.
Table 2–70. Conestoga 1620 Characte

Booster Solid Rocket Upper Stage P

Motor Stage

Length 30 ft (9.12 m) 6.8 ft (2.07 m) 16 ft (4

Diameter 3.3 ft (1.0 m) 4.1 ft (1.25 m) 72 in (1Gross mass Each: 25,100 lb 

(11,400 kg)

4,765 lb (2,161 kg) Varies 

Propulsion Two Castor IVA and four Castor Star 48V motor

IVB strap-on motors plus one Castor IVB core strap-on motor

Propellant Hydroxyl-terminated HTPB

polybutadiene (HTPB)b

Propellant mass Each: 22,300 lb 

(10,100 kg)

4,430 lb (2,010 kg)

Thrust Each: 111,000 lb 

(493,700 kN) 

15,355 lb (68,300 N) 

Max. payload 5,000 lb to low-Earth orbitContractors Thiokol Thiokol 

a Isakowitz and Samella, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2nd ed., pp. 221–224.b This definition of HTPB as hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene comes from the NASA Kennedy Space Center 

acronym lists, including the NASA Scientific and Technical Information acronym list (http://www.sti.nasa.gov/a

databk7_collected.book Page 135 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–71. Delta Launches (1989–1

Delta Mission No. Mission Launch Date (GMT) Vehicle Ty

184 NAVSTAR II-1 GPS February 14, 1989 Delta II/69

183 SDI Delta Star March 24, 1989 Delta/3920185 NAVSTAR II-2 GPS June 10, 1989 Delta II/69186 NAVSTAR II-3 GPS August 18, 1989 Delta II/69

187 BSB-R1 August 27, 1989 Delta/4925

188 NAVSTAR II-4 GPS October 21, 1989 Delta II/69189 COBE November 18, 1989 Delta/5920 

190 NAVSTAR II-5 GPS December 11, 1989 Delta II/69

191 NAVSTAR II-6 GPS January 24, 1990 Delta II/69

192 SDI-LACE/RME February 14, 1990 Delta II/69

(LOSAT) 

193 NAVSTAR II-7 GPS March 26, 1990 Delta II/69194 Palapa B-2R April 13, 1990 Delta II/69195 ROSAT June 1, 1990 Delta II/69

196 INSAT-1D June 12, 1990 Delta/4925197 NAVSTAR II-8 GPS August 2, 1990 Delta II/69

198 BSB-R2 (Thor 1) August 18, 1990 Delta II/69

databk7_collected.book Page 136 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–71. Delta Launches (1989–1998)a 

databk7_collected.book Page 137 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Delta Mission No. Mission Launch Date (GMT) Vehicle Ty

199 NAVSTAR II-9 GPS October 1, 1990 Delta II/69

200 INMARSAT-2 (F1) October 30, 1990 Delta II/69

201 NAVSTAR II-10 GPS November 26, 1990 Delta II/79

202 NATO IV-A January 8, 1991 Delta II/79

203 INMARSAT-2 (F2) March 8, 1991 Delta II/69

204 ASC-2 April 13, 1991 Delta II/79

205 Aurora II May 29, 1991 Delta II/79

206 NAVSTAR II-11 GPS 

and LOSAT-X

July 4, 1991 Delta II/79

207 NAVSTAR II-12 GPS February 23, 1992 Delta II/79

208 NAVSTAR II-13 GPS April 10, 1992 Delta II/79

209 Palapa B4 May 14, 1992 Delta II/79

210 EUVE June 7, 1992 Delta II/69

211 NAVSTAR II-14 GPS July 7, 1992 Delta II/79

212 1) Geotail, 2) DUVE July 24, 1992 Delta II/69

213 SATCOM C-4 August 31, 1992 Delta II/79
Table 2–71. Delta Launches (1989–1998)a 

databk7_collected.book Page 138 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Delta Mission No. Mission Launch Date (GMT) Vehicle Ty

214 NAVSTAR II-15 GPS September 9, 1992 Delta II/79

215 DFS 3 Kopernikus October 12, 1992 Delta II/79

216 NAVSTAR II-16 GPS November 22, 1992 Delta II/79

217 NAVSTAR II-17 GPS December 18, 1992 Delta II/79

218 NAVSTAR II-18 GPS February 3, 1993 Delta II/79

219 NAVSTAR II-19 GPS March 30, 1993 Delta II/79

and SEDS-1 

220 NAVSTAR II-20 GPS May 13, 1993 Delta II/79

221 NAVSTAR II-21 GPS June 26, 1993 Delta II/79

and PMG 

222 NAVSTAR II-22 GPS August 30, 1993 Delta II/79

223 NAVSTAR II-23 GPS October 26, 1993 Delta II/79

224 NATO IVB December 8, 1993 Delta II 79

225 Galaxy I-R February 19, 1994 Delta II/79
Table 2–71. Delta Launches (1989–1998)a 

databk7_collected.book Page 139 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Delta Mission No. Mission Launch Date (GMT) Vehicle Ty

226 NAVSTAR II-24 GPS March 10, 1994 Delta II/7925 

and SEDS-2 

227 Wind November 1, 1994 Delta II/7925

228 Koreasat-1 August 5, 1995 Delta II/7925 

229 RADARSAT and November 4, 1995 Delta II/7920

SURFSAT 

230 RXTE December 30, 1995 Delta II/7920

231 Koreasat-2 January 14, 1996 Delta II/7925 

232 NEAR February 17, 1996 Delta II/7925

233 Polar February 24, 1996 Delta II/7925

234 NAVSTAR II-25 GPS March 28, 1996 Delta II/7925 

235 Middlecourse Space 

Experiment (MSX)

April 24, 1996 Delta II/7920

236 Galaxy IX May 24, 1996 Delta II/7925

237 NAVSTAR II-26 GPS July 16, 1996 Delta II/7925 

238 NAVSTAR II-27 GPS September 12, 1996 Delta II/7925 

239 Mars Global Surveyor November 7, 1996 Delta II/7925 

240 Mars Pathfinder December 4, 1996 Delta II/7925 
Table 2–71. Delta Launches (1989–1998)a 

databk7_collected.book Page 140 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Delta Mission No. Mission Launch Date (GMT) Vehicle Ty

241 GPS BIIR-01 January 17, 1997 Delta II/7925 

(NAVSTAR 2R-1) 

242 MS-1 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

May 5, 1997 Delta II/7920

243 Thor II May 20, 1997 Delta II/7925 

244 MS-2 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

July 9, 1997 Delta II/7920

245 NAVSTAR GPS-IIR2 July 23, 1997 Delta II/7925 

246 MS-3 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

August 21, 1997 Delta II/7920

247 Advanced Composition 

Explorer (ACE)

August 25, 1997 Delta II/7920

248 MS-4 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

September 27, 1997 Delta II/7920

249 NAVSTAR II-28 GPS November 6, 1997 Delta II/7925 

250 MS-5 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

November 9, 1997 Delta II/7920

251 MS-6 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

December 20, 1997 Delta II/7920

252 Skynet 4D January 10, 1998 Delta II/7925 

253 Globalstar-1 (4 satellites 

Space Systems/Loral)

February 14, 1998 Delta II/7420 
Table 2–71. Delta Launches (1989–1998)a 

databk7_collected.book Page 141 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Delta Mission No. Mission Launch Date (GMT) Vehicle Ty

254 MS-7 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

February 18, 1998 Delta II/7920

255 MS-8 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

March 30, 1998 Delta II/7920

256 Globalstar-2 

(4 satellites Space Systems/Loral)

April 24, 1998 Delta II/7420

257 MS-9 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

May 17, 1998 Delta II/7920

258 Thor III June 10, 1998 Delta II/7925 

259 Galaxy X August 27, 1998 Delta III/893

260 MS-10 Iridium® 

(5 Satellites)

September 8, 1998 Delta II/7920

261 Deep Space 1 and Sedsat October 24, 1998 Delta II/732

262 MS-11 Iridium® 

(5 satellites)

November 6, 1998 Delta II/7920

263 BONUM-1 November 22, 1998 Delta II/7925 

264 Mars Climate Orbiter December 11, 1998 Delta II/742

a “Delta Launch Record,” http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/delta/record.htm (accessed January 31, b Koreasat-1 was able to achieve orbit. The Delta booster, however, placed the satellite in a lower-than-specifiec New variant of Delta II that used three solid Alliant GEM-40 strap-ons rather than nine.
Table 2–72. Delta 3920/PAM-D Charac

Strap-ons Stage 1 Stage 2 

(each)a 

Length 9.07 m (30 ft) 22.8 m (75 ft) 6 m (19.6 ft) 

(includes second stage) 

Diameter 1.02 m (3.3 ft) 2.4 m (8 ft) 2.4 m (8 ft) 

Gross mass 10,530 kg (23,215 lb) 85,076 kg (187,560 lb) 6,930 kg (15,331 lPropulsion Nine Thiokol Castor IV Rocketdyne RS-27 Aerojet AJ10-118K 

TX 526-2 strap-on assembly consisting of engine motors one RS27 A/B main engine and two LR101- NA-11 vernier engines Propellant HTPB Oxidizer: LOX Aerozine-50 and N

Fuel: RP-1 Propellant mass 9,373 kg (20,664 lb) 79,380 kg 6,004 kg (13,236 l

(175,000 lb) Avg. Thrust 428 kN (96,218 lb) 1,030 kN (231,553 lb) 44 kN (9,815 lb) 

Nominal burn time 57 sec 224 sec 431 sec 

Max. payload 3,045 kg (6,713 lb) to low-Earth orbit; 1,275 kg (2,800 lb) to geosy

circular sun-synchronous orbit (polar launch)b

Contractors Thiokol Rocketdyne Aerojet 

a Jean-Jacques Serra, “Castor,” The Satellite Encyclopedia, http://www.tbssatellite.com/tse/online/lanc_castor.hb Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1989–1990 Activities (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics 

databk7_collected.book Page 142 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–73. Delta II 6925 Character

Strap-ons (each) Stage 1 Stage 

Length 11.2 m (36.3 ft) 26.1 m (85.6 ft) 6 m (19.6 ft) Diameter 1.0 m (3.3 ft) 2.44 m (8 ft) 2.44 m (8 ft) 

Gross mass Ground lit: 11,700 kg 101,700 kg (224,210 lb) 6,997 kg (15,400 

(25,800 lb) Air lit: 11,900 kg (26,100 lb)

Propulsion Nine Castor IVA solid Rocketdyne RS-27 Aerojet AJ10-11

rocket motors assembly consisting of engine 

one RS2701A/B main engine and two LR101-NA-11 vernier engines

Propellant HTPB Oxidizer: LOX Aerozine-50 and 

Fuel: RP-1

Propellant mass 10,100 kg (22,300 lb) 96,100 kg (211,900 lb) 6,076 kg (14,40Avg. thrust 427.1 kN (97,700 lb) 911 kN (204,800 lb) 42.4 kN (9,645 l

at sea level 478.3 kN (sea level)(108,700 lb) vac.

Nominal burn time 56.2 sec 265 sec 440 sec Max. payload 5,039 kg (11,100 lb) to low-Earth orbit; 1,819 kg (4,000 lb) to geos

orbit, 3,175 kg (7,000 lb) to sun synchronous orbitb

Contractors Thiokol Rocketdyne Ae

databk7_collected.book Page 143 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Isakowitz and Samella, International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 2nd ed., pp. 234–237.b Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1992 Activities, p. 94.
Table 2–74. Delta 7925 Characteris

Strap-on Solid Rocket Stage 1 Stage 2 

Motors 

Length 13.0 m (42.5 ft) 26.1 (85.6 ft) 6 m (19.6 ft) 

Diameter 1.0 m (3.3 ft) 2.4 m (8 ft) 2.4 m (8 ft) Gross mass 13,080 kg (28,840 lb) 101,800 kg 6,954 kg (15,331 l

each (224,400 lb) 

Propulsion Nine Hercules GEM 40 Rocketdyne RS-27 Aerojet AJ10-118K 

solid rocket motors; assembly consisting of engine some configurations one RS27A/B main used three or four engine and two LR101- motors NA-11 vernier engines Propellant HTPB Oxidizer: LOX Aerozine-50 and N

Fuel: RP-1 Propellant mass 11,765 kg (25,940 lb) 96,100 kg 6,004 kg (13,236 l

(211,900 lb) Avg. thrust Sea level: 446 kN 890 kN (200,000 lb) 44 kN (9,815 lb) 

(100,300 lb); air-lit: (sea level) 516.2 kN (116,100 lb) each

Nominal burn time 63.3 sec 261 sec 431 sec 

Max. payload 3,895 kg (8,590 lb) to 5,140 kg (11,330 lb) to low-Earth orbit depe

3,220 kg (7,100 lb) to Sun-synchronous orbit; 1,870 kg (4,120 lb) 

Contractors Alliant Techsystems Rocketdyne Aerojet 

databk7_collected.book Page 144 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Isakowitz et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., pp. 112, 115–118.b No PAM upper stage was used for low-Earth orbit missions.
Table 2–75. Representative Delta II Mission Profile Events

Event Mission Elapsed Time (sec)

Main engine and six solid motors ignited, 0.0

liftoff

Mach 1 32.4

Maximum dynamic pressure 49.7

Solid motor burnout (6 of 9) 56

Solid motor ignition (3 of 9) 59

Jettison 6 solid motors 60/61

Jettison 3 solid motors 118

Stage 1 main engine cutoff (MECO) 265

Stage 1-2 separation 271.4

Stage 2 ignition 278

Payload fairing jettison 298

Stage 2 engine first cutoff 1 (SECO 1) 687

Stage 2 restart ignition 1263

Second cutoff–Stage 2 (SECO 2) 1286

Stage 2-3 separation 1300

Stage 3/PAM ignition 1376

Stage 3/PAM burnout 1463

Spacecraft separation 1576
Table 2–76. Pegasus Launches (1989–

Launch Date Vehicle Model Customer(s) Pay

April 5, 1990 Standard NASA, DOD PegSat, US

(SECS) 

July 7, 1991 Standard with HAPS DOD MicroSat 1

5, 6, and 7 

February 9, 1993 Standard 1) INPE Brazil 1) SCD-1 

2) Orbital Sciences Corp. 2) OXP-1 

April 25, 1993 Standard 1) Department of Energy- 1) ALEXIS 

sponsored 2) Orbital Sciences Corp. 2) OXP-2b 

May 19, 1994 Standard with HAPS DOD STEP-2 June 27, 1994 XL DOD STEP-1 

August 3, 1994 Standard DOD APEX April 4, 1995 Standard (Hybrid) 1) ORBCOMM 1) FM1 & F

2) NASA 2) MicroLa

June 22, 1995 XL DOD STEP-3 

databk7_collected.book Page 146 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–76. Pegasus Launches (1989–1998) 

databk7_collected.book Page 147 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Launch Date Vehicle Model Customer(s) Pay

March 8, 1996 XL DOD REX-2 

May 16, 1996 Standard (Hybrid) U.S. Air Force MSTI-3 

July 2, 1996 XL NASA TOMS-EP August 21, 1996 XL NASA FAST 

November 4, 1996 XL NASA SAC-B 

HETE-1 

April 21, 1997 XL INTA Spain MINISAT 0

August 1, 1997 XL Orbital Sciences Corp./ OrbView-2 

NASA 

August 29, 1997 XL DOD FORTE 

October 22, 1997 XL DOD STEP-4 

December 23, 1997 XL with HAPS ORBCOMM-1 ORBCOMM 

February 25, 1998 XL 1) NASA, 2) Teledesic 1) SNOE, 2

April 1, 1998 XL NASA TRACE 
Table 2–76. Pegasus Launc s (1989–1998) 

he Launch Date Vehicle Model Customer(s) Pay

August 2, 1998 XL with HAPS ORBCOMM-2 ORBCOMM September 23, 1998 XL with HAPS ORBCOMM-3 ORBCOMM 

October 22, 1998 Standard (Hybrid) INPE Brazil SCD-2 

December 5, 1998 XL NASA SWAS 

a The 356-km by 455-km (192-nmi by 246-nmi) orbit fell short of the planned 720-km (389-nmi) circular orbit 

Orbital Sciences listed the mission as a “success” and stated that the inclination was on target, allowing missHistory, table 2–2, pp. 2–8). The satellites’ customer, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARP

orbit and repositioned the satellites to an elliptical orbit that ensured DARPA’s objectives were met. Aviation Office Folder 010788). However, other references call it a “failure,” or “partial failure.” (Mark Wade, Astro

February 8, 2005)). Also “Launching on Pegasus,” Small Satellites home page, http://centaur.sstl.co.uk/SSH

“Pegasus,” The Satellite Encyclopedia, http://tbs-satellite.com/tse/online/lanc_pegasus.html (accessed Februa

b This payload is listed on Jonathan’s Space Report, http://planet4589.org/space/log/launchlog.txt (accessed 

History list produced by Orbital Sciences: http://www.orbital.com/SpaceLaunch/Pegasus/pegasus_history.htm 

separate from the Pegasus third stage. c SAC-B was unable to deploy its solar arrays because the spacecraft did not separate from the Pegasus thir

remained sealed in the interior of the dual payload support structure. SAC-B solar arrays were deployed via grthe satellite’s batteries charged. Both died due to power failure within days of launch. “SAC-B/HETE S

November 7, 1996, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/1996/96-231.txt (accessed February 10, 2005); “Pa

Goddard Space Flight Center Top Story, April 4, 2002, updated April 7, 2002, http://www.gsfc.nasa.gov/t

“SAC-B” Gunter’s Space Page http;//skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/hete.htm (accessed February 23, 2005) a

doc_sdat/hete.htm (accessed April 14, 2006). 

d Among the 24 capsules of funeral ashes taken aloft and put into orbit from this Pegasus were those of the 19

Trek.” Marlise Simons, “A Final Turn-On Lifts Timothy Leary Off,” New York Times, April 22, 1997, A1. 

databk7_collected.book Page 148 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–77. Standard Pegasus Charact

Stage 1 Stage 2 

Length 8.9 m (29 ft) 2.3 m (7.5 ft) 1.3 

Diameter 1.28 m (4.2 ft) without 1.28 m (4.2 ft) 0.97 

6.7-m (22-ft) wingspan

Liftoff mass 13,417 kg (29,579 lb) 3,367 kg (7,423 lb) 897 Propulsion Orion 50S motor Orion 50 motor Orio

Propellant HTPB HTPB HTP

Propellant mass 12,160 kg (26,808 lb) 3,024 kg (6,667 lb) 771 Nominal burn timec 72.4 sec 73.3 sec 68.4

Thrust (max. vac.) 580.46 kN (130,493 lb) 138.64 kN (31,168 lb) 35.8Max. payloadd 380 kg into 185-km orbit; 280 kg into 185-km polar orbit from 

210 kg into sun-synchronous orbit from Vandenberg Air Forc

Contractor Hercules Hercules Her

databk7_collected.book Page 149 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a All vehicle characteristics are from NASA SELVS Pegasus Launch System Payload User’s Guide, Release 

otherwise indicated.

b “Pegasus Launch Vehicle,” Space & Missile Systems Center, Department of the Air Force, http://www.te.plk.

aft skirt assembly, interstage, and fairing.

c At 21°C (70°F).d Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1994 Activities (Washington, DC: National Aeron
Table 2–78. Pegasus XL Characteris

Stage 1 Stage 2 

Length 10.3 m (34 ft) 3.1 m (10.2 ft) 1.3 

Diameter 1.28 m (4.2 ft) without 1.28 m (4.2 ft) 1 m 

6.7-m (22-ft) wingspan Liftoff mass 16,383 kg (36,118 lb) 43,411 kg (95,705 lb) 896 

Propulsion Orion 50S XL motor Orion 50 XL motor OrioPropellant HTPB HTPB HTP

Propellant mass 15,014 kg (33,100 lb) 3,925 kg (8,653 lb) 770 Nominal burn timeb 68.6 sec 69.4 sec 68.5 

Thrust (max. vac.) 726 kN (163,211 lb) 196 kN (44,063 lb) 36 kPayload capacityc 460 kg (1,014 lb) into 185-km orbit; 350 kg (772 lb) into 185-

kg (739 lb) into sun-synchronous orbit from Vandenberg Air F

Contractor Alliant Techsystems Alliant Techsystems Alli

Remarks All XL launches have taken place from the L-1011 “Stargazer

databk7_collected.book Page 150 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Pegasus User’s Guide, Release 5.0, August 2000 (Orbital Sciences Corporation, 2000), pp. 2–4, http://ww

February 4, 2005).

b At 21°C (70°F).c Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1999 Activities (Washington, DC: National Aeron
Table 2–79. Scout G1 Characterist

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 

Length 9.94 m (32.6 ft) 6.56 m (21.5 ft) 3.28 m (10.8 ft) 

Diameter 1.01 m (3.3 ft) max. 0.79 m (2.6 ft) 0.75 m (2.5 ft) 

Launch mass 14,255 kg (31,361 lb) 4,424 kg (9,753 lb) 1,395 kg (3,075 lbPropulsion Algol IIIA motor Castor IIA motor Antares IIIA moto

Propellant Solid Solid Solid 

Propellant mass 12,684 kg (27,965 lb) 3,762 kg (8,294 lb) 1,286 kg (2,835 lb

Avg. thrust 467.1 kN (105,112 lb) 284.3 kN (63,971 lb) 83.1 kN (18,698 lb

Nominal burn time 56 sec 35 sec 44 sec 

Payload capacity 175 kg (386 lb) to a 185-km (100-nmi) orbit Prime Contractor Vought Corp. (LTV Corp.)

databk7_collected.book Page 151 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a “Scout–Launch Vehicle,” Vought Corp., http://www.vought.com/heritage/special/html/sscout1.html (accesse

Research Center Fact Sheet, last updated November 24, 2004, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/facts
Table 2–80. Scout Launches (1989–1

Mission No. Launch Date Vehicle Type Customer(s) 

212C May 9, 1990 Scout G1 Reimbursable DOD MAC

Acce

216C June 29, 1991 Scout G DOD REX 215C July 3, 1992 Scout G1 NASA SAM

210C November 21, 1992 Scout G1 Ballistic Missile MST

Defense Organization Sensand U.S. Air Force Integ

217C June 25, 1993 Scout G1 U.S. Air Force RAD

218 May 9, 1994 Scout G1 Ballistic Missile MST

Defense Organization and U.S. Air Force 

databk7_collected.book Page 152 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–81. Taurus 2210 Characteri

Stage 0b Stage 1 Stage 

2 St

Length 12.8 m (41.9 ft) 8.6 m (28.3 ft) 3.1 m (10.1 ft) 1.3 m (4

Diameter 2.4 m (7.8 ft) 1.3 m (4.2 ft) 1.3 m (4.2 ft) 1.0 m (3

Liftoff mass 53,424, kg 13,242 kg 3,379 kg 875 kg (

(117,800 lb) (29,200 lb) (7,450 lb)

Propulsion Castor 120 motor Orion 50S-G motor Orion 50 motor Orion 3

Propellant HTPB HTPB HTPB HTPB

Propellant mass 49,024 kg 12,154 kg 3,027 kg 771 kg (

(108,100 lb) (26,800 lb) (6,674 lb)

Thrust (avg. vac.) 1,615 kN 471 kN 115 kN 13.8 kN 

(363,087 lb) (106,000 lb) (25,910 lb)

Nominal burn time 82.5 sec 72.4 sec 75.1 sec 68.5 secPayload capacity 1,400 kg (3,086 lb) into 185-km orbit (100-nmi); 1,080 kg (2,381 lb) i

Air Force Base; 255 kg (562 lb) into geosynchronous transfer orbit; 1Vandenberg Air Force Basee

Contractor Thiokol Alliant Alliant Alliant T

Techsystems Techsystems 

databk7_collected.book Page 153 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a Taurus User’s Guide, Release 3.0 (Orbital Sciences Corporation, September 1999), pp. 2–5, http://www.o

February 9, 2005). Liftoff masses and total length were not available from the Taurus User’s Guide and wer

Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., pp. 440–441.

b The first stage was known as “Stage 0.”c Included interstage and fairing.d This stage could be replaced by a spin-stabilized upper stage using Thiokol’s Star 37FM perigee kick motor fe Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 1999 Activities, p. 97.
Table 2–82. Taurus Launches (1989–1998)

Launch Vehicle Launch Date Mission Comment

Taurus ARPA March 13, 1994 STEP-0 (USA-101), 

Darpasat (USA-102) 

DOD mission

Taurus 2210 February 10, 1998 1) Celestis 2 1) funeral ash

2) Geosat Follow-on disposal 

(GFO) 2) military E

3) ORBCOMM science 

FM-3, FM-4 3) communic

satellite

Taurus ARPA October 3, 1998 STEX, ATEX DOD mission

(USA-141)
Table 2–83. Titan Launches (1989–1

Titan Launch Vehicle Launch Date (GMT) Mission 

34D May 10, 1989 USA 37 DOD 

IV June 14, 1989 USA 39 Defen

34D September 4, 1989 USA 43, 44 Defen

II September 6, 1989 USA 45 DOD 

III January 1, 1990 Skynet 4A/JCSat 2 U.K. d

comm

III March 14, 1990 Intelsat 6 F-3 Intern

reacheseparareboos

IVA June 8, 1990 USA 59, 60, 61, 62 DOD 

III June 23, 1990 Intelsat 6 F-4 Intern

IVA November 13, 1990 USA 65 DOD 

IVA March 8, 1991 USA 69 DOD 

IVA November 8, 1991 USA 72, 74, 76, 77 DOD II April 25, 1992 USA 81 DOD 

III September 25, 1992 Mars Observer NASA 

ICBM

IVA November 28, 1992 USA 86 DOD 

IVA August 2, 1993 USA DOD 

databk7_collected.book Page 155 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–83. Titan Launches (1989–1998) (

databk7_collected.book Page 156 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Titan Launch Vehicle Launch Date (GMT) Mission 

II October 5, 1993 Landsat-6 Earth 

ICBMmanifostabiliorbit.

II January 25, 1994 Clementine DOD 

IVA February 7, 1994 Milstar Milita

Centau

IVA May 3, 1994 DSP DefenIVA August 27, 1994 USA 105 DOD sIVA December 22, 1994 USA 107 DefenIVA May 14, 1995 USA 110 DOD 

IVA July 10, 1995 USA 112 DOD s

IVA November 6, 1995 USA 115 Milita

IVA December 5, 1995 USA 116 Milita

IVA April 24, 1996 USA 118 DOD 

IVA May 12, 1996 USA 119, 120, 121, 122, 

123, 124

DOD 

IVA July 3, 1996 USA 125 Milita

IVA December 20, 1996 USA 129 DOD 

IVB February 23, 1997 USA 130 First TII April 4, 1997 USA 131, DMSP F14 DOD 

IVB October 15, 1997 Cassini/Huygens NASA 
Table 2–83. Titan Launches (1989–1998) (

Titan Launch Vehicle Launch Date (GMT) Mission 

IVA October 24, 1997 USA 133 DOD IVA November 8, 1997 USA 136 DOD 

IVB May 8, 1998 USA 139 Milita

II May 13, 1998 NOAA-15 NOAA 

IVA August 12, 1998 USA DOD 

Failed

a Isakowitz et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., p. 453.

databk7_collected.book Page 157 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–84. Titan II Characteristicsa

Stage 1 Stage 2

Length 70 ft (21.3 m) 24 ft (7.3 m)

Diameter 10 ft (3.0 m) 10 ft (3.0 m)

Launch mass 269,000 lb (122,016 kg) 65,000 lb (29,484 kg

Propulsion Two LR87-AJ-5 One LR 91-AJ-5

Propellant Aerozine 50, N2O4 Aerozine 50, N2O4

Propellant mass 260,000 lb (117,934 kg) 59,000 lb (27,215 kg

Thrust (vac.) 474,000 lb (2,100 kN) 100,000 lb (450 kN)

Nominal burn time 147 sec 182 sec

Payload capacity 4,200 lb (1,905 kg) to polar low-Earth orbit 

Contractor Aerojet Techsystems (engines)

Lockheed Martin (vehicle refurbishment)

a “Titan II Space Launch Vehicle,” Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, http://www.losangele

SMC/PA/Fact_Sheets/ttn2_fs.htm (accessed February 14, 2005) and Isakowitz et al., Inter

Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., pp. 457–458.
.

Table 2–85. Space Shuttle Flights (198

Mission Date Orbiter Payload 

STS-29 March 13–March 18, 1989 Discovery Tracking and Data R

Satellite (TDRS)-4

STS-30 May 4–May 8, 1989 Atlantis Magellan STS-28 August 8–August 13, 1989 Columbia DOD payloadSTS-34 October 18–October 23, 1989 Atlantis Galileo 

STS-33 November 23–November 26, 1989 Discovery DOD payloadSTS-32 January 9–January 20, 1990 Columbia DOD communicatio

satellite Syncom IV-

STS-36 February 28–March 4, 1990 Atlantis DOD payloadSTS-31 April 24–April 29, 1990 Discovery Hubble Space Teles

STS-41 October 6–October 10, 1990 Discovery European Space Ag

sponsored Ulysses 

STS-38 November 15–20, November 1990 Atlantis DOD payloadSTS-35 December 2–December 11, 1990 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-37 April 5–April 11, 1991 Atlantis Gamma Ray Observ

databk7_collected.book Page 159 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–85. Space Shuttle Flights (1989–1998

databk7_collected.book Page 160 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Mission Date Orbiter Payload 

STS-39 April 28–May 6, 1991 Discovery Deployed and retriev

Strategic Defense InOrganization's InfrarBackground SignatuSurvey experiment, mounted on the ShuPallet Satellite (SPAplatform 

STS-40 June 5–June 14, 1991 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-43 August 2–August 11, 1991 Atlantis TDRS-5 STS-48 September 12–September 18, 1991 Discovery Upper Atmosphere 

Research Satellite

STS-44 November 25–December 1, 1991 Atlantis Defense Support Pro

Satellite

STS-42 January 22–January 30, 1992 Discovery No deployed payloa

STS-45 March 24–April 2, 1992 Atlantis No deployed payloa

STS-49 May 2–May 16, 1992 Endeavour Captured and redepl

Intelsat VI satellite arepair

STS-50 June 25–July 9, 1992 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-46 July 31–August 8, 1992 Atlantis European Space Age

European RetrievablCarrier (EURECA)
Table 2–85. Space Shuttle Flights (1989–199

databk7_collected.book Page 161 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Mission Date Orbiter Payload 

STS-47 September 12–September 20, 1992 Endeavour No deployed payloa

STS-52 October 22–November 1, 1992 Columbia Laser Geodynamic 

Satellite II 

STS-53 December 2–December 9, 1992 Discovery DOD payload 

STS-54 January 13–January 19, 1993 Endeavour TDRS-6 

STS-56 April 8–April 17, 1993 Discovery Deployed and retriev

Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Researfor Astronomy (SPARTAN)-201

STS-55 April 26–May 6, 1993 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-57 June 21– July 1, 1993 Endeavour Retrieved EURECA 

STS-51 September 12– Discovery 1) Advanced 

September 22, 1993 Communications 

Technology Satellite (ACTS), 2) Orbiting Retrievable Far and Extreme Ultraviolet Spectrograph (ORFESPAS deployed and retrieved

STS-58 October–18 Columbia No deployed payloa

November 1, 1993

STS-61 December 2–December 13, 1993 Endeavour Hubble Space Teles

retrieved and redepl
Table 2–85. Space Shuttle Flights (1989–1998

databk7_collected.book Page 162 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

Mission Date Orbiter Payload 

STS-60 February 3–February 11, 1994 Discovery Deployed two paylo

from Get Away Spec(GAS) canisters

STS-62 March 9–March 19, 1994 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-59 April 9–April 20, 1994 Endeavour No deployed payloa

STS-65 July 9–July 23, 1994 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-64 September 9–September 20, 1994 Discovery Deployed and retriev

SPARTAN-201 

STS-68 September 30–October 11, 1994 Endeavour No deployed payloa

STS-66 November 3–November 14, 1994 Atlantis Deployed and retriev

German Cryogenic ISpectrometers and Telescopes for the Atmosphere (CRISTSPAS 

STS-63 February 3–February 11, 1995 Discovery Deployed and retriev

SPARTAN-204 

STS-67 March 2–March 18, 1995 Endeavour No deployed payloaSTS-71 June 27–July 6, 1995 Atlantis No deployed payloa

STS-70 July 13–July 22, 1995 Discovery TDRS-7 
Table 2–85. Space Shuttle Flights (1989–199

Mission Date Orbiter Payload 

STS-69 September 7–September 18, 1995 Endeavour Deployed and retriev

SPARTAN 201 and Shield Facility-2

STS-73 October 20–November 5, 1995 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-74 November 12– November 20, 1995 Atlantis No deployed payloa

STS-72 January 11–January 20, 1996 Endeavour Deployed and retriev

SPARTAN OAST fl

STS-75 February 22–March 7, 1996 Columbia Deployed tethered s

(3-day duration befotether broke)

STS-76 March 22–March 30, 1996 Atlantis No deployed payloa

STS-77 May 19–May 29, 1996 Endeavour Deployed and retriev

SPARTAN-207/Infla

Antenna Experimen

STS-78 June 20–July 7, 1996 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-79 September 19–September 26, 1996 Atlantis No deployed payloa

STS-80 November 19–December 7, 1996 Columbia Deployed and retriev

ORFEUS-SPAS and Shield Facility-3

STS-81 January 12–January 22, 1997 Atlantis No deployed payloa

STS-82 February 11–February 21, 1997 Discovery Retrieved and redep

Hubble Space Teles

STS-83 April 4–April 8, 1997 Columbia No deployed payloa

databk7_collected.book Page 163 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–85. Space Shuttle Flights (1989–1998

Mission Date Orbiter Payload 

STS-84 May 15–May 24, 1997 Atlantis No deployed payloa

STS-94 July 1–July 17, 1997 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-85 August 7– Discovery Deployed and retriev

August 19, 1997 German CRISTA-SP

STS-86 September 25– Atlantis No deployed payloa

October 6, 1997 STS-87 November 19–December 5, 1997 Columbia Deployed and retriev

SPARTAN-201 

STS-89 January 22–January 31, 1998 Endeavour No deployed payloa

STS-90 April 17–May 3, 1998 Columbia No deployed payloa

STS-91 June 2–June 12, 1998 Discovery No deployed payloa

STS-95 October 29–November 7, 1998 Discovery Deployed and retriev

SPARTAN-201 

STS-88 December 4–December 15, 1998 Endeavour Satelite de Aplicacio

Cientifico (SAC)-A Argentina

databk7_collected.book Page 164 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM
Table 2–86. External Tank Characteristicsa

Component Characteristics

Propellants LOX/LH2

Length 153.8 ft (46.9 m)

Diameter 27.6 ft (8.4 m)

Gross liftoff weight 1,655,600 lb (760,947 kg)

Inert weight of lightweight tank 66,000 lb (29,937 kg)

Inert weight of super lightweight tankb 58,500 lb (26,535 kg)

Liquid oxygen max. weight 1,361,936 lb (617,764 kg)

Liquid oxygen tank weight (empty) 12,000 lb (5,443 kg)

Liquid oxygen tank volume 19,563 cu ft (553,963 liters)

Liquid oxygen tank length 49.3 ft (15 m)

Liquid oxygen tank diameter 27.6 ft (8.4 m)

Liquid hydrogen max. weight 227,641 lb (103,256 kg)

Liquid hydrogen tank diameter 27.6 ft (8.4 m)

Liquid hydrogen tank length 96.7 ft (29.5 m)

Liquid hydrogen tank volume 53,518 cu ft (1,515,461 liters)

Liquid hydrogen tank weight (empty) 29,000 lb (13,154 kg)

Intertank length 22.5 ft (6.9 m)

Intertank diameter 27.6 ft (8.4 m)

Intertank weight 12,100 lb (5,488 kg)

Prime contractor Martin Marietta/Lockheed Mart

since 1994

a “External Tank,” NSTS 1988 News Reference Manual, September 1988, http://science.ksc.n

shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/et.html (accessed February 25, 2005). b The super lightweight external tank was first used on STS-91 in June 1998. “Super Ligh

External Tank,” Space Shuttle Technology Summary, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, F

06-70-MSFC, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/pdf/100423main_shuttle_external_tank.pd

(accessed February 25, 2005).
Table 2–87. Solid Rocket Booster Characteristicsa

Component Characteristics

Length 149.16 ft (45.5 m)

Diameter 12.17 ft (3.7 m)

Propellant weight (each solid rocket 1,100,000 lb (500,000 kg)

motor)

Inert weight (each SRB) 192,000 lb (89,090 kg)

Thrust at launch 3,300,000 lb (14,679 kN)

Propellant mixture Ammonium perchlorate oxidizer, 

aluminum fuel, iron oxide, polymer, 

epoxy

a “Solid Rocket Boosters,” NSTS 1988 News Reference Manual, September 1988, 

science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/srb.html (accessed February 25, 2005).

Table 2–88. Space Shuttle Main Engine Characteristicsa

Component Characteristics

Length 14 ft (4.3 m) at nozzle exit

Diameter 7.5 ft (2.3 m) at nozzle exit

Approx. weight (each) 7,000 lb (3,175 kg)

Number of engines Three on each orbiter

Range of thrust level 65%–109% of rated power level

Thrust (100%) Each engine: 375,000 lb (1,668 kN) 

level, 470,000 lbs (2,091 kN) in vacu

Thrust (109%) 417,300 lb (1,856 kN) at sea level, 

513,250 lb (2,283 kN) in vacuuma

Operating life 7.5 hours and 55 starts

Propellant Fuel: LH2, Oxidizer: LOX, in a 6:1 r

Nominal burn time 522 secbb

Prime contractor Boeing Rocketdyne

a “Main Propulsion System,” NSTS 1988 News Reference Manual, September 1988, 

science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/sts-mps.html (accessed February 25, 2005)

b Boeing Rocketdyne, the engine manufacturer, lists the maximum thrust of each engine in va

512,950 lb (2,282 kN). b Isakowitz et al., International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 3rd ed., p. 407.
Table 2–89. Titan Centaur Upper Stage Characteristicsa

Component Characteristics

Length 29.45 ft (9 m)

Diameter 14.2 ft (4.3 m)

Thrust 33,000 lb (15,000 kg)

Propellants Cryogenic–Liquid Oxygen and Liqu

Hydrogen Stage

Propellant weight 46,000 lb (20,865 kg)

Propulsion Two Pratt & Whitney restartable RL

engines

Contractor Lockheed Martin Space Systems

a “Titan,” Lockheed Martin, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=

rsbci=0&fti=0&ti=0&sc=400 (accessed March 17, 2005).

Table 2–90. Inertial Upper Stage Characteristics

Component Characteristics

Length 17 ft (5.18 m)

Diameter 9.25 ft (2.8 m)

Weight 32,500 lb (14,742 kg)

Propulsion Two solid-fueled United Technologie

motors

Propellant weight First stage: 21,400 lb (9,797 kg)

Second stage: 6,000 lb (2,722 kg)

Thrust First stage: 42,000 lb (188,496 N)

Second stage: 18,000 lb (80,784 N)

Contractor Boeing
Table 2–91. Inertial Upper Stage Launches 

Date Vehicle Payload

March 13, 1989 STS-29 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

May 4, 1989 STS-30 Magellan

June 14, 1989 Titan IV Defense Support Program satellit

September 4, 1989 Titan 34D Defense Satellite Communication

System satellite

October 18, 1989 STS-34 Galileo

November 23, 1989 STS-33 DOD payload

October 6, 1990 STS-41 Ulysses

November 13, 1990 Titan IV Defense Support Program satellit

August 2, 1991 STS-43 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

November 24, 1991 STS-44 Defense Support Program satellit

January 13, 1993 STS-54 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

December 22, 1994 Titan IV Defense Support Program satellit

July 13, 1995 STS-70 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

February 24, 1997 Titan IV Defense Support Program satellit
Table 2–92. DC-X Characteristicsa

Component Characteristics

Width 13-1/3 ft (4 m) at base, conical shap

Height 40 ft (12.2 m)

Weight (empty) 20,000 lb (9,072 kg)

Weight (with propellants) 41,600 lb (18,870 kg)

Propellants LOX and LH2

Propulsion Four RL10A5 rocket engines

Thrust 13,500 lb each (60,000 N)

Reaction controls Four 440 lb (1,957 N)-thrust gaseou

oxygen, gaseous hydrogen thrusters

Contractor McDonnell Douglas

a “DC-X Fact Sheet,” BMDOLink, Delta Clipper-Experimental Fact Sheet, Office of External 

April 1993, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/x-33/dcx-facts.htm (accessed March 22, 
. 

Table 2–93. DC-X and DC-XA Flight 

Flight Launch Date Duration (sec) Altitude (m/ft) 

DC-X Test Flights

1 August 18, 1993 59 46/151 2 September 11, 1993 65.8 92/302 3 September 30, 1993 72.2 370/1,214 

4 June 20, 1994 135.9 870/2,854 

5 June 27, 1994 77.9 790/2,592 

6 May 16, 1995 123.6 1,330/4,364 

7 June 12, 1995 132 1,740/5,709 8 July 12, 1995 124 2,500/8,202 

DC-XA Test Flights

1 May 18, 1996 62 244/801 

2 June 7, 1996 63.6 590/1,936 

3 June 8, 1996 142 3,14010,302 

4 July 31, 1996 140 1,250/4,101 

databk7_collected.book Page 170 Monday, September 14, 2009 2:53 PM

a “The Delta Clipper Experimental: Flight Testing Archive,” http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/x-33/dcxfile.
Table 2–94. X-34 Characteristicsa

Component Characteristics

Length 58.3 ft (17.8 m)

Wingspan 27.7 ft (8.4 m)

Weight unfueled 18,000 lb (8,165 kg)

Main propulsion One NASA (Marshall Space Flight 

Center)-designed Fastrac engine

Propellant LOX/RP-1

Propellant weight 30,000 lb (13,600 kg)

Thrust 60,000 lb (27,216 kg)

Nominal burn time 154 sec (without throttling)

Maximum speed Mach 8

Maximum altitude Approximately 50 miles (80 km)

Prime contractor Orbital Sciences Corporation

a “X-34 Demonstrating Reusable Launch Vehicle Technologies,” Historical Fact Sheet, NASA M

Space Flight Center, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/background/facts/x-34.html (a

March 22, 2005).

Table 2–95. X-33 Characteristicsa

Component Characteristics

Length 69 ft (21 m)

Width 77 ft (23.5 m)

Takeoff weight 285,000 lb (129,274 kg)

Propellant LH2/LOX

Fuel weight 210,000 lb (95,254 kg)

Main propulsion Two J-2S linear aerospike engines

Take-off thrust 410,000 lb (185,973 kg)

Maximum speed Mach 13+

Contractors Lockheed Martin (prime)

Rocketdyne (engines)

Rohr (thermal protection systems)

Allied Signal (subsystems)

Sverdrup (ground support equipmen

a “X-33 Advanced Technology Demonstrator,” Historical Fact Sheet, Marshall Space Flight Cente

/www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/background/facts/x33.html (accessed March 22, 2005).
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya

Date Event

1990 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization initiated DC-X 

program.

August 1991 McDonnell Douglas won a $60 million contract to bu

the DC-X.

August 18, 1993 Flight tests of DC-X were begun.

January 1994 NASA’s Access to Space study released. The study 

recommended that development of an advanced 

technology, single-stage-to-orbit, fully reusable rocke

launch vehicle become a NASA goal.

February 1994 NASA released a series of NASA Research 

Announcements to industry for RLV component 

technology. This program laid the groundwork for 

technologies to be demonstrated during the X-33 flig

program.

May 31, 1994 NASA identified $1 million for the DC-XA test progr

addition to $990,000 dollars transferred to the DC-X 

program earlier in 1994. Enabled acceptance of DC-X 

vehicle from the Air Force.

June 20, 1994 First flight of DC-X under second phase of program t

place.

June 27, 1994 DC-X test demonstrated the vehicle’s autoland capab

July 1994 Eighteen cooperative agreements were signed with ind

in the areas of structures, thermal protection, and adv

propulsion.

August 5, 1994 President William J. Clinton issued National Space 

Transportation Policy (NSTC-4) for the RLV Techno

program. It called for NASA to formulate an 

implementation plan by October 5, 1994 for 

Administration review.

October 31, 1994 NASA’s FY 1995 Operating Plan established a new S

Access and Technology Program and funded the RLV 

program at $93.5 million.

November 7, 1994 The Administration approved the NASA Implementa

Plan for the President’s National Space Transportatio

Policy. The plan accelerated the X-33 schedule and c

for NASA to select an X-33 technology demonstrator 

July 1996.

January 12, 1995 NASA issued two Cooperative Agreement Notices 

requesting proposals for the development of technolo

demonstrators for an RLV program.

March 1995 NASA and Orbital Sciences Corporation signed a 

cooperative agreement for the X-34.
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

March 29, 1995 NASA signed three cooperative Phase I agreements t

design the X-33, the next generation space booster. 

Agreements were signed with Lockheed Advanced 

Development Company (Skunk Works), McDonnell 

Douglas Aerospace, and Rockwell International 

Corporation. NASA provided approximately $7 milli

each industry partner, with each investing a matching 

May 16, 1995 DC-X test flights were begun in support of NASA’s R

program.

July 7, 1995 Last test flight of DC-X took place. The aeroshell crac

during landing. The vehicle was turned over to NASA 

sent to McDonnell Douglas for modifications to the DC

December 15, 1995 NASA issued a draft Cooperative Agreement Notice f

design, fabrication, and flight test of the X-33 advanc

technology demonstrator.

March 1996 The President’s FY 1997 budget highlighted that the 

was a science and technology investment. The RLV w

cited as a way to significantly cut the cost of reaching 

space. 

March 1996 NASA issued a new NASA Research Announcement 

the X-34.

April 1, 1996 NASA issued a Cooperative Agreement Notice for 

demonstration of single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) techno

through the design, fabrication, and flight test of an X

advanced technology demonstrator.

May 8, 1996 The DC-XA completed a series of ground tests at the 

Army White Sands Missile Range in preparation for 

tests.

May 18, 1996 The DC-XA began a new set of test flights.

June 1996 NASA awarded a contract valued at approximately $

million to Orbital Sciences Corporation for the X-34.

June 14, 1996 A full-scale segment of a graphite-composite wing 

designed for an RLV was successfully “tested to failu

Langley Research Center. This was the first structura

of a full-scale component designed and fabricated to 

validate the use of graphite-composite primary struct

for RLVs. The purpose of the test was to determine th

maximum load the wing-box could carry as well as to 

understand how it would fail. 

July 2, 1996 Vice President Al Gore announced at the Jet Propulsi

Laboratory in Pasadena, California, that Lockheed M

had been selected to build the X-33 test vehicle, calle

VentureStar. Lockheed Martin won the competition f

X-33 Phase II contract over contenders McDonnell 

Douglas and Rockwell International.
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

July 31, 1996 A landing strut on the DC-XA failed to extend. The v

tipped over and exploded due to an open pressurant l

The vehicle was destroyed.

October 1, 1996 NASA filed Notice of Intent 96-118 with the Federal 

Register of its intention to prepare an environmental im

statement (EIS) and to conduct scoping meetings for 

development and testing of the X-33 vehicle. The EIS 

addressed environmental issues associated with fabric

assembly, testing, and preparation of the flight operat

and landing sites associated with the X-33 flight vehi

November 13, 1996 Gary Payton, NASA's Director of Space Transportatio

T. K. Mattingly, Vice President for Lockheed Martin's 

Program, held an informal meeting to discuss the prog

status and answer questions on the X-33, which was 

undergoing its Preliminary Design Review that week 

California to formalize the engineering baseline of the 

vehicle before moving on to the detailed design phase

November 1, 1996 Langley Research Center conducted thermal-mechan

tests toward the development of a durable, lightweigh

cryogenic insulation system for possible use on futur

RLVs. 

December 18, 1996 A three-day Preliminary Design Review (PDR) was 

completed for the X-33 operations segment and grou

systems segment. Individual PDRs already had been 

conducted on the aerospike engine, the hydrogen tank

structure, and most subsystems. 

January 21, 1997 Langley Research Center issued a press release about 

wind tunnel testing during Phase I in the 22-Inch Ma

Helium Tunnel at Langley. 

January 23, 1997 NASA held a public meeting in Idaho Falls, Idaho, to 

gather public comment on its plan to conduct flight te

the X-33. The meeting was part of NASA's EIS proce

support of the X-33 program. The formal process had 

begun on October 7, 1996, after NASA published a N

of Intent 96-118 in the Federal Register. The Idaho F

meeting was the 12th NASA public meeting to discu

potential environmental impact of the X-33 test fligh

Earlier meetings were held in towns neighboring prop

takeoff and landing sites in Southern California, Utah

Washington, and Montana. 

February 20, 1997 A 7.75 percent scale model of the X-33 completed tw

weeks of wind tunnel tests in the 5.1-meter transonic 

tunnel at the Air Force’s Arnold Engineering Develop

Center at Arnold Air Force Base, Tullahoma, Tennes

according to Space Log, March 10 to March 16, 1997

March 1997 An aluminum and stainless steel model of the X-33 w

tested in Langley’s Low-Turbulence Pressure Tunnel
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

March 6, 1997 NASA announced that surveying was underway at Ed

Air Force Base, California, in preparation for the 

construction of the X-33 launch site. Sverdrup Corpor

the X-33 team's launch facility contractor, was undert

the surveying of the launch site at Haystack Butte. 

Construction of the launch pad and facilities was exp

to be completed by September 9, 1998. Launch facili

activation, which included verification of the launch p

fueling system, was scheduled to be completed by 

October 1, 1998. 

April 10, 1997 NASA announced that an aluminum and stainless ste

scale model of the X-33–about 38 cm (15 in) long by 

cm (15 in) wide–was undergoing extensive wind tun

testing at Langley’s 16-Foot Transonic Tunnel throug

mid-April 1997. 

April 16, 1997 Continuing wind tunnel testing was carried out at 

Marshall Space Flight Center to correct an X-33 con

deficiency at low supersonic speeds (Mach 1 to Mach 

Adding canards appeared to be the only viable soluti

to date. 

April 30, 1997 Marshall Space Flight Center announced that, it had 

conducted hot-fire tests of components for the X-33 l

aerospike engine in its Propulsion Laboratory’s East 

Area. The test apparatus consisted of three hydrogencooled thrust cells constructed to represent a section 

X-33 engine, which was to have two banks of 10 side

side thrusters. Test results were to be reviewed with 

Rocketdyne, which built the test thrust cells and was 

build the X-33 aerospike engine. 

Mid-April–May 1997 Wind tunnel testing of a scale model X-33 in the Lan

Research Center's Unitary Wind Tunnel at supersonic 

speeds ranging from Mach 1.5 to Mach 4.5 continued 

mid-April to early May. Wind tunnel testing also cont

through May at Marshall Space Flight Center. 

May 1997 A “tiger team” was working full-time on reducing the 

weight (without fuel) of the X-33 by 5,000 lb (2,268 

6,000 lb (2,722 kg). The team sorted through more th

400 recommendations of ways to reduce the weight. 

May 21, 1997 The “tiger team” working on the X-33 weight proble

gave a presentation. Weight reduction recommendati

were ranked according to minor, medium, or major c

and schedule impacts. The team indicated that weigh

could be reduced by about 8,000 lb (3,629 kg) to 11,0

(4,990 kg), but the X-33 project costs and schedule w

be affected. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

June 1997 Additional wind tunnel testing of X-33 models took p

in Langley’s Hypersonic Facilities Complex. Also, X

wind tunnel testing started in Langley’s 14-by-22-Foo

Subsonic Tunnel in mid-June. 

June 24, 1997 Aerospace Daily reported that “typical development 

problems” had led to postponement of the first X-33 

flight from March 1999 to July 1999, and slippage o

Critical Design Review (CDR) from September to a

unspecified time in the fall. A critical problem behin

postponement was fabrication of the liquid-hydroge

tank. In addition, Aerospace Daily reported that the 

Lockheed Martin Skunk Works had consolidated X-

project management at Palmdale, California, and Je

Rising had been named Vice President for X-33 and 

RLVs. Rising replaced T.K. Mattingly, who transfer

Lockheed Martin's aeronautical division at corporat

headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland.

June 27, 1997 NASA released the draft EIS. 

July 1997 In mid-July, wind tunnel testing of X-33 models in 

Langley’s 14-by-22-Foot Subsonic Tunnel was concl

July 3, 1997 Aerospace Daily reported on X-33 progress, based on 

interview with Lockheed Martin X-33 Vice President 

Rising. The Skunk Works was considering use of a c

denser cryogenic propellant and had dropped plans to 

canards for vehicle stability in the low transonic rang

(Mach 1 and Mach 2) in favor of changes in the tail 

structure. Weight growth was under attack by a speci

“tiger team.”

August 1997 A critical series of tests on the X-34 Fastrac engine w

successfully completed at Marshall Space Flight Cen

August 26, 1997 The Linear Aerospike SR-71 Experiment was mount

a NASA SR-71 aircraft at Dryden Flight Research Ce

Edwards, California, in preparation for the experimen

first flight, then scheduled for September. 

August 26, 1997 Aerospace Daily reported that a gas generator adapte

the X-33 aerospike engine from a J-2 Saturn rocket e

had undergone 14 hot-fire tests at Marshall Space Fli

Center.

August 28, 1997 Langley Research Center conducted load tests of a full

segment of a composite intertank structure for the X-33 

program. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

September 11, 1997 Aerospace Daily reported on X-33 progress. Five of e

100-lb (45.4 kg) liquid hydrogen tank panels had bee

fabricated by Alliant Techsystems in a Utah plant, and 

of the composite seams were proceeding without any 

surprises. The liquid oxygen tank had been welded 

together. Removing the turbo alternator removed a “b

hunk” of vehicle weight. Cooling the liquid oxygen a

hydrogen propellants to temperatures lower than norm

cut overall vehicle weight further and allowed the X-

carry additional fuel.

September 18, 1997 A two-day CDR of the X-33 thermal protection syste

Rohr at its Chula Vista, California, facility ended 

September 24, 1997 The two-day CDR of the X-33 aerospike engine (kno

also as the XRS-2200 engine) ended. The CDR took 

at Rocketdyne’s DeSoto campus in Chatsworth, Calif

where the X-33 engines were being designed. 

September 26, 1997 NASA released the Final EIS for the X-33 and named 

preferred flight testing launch and landing sites. 

October 31, 1997 NASA announced that the X-33 had completed the fiv

vehicle CDR successful, a major event in X-33 evolu

With completion of the CDR, NASA gave the Lockh

Martin Skunk Works approval to proceed with the 

fabrication of all remaining components and the asse

of the flight vehicle. The package of CDR technical 

information contained roughly 2,750 charts in 11 vol

October 31, 1997 The first successful flight of the Linear Aerospike S

Experiment (LASRE) at Dryden Flight Research C

took place. 

November 4, 1997 NASA completed its Record of Decision on the X-33 

and announced an intention to proceed with the prefe

X-33 flight test program as described in the Final EIS 

issued October 3, 1997. 

November 14, 1997 Groundbreaking ceremony took place at the future X

launch site on Edwards Air Force Base. 

January 1998 NASA decided to modify its contract with Orbital Sci

Corporation to provide for a second X-34 flight vehic

The modification also allowed for additional unpowe

tests and more flexibility in demonstrating various 

technologies.

January 1, 1998 A faulty control system in the X-33 construction hang

off water canons intended to fight fires. A crew of ab

dozen worked on New Year’s Eve to dry out the X-33 

construction area. No permanent damage resulted, an

work continued as usual. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

January 14, 1998 Construction of the X-33 launch site at Haystack But

progressed. Sverdrup completed rough grading of the 

launch site. The new road to the launch site was driva

but, like the site, was still at subgrade level. 

January 21, 1998 Sverdrup completed rough grading of the X-33 launc

February 11, 1998 The first major X-33 component, the liquid oxygen 

was delivered to the Palmdale, California, hangar w

construction of the vehicle was taking place. An A

A300-600ST made the delivery. 

February 12, 1998 The ground cold flow test of the LASRE was perfor

This test included one normal cold flow and one 

emergency systems cold flow. The emergency syste

cold flow tested the effects of control system power 

during flight. The liquid oxygen tank pressurized 

normally during the first (normal cold flow) test, 

validating the repair made to the vent system. The 

emergency test appeared to have been successful. A 

review was scheduled for February 18, 1998. 

February 25, 1998 A routine X-33 quarterly review took place at Marsha

Space Flight Center. Presentations surveyed current 

progress. 

February 25, 1998 Launch site construction continued to progress as all Ed

Air Force Base infrastructure (roads, power, water, and 

communications) was extended to the site. 

March 4, 1998 A NASA SR-71 completed its first cold flow flight a

of the LASRE at Dryden Flight Research Center, Edw

California. 

March 11–March 12, The NASA Independent Annual Review of the X-33 

1998 program took place. X-33 technical and cost perform

was surveyed. A final report detailing findings and 

conclusions was to be briefed to the NASA Program 

Management Council on April 15, 1998. The review 

indicated that Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works had 

addressed many of the concerns that arose during th

September 1997 Independent Annual Review. NASA

Gary Payton and Gene Austin were pleased with the 

review results. 

March 20, 1998 During a project review held at the Rocketdyne facili

Canoga Park, California, Rocketdyne made known ce

schedule hazards that had developed with two of thei

suppliers, Weldmac and CFI. It was reported that, in 

worst case, aerospike engine deliveries might slip thr

five months. Rocketdyne was looking into their suppl

difficulties to mitigate risk to the program schedule. 

April 8, 1998 With the exception of some fastener shortages, the ce

thrust structure of the X-33 vehicle was now complet
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

April 19, 1998 The liquid oxygen tank was moved into the main asse

fixture. The move took less than an hour and was 

completed two days ahead of schedule. 

May 18, 1998 NASA’s F-15B Aerodynamic Flight Facility fighter 

aircraft, based at Dryden Flight Research Center, flig

tested thermal protection materials intended for use o

X-33 to determine the durability of the materials, 

specifically measuring the shear and shock loads to w

the materials were exposed. The materials tested incl

metallic Inconel tiles, soft Advanced Flexible Reusab

Surface Isolation tiles, and sealing materials. 

June 8, 1998 Aerospace Daily reported that “Lockheed Martin was 

carrying a ‘three-month hazard’ on the linear aerospike 

engine it will need to power the X-33 testbed next sum

but Rocketdyne had developed workarounds and fixes 

the engine back on track,” cited Jerry Rising, Lockhee

Martin Program Manager.

June 8, 1998 Aerospace Daily reported that leakage into the structu

the subscale aerospike mounted on NASA’s SR-71 

Blackbird had delayed the first hot-fire test of the eng

few weeks.”

June 8, 1998 Aerospace Daily reported that X-33 Program Manage

Jerry Rising and X-34 Program Manager Bob Lindbe

threatened to not allow their X vehicles to fly unless 

Congress passed indemnification legislation protectin

them against third-party liability in case of an acciden

during flight testing.

June 10, 1998 NASA announced that pictures of the X-33 vehicle a

launch site, taken every 15 minutes from three digital 

cameras, would be posted on an Internet site. The im

from two cameras would show the vehicle’s primary 

assembly structure, the side-by-side tooling structure

the X-33’s upper thermal protection system, and the 

vehicle’s upper internal support structure, while the th

camera would focus on the vehicle’s launch pad. The 

vehicle images would not be current, delayed one day

June 30, 1998 NASA announced completion of the F-15B flight test

thermal protection materials for the X-33 at Dryden F

Research Center, Edwards, California. The six flights 

tested the durability of the materials at hypersonic 

velocities. The F-15B reached an altitude of 36,000 f

(10,973 M) and a top speed of Mach 1.4. The materia

samples tested included metallic Inconel tiles, soft 

Advanced Flexible Reusable Surface Insulation tiles, 

sealing materials. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

July 1998 The X-34 program passed a critical milestone as the f

wing assembly completed qualification tests and was 

shipped to Orbital Sciences Corporation and mated to 

X-34 test article under construction.

July 6, 1998 Aerospace Daily, in an article titled “Wagons Ho!” rep

that the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works had abandon

flying the X-33 back to its launch pad at Edwards Air 

Base in favor of trucking the experimental aircraft 

overland, “because the Shuttle program won’t give up 

of its two Boeing 747s for ferry flights.”

July 22, 1998 Difficulties with fabricating the X-33 liquid hydrogen 

continued. As a result, delivery dates for the two tank

slipped from July 31 and September 2 to mid-Octobe

mid-November, respectively. The impact of these dela

vehicle assembly was still being assessed. 

July 29, 1998 Aerojet recommended to NASA and Lockheed Martin 

they use a thruster configuration that included a nozzle 

of columbium to correct for the thermal problems that 

caused nozzles to burn through in earlier tests. Using 

columbium nozzle parts would not increase the X-33’s 

weight; however, preparing the parts would require a l

lead time. To minimize schedule impact, Aerojet prop

delivering the thrusters without nozzles to allow 

continuation of vehicle assembly and supplying the 

columbium nozzles at a later date. 

August 5, 1998 The X-33 System Architecture Review (SAR) and 

Optimized Design Review (ODR) were held in Palmd

with representatives from each Skunk Works partner, N

and the “Gray Beards” attending. The “Gray Beards” p

of experts was composed mainly of NASA senior pers

led by Del Freeman of Langley Research Center. 

August 26, 1998 AlliedSignal delivered the X-33 nose landing gear str

was to be modified into the X-33 configuration for a te

This same test fit already had been accomplished for 

main trunion pivots and the drag link attachments wit

any problems. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

September 2, 1998 Spence M. (Sam) Armstrong, recently named NASA 

Associate Administrator for the Office of Aeronautic

Space Transportation Technology (Code R), revealed 

reorganization during a staff briefing that would dilut

responsibilities of Gary Payton, who, as Deputy Asso

Administrator for Space Transportation Technology, 

currently headed the X-33, X-34, and advanced space 

transportation programs, moving him more into the 

aeronautics half of the Office. Payton would occupy a 

lower position, Division Director, under the proposed 

reorganization, which was scheduled to take place on 

October 1. Payton had championed single-stage-to-or

vehicles for many years. The change seriously jeopar

the status of the program within the NASA hierarchy

September 11, 1998 Aerospace Daily reported that the pending reorganiza

of NASA’s Office of Aeronautics and Space Transpor

Technology “raised the hackles” of Rep. Dana Rohrab

of California, a long-time champion of single-stage-to

technology and chairman of the NASA authorization 

subcommittee. Rohrabacher expressed his concerns i

letter to NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin.

September 23, 1998 A nine-panel thermal protection system array was tes

fitted on the bottom of the X-33 during the previous w

by a joint team of B.F. Goodrich and Skunk Works 

technicians. The metallic panels were equipped with 

new secondary seal designs. One panel also was remo

from the center of the array to prove that any panel cou

replaced. 

September 27, 1998 Continuing difficulties with fabrication of the two liq

hydrogen tanks were experienced. A cure cycle was l

during the first doubler installation process on tank #2

tank was removed early from the cure cycle after blow

bag at the end of a ramp-up point. The combination o

out time and this cure cycle resulted in an unacceptab

strength impact to the bond joints. The doublers were 

removed over the weekend (September 26–27) and c

be replaced with existing materials. Loss of the cure 

delayed fabrication of tank #2 by 30 days. Constructi

the vehicle structure and electronics continued. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

October 2, 1998 The X-33 engine testing program began. At 12:13 a.

Central Time, the first successful aerospike engine-re

test took place at Stennis Space Center. The test inte

to calibrate the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen fu

turbopumps, check facility settings, and verify valve 

timing to prime the gas generator. The test lasted 2.8

seconds, and no flaws or anomalies were detected. T

tested powerpack hardware consisted of the main po

generating and pumping components of the aerospik

engine, including the liquid oxygen and liquid hydro

turbopumps, a gas generator for the turbopump drive

vehicle connect lines, and interconnecting flight duc

These powerpack tests were critical to the developm

the linear aerospike engine because they allowed var

performance levels to be tested in parallel with the d

and construction of the engine. Full-scale engine test

were scheduled to take place at Stennis Space Cente

late 1998. 

October 7, 1998 B.F. Goodrich completed the last major testing of the 

metallic panels for the X-33 thermal protection syste

Marshall Space Flight Center. 

October 14, 1998 NASA announced the reorganization of NASA’s Cod

the Office of Aeronautics and Space Transportation 

Technology—under Associate Administrator Spence 

Armstrong, to the Office of Aero-Space Technology. 

NASA press release, it was reported that Armstrong s

that “Goldin wanted me to personally be an advocate 

the Reusable Launch Vehicle programs to effect a ch

means of access to space.” The press release did not 

mention Gary Payton’s changed role within Code R o

the X-33 program. 

October 14, 1998 Boeing presented its estimate to complete engine del

Boeing’s plan transferred $36 million from the Ventu

RLV to the half-scale X-33 by eliminating the fabrica

assembly, and testing of the RLV power pack. By add

second engine test stand in Phase III (the program is 

presently in Phase II), Boeing developed a schedule t

would support a first flight of the VentureStar within 

months of the Skunk Works schedule. In addition, Bo

declined additional investment in the project. The $36 

million transferred from the VentureStar to the X-33 

the same amount as the additional X-33 costs caused 

Boeing’s delay in delivering the aerospike engine. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

October 21, 1998 The first two upper thermal protection system panel

arrived at the hangar from B.F. Goodrich’s Riversid

plant. They were to be test fitted on the forward-mo

position of the liquid oxygen tank. Repair patches fo

liquid hydrogen tank #1 had been completed and shi

while work continued on the second tank. 

October 23, 1998 NASA announced that it and Lockheed Martin would 

a media teleconference on Tuesday, October 27, with 

program officials Gary Payton, NASA Deputy Assoc

Administrator for Space Transportation Technology, 

NASA Headquarters; Gene Austin, NASA X-33 Prog

Manager; Jerry Rising, Lockheed Martin Skunk Wor

Vice President for the X-33 and VentureStar; and Cle

Lacefield, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works X-33 Prog

Manager. A similar teleconference took place the pre

October to update the media on the status of the prog

following the CDR. This teleconference was expecte

announce a six-month delay in the X-33 flight tests. 

October 27, 1998 In a joint NASA and Lockheed Martin media 

teleconference, Jerry Rising announced that the first f

of the X-33 would be delayed six months until Decem

1999 because of late delivery of the aerospike engine 

September 1999. This delay in engine delivery would 

an additional $36 million. Lockheed Martin expected 

Rocketdyne to absorb the additional cost. Lockheed M

had cut all overtime on the program and planned to c

project personnel to reduce escalating costs. 

October 28, 1998 The two leeward #1 composite panels were delivered 

hangar for a fit check on the vehicle. The two leeward 

panels were to be shipped on November 1 for a fit ch

Once the panel fit checks were made, all composite p

would be shipped back to B.F. Goodrich’s Riverside p

for completion. Also, a successful cure cycle on liqui

hydrogen tank #2 was accomplished October 24–25. 

result, all lobe skins were bonded on both tanks. 

November 6, 1998 NASA released the Hawthorne Report, named after t

Boston firm, Hawthorne, Krauss, and Associates, LL

The firm conducted a study titled “Analysis of Poten

Alternatives to Reduce NASA’s Cost of Human Acce

Space.” NASA intended to use the Hawthorne Repor

the Space Transportation Architecture Study currentl

under way as guides for planning future space launch

The Hawthorne report strongly supported the econom

of commercial RLVs over continued use of the Space 

Shuttle. Hawthorne also urged NASA to exercise cau

in setting up loan guarantees to support development 

commercial RLVs. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

November 11, 1998 The X-33’s electronics achieved an important milesto

when Sanders shipped two Vehicle Health Monitorin

computers to the Skunk Works. Also, the Skunk Wor

identified a potential winner of the contract to transpo

X-33 over land. 

November 13, 1998 A test of the aerospike engine power pack took place 

percent power over a period of 30 seconds during the 

ending November 13. A 250-second test was planned 

the following week. 

November 18, 1998 Work began on the ballast bulkhead assembly. Faced w

continually slipping schedule at the Sunnyvale plant, 

subcontractor Alliant and the Lockheed Martin Skun

Works formulated a plan to speed up work. Shift sche

were changed to double manpower. 

November 20, 1998 The announcement was made that NASA and Lockhee

Martin had terminated the LASRE. The LASRE sough

obtain data on the aerospike engine intended for use o

X-33 and VentureStar by mounting half of a scale-mod

aerospike engine on the back of an SR-71 aircraft and 

studying the effects of gas flow. The modified SR-71 c

out seven LASRE test flights. Those flights, however, 

only cold flow gas conditions; all hot flow experiments 

now cancelled. Two flights collected aerodynamic dat

the combination of the aerospike engine with the SR-7

aircraft. In two other flights, gaseous helium and liquid 

nitrogen were cycled through the test rig to test its plum

and, in three more flights, liquid oxygen flowed throug

system. The two hot-fire test flights planned to validat

computer models of aerospike performance in flight w

now cancelled. The LASRE had been repeatedly delay

hardware and other problems. Cancellation of the LAS

allowed any remaining funds to be used by the Skunk W

to cover X-33 cost overruns. 

November 24, 1998 In its December 2, 1998, issue, Aerospace Daily repor

that on November 24, 1998, Boeing’s Rocketdyne Div

completed the first four tests of its XRS-2200 linear 

aerospike engine at Stennis Space Center. In these test

engine’s turbomachinery and gas generator were run a

power and then throttled back to 57 percent power.

December 1998 Construction of the X-33 Flight Operations Center w

completed a little more than 12 months after 

groundbreaking. The center was located on the easter

portion of Edwards Air Force Base.
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

December 2, 1998 Aerospace Daily reported that NASA’s Office of Insp

General, in an audit titled “X-33 Funding Issues” (IG

001), found that Marshall Space Flight Center allowe

million in year-end obligations for the X-33 to go 

unrecorded in FYs 1996 and 1997, thereby giving Con

an inaccurate picture of the program’s status at the en

those two years. The Inspector General reported that 

Marshall contract officers had established an arrange

with Lockheed Martin to delay billing for completed 

work until the following fiscal year. In FY 1996, that 

amounted to $22 million, and in FY 1997, to $34 mil

The Inspector General maintained that obligations “s

be recorded not later than NASA's acceptance of the 

completed milestone work” and recommended that N

adjust its financial records to reveal the X-33 program

financial status “fully and accurately,” and that NASA 

review the funding and payment practices used on the 

program to ensure that they met the requirements of t

Antideficiency Act and internal controls.

December 4, 1998 Senior NASA staff, Boeing representatives, and X-33 

project personnel from Boeing, Rocketdyne, and Lock

Martin attended a meeting at Lockheed Martin’s corpo

headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, to discuss develop

of the X-33 aerospike engine. At the meeting, Boeing 

proposed to downsize the ground portion of the propul

demonstration program to use the resulting savings to 

X-33 engine cost overruns. Three teams were formed t

evaluate Boeing’s proposal and to assess opportunities 

NASA Centers might have to mitigate the impact on 

technology development. The results of these independ

team assessments were to be reviewed in mid-January

December 16, 1998 Construction of the X-33 continued. Both liquid hydr

tanks completed cures. Two gaseous oxygen tanks an

methane tanks belonging to the auxiliary propellant s

were installed on the liquid oxygen tank. The thrust 

structure was nearly complete. Some clearance issues 

emerged during installation of the nose gear support 

structure. Power pack assembly No. 2 was completed 

sent to Stennis Space Center for testing, while power 

assembly No. 1 was still having problems. 

Construction of the X-33 launch site continued. The f

vehicle hold-down posts were installed onto the rotat

launch mount. The diesel generator for the site’s elec

supply was run for the first time. The Vehicle Positio

System was unpacked and set up for testing. Sanders 

completed delivery of the Operations Control Center 

hardware. The X-33 launch site was now complete. 
Table 2–96. Reusable Launch Vehicle Chronologya (Continued

Date Event

December 18, 1998 NASA exercised an option with Orbital Sciences for 

additional test flights during a 12-month period begin

immediately after completion of the initial contract. T

option was valued at more than $10 million, with 

government organizations performing an additional $

million in work.

March 2001 The X-33 and X-34 programs were cancelled.

a Material in this table relating to the X-33 for the years 1996–1998 is drawn largely from Andrew 

“Key X-33 Events,” http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/x-33/1998.htm. (accessed March 15

b Hawthorne, Krauss & Associates, LLC, “Analysis of Potential Alternatives to Reduce NASA’s 

Human Access to Space,” September 30, 1998, ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/1998/Haw

(accessed May 18, 2005).