NASA SP-4012

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Volume !i

Programs and Projects 1958-1968

Linda Neuman Ezell

The NASA Historical Sede$

Scientific and Technical Information Division 1988

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DE;
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

(Revised for vols. 2 and 3)

Van Nimmen, Jane, 1937-

NASA historical data book, 1958-1968.

(The NASA historical series) (NASA SP ; 4012)

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Vols. 2 and 3 by Linda Neuiman Ezell.

Contents: v. 1. NASA resources -- v. 2. Programs

and projects, 1958-1968 -- v. 3. Programs and projects,

1969-1978.

I. United States. National Aeronautics and Space

Administration. I. Bruno, Leonard C., joint author.

I1. Ezell, Linda Neuman. Ill. Title. IV. Series.

V. Series: The NASA historical series.

TL521.312.V36 629.4'0973 74-600126

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

Washington, D.C. 20402
PREFACE

The first two volumes of this series provide a statistical summary of the first

decade of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). It was a

pioneering decade, characterized by public and congressional support, growth, and

adventure. While Volume I introduces the researcher to NASA finances, personnel,

and installations, the second volume contains information on the agency's major

programs and projects-the raison d'etre for the "dollars, people, and things"

previously measured.

Established by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of July 1958, NASA, a

civilian organization, was charged with managing those aeronautics and space activities sponsored by the United States that fell outside the purview of the Department of Defense. Included in the space act were eight general objectives for the new

agency: (1) to expand man's knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space;

(2) to improve the usefulness and performance of aeronautical and space vehicles;

(3) to send instrumented vehicles into space that could support life; (4) to study the

long-range benefits that might result from utilizing space; (5) to preserve the role of

the U.S. as a technological leader; (6) to support national defense by providing other

agencies with information on new discoveries; (7) to cooperate with other countries

in the peaceful utilization and exploration of space; and (8) to utilize existing scientific and engineering facilities and personnel. To meet these objectives, NASA

channeled its resources into five programs: space science and applications, manned

spaceflight, launch vehicle development, tracking and data acquisition, and advanced research and technology.

The procurement and development of launch vehicles was a critical first step for

NASA. Chapter 1 discusses the military vehicles used by the agency in its early years

and the stable of launchers designed and developed by NASA and its contractors.

Saturn V, the largest and most powerful of these vehicles, was built for a specific

purpose--manned expeditions to the moon. Chapter 2 outlines for the reader

NASA's manned spaceflight program. Project Mercury proved that one man could

safely orbit the earth at_,t return. Pairs of astronauts in larger vehicles performed

larger, more sophisticated missions during Project Gemini. But it was the ambitious

Apollo program that captured the attention and the purse of the nation. In 1961 in

answer to Yuri A. Gagarin's successful orbital flight, which preceded John H.

Glenn, Jr.'s orbital mission by 10 months, President John F. Kennedy declared that

before the end of the decade the U.S. would send a man to the moon. At the close of

NASA's first decade, three Americans circled earth's natural satellite aboard Apollo

4

iii
iv NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

8; in July 1969 the first of six Apollo lunar landers touched down safely on the

moon. Although it received less fiscal support, the space science and applications

program brought the agency its first and steadiest supply of results.

Chapter 3 explores the disciplines NASA's space scientists sought to study and

describes the many vehicles they used-from small sounding rockets and the Explorer family of satellites to large orbiting-laboratory satellites. In addition to supporting "pure" scientific research, NASA specialists also developed satellites of a

more "practicaL" nature that contributed to such fields as meteorology and communications. NASA also applied its expertise to aeronautical research, continuing a

practice begun by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in 1915. Also

included in the advanced research and technology program, desci'ibed in Chapter 4,

were investigations in the fields of space vehicle systems, electronics and control,

human factor systems, and space power and propulsion. Scientific satellites,

manned spacecraft, and experimental aircraft all demanded accurate tracking procedures and sophisticated data acquisition and analysis equipment, which is discussed in Chapter 5. During the first 10 years, the agency's tracking and data acquisition

program supported three networks: the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (satellites), the Manned Space Flight Network, and the Deep Space Network.

Each of the five chapters is divided into three sections. The narrative introduction

to each chapter includes information on the changing management of the program

offices at NASA Headquarters. In the budget sections, tables provide a fiscal history

of each program and the many flight and research projects sponsored by NASA.

The bulk of the book is devoted to describing these projects, including data on the

projects' origins. For example, in Chapter 3, the material is divided among six broad

categories: physics and astronomy, lunar and planetary, life sciences, meteorology,

communications, and applications (including geodesy). In turn, the physics and

astronomy section is organized by project: Explorer, Orbiting Solar Observatory,

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, Orbiting Geophysical Observatory, sounding

rockets, Vanguard, and miscellaneous projects (including several international ventures). For each flight, a data sheet gives a physical description of the spacecraft and

information on objectives, results, and participants. Throughout the book, the

reader will find material that is duplicative. This is necessary to give the researcher

who is interested in only one program or one project a more complete story.

The authors of the NASA Historical Data Book series have made no attempts to

interpret or judge the events they describe; instead they have provided only the facts,

figures, and background. Such an approach does not lend itself to volumes that are

read from cover to cover, but it does provide students, writers, and others-especially those without ready access to primary documentation-objective material with

which to begin their research. The second volume also gives historians, managers,

engineers, and scientists working in the field quick answers to specific questions such

as: Who initiated the Explorer series of satellites? How large was the Ranger

spacecraft? When did the Space Task Group become the Manned Spacecraft

Center? How many NASA pilots flew the X-15? What steps did the agency take to

expand its research abilities in the field of electronics in the 1960s? Taken as a unit,

each chapter will give the more serious reader a complete look at a program, its preNASA origins, objectives, constituents, and results.
PREFACE v

VolumeII waspreparedundercontract,sponsoredbytheNASAHistoricalOffice.Theauthorisindebtedto thestaffof thatofficefortheirassistance,criticisms,

andmoralsupport.

LindaNeumanEzell

Spring1982
CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................... iii

Chapter One: Launch Vehicles ....................................... 1

Chapter Two: Manned Spaceflight .................................... 89

Chapter Three: Space Science and Applications ......................... 195

Chapter Four: Advanced Research and Technology ..................... 401

Chapter Five: Tracking and Data Acquisition .......................... 519

Notes ............................................................. 597

Notes on Sources ................................................... 605

Appendix: NASA Organization Charts ................................ 609

Index ............................................................. 619

vii
CHAPTER ONE

LAUNCH VEHICLES
CHAPTER ONE

LAUNCH VEHICLES

Before the National Aeronautics and Space Act was signed on July 29, 1958, the

art of launch vehicle development was the exclusive concern of the Department of

Defense (DoD). With the passage of the act, the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA), the new civilian agency charged with managing the country's space program was given the authority to initiate its own launch vehicle program. From an amalgam of civilian and military groups and organizations, NASA's

managers began to gather the expertise and hardware they required, but for several

years NASA would depend largely on DoD-developed missiles to launch its civilian

payloads.

When NASA was organized, DoD's Scientific Satellite Project, which included

the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard Division and its upper atmosphere

sounding rocket team, was transferred to the new agency. In addition to several

satellite and probe projects, NASA acquired the F-I engine development project

from the Air Force. On December 3, 1958, the facilities and 2300 employees of the

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, were transferred to

NASA from the Army. For 22 years, this research group had been studying liquid

and solid propellant rockets and recently had been supporting the Army Ballistic

Missile Agency's work on Explorer 1, America's first successful artificial satellite. At

NASA's Langley Research Center, a facility inherited from the National Advisory

Committee for Aeronautics, the Scout solid propellant rocket was being developed.

Scout, the agency's first launch vehicle program of its own, was an assembly of existing components gathered from the Navy's Polaris missile project, JPL's Sergeant

missile, and the Vanguard satellite launcher. In October 1959, the decision was made

to transfer to NASA the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's important Development

Operations Division, the Wernher von Braun team. This group was developing a

large clustered-engine rocket called Saturn (formerly known as Juno V), which agency planners had identified as a potential booster for advanced manned vehicles.

NASA had been seeking to acquire the competence of the von Braun team since its

founding and on July 1, 1960 officially assumed responsibility for some 4000 personnel and part of the division's facilities near Huntsville, Alabama, which were

renamed the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. The civilian agency also had

been given authority to develop the Thor-Delta vehicle and the Vega upper stage and

in 1960 took over from the Air Force the Centaur high-energy upper stage, which

could be used with either the Atlas or the Titan booster. With the acquisition of the

Missile Firing Laboratory at Cape Canaveral, Florida, in 1960, NASA possessed the
2 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

experienced people and the specialized facilities it needed to develop a successful

family of launch vehicles.*

To develop a "national" launch vehicle program, the Department of Defense

and NASA had to coordinate their efforts to assist one another and to avoid unnecessary and costly duplication. Responsibility for this coordination was assumed

by the Launch Vehicle Panel of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating

Board, a NASA-DoD organization established in September 1960 to replace the ineffectual Civilian-Military Liaison Committee. Since NASA-DoD relations and the

prudent management of funds was also a frequent concern of Congress, the space

agency's managers and designers took special care in the late 1950s and early 1960s

to use military boosters already developed, to continue propulsion research initiated

by the services, and to phase out any vehicle that was no longer suitable. NASA

made immediate use of Juno and Vanguard vehicles and the Thor intermediate

range missile with modified military upper stages; the agency began borrowing the

Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile in 1959, Redstone in 1960, and Titan in 1964.

However, NASA's plans for advanced missions called for larger and more specialized boosters than the military had to offer. 2 In designing these new vehicles,

NASA's specialists made every effort to develop the minimum number of different

vehicles with which to accommodate the wide range of missions that the agency was

planning, and it became standard policy to use the same vehicle configurations

repeatedly to improve their reliability.3 Cost effectiveness, reliability and versatility

were characteristics the agency's managers and engineers sought in their launchers.

NASA's first decade saw the successful conclusion of the manned Mercury and

Gemini projects, which employed Redstone, Atlas, and Titan boosters, and the

development of the Saturn family of launch vehicles for manned spaceflight. Apollo

8 was sent to orbit the moon with a crew of three by a Saturn V in December 1968,

the first manned mission launched by the large booster. For NASA's unmanned programs, the Thor-Delta launch vehicle proved to be a workhorse. It was used 63 times

in 1960-1968 to orbit geophysical, astronomical, biological, meteorological,

communications-navigation, and interplanetary payloads. The dependable Atlas

booster was employed successfully in several configurations, including the AtlasCentaur, which at the end of the agency's first 10 years promised to be a valuable

combination for large space science projects. NASA and the military were still

depending on and improving the Scout launcher for small-payload tasks at the end

of the decade (see fig. 1-1).

Until December 1959, all launch vehicle development was managed at NASA

Headquarters by the director of spaceflight development, Abe Silverstein. Abraham

Hyatt, assistant director for propulsion, reported to Silverstein, and several chiefs

*For further information on NASA facilities, see Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno with

Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968; NASA Resources, vol. 1, NASA SP-4012

(Washington, 1976), pp. 13-50. Also useful are Charles D. Benson and William B. Faherty, Moonport: A

History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations, NASA SP-4204 (Washington, 1978); Manned

Spacecraft Center, White Sands Tesl Facility, "MSC White Sands Test Facility History, July

1965-December 1967," MSC rep. [no number], Dec. 1967; Kennedy Space Center Public Affairs Off.,

"The Kennedy Space Center Story," Jan. 1968; NASA, "Wallops Station Handbook; General Information," vol. 1, April 3, 1961; and NASA Hq., Off. of Facilities, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Facilities Data (Washington, 1974).
LAUNCHVEHICLES

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4 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

responsible for such areas as solid rocket development and nuclear engines answered

to Hyatt. In late 1959, a Launch Vehicle Programs Office was established, with

Director Ron R. Ostrander reporting to the agency's associate administrator. A

November 1961 reorganization divided launch vehicle management among the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART), the Office of Manned Space

Flight (OMSF), and the Office of Space Science (OSS), later the Office of Space

Science and Applications (OSSA). Managed in this fashion, nuclear and other advanced power systems were the responsibility of OART (see also chapter 4 for more

on OART). Launch vehicles intended for use in unmanned space science projects

were under the purview of Director of Launch Vehicles and Propulsion Programs

Donald H. Heaton (replaced by Richard B. Morrison in 1962). As director of launch

vehicles and propulsion in OMSF, Milton W. Rosen oversaw those vehicles that

would boost men into space. In 1963, because NASA in general and the Apollo

lunar exploration program in particular had become so very large, a major restructuring of the organization took place. The management of launch vehicles for unmanned projects was not affected. Project managers for the various vehicles continued to report to the director of launch vehicles and propulsion programs (Vincent

L. Johnson replaced Morrison in 1964; Joseph B. Mahon assumed the role in 1967).

Management of the manned vehicles, however, underwent a change. Instead of individuals assuming responsibility for specific components of the Apollo space vehicle and the Saturn launcher, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight

George E. Mueller divided the authority for Apollo five ways: program control,

systems engineering, testing, flight operations, and reliability and quality. For example, the director for systems engineering would be concerned with the Apollo command module, the launch vehicle, the lunar module, and any other component of

Apollo for which systems engineering was required. There was no longer a launch

vehicle manager per se in OMSF. (See table l-I for more information on the

organization of the several offices concerned with the management of launch vehicle

development and operations.)
LAUNCH VEHICLES

Table 1-1.

Four Phases of Launch Vehicle Management, NASA Headquarters

Phase I

Oct. 1958-Dec. 1959

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Director, Space Flight Development (Abe Silverstein)

Assistant Director, Propulsion (Abraham Hyatt)

Chief, Rocket Vehicle Development (Milton W. Rosen)

Chief, Solid Rocket Development (Elliot Mitchell)

Chief, Liquid Fuel Rocket Engines (Adelbert O. Tischler)

Chief, Space Propulsion and Auxiliary Power Units (William Cooley)

Chief, Analysis and Requirements (Eldon W. Hall)

Phase I1

Dec. 1959-Nov. 1%1

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Director, Launch Vehicle Programs (Don R. Ostrander)

Deputy Director (Hyatt; Rosen, Jan. 1%1)

Assistant Director, Vehicles (Rosen; Donald H. Heaton, Jan. 1961)

Assistant Director, Propulsion (Mitchell)

Assistant Director, Launch Operations (Samuel Snyder)

Assistant Director, Nuclear Propulsion (Harold B. Finger)

Phase III

Nov. 1961-Oct. 1963

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Director, Office of Advanced Research and Technology (Ira H. Abbott; Raymond L. Bisplinghoff,

Aug. 1962)

Director, Nuclear Systems (Finger)

Director, Propulsion and Power Generation (William H. Woodward; John L. Sloop, Feb.

1962); office combined with Nuclear Systems in 1963

Director, Office of Space Science (Homer E. Newell)

Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion Programs (Heaton; Richard B. Morrison, June 1%2)

Deputy Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion Programs (Sloop); office dropped in early

1962

Coordinator, Launch Operations (John W. Rosenberry); office dropped in 1963

Head, Small Vehicles and International Projects (Vincent L. Johnson; Roll D. Ginter, July

1%2)

Head, Centaur (W. Schubert; Johnson, 1962)

Head, Agena (Dixon L. Forsythe; Joseph B. Mahon, 1963)

Program Manager, Scout (Ginter; Warren A. Guild, July 1962)

Program Manager, Delta (Johnson; Theodrick B. Norris, 1%2)

Program Manager, San Marco (Ginter); office added in late 1962

Head, Advanced Projects (Alfred M. Nelson; J. A. Salmanson, 1963)

Director, Office of Manned Space Flight (D. Brainerd Holmes; George E. Mueller, Sept. 1963)

Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Rosen; Robert F. Freitag, April 1963); office

dropped in 1%3 (see discussion above)

Assistant Director, Vehicle Engineering (Hall; Rosen, acting, late 1962); office dropped in

1963 (see discussion above)
NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-1.

Four Phases of Launch Vehicle Management, NASA Headquarters (Continued)

Assistant Director, Vehicles (Richard B. Canright; Stanley M. Smolensky, acting, late 1962);

office dropped in 1963 (see discussion above)

Assistant Director, Propulsion (Tischler); functions transferred to OART

Assistant Director, Launch Operations (Gus A. D'Onofrio, acting; John K. Holcomb, June

1962); office dropped in 1963 (see discussion above)

Phase IV

Nov. 1963-Dec. 1968

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Associate Administrator, Office of Advanced Research and Technology (Bisplinghoff; Mac C.

Adams, Oct. 1965; James M. Beggs, June 1968)

Division Director, Chemical Propulsion (Tischler)

Division Director, Nuclear Systems and Space Power (Finger; Woodward, April 1967);

office renamed Space Power and Electric Propulsion in April 1967

Associate Administrator, Office of Space Science and Applications (Newell)

Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion Programs (Morrison; Johnson, June 1964;

Mahon, Dec. 1967)

Program Manager, Centaur (Johnson; Ginter, 1964; Norris, 1967)

Program Manager, Small Vehicles and International Projects (Ginter); office

dropped in 1964 but reestablished in 1967 (R. W. Manville)

Program Manager, San Marco (Ginter); office dropped in 1964

Program Manager, Delta (Norris; Manville, 1966; 1. T. Gillam, 1967)

Program Manager, Scout (Guild; R. K. Sherburne, 1966; Paul E. Goozh, 1967)

Program Manager, Agena (Mahon; W. L. Lovejoy, 1968)

Program Manager, Advanced Programs and Technology Support (Salmanson,

acting; Joseph E. McGolrick, 1964)

Program Manager, Medium Launch Vehicles (Norris); office added in 1968

Associate Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight (Mueller)

Director, Apollo Program (Samuel C. Phillips) (see discussion above)

Director, Program Control (Phillips, acting; Milo L. Seccomb, 1965; Jerald R. Kubat,

1967; James B. Skaggs, 1968)

Director, Systems Engineering (Thomas H. Thompson; Robert L. Wagner, 1967)

Director, Testing (John H. Disher; Melvin Savage, 1965; LeRoy E. Day, 1966)

Director, Flight Operations (Walter C. Williams, acting; Holcomb, 1963)

Director, Reliability and Quality (James Turnock; George A. Lemke, 1964; George

C. White, Jr., 1966)

BUDGET

NASA's budget process, from requests for funds to programming the funds

granted, was a complex one involving the agency, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB),

and Congress. The agency was always considering three budgets simultaneously: the

current operating budget, the budget for the ensuing fiscal year, and the preliminary

budget for the following fiscal year (the fiscal year beginning July 1). In addition to

asking for specific dollar amounts in each year's request, NASA's managers also had

to explain and justify each budget category.
LAUNCHVEHICLES

Table 1-2.

Simplified Steps of the Budget Process

7

1. Program Operating Plans submitted quarterly to NASA Headquarters program offices by the field

installations.

2. First draft of preliminary budget prepared by Office of Programming.

3. First internal NASA semiannual budget review (March).

4. Preliminary budget review by BoB, which leads to NASA-BoB negotiations and BoB targets (summer).

5. Second internal NASA semiannual budget review (fall).

6. Formal submission of requests to BoB (Sept. 30).

7. Requests readied and justified for review by congressional authorization and appropriation committees (by Jan.).

8. Initial hearings before House and Senate authorization committees, followed by reporting out of an

authorization bill.

9. Similar review by House and Senate appropriations subcommittees.

10. Conference committees resolve any differences.

1I. Debate on floor of House and Senate, followed by passage of NASA authorization and appropriation acts.

From fiscal years 1963 through 1969, NASA's budget was divided into three'accounts: Research and Development (R&D), Administrative Operations (AO), and

Construction of Facilities (CoF).* R&D and AO were funded on a no-year basis;

that is, the funds were made available over an undefined multiyear period and did

not have to be spent in one particular fiscal year. NASA was also permitted to

reprogram internally among the three accounts (as of 1965, transfer authority was

reduced from 3 °70to 0.5 °7oof the total R&D authorization). This volume will only be

concerned with R&D funds. For budget purposes, R&D was defined loosely to include more than pure research and development. For example, R&D funds were

used not only to develop but also to procure launch vehicles and spacecraft after

they were being produced in quantity. Severable equipment (equipment not permanently attached to a structure) could be financed with R&D funds, and nonNASA personnel supporting or working directly on an agency project could be paid

from R&D accounts.

The Bureau of the Budget was responsible for most of the cuts suffered by

NASA budgets months before Congress acted on the requests. In the tables that

follow, the "request" column represents the amounts agreed to by NASA and BoB.

Data on submissions (requests) for this volume are taken from the yearly budget

estimates prepared by NASA's Office of Administration, Budget Operations Division, and from chronological histories prepared for each fiscal year by the same ofrice. In Congress, the authorization committees and their several subcommittees intensely examined NASA's requests and the programs for which the funds would be

spent. The House committee, for example, was divided into subcommittees corresponding to each NASA program office. NASA managers reported regularly to

these subcommittees to keep them informed, because they had the authority to in-

*R&D and AO were combined in FY 1963-1964 and called Research, Development, and Operations

(RDO).
8 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

crease or decrease the agency's budget requests. The authorization committees set a

maximum over which funds could not be appropriated; they imposed limitations or

preconditions on how funds could be spent; they determined how the agency could

reprogram or transfer its monies among accounts.

The "authorization" column in the following charts is the ceiling set by the

authorization committees. Authorizations were not always listed for individual projects in the chronological histories, especially in the early 1960s. To determine the

amount authorized for the general category or program under which a certain project fell, consult the chronological histories. The appropriations committees had the

power to restore funds cut by the authorization committees or make further adjustments to the requests. Generally, however, the appropriations committees did

not scrutinize NASA's budgets as closely as did the authorization subcommittees.

Also, funds were not appropriated by "line item," an individual listing in the request, as they were authorized; for example, a sum would be appropriated for

launch vehicle development, but the amount would not be itemized for each launch

vehicle. Therefore, there are no appropriations columns in the tables to follow

(however, see table 1-3 for a summary of appropriations for the three accounts).

Data on authorizations and appropriations for this volume are taken from the

annual chronological histories mentioned above. The last column, "programmed,"

represents the funds spent during the fiscal year as reported in the NASA budget

estimates (for example, funds programmed in FY 1964 were reported in the FY 1966

estimate). However, to account for all the funds expended for a major NASA

Table 1-3

NASA Appropriations, 1959-1968 (in millions of dollars)

Fiscal Salaries & Expenses/ Research & Construction & Equipment Total

Year Administrative Operations a Development Construction of Facilities b

1959 c 86.3 a 196.6 48.0 330.9

! 960 91.4 347.6 84.6 523.6

1961 170.8 670.4 122.8 964.0

1962 206.8 1302.5 316.0 1825.3

1963 .... 2897.9 d 776.2 3674.1

1964 494.0 3926.0 680.0 5100.0

1965 623.5 4363.6 262.9 5250.0

1966 584.0 4531.0 60.0 5175.0

1967 640.0 4245.0 83.0 4968.0

1968 628.0 3925.0 35.9 4588.9

Total 3524.8 e 26 405.6 f 2469.4 32 399.8

aS&E, 1959-1962; AO, 1963-1968.

bC&E, 1959-1961; CoF, 1962-1968.

cFY 1959 funds came from NACA and NASA appropriations and from a transfer from DoD.

aDuring FY 1963, AO and R&D funds were combined to form Research, Development, and Operations.

CBecause of the change in how the accounts were managed in FY 1963, this total is understated by

about $440 000 000 (see note d above).

fBecause of the change in how the accounts were managed in FY 1963, this total is overstated by about

$440 000 000 (see note d above).

From Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book,

1958-1968; NASA Resources, Vol. i, NASA SP-4012 (Washington, 1976), p. 115.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 9

researchanddevelopment project, one would also have to consider such things as

funds reprogrammed from other accounts, special facilities built to support a particular project, salaries for NASA employees, and support activities. .4

To review the budgets of various launch vehicle programs, consult such obvious

budget categories in the tables to follow as the name of the vehicle in which you are

interested (arranged alphabetically), but do not overlook the miscellaneous

categories included in table 1-31. Summary information can be found in tables 1-3

through 1-5. Valuable information is provided in the following tables in the bottom

notes. For example, prior to FY 1966, portions of individual spacecraft project

budgets were earmarked for launch vehicles. Of the FY 1964 request for Mariner

($100 000 000), $15 600 000 was requested for Atlas-Agena and $9 700 000 for Centaur. But the requests were not always written so precisely. In the FY 1965 request

for Mariner ($54 100 000), $10 900 000 was requested for launch vehicles, which

would be divided between Atlas-Agena and Centaur; the request did not specify the

amount to be budgeted for each vehicle. In using these tables, carefully review the

bottom notes before making conclusions about totals for any particular vehicle or

year.

*For further information on NASA's budget process, see Arnold Levine, Managing NASA in the

Apollo Era (1963-1969), NASA SP-4102 (Washington, 1982).

Table 1-4

NASA Research and Development Funds, 1959-1968

(in millions of dollars)

Fiscal Request Authorization Programmed

Year

1959 237.6a 237.6 b 175.7

1960 345.3 333.1 307.9

1961 671.0 671.4 644.1

1962 1380.5 1305.5 1261.3

1963 2968.3 c 2957.9 ¢ 2878.6

1964 4351.7 4119.6 3824.4

1965 4523._ 4341.1 4358.6

1966 4575.9 4537.0 4468.9

1967 4246.6 4248.6 4249.3

1968 4352.0 4147.6 3881.3

Total 27 651.9 e 26 899.4 26 050.1

aof the total, $146 619 532 was transferred to NASA.

b Actual authorization for NASA was $20 750 000; the remainder was transferred to the agency.

c Includes administrative operations money and is thus overstated.

d Includes $141 000 000 supplemental request for FY 1964 R&D program.

e Overstated as per note c above.

From Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book,

1958-1968; NASA Resources, NASA SP-4012, Vol. 1 (Washington, 1976), p. 120.
10 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

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12 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-6.

Atlas Funding History, a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 8760 b

1960 --- 11 390 b

! 961 24 900 b ___c

1962 39 000 d ---

aSee also Atlas-Able, Atlas-Agena/Thor-Agena, Atlas-Antares, and Atlas-Centaur.

b From the manned spaceflight (Mercury) budget.

CTotal programmed for all Mercury launch vehicles (Atlas, Redstone, and Little Joe I) was

$30 836 000.

dlncludes $11 500 000 from the Mercury request, $22 000 000 from the Apollo orbital flight tests request, and $5 500 000 from the Apollo biomedical flight research request.

Table 1-7.

Atlas-Able Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 4097

1960 --- 18 349 b

1961 --- 5975 b

aFrom the lunar and planetary exploration (Pioneer) budget.

b Includes funds for the Pioneer payload.
LAUNCH VEHICLES

Table 1-8.

Atlas-Agena B and D Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

13

Year Request Programmed

1959 3500 b

1960 7706 c

1961 16 500 d 16 670 e

1962 113 675 f 53 500 g

1963 93 581 h 58 874 i

1964 132 800 j __ _k

1965 97 3001 __ m

1966 _ __ _n _ __ _o

1967 -- -- -P _ _ _q

1968 r _ __ s

aSee also Thor-Agena.

bFrom the lunar and planetary budget.

Clncludes $346 000 from the astronomical observatories budget, and $7 360 000 from the Ranger

budget.

dlncludes $3 000 000 from the scientific satellite request, and $9 500 000 from the lunar and

planetary request, plus two FY 1961 supplementary requests: $200 000 from the Rebound request and

$3 800 000 from a transitional communications system request.

eFrom the Ranger budget.

flncludes funds from the following project requests: astronomical observatories ($22 775 000),

geophysical observatories ($3 700 000), Ranger ($32 800 000), Rebound ($8 100 000), a transitional communications system ($27 300 000), and Apollo for high-speed reentry tests ($19 000 000).

qncludes funds from the following project budgets: Gemini ($2 000 000), Ranger ($30 900 000),

Mariner ($17 000 000), advanced Syncom ($200 000), and OAO ($3 400 000). In addition, $5 100 000

was programmed for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena from the OGO budget,

plus $2 500 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Delta from the OSO budget.

hlncludes funds from the following project requests: Rebound ($11 828 000), intermediate-altitude

satellite ($10 215 000), advanced Syncom ($6 236 000), OGO ($17 565 000), advanced OSO ($3 600 000),

Ranger ($20 900 000), Mariner R ($6 240 000), and OAO ($16 997 000).

ilncludes funds from the following project budgets: Mariner ($4 812 000), OAO ($1 356 000),

Gemini ($15 400 000), geophysics observatories ($4 890 000), and,Ranger ($32 416 000).

Jlncludes funds from the following project requests: OAO ($15 100 000), advanced Syncom

($12 500 000), Gemini ($47 900 000), Ranger ($41 700 000), and Mariner ($15 600 000). In addition,

$22 200 000 was requested for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena from the

OGO budget, plus $4 800 00 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Delta from the OSO

budget.

kOSSA programmed $54 599 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

OMSF programmed $122 700 000 for Gemini launch vehicles, which included Atlas-Agena D and Titan

II.

tlncludes funds from the following project requests: geophysical observatories ($5 200 000), Ranger

($2 000 000), Lunar Orbiter ($15 500 000), Mariner ($10 900 000), OAO ($13 400 000), ATS

($5 900 000), and Gemini ($44 400 000).

raOSSA programmed $55 040 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

OMSF programmed $115 400 000 for Gemini launch vehicles, which included Atlas-Agena D and Titan

II.

nOSSA requested $82 300 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

OMSF requested $88 600 000 for Gemini launch vehicles, which included Atlas-Agena D and Titan II.

°OSSA programmed $70 669 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

oOSSA requested $54 700 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

OMSF requested $8 500 000 for Gemini launch vehicles, which included Atlas-Agena D and Titan II.

qOSSA programmed $29 396 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

rOSSA requested $24 700 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

sOSSA programmed $7 999 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.
14 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-9.

Atlas-Antares Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1963 --- 4000 a

1964 --- 1786 b

1965 1110 a 8972 t_

1966 --- 3602 °

aFunds provided by the Project FIRE Budget.

bOSSA Atlas procurement for Project FIRE.

Table 1-10.

Atlas-Centaur Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

Procurement Development Procurement Development Procurement Development

(Centaur) (Centaur) (Centaur)

1959 ............... 4000

1960 --- 41 000 --- 41 000 --- 36 644

1961 --- 47 000 --- 47 000 --- 64 673

1962 12 070 a 65 400 b --- 56 400 2309 c 73 791

1963 34 400 d 66 664 --- 66 664 13 900 c 90 600

1964 51 700 e 110 700 --- 110 700 32 000 108 100

1965 54 000 c 92 000 --- 92 000 44 814 89 400

1966 69 800 59 600 ---f 59 600 65 000 53 790

1967 64 000 29 700 60 000 g 29 700 55 019 27 200

1968 87 000 --- 85 000 --- 68 305 ---

alncludes $6 700 000 from the Surveyor request, and $5 370 000 from the Mariner request.

b Includes a $9 000 000 supplementary request.

CFrom the Surveyor budget.

alncludes $17 300 000 from the Surveyor request, and $17 100 000 from the Mariner request.

elncludes $42 000 000 from the Surveyor request, and $9 700 000 from the Mariner request.

fTotal 1966 request for launch vehicle procurement was $194 500000; total authorized was

$178 700 000 (authorizations were not itemized by launch vehicle).

sit was noted by the Conference Committee that $4 000 000 of the $9 250 000 reduction in the launch

vehicle procurement budget was against Centaur, bringing the authorization to $60 000 000.
LAUNCHVEHICLES

Table1-11.

JunoII FundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

15

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- l0 690 a

1960 ___ 3483 b

1961 ___ 2848 c

alncludes $8 540 000 from the scientific satellites budget, and $2 150 000 from the communications

budget.

b lncludes funds from the following scientific satellite budgets: gamma ray astronomy satellite

($870 837), ionosphere direct measurements satellite ($870 837), and ionosphere beacon satellite

($1 741 672).

Clncludes funds from the following scientific satellite budgets: ionospheric air measurements

($730 000), gamma ray satellite ($705 000), and ionospheric beacon satellite ($1 413 000).

Table 1-12.

Jupiter (Juno I) Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 2740

1960 ...... b

aFrom the manned spaceflight budget (Mercury).

alt was estimated in the FY 1961 budget estimate that $40 000 would be programmed for Jupiter

vehicles in FY 1960. Plans for using this launch vehicle were cancelled, and no hardware was procured.

Table 1-13.

Little Joe I Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 -__ 2850 a

1960 ...... b

1961 ...... c

a From the manned spaceflight budget. In addition, $1 170 000 was programmed for Little Joe I special

purpose test apparatus and airframe development.

b It was estimated in the FY 1961 budget estimate that $1 300 000 would be programmed for Little Joe I

special purpose test apparatus and airframe development.

CTotal programmed for all Mercury launch vehicles (Little Joe I, Atlas, and Redstone) was

$30 836 000.
16 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-14.

Little Joe II Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 1900 a 1250 a

1963 8800b ___c

1964 5000 a ___d

___f 1965 __3

1966 ___g ___h

1967 ___i __j

aFrom the manned spacecraft systems (Apollo) budget.

bFrom the Apollo (advanced manned spaceflight) request for a "solid, suborbital" launch vehicle.

CTotal programmed for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe 11 was a part, was $47 286 000.

aTotal programmed for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe II was a part, was $43 503 000.

eTotal requested for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe 11 was a part, was $144 000 000.

fTotal programmed for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe II was a part, was $83 663 000.

gTotal requested for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe I1 was a part, was $120 840 000.

hTotal programmed for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe II was a part, was

$120 840 000.

iTotal requested for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe I1 was a part, was $96 500 000.

iTotal programmed for Apollo spacecraft support, of which Little Joe II was a part, was $119 937 000.

Table 1-15.

Nova Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 297

1962 48 500 48 500 ___a

1963 163 574 163 574 ---

a NASA's adoption of the Saturn C-5 in July 1962 effectively cancelled Nova. In the FY 1963 request, it

was estimated that $6 322 000 would be programmed for Nova in FY 1962.

Table 1-16.

Redstone Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 6490

1960 --- 4477

1961 750 __b

_ From the manned spaceflight (Mercury) budgel.

bTotal programmed for all Mercury launch vehicles (Redstone, Atlas, and Little Joe I) was

$30 836 000. II was estimated in the FY 1962 budget request that $2 450 000 would be programmed for

Rcdslonc in FY 1961.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 17

Table 1-17.

Saturn I Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

Procurement Development Procurement Development Procurement Development

1959 ............... 19 325 b

1960 ............... 9450 c

1961 --- 134 309 --- 134 308 --- 173 908

1962 --- 224 160 d --- 224 160 950 e 193 326

1963 90 864 e 249 237 --- 249 237 --- 256 887

1964 75 000 e 93 800 --- 93 800 --- 187 077

1965 --- 120 600 --- 120 600 --- 40 265

1966 --- 4 400 --- 4 400 ......

a Funded as a separate launch vehicle project in the FY 1959-1963 requests, as part of the OMSF launch

vehicle and propulsion systems project in the FY 1964 request, and as part of Project Apollo in the FY

1965-1966 requests (funds for procuring Saturn vehicles were also included in the FY 1964 request as part

of Apollo).

b Funded by DoD.

CAn additional $47 870 000 was programmed for the development of the Saturn family by DoD.

NASA programmed its funds for Saturn vehicle development, of which the Saturn I was the first step.

d Requested for Saturn vehicle development, of which the Saturn I was the first step; however, some of

these funds were being requested for work on advanced Saturn hardware.

e Distinctions between procurement and development were not usually made in the Saturn launch vehicle budget (as they were for the launch vehicles used by OSSA). The procurement figures for 1962 and

1964 are exceptions; the procurement figure for 1963 is from the advanced manned spaceflight budget.

Table 1-18.

Saturn IB Funding History

(in thousands of dollarsp

Year Request Authorization Programmed

Procurement Development Procurement Development Procurement Development

t963 ............... 21 271

1964 55 000 b 68 600 --- 68 600 --- 146 817

1965 --- 260 100 --- 260 100 --- 262 690

1966 --- 274 700 --- 274 700 1000 b 274 786

1967 --- 216 400 --- 216 400 21 900 b 225 626

1968 78 500 b 156 200 ......... 101 100

a Included as part of the OMSF launch vehicle and propulsion systems program and Project Apollo in

the FY 1964 request, as part of Project Apollo in the FY 1%5-1967 and 1970 requests, and as parl of

Project Apollo and Apollo applications in the FY 1968-1969 requests.

t, Distinctions between procurement and developmenl were not usually made in the Saturn launch vehicle budget (as they were for OSSA launch vehicles). The procurement figure shown for FY 1964 (from the

Apollo request) was an exception; the procurement figures shown for FY 1966-1968 are from the Apollo

applications budget.
18 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table1-19.

SaturnVFundingHistory

(inthousandsof dollars)a

Year Request Authorization Programined

Procurement Development Procurement Development Procurement Development

1961 ............... 623

1962 --- 50 000 b ......... 57 375

1963 --- 335 172 --- 335 172 --- 343 442

1964 --- 843 000 c --- 733 000 --- 763 382

1965 --- 988 400 --- 988 400 --- 964 924

1966 --- 1 236 500 --- 1 236 500 --- 1 135 081 d

1967 --- 1 191 000 --- 1 191 000 1300 e 1 098 154

1968 45 600 e 1 110 000 f ...... g --- 853 965

aFunded as a separate launch vehicle program in the FY 1963 request, as part of the OMSF launch

vehicle and propulsion systems program in the FY 1964 request, as part of Project Apollo in the FY

1965-1967 and 1970 requests, and as part of Project Apollo and Apollo applications in the FY 1968-1969

requests.

bSupplementary request.

Clncludes a supplementary request of $110 000 000.

d Includes $210 000 for Voyager studies of a Saturn V launch vehicle system.

e Distinctions between procurement and development were not usually made in the Saturn launch vehicle budget (as they were for OSSA launch vehicles). The procurement figures shown for FY 1967-1968 are

for Apollo applications.

flncludes $1 500 000 for Voyager studies of a Saturn V launch vehicle system.

SThe authorization was not itemized by individual items; the total authorization for Project Apollo

was $2 521 500 000.
LAUNCH VEHICLES 19

Table 1-20.

Scout Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

Procurement Development Procurement Development Procurement Development

1959 ............... 6048

1960 --- 2000 --- 2000 --- 3000

1961 3500 a ......... 2202 b 9652

1962 3000 c 3675 --- 3675 ---_ 4700

1963 4176 e 8947 --- 8947 4954 f 3648

1964 ---g ......... 11 500 ---

1965 5300 h ......... 13 287 ---

1966 11 700 ...... i --- 11 700 ---

1967 10 400 ..... --J --- 9400 ---

1968 16 800 --- 14 300 --- 10 200 ---

a From the scientific satellites budget.

bIncludes funds from the budgets of the following scientific satellites: topside sounder ($52 000), U.K.

ionosphere satellite ($1 200 000), and electron density profile probe ($950 000).

c Includes funds from the budgets of the following scientific satellites: recoverable nuclear emulsions

probe ($1 000 000), topside sounder ($1 000 000) and U.K. ionosphere satellite ($1 000 000).

dCombined amount programmed for procurement of Scout, Delta, and Thor-Agena from the international satellite budget (geophysics-astronomy) was $7 350 000.

elncludes funds from the budgets of the following scientific satellites: topside sounder ($326 000),

geoprobes ($1 000 000), and U.K. international satellite ($2 850 000).

fFrom the Explorer budget.

g$8 800 000 was requested for the combined procurement of Scout and Delta for Explorer and

Monitor; $5 500 000 was requested for the combined procurement of Scout, Delta, and Thor-Agena for

several international satellite projects.

h Includes $4 300 000 from the Explorer budget, and $1 000 000 from the Soviet reentry heating experiment budget.

iTotal request for launch vehicle procurement was $194 500 000; total authorized was $178 700 000

(authorizations were not broken down by individual vehicle).

JTotal request for launch vehicle procurement was $152 000 000; total authorized was $142 750 000

(authorizations were not broken down by individual vehicle).

Table 1-21.

Thor Funding History, a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1961 2400 b 3200 c

1962 --- 1000 c

a See also Atlas-Agena/Thor-Agena, Thor-Able, and Thor-Delta.

bFY 1961 supplementary request for Echo suborbital tests.

c For ballistic tests of the Echo (rigid) satellite; no upper stage was used.
20 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-22.

Thor-Able Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 4963 a

1960 ...... b

a Includes $2 120 000 from the scientific satellites budget, and $2 843 000 from the lunar and planetary

budget.

hAs reported in the FY 1961 request, it was estimated that $727 000 of the scientific satellites budget

would be programmed for Thor-Able.

Table 1-23.

Thor-Agena B & B Funding History FY 1959-1968

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Programmed

1961 10 600 b 8 302 c

1962 24 400 d 12 100 e

1963 13 059 f 7 166 g

1964 8 200 h _ _ _i

1965 10 100 j __ k

1966 _ _ _t _ _ _m

1967 _ _ _n _ _ _o

1968 -- -- --P -- -- --q

aSee also Atlas-Agena B and D.

bIncludes $3 000 000 from the scientific satellites request, and $5 700 000 from the Tiros request,

plus $1 900 000 from a supplementary request for Echo.

Clncludes funds programmed for the following projects: Nimbus ($2 802 000), Echo ($2 200 000),

and topside sounder ($3 300 000).

dlncludes funds from the following requests: OSO ($1 000 000), topside sounder ($8 300 000), Nimbus ($10 900 000), and Echo ($4 200 090).

elncludes funds programmed for the following projects: Echo ($4 800 000) and Nimbus ($7 300 000).

In addition, $5 100 000 was programmed from the OGO budget for the combined procurement of AtlasAgena and Thor-Agena, and $7 350 000 from the international satellites budget (geophysics-astronomy)

for the combined procurement of Delta, Thor-Agena, and Scout.

flncludes funds from the following requests: Nimbus ($91 517 000) and OGO ($3 908 000).

alncludes funds programmed for the following projects: geophysical observatories ($2 366 000), Explorer ($3 100 000), Nimbus ($1 200 000), and Echo I1 ($500 000).

hFrom the Nimbus request. In addition, $22 200 000 was requested for the combined procurement of

Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena for OGO; and $5 500 000 for the combined procurement of Delta, ThorAgena, and Scout for several international satellite projects (geophysics-astronomy).

iOSSA programmed $54 599 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

Jlncludes funds from the following requests: geophysical observatories ($5 700 000), Explorer

($1 000 000), and Nimbus ($3 400 000).

kOSSA programmed $55 040 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

IOSSA requested $82 300 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

raOSSA programmed $70 669 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena

nOSSA requested $54 700 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

°OSSA programmed $29 396 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

POSSA requested $24 700 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.

qOSSA programmed $7 999 000 for the combined procurement of Atlas-Agena and Thor-Agena.
LAUNCH VEHICLES 21

Table 1-24.

Thor-Delta Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

Procurement Development Procurement Development Procurement Development

1959 ............... 12 927

1960 --- 13 300 --- 13 300 34a 12 476

1961 --- 20 000 b --- 12 500 8000 c 10 479

1962 20 000 d 2900 --- 2900 2500 ¢ 5255

1963 6500 f 268 --- 268 31 589_ 2183

1964 10 It)0 h ......... 30 101 ---

1965 28 100i ......... 32 374 ---

1966 30 700 ..... __i --- 27 729 ---

1967 22 900 ....... k --- 23 835 ---

1968 32 600 --- 31 100 --- 33 696 ---

aFrom the Project Echo budget for third-stage hardware.

bIncludes a supplementary request of $7 500 000.

aFrom the Project Relay budget.

dIncludes $7 500 000 from the Project Relay request, and $2 500 000 from the Tiros request.

eFrom the Syncom budget. In addition, $2 500 000 was programmed for the combined procurement of

Delta and Atlas-Agena from the OSO budget, and $7 350 000 was programmed for the combined procurement of Delta, Thor-Agena, and Scout from the international satellites (geophysics-astronomy)

budget.

fFrom the Project Relay request.

glncludes funds from the following projects: OSO ($2289000), Explorer ($14 100000), Tiros

($10 200 000), Relay ($1 000 000), and Syncom ($4 000 000).

hlncludes funds from the following requests: Pioneer ($5 000 000), geodesy ($2 800 000) and Tiros

($2 300 000). In addition, $8 800 000 was requested for the combined procurement of Delta and Scout

from the Explorer and Monitor request, $4 800 000 for the combined procurement of Delta and AtlasAgena from the OSO request, and $5 500 000 for the combined procurement of Delta, Thor-Agena, and

Scout from the international satellites request (geophysics-astronomy).

i Includes funds from the following requests: OSO ($2 700 000), Explorer ($7 500 000), Pioneer

($8 100 000), Biosatellite ($6 500 000), and Tiros ($3 300 000).

iTotal request for launch vehicle procurement was $194 500 000; total authorized was $178 700 000

(authorizations were not broken down for individual launch vehicles).

kTotal request for launch vehicle procurement was $152 000 000; total authorized was $142 750 000

(authorizations were not broken down for individual launch vehicles).
22 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-25.

Titan II Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request ..... Authorization . _ Programmed

1962 22 391

1963 50000 63 709

1964 46 900 _ _ _b

1965 66 900 66 900 _ _ _c

1966 ___d ___d

1967 __ _e _ __e

aFrom the manned spaceflight budget (Gemini).

bCombined total programmed for both Gemini launch vehicles (Titan 11 and Atlas-Agena D) was

$122 700 000.

cCombined total programmed for both Gemini launch vehicles (Titan I1 and Atlas-Agena D) was

$115 400 000.

dCombined total requested and authorized for both Gemini launch vehicles (Titan II and AtlasAgena D) was $88 600 000.

eCombined total requested and authorized lot both Gemini launch vehicles (Titan 11 and AtlasAgena D) was $8 500 000.

Table 1-26.

Vega Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Requcsl Authorization Programmed

1959 14 291

1960 42 800 42 800 4000

Table 1-27.

F-I Engine Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

--- 50 849 1961 ---

--- 48 320 1962 ---

1963 55 316 55 316 53 703

1964 54 100 54 100 61 954

1965 64 100 64 100 62 396

__b

1966 52 500 ---

___¢ 1967 41000 ---

1968 ___d ...... e

a Funded as part of the liquid propulsion program in the FY 1963 request, as part of the OMSF launch

vehicle and propulsion systems program in the FY 1964 request, and as part of Project Apollo in the FY

1965-1968 requests.

bThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-l, H-l, and J-2) was $133 200 000.

CThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-I, H-I, and J-2) was $49 800 000.

d FY 1968 was the last year NASA requested funds for Apollo engine development. The request of

$24 500 000 was for the F-l, H-I, and J-2. The procurement of engines for the Saturn launch vehicles was

charged to the appropriate Saturn account.

eThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-I, H-l, and J-2) was $20 500 000.
LAUNCH VEHICLES

Table 1-28.

H-1 Engine Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

23

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ---

--- 5_2

1963 --- --- 6260

1964 5200 5200 11 531

1965 9800 9800 6550

1966 4800 ...... b

1967 5500 .....

1968 __a .....

a Funded as part of the OMSF launch vehicle and propulsion systems program in the FY 1964 request

and as part of Project Apollo in the FY 1965-1968 requests.

bThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-l, H-I, and J-2) was $133 200 000.

CThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-l, H-l, and J-2) was $49 800 000.

oFy 1968 was the last year NASA requested funds for Apollo engine development. The request of

$24 500 000 was for the F-1, H-l, and J-2. The procurement of engines for the Saturn launch vehicles was

charged to the appropriate Saturn account.

eThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-l, H-l, and J-2) was $20 500 000.

Table 1-29.

J-2 Engine Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 18 574

1962 ...... 33 635

1963 38 732 38 732 46 769

1964 48 200 48 200 48 284

1965 61 600 61 600 49 102

1966 45 500 ...... b

1967 37 900 ...... c

1968 ___a ...... e

aFunded as part of the liquid propulsion program in the FY 1963 request, as part of OMSF launch

vehicle and propulsion systems program in the FY 1964 request, and as part of Project Apollo in the FY

1965-1968 requests.

bThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-l, H-l, and J-2) was $133 200 000.

CThe amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-l, H-l, and J-2) was $49 800 000.

dFy 1968 was the last year NASA requested funds for Apollo engine development. The request of

$24 500 000 was for the F-l, H-l, and J-2. The procurement of engines for the Saturn launch vehicles was

charged to the appropriate Saturn account.

e The amount programmed for Apollo engine development (F-1, H-l, and J-2) was $20 500 000.
24 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table 1-30.

RL-10 Engine Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 16 332

1963 ...... 29 645

1964 32 600 32 600 18 521

1965 17 900 17 900 14 970

1966 20400 ......

1967 12 000 ......

1968 .........

a Funded as part of the OMSF launch vehicle and propulsion systems program in the FY 1964 request,

as part of Project Apollo in the FY 1965 request, and as part of Project Apollo and the Centaur development project in the FY 1966-1967 requests. The procurement of RL-10 engines was charged to the appropriate launch vehicle accounts.

CHARACTERISTICS

The launch vehicles utilized by NASA during the agency's first 10 years are

described in the following tables. Two boosters borrowed from the military, Atlas

and Thor, were used with several different upper stages. Atlas was paired with Able,

Agena, Antares, and Centaur; it also stood alone as the standard Mercury launch

vehicle for orbital missions. Able, Agena, and Delta were added to Thor to increase

that missile's range and versatility. Juno and Vanguard vehicles contributed to

NASA's early space science program. Redstone missiles were man-rated to boost the

first Mercury astronauts onto ballistic trajectories, and Gemini astronauts rode

modified Titan IIs into orbit. Two distinct vehicles, Little Joe I and Little Joe II,

were used to test and qualify launch techniques and hardware for the Mercury and

Apollo programs. The Saturn family of launch vehicles was developed specifically to

support the Apollo lunar exploration venture. And Scout, which changed over time

as its engines were upgraded and its reliability improved, was NASA's first contribution to the launch vehicle stable. Two proposed vehicles, Vega and Nova, are also

discussed. 5

In some cases, finding the "official" figures for the height, weight, or thrust of a

particular launch vehicle was not possible. It was not uncommon to find several

NASA sources with conflicting data on the same vehicle. Measurements, therefore,

may be approximate. Height may be measured several different ways, and there was

some disagreement in the source material over where an upper stage begins and ends

for measuring purposes. The height of a launch vehicle stack does not usually include the payload (spacecraft); weight, however, does. Weight of the individual

stages includes propellant (wet weight). Diameter does not take into consideration

the base of the booster stage, which is often much wider than the rest of the cylindrical vehicle due to the addition of fins or strap-on engines.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 25

O

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._o

*" O

_B

.Z:

¢q

O r---

O

I O

18

Ox

p_

¢,4

O

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-_-_ _

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_ _I_ ¢-I ¢'I

0

e¢l

e

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26 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Engine number changes may not always be noted if only minor modifications of

the engines precipitated the changes. The following abbreviations for propellants

were used throughout the following tables:

IRFNA =

LH2 =

LOX =

N204 =

RP-1 =

UDMH =

WFNA =

inhibited red fuming nitric acid

liquid hydrogen

liquid oxygen

nitrogen tetroxide

kerosene

unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine

white fuming nitric acid

Thrust was measured in newtons (pounds of thrust multiplied by 4.448 equals

newtons). Payload capacity was expressed in the number of kilograms that could be

boosted to a specific ballistic height or to a certain orbit (measured in nautical miles

converted to kilometers).

When available for major vehicles, a listing by launch vehicle number (serial

number or production number) has been provided, with information on how each

vehicle was used and its rate of success. Consult table 1-32 and figure 1-2 for a summary of the success rates of NASA's launch vehicles.

A chronology of each vehicle's development and operation has also been included. Development of many of the launch vehicles often preceded the founding of

the space agency, but these early highlights of the vehicle's history have been provided. Launch dates and time were based on local time at the launch site.

100

8O

o /

= 60 f J 40

0

1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 TOTAL

VEHICLE ATTEMPTS 4 14 17 24 27 15 30 30 36 27 23 247

VEHICLE SUCCESSES 0 8 10 16 23 14 27 26 34 25 19 202

PERCENT SUCCESSFUL 0 57 59 67 85 93 90 87 94 93 83 82

Figure 4-2. Launch Vehicle Success
LAUNCH VEHICLES 27

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_- i Z_ "_'

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28 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

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LAUNCH VEHICLES 29

The Atlas Family

When engineers at NACA's Langley laboratory began seriously studying

manned spacecraft designs in early 1958, they identified the Atlas intercontinental

ballistic missile as a candidate for orbiting a small blunt-shaped craft. Under

development at Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair, later a division

of General Dynamics) since 1946, Atlas flew its designed range for the first time in

November 1958. NASA, the new civilian space agency, put Atlas to work the next

year. Four Mercury astronauts were boosted into orbit by the Atlas D (also

designated Atlas SLV-3) in 1962-1963 (see tables 1-33, 1-34). This reliable booster

was also put to use during the second phase of the manned program as the Gemini

target launch vehicle. But Atlas played an even larger role in the agency's space

science and applications program.

Atlas was first paired with the Able upper stage, which was derived from the

Vanguard launch vehicle. This unsuccessful configuration failed in its attempts to

send a Pioneer probe to the moon in 1959-1960 (see tables 1-37, 1-38). The AtlasAgena combination fared better. First with Agena B and later with the upgraded

Agena D (manufactured by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company for the Air

Force and NASA), Atlas-Agena launched Mariner, Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, Orbiting

Geophysical Observatory, and Applications Technology Satellite payloads (see

tables 1-39 through 1-43). Teamed with the Antares, a modified solid motor from

the Scout third stage, Atlas was used to hurl reentry experiments (Project FIRE)

onto ballistic trajectories at speeds that simulated lunar spacecraft reentry in

1964-1965 (see tables 1-44, 1-45). Atlas-Centaur was the most promising configuration of the Atlas family. The high-energy Centaur, made by General Dynamics, was

the first American vehicle to use liquid hydrogen as a propellant. During 1966-1968,

Atlas-Centaur launched the Surveyor lunar probe series and one Orbiting

Astronomical Observatory (see tables 1-46 through 1-48). NASA officials seriously

considered one other Atlas-upper stage combination. Vega was being planned by

NASA and General Dynamics as an interim vehicle to be used while Centaur was

undergoing lengthy research and development phases. In 1959, however, the Department of Defense revealed its work on the Agena B stage; Atlas-Vega was dropped in

favor of the military's proposed vehicle (see tables 1-49, 1-50).

The Atlas booster was unique in that it had 1.5 stages. In addition to its primary

booster engines, Atlas carried a sustainer engine system, which was jettisoned shortly after launch. The Atlas MA-5 propulsion system was manufactured by Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation. In the mid-1960s, NASA funded a

"stretch-out" program for Atlas. By increasing its length, engineers were able to increase the vehicle's propellant capacity. The Atlas SLV-3X (or SLV-3C) was first

used by NASA in 1966. 6
30 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-33.

Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3 (Standard

Launch Vehicle-3) Characteristics

Height (m): 23.2 (24.1 including the Centaur interstage adapter)

Diameter (m): 3 (4.9 at the base)

Launch weight (kg): 128 879

Propulsion system

Stages: 1.5

Powerplant." Rocketdyne MA-5 propulsion system (see table 1-33)

Thrust (newtons): 1 752 512

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized."

Remarks:

See also:

LOX/RP-1

With Centaur, 1133 kg to a parking orbit trajectory to the moon

Funds were spent in FY 1965 and 1966 to "stretch out" the standard Atlas, thereby

increasing its propellant capacity.

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., engines

With Centaur and Agena D upper stages to launch unmanned payloads, from 1966.

First used on Oct. 26, 1966 for an Atlas-Centaur R&D launch.

Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3, Atlas-Agena D, and Atlas-Centaur.

Table 1-34.

Atlas SLV-3X/Atlas SLV-3C Characteristics

Height (m): 21.9

Diameter (m): 3 (4.9 at base)

Launch weight (kg): 117 979

Propulsion system

Stages: 1.5

Powerplant: MA-5 propulsion system, consisting of one sustainer engine (Rocketdyne YLR-105)

producing 266 880 newtons of thrust and two booster engines (Rocketdyne YLR-89)

producing 667 200 newtons of thrust each.

Thrust (newtons): 1 601 280

Propellant: LOX/RP- 1

Payload capacity: 1224.7 kg to 555 km earth orbit

Origin: ICBM developed by Convair under contract to U.S. Air Force.

Contractors: Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., engines

How utilized: Project Mercury, 1959-1963

With Able, Agena B, Agena D, and Centaur upper stages to launch unmanned

payloads, 1959-1966.

Project Gemini to launch Agena target vehicles, 1966

Remarks: There were six versions of the Atlas, A to F. NASA used only the D model, which

differed from the military versions in the following ways: modified spacecraftlaunch vehicle adapter section, stronger upper neck, and inclusion of an emergency

system for manned Mercury spacecraft. The Atlas is said to have 1.5 stages. The

half-stage consisted of the sustainer engine plus some supporting structure, which

was jettisoned to reduce weight after the initial boost phase. During 1964-1965,

NASA and Rocketdyne explored the possibility of adding fluorine to the

propellant's oxidizer to increase Atlas booster performance. The "FLOX Atlas"

project was dropped in 1965 in favor of improving Centaur's performance.

See also: Atlas SLV-3X/Atlas SLV-3C, Atlas-Able, Atlas-Agena A, Atlas-Agena B, AtlasAgena D, Atlas-Antares, Atlas-Centaur, and Atlas-Vega.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 31

Table 1-35.

Listing of Atlas D Boosters

Vehicle Date Mission Atlas Stage

Serial # Successful*

10 Sept. 9, 1959 Mercury boilerplate test

- - Sept. 24, 1959 Pioneer (Atlas-Able)

20 Nov. 26, 1959 Pioneer (Atlas-Able)

50 July 29, 1960 Mercury MA-1

67 Feb. 21, 1961 Mercury MA-2

77 Mercury (flight cancelled)

80 Sept. 25, 1960 Pioneer (Atlas-Able)

88 Sept. 13, 1961 Mercury MA-4

91 Dec. 15, 1960 Pioneer (Atlas-Able)

93 Nov. 29, 1961 Mercury MA-5

100 April 25, 1961 Mercury MA-3

103 Mercury (flight cancelled)

104 May 8, 1962 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-1)

107 May 24, 1962 Mercury MA-7

109 Feb 20, 1962 Mercury MA-6

111 Aug. 23, 1961 Ranger 1 (Atlas-Agena B)

113 Oct. 3, 1962 Mercury MA-8

117 Nov. 18, 1961 Ranger 2 (Atlas Agena B)

121 Jan. 26, 1962 Ranger 3 (Atlas Agena B)

126 Nov. 27, 1963 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-2)

130 May 15, 1963 Mercury MA-9

133 April 23, 1962 Ranger 4 (Atlas-Agena B)

135 June 30, 1964 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-3)

144 Mercury MA-10 (cancelled)

145 July 22, 1962 Mariner 1 (Atlas-Agena B)

146 Dec. 11, 1964 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-4)

151 Aug. 11, 1965 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-6)

152 Mercury (unassigned)

156 March 2, 1965 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-5)

167 Mercury (flight cancelled)

174 Oct. 26, 1966 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-9)

179 Aug. 27, 1962 Mariner 2 (Atlas-Agena B)

184 April 7, 1966 R&D launch with Centaur (AC-8)

194 Sept. 20, 1966 Surveyor 2 (Atlas-Centaur)

195 Sept. 4, 1964 OGO 1 (Atlas-Agena B)

No (electrical failure)

Yes

Yes

No (airframe failure)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No (airframe failure)

Yes

No (flight control failure)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No (guidance system

failure)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No (ground guidance

failure)

Yes

Yes

No (propellant feed

failure)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
32 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-35.

Listing of Atlas D Boosters (Continued)

Vehicle Date Mission Atlas Stage

Serial # Successful*

196 Feb. 17, 1965 Ranger 8 (Atlas-Agena B) Yes

199 Jan. 30, 1964 Ranger 6 (At|as-Agena B) Yes

204 March 21, 1965 Ranger 9 (Atlas-Agena B) Yes

215 Oct. 18, 1962 Ranger 5 (Atlas-Agena B) Yes

250 July 28, 1964 Ranger 7 (Atlas-Agena B) Yes

263 April 14, 1964 FIRE 1 suborbital (Atlas-Antares) Yes

264 May 22, 1965 FIRE I1 suborbital (Atlas- Yes

Antares)

288 Nov. 28, 1964 Mariner 4 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

289 Nov. 5, 1964 Mariner 3 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

290 May 30, 1966 Surveyor 1 (Atlas-Centaur) Yes

291 July 14, 1967 Surveyor 4 (Atlas-Centaur) Yes

292 April 17, 1967 Surveyor 3 (Atlas-Centaur) Yes

5001 April 8, 1966 OAO 1 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5002C Dec. 7, 1968 OAO 2 (Atlas-Centaur) Yes

5101 Dec. 6, 1966 ATS 1 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5102 April 5, 1967 ATS 2 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5103 Nov. 5, 1967 ATS 3 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5104 Aug. 10, 1968 ATS 4 (Atlas-Centaur) Yes

5301 Oct. 25, 1965 Gemini target (Agena D) Yes**

5302 Mad'ch 16, 1966 Gemini target (Agena D) Yes

5303 May 17, 1966 Gemini target (Agena D) No (flight control failure)

5304 June 1, 1966 Gemini target (Agena D) Yes

5305 July 18, 1966 Gemini target (Agena D) Yes

5306 Sept. 12, 1966 Gemini target (Agena D) Yes

5307 Nov. II, 1966 Gemini target (Agena D) Yes

5401 June 14, 1967 Mariner 5 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5601 June 6, 1966 0(30 3 (Atlas-Agena B) Yes

5602A March 4, 1968 OGO 5 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5801 Aug. 10, 1966 Lunar Orbiter l (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5802 Nov. 6, 1966 Lunar Orbiter 2 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5803 Feb. 4, 1967 Lunar Orbiter 3 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5804 May 4, 1967 Lunar Orbiter 4 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5805 Aug. 1, 1967 Lunar Orbiter 5 (Atlas-Agena D) Yes

5901C Sept. 8, 1967 Surveyor 5 (Atlas-Centaur) Yes

5902C Nov. 7, 1967 Surveyor 6 (Atlas-Centaur) Yes

5903C Jan. 7, 1968 Surveyor 7 (Altas-Centaur) Yes

*8 failures out of 67 attempts (88% successful).

_The Agena stage, however, malfunctioned shortly after separation.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 33

Table 1-36.

Chronology of Atlas Development and Operations

Date Event

1946

1947

1950

Jan. 1951

1953

June 11, 1957

March 1958

Oct. 17-18, 1958

Nov. 24, 1958

Dec. 18, 1958

Sept. 9, 1959

Nov. 26, 1959

June 18, 1960

July 29, 1960

Feb. 21, 1961

April 25, 1961

Sept. 13, 1961

Nov. 29, 1961

Feb. 20, 1962

May 24, 1962

Oct. 3, 1962

May 15, 1963

1965-1966

Oct. 26, 1966

Contract awarded by U.S. Air Force to Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair) to develop a long-range missile, the MX-774.

Contract with Convair cancelled due to budget restraints; Convair continued

research on its own.

Air Force reestablished missile program.

Convair contract with Air Force reinstated (Project MX-1953); proposed

missile named Atlas.

Essentials of Atlas design were developed by 1953.

Atlas flight testing began.

NACA Langley designers considered Atlas for the first U.S. manned

spaceflight program.

Langley personnel opened negotiations with the Air Force Ballistic Missile

Division to procure Atlas vehicles.

Atlas flew its designed range for the first time.

First orbital launch of entire vehicle (Air Force Project Score).

NASA successfully conducted Mercury Big Joe boilerplate test with Atlas

IO-D (the Atlas, however, suffered an electrical failure).

Unsuccessful launch of Atlas-Able with a Pioneer lunar probe; failure due to

upper stage malfunctions; first time Atlas was used with an upper stage.

Atlas 50-D delivered to Cape Canaveral for first Mercury-Atlas mission

(MA-I).

MAd launch was unsuccessful because of launch vehicle and adapter structural failure.

MA-2 launch was successful.

MA-3 launch was unsuccessful because of launch vehicle failure to assume

proper trajectory.

MA-4 launch was successful; Atlas declared safe for manned launch.

MA-5 launch was successful with chimpanzee aboard.

MA-6 launch was successful; first manned flight using Atlas launch vehicle.

MA-7 launch was successful.

MA-8 launch was successful.

MA-9 launch was successful.

Funds were spent to modify the Atlas; by stretching out the vehicle's tanks its

propellant capacity was increased; work was accomplished by Convair.

First launch of stretched-out Atlas with Centaur upper stage (R&D launch)

was successful.
34 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-37.

Atlas-Able Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage 4th stage Total

(Atlas) (w/payload)

Height 5.3 1.9 0.7 29.8 (m): 21.9

Diameter (m): 3

Launch weight (kg): 117 780

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Con tractors:

How utilized."

Remarks:

See also:

2265 390 154 120 589

MA-5 A J10-101 Altair X-248 injection rocket

propulsion

system

1 601 280 33 360 13 344 1930 1 649 914

LOX/RP-I WFNA/UDMH Solid hydrazine

680 kg to 555 km earth orbit

227 kg to lunar impact

136 kg to escape trajectory for interplanetary mission

Able stages derived from the Vanguard launch vehicle.

Space Technology Laboratories, Able assembly, instrumentation, checkout, and

Pioneer payload (4th stage)

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), Atlas

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., Atlas engines

Aerojet-General, 2d-stage engine

Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory, Hercules Powder Co., 3d stage engine

Pioneer lunar probe (with Atlas booster stage).

Failed due to upper stage malfunctions in all three attempts to launch the Pioneer

lunar probe; retired in 1960.

First configuration in which the Atlas was mated with an upper stage.

Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3, Thor-Able, and Vanguard.
LAUNCH VEHICLES 35

Table 1-38.

Chronology of Atlas-Able Development and Operations

Date Event

1955

Dec. 6, 1957

Late 1957

March 17, 1958

March 27, 1958

April 23, 1958

Aug. 17, 1958

Fall 1958

Nov. 1958

Sept. 24, 1959

Nov. 26, 1959

Sept. 25, 1960

Dec. 15, 1960

Aerojet-General received an Air Force contract to design and produce a

second-stage propulsion system for Vanguard derived from the Aerobee-Hi

sounding rocket engine.

First Vanguard test vehicle launch with live second stage (TV-3); vehicle exploded due to first stage malfunction.

Air Force requested Aerojet-General to modify stage for use in ICBM nose

cone reentry tests. Two months later the first Able upper stage was delivered.

It was used with the Thor booster as the Thor-Able RTV (reentry test

vehicle).

First successful Vanguard launch; second stage performed as expected.

Vanguard was used through 1959.

NACA directed the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division to proceed with the

procurement of two Able probes, Able 3 and 4.

First Thor-Able RTV launch.

Thor-Able 1 exploded due to first stage malfunction.

Atlas-Able combination suggested to NASA by Abe Silverstein, director, Office of Space Flight Development, to launch small probes to the moon.

Work was begun on Atlas-Able probe project under agreement between NASA

and Air Force Ballistic Missile Division. Space Technology Laboratories began

constructing Able 3 and 4.

Atlas-Able vehicle exploded on pad during ground tests.

Unsuccessful launch of Pioneer lunar probe with Atlas-Able.

Second unsuccessful launch of Pioneer lunar probe with Atlas-Able.

Third unsuccessful launch of Pioneer lunar probe with Atlas-Able. AtlasAble vehicle retired without a successful launch.
36 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-39.

Atlas-Agena A Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage Total

(Atlas) (Agena A) (w/adapter)

Height (m): 21.9

Diameter (m): 3

Launch weight (kg): 117 780

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: MA-5

propulsion system

Thrust (newtons): 1 601 280

Propellant: LOX/RP-I

5.9 29

1.5

3851 121 631

2

Bell XLR-81 (model

8001; upgraded to model

8048)

67 610

IRFNA/UDMH

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

1 668 890

2265 kg to 555 km earth orbit

Derived from the proposed Atlas-Hustler, a configuration proposed to the Air Force

in the late 1950s.

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), Atlas

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., Atlas engines

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Agena

Bell Aerospace, Textron, 2d-stage engine

Proposed for launching unmanned satellites into earth orbit.

Tailor-made to requirements for each mission. Because the improved Agena B

became available, the Agena A was never used by NASA. The Bell engine was also

called the "Hustler"; the first model used JP4 fuel, the second IRNA/UDMH.

Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3, Atlas-Agena B, and Atlas-Agena D.

Table 1-40.

Atlas-Agena B Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage Total

(Atlas) (Agena B) (w/adapter)

Height (m): 21.9

Diameter (m): 3

Launch weight (kg): 117 780

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: MA-5

propulsion system

Thrust (newtons): 1 601 280

Propellant: LOX/RP- 1

7.2 30.6

1.5

7022 124 802

2

Bell XLR-8 l-Ba-9 (model

8081; upgraded to 8096)

71 168 i 672 448

IRFNA/UDMH

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Con tractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

2627 kg to 555 km earth orbit

340 kg to escape trajectory

204 kg to Mars or Venus

Uprated Atlas-Agena A.

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), Atlas Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., Atlas engines Lockheed Missiles and

Space Co., Agena

Bell Aerospace, Textron, 2d-stage engine

To launch the Mariner and Ranger series and two OGO satellites.

Capable of engine restart.

Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3, Atlas-Agena A, Thor-Agena B, Atlas-Agena D, and ThrustAugmented Thor-Agena B and D.
LAUNCHVEHICLES

Table1-41.

Atlas-AgenaDCharacteristics

37

1st stage 2d stage Total

(Atlas) (Agena D) (w/adapter)

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

Height (m): 21.9 7.2 30.6

23.2 (SLV-3C) 32.1 (w/SLV-3C)

Diameter (m): 3 1.5

Launch weight (kg): 117 780 7248 125 028

128 879 (SLV-3C) 136 127 (w/SLV-3C)

Propulsion system

Stages: 2

Powerplant: MA-5 Bell XLR-81-Ba-9

propulsion system (model 8247)

Thrust (newtons): 1 601 280 71 168 1 672 448

1 752 512 (SLV-3C) 1 823 680 (w/SLV-3C)

Propellant: LOX/RP-I N2OJUDMH

Payload capacity: 2718 kg to 555 km earth orbit

385 kg to escape trajectory

250 kg to Mars or Venus

Origin: Uprated Atlas-Agena B.

Contractors: Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), Atlas

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., Atlas engines

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Agena

Bell Aerospace, Textron, 2d-stage engine

Target vehicle for Project Gemini, 1966.

To launch Mariner, OAO, Lunar Orbiter, and ATS unmanned payloads.

The Agena D model could accept a greater variety of payloads than could the B

model.

Work was underway in 1967 for an uprated Agena D Bell engine, model 8533.

Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3, Atlas SLV-3C, Atlas-Agena A, Atlas-Agena B, and ThrustAugmented Thor-Agena B and D.
38 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table1-42.

Listingof AgenaBandDStages

VehicleDateof BorD Mission AgenaStage

Serial# Launch Model Successful*

6001Aug.23,1961

6002Nov.18,1961

6003Jan.26,1962

6004Apr.23,1962

6005Oct.18,1962

6006Feb.17,1965

6007March21,1965

6008Jan.30,1964

6009 July28,1964

6101Sept.28,1962

6102Nov.28,1965

6201 Aug.28,1964

6202 May14,1966

6301Jan.25,1964

6501 Sept.5,1964

6502Oct.14,1965

6901July22,1962

6902Aug.27,1962

ADT1/5001Nov.11,1966

AD82/5002Oct.25,1965

AD108/5003March16,1966

AD109/5004May17,1966

AD129/5005July18,1966

AD130/5006Sept.12,1966

AD136/6151Dec.6,1966

AD137/6152Apr.5,1967

AD140/6153Nov.5,1967

AD165/6221May18,1968

AD123/6311June23,1966

AD171/6503March4,1968

B Ranger1(Atlas-Agena) No(failedtorestart)

B Ranger 2 (Atlas-Agena) No (attitude control

system failed)

B Ranger 3 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

B Ranger 4 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

B Ranger 5 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

B Ranger 8 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

B Ranger 9 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

B Ranger 6 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

B Ranger 7 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

B Alouette 1 (Thor-Agena) Yes

B Explorer 31 and Alouette 2 Yes

(Thor-Agena)

B Nimbus 1 (Thor-Agena) Yes

B Nimbus 2 (Thor-Agena) Yes

B Echo 2 (Thor-Agena) Yes

B OGO 1 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

D OGO 2 (Thor-Agena) Yes

B Mariner 1 (Atlas-Agena) N/A (Atlas stage

failed)

B Mariner 2 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

D GATV 5001, Gemini 12 Yes

(Atlas-Agena)

D GATV 5002, Gemini 6A

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

No (probable hard

start)

GATV 5003, Gemini 8 (Atlas- Yes

Agena)

GATV 5004, Gemini 9A

(Atlas-Agena)

GATV 5005, Gemini 10 ,Yes

(Atlas-Agena)

GATV 5006, Gemini 11 Yes

(Atlas-Agena)

ATS 1 (Atlas-Agena)

ATS 2 (Atlas-Agena)

ATS 3 (Atlas-Agena)

Nimbus B (Thor-Agena)

PAEGOS 1 (Thor-Agena)

OGO 5 (Atlas-Agena)

N/A (Atlas stage

failed)

Yes

No (failed to restart)

Yes

N/A (Thor stage

failed)

Yes

Yes
LAUNCHVEHICLES 39

Table 1-42.

Listing of Agena B and D Stages (Continued)

Vehicle Date of B or D Mission Agena Stage

Serial # Launch Model Successful*

AD121/6630 Sept. 12, 1966 D Lunar Orbiter 1 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD122/6631 Nov. 6, 1966 D Lunar Orbiter 2 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD128/6632 Feb. 4, 1967 D Lunar Orbiter 3 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD131/6633 May 4, 1967 D Lunar Orbiter 4 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD159/6634 Aug. 1, 1967 D Lunar Orbiter 5 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD99/6703 Apr. 8, 1966 D OAO 1 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD74/6801 June 6, 1966 B OGO 3 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD133/6802 July 28, 1967 D OGO 4 (Thor-Agena) Yes

AD68/6931 Nov. 5, 1964 D Mariner 3 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD69/6932 Nov. 28, 1964 D Mariner 4 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

AD157/6933 June 14, 1967 D Mariner 5 (Atlas-Agena) Yes

*4 failures out of 38 attempts (89070 successful).

Table 1-43.

Chronology of Agena Development and Operations

Date Event

Oct. 1956

1957

Jan. 1959

Feb. 28, 1959

April 24, 1959

• Dec. 11, 1959

Early 1960

April 1960

Development began at Lockheed under contract to the Air Force Ballistic

Missile Division to develop an advanced military satellite system (WS 117L)

and its associated upper stage vehicle, which would be capable of in-orbit

propulsion and control. The upper stage was called Hustler after its Bell

engine, and later renamed Agena. The Hustler engine had been under Bell

Aerospace's purview since 1956. It was designed to provide 66 720 newtons of

thrust for an air-to-surface missile which would be carried by a B-58 bomber.

When requirements for the missile were dropped, the engine was transferred

to the Agena project.

The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division contracted with Lockheed for the

Agena.

NASA had plans for using Agena with Thor and Atlas boosters.

First Air Force launch of an Agena with a Thor first stage. Used by the Air

Force to launch the Discoverer satellite series from Feb. 28, 1959 through

Sept. 13, 1960.

Air Force issued a contract amendment to Lockheed for the development of

an advanced Agena, to be known as Agena B.

NASA's Vega launch vehicle program was cancelled in favor of the Air Force

Atlas-Agena B. An Agena B Coordinating Board was established to assist the

Air Force and NASA in coordinating the development and utilization of the

new Agena.

NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL, was given authority

to supervise procurement of Agena B vehicles for NASA from the Air Force

Ballistic Missile Division, who would acquire them directly from Lockheed.

Agreement was reached between NASA and Lockheed for the purchase of 16

Agena B vehicles over the next three years.
40 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table1-43.

ChronologyofAgenaDevelopmentandOperations(Continued)

Date Event

May1960

Oct.26,1960

Nov.12,1960

1961

Feb.1961

Aug.23,1961

1961-1966

May29,1962

June1962

Dec.12,1962

Sept.1963

1964-1968

FirstsuccessfullanchofAtlas-AgenaA,carryingtheMidas2satellite.

UnsuccessfullaunchofAirForceThor-AgenaBwithDiscoverersatellite;

failureduetostageseparationmalfunction.

FirstAirForcelaunchofAgenaBonanAtlasbooster.

Atlas-AgenaAdiscontinuedbytheAirForceinfavoroffollow-onAtlasAgenaB.

AgreementsignedbetweenNASAandAirForceregardingprocurementof

AgenaBvehicles.

NASA'sfirstlaunchofAtlas-AgenaBwithRanger 1, a lunar probe, as the

payload. The Agena stage failed to restart, and the probe was injected into

low earth orbit.

Atlas-Agena B combination used to launch Ranger I through 9, with Ranger

4 being the first mission during which the two-stage launch vehicle performed

satisfactorily. Atlas-Agena B was also used with Mariner I and 2 and OGO 1

and 3, with the last launch of an Agena B taking place on June 6, 1966.

(NASA used a total of 18 Agena B stages; 5 of these were used with the Thor

booster.)

NASA memorandum of agreement was issued stating that the adoption of an

improved Agena model, the Agena D, was desirable.

Air Force successfully flight tested the Agena D.

Atlas-Agena program authority transferred from Marshall Space Flight

Center to Lewis Research Center, Cleveland.

New agreement between Air Force and NASA was reached regarding procurement of Agena vehicles and cooperation between the two organizations.

From Nov. 5, 1964 through 1968, Atlas-Agena D was used 20 times to launch

6 Project Gemini targets, PAEGOS 1, Mariner3 through 5, Lunar Orbiter 1

through 5, A TS 1 through 3, and OG05. The March 4, 1968 launch of OGO

5 utilized the stretched-out Atlas SLV-3C. (NASA also used the Thor-Agena

D configuration four times in 1965-1968.)
LAUNCH VEHICLES

Table 1-44.

Atlas-Antares Characteristics

41

1st stage 2d stage Total

(Atlas) (Antares) (w/adapter)

Height (m): 21.9 2.9 25.6

Diameter (m): 3 0.7

Launch weight (kg): 117 780 1258 122 310

Propulsion system

Stages: 2.5

Powerplant: MA-5 ABL X-259

propulsion system

Thrust (newtons): 1 601 280 106 752 1 708 032

Propellant: LOX/RP- 1 solid

Payload capacity: 90 kg on a 9260 km ballistic trajectory

Origin: The Antares upper stage was a modified Antares solid motor from the 3d stage of

the Scout launch vehicle.

Contractors: Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), Atlas

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., Atlas engines

Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory, Hercules Powder Co., 2d stage

How utilized: Project FIRE (Flight Investigation Reentry Environment).

Remarks: Special test launch vehicle used to obtain direct measurements of reentry heating at a

speed in excess of 40 225 kilometers per hour to simulate lunar spacecraft and interplanetary probe reentry.

See also: Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3 and Scout.

Table 1-45.

Chronology of Atlas-Antares Operations

Date Event

April 14, 1964 Launch of FIRE 1 (Flight Investigation Reentry Environment) was successful.

May 22, 1965 Launch of FIRE 2 was successful.
42 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-46.

Atlas-Centaur Characteristics

Height (m): 23.2 13 34

14.6 w/payload fairing

3

17 145

Diameter (m): 3

Launch weight (kg): 128 879 146 024

Propulsion system

Stages: 2.5

Powerplant: MA-5 2 RL-10s

propulsion system

Thrust (newtons): 1 752 512 66 720 x 2 = 133 440 I 885 952

Propellant: LOX/RP- 1 LOX/LH 2

Payload capacity: 3857 kg to 555 km earth orbit

1225 kg to escape trajectory

815 kg to Venus or Mars

Origin: General Dynamics studies for a high-energy second stage.

Contractors: Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), Atlas

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., Atlas engines

General Dynamics, Centaur

Pratt & Whitney, 2d-stage engines

How utilized: Originally planned to boost 1962-1965-era Mars and Venus spacecraft, but due to

development problems with Centaur it was not used until 1966 to launch the

Surveyor lunar probe series (1966-1968) and other scientific satellites.

Remarks: First American launch vehicle to utilize liquid hydrogen as a propellant. One of the

serious problems with the vehicle's development was hydrogen loss; heat transfer

between the oxygen and hydrogen fuel tanks caused the liquid hydrogen to

evaporate.

Early R&D launches used the standard Atlas; the stretched-out Altas was first used

on Oct. 26, 1966 with AC-9.

See also: Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3 and Atlas SLV-3C.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 43

Table 1-47.

Listing of Centaur Vehicles

Vehicle Date Mission Centaur Stage

Serial # Successful*

F-I May 8, 1962 R&D launch No (fairing malfunction)

AC-2 Nov. 27, 1963 R&D launch Yes

AC-3 June 30, 1964 R&D launch No (premature engine

shutdown)

AC-4 Dec. 1 I, 1964 R&D launch Yes

AC-5 March 2, 1965 R&D launch No trial (Atlas stage shut

down prematurely)

AC-6 Aug. 11, 1965 R&D launch Yes

AC-7 Sept. 20, 1966 Surveyor 2 Yes

AC-8 April 7, 1966 R&D launch No (failed 2d burn)

AC-9 Oct. 26, 1966 R&D launch Yes

AC-10 May 30, 1966 Surveyor 1 Yes

AC-11 July 14, 1967 Surveyor 4 Yes

AC-12 April 17, 1967 Surveyor 3 Yes

AC-13 Sept. 8, 1967 Surveyor 5 Yes

AC-14 Nov. 7, 1967 Surveyor 6 Yes

AC-15 Jan. 7, 1968 Surveyor 7 Yes

AC-16 Dec. 7, 1968 OAO 2 Yes

AC-17 Aug. 10, 1968 ATS 4 No (failure to ignite)

*4 fad.lures out of 16 attempts (75% successful).
44 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-48.

Chronology of Atlas-Centaur Development and Operations

Date Event

1956

Oct. 1957

Aug. 28, 1958

July 1, 1959

July 1960

Jan. 1961

Oct. 30, 1961

May 8, 1962

Sept. 1962

Nov. 27, 1963

June 30, 1964

Dec. 11, 1964

March 2, 1965

Mid-1965

Aug. 11, 1965

April 7, 1966

May 30, 1966

Sept. 20, 1966

Oct. 26, 1966

Dec. 1966

April 17, 1967-

Dec. 7, 1968

Convair/General Dynamics began to study high-energy second stages that

could be used with the Atlas booster.

Studies for a Centaur prototype were completed; General Dynamics began

discussions with the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).

ARPA requested the Air Force Research and Development Command to

oversee a contract with General Dynamics for the development of an upper

stage for Atlas to be propelled by liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen (contract executed on Nov. 14). Pratt & Whitney received a contract for the

stage's engine development.

Responsibility for Centaur was transferred to NASA.

NASA proposed to utilize Centaur, which was being managed by the new

Marshall Space Flight Center, for 1962 Venus and Mars missions.

The Centaur launch schedule was revised due to problems with engine

development; first mission rescheduled for 1964.

First flight vehicle shipped to Cape Canaveral by General Dynamics.

First Atlas-Centaur test launch (AC-I) was unsuccessful due to Centaur fairing failure. Launch schedule revised again with first mission set for 1965.

Marshall recommended cancelling Centaur; management responsibility for

Centaur was transferred to Lewis Research Center, Cleveland.

AC-2 R&D launch was successful.

AC-3 R&D launch achieved majority of objectives, but experienced

premature Centaur engine shutdown.

AC-4 R&D launch with model of Surveyor lunar probe was successful, but

secondary two-burn inflight experiment was not completed.

AC-5 R&D launch was unsuccessful due to premature shutdown of Atlas

stage.

Centaur declared operational.

AC-6 R&D launch with new propellant utilization system was successful

(simulated Surveyor launch).

AC-8 R&D launch was unsuccessful; the dummy payload was not put into

the planned parking orbit.

Launch of Surveyor 1 lunar probe was successful.

Launch of Surveyor 2 lunar probe was successful.

AC-9 R&D launch with stretched-out Atlas SLV-3C was successful.

NASA decided to launch OAO and ATS satellites with Atlas-Centaur rather

than Atlas-Agena D.

Atlas-Centaur successfully launched Surveyor 3 through 7 and OAO 2. The

attempt to launch ATS 4 on Aug. 10, 1968 failed when Centaur ignition did

not occur and the spacecraft and second stage did not separate.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 45

Table 1-49.

Proposed Atlas-Vega Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage Total

(modified Atlas) (optional)

Height (m): 18.6

Diameter (m): 3

Launch weight (kg): 117 910

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized."

Remarks:

See also:

4.8 6.4 29.9

3 3

14 512 2268 134 690

2.5 or 3.5

MA-5 GE 405H-2 JPL design

propulsion system

1 601 280 155 680 26 688 1 783 648

LOX/RP- 1 LOX/RP-I solid

2177 kg to 555 km earth orbit

476 kg to escape trajectory (with 3d stage)

227 kg to lunar orbit (with 3d stage)

NASA design

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. (Convair/General Dynamics), Atlas

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., Atlas engines, Consolidated

Vultee Aircraft Corp., (Convair/General Dynamics), Vega

General Electric, 2d-stag6 engine

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 3d-stage engine

General purpose "interim" launch vehicle to be used for a variety of missions until

Atlas-Centaur became operational.

Dropped in favor of DoD-sponsored Atlas-Agena B.

Atlas D/Atlas SLV-3.

Table 1-50.

Chronology of Atlas-Vega Development

Date Event

Fall 1958

Dec. 15, 1958

Jan. 30, 1959

March 18, 1959

March 18, 1959

April 4, 1959

Oct. 13, 1959

Dec. 11, 1959

Vega design was conceived by NASA engineers as an interim upper stage to

be used with Atlas booster for a variety of unmanned and manned missions

until Atlas-Centaur was available.

Atlas-Vega design was proposed by NASA in an interagency meeting on U.S.

launch vehicles; it was described as a three-stage vehicle with a thrust of nearly two million newtons.

Funds were made available to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for third stage

development.

Convair, General Dynamics Corp., was awarded the prime contract for

Atlas-Vega development and production.

General Electric Co. was awarded a contract for the second stage engine.

Launch schedule plan was adopted for Vega, with the first flight set for Aug.

1960.

Civilian-Military Liaison Committee recommended that the Vega stage be

dropped in favor of the DoD-sponsored Agena B.

Vega was cancelled in favor of Agena B, which had a similar payload capacity and development schedule.
46 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Juno 1 and II

NASA adopted the Juno I and Juno II military vehicles to launch its early Explorer satellites and probes. Juno I, made from a modified Jupiter C, successfully

launched the first American satellite, Explorer 1, for the Army in 1957. Juno I was

transferred to NASA shortly after the civilian agency was established and was used

only once unsuccessfully before it was replaced by Juno II. An extended Jupiter intermediate ballistic missile served as Juno II's booster stage. NASA used Juno II in

1958-1961 with poor results: only 3 successful missions in 10 attempts. NASA's own

Scout launch vehicle replaced Juno as the primary launcher for the Explorer series. 7

Table 1-51.

Juno I Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage 4th stage Total

(modified (w/payload)

Redstone)

Height (m): 17.1 approx. 1.2 approx. 1.2 approx. 1.5 21

Diameter (m): 1.8

Launch weight (kg): 28 828 575 244 varied with approx. 30 000

payload

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: Rocketdyne 11 scaled-down 3 scaled-down 1 scaled-down

A-7 Sergeants, Sergeants, Sergeant

clustered clustered

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors."

How utilized:

Remarks."

See also."

369 184 73 392 24 019 8006 474 601

LOX/ solid solid solid

hydrazine

18 kg to 555 km earth orbit

Developed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

Chrysler, prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., lst-stage engine Jet Propulsion

Laboratory, upper-stage engines

To launch early Explorer satellites.

Juno I is sometimes incorrectly referred to as Jupiter C, which was a three-stage

launch vehicle used by the Army for reentry nose cone tests. Juno 1 is an adaptation

of Jupiter C.

Mercury-Redstone and Juno I1.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 47

Table 1-52.

Chronology of Juno I Development and Operations

Date Event

Sept. 20, 1956

Nov. 8, 1957

Jan. 31, 1958

March 5, 1958

March 26, 1958

July 26, 1958

Aug. 24, 1958

Oct. 21, 1958

Oct. 22, 1958

The Army conducted the first long-range firing of Jupiter C, a three-stage

vehicle (Redstone, plus two solid-fuel upper stages). Jupiter C was used for

missile nose cone reentry tests by the Army.

The Army was directed to launch a scientific satellite for the International

Geophysical Year with a modified Jupiter C with an added fourth stage, a

single Sergeant motor. This launch vehicle became known as Juno.

Launch of Explorer 1, the first American satellite, by the Army Ballistic

Missile Agency was successful.

Launch of Explorer 2 was unsuccessful due to fourth-stage malfunction.

Launch of Explorer 3 was successful.

Launch of Explorer 4 was successful.

Launch of Explorer 5 was unsuccessful; satellite failed to achieve orbit.

Juno was transferred to NASA.

Launch of Beacon 1, a suborbital atmospheric physics test developed by

Langley Research Center, was unsuccessful due to premature upper stage

separation.

Table 1-53.

Juno II Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage 4th stage Total

(extended (w/payload)

Jupiter)

Height (m): 19.6

Diameter (m): 2.7

Launch weight (kg): 49 000

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: Rocketdyne

5-30

approx. 1.2 approx. 1.2 approx. 1.5 23.5

575 244 varied 50 111

4

11 scaled-down 3 scaled-down 1 scaled-down

Sergeants, Sergeants, Sergeant

clustered clustered

Thrust (newtons):

Propellan t:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized."

Remarks:

See also:

667 200 66 720 17 792 7117 758 829

LOX/ solid solid solid

RP-1

45 kg to 555 km earth orbit

20 kg to escape trajectory

Upgraded Juno I, which was developed by the Army.

Chrysler, prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., lst-stage engine

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, upper-stage engines

To launch Explorer scientific satellites.

Jupiter IRBM propellant capacity was increased by extending the booster section

and fuel tanks by 0.9 meter.

Juno I.
48 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-54.

Chronology of Juno II Development and Operations

Date Event

1955

March 1957

Sept. 1958

Oct. 21, 1958

Dec. 6, 1958

March 3, 1959

July 16, 1959

Aug. 14, 1959

Oct. 13, 1959

March 23, 1960

Aug. 1960

Nov. 3, 1960

Feb. 24, 1961

April 27, 1961

May 24, 1961

Work began on the Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missile by the Army

Ballistic Missile Agency.

First Jupiter IRBM flight tests.

Chrysler delivered first flight qualification missile to Army Ballistic Missile

Agency. Jupiter was named as the new booster stage for the Juno launch

vehicle, which was redesignated Juno 11.

NASA adopted the Juno 11 vehicle.

Launch of Pioneer3 lunar probe was unsuccessful due to several launch vehicle malfunctions that prevented the spacecraft from escaping earth orbit.

Launch of Pioneer 4 was unsuccessful; the probe was put into heliocentric

rather than lunar orbit when the second stage fired too long.

Launch of Explorer probe was unsuccessful; the vehicle was destroyed shortly after launch when it deviated sharply from its course.

Launch of Beacon 2 was unsuccessful due to booster and attitude control

system malfunctions.

Launch of Explorer 7 was successful.

Launch of Explorer probe was unsuccessful due to upper stage malfunction.

Marshall Space Flight Center assumed overall responsibility for Juno I1;

prior to this time JPL had shared the authority with Marshall.

Launch of Explorer 8 was successful.

Launch of Explorer probe was unsuccessful; the probe did not achieve proper

orbit.

Launch of Explorer 11 was successful.

Launch of Explorer probe was unsuccessful due to second-stage failure.

Little Joe I and Little Joe I1

NASA engineers designed Little Joe I and Little Joe II to serve as test vehicles

for two manned spacecraft projects. The two vehicles are not related, but were both

used to verify spacecraft abort systems and to simulate other mission phases.

Little Joe I, the airframes for which were manufactured by North American

Aviation, was first put on the launch pad at Wallops Island in August 1959 with a

boilerplate model of the Mercury capsule. In the event of a malfunctioning Redstone

or Atlas booster, Mercury astronauts would need an escape system. With Little Joe

I, this system was verified under a variety of conditions. Two of the eight payloads

carried biological payloads, as well. The last test took place in April 1961. For more

information see table 2-29.

Little Joe II served the Apollo program. Built by Convair/General Dynamics,

Little Joe I1 demonstrated the Apollo abort system at transonic, high-altitude, and

intermediate-altitude phases of launch. Four Apollo boilerplate models were

launched by the test vehicle in 1964-1966 at White Sands. (For more information see

table 2-51). 8
LAUNCH VEHICLES 49

Table 1-55.

Little Joe I Characteristics

Height (m): 16.8

Diameter (m): 2

Launch weight (kg): 18 140

Propulsion system

Stages: 1

Powerplant." 4 Thiokol Castors + 4 Thiokol Recruits

Thrust (newtons): 1 023 040

Propellant: solid

Payload capacity: 1814 kg on a 160 km ballistic path

Origin: NASA design

Contractors: North American Aviation, prime

Thiokol Chemical Corp., propulsion system

How utilized: Project Mercury manned capsule qualification tests (matched altitude that could be

reached with the Mercury-Redstone). Capsule escape system was tested at maximum

dynamic pressure; parachute system was qualified; search and retrieval methods

were verified.

Remarks: Designed exclusively for Project Mercury tests.

Table 1-56.

Chronology of Little Joe I Development and Operations

Date Event

Aug. 1958 NACA's Langley Research Center Pilotless Aircraft Research Division was

requested to prepare specifications for a vehicle capable of launching fullscale and full-weight manned spacecraft for tests to a maximum altitude of

160 kilometers.

Twelve companies responded to NASA's invitation for bids to construct Little Joe airframes.

North American Aviation was assigned the prime contract.

Thirty minutes before the first Little Joe scheduled launch (L J-l), the rocket

fired prematurely. Capsule and tower combination were launched on an offthe-pad abort trajectory.

North American completed shipment of the airframes.

Little Joe 6 (also called L J-I) launch was successful with a Mercury

boilerplate model.

Little' Joe IA (also called LJ-2) launch was successful with a Mercury

boilerplate model.

Little Joe 2 (also called L J-3) launch was successful with a Mercury

boilerplate model and a biological payload (a rhesus monkey).

Little Joe IB (also called LJ-4) launch was successfull with a Mercury

boilerplate model and a biological payload (a rhesus monkey).

Little Joe 5 launch with Mercury production capsule was unsuccessful;

escape rocket and tower jettison rocket ignited prematurely; booster, capsule, and tower did not separate.

Little Joe 5A (also called L J-6) launch with a production capsule was a partial success; the escape rocket fired prematurely.

Little Joe 5B (also called L J-7) launch with a production capsule was successful; two of the Castor motors carried ballast rather than propellant.

Nov. 1958

Dec. 29, 1958

Aug. 21, 1959

Sept. 25, 1959

Oct. 4, 1959

Nov. 4, 1959

Dec. 4, 1959

Jan. 21, 1960

Nov. 8, 1960

March 18, 1961

April 28, 1961
50 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-57.

Little Joe II Characteristics

Height (m): 10

Diameter (m): 3.9

Launch weight (kg): 25 924--63 368

Propulsion system

Stages: 1

Powerplant: 1 Aerojet-General Algol ID + 6 Thiokol Recruit TE-29s

Thrust(newtons):459034 + (148563×6=891 379) = 1 350413

Propellant: solid

Payload capacity: 12 69g kg to an altitude of 35 km on a ballistic path

Origin: NASA design

Contractors: General Dynamics/Convair, prime

Aerojet General, propulsion system Thiokol

Chemical Corp., propulsion system

How utilized." Simulations of flight conditions to be experienced during Apollo missions. Structural design and escape system of Apollo command module was tested under maximum aerodynamic conditions.

Remarks: Completely different design from Mercury's Little Joe 1, but used for the same kind

of program-testing of a spacecraft abort system and simulation of mission

characteristics. First U.S. launch vehicle to utilize a corrugated skin.

Table 1-58.

Chronology of Little Joe I1 Development and Operations

Date Event

June 1961

April 6, 1962

May 11, 1962

Feb. 18, 1963

July 16, 1963

Aug. 28, 1963

May 13, 1964

Dec. 8, 1964

May 19, 1965

Jan. 20, 1966

Apollo engineers suggested using a fin-stabilized, clustered-rocket, solid propellant booster for boilerplate flight tests of Apollo.

A request for proposals was issued for the production of an Apollo test

launch vehicle.

Convair/General Dynamics was selected to develop the Little Joe vehicle; a

letter contract was awarded.

A definitive contract was negotiated with Convair/General Dynamics.

Convair delivered the first flight vehicle to the White Sands test facility.

The first launch of Little Joe II demonstrated the overall capability of the

vehicle for Apollo simulations.

Launch of A-001 (Apollo Transonic Abort) with Apollo boilerplate was successful.

Launch of A-002 (Apollo Max q Abort) with Apollo boilerplate was successful.

Launch of A-003 (Apollo High Altitude Abort) with Apollo boilerplate was

unsuccessful. However, the launch escape system took the boilerplate safely

away from the malfunctioning launch vehicle, which was what the mission

was designed to accomplish.

Launch of A-004 (Intermediate Altitude Abort) with Apollo boilerplate was

successful.
Mercury-Redstone

LAUNCH VEHICLES 51

Project Mercury, the first step in the NASA manned spaceflight program, was

undertaken to prove that one man could safely orbit earth and return to a predetermined point. The Atlas missile was being modified to boost astronauts to orbit, but

a less powerful, less expensive vehicle was required for the manned ballistic tests that

would precede orbital flight. Two of the Army's missiles became candidates for the

role.

In October 1958, days after the space agency was officially opened for business,

NASA requested eight Redstone and three Jupiter missiles from the Army for Project Mercury. In the interest of simplifying launch operations, the requirement for

Jupiter was soon dropped. Redstone was modified for manned use by Chrysler Corporation, its manufacturer, and was ready for verification tests by late 1960. A

chimpanzee was Mercury-Redstone's first passenger. In 1961, two missions were

launched successfully with astronauts on board. (For more information see chapter

2 under Mercury.) 9

Table 1-59.

Mercury-Redstone Characteristics

Height (m):

Diameter (m):

Launch weight (kg):

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Con tractors:

How util&ed:

Remarks:

See also:

18 (25.3 w/spacecraft)

1.8

29 931

1

Rocketdyne A-7

346 944

LOX/RP-1

1814 kg to an altitude of 189 km on a ballistic path.

Army ballistic missile.

Chrysler Corp., prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American Aviation, Inc., engine

Project Mercury launch vehicle for ballistic shots.

First large ballistic missile developed by the U.S. Redstone propellant

tanks elongated for Mercury.

Juno I.
52 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-60.

Chronology of Mercury-Redstone Development and Operations

Date Event

1950

March 27, 1951

May 1, 1951

April 8, 1952

Oct. 28, 1952

Aug. 20, 1953

June 18, 1958

Oct. 6, 1958

Jan. 8, 1959

Jan. 1960

July 1, 1960

Aug. 3, 1960

Nov. 21, 1960

Dec. 19, 1960

Jan. 31, 1961

March 24, 1961

May 5, 1961

July 21, 1961

June 1964

The Army's Guided Missile Center recommended further development of the

proposed Hermes CI surface-to-surface missile and the North American

XLR43-NA-1 engine to meet Department of the Army's requirements for a

tactical missile system.

Contract was awarded to North American to modify their engine for the

missile system.

A development program was begun for a new missile.

The new missile was assigned the name Redstone.

Chrysler was issued a letter contract as prime contractor for Redstone production.

First R&D flight test.

First operational deployment.

Tentative agreement was reached between NASA and the Army Ordnance

Missile Command whereby the Army would supply 10 Redstones and 3

Jupiters for NASA's manned program.

NASA supplied funds to the Army Ordnance Missile Command for 8

Redstones; the Army Ballistic Missile Agency began production planning of

Mercury-Redstone.

First Mercury-Redstone static test firing.

Authority for the Mercury-Redstone was transferred from the Army Ballistic

Missile Agency to Marshall Space Flight Center.

Mercury-Redstone I arrived at Cape Canaveral.

Launch of MR-I was unsuccessful due to premature booster cutoff.

Launch of MR-IA to qualify abort system and spacecraft-launch vehicle

combination was successful.

Launch of MR-2 with a biological payload (chimpanzee) was successful, but

a malfunction caused the engine to operate at a higher thrust level, which

caused the capsule to impact beyond the target area.

Launch of MR-BD (Booster Development) was successful.

Launch of MR-3 with a man aboard was successful.

Launch of MR-4 with a man aboard was successful.

Redstone missile program was deactivated.
Nova

LAUNCH VEHICLES 53

Nova was proposed by early NASA advanced planners as a "super booster,"

capable of sending large spacecraft directly to the moon and beyond. Ten powerful

F-1 engines would make up its first stage; a nuclear engine was being considered for

the third stage. Four major aerospace companies were studying designs for the giant

launcher in the early 1960s.

Also under development at this time was the Saturn family of vehicles.

Managers at NASA Headquarters and at the Marshall Space Flight Center recognized that the agency could not afford both. In July 1962, NASA chose the lunar

rendezvous mode for Apollo, the agency's manned lunar program, over direct ascent, cancelling any immediate need for Nova. Saturn would serve Apollo's needs.

Although studies of possible Nova configurations and missions continued for two

more years, hardware design and development were never commenced, l0

Table 1-61.

Proposed Nova Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage Total

Height (m): 35

Diameter (m): 15-18

Launch weight (kg):

Propulsion system:

Stages:

Po werplant

(example A):

107-114

4 530000-

5 436000

Sever_ configurations were proposed that would use F-l, M-l, J-2, solidpropellant, or nuclear engines.

8-10

Rocketdyne

F-Is

Thrust (newtons): 53 376 000-

66 720 000

or

Powerplant 10-12

(example B): Rocketdyne

F-Is

Thrust (newtons): 66 720 000-

80064000

Propellant: LOX/RP-1

Origin: NASA design

Contract ors

for design

study:

How utilized:

Remarks:

1-2 I

Aerojet General Rocketdyne

M-ls J-2

5 337 600- 889 600 59 603 200-

10 675 200 78 284 800

or oi"

10 nuclear

Rocketdyne engine

J -2s

8 896 000 undefined undefined

LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 or

nuclear

General Dynamics, Martin Marietta, Boeing, and Douglas

Proposed for manned missions to the moon and for planetary flights.

Operational target for this super-booster was 1970.
54 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-62.

Chronology of Nova Development

Date Event

Jan. 1959

Aug. 1959

Early 1961

Aug. 1961

Jan. 24, 1962

March 28, 1962

July 1962

July 11, 1962

Oct. 1, 1962

1963-1964

Nova was officially proposed by NASA to serve as a "super rocket" more

powerful than the Saturn; it would utilize a 6 700 000-newton thrust singlechamber engine under development by the Air Force. Nova would be capable

of direct ascent to the moon. Rocketdyne was awarded a contract by NASA

for F-I engine development.

Launch vehicle managers at NASA Headquarters recognized the possibility

of conflicts between Saturn and Nova proponents.

The yon Braun team indicated that NASA would be overextended if it pursued development of both Saturn C-2 and Nova.

First open test firing of the F-I engine.

NASA awarded a contract for M-I engine development to Aerojet-General.

Marshall Space Flight Center issued a request for proposals for Nova systems

definition and preliminary design.

General Dynamics and Martin Marietta were chosen for Nova study contracts.

NASA endorsed the Saturn C-5 and the lunar rendezvous mode for its first

lunar program, thereby cancelling an immediate need for Nova.

Martin Marietta was awarded a Nova launch facilities study contract.

Nova studies were continued as part of post-Saturn planning funded by Marshall's Future Projects Office, but no large booster beyond the Saturn class

was seriously considered by NASA.

The Saturn Family

Wernher von Braun's earliest proposals to the U.S. Army were for large

clustered-engine rockets. With such a vehicle, heavy payloads could be put into orbit

or spacecraft could reach the moon. The Advanced Research Projects Agency approved plans for an Army Ballistic Missile Agency clustered-engine booster in

August 1958. Von Braun's multistage vehicle was called Juno.

The first contracts let for Juno were to the engine maker. Rocketdyne (later a

division of North American Aviation) set to work uprating its Thor-Jupiter engine

(H-l) and developing an even larger powerplant, the F-1 (also being considered for

the proposed Nova vehicle). In November 1959, NASA assumed management

responsibility for the large booster program, which had been redesignated Saturn.

The agency soon recommended that long-range development include a family of

Saturn launch vehicles. By the summer of 1962, Saturn had a firm assignment: it

would boost Apollo astronauts to the moon.

The first member of the family was the two-stage Saturn I (originally called

Saturn C-I). Powered by engines made at Rocketdyne and Pratt & Whitney, both

stages were flight tested in a 1964 launch. Five Apollo boilerplate models were

launched by Saturn I in 1964-1965 as a step toward qualifying the spacecraft for

manned flight.
LAUNCH VEHICLES 55

Saturn IB (also called C-1B and Uprated Saturn) was a step closer to the vehicle

required for lunar missions. Used to perform the earth-orbital phase of Apollo, it

depended on nine Rocketdyne engines in its two stages. Saturn IB helped qualify the

Apollo spacecraft three times in 1966 and 1968. On October 11, 1968, it boosted

Apollo 7 with a crew of three astronauts into orbit.

Plans for Saturn V (also called Saturn C-5), NASA's largest launch vehicle, were

officially approved in January 1962. Powered by 11 Rocketdyne engines, its first

launch took place in 1967. Saturn V's three stages sent an Apollo spacecraft to lunar

orbit for the first time in December 1968 (Apollo 8). This reliable vehicle would be

used in the next decade of NASA's operations for lunar exploration and Apollo applications (Skylab) missions.

The Marshall Space Flight Center oversaw the work of many Saturn contractors. The major ones were Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation

(Saturn I first-stage propulsion, Saturn IB first- and second-stage propulsion, and

Saturn V first-, second-, and third-stage propulsion, plus Saturn V second-stage airframe), Chrysler Corporation (Saturn I first-stage airframe, Saturn IB first-stage

airframe), Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company (Saturn I second-stage propulsion),

Douglas Aircraft Corporation (Saturn I second-stage airframe, Saturn IB secondstage airframe, Saturn V third-stage airframe), and Boeing Company (Saturn V

first-stage airframe). _]

APOLLO

;-"_i / SPACECRAFT

_# INSTRUMENT

::T

_.1 _/" BOOSTER

i Itlrl_ s,

BOOSTER

•APOLLO

f1_ SPACECRAFT

LEM

ADAPTER T

r

--, I/.I

APOLLO

SPACECRAFT

LEM

ADAPTER

¢/ INSTRUMENT

UNIT

S-IVB

BOOSTER

J S-II

BOOSTER

S-IC

BOOSTER

SATURN I SATURN II SATURN V

Height (m): 57.9 68.3 111

Figure 1-3. Comparison of Three Saturn Launch Vehicles

Source: From Courtney G. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Chariots for Apollo; A History of Manned

Lunar Spacecraft, NASA SP-4205 (Washington, 1979), p. 93.
56 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-63.

Saturn I Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage Instrument Total w/

(S-I) (S-IV) Unit spacecraft & tower

Height (m): 25

Diameter (m): 6.5

Launch weight (kg): 385 475

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: 8 Rocketdyne H-Is

Thrust (newtons): 6 672 000

Propellant: LOX/RP-1

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Con tractors:

12 0.86 57.9

5.6 4

45 350 1179 453 500

2

6 Pratt & Whitney

RL-10A3s

400 320

LOX/LH2

9070 kg in 555 km earth orbit

How utilized:

Army Ballistic Missile Agency (von Braun team) design

North American Aviation, first-stage propulsion

Chrysler, first stage

Pratt & Whitney, second-stage propulsion

Douglas, second stage

Remarks:

See also:

7 072 320

First step toward perfecting the Saturn V vehicle for lunar missions. Used in

qualification tests of the Apollo spacecraft.

Briefly referred to as Juno V.

Saturn IB and Saturn V.

Table 1-64.

Chronology of Saturn I Development and Operations

Date Event

April 1957

Dec. 1957

Aug. 15, 1958

Sept. 11, 1958

Oct. 1958

Dec. 1958

Jan. 9, 1959

Feb. 3, 1959

April 28, 1959

Nov. 18, 1959

Dec. 1959

Studies were begun by the Army's yon Braun team at Redstone Arsenal on

darge boosters capable of launching 9070 to 18 140 kilograms into orbit or

2721 to 5442 kilograms to an escape trajectory.

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency proposed to DoD a booster capable of

6 672 000 newtons of thrust with a cluster of four Rocketdyne engines.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) authorized the Army

Ballistic Missile Agency to conduct an R&D program at Redstone for a

6 672 000-newton booster (unofficially known as Juno V).

Contract was awarded to Rocketdyne to update the Thor-Jupiter engine,

which became the H-I.

ARPA tentatively identified the advanced multistage launch vehicle as Juno

V.

First full-power H-I engine firing.

Rocketdyne was awarded a contract to develop a larger single-chamber

engine, the F-I.

ARPA officially named the project Saturn.

First production H-I engine was delivered to the Army Ballistic Missile

Agency.

NASA assumed technical direction of Saturn.

ARPA and NASA requested an engineering study for a three-stage Saturn

from the Army Ordnance Missile Command.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 57

Table 1--64.

Chronology of Saturn I Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Dec. 15, 1959

Jan. 18, 1960

March 16, 1960

March 28, 1960

April 26, 1960

July 1, 1960

Aug. 10, 1960

Oct. 21, 1960

Feb. 1961

March 1961

April 29, 1961

June 1961

July 1961

Sept. 15, 1961

Oct. 27, 1961

Nov. 6, 1961

Nov. 17, 1961

Nov. 19, 1961

April 25, 1962

May 1962

Aug. 6, 1962

Nov. 16, 1962

Feb. 1963

March 28, 1963

June 1963

Oct. 30, 1963

Saturn Vehicle Evaluation Committee recommended a long-range development program for a family of Saturn launch vehicles, the first to be called

C-1.

The Saturn project was formally approved and given the highest national

priority.

Saturn transfer to NASA became official.

First live firing of Saturn test booster.

NASA awarded Douglas Aircraft Co. a contract to develop the Saturn second stage (S-IV).

Program was formally transferred to the Marshall Space Flight Center.

NASA awarded a contract to Pratt & Whitney to develop the LR-119 engine

for the S-IV and S-V stages of the C-I vehicle.

NASA awarded a study contract to Convair for the S-V upper stage, but the

requirement for an S-V stage on the C-I was dropped in Jan. 1961.

First horizontal assembly of a complete C-I vehicle.

Marshall redirected Pratt & Whitney's development of the LR-119; instead,

the RL 10-A-1 would be used for Centaur and the S-IV stage.

First flight qualification test of SA-I booster was successful.

Contract was awarded to Chrysler for the management of the quality and

reliability testing program required to qualify the various Saturn booster

components.

Rocketdyne static fired the F-1 engine. Contracts were awarded to General

Dynamics, Douglas, Lockheed, and Martin Marietta to study a nuclearpowered upper stage for Saturn.

SA-I vehicle was completely assembled on the launch pedestal at launch complex 34, Cape Canaveral.

SA-1 launch was almost flawless (first stage test only; dummy second stage).

S-I1 stage was redesigned to incorporate five J-2 engines.

Chrysler Corp. was selected to build 20 S-I boosters.

RL-10 engine was successfully tested (first U.S. liquid hydrogen engine).

SA-2 launch was successful (first-stage test only; second stage was filled with

water-called Project Highwater).

S-II stage was lengthened from 22.9 meters to 24.8 meters; S-IC stage was

shortened from 43 meters to 42 meters.

Chrysler was awarded a contract to produce 21 C-I boosters.

SA-3 launch was successful (first-stage test only).

Saturn C-1 was renamed Saturn I.

SA-4 launch was successful (first-stage test only).

Dynamics test of S-IV stage with Apollo boilerplate and launch escape system

was completed.

Saturn 1 manned missions were dropped from NASA's plans, thereby

deleting the need for six Saturn I vehicles. Later that winter a third Pegasus

meteoroid detector satellite mission was planned for the 10th Saturn I launch.
58 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table1-64.

Chronologyof SaturnI DevelopmentandOperations(Continued)

Date Event

Oct.31,1963

Jan.29,1964

May28,1964

Sept.18,!964

Feb.16,1965

May25,1965

July30,1965

MarshallreceivedthefirstproductionmodelF-1engine.

SA-5launchwasuccessfulwithivefirstandsecondstages.

SA-6launchwasuccessfulwiththeguidancesystemactiveforthefirstime

andanApolloboilerplatemodelincludedintheconfiguration.

SA-7launchwithApolloboilerplatecommandandservicemoduleswasuccessful.SaturnI wasdeclaredoperational.

SA-9launchwithApolloboflerplateandPegasus 1 meteoroid detection

satellite was successful.

SA-8 launch with Apollo boilerplate and Pegasus 2 was successful (first

contractor-built S-I stage).

SA-10 launch with Apollo boilerplate and Pegasus 3 was successful; this

marked the conclusion of the Saturn I program.

Table 1-65.

Saturn IB Characteristics

I st stage

(S-IB)

2d stage Instrument Total w/

(S-IVB) Unit spacecraft & tower

Height (m): 24.5 17.8

Diameter (m): 6.5 6.6

Launch weight (kg): 401 348 103 852

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: 8 Rocketdyne H-Is 1 Rocketdyne J-2

Thrust (newtons): 7 116 800 1 000 800

Propellant: LOX/RP-1 LOX/LH2

Payload capacity: 16 598 kg to 195 km earth orbit

Origin: Uprated Saturn 1.

Contractors:

How utilized:

0.9 68.3

6.6

1859 589 550

North American Aviation, first-stage propulsion

Chrysler, first stage

North American, second-stage propulsion

Douglas, second stage

Remarks:

See also:

8 117 600

To further qualify the Apollo spacecraft and the Saturn stages required for the lunar

missions; also used for astronaut training.

Called Uprated Saturn 1 from May 1966 through 1967.

Saturn 1 and Saturn V.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 59

Table 1-66.

Chronology of Saturn 1B Development and Operations

Date Event

March 31, 1961

May 1961

June 23, 1961

Dec. 21, 1961

July 11, 1962

Feb. 1963

Aug. 1963

Oct. 30, 1963

Nov. 8, 1963

Nov. 27, 1963

June 1964

April 1, 1965

July 1965

Aug. 9, 1965

Sept. 19, 1965

Oct. 1, 1965

Oct. 28, 1965

Dec. 26, 1965

Feb. 26, 1966

May 6, 1966

May 19, 1966

July 5, 1966

Aug. 25, 1966

Jan. 22, 1968

Jan. 1968

Oct. 11, 1968

NASA approved the accelerated development of the Saturn C-2 vehicle.

Reexamination of the C-2 configuration to support lunar circumnavigation

indicated a need for a Saturn with greater performance capability.

Design work on C-2 was discontinued in favor of C-3 and Nova concepts.

Douglas was selected to modify the second stage (S-IVB) by installing a single

J-2 engine capable of 889 600 newtons thrust.

NASA announced the need for a new t_'o-stage Saturn for manned earthorbital missions with full-scale Apollo spacecraft.

Saturn C-IB was renamed Saturn IB.

Contracts were awarded to Chrysler for the S-IB stage and to Douglas for the

S-IVB stage.

Speedup of Saturn 1B development was approved.

Marshall Space Flight Center directed Rocketdyne to develop an uprated H-I

engine.

First extended-duration firing test of J-2 engine.

Rocketdyne delivered the first four uprated H-I engines.

First stage was successfully static-fired for the first time; Rocketdyne was

authorized to increase the H-l's capability to 911 840 newtons.

Rocketdyne initiated a development program to uprate the thrust capability

of the J-2 engine to 1 023 040 newtons.

Chrysler shipped the first IB booster to Kennedy Space Center.

First IVB stage arrived at Kennedy.

Stages were mated at launch complex 34.

Rocketdyne delivered to Chrysler the first two H-1 uprated engines.

An Apollo spacecraft was added to the launch vehicle; together they were

designated AS-201.

Launch of AS-201 was successful (suborbital test of Apollo command

module heat shield).

First uprated J-2 engine arrived at Marshall.

Saturn IB was renamed Uprated Saturn I.

Launch of AS-203 without a spacecraft was successful (observation of liquid

hydrogen in zero gravity).

Launch of AS-202 was successful (test of command module heat shield).

Launch of Apollo 5 (AS-204) with lunar module was successful.

Uprated Saturn I was officially designated Saturn IB.

Launch of Apollo 7 (AS-205) with crew of three was successful.
60 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-67.

Saturn V Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage Instrument Total w/

(S-IC) (S-II) (S-IVB) Unit spacecraft &

tower

Height (m): 42.1

Diameter (m): 10.1

Launch weight (kg): 2 076 123

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

24.9 17.9 0.9 111

10.1 6.6 6.6

437 628 105 212 2041 2 621 004

3

5 5 1

Rocketdyne Rocketdyne Rocketdyne J-2

F-Is J-2s

33 360 000 5 004 000 1 023 040

LOX/RP-I LOX/LH_ LOX/LH2

129 248 kg to 195 km earth orbit

45 350 kg to escape trajectory

Uprated Saturn lB.

North American, lst-, 2d-, and 3d-stage propulsion and 2d

stage Boeing, 1st stage, Douglas, 3d stage

To launch Apollo lunar missions.

Called Saturn C-5 in 1961-1962.

Saturn 1 and Saturn lB.

39 387 040
LAUNCHVEHICLES

Table1-68.

ChronologyofSaturnVDevelopmentadOperations

61

Date Event

Sept. 11, 1961

Nov. 10, 1961

Dec. 15, 1961

Dec. 21, 1961

Jan. 25, 1962

Feb. 9, 1962

Mid-May 1962

Aug. 6, 1962

Aug. 8, 1962

Aug. 15, 1962

Feb. 1963

May 1963

April 23, 1966

Aug. 26, 1966

Jan. 21, 1967

Jan. 27, 1967

April 27, 1967

May1967

June 1967

July 11, 1967

Aug. 3, 1967

Aug. 26, 1967

Nov. 9, 1967

April 4, 1968

Dec. 21, 1968

NASA selected North American to develop and build the S-I! stage for an advanced Saturn.

NASA received proposals from five firms for the development and production of advanced Saturn boosters.

Boeing was selected as the most likely candidate for prime contractor of the

S-IC stage of advanced Saturn.

Douglas was selected to modify the second stage of Saturn IB by installing a

single J-2 engine of 889 600 newtons thrust. Called the S-IVB stage, it would

be used as the third stage in the advanced Saturn.

NASA approved the development of the three-stage Saturn C-5 for the

manned lunar program.

Preliminary contract was awarded to North American to design and fabricate

the S-II stage of C-5.

Marshall Space Flight Center directed Douglas to increase the diameter of the

S-IVB stage to 6.6 meters.

Boeing was awarded a contract for the development of the C-5 booster.

Douglas was awarded a contract for 11 S-IVB stages.

Rocketdyne was awarded a contract to continue H-1 engine R&D.

Saturn C-5 was renamed Saturn V.

The J-2 engine was successfully fired for the first time.

First captive firing of Saturn V second stage test vehicle, which developed

more than 4 million newtons of thrust.

First Saturn V flight booster was shipped to Kennedy Space Center.

First S-If stage arrived at Kennedy.

Jet Propulsion Laboratory issued a request for proposals for preliminary

design studies of unmanned Voyager missions to Mars to be launched by

Saturn V.

Saturn upper stage model outfitted as a manned orbital workshop arrived at

Marshall.

S-IVB orbital workshop design review was held at Marshall.

AS-501 was erected.

First and second stages of AS-502 were mated.

Successful completion of Apollo-Saturn V dynamic test program.

Rollout of first Saturn V vehicle, the AS-501, at Kennedy.

Launch of Apollo 4 (AS-501) was successful.

Launch of Apollo 6 (AS-502) was partially successful (premature secondstage engine shutdown and third-stage failure to restart).

Launch of Apollo 8 (AS-504) with crew of three was successful; the

spacecraft orbited the moon.

Scout

Scout was NASA's most frequently used small launch vehicle. A product of the

Langley Research Center, its development was initiated in 1957 when the laboratory

was part of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Scout's designers

created a vehicle that depended on off-the-shelf components and a small budget; accordingly, it was dubbed the "poor man's rocket." Both NASA and the Air Force

recognized the importance of the solid-fuel Scout for launching small payloads and

pushed for its early completion. Vought Astronautics of Chance Vought Aircraft
62 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

(later Ling-Temco-Vought, Incorporated), the prime contractor, delivered the first

four-stage Scout to Wallops Island in 1960.

NASA used Scout to launch more than a score of Explorer-class satellites and

probes, small payloads with scientific objectives, in 1961-1968. But Scout's design

was not static. In 1962, its first and third stages were upgraded with new engines, as

was the fourth stage in 1963. In response to requests from the military for more

reliability and in anticipation of an increased demand for a small-satellite launcher,

NASA further improved the second and fourth stages in 1965. Scout's payload

capacity had more than doubled by 196512

Table 1-69.

Scout Characteristics (as of 1968)

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage 4th stage Total

(Algol liB) (Castor 11) (Antares II) (Altair I11)

Height (m): 9.1

Diameter (m): 1

Launch weight (kg): 10 771

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: AerojetGeneral

Thrust (newtons): 449 248

Propellant: solid

6.2 2.9 1.5 21.9

0.8 0.7 0.5

4429 1260 300 16 780

4

Thiokol Hercules UTC

TX 354 ABL X-259 FW-4S

271 328 93 408 25 798 839 782

solid solid solid

Payload capacity: 145 kg to 555 km earth orbit

45 kg to an altitude of 8000-9600 km

Origin: Pilotless Aircraft Research Division, Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory,

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

Contractors: Vought Astronautics Div., Chance Vought Aircraft (Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.),

prime

Aerojet-General, first-stage propulsion

Thiokol Chemical Corp., second-stage propulsion

Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory, Hercules Powder Co., third- and fourth-stage propulsion

United Technology Center, fourth-stage propulsion

How utilized: To launch Explorer and other small scientific satellites, including a number of international payloads.

Remarks: As NASA's first launch vehicle program of its own, the emphasis was on off-theshelf components; Scout was thus dubbed the "poor man's rocket."

Scout was upgraded several times from 1960 to 1968 (see table 1-70).
LAUNCHVEHICLES 63

c5

I"--

i

Fr.-.r

wE

'..D

O',

6

',D

e-, O',

0'3

8

',,D

_ <_ -_.

E

=_" c,

.-_ t"4

eq eq "q

_J

e-

_ _ ___
64 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-71.

Listing of Scout Vehicles

Vehicle Date Mission Successful

Serial # Launch*

ST-I July 1, 1960 R&D launch

ST-2 Oct. 4, 1960 R&D launch

ST-3 Dec. 4, 1960 Beacon satellite

ST-4 Feb. 16, 1961 Explorer 9

ST-5 June 30, 1961 S-55 satellite

ST-6 Aug. 25, 1961 Explorer 13

ST-7 Oct. 19, 1961 P-21 probe

ST-8 March 1, 1962 R&D launch (plus Reentry

Heating Experiment 1)

ST-9 March 29, 1962 P-21A

P-21A probe

S-110 July 20, 1963 Reentry Heating

Experiment 3

S-113 June 28, 1963 NASA launch of Air Force

geophysics research payload

S-114 Aug. 31, 1962 R&D launch (plus Reentry

Heating Experiment 2)

S-115 Dec. 16, 1962 Explorer 16

S-116 May 22, 1963 RFD-I (Reentry Flight

Demonstration) for AEC

S-122R Dec. 19, 1963 Explorer 19

S-123RR Oct. 9, 1964 Explorer 22

S-124R July 20, 1964 SERT 1

S-127 March 27, 1964 Ariel 2

S-129R Aug. 18, 1964 Reentry Heating

Experiment 4

S-130R Oct. 9, 1964 RFD-2 for AEC

S-131R Aug. 10, 1965 R&D launch

S-133R Nov. 6, 1964 Explorer 23

S-134R Aug. 25, 1964 Explorer 20

S-135R Nov. 21, 1964 Explorer 24 and 25

S-136R April 29, 1965 Explorer 27

S-137R Dec. 15, 1964 San Marco I

S-138R Nov. 18, 1965 Explorer 30

S-139R Dec. 6, 1965 FR-I French satellite

Partial (4th-stage separation incomplete)

Yes

No (2d-stage failure)

Yes

No (3d-stage failure)

Partial (orbit life of

satellite reduced by 4thstage malfunction)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No (lst-stage failure)

Yes

No (3d-stage failure)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
LAUNCHVEHICLES 65

Table 1-71.

Listing of Scout Vehicles (Continued)

Vehicle Date Mission Successful

Serial # Launch

S-141C Feb. 9, 1966 Reentry Heating Experiment 5 Yes

S-147C June 10, 1966 NASA launch of Air Force OV3- Yes

IV research satellite

S-152C May 29, 1967 ESRO 2A

S-155C May 5, 1967 Ariel 3

S-159C Oct. 19, 1967 RAM C-1

S-160C March 5, 1968 Explorer 37

S-161C May 16, 1968 ESRO 2B (IRIS)

S-164C April 27, 1968 Reentry Heating

Experiment 6

S-165C Aug. 8, 1968 Explorer 39 and 40

S-167C Oct. 3, 1968 ESRO 1 (Aurorae)

S-168C Aug. 22, 1968 RAM C-2

No (4th-stage failure;

payload did not achieve

orbit)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

*5 failures out of 39 attempts (87% successful).
66 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-72.

Chronology of Scout Development and Operations

Date Event

July 1957

Summer 1958

Aug. 11, 1958

Oct. 1958

Oct.-Dec. 1958

Feb. 27, 1959

March 1959

March 1, 1959

April 1959

April 18, 1960

July 1, 1960

Oct. 4, 1960

Dec. 4, 1960

Feb. 16, 1961

March 1961

June 30, 1961-

Oct. 3, 1968

Nov. 1, 1961

1962

March 29, 1962

Aug. 31, 1962

The Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARD) at NACA's Langley center

recognized the need to extend the performance capabilities of existing

research rockets.

A design for a new rocket was conceived by PARD.

Specifications for the rocket were drafted.

NASA assumed responsibility for Scout development.

Contracts were let for propulsion development.

Memorandum of understanding between NASA and the Air Force, which

was also developing a small all-solid-fueled launch vehicle was signed to

avoid duplication. NASA would have responsibility for Scout development

while the Air Force would make the necessary modifications it required to

Scout for military payloads.

Contracts with Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. and Aerojet-General

were announced by NASA.

NASA and the Air Force officially announced their joint Scout program; the

Air Force's version of the vehicle would be called Blue Scout.

Vought was awarded a contract for the airframes and the launch tower.

During a component test to analyze first- and third-stage performance, the

vehicle broke up after first-stage burnout.

First complete Scout launch from Wallops Station; fourth-stage separation

was not accomplished.

Scout R&D launch was successful.

Beacon satellite launch was unsuccessful due to second-stage failure.

Explorer 9 launch was successful (first satellite launch with Scout).

Decision was announced to increase the performance of Scout's third and

fourth stages, the work to be funded jointly by NASA and the Navy.

Scout was used by NASA to launch 18 orbital payloads and 7 ballistic experiments, plus 11 non-NASA payloads.

Launch of Mercury-Scout 1 (Mercury Network Test Vehicle or MNTV), a

small communications payload to verify the Project Mercury tracking network, was unsuccessful due to a technician's error; the vehicle was destroyed

43 seconds after launch.

First and third stages of Scout were upgraded.

Launch of P-21A probe was successful (first flight with X-259 engine).

Scout R&D launch to test an improved first stage (Algol liB) was unsuccessful due to a third-stage electrical malfunction.
LAUNCH VEHICLES 67

Table 1-72.

Chronology of Scout Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

1963

June 28, 1963

Nov. 1963

Nov. 21, 1964

1965

Aug. 10, 1965

Fourth stage was upgraded.

Launch of an Air Force research payload was successful (first flight of ABL

X-258 engine on fourth stage).

The Air Force and the Navy urged NASA to improve the reliability of Scout.

Two Explorer satellites were successfully launched with a single Scout.

Second and fourth stages were upgraded.

R&D launch to evaluate upgraded second and fourth stages was successful.

The Thor Family

Thor was developed in 1956 by Douglas Aircraft Company as an intermediate

range ballistic missile for the Air Force, but it also proved to be a most useful

booster for launching Air Force and NASA unmanned payloads to earth orbit. Not

a year went by during NASA's first decade that the agency did not make use of Thor

with either the Able, Agena, or Delta upper stage.

NASA used the Thor-Able combination only five times in 1958-1960, with three

successful launches. The Able stage was derived from the Vanguard vehicle by the

Air Force (see tables 1-76, 1-77). More successful was the Thor-Agena configuration, also initiated by the Air Force. NASA put Thor to work with Lockheed's

Agena B in 1962, replacing the upper stage with the improved restartable Agena D in

1966 (see tables 1-78 through 1-83). But Thor was most frequently launched with

Delta, a two-part vehicle designed by NASA engineers and produced by Douglas.

Together Thor and Delta went through 12 configuration changes over nine years (see

table 1-84). Delta's two stages were steadily improved; strap-on engines were added

to Thor (Thrust-Augmented Delta, or TAD); Thor was lengthened (Thorad); Delta's

second stage was omitted in two models. Thor-Delta, often called simply Delta, was

highly successful in launching Echo, Explorer, Tiros, Syncom, Orbiting Solar

Observatory, Intelsat, and other scientific and applications satellites: only 5 failures

in 63 attempts in 1960-1968 (see tables 1-85, 1-86).

Thor's powerplant was augmented by the addition of three strap-on solid-fuel

Thiokol engines, almost doubling the booster's thrust. This version of Thor was

used with Agena B, Agena D, and Delta. By stretching the Thor booster from 17 to

21.6 meters in length, Douglas gave the vehicle more propellant, increasing its burn

time. The thrust-augmented Thorad, as the lengthened Thor was called, was paired

with Agena D and Delta. The improved Thor-Delta was able to put Intelsat 3 communications satellites (286.7 kilograms) into geosynchronous orbit (approximately

35 000 kilometers) in 1968. _3
68 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-73.

Thor Characteristics

Height (m): 17

Diameter (m): 2.4

Launch weight (kg): 48 978

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

1

Rocketdyne

MB-1 Basic

LR79-NA-9

676 096

LOX/RP-1

243 kg to an altitude of 463 km on a ballistic path

Air Force IRBM.

Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. (McDonnell Douglas), prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American, propulsion system

To launch inflation tests for Echo.

With Able, Agena B, Agena D, and Delta upper stages to launch a variety of unmanned payloads.

Echo inflation test launch vehicles used an MB-3 propulsion system capable of

733 920 newtons of thrust.

The standard model Thor used was the DM-18.

Thor was upgraded in some configurations with the addition of strap-on engines and

by the elongation of its tanks. See following tables.

Thor-Able, Thor-Agena B, Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena B and D, Long-Tank,

Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena D, and Thor-Delta.

Table 1-74.

Listing of Thor Stages

Vehicle Manufacturing no./Model no.

Date Mission Thor Stage

Successful*

129/DM-1812-6 Nov. 8, 1958

130/DM-1812-6 Oct. 11, 1958

134/DM-1812-6 Aug. 7. 1959

144/DM-19 May 13, 1960

148/DM-1812-2 April 1, 1960

219/DM-1812-6A March 11, 1960

245/DM-19 Nov. 23, 1960

270/DM-19 Aug. 12, 1960

286/DM-19 July 12, 1961

295/DM-19 March 25, 1961

301/DM-19 March 7, 1962

312/DM-19 Aug. 15, 1961

316/DM-19 July 10, 1962

317/DM-19 Feb. 8, 1962

318/DM-19 Sept. 18, 1962

320/DM-19 April 26, 1962

Pioneer 2 (Thor-Able I) Yes

Pioneer 1 (Thor-Able 1) Yes

Explorer 6 (Thor-Able III) Yes

Echo (Thor-Delta) Yes

Tiros 1 (Thor-Able II) Yes

Pioneer 5 (Thor-Able IV) Yes

Tiros 2 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Echo 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Tiros 3 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Explorer 10 (Thor-Delta) Yes

OSO 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Explorer 12 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Telstar l (Thor-Delta) Yes

Tiros 4 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Tiros 6 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Ariel 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes
LAUNCHVEHICLES 69

Table 1-74.

Listing of Thor Stages (Continued)

Vehicle Manufactur- Date Mission Thor Stage

ing no./Model no. Successful*

321/DM-19 June 19, 1962 Tiros 5 (Thor-Delta) Yes

337/DSV-2D Jan. 15, 1962 Echo (Big Shot 1) Yes

(booster only)

338/DSV-20 July 18, 1962 Echo (Big Shot 2) Yes

(booster only)

341/DM-21 Sept. 29, 1962 Alouette 1 (Thor-Agena B) Yes

345/DSV-3A Oct. 2, 1962 Explorer 14 (Thor-Delta) Yes

346/DSV-3A Oct. 27, 1962 Explorer 15 (Thor-Delta) Yes

355/DSV-3B Dec. 13, 1962 Relay 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes

357/DSV-3B April 2, 1963 Explorer 17 (Thor-Delta) Yes

358/DSV-3B Feb 14, 1963 Syncom 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes

359/DSV-3B June 19, 1963 Tiros 7 (Thor-Delta) Yes

363/DSV-3B May 7, 1963 Telstar 2 (Thor-Delta) Yes

370/DSV-3B July 26, 1963 Syncom 2 (Thor-Delta) Yes

371/DSV-3B Dec. 21, 1963 Tiros 8 (Thor-Delta) Yes

373/DSV-3B Jan. 21, 1964 Relay 2 (Thor-Delta) Yes

374/DSV-3C Jan. 22, 1965 Tiros 9 (Thor-Delta) Yes

387/DSV-3C Nov. 26, 1963 Explorer 18 (Thor-Delta) Yes

391/DSV-3B March 19, 1964 Beacon Explorer A (Thor-Delta) Yes

392/DSV-3C Oct. 4, 1964 Explorer 21 (Thor-Delta) Yes

393/DSV-3C Dec. 21, 1964 Explorer 26 (Thor-Delta) Yes

397/DSV-2A Jan. 25, 1964 Echo 2 (Thor-Agena B) Yes

399/DSV-2A Aug. 28, 1964 Nimbus 1 (Thor-Agena B) Yes

411/DSV-3C Feb. 3, 1965 OSO 2 (Thor-Delta) Yes

415/DSV-3C July 2, 1965 Tiros 10 (Thor-Delta) Yes

417/DSV-3D Aug. 19, 1964 Syncom 3 (Thor-Delta) Yes

426/DSV-3D April 6, 1965 Intelsat I (Early Bird) (Thor-Delta)Yes

431/DSV-3C March 8, 1967 OSO 3 (Thor-Delta) Yes

434/DSV-3C Aug. 25, 1965 OSO C (Thor-Delta) Yes

435/DSV-2C Oct. 14, 1965 0(30 2 (Thor-Agena D) Yes

436/DSV-3C May 25, 1966 Explorer 32 (Thor-Delta) Yes

441/DSV-3C May 29, 1965 Explorer 28 (Thor-Delta) Yes

442/DSV-3E Sept. 27, 1967 lntelsat II-D (Thor-Delta) Yes

445/DSV-3C Feb. 3, 1966 ESSA 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes

453/DSV-2A Nov. 29, 1965 Explorer 31 and Alouette 2 (Thor- Yes

Agena B)

Explorer 36 (Thor-Delta) Yes

Nimbus 2 (Thor-Agena D) Yes

Explorer 29 (Thor-Delta) Yes

454/DSV-3E Jan. 11, 1968

456/DSV-2C May 15, 1966

457/DSV-3E Nov. 6, 1965
70 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table1-74.

ListingofThorStages(Continued)

VehicleManufactur- Date Mission ThorStage Successful* ingno./Modelno.

460/DSV-3E Dec.16,1965 Pioneer 6 (Thor-Delta) Yes

461/DSV-3E Feb. 28, 1966 ESSA 2 (Thor-Delta) Yes

462/DSV-3E Aug. 17, 1966 Pioneer 7 (Thor-Delta) Yes

463/DSV-3E Oct. 2, 1966 ESSA 3 (Thor-Delta) Yes

464/DSV-3E Oct. 26, 1966 Intelsat II-A (Thor-Delta) Yes

467/DSV-3E July 1, 1966 Explorer 33 (Thor-Delta) Yes

468/DSV-3E Jan. 11, 1967 lntelsat I[-B (Thor-Delta) Yes

470/DSV-3E March 22, 1967 Intelsat II-C (Thor-Delta) Yes

471/DSV-3G Dec. 14, 1966 Biosatellite 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes

472/DSV-3E Jan. 26, 1967 ESSA 4 (Thor-Delta) Yes

473/DSV-2C June 23, 1966 PAGEOS 1 (Thor-Agena D) Yes

474/DSV-3E July 28, 1967 OGO 4 (Thor-Delta) Yes

475/DSV-3G Sept. 7, 1967 Biosatellite 2 (Thor-Delta) Yes

476/DSV-3E July 4, 1968 Explorer 38 (Thor-Delta) Yes

479/DSV-3E Nov. 8, 1968 Pioneer 9 (Thor-Delta) Yes

480/DSV-3E Nov. 10, 1967 ESSA 6 (Thor-Delta) Yes

481/DSV-3E Dec. 5, 1968 HEOS 1 (Thor-Delta) Yes

484/DSV-3E April 20, 1967 ESSA 5 (Thor-Delta) Yes

486/DSV-3E May 24, 1967 Explorer 34 (Thor-Delta) Yes

488/DSV-3E July 19, 1967 Explorer 35 (Thor-Delta)

489/DSV-3E Dec. 13, 1967 Pioneer 8 (Thor-Delta)

490/DSV-3C Oct. 18, 1967 OSO 4 (Thor-Delta)

520/DSV-2L May 18, 1968 Nimbus B (Thor-Agena D)

528/DSV-3L Aug. 16, 1968

529/DSV-3L Sept. 18, 1968

534/DSV-3L Dec. 15, 1968

536/DSV-3L Dec. 18, 1968

ESSA 7 (Thor-Delta)

Intelsat Ill F-I (Thor-Delta)

ESSA 8 (Thor-Delta)

Intelsat II| F-2 (Thor-Delta)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No (control

system

malfunction)

Yes

No (control

system

malfunction)

Yes

Yes

*2 failures out of 79 attempts (97°70 successful).
LAUNCH VEHICLES

Table 1-75.

Chronology of Thor Development and Operations

71

Date Event

Dec. 27, 1955

Oct. 26, 1956

Jan. 25, 1957

Sept. 20, 1957

Oct. 24, 1957

1958

1959

May 13, 1960

Aug. 12, 1960

Sept. 29, 1962

Ballistic Missile Office, Air Materiel Command, awarded a contract to the

Douglas Aircraft Company for the development of Weapon System 315A, an

intermediate range ballistic missile.

Douglas delivered the first WS-315A missile, which became known as Thor.

Missile 101 launch was unsuccessful due to the rupture of the liquid oxygen

tank.

Missile 105 launch was the first completely successful Thor launch.

Missile 109 launch proved that the vehicle could fly its required 3200-

kilometer range.

The Thor booster was used with the Able upper stage by the Air Force and by

NASA (NASA had responsibility for the October 11 and November 8 launch

attempts of Pioneer 1 and 2 lunar probes; in both cases the launch vehicles'

upper stages malfunctioned).

The Thor booster was mated with the Agena upper stage by the Air Force.

The Thor booster was used with the Delta upper stage by NASA in the attempted launch of an Echo satellite; the Delta stage malfunctioned.

First successful Thor-Delta launch by NASA (Echo 1) took place. Thor-Delta

proved to be a highly successful configuration (used 61 times by NASA in

1960-1968).

The Thor-Agena B configuration was used by NASA for the first time in the

launch of OGO 2; this configuration was used four times by NASA in

1965-1968.
72 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-76.

Thor-Able Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage 4th stage Total

(Thor) (w/payload)

Height (m):

Diameter (m):

Launch weight (kg):

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized."

Remarks:

See also:

17 5.3 1.9 0.7 27

2.4

48 978 2100 390 154 51 622

Rocketdyne A.ll0-41 or Altair ABL ARC 1

MB-I Basic AJI0-42 X 248 KS 420

LR79-NA-9

676 096 34 000 13 650 1930 725 676

LOX/ solid solid

RP-I WFNA/UDMH

122 kg to 850 km earth orbit

Able stages derived from the Vanguard launch vehicle; Thor was an Air Force IRBM.

Douglas Aircraft Co., (McDonnell Douglas), Thor prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American, Thor propulsion system

Space Technology Laboratories, Able prime

Aerojet-General, second stage propulsion

Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory, Hercules Powder Co., third-stage propulsion

Atlantic Research Corp., fourth-stage propulsion

To launch small probes and satellites.

NASA briefly used this configuration in four variations (Able I, 11, III, and IV). The

four Ables were basically the same vehicle, but there were some slight variations in

weight, thrust, and engine numbers. The figures shown above are an average for the

different variations. The Thor model used in this configuration was the DM 1812-2, the

DM1812-6, or the DM1812-6A.

Atlas-Able and Thor.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 73

Table 1-77.

Chronology of Thor-Able Development and Operations

Date Event

1955

Dec. 6, 1957

Late 1957

March 17, 1958

April 23, 1958

July 9, 1958

Aug. 17, 1958

Oct. 11, 1958

Nov. 8, 1958

Aug. 7, 1959

March 11, 1960

April 1, 1960

Aerojet-General was awarded an Air Force contract to design and produce a

second-stage propulsion system based on the Aerobee-Hi sounding rocket for

the Vanguard launch vehicle.

Vanguard with live second stage (TV-3) exploded due to a first-stage

malfunction.

Air Force requested Aerojet-General to modify the stage for use in ICBM

nose cone reentry tests; the Able stage was the result of those modifications.

Air Force established a space probe program that would utilize the Able upper stage.

First successful launch of Vanguard; second stage performed as programmed.

Attempted launch of Thor-Able combination by the Air Force was unsuccessful.

Successful launch of Thor-Able; first test of a full-scale ICBM nose cone at

ICBM ranges and velocities.

Thor-Able 1, an Air Force attempt to launch a lunar probe, was unsuccessful;

the first-stage engine exploded 77 seconds after liftoff; there was also uneven

separation of the second and third stages.

NASA's attempt to launch the Pioneer 1 lunar probe was unsuccessful.

NASA's attempt to launch the Pioneer 2 lunar probe was unsuccessful; the

third stage failed to ignite.

Thor-Able II1 successfully launched Explorer 6.

Thor-Able IV successfully launched Pioneer 5.

Thor-Able II successfully launched Tiros 1.
74 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-78.

Thor-Agena B Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage Total

(Thor) (Agena B)

Height (m): 17

Diameter (m): 2.4

Launch weight (kg): 48 978

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

7.2 23

1.5

7000 55 978

Rocketdyne MB-3 Basic Bell XLR-81-Ba-11

LR79-NA-13

765 056 66 720 831 776

LOX/RP-1 IRFNA/UDMH

1380 kg to 185 km earth orbit

34 kg to synchronous altitude transfer ellipse

Agena developed by Lockheed under contract to the Air Force; Thor was an Air

Force IRBM.

Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. (McDonnell Douglas), Thor prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American, Thor propulsion system

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Agena prime

Bell Aerospace, Textron, second-stage propulsion

To launch earth-orbital scientific satellites.

Agena stage capable of engine restart.

Atlas-Agena B and Thor

Table 1-79.

Chronology of Thor-Agena B Development and Operations

Date Event

Oct. 1956 Development began at Lockheed under contract with the Air Force for an advanced military satellite system and its associated upper stage vehicle; this upper stage became the Agena.

The Air Force contracted with Lockheed for production of the Agena upper

stage.

NASA announced plans to use the Agena with Atlas and Thor.

The Air Force issued a contract amendment to Lockheed for the development

of an advanced Agena, to be known as Agena B.

NASA cancelled its Vega upper-stage development program in favor of the

Agena B.

The Air Force failed in its attempt to launch a Thor-Agena A; failure was due

to stage-separation malfunction.

An agreement was signed between NASA and the Air Force regarding

NASA's procurement of Agena B vehicles.

NASA successfully launched Alouette 1 with a Thor-Agena B (first NASA

launch from the Western Test Range).

Thor-Agena B launch of Echo 2 passive communications satellite was successful.

Thor-Agena B launch of Nimbus 1 meteorological satellite was successful.

Thor-Agena B dual launch of Alouette 2 and Explorer 31 was successful.

Agena B was discontinued in favor of Agena D.

1957

Jan. 1959

April 24, 1959

Dec. 11, 1959

Oct. 26, 1960

Feb. 1961

Sept. 29, 1962

Jan. 25, 1964

Aug. 28, 1964

Nov. 29, 1965

1966
LAUNCH VEHICLES 75

Table 1-80.

Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena B and D Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage or 2d stage

(Thor) (Agena B) (Agena D) Total

Height (m): 17 7.2 7.2 23

Diameter (m): 2.4 1.5 1.5

3.4 (w/strap-ons)

Launch weight (kg): 48 777 7000 7250 69 000

12 653 (strap-ons)

Propulsion system

Stages: 2

Powerplant: Rocketdyne + 3 Thiokol Bell XLR-81- Bell XLR-81Ba-11

MB-3 Basic TX-33-52 strap-ons BA-11

Thrust (newtons): 765 056 719 775 71 168 1 555 999

Propellant: LOX/RP-I solid IRFNA/UDMH N2OJUDMH

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

57 kg to 4284 km earth orbit

Agena developed by Lockheed under contract to the Air Force; Thor was an Air

Force IRBM.

Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. (McDonnell Douglas), Thor prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American, Thor propulsion system

Thiokol Chemical Corp., Thor strap-ons

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Agena prime

Bell Aerospace, Textron, second-stage propulsion

To launch earth-orbital scientific satellites.

Thor used was Douglas Model DSV-2C.

Thor, Thor-Agena B, Atlas-Agena B, Atlas-Agena D, and Long-Tank, ThrustAugmented Thor-Agena D

Table 1-81.

Chronology of Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena B & D

Development and Operations

Date Event

1962

Feb. 28, 1963

March 18, 1963

Oct. 14, 1965

May 15, 1966

June 23, 1966

July 28, 1967

Air Force ordered the Thrust-Augmented Thor from Lockheed; the vehicle

consisted of a standard Thor with three strap-on solid-propellant Castor I

motors.

First Air Force launch of a Thrust-Augmented Thor was unsuccessful; the

vehicle was destroyed when it veered off course.

The Air Force launched a payload into polar orbit with a Thrust-Augmented

Thor-Agena D.

NASA launch of OGO 2 was successful with Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena

D.

NASA launch of Nimbus 2 was successful with Thrust-Augmented ThorAgena B.

NASA launch of PAGEOS 1 was successful with Thrust-Augmented ThorAgena D.

NASA launch of OGO 4 was successful with Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena

D.
76 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-82.

Long-Tank, Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena D

(Thorad-Agena D) Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage Total

(Thorad) (Agena D)

Height (m): 21.6 6.2 27.8

Diameter (m): 2.4 1.5

Launch weight (kg): 70 000 7250 90 000

12 653 (strap-ons)

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

See also:

2

Rocketdyne + 3 Thiokol TX-33-52

MB-3 Basic strap-ons Bell XLR-81-Ba-11

765 056 719 775 71 168 1 555 999

LOX/RP- 1 solid N2OJUDMH

1360 kg to 185 km earth orbit

Agena developed by Lockheed under contract to the Air Force; Thor was an Air

Force IRBM.

Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. (McDonnell Douglas), Thor prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American, Thor propulsion system

Thiokol Chemical Corp., Thor strap-ons

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Agena prime

Bell Aerospace, Textron, second-stage propulsion

Used once by NASA in an unsuccessful attempt to launch two earth-orbital scientfic

satellites.

The long-tank Thor became the standard model Thor; the thrust capability remained the same as the short-tank Thor, but the burn time was increased by 65

seconds. The Thorad-Agena D combination was dropped in favor of Thorad-Delta

after only one attempted launch.

Thor, Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena B & D, Atlas-Agena D, and Thor-Delta.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 77

Table 1-83.

Chronology of Long-Tank, Thrust-Augmented

Thor-Agena D (Thorad-Agena D) Development and Operations

Date Event

1966

Jan. 5, 1966

May 18, 1968

The Thor booster was uprated by stretching the stage; the result was the

Long-Tank Thor, or Thorad. The liquid oxygen and RP-1 tanks were

lengthened, giving the booster 65 more seconds of burn time and the capability to lift 20 percent more payload.

21 Thorad boosters were purchased from Douglas by the Air Force; all subsequent new-production Tbors were the Thorad version.

NASA attempted to launch Nimbus B and Secor satellites on a simple

Thorad-Agena D vehicle; the vehicle was destroyed at launch when it

malfunctioned.

Table 1-84.

Thor-Delta Characteristics

Thor-Delta 1st stage 2d stage 3d stage Total w/

(Thor) (Delta) (Delta) adapters

Height (in): 17 5.2 1.5 27.4

Diameter (m): 2.4 1.3 0.5

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 3149 268 52 395

Propulsion system

Stages: 3

Powerplant: Rocketdyne MB-3 AJ10-142 Altair X-248-A7

Basic LR79-NA-9

Thrust (newtons): 676 096 33 360 13 344 722 800

Propellant: LOX/RP-1 WIFNA/UDMH solid

Payload capacity: 272 kg to 185-kin earth orbit

Thor-Delta A

Height (m): 15.9 5.2

Diameter (m): 2.4 0.8

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 2268

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: Rocketdyne MB-3 AJl0-118

Basic LR-79-NA-11

Thrust (newtons): 742 816 33 360

Propellant: LOX/RP-1 WIFNA/UDMH

Payload capacity: 272 kg to 185 km earth orbit

Height (m): 15.9 5.2

Diameter (m): 2.4 0.8

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 2721

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: Rocketdyne MB-3 A J10-118A

Basic LR79-NA-11

1.5 27.4

0.5

268 51 509

3

Altair X-248-A5D

13 344 789 520

solid

1.5 27.4

0.5

239 51 938

3

Altair X-248-A5DM
78 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-84.

Thor-Delta Characteristics (Continued)

Thor-Delta B (Operational Delta)

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage

(Thor) (Delta) (Delta)

Thrust (newtons): 742 816 34 250 13 344

Propellant: LOX/RP-I IRFNA/UDMH solid

Payload capacity: 272 kg to 185 km earth orbit

Total w/

adapters

790 410

Thor-Delta C (Standard Delta)

Height (m): 15.9 5.2 0.9

Diameter (m): 2.4 0.8 0.5

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 2721 259

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: Rocketdyne MB-3 AJ10-118D Altair A-258

Basic LR79-NA-11

Thrust (newtons): 742 816 34 472 25 576

Propellant: LOX/RP-I IRFNA/UDMH solid

Payload capacity: 272 kg to 185 km earth orbit

27.4

51 958

3

802 864

Thor-Delta C-I (Standard Delta)

Height (m): 15.9 5.2 1.5 27.4

Diameter (m): 2.4 0.8 0.5

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 2721 259 51 958

Propulsion system

Stages: 3

Powerplant: Rocketdyne MB-3 AJI0-118D UTC FW-4

Basic LR79-NA-11

Thrust (newtons): 742 816 34 472 24 909 802 197

Propellant: LOX/RP-1 IRFNA/UDMH solid

Payload capacity: 272 kg to 185 km earth orbit

Thor-Delta D (Thrust-Augmented Delta, TAD)

Height (m): 15.9 5.8 1.6 28.0

Diameter (m): 2.4 0.8 0.5

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 2721 270 64 622

12 653 (strapons)

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: Rocketdyne + 3 Thioko[ AJ10-118D

MB-3 Basic TX-33-52 strapLR79-NA-13 ons

Thrust (newtons): 765 056 719 775 34 694

Propellant: LOX/RP-I solid IRFNA/

UDMH

Payload capacity: 590 kg to 185 km earth orbit

3

Altair X-258

25 576 I 545 101

solid
LAUNCHVEHICLES 79

Table 1-84.

Listing of Thor Stages (Continued)

Thor-Delta G (Thrust-Augmented Improved Delta)

ls_ stage 2d stage 3d stage

(Thor) (Delta) (Delta)

Total

(w/adapter)

Height (rn): 15.9 5.2

Diameter (m): 2.4 1.4

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 6167

12 653 (strapons)

Propulsion system

Stages."

Po werplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant."

Payload capacity."

27.4

67 798

2

Rocketdyne + 3 Thiokol AJ10-118E ---

MB-3 Basic TX-33-52 strapLR79-NA-13 ons

765 056 719 775 34 694 1 519 525

LOX/RP-1 solid IRFNA/UDMH

500 kg to 265 km earth orbit

................................................... _ ......................................

Delta J (Thrust-A ugmented Improved Delta)

Height (m): 15.9 5.2 1,4 27.4

Diameter (m): 2.4 1.4 0.9

Launch weight (kg): 48 978 6167 301 68 099-

12 653 68 779

(TX°33-52)

strap-ons)

13 333

(TX-354-3)

strap-ons)

Propulsion system

Stages: 3

Powerplant: Same as for AJ 10-118E Thiokol

Delta E TE-364-3

Thrust (newtons): 765 056 719 775 34 694 44 480 1 564 005

Propellant: LOX/RP-1 solid IRFNA/ solid

UDMH

Payload capacity: 190 kg to 6900 km earth orbit

Delta M (Long-Tank, Thrust-Augmented Delta)

Height (m): 21.6 5.2 1.4 32.0

Diameter (m): 2.4 1.4 0.9

Launch weight (kg): 70 000 6167 301 89 801

13 333 (strap-ons)

Propulsion system

Stages: 3

Powerplant: Rocketdyne + 3 Thiokol AJ10-118E Thiokol

MB-3 Basic TX-354-5 strap- TE-364-3

LR79-NA-13 ons
80 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table1-84.

Listingof ThorStages(Continued)

1ststage 2dstage 3dstage Total

(Thorad) (Delta) (Delta) (w/adapters)

Thrust (newtons): 765 056 719 775 34 694 42 256 l 561 781

Propellant: LOX/RP-I solid IRFNA/ solid

UDMH

Payload capacity: 1180 kg to 185 km earth orbit

372 kg to synchronous altitude transfer ellipse

Thor-Delta N (Long-Tank, Thrust-Augmented Delta)

Height (m): 21.6

Diameter (m): 2.4

Launch weight (kg): 70 000

13 333

(strap-ons)

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: Same as for

Delta M

Thrust (newtons): 765 056 719 775

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

5.2 32.0

1.4

6167 89 500

AJ 10-118E

34 694

Origin:

Con tractors:

How utilized."

Remarks:

See also:

1 519 525

LOX/RP-1 solid IRFNA/UDMH

1180 kg to 185 km earth orbit

372 kg to synchronous altitude transfer ellipse

NASA design produced by Douglas Aircraft to extend usefulness of Thor booster.

Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. (McDonnell Douglas), Thor prime and Delta prime

Rocketdyne Div., North American, Thor propulsion system

Thiokol Chemical Corp., Thor strap-ons and third stage

Aerojet-General, Delta stage propulsion system

Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory, Hercules Powder Co., third stage

United Technology Center, third stage

With the Thor booster in a variety of configurations to boost many different classes

of satellites to several kinds of orbits; included in the payloads launched by Delta

combinations were Echo, Tiros, Relay, Explorer, lntelsat, OSO, HEOS, and ESSA

satellites.

The Thor-Delta configurations were often referred to only as "Delta." Thor-Delta

was often called the workhorse of NASA's unmanned program.

Thor, Thrust-Augmented Thor-Agena B & D, and Long-Tank, Thrust-Augmented

Thor-Agena D.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 81

Table1-85.

ListingofDeltaVehicles

VehicleSerial#/ Date Mission DeltaStages

Delta Model # Successful*

I/DM-19 May 13, 1960 Echo No (2d-stage failure)

2/DM-19 Aug. 12, 1960 Echo 1 Yes

3/DM-19 Nov. 23, 1960 Tiros 2 Yes

4/DM-19 March 25, 1961 Explorer 10 Yes

5/DM-19 July 12, 1961 Tiros 3 Yes

6/DM-19 Aug. 15, 1961 Explorer 12 Yes

7/DM-19 Feb. 8, 1962 Tiros 4 Yes

8/DM-19 March 7, 1962 OSO l Yes

9/DM-19 April 26, 1962 Ariel 1 Yes

10/DM-19 June 19, 1962 Tiros 5 Partial (spacecraft did

not enter planned

orbit)

ll/DM-19 July 10, 1962 Telstar 1 Yes

12/DM-19 Sept. 18, 1962 Tiros 6 Yes

13/A Oct. 2, 1962 Explorer 14 Yes

14/A Oct. 27, 1962 Explorer 15 Yes

15/B Dec. 13, 1962 Relay l Yes

16/B Feb. 14, 1963 Syncom 1 Yes

17/B April 2, 1963 Explorer 17 Yes

18/B May 7, 1963 Telstar 2 Yes

19/B June 19, 1963 Tiros 7 Yes

20/B July 26, 1963 Syncom 2 Yes

21/C Nov. 26, 1963 Explorer 18 Yes

22/B Dec. 21, 1963 Tiros 8 Yes

23/B Jan. 21, 1964 Relay 2 Yes

24/B March 19, 1964 Beacon Explorer A No (3d-stage

malfunction)

25/B Aug. 19, 1964 Syncom 3 Yes

26/C Oct. 4, 1964 Explorer 21 Yes

27/C Dec. 21, 1964 Explorer 26 Yes

28/C Jan. 22, 1965 Tiros 9 Yes

29/C Feb. 3, 1965 OSO 2 Yes

30/D April 6, 1965 Early Bird (Intelsat I) Yes

31/C May 29, 1965 Explorer 28 Yes

32/C July 2, 1965 Tiros 10 Yes

33/C Aug. 25, 1965 OSO C No (3d-stage

failure)

34/E Nov. 6, 1965 Explorer 29 Yes
82 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 1-85.

Listing of Delta Vehicles (Continued)

Vehicle Serial #/ Date Mission Delta Stages

Delta Model # Successful*

35/E Dec. 16, 1965 Pioneer 6 Yes

36/C Feb. 3, 1966 ESSA 1 Yes

37/E Feb. 28, 1966 ESSA 2 Yes

38/C-1 May 25, 1966 Explorer 32 Yes

39/E-1 July 1, 1966 Explorer 33 Yes

40/E-I Aug. 17, 1966 Pioneer 7 Yes

41/E Oct. 2, 1966 ESSA 3 Yes

42/E-1 Oct. 26, 1966 lntelsat II-A No (apogee motor

malfunction)

43/G Dec. 14, 1966 Biosatellite 1 Yes

44/E-1 Jan. 11, 1967 Intelsat II-B Yes

45/E Jan. 26, 1967 ESSA 4 Yes

46/C March 8, 1967 OSO 3 Yes

47/E-1 March 22, 1967 lntelsat II-C Yes

48/E April 20, 1967 ESSA 5 Yes

49/E-1 May 24, 1967 Explorer 34 Yes

50/E-1 July 19, 1967 Explorer 35 Yes

51/G Sept. 7, 1967 Biosatellite 2 Yes

52/E-1 Sept. 27, 1967 lntelsat II-D Yes

53/C Oct. 18, 1967 OSO 4 Yes

54/E-1 Nov. 10, 1967 ESSA 6 Yes

55/E-1 Dec. 13, 1967 Pioneer 8 Yes

56/E-1 Jan. 11, 1968 Explorer 36 Yes

57/J July 4, 1968 Explorer 38 Yes

58/N Aug. 16, 1968 ESSA 7 Yes

59/M Sept. 18, 1968 lntelsat 111 F-I No (3d-stage

malfunction)

60/E-1 Nov. 8, 1968 Pioneer 9 Yes

61/E-I Dec. 5, 1968 HEOS 1 Yes

62/N Dec. 15, 1968 ESSA 8 Yes

63/M Dec. 18, 1968 lntelsat I11 F-2 Yes

*5 failures out of 63 attempts (92°7o successful).
LAUNCHVEHICLES

Table1-86.

ChronologyofThor-DeltaDevelopmentandOperations

83

Date Event

Feb. 3, 1959

April 1, 1959

May 13, 1960

Aug. 13, 1960

Nov. 23, 1960

Dec. 18, 1968

Oct. 2, 1962

Dec. 13, 1962

Nov. 26, 1963

April 6, 1965

Dec. 11, 1959

Nov. 6, 1965

May 25, 1966

July 1, 1966

July 4, 1968

Aug. 16, 1968

Sept. 18, 1968

Douglas Aircraft responded to a NASA request for proposals to develop a

modified launch vehicle based on the Thor booster. NASA wanted to extend

the usefulness of the Thors the agency had purchased from the Air Force by

creating a vehicle based on the Thor-Able. The second stage was a modified

Vanguard second stage with an improved guidance and attitude control

system. It was redesignated Delta. A Vanguard X-248 third stage would serve

as Thor-Delta's third stage.

Douglas was awarded a contract by NASA to produce the Delta, which was

defined as an "interim" launch vehicle. It was intended to be used only as a

temporary vehicle, with Scout and Vega serving as the primary launch

vehicles of the future.

First launch of Thor-Delta with an Echo passive communications satellite

was unsuccessful due to a second-stage failure.

First successful launch of Thor-Delta with Echo 1.

Thor-Delta configurations were used successfully to launch many different

payloads to a variety of orbits,

Thor-Delta A model was used for the first time successfully.

Thor-Delta B model was used for the first time successfully.

Thor-Delta C model was used for the first time successfully.

Thor-Delta D model with thrust augmentation was used for the first time successfully.

NASA's Vega second-stage project was cancelled in favor of the Agena B,

and the agency continued to use Thor-Delta as a standard launch vehicle.

Thor-Delta E model with improved Delta stage was used for the first time

successfully.

Thor-Delta C-1 model was used for the first time successfully.

Thor-Delta E-1 model was used for the first time successfully.

Thor-Delta J model was used for the first time successfully.

Thor-Delta N model was used for the first time successfully.

Thor-Delta M model with Thorad was used for the first time; the attempt to

launch a dual payload was unsuccessful because Delta's third stage malfunctioned.

Titan II (Gemini Launch Vehicle)

The Titan II is another example of a missile borrowed by NASA for a nonmilitary purpose. Built for the Air Force by the Martin Company, the Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile was adapted for use in Gemini, the second phase of

NASA's manned spaceflight program, in 1963.

Titan, with its two stages, was more powerful than Atlas and safer because it

used a storable hypergolic liquid propellant. Titan did not require the complex abort
84 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

system necessary for the potentially explosive Redstone, Atlas, and Saturn boosters.

The vehicle was not without its difficulties, however. Problems with second-stage

combustion stability and a tendency for the entire vehicle to oscillate during launch

forced a delay in scheduling the first two-man Gemini mission to earth orbit.

The Gemini Launch Vehicle (GLV) was qualified in a test launch in April 1964.

Less than a year later, it boosted the first of 10 crews to orbit. NASA put Titan II on

the launch pad 12 times in 1964-1966; all the launches were successful. For more information see also chapter 2 under Gemini.14

Table 1-87.

Titan II (Gemini Launch Vehicle, GLV) Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage Total

Height (m): 21.6

Diameter (m): 3

Launch weight (kg): 122 445

Propulsion system

Stages."

Po werplant:

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

How utilized:

Remarks:

8.2 27.4

(5.8 forward of stage

separation plane)

3

27 210 150 000

2 Aerojet-General Aerojet-General

YLR-87-AJ-7 YLR-91-AJ-7

1 912 640 444 800 2 357 440

UDMH/N204 UDMH/N204

3200 kg in 185 km earth orbit

Air Force ICBM

Martin Co., Martin Marietta Corp., prime

Aerojet-General Corp., propulsion

T_ launch Gemini spacecraft to qualify rendezvous and docking techniques, and to

observe astronauts' reactions to long-duration earth-orbital missions.

Man-rating the Titan ICBM required minimal changes to the basic Titan 11. Changes

were made in the interest of pilot safety (e.g., system redundancies); some modifications were also necessary to ready the basic ICBM to accept the Gemini payload.
LAUNCH VEHICLES 85

Table 1-88.

Chronology of Titan II (Gemini Launch Vehicle, GLV)

Development and Operations

Date Event

May 2, 1955

Feb. 6, 1959

June 1960

Spring 1961

Fall 1961

Dec. 28, 1961

March 1962

March 16, 1962

Spring 1963

Fall-Winter 1963

Oct. 26, 1963

April 8, 1964

Jan. 19, 1965

March 23, 1965

June 3, 1965

Aug. 21, 1965

Dec. 4, 1965

Dec. 15, 1968

March 16, 1966

June 3, 1966

July 18, 1966

Sept. 12, 1966

Nov. 11, 1966

The Air Force approved the development of an ICBM airframe, which

became the Titan missile.

First Titan ICBM test launch.

The Air Force awarded a contract to the Martin Co. (later Martin Marietta)

for the development of a Titan 1I; the primary difference between the two

missiles was Titan II's ability to use a storable hypergolic liquid propellant

that would not require liquid oxygen.

NASA engineers considered Titan lI for launching an improved Mercury

(Gemini) manned spacecraft.

Air Force Titan II was officially selected by NASA as the Project Gemini

launch vehicle.

First successful captive firing of Titan ll.

First operational launch of Titan I ICBM by the Air Force, preceded by 51

R&D and test launches.

First R&D launch of Air Force Titan I1.

Together NASA and the Air Force solved second-stage combustion instability and vehicle vibration-oscillation (called the Pogo effect) problems with

Titan II; these problems had to be corrected before the missile could be manrated. Gemini's schedule was delayed because of launch vehicle difficulties.

NASA considered substituting the Saturn I for Titan II as the Gemini launch

vehicle. However, problems with Titan were solved during the various test

flights (Nov. 1963 to April 1964).

GT-I was airlifted to Cape Kennedy.

Launch of Gemini 1 to qualify the launch vehicle was successful.

Launch of Gemini 2 to qualify the spacecraft was successful.

Launch of Gemini 3 with crew of two was successful.

Launch of Gemini 4 with crew was successful.

Launch of Gemini 5 with crew was successful.

Launch of Gemini 7 with crew to act as a rendezvous target for Gemini 6.4

was successful.

Launch of Gemini 6,4 with crew was successful.

Launch of Gemini 8 with crew was successful.

Launch of Gemini 9,4 with crew was successful.

Launch of Gemini 10 with crew was successful.

Launch of Gemini 11 with crew was successful.

Launch of Gemini 12 with crew was successful.
86

Vanguard

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Vanguard, the launch vehicle and the satellite, was the product of the Naval

Research Laboratory (NRL). The Navy team, which had experience with sounding

rocket research, began in 1955 to design a small vehicle capable of orbiting a satellite

for the American committee of the International Geophysical Year (IGY). NRL

received official approval for the project from the Department of Defense (DoD) in

August 1955. In less than a month, they had awarded the prime contract for the

three-stage launcher to the Martin Company.

Table 1-89.

Vanguard Characteristics

1st stage 2d stage 3d stage o r 3d stage Total

Height (m): 13.4 5.8 1.5 1.5

Diameter (m): 1.1

Launch weight (kg): 8181

Propulsion system

Stages:

Powerplant: GE X-405

Thrust (newtons):

Propellant:

Payload capacity:

Origin:

Contractors:

21.9 (w/cone

and aerodynamic

spike)

How utilized:

Remarks."

0.8 0.8 0.8

1977 194 227 10 385

3

Aerojet-General Grand Central ABL X-248

A J-10 Rocket Co.

133-KS-2800

124 544 33 360 10 230 10 675 168 134-168 579

LOX/RP-I WIFNA/ solid solid

UDMH

11.3 kg to 555 km earth orbit

24 kg to 555 km earth orbit with ABL third stage

Naval Research Laboratory design.

Martin Co., prime

General Electric Co., first-stage propulsion

Aerojet-General, second-stage propulsion

Grand Central Rocket Co., third-stage propulsion

Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory, Hercules Powder Co., third-stage propulsion

To launch small geodetic satellites as part of the United States' earliest satellite program (part of the International Geophysical Year).

Many later launch vehicles would be built on the technology developed during the

Vanguard program.

The first stage was derived from the Viking sounding rocket, the second from the

Aerobee sounding rocket.

Vanguard was the designation for both the launch vehicle and the satellite.
LAUNCHVEHICLES 87

Because NRL suffered delays in the development of the Vanguard launch vehicle, DoD gave the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, which had also submitted an

IGY satellite proposal, approval to participate. Explorer 1, launched by a Juno I,

became the first American satellite to orbit earth on January 31, 1958. Vanguard I

followed less than two months later. When NASA was established in October 1958,

Vanguard and the group at NRL responsible for the project were transferred to the

new civilian agency. NASA tried four times in 1959 to orbit scientific payloads with

Vanguard; only one was successful. For more information see also chapter 3 under

Vanguard. _5

Table 1-90.

Chronology of Vanguard Development and Operations

Date Event

1955

July 6, 1955

Aug. 24, 1955

Sept. 9, 1955

Sept. 23, 1955

Nov. 1955

March 1956

Dec. 6, 1957

March 17, 1958

Oct. 1, 1958

Feb. 17, 1959

Feb. 13, 1959

June 22, 1959

Sept. 18, 1959

Early in the year, Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) scientists and engineers

started working on the design of a three-stage vehicle capable of launching a

small satellite, in reply to interest expressed by the international scientific

community and the military in orbiting artificial satellites.

The Committee on Special Capabilities (the Steward Committee within DoD)

heard NRL's proposal for a scientific satellite program.

The Steward Committee approved NRL's proposal for launching an International Geophysical Year satellite with a three-stage vehicle (Viking first stage,

Aerobee second stage, new third stage).

NRL was authorized to proceed with its proposal for Project Vanguard.

The Martin Co. was awarded the prime contract for development and production of Vanguard; Martin subcontracted with General Electric for the

first-stage engine.

Aerojet-General was awarded a contract for the second stage.

Grand Central Rocket Co. and Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory were awarded contracts for third stages.

TV-3 launch was the first complete Vanguard launch with three live stages.

TV-4 launched Vanguard 1 scientific satellite successfully.

Project Vanguard was transferred to NASA.

SLV-4 launch Vanguard 2 into orbit, but the third stage reignited and

bumped the payload, impairing the scientific value of the satellite.

SLV-5 Vanguard launch with a magn0meter satellite was unsuccessful

because of second-stage malfunction.

SLV-6 Vanguard launch with a scientific satellite was unsuccessful because

tank pressure dropped after second-stage ignition.

TV-4BU, with ABL third stage, successfully launched Vanguard 3 scientific

satellite into orbit.
CHAPTER TWO

MANNED SPACEFLIGHT
CHAPTER TWO

MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Wartime research in the fields of aeronautics and rocketry guaranteed that the

1950s would be a promising decade for American engineers and pilots who sought

aircraft that would fly faster and higher, and for military specialists and scientists

who recognized the rocket's potential. Private industry, the military, and one of the

country's chief civilian research organizations, the National Advisory Committee

for Aeronautics (NACA), sought to apply the new technology spawned by the crises

of a world war to more nationalistic goals. Improved radar and radio interferometry

equipment on missile ranges allowed the military to evaluate captured German

rockets and their own sounding rockets and fledgling missiles more effectively.

Specially-instrumented aircraft proved out new design concepts and operational

procedures over California deserts. On the Atlantic coast, engineers used small

rockets to conduct materials testing at high speeds. Frontier beyond the atmosphere

was the goal of these and other exercises. By mid-decade, the Navy, Army, and Air

Force were all exploring different paths by which to reach that frontier.

Rivalry among the services to become the leader of an American "space program" almost swept aside NACA. This advisory-research body was traditionally

committed to methodical investigations that would assist the user agency (usually

the military) in its mission; space spectaculars and quantum overnight leaps in the

state of the art were not its way of doing business. But it was an age of rapid acceleration, and there were pockets of enthusiasm for the new pace even within the

conservative NACA.

Sending biological payloads, animal and later human, into space was seemingly

a logical extension of two ongoing activities: the scientific satellite-sounding rocket

program being conducted by the Naval Research Laboratory, the Army, and others,

and the Air Force-NACA hypervelocity research aircraft program.* If intercon-

*During the postwar years, the Army experimented with animals (monkeys and mice) as part of the

V-2 program at White Sands Missile Range, while the Air Force conducted similar investigations with

Aerobee sounding rockets at Holloman Air Force Base. From 1953 through 1957, however, medical experimentation with animals was discontinued as the military ballistic missile project monopolized night

opportunities and funds. Investigators had to be content with aircraft-borne experiments. In the USSR

during the 1950s, researchers sent numerous biological payloads on rocket flights, with dogs being frequent test subjects. For more information, see Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles

C. Alexander, This New Ocean; A History of Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201 (Washington, 1966), pp.

37-38; Edward C. Ezell and Linda N. Ezell, The Partnership; A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test

Project, NASA SP-4209 (Washington, 1978); and Joel Powell, "Animal Precursors to Manned Space

Flight," Spaceflight 22 (Sept.-Oct. 1980), pp. 315-18.

91
92 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

tinentalballisticmissilescouldbeaugmentedto boostinstrumentsintoorbit,why

couldtheynotcarrymen?If pilotscouldfly to thefringesof theatmosphere,why

couldtheynotgobeyond?Excepttotheenthusiasticbelievers,the"whys"wereobvious.Boostersunderdevelopmentinthemid-1950sbytheAir ForceandtheArmy

werestill experimentaland couldnot be expectedto carrylargespaceships.

Althoughthemysteriesof thesoundbarrierhadbeensolvedwiththeXS-1research

aircraft,hypervelocityflightaboveMach4 wasstill challengingtheAir ForceNACA team;escapevelocitieswerefar outof reach.Medicalevidencethatman

couldsurvivetherigorsof spaceflightwassketchyandbasedonexperimentswith

rocket-poweredimpactsleds,centrifuges,soundingrockets,andparabolicaircraft

flights.Expertscouldnot evenagreeon the optimumdesignfor a manned

spacecraftthatwouldprovidethepilotprotectionfromtheenvironmentof spaceas

wellaswithstandtheintenseheatingthatwasexpectedduringatmosphericreentry.

Therewereenoughchallengesto keepall interestedparties,militaryandcivilian,

busyfor manyyears.

MilitaryProposals for Man-in-Space

A view popular with the Air Force was that the skies belonged to it, and this

branch of the military was not going to allow the absence of an atmosphere to

restrict its domain. With the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile, under development at Convair since 1946, the Air Force sought to defer "Soviet aggression." In increasingly sophisticated aircraft, Air Force test pilots in the mid-1950s were flying

three times the speed of sound and approaching altitudes of 20 000 meters. Space

medicine proved to be a natural extension of aviation medicine, and the Air Force

established several special facilities for human factors research as it related to space

travel. NACA supported these Air Force programs with research in the fields of

aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, and materials. Protection of a warhead during reentry was one critical problem that NACA specialists at the Ames and Langley

aeronautical laboratories tackled. Since 1954, the Air Force and NACA, along with

the Navy, had also been formally involved in a joint hypersonic research aircraft

project that the Air Force labeled X-15.* Flying at speeds in excess of Mach l had

been "round one." The X-15 with a design speed of Mach 6 at 76 000 meters was

"round two." The third round would hopefully take the Air Force into space.

The Soviet Union's unexpected success in orbiting two satellites in 1957, the second one with a biological payload, interfered with the Air Force's incremental plans.

The U.S. desperately needed to get into space soon, and with a manned mission,

warned military leaders. The Air Force could not hope to launch its weighty X-20

Dyna-Soar (round three, based on a delta-wing flat-bottom glider design favored at

NACA's Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory) in the near future, but there

was a more feasible alternative: send a man into orbit in a ballistic-shaped capsule

*See chapter I, pp. 44-51, for more information on the Atlas missile and chapter 4, pp. 202-24, for

more on the joint hypervelocity research aircraft program.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 93

atop an ICBM.* NACA engineers at Langley had been studying this possibility, and

they agreed that a conical spacecraft with a blunt reentry surface could be launched

by missiles currently available. Abandoning for the present a scheme for a mission

launched by a two-stage vehicle under development, the Air Force proposed to

NACA in January 1958 that the Committee join them in supporting a two-phase

manned program. First they would get "Man-in-Space-Soonest" using the ballistic

missile (Atlas) approach; then they would proceed with their boost-glide vehicle.'

Before NACA and the Air Force could formalize any agreement, events in

Washington of a more political nature overtook them. President Dwight D.

Eisenhower, personally committed to keeping space a peaceful frontier, submitted a

bill to Congress in April in which he recommended establishing a new civilian agency

based on the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics that would manage this

country's space program. NACA waited for Congress to act before committing itself

to the Air Force's proposal.

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville,

Alabama, was also anxious to expand its ongoing intermediate range ballistic missile

projects into a program involving spaceflight. Under the leadership of Wernher von

Braun and other German rocket specialists brought to the U.S. after World War II,

ABMA had successfully developed several tactical missiles for the Army. The

Redstone missile was sent on its first test flight in 1953. Building on this reliable

booster, yon Braun's team added two upper stages with which to conduct their own

nose cone reentry tests (Jupiter C). Adding to the stack again, ABMA offered the

Juno I to the American International Geophysical Year (IGY) committee in 1955 as

the best vehicle for launching this country's first artificial satellite. In competition

with a project sponsored by the Naval Research Laboratory, the Army orbited the

first American satellite (Explorer) in January 1958. With success on their side, von

Braun angled for a manned spaceflight assignment, using proposals for a huge

clustered-engine rocket as bait. According to specialists in Alabama, not only was

orbital manned flight possible, it was a first step to manned lunar bases and space

stations. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), established in February

1958 to oversee the various space projects and proposals, approved ABMA's scheme

for the powerful rocket in August.t The Army, however, was not destined to

manage its own manned space program. In Washington, planners of the new civilian

space agency were assessing the possible value of yon Braun's rocket. 2

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) near Washington had been the home of

sounding rocket research in the U.S. since 1945. Refinements of these small rockets

during the postwar years inspired a group of engineers and scientists to respond to

the IGY call for a satellite. Although the Army, not NRL, launched the first orbiting

payload, Project Vanguard did add to the country's growing pool of knowledge

* Chap. 4, pp. 112-13, discusses Project Dyna-Soar. This glider design, which hv/d been promoted by

experts at Langley, was a lifting body-type vehicle. It was designated X-20 in 1962.

t During 1958, the Army was also suggesting that the Redstone missile could be used to launch a man

along a steep suborbital trajectory, after which he would splash down in the Atlantic. When Air Force officials declined to get involved in Project Man Very High, the Army renamed their plan Project Adam.

The proposal was not considered a practical one by the Department of Defense or ARPA and was not

funded.
94 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

about space. Within the Navy, there were other groups, the missile contingent

among them, who were interested in even more ambitious programs. With the Air

Force and NACA, the Navy contributed to the X-15 project, and the service supported aerospace medicine research) In 1958, the Navy added to the growing

number of proposals for manned spaceflight. Their study of a "Manned Earth

Reconnaissance" mission included plans for a cylindrical spacecraft with spherical

ends, which could be transformed into a delta-wing inflated glider once in orbit.

Project MER was not funded beyond a feasibility study.

NACA's Response to the Space Age

The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics met the space age introspectively. It had changed since its birth in 1915 from a strictly advisory group to a

research organization and policy maker, but it was little known outside the military

and the aircraft industry. The NACA laboratories' engineers conducted studies, carried out research, and delivered their reports, but it was not their job to apply the

results. The Committee's leaders of the 1940s had been reluctant to commit the

organization to a role in rocket propulsion research or the risky new field of

astronautics, and it was not until 1952 that a move was made to seriously study flight

in the upper atmosphere and space. One small group at the Langley laboratory, the

Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARD), was already using rockets as a

research tool on nearby Wallops Island, Virginia. Since 1945, PARD (originally the

Auxiliary Flight Division) had been measuring the effects of hypervelocity flight and

the resultant heating on models launched by small rockets: In California at the

Ames Research Laboratory, aerodynamicists working with H. Julian Allen conducted wind tunnel experiments with missile nose cone models for the Air Force.

They discovered that a blunt-bodied configuration rather than the sharp-nosed one

being considered at Convair for Atlas would survive atmospheric reentry. These

nose cone studies led Allen and his colleagues Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., and Stanford E.

Neise to speculate on designs suitable for manned spacecraft of the future. In an important paper, the three men discussed ballistic, skip, and glide vehicles)

As the Air Force Air Research and Defense Command's interest in manned

spaceflight grew, so did the amount of spaceflight-related research at NACA,

although it still remained low priority relative to aeronautics work. By 1957,

however, an estimated 40 to 50 percent of NACA's assignments involved space

research. Supporters of all three of the proposed general designs for a manned

spacecraft existed at NACA, with the early favorite, especially at Langley, being a

delta-wing fiat-bottom glider. Eggers borrowed from this configuration and the

ballistic shape to design what came to be called a lifting body- a semiballistic vehicle

with a certain amount of aerodynamic lift with a nearly flat top and a round bottom

(the M-l). This design was further refined, and models were built and flight-tested at

the Flight Research Center near Edwards Air Force Base, California.* PARD

engineers led by Maxime A. Faget and Paul E. Purser stuck by their original studies,

* See chapter 4, pp. 110-24, for more on NASA's lifting body program.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 95

which favored the ballistic shape. While the Langley researchers worked in their

spare time on refining their suggestions for a manned spaceflight, the Soviets orbited

the first two artificial satellites. NACA Headquarters in Washington reacted to

Sputnik with a new committee: the Special Committee on Space Technology; its

members were charged with finding ways in which NACA could participate more

aggressively in upper atmosphere and space research.

NACA was not the only body to form investigating committees in response to

the Soviet Union's mechanical moons. A U.S. Senate committee chaired by Lyndon

B. Johnson met to review America's prospects for a national space program. The

Secretary of Defense established ARPA. And President Eisenhower instructed his

new President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) to study the legality and

feasibility of a federally funded space program. In mid-April, the president sent his

proposed space bill to Congress, which reflected the advice of his scientific committee and a White House Advisory Committee on Government Organization. It did

not take the lawmakers long to revise and approve the National Aeronautics and

Space Act of 1958. Passed on July 16, the act was signed into law on the 29th, but it

took another month for the White House to assign the important manned

spaceflight task to the new civilian National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA). Robert R. Gilruth, the first chief of PARD and Langley's assistant director

when the space act was passed, was named to chair a NASA-ARPA Manned

Satellite Panel in September. These experts, who met for the first time in late

September 1958, would provide specific recommendations and a basic procedural

plan for NASA's manned program.
96 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-1.

Events that Influenced NASA's Manned Spaceflight Program prior to the Agency's

Establishment

Date Event

May 7, 1945

1946

Nov. 1948

Jan. 1951

Sept. 1951

Summer 1952

Summer 1953

1954-1955

Dec. 23, 1954

1955-1956

The Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory of the National Advisory

Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) created an Auxiliary Flight Division,

with an operational Research Station located at Wallops Island, Virginia. In

1946, this group, which carried out materials testing and other investigations

by means of small rocket launchings, was renamed the Pilotless Aircraft

Research Division (PARD). Robert R. Gilruth was chief of this division until

1952.

The Air Force awarded a contract to Convair to develop a long-range missile,

the MX774. Although the Air Force's missile program was cancelled the next

year, Convair continued its research in-house.

At Randolph Air Force Base, a panel under the direction of Harry G. Armstrong discussed "Aeromedical Problems of Space Travel." Three months

later Armstrong established a Department of Space Medicine at Randolph

under the direction of Hubertus Strughold.

With the reestablishment of the Air Force missile program, the Convair contract was reinstated; the proposed missile was named Atlas.

The first successful recovery of rocket-launched animals by an American

team took place at Holloman AFB; a monkey and 11 mice survived a sounding rocket flight (The first attempt at this experiment had been made in June

1948.)

In response to proposals to study hypersonic-class research aircraft, NACA's

Committee on Aerodynamics moved to expand its research program to include altitudes of 19 to 80 kilometers at speeds of Mach 4 to 10 and to devote

a modest effort to studying escape-velocity flights. Specialists at NACA's

Ames Aeronautical Laboratory under the leadership of H. Julian Allen conducted wind tunnel experiments with several configurations that were considered feasible for missile nose cones and spacecraft. Allen's team concluded

that a blunt-bodied vehicle would survive atmospheric reentry better than a

sharp-nosed one.

In August, the Army fired its first research and development model of the

Redstone missile and began to study nose cone reentry thermodynamics at

Redstone Arsenal. At Holloman AFB, the Space Biology Branch of the

Aeromedical Field Laboratory began a program that would last more than

five years to study weightlessness during parabolic flights. (Other groups interested in weightlessness studies at this time included the Department of

Space Medicine, Randolph AFB; the Wright Air Development Center,

Wright-Patterson AFB; the Navy School of Aviation Medicine; and NACA's

Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory.)

At Ames, studies were conducted on the impact of reentry heating on

hypervelocity missiles. In a paper, Allen, Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., and Stanford

E. Neise discussed the three basic designs they considered appropriate for

future space vehicles: ballistic, skip, and glide ("A Comparative Analysis of

the Performance of Long-Range Hypervelocity Vehicles," 1954.)

Representatives from NACA, the Air Force, and the Navy signed a

memorandum of understanding establishing a joint hypersonic research aircraft program. A design for the aircraft proposed at Langley had been accepted earlier in the year. The project was designated X-15 by the Air Force.

At the request of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, NACA tested materials

suitable for use as heat sinks and ablatives. The PARD group studied the heat
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 97

Table 2-1.

Events that Influenced NASA's Manned Spaceflight Program prior to the Agency's

Establishment (Continued)

Date Event

Early 1956

1956-1957

April 1957

June 11, 1957

Oct. 4, 1957

Oct. 9, 1957

Oct. 15-21, 1957

Winter 1957-1958

Nov. 3, 1957

transfer characteristics on variations of a basic blunt heat shield as suggested

by Allen of Ames.

The Air Force began letting contracts for feasibility studies of manned

satellites; specifically, the Air Force was looking for a project that would take

them beyond the X-15. In March, the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) established two research projects, one to investigate a manned

glide rocket research system and another to study a manned ballistic rocket

(the final stage of an ICBM). The Command also promoted extensive human

factors research at the School of Aviation Medicine, the Aeromedical Field

Laboratory, and the Aeromedical Laboratory.

In cooperation with the ARDC, NACA engineers at Langley, Lewis, and

Ames conducted manned spacecraft feasibility and design studies. The design

most favored was a flat-top round-bottom configuration. At Ames, Eggers

compared ballistic, skip, and glide vehicles in his search for a suitable design.

Because of its great weight, he revised his original optimum glider design to

include features from the ballistic and glider concepts, the result being a

semiballistic vehicle, blunt, but with a certain amount of aerodynamic lift

and a nearly flat top and round bottom (the M-1 lifting body design). Meanwhile, at Redstone Arsenal, the Army extended its studies of nose cone reentry by modifying and adding to the Redstone missile. The resulting multistage

vehicle was called Jupiter C by designer Wernher von Braun and his colleagues in Alabama. In conjunction with its nose cone manufacturers, the Air

Force was also investigating reentry heating. The ARDC's Division of

Human Factors had concluded that from a medical standpoint, sufficient

knowledge and expertise existed to support a manned space mission.

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) began studies of a large

clustered-engine booster capable of generating 6 672 000 newtons of thrust.

Atlas missile flight testing was begun.

The USSR successfully orbited Sputnik 1, the first manmade satellite.

An ad hoc committee of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board urged the

development of a second generation of ICBM's that could be used as boosters

for spacecraft, proposed a manned lunar mission, and recommended that the

Air Force launch reconnaissance, weather, and communications satellites as

soon as possible.

At a NACA conference at Ames, the three leading candidate configurations

for manned spacecraft were discussed: (1) a delta-wing flat-bottom glider

(favored by many at Langley); (2) a ballistic capsule (considered by PARD to

be the quickest solution to finding a workable design); and (3) Eggers' M-l,

which would weigh fi'om 1800 to 3400 kilograms (still too heavy for existing

boosters).

The American Rocket Society called for a civilian space agency, and the National Academy of Sciences endorsed a plan for a National Space Establishment. At Langley, Maxime A. Faget, Paul E. Purser, and other members of

PARD worked on refining a ballistic manned spacecraft design. Additionally, they started exploring the possibility of using a solid-fuel rocket for the

research and development phase of a manned program.

The USSR successfully orbited Sputnik 2 with a dog onboard. The ARDC

was charged with preparing a comprehensive astronautics program for the

Air Force. At a December 18-20 meeting of NACA's Committee on
98 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-1.

Events that Influenced NASA's Manned Spaceflight Program prior to the Agency's

Establishment (Continued)

Date Event

Jan. 23, 1958

Jan. 24, 1958

Jan. 29-31, 1958

Jan. 31, 1958

Feb. 1958

March 1958

Winter-Spring 1958

April 1958

Aerodynamics, the members called for increased, aggressive NACA participation in upper atmosphere and spaceflight research. On the 22nd, a

NACA Special Committee on Space Technology was formed with H.

Guyford Stever as chairman.

Senator Lyndon B. Johnson summarized the findings of the Senate

Preparedness Investigating Committee formed to review the U.S. space program. Their 17 recommendations included establishing an independent space

agency.

The ARDC's plan for astronautics called for reconnaissance, communications, and weather satellites, recoverable data capsules, manned capsules,

manned stations, and eventually a manned lunar base.

At a closed conference, 11 aircraft and missile companies outlined for the Air

Force and NACA their various proposals for manned satellite vehicles.

The Air Force formally invited NACA to participate in its man-in-space program. The Committee was asked to support both a one-orbit manned flight

and a boost-glide research airplane (Project Dyna-Soar, a design based on

Langley's delta-wing flat-bottom glider).

The Secretary of Defense created the Advanced Research Projects Agency

(ARPA) to manage all existing space projects. President Dwight D.

Eisenhower instructed the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC)

to study the feasibility of government-financed astronautical ventures and a

national space science program. Late in the month, a PSAC subcommittee

suggested establishing a new civilian space agency to be built around NACA.

Also during February, the NACA Committee on Aerodynamics was renamed

the Committee on Aircraft, Missile, and Spacecraft Aerodynamics.

ARPA recognized the Air Force's responsibility to accomplish manned

satellite flight as soon as the technology permitted, and the Department of

Defense authorized the Air Force to develop a liquid propellant upper stage

(Agena) to be used with Atlas or Thor. The ABMA also proposed a manned

spaceflight program, which included von Braun's ideas for a clustered-engine

booster. On March 10-12, ARDC held a conference in Los Angeles for Air

Force, NACA, and industry specialists who were working in the fields of

rocketry, aeronautics, or biotechnology. Most attendees agreed that a simple

ballistic capsule would offer the quickest means for getting man into orbit.

On the 14th, NACA officially informed the Air Force that it would cooperate

in drawing up a detailed manned satellite development plan. Also on the

14th, a NACA Conference on High-Speed Aerodynamics began at Ames, at

which Faget (PARD) presented a paper favoring the wingless nonlifting

ballistic configuration for manned spaceflight. (The paper was coauthored by

Faget, Benjamin J. Garland, and James J. Buglia).

At Langley, PARD and other research divisions devoted their time to working out the details of a manned mission that would utilize the ballistic-type

spacecraft and the Atlas missile. On another front, working to determine the

human body's tolerance to increased gravity, it was discovered at l-tolloman

AFB on a rocket-driven impact sled that 83g represented the limit of human

tolerance for deceleration. Using centrifuges at the Navy's Aviation Medical

Acceleration Laboratory and at the Air Force's Aeromedical Laboratory,

specialists determined that 8g represented the acceleration safety limit.

When the Air Force refused to participate in the Army's plans for an interservice "Man Very High" spaceflight project, the ABMA devised an Army-
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-1.

Events that Influenced NASA's Manned Spaceflight Program prior to the Agency's

Establishment (Continued)

99

Date Event

April 14, 1958

May 2, 1958

Mid-May 1958

June 16, 1958

July 11, 1958

July 16, 1958

Aug. 1958

Sept. 1958

Navy proposal called Project Adam. Using a modified Redstone, von Braun

and his colleagues wanted to launch a man in a sealed capsule along a steep

ballistic trajectory, after which the capsule would land in the ocean and be

recovered.

President Eisenhower sent his proposed space bill (based largely on PSAC's

advice and the White House Advisory Committee on Government Organization's suggestions) to Congress; special committees began hearings on the

bill.

Air Force Headquarters was sent detailed designs and procedures for the

ARDC Ballistic Missile Division's "Man-in-Space-Soonest" scheme.

NACA and the Air Force tabled their agreement to work together on a

ballistic manned spacecraft project.

ARPA approved a revised Air Force Man-in-Space-Soonest proposal that

called for using the Atlas rather than a proposed two-stage vehicle. However,

only funds for life support system studies were granted.

ARPA rejected the Army's Project Adam.

Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, creating

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Eisenhower signed the

act into law on the 29th.

Eisenhower assigned the new space administration specific responsibility for

developing and carrying out the mission of manned spaceflight. The Air

Force Man-in-Space-Soonest project was cancelled, money earmarked for it

being transferred to NASA. But the Air Force was allowed to proceed with

development of Dyna-Soar in conjunction with NASA. On the 15th, ARPA

provided the Army Ordnance Missile Command with the authority to

develop the Juno V launch vehicle based on von Braun's plans for a large

clustered-engine rocket.

A NASA-ARPA Manned Satellite Panel (Gilruth of Langley, chairman) was

formed to generate specific recommendations and a basic procedural plan for

NASA's manned satellite project. The panel began holding meetings during

the last week of the month.

Oct. 1, 1958 NASA officially began operations.
100 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Manned Spaceflight, 1958-1968

From the Langley engineers' studies of reentry configurations grew Project Mercury, NASA's first entry in the manned space program.* Project Mercury would

prove that one man could be safely launched into earth orbit in a ballistic-shaped

spacecraft, that he could survive increasing lengths of time in the weightlessness of

space, that his progress could be monitored by a global network of ground stations,

and that he could return safely to a predetermined splash-down point where crews

waited to recover him. Beyond earth orbit was the moon, orbiting space stations,

perhaps manned exploration of the planets. Mercury was only a simple first step. 6

NASA officials were working steadily toward manned orbital flight in the

spring of 1961, anticipating the first suborbital piloted missions that were scheduled

to take place soon, when the USSR launched another "space first." Yuri A. Gagarin

in Vostok 1 circled the earth on April 12. The U.S. was still 10 months away from its

first orbital manned mission. NASA had tested full-scale models of the Mercury

spacecraft during suborbital flights, had a team of astronauts in training, and had

successfully flight-tested the Redstone and Atlas boosters, but a Russian astronaut

had earned the title "first man in space." An American president would once again

react to Soviet space feats with a countermove. The United States was the

technological leader of the world, President John F. Kennedy asserted just weeks

after the Gagarin flight, and NASA would prove it by landing a man on the moon

and returning him safely by the end of the decade- an ambitious goal for the young

agency. 7 Project Apollo, NASA's proposed lunar enterprise, was thus given the administration's highest priority. Apollo would require great sums of money and most

of the agency's attention during its first decade. Before John Glenn could make the

first U.S. orbital flight aboard his Mercury Friendship 7 spacecraft in February

1962, NASA had already reorganized its headquarters management to reflect the increased commitment it had given Apollo.

However, NASA did not leap from Mercury to Apollo. Project Gemini, the intermediate step, called for a spacecraft larger than Mercury to accommodate two

passengers for longer missions. With more control over their spacecraft, Gemini

astronauts would demonstrate rendezvous and docking with other vehicles while in

orbit. These second-generation spacecraft circled earth in 1965 and 1966 on missions

lasting from 4 hours to 13 days. The highly successful project gave NASA's operations people experience with tracking and supporting two manned spacecraft

simultaneously and an appreciation for the mechanics of orbital rendezvous and extravehicular activity. It also gave von Braun's team in Alabama and the engineers at

the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston the time they needed to develop the

powerful Saturn V launch vehicle and the complex Apollo spacecraft.

*At an important meeting at Ames in March 1958, Faget delivered a formal paper defining the

ballistic-shaped manned spacecraft (Maxime A. Faget, Benjamin J. Garland, and James J. Buglia,

"Preliminary Studies of Manned Satellites- Wingless Configuration: Nonlifting," in "NACA Conference

on High-Speed Aerodynamics, Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, Moffett Field, Calif., Mar. 18, 19, and

20, 1958: A Compilation of Papers Presented," pp. 9-34, reissued as NASA Technical Note D-1254,

Langley Research Center, 1962).
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 101

Apollowithitscrewof threewouldnotbeboostedirectlytothemoon.From

earthorbit,Apolloandthefinalstageof thelaunchvehiclewouldbeginthetrip to

themoon.Alongtheway,thecommandandservicemodulewouldpullawayfrom

theSaturnstage,turnaroundandreturnto dockwithalunarmodule,andthencontinuethejourney.Fromlunarorbit,thelunarmodulewouldmakethelandingwith

twoof themen.Aftertheastronautshadcompletedtheirlunartasks,themodule

wouldreturnto theorbitingship.At thecloseof NASA'sfirstdecade,theagency

wasnearitslunargoal.In November1967,a SaturnVsuccessfullyorbitedanunmannedspacecraft(Apollo4). In December 1968, three Americans orbited the

moon aboard Apollo 8. 8 NASA was no longer in a contest with the Soviet Union to

reach earth's natural satellite; its race was with the calendar.*

Managing the Manned Program at NASA

Under NASA Headquarters's first organizational plan, manned spaceflight was

assigned to Abe Silverstein's Office of Space Flight Development as part of the Advanced Technology Program (Newell D. Sanders, assistant director). Even before

President Kennedy's decision in May 1961 to assign NASA the task of sending

astronauts to the moon before 1970, agency managers had been moving to

reorganize the Washington offices to correspond with four broad program areas:

applications, advanced research and technology, space sciences, and manned

spaceflight. It quickly became apparent that the Office of Manned Space Flight

(OMSF) under Director D. Brainerd Holmes would be responsible for NASA's major project of the decade, Apollo, to which Project Mercury and Project Gemini

were stepping stones. Reporting to Holmes were directors for launch vehicles, propulsion, spaceflight, and flight missions, systems engineering, aerospace medicine,

program review and resources management, and integration and checkout. In the

spring of 1963, Holmes added to his network of managers. Two deputy directors,

one for programs and one for systems, joined the team, along with a director for

systems studies and a representative from the Air Force Systems Command.

Holmes, who had been with RCA before joining NASA in November 1961, was

totally committed to achieving the lunar landing goal. He was so committed that he

and Administrator James E. Webb often disagreed over policy and budget matters,

especially when Webb believed that OMSF's demands threatened the agency's other

programs. In March 1963, Holmes testified that the administration's refusal to seek

supplemental funds for Apollo and Gemini had led to delays in Gemini's schedule.

NASA's director of manned spaceflight returned to industry soon thereafter. When

*The existence of an actual race to the moon with the Soviets is still under debate. Most experts

believe that any early discussions by Soviet spokesmen of manned flights to the moon and beyond were

political in nature or at least premature and not based on the actual hardware under development. The

Soviets relied on automatic spacecraft to explore the moon and the planets, devoting their manned program to increasingly sophisticated earth-orbital activities. During the early 1960s, however, it was the

firm conviction of many Americans that success with Project Apollo would prove the technological, and

thus the military, superiority of the U.S.
102 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

George E. Mueller became associate administrator for manned spaceflight on

September 1, 1963, the management responsibilities of the program had grown considerably. To assist him, Mueller often had up to four deputies plus a manned

spaceflight experiments board secretary on his staff. Also reporting to Mueller were

a representative from the Air Force Systems Command and directors for field center

development, program control, operations, space medicine, Gemini (until 1968),

Apollo, advanced manned missions, mission operations (added in 1965), Apollo applications (added in 1965), and safety (added in 1967). This large management structure was operating at the close of the agency's first decade (see table 2-2 for details

on OMSF's changing organization. 9

When President Eisenhower delegated authority for the country's manned space

program to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Administrator T.

Keith Glennan assigned the working level responsibility to Robert Gilruth. As assistant director of the Langley center, Gilruth had encouraged the small group of

designer-engineers from the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division in their studies of

the ballistic-shaped spacecraft. On November 5, 1958, Gilruth borrowed heavily

from PARD to build a Space Task Group (STG) with which to manage Project Mercury, the first phase of the agency's manned program.* Charles J. Donlan was appointed assistant program manager. In addition to his duties as program manager,

Gilruth was also assistant director for a new NASA center to be built near

Greenbelt, Maryland. Until their new home was ready, the Space Task Group would

stay at Langley. Gilruth's team reported directly to NASA Headquarters through

George M. Low, chief of manned spaceflight.l°

STG's size grew as Project Mercury matured. As specialists finished mission

definition studies and began the advanced engineering work, the group's ranks

reached 400 during the summer of 1959. One small cadre relocated in Florida at the

Atlantic Missile Range to ready NASA's manned launch site, while another went to

the midwest t_ oversee the work of the spacecraft prime contractor, McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, in St. Louis. In Virginia, Gilruth divided his organization into

three divisions: flight systems under Faget, engineering under James A. Chamberlin,

and operations under Charles Mathews. This three-directorate system was intact in

late 1960 when the manned spaceflight team learned they would not be moving to

the Goddard Space Flight Center along with the unmanned space projects group. Instead, the STG was declared an autonomous organization. The events of the spring

of 1961-Gagarin's orbital flight and Kennedy's declaration concerning a lunar

*Of the 36 original members of the STG from Langley, 14 were drawn from PARD (William M.

Bland, Jr., Aleck C. Bond, Maxime A. Faget, Edison M. Fields, Jack C. Heberlig, Clairborne R. Hicks,

Jr., Alan B. Kehlet, Ronald Kolenkiewicz, John B. Lee, Betsy F. Magin, Paul E. Purser, Herbert G. Patterson, Frank C. Robert, and Julia R. Watkins); 5 from the Flight Research Division (Robert G. Chilton,

Jerome B. Hammack, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Charles W. Mathews, and John P. Mayer); 2 from the

Instrument Research Division (William J. Bayer and Harry H. Ricker, Jr.), 2 from the Office of the

Assistant Director (Charles J. Donlan and Robert R. Gilruth), 2 from the Stability Research Division

(George F. MacDougall, Jr., and Charles H. Zimmerman), 1 from the Structures Research Division

(Melvin S. Anderson), 1 from the Full-Scale Tunnel Research Division (Paul D. Taylor), 1 from the

Dynamic Loads Division (William T. Lauten, Jr.), plus 1 each from the planning and fiscal offices

(William C. Muhly and Ronelda F. Sartor), and 3 stenographers and 3 file clerks. Ten other specialists

from the Lewis Research Center brought the total number of scientist-engineers to 38.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 103

landing-prompted NASA officials to find a permanent center for Gilruth's growing family, From a group of 20 prospective locations for the Manned Spacecraft

Center, NASA chose Houston, Texas, and Gilruth began moving his people south

into temporary quarters in October.* The relocation was completed by mid-1962.

Gilruth's management plan for MSC was not unlike the STG style: directorates

for administrative, engineering, and operations activities; program offices for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. Engineering and development (Faget), flight crew operations (Donald K. Slayton), and general operations (Christopher Kraft) were joined

by two new directorates in 1966: science and applications and medical operations.

Program offices were dropped when their objectives were met; new ones were added

to manage future flight projects: Apollo applications (1966) and advanced missions

(1968). (See table 2-3 for a summary of STG and MSC organizational changes.)

* During August 1961, a site selection team led by John F. Parsons (Ames Research Center) evaluated

20 cities in their search for a location that met 10 specific requirements for the new manned spaceflight

center. These requirements included available facilities for advanced scientific study, power facilities and

utilities, water supply, mild climate, adequate housing, at least 1003 acres of land, available industrial

facilities, transportation, including water for shipping by barge, jet service airport, and local cultural and

recreational facilities. Sites considered were Tampa and Jacksonville, Florida; New Orleans, Baton

Rouge, Shreveport, and Bogalusa, Louisiana; Houston, Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Victoria, Liberty,

and Harligen, Texas; St. Louis, Missouri; Los Angeles, Berkeley, San Diego, Richmond, Moffett Field,

and San Francisco, California; and Boston, Massachusetts. On September 19, it was announced that

MSC would be constructed on 1000 acres donated by Rice University southeast of Houston. On

November 1, the STG was officially redesignated the Manned Spacecraft Center, with Gilruth as director.
104 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-2.

Four Phases of Manned Spaceflight

Management, NASA Headquarters*

Phase I

Oct. 1958-Oct. 1961

Administrator/Deputy Administrator/Associate Administrator

Director, Space Flight Development (Abe Silverstein); office renamed Space Flight Programs in 1960

Assistant Director, Advanced Technology (Newell D. Sanders); office renamed Applications and

Manned Flight Programs in 1960

Chief, Manned Space Flight (George M. Low)

Chief, Manned Satellites (Warren J. North)

Chief, Advanced Manned Systems (John H. Disher)

Chief, Biotechnology (G. Dale Smith); office dropped in 1960

Staff Scientist (Richard J. Wisniewski); office dropped in 1961

Chief, Plans and Evaluation (Merle G. Waugh); office added in 1961

Phase lI

Nov. 1961-Winter 1962-1963

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Director, Manned Space Flight (D. Brainerd Holmes)

Executive Assistant (Clyde Bothmer)

Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Milton W. Rosen)

Deputy Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Stanley M. Smolensky); office added

Aug. 1962

Executive Assistant (John R. Schaibley; William T. Ashley, 1962)

Technical Assistant (Harvey Hall)

Assistant Director, Launch Vehicle Engineering (Eldon W. Hall; Rosen, acting, 1962)

Assistant Director, Vehicles (Richard B. Canright; Smolensky, acting, 1962)

Assistant Director, Propulsion (Adelbert O. Tischler)

Assistant Director, Launch Operations (Gus A. D'Onofrio; John K. Holcomb, June 1962)

Director, Spacecraft and Flight Missions (Low)

Executive Assistant (Paul E. Cotton)

Assistant Director, Apollo Spacecraft Development (Disher)

Assistant Director, Manned Satellite Programs (North; Daniel D. McKee, 1962)

Assistant Director, Manned Spaceflight Operations (Harper E. Van Ness)

Assistant Director, Human Engineering (Fred Ireland)

Chief, Future Projects, Plans, and Evaluations (Waugh, 1962); office dropped in 1962

Deputy Director, Systems Engineering (Joseph F. Shea)

Executive Assistant (Joseph R. Quinn)

Director, Systems Engineering (John A. Gautraud)

Assistant Director, Systems Engineering, Vehicle and Spacecraft (Eldon W. Hall); office

renamed Design and Performance in 1962

Assistant Director, Flight Systems (Michael Yarymovych); office added in Oct. 1962

Assistant Director, Communications and Tracking (James H. Turnock, Jr.)
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table2-2.

FourPhasesof MannedSpaceflight

Management,NASAHeadquarters*(Continued)

105

AssistantDirector,DesignPracticesandReliability(JamesE.O'Neill)

Director,SystemsStudies(WilliamA.Lee)

AssistantDirector,EvaluationStudies(DouglasR.Lord);officerenamedSystemsStudies

MissionPlanninginearly1962andthenProgramPlanninglaterin1962

AssistantDirector,EngineeringStudies(WilliamB.Taylor)

AssistantDirector,HumanFactors(WilliamA.Lee)

AssistantDirector,SpaceScienceStudies(vacant)

Director,AerospaceMedicine(CharlesH.Roadman)

DeputyDirector,AerospaceMedicine(GeorgeM.Knauf);officeaddedinJan.1962

ExecutiveAssistant(J.RobertBrown)

TechnicalAssistant,ProgramControlandSystems(AlfredM.Mayo);officedroppedin1962

AssistantDirector,Analysis(JamesP.Nolan,Jr.);officerenamedPlansandProgramsin 1962

AssistantDirector,MedicalOperations(W.R.Turner;DavidH.Stoddard,1962)

AssistantDirector,AdvancedTechnicalDevelopment(FrankB.Voris;JosephConnor,1962); officerenamedTestandEvaluationn1962

Director,ProgramReviewandResourcesManagement(WilliamE.Lilly)

Assistants,ProgramManagment(SecrestL.BerryandJuanita Hathcock)

Assistant Director, Plans and Resources (William P. Risso)

Assistant Director, Facilities (Rodolfo A. Diaz)

Chief, Program Management Support (Alex P. Nagy)

Director, Integration and Checkout (James E. Sloan; directorate added in Feb. 1962)

Executive Assistant (Schaibley)

Assistant Director, Checkout (Jack F. Underwood)

Assistant Director, Reliability Assessment (Richard H. Myers)

Assistant Director, Integration (vacant)

Phase III

Spring 1963-Aug. 1963

Administrator/Deputy

Associate Administrator

Director, Manned Space Flight (D. Brainerd Holmes)

Executive Assistant (Bothmer)

Deputy Director (Programs) (Low)

Executive Assistant (Cotton)

Deputy Director (Systems) (Shea)

Special Assistant (Systems) (Bert A. Denicke)

Deputy to Commander, Air Force Systems Command (Osmond J. Ritland)

Assistant Deputy to Commander, Air Force Systems Command (Harvey W. C. Shelton)

Executive Officer (John B. Chickering)

Director, Space Medicine (John M. Talbot)

Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Donald H. Heaton)
106 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-2.

Four Phases of Manned Spaceflight

Management, NASA Headquarters* (Continued)

Phase III (Continued)

Spring 1963-Aug. 1963

Director, Program Review and Resources Management (C. C. Lutman)

Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Robert F. Freitag)

Executive Assistants (Ashley and Harvey Hall)

Deputy Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Smolensky)

Assistant Director, Vehicles (Smolensky, acting)

Assistant Director, Propulsion (Tischler)

Assistant Director, Launch Operations (John K. Holcomb)

Director, Spacecraft and Flight Missions (Low, acting)

Executive Assistant (Cotton, acting)

Assistant Director, Apollo Spacecraft Development (Disher)

Assistant Director, Information and Control Systems and Human Factors (Ireland)

Assistant Director, Manned Spaceflight Operations (Van Ness)

Assistant Director, Manned Satellites (McKee)

Director, Systems Engineering (Gautraud)

Assistant Director, Communications and Tracking (Turnock)

Assistant Director, Design and Performance (Eldon W. Hall)

Assistant Director, Flight Systems (Yarymovych)

Director, Systems Support Group (Cole)

Director, Systems Studies (William A. Lee)

Assistant Director, Engineering Studies (Taylor)

Assistant Director, Hum_.n Factor Studies (vacant)

Assistant Director, Program Planning (Lord)

Assistant Director, Exploration Studies (vacant)

Director, Aerospace Medicine (Roadman)

Deputy Director, Aerospace Medicine (Knauf)

Executive Assistant (J. Robert Brown)

Assistant Director, Development Test and Evaluation (Connor)

Assistant Director, Medical Operations (Stoddard)

Assistant Director, Plans and Programs (Nolan)

Director, Program Review and Resources Management (Lilly)

Assistants, Program Management (Berry and Hathcock)

Assistant Director, Plans and Resources (Risso)

Assistant Director, Facilities (Diaz)

Chief, Program Management Support (vacant)

Director, Integration and Checkout (vacant)

Executive Assistant (Schaibley)

Assistant Director, Checkout (Underwood)

Assistant Director, Reliability Assessment (O'Neill)

Assistant Director, Integration (Philip S. Selvaggi)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-2.

Four Phases of Manned Spaceflight

Management, NASA Headquarters* (Continued)

107

Phase IV

Sept. 1963-1968

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight (George E. Mueller)

Deputy Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight (Low, Nov. 1963-May 1964; James C.

Elms, Sept. l%5-Sept. 1966; Edgar M. Cortright, Oct. 1967-Apr. 1968; Charles W. Mathews,

May 1968)

Executive Assistant (Cotton); office dropped in 1964

Special Assistants (Everett E. Christiansen and Joe T. Dickerson); office added in 1964 and

dropped in 1965

Deputy Associate Administrator (Management) (William B. Rieke, Nov. 1964-June 1965; Frank

A. Bogart, Sept. 1965)

Deputy Associate Administrator (Programs) (David M. Jones, Nov. 1964); office dropped in

May 1967

Deputy Associate Administrator (Technical) (Shea, Apr.-July 1%7; Harold T. Luskin, MarchApr. 1968; Charles J. Donlan, May 1968)

Deputy Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight Operations (Walter C. Williams,

Nov. l%3-Apr. 1964); office dropped in Apr. 1964

Executive Secretary, Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (Denicke; William O. Armstrong,

1967); briefly during 1965 this function was assigned to the Advanced Manned Mission Program

Office

Deputy to Commander for Space, Manned Space Flight, Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)

(Ritland; Harry L. Evans, 1%6), directorate reduced in size in early 1%7 and dropped later

that year

Assistant Deputy to Commander for Space, Manned Space Flight, AFSC (Shelton); office

dropped in 1964 but reactivated as Assistant Deputy to Commander for Space Systems in early

1967 to oversee reduced operations (Walter R. Hedrick)

Executive Officer (Chickering); office dropped in 1964

Director, AFSC Directorate, NASA Program Support (John M. Coulter, 1964; Harry B. Allen,

1964); office added in 1964; redesignated Chief, NASA Programs Support Division in early

1967

Director, Gemini Program Support (M. P. Yopchick; W. J. Fry, 1%5; Herman Dorfman,

1%6); office dropped in early 1967

Director, Apollo and MOL Program Support (Dorfman, 1965; James E. Miller, 1%7); office

changed to Systems Officer, Apollo and MOL, in 1%7

Director, Advanced Manned Mission Support (Coulter, 1964; Allen, 1964; John R. Burke,

1965; James E. Miller, 1966)

Director, Program Support (Lutman; Yopchick, 1%5; James E. Miller, 1965); office

redesignated Systems Officer, Program Support, in 1967

Director, Biomedical Support (Donald C. Almy, 1964; H. Grady Wise, 1%5); office

redesignated Systems Officer, Biomedical Support, in 1%7

Director, Procurement Processes Support (Alvin E. Greenhorn); office added in 1%5 and

dropped in 1966

Director, Manned Space Flight Field Center Development (Freitag)
108 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-2.

Four Phases of Manned Spaceflight

Management, NASA Headquarters* (Continued)

Deputy Director, Manned Space Flight Field Center Development (Smolensky; Freitag, acting,

1968; V. John Lyle, Aug. 1968); office added in Nov. 1963

Director, Technical Staff (William F. Moore); position called Executive Assistant in 1964-1965,

and Chief, Technical Staff, in 1965-1967

Director, Logistics (Smolensky; office renamed Center Development Planning in 1964 and

dropped in 1965

Director, Manpower (Freitag, acting, 1964-1965; Smolensky, acting, 1966; William J. Bolce,

1967); office renamed Special Operations in 1964 and Special Staff in 1965

Director, Resources (Van Ness); office dropped in 1964

Director, Manned Space Flight Program Control (Lilly; Bogart, acting, March 1967; Maynard E.

White, June 1967; Jerald R. Kubat, Jan. 1968)

Executive Assistant (Albert P. Little, 1963-1965; Anthony Cannetti, 1968)

Director, Facilities Management (Diaz; Maynard E. White, acting, 1967; Harry Mitchell, 1968);

office known as Facilities Programming Construction in 1964-1967; office dropped in 1968

Director, Plans and Analysis (Norman Rafel)

Director, Programming Operations (Lilly, acting; Bernard L. Johnson, June 1964)

Director, Test Systems Requirements (Lilly, acting, 1965); office operated only briefly in 1965

Director, Resources Analysis (Charles E. Koenig); office added in Nov. 1968

Director, Manned Space Flight Management Operations (Bothmer; Bogart, Feb. 1965; Cotton,

Sept. 1965; White, Jan. 1968)

Executive Assistant (Harold E. Pryor); office dropped in 1965

Director, Management Assistant and Personnel (William R. Sweeny; C. C. Coyne, 1965); office

added in 1964

Director, Procurement Management (M. J. Barkdull Kahao; Charles J. Bingman, July 1966;

Cotton, acting, June 1967; William P. Davis, 1968)

Chief, Special Services (Jay Holmes); office dropped in 1964

Director, Space Medicine (Knauf, acting; W. Randolph Lovelace, II, Apr. 1964; Jack Bollerud,

acting, Feb. 1966; James W. Humphreys, June 1967)

Deputy Director, Space Medicine (Knauf, Apr.-Dec. 1964; Bollerud, June 1965-June 1967); office dropped in 1967

Assistant, Program Coordination (Herbert S. Brownstein)

Director, Medical Science and Technology (Sherman P. Vinograd); office called Professional

Services in 1963-1964

Director, Medical Operations (Knauf, acting; vacant, 1965-1966); office dropped in 1966

Director, Lunar Receiving Operations (John Pickering); office added in 1966; earlier that year

Picketing held the post Special Assistant to Director, Space Medicine

Director, Gemini Program (Low, acting; Mueller, acting, 1965-1968); directorate was downgraded

in early 1967 and disbanded entirely in 1968

Special Assistant (Samuel H. Hubbard); Hubbard continued in this post until the directorate

was disbanded in 1968

Deputy Director, Gemini Program (William E. Schneider; LeRoy E. Day, acting, Oct. 1965;

John A. Edwards, July 1966)

Director, Program Control (Richard C. Henry; Anthony L. Liccardi, acting, 1964; J. Pemble

Field, 1965; William A. Summerfelt, acting, 1965)

Director, Systems Engineering (Eldon W. Hall, Dec. 1963-Nov. 1966)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 109

Table 2-2.

Four Phases of Manned Spaceflight

Management, NASA Headquarters* (Continued)

Director, Test (Day; Charles W. McGuire, acting 1965-1966; Clarence C. Gay, Jr., 1966)

Director, Flight Operations (Edwards; Hubbard, July 1966)

Director, Reliability and Quality (Dwight C. Cain; Schneider, acting, 1965; Day, 1965-1966; Edwards, July 1966)

Director, Apollo Program (Mueller, acting; Samuel C. Phillips, Oct. 1964)

Deputy Director, Apollo Program (Phillips, Jam-Oct. 1964; Lee B. James, Feb. 1967; George

H. Hage, Jan. 1968)

Executive Assistant (Schaibley; Gilbert L. Roth, 1967; Schaibley, 1967)

Deputy Director (Programs) (Turnock); office added in 1966 and dropped in 1968

Deputy Director (Engineering) (Hage, Oct. 1967-Jan. 1968; William E. Stoney, Sept. 1968); office added in 1967

Special Assistant (Operational Readiness) (Harold G. Russell); office added in 1966 and

dropped in 1967

Special Assistant (Allen Jones); office operated only briefly in 1967

Assistant Director (Management) (Thomas E. Jenkins); office added in Feb. 1968

Mission Director (Schneider); office added in July 1967

Assistant Mission Directors (Chester M. Lee, Aug. 1966-1968; and Thomas H. McMullen,

1968); both men served as assistant directors in 1968

Director, Program Control (Phillips, acting, 1964; Milo L. Seccomb, 1965; Kubat, July 1967;

James B. Skaggs, Jan. 1968)

Director, Test (Disher; Melvyn Savage, Aug. 1965; Day, July 1966)

Director, Flight Operations (Williams, acting; Holcomb, Nov. 1963)

Director, Reliability and Quality Control (Turnock; George A. Lemke, 1964; George C. White,

Jr., Nov. 1966)

Director, Apollo Lunar Exploration (Lee R. Scherer); directorate added in Dec. 1967; the

several assistant directorships were added during 1968

Assistant Director, Flight Systems Development (William T. O'Bryant)

Assistant Director, Lunar Science (R. J. Allenby)

Assistant Director, Lunar Sample Program (Benjamin Milwitsky)

Assistant Director, Lunar Sample Program (Verl R. Wilmarth)

Director, Systems Engineering (Bellcomm) (Thomas H. Thompson, 1964; Robert L. Wagner,

1967)

Vice President, General Manager (Boeing) (George Stoner; C. A. Wilkinson, 1968); office

added in 1967; Wilkinson's title was Assistant Division Manager (Boeing)

Washington Office (General Electric) (Jack E. Vessely); office added in 1968

Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program (Edward Z. Gray; George S. Trimble, Apr. 1967;

Lord, acting, Oct. 1967; Cortright, acting, early 1968; Donlan, acting, May 1968)

Executive Assistant (William A. LaRue)

Deputy Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program (Lord); office added in Nov. 1966

NASA-USAF Technical Director, MOL (Yarymovych); office added in 1965 and dropped in

1968

NASA DoD Technical Advisor (Hubbard); office added in 1968

Director, Program Control (Gray, acting, 1964; Walter C. Beckwith, 1965; Waugh, 1967)

Director, Special Manned Space Flight Studies (Taylor); office dropped in 1965
110 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-2.

Four Phases of Manned Spaceflight

Management, NASA Headquarters* (Continued)

Director, Systems Engineering (Lord, Eldon W. Hall, Nov. 1966; Brian T. Howard, Dec. 1967)

Director, Manned Space Flight Advanced Technology (William D. Greene); office dropped in

1965

Director, Vehicle Studies (Lester K. Fero; A. Daniel Schnyer, March 1965); office renamed

Transportation Systems in 1968

Director, Earth Orbital Mission Studies (Yarymovych, acting; Maurice J. Raffensperger, 1974);

office dropped in March 1968

Director, Lunar Mission Studies (Thomas C. Evans, acting; Franklin P. Dixon, acting, Feb.

1965; Thomas E. Hanes, spring 1965; Philip E. Culbertson, Sept. 1965; P. Grosz, May 1967);

office dropped in March 1968

Director, Planetary Mission Studies (Lord, acting; Dixon, June 1964); office dropped in March

1968

Director, Experiments (Lord, acting; Armstrong, 1967); office added in 1965 and renamed

Payloads in March 1968

Executive Secretary, Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (Denicke); office added in summer 1965, but by year's end it was moved back to the direct purview of the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight

Director, Supporting Development (Eldon W. Hall); office added in Dec. 1967

Director, Mission Planning and Operations (Raffensperger; Lord, acting, Apr. 1968; Jack W.

Wild, winter 1968); office added in March 1968

Director, Manned Spacecraft (Dixon); office added in March 1968

Director, Mission Operations (Christensen; John D. Stevenson, Feb. 1967); directorate added in

Jan. 1965

Executive Assistant (Joseph W. Cover; L. K. Abernethy, acting, winter 1967; Archer W. Kinny,

1968)

Deputy Directors, Mission Operations (Carroll H. Bolender, Schneider, and Roderick O. Middleton); offide added in 1966 and dropped in mid-1967

Mission Directors (Bolender, Jan. 1965-early 1966; and Robert Thompson, June 1965-early

1966); this office was dropped in early 1966 and the mission director function transferred to the

various program offices

Assistant Mission Director (Apollo) (Chester M. Lee); this office was briefly part of Mission Operations in 1967; function was assumed by the Apollo Program Office

Director, Operations Support Requirements (B. Porter Brown)

Chief, Ground Operations Support Systems (William E. Miller); office renamed Information

and Control Systems in 1967

Chief, Flight Crew Support (Reuben P. Prochard, Jr.; Thomas U. McElmurry, 1965; John Prodan, 1967)

Director, Systems Analysis (Bellcomm) (John Hibbert); office added in 1967

Chief, Operations Planning (Chester M. Lee, Aug. 1965-July 1966; Nolan, mid-1967 to

mid-1968); office added in Aug. 1965

Chief, Program Control (Abernethy); office added in mid-1967

Director, Saturn/ Apollo Applications (Harold G. Russell; David M. Jones, acting, mid-1965;

Mathews, Dec. 1966; Luskin, May 1968); directorate added in Apr. 1965 as the Saturn IB/Centaur

Program; it was renamed and expanded later in 1965 and then renamed again in late 1967 to

Apollo Applications Program

Deputy Director, Saturn/Apollo Applications (Fero; Disher, Aug. 1965)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 1 1 1

Table 2-2.

Four Phases of Manned Spaceflight

Management, NASA Headquarters* (Continued)

Executive Assistant (Stephan S. Levenson); office added in mid-1966

Assistant (Programs) (Hubbard); office operated only briefly in 1968

Director, Saturn IB/Centaur (Russell); office operated only briefly in 1968

Director, Program Control (Field)

Director, Test (Disher, acting, 1965; Savage, July 1966)

Director, Flight Operations (Taylor, acting; Edwards, Dec. 1966)

Director, Reliability, Quality, and Safety (Field, acting; Haggai Cohen, Sept. 1966)

Director, Apollo Extension Systems (Taylor; Culbertson, May 1967); office renamed Project

Integration in mid-1967

Director, Systems Engineering (Bellcomm) (P. L. Havenstein; George M. Anderson, acting,

1966; Donald R. Hagner, 1967)

Director, Manned Space Flight Safety (Jerome Lederer); directorate added in June 1967

Deputy Director, Manned Space Flight Safety (Philip H. Bolger); office added in Nov. 1967

*These four phases represent composites for each time period. Refer to Appendix A and other NASA

historical publications for complete organization charts. Phase four (Sept. 1963-1968) includes many offices

whose existence was short-lived within the 11 OMSF directorates; extra information has been included to indicate when these offices were added or dropped.
112 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1968

Phase I

1959-Oct. 1961

Director (Robert R. Gilruth)

Associate Director, Development (Charles J. Donlan)

Associate Director, Operations (Walter C. Williams)

Special Assistant (Paul E. Purser)

Technical Assistant (James A. Chamberlin); office dropped in 1960

Executive Assistant (Raymond L. Zavasky)

Chief, Hight Systems Division (Maxime A. Faget)

Assistant Chief, Flight Systems (Robert O. Piland); Piland's title was changed to Assistant Chief, Advanced Projects in 1960

Executive Engineer, Hight Systems (J. T. Markley); office dropped in 1960

Assistant Chief, Mercury Support (Aleck C. Bond); office added in early 1960

Chief, Engineering and Contract Administration Division (Chamberlin); office renamed

Engineering Division in 1960

Assistant Chief, Engineering and Contract Administration (Andr6 J. Meyer, Jr.; and William M.

Bland, Jr., 1960)

Executive Engineer (Norman F. Smith); office dropped in 1960

Chief, Operations Division (Charles W. Mathews)

Assistant Chief, Implementation (G. Merritt Preston)

Assistant Chief, Plans and Arrangements (Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.)

Executive Engineer (Chris C. Critzos); office dropped in 1960

Head, Astronauts and Training (Keith G. Lindell)

Flight Surgeon (William K. Douglas)

Training Officer (Robert B. Voas)

Important points regarding Phase I: The first organization chart drawn up for the Space Task Group was

dated Sept. 1959, but it was functioning as an organization by Oct. 7, 1958. The third chart (Sept. 1960)

gave Faget's flight systems division responsibility for Mercury and Apollo. Astronaut activities were

directly under the office of the director. Reporting to the Flight Systems Division were the following

branches: electrical systems, flight dynamics, life systems, systems engineering, and structures. Reporting

to the Engineering and Contract Administration Division were branches for contracts and scheduling and

project engineering. Four branches added to the Operations Division in 1960 managed mission analysis,

flight control, recovery operations, and launch operations. Although an Apollo office was established in

Sept. 1960, a manager for that office was not selected until the next major reorganization.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 113

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1968

Phase II

Nov. 1961-1962

Director (Gilruth)

Associate Director (Williams)

Special Assistant (Purser)

Executive Assistant (Zavasky)

Technical Assistant (Don T. Gregory)

Assistant, Human Factors (Voas)

Special Assistant, Astronaut Affairs (Ford Eastman); office added in June 1962

Manager, Mercury Program Office (Kenneth S. Kleinknecht)

Manager, Gemini Project Office (Chamberlin)

Manager, Apollo Program Office (Charles W. Frick)

Assistant Director, Administration (Wesley L. Hjornevik)

Assistant Director, Research and Development (Faget)

Chief, Spacecraft Research Division (Mathews)

Chief, Life Systems Division (White)

Chief, Systems Evaluation and Development Division (Bond)

Chief, Space Physics Division (vacant)

Assistant Director, Operations (Mathews; vacant, Jan. 1962)

Chief, Aerospace Medical Operations (Charles A. Berry)

Chief, Preflight Operations (Preston)

Chief, Flight Operations Division (Kraft)

Chief, Flight Crew Operations (Warren J. North)

Important points regarding Phase II: This phase represents the Space Task Group's reorganization as the

Manned Spacecraft Center. Offices for the three flight programs stood alone outside the directorates.

During this period, Kraft's Flight Operations Division in the operations directorate grew dramatically as

the center readied for Mercury's first orbital missions. Astronaut training was part of flight crew operations in the operations directorate. An assistant director for engineering support with four chiefs assigned

to him was carried on the operations directorate's organization chart during this period, but the positions

were not filled.
1 14 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1%8 (Continued)

Phase III

Spring-Fall 1963

Director (Gilruth)

Deputy Director, Development and Programs (James C. Elms)

Deputy Director, Mission Requirements and Flight Operations (Williams)

Special Assistant (Purser)

Engineering Advisor (Chamberlin)

Assistant, Human Factors (Voas)

Executive Assistant (Zavasky)

Technical Assistant (Gregory)

Manager, Mercury Program Office (Kleinknecht)

Deputy Manager, Mercury Program Office (Bland)

Manager, Gemini Project Office (Mathews)

Manager, Apollo Program Office (Robert Piland, acting; Joseph F. Shea, Oct. 1963)

Deputy Manager, Spacecraft (Robert Piland)

Deputy Manager, Lunar Module (James L. Decker)

Assistant Director, Administration (Hjornevik)

Assistant Director, Engineering and Development (Faget)

Chief, Spacecraft Technology (William E. Stoney)

Chief, Crew Systems (Richard Johnston)

Chief, Systems Evaluation and Development (Bond)

Chief, Space Environment (Faget, acting)

Assistant Director, Information and Control Systems (G. Barry Graves)

Chief, Instrumentation and Electronic Systems (Graves, acting)

Chief, Computation and Data Reduction (Brock)

Manager, Ground Systems Project Office (Paul H. Vavra)

Chief, Flight Crew Operations (North)

Chief, Flight Operations (Kraft)

Chief, Preflight Operations (Preston)

Chief, Center Medical Operations (Berry)

Coordinator, Astronaut Activities (Donald K. Slayton)

Important points regarding Phase III: The spring 1963 reorganization was an attempt to divide MSC's

operational activities from its developmental work. Crew, flight, preflight, and medical operations all fell

under the supervision of the director.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1968 (Continued)

115

Phase IV

Nov. 1963-1965

Director (Gilruth)

Deputy Director (Elms; George M. Low, Feb. 1964)

Special Assistant (Purser)

Senior Engineering Advisor (Chamberlin); office dropped in late 1964

Executive Assistant (Zavasky, Nov. 1963-1ate 1964; Stanley P. Weiss, acting, 1965); office dropped in

1965

Technical Assistant (Gregory, Nov. 1963-1ate 1964; Weiss, 1965); office dropped in 1965

Manager, Gemini Program Office (Mathews)

Deputy Manager (Kleinknecht)

Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (Shea)

Deputy Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (Robert Piland; William A. Lee, 1965); position renamed Assistant Manager in 1965

Chief, Ground Systems Engineering (Roll W. Lanzkroa); office replaced by Flight Projects

Division in 1965

Chief, Operations Planning (Lee)

Chief, Program Control (J. Thomas Markley)

Chief, Reliability and Quality Assurance (vacant; Owen G. Morris, 1964)

Chief, Systems Engineering (Owen E. Maynard)

Chief, Checkout and Test (Bland)

Assistant Director, Administration (Hjornevik)

Assistant Director, Engineering and Development (Faget)

Deputy Assistant Director, Engineering and Development (Graves); office dropped in 1965

Manager, Systems Test and Evaluation (Bond); office added in 1965

Manager, Special Design Efforts (Chamberlin); office added in 1965

Manager, Engineering and Development Experiments (Robert Piland); office added in 1965

Chief, Long-Range Planning (Thomas W. Briggs); office added in 1965

Chief, Information Systems (Vavra)

Chief, Crew Systems (Johnston)

Chief, Instrumentation and Electronic Systems (Ralph S. Sawyer)

Chief, Guidance and Control (Robert C. Duncan)

Chief, Propulsion and Power (Joseph G. Thibodaux, Jr.)

Chief, Structures and Mechanics (Joseph N. Kotanchik)

Chief, Advanced Spacecraft Technology (Stoney)

Chief, Experiments Program Office (Robert Piland); office added in 1966

Assistant Director, Flight Crew Operations (Slayton)

Chief, Astronaut Office (Slayton, acting; Alan B. Shepard, July 1964)

Chief, Aircraft Operations (Joseph S. Algranti)

Chief, Flight Crew Support (North)

Assistant Director, Operations (Kraft)
116 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1%8 (Continued)

Manager, Operations Planning and Development (Sigurd A. Sjoberg)

Chief, Flight Control (John D. Hodge)

Chief, Landing and Recovery (Robert F. Thompson)

Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis (John P. Mayer)

Chief, Flight Support (Henry E. Clements); office added in 1%5

Chief, Center Medical Programs (Berry)

Chief, Center Medical Office (D. Owen Coons)

Manager, MSC Florida Operations (Preston); office dropped in Dec. 1964 when the Kennedy

Space Center assumed the duties

Manager, MSC White Sands Missile Range Operations (Martin L. Raines)

Important points regarding Phase I V: With a Nov. 1963 reorganization, MSC settled back into the threedirectorate pattern (plus the administrative directorate). Mercury personnel were reassigned elsewhere

(primarily to Gemini and Apollo). The engineering and development directorate expanded noticeably.

Astronaut Slayton became assistant director for a new flight crew operations directorate, and Kraft, with

his growing flight operations team, assumed leadership of the operations directorate. Two separate offices were established to handle life sciences matters: center medical programs and center medical office.

Two offices directed off-site operations at the Cape and at White Sands.

Phase V

1966-1%7

Director (Gilruth)

Deputy Director (Low, George S. Trimble, Oct. 1967)

Special Assistant (Purser)

Special Assistant, Long-Range Planning (Julian M. West); office briefly called Advanced

Spacecraft Planning in early 1966

Technical Assistant (Robert Piland); office added in Dec. 1967

Executive Assistant (M. Scott Carpenter; vacant, May 1%6); office dropped in mid-1966

Manager, Gemini Program Office (Mathews); program concluded in Nov. 1966

Deputy Manager (Kleinknecht)

Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (Shea; Low, Apr. 1%7)

Assistant Manager(s), Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (Lee, Jan. l%6-spring 1967; Kotanchik,

Jan.-mid-1966; Markley, spring 1967; Kleinknecht, spring-summer 1%7)

Manager, Lunar Module (Lee; C. H. Bolender, fall 1967); office added in spring 1967

Manager, Command and Service Module (Kleinknecht); office added in Feb. 1%7

Chief, Flight Projects Division (Lanzkron); office dropped in spring 1%6

Chief, Systems Engineering (Maynard; Robert W. Williams, spring 1%6; Maynard, fall 1967)

Chief, Reliability, Quality, and Test (Morris; Bland, spring 1966; Donald D. Arabian, late 1967);

called Reliability and Test in early 1966, while a separate office attended to Checkout and Test

(Bland); the two were combined in spring 1966 under Bland

Chief, Program Control (Markley; McClintock, spring 1967)

Chief, Lunar Module Project Engineering and Checkout (Morris); office added in spring 1966
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 1 17

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1968 (Continued)

Chief, Command and Service Module Project Engineering and Checkout (Lanzkron); office added

in spring 1966

Chief, Mission Operations (Maynard); office added in spring 1966

Chief, Mission Support (A.D. Mardel); office added in 1967

Chief, Test Division (Mardel); office added in fall 1967 in addition to Reliability, Quality, and Test

under Bland

Manager, Apollo Applications Program Office (Low, acting; vacant, Apr.-Nov. 1967; Thompson,

Dec. 1967); office added in July 1966 and expanded in early 1967

Deputy Manager, Apollo Applications Program Office (Thompson)

Head, Future Missions (Harold E. Gartrell)

Head, Mission Operations (Wyendell B. Evans)

Head, Program Control (vacant)

Head, Systems Engineering (Homer W. Dotts)

Head, Test Operations (W. Harry Douglas)

Head, Orbital Workshop Project (Kenneth F. Hecht)

Director, Administration (Hjornevik)

Director, Engineering and Development (Faget)

Manager, Systems Test and Evaluation (Bond); office combined with Special Design and Analysis to

form the Design and Analysis Office in fall 1967

Manager, Special Design and Analysis (Chamberlin); office combined with Systems Test and Evaluation to form the Design and Analysis Office under Chamberlin in fall 1967

Manager, Engineering and Development Experiments (Robert Piland); office dropped in spring 1967

Chief, Advanced Spacecraft Technology (Stoney)

Chief, Crew Systems (Johnston)

Chief, Instrumentation and Electronics (Sawyer)

Chief, Information Systems (Vavra)

Chief, Power and Propulsion (Thibodaux)

Chief, Computation and Analysis (Brock)

Chief, Guidance and Control (Robert C. Duncan; vacant, spring 1967; Robert A. Gardiner,

mid-1967)

Chief, Structures and Mechanics (Kotanchik)

Chief, Long-Range Planning (Thomas W. Briggs); office dropped in mid-1966

Chief, Experiments Program (Robert Piland); office dropped and incorporated into the new Science

and Applications directorate in Jan. 1967

Chief, Space Science (Robert Piland, acting; Kotanchik, fall 1966); office added in spring 1966 and

dropped and incorporated into the new Science and Applications directorate in Jan. 1967

Director, Science and Applications (Robert Piland, acting; Wilmot N. Hess, spring 1967); directorate

established in Jan. 1967 and expanded in mid-1967)

Deputy Director, Science and Applications (Robert Piland)

Manager, Flight Projects (Robert E. Vale)

Manager, Management Operations (Paul R. Penrod)

Manager, Reliability and Quality Assurance (Earl K. Smith)
118 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1968 (Continued)

Chief, Space Physics Division (Jerry Modisette)

Chief, Lunar Surface Project Office (John W. Small)

Chief, Lunar and Earth Sciences Division (vacant; Persa R. Bell, fall 1967)

Chief, Test and Operations Office (Norman G. Foster)

Chief, Applications Project Office (Bruce G. Jackson)

Chief, Advanced Systems Office (Fred T. Pearce, Jr.)

Chief, Applications Plans and Analysis Office (vacant)

Director, Medical Research and Operations (Berry); office established in May 1966 (Berry was Chief,

Center Medical Programs for the first four months of 1966)

Chief, Occupational and Environmental Medicine Office (Coons, acting; Edward L. Beckman,

mid-1966)

Chief, Biomedical Research Office (Lawrence F. Dietlein)

Chief, Medical Operations Office (Coons; Willard R. Hawkins, fall 1967)

Director, Flight Crew Operations (Kraft)

Deputy Director, Flight Crew Operations (Sjoberg)

Chief, Flight Support (Clements; Lynwood C. Dunseith, mid-1967)

Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis (Mayer)

Chief, Flight Control (Hodge)

Chief, Landing and Recovery (Thompson; Hammock, July 1966)

Manager, MSC White Sands Missile Range Operations (Raines)

Manager, Lunar Receiving Laboratory Program (Joseph V. Piland, fall 1966); office dropped in 1967;

the laboratory was briefly part of the engineering and development directorate when it was established in

spring 1966 (James C. McLane, Jr., acting manager)

Important points regarding Phase IT..-The 1966-1967 period brought several important changes to MSC.

Management of Project Apollo was assumed by George Low in 1967, who instituted some organizational

changes in the program office. Project Gemini met its final objectives in Nov. 1966. An Apollo applications office was established to investigate how the agency might use the Apollo spacecraft in the future.

Charles Berry became the assistant director of a new medical research and operations directorate, which

centralized the center's several life sciences interests in one office.

Phase VI

1968

Director (Gilruth)

Deputy Director (Trimble)

Special Assistant (Purser; Johnston, mid-1968)

Special Assistant, Long-Range Planning (West)

Technical Assistant (Robert Piland)

Associate Director (Hjornevik)

Director, Administration (Philip H. Whitbeck)

Director, Program Control and Contracts (Dave W. Lang)

Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (Low)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 1 19

Table 2-3.

Six Phases of Space Task GroupManned Spacecraft Center Organization, 1959-1968 (Continued)

Manager, Lunar Module (Bolender)

Manager, Command and Service Module (Kleinknecht)

Chief, Systems Engineering (Maynard)

Chief, Lunar Module Project Engineering (Morris)

Chief, Command and Service Module Project Engineering (Lanzkron; Aaron Cohen, mid-1968)

Chief, Program Control (J. G. McClintock)

Chief, Test (Arabian)

Chief, Mission Operations (Maynard); office dropped in mid-1968

Chief, Mission Support (Mardel); office dropped in mid-1968

Manager, Apollo Applications Program (Thompson)

Head, Future Missions Project Office (Gartrell)

Deputy, Lunar Module (Reginald M. Machell)

Deputy, Command and Service Module (James C. Shows)

Head, Mission Operations Office (Evans)

Head, Program Control (vacant)

Head, Systems Engineering Office (Dotts)

Head, Test Operations Office (Douglas)

Head, Orbital Workshop Project Office (Hecht)

Manager, Advanced Missions Program (Hodge)

Chief, Project Engineering (Joseph P. Loftus, Jr.)

Chief, Lunar Exploration (Meyer)

Chief, Advanced Projects (Rene A. Berglund)

Chief, Program Planning (Dennis E. Fielder)

Director, Engineering and Development (Faget); directorate reorganized April 1968 to include three

assistant directors

Manager, Design and Analysis (Chamberlin)

Assistant Director, Chemical and Mechanical Systems (Bond)

Chief, Crew Systems (Robert E. Smylie)

Chief, Propulsion and Power (Thibodaux)

Chief, Structures and Mechanics (Kotanchik)

Chief, Space Environment Test (James C. McLane, Jr.)

Assistant Director, Spacecraft Integration (Faget, acting)

Assistant Director, Electronic Systems (Robert A. Gardiner)

Chief, Information Systems (Vavra)

Chief, Guidance and Control (Gardiner, acting)

Chief, Computation and Analysis (Brock)

Chief, Space Electronic Systems (Sawyer)

Director, Science and Applications (Hess)

Deputy Director, Science and Applications (Anthony J. Calio)

Manager, Lunar Surface Project Office (Small)

Chief, Space Physics (Modisette; S. Freden, mid-1968)
120 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table2-3.

SixPhasesofSpaceTaskGroupMannedSpacecraftCenterOrganization, 1959-1%8 (Continued)

Manager, Earth Resources Group (Robert Piland)

Manger, Applications Project Office (Jackson); office dropped in mid-1968

Chief, Lunar and Earth Sciences Division (Bell)

Manager, Advanced Systems (Pearce; Jackson, mid-1968); office dropped in late 1968

Manager, Mapping Sciences Laboratory (James H. Sasser, acting)

Director, Medical Research and Operations (Berry)

Deputy Director, Medical Research and Operations (A. D. Catterson)

Deputy Director, Medical Requirements (Coons)

Assistant Director, Research (Dietlein)

Chief, Biomedical Research (Dietlein; Beckman, mid-1968)

Chief, Preventive Medicine (John J. Dreoscher, Jr.; Walter K. Kemmerer, Jr., mid-1968)

Chief, Medical Operations (Hawkins)

Head, Biomedical Technology Group (George G. Armstrong, Jr.)

Director, Flight Crew Operations (Slayton)

Chief, Astronaut Office (Shepard)

Chief, Aircraft Operations Office (Algranti)

Chief, Flight Crew Support Division (North)

Director, Flight Operations (Kraft)

Deputy Director, Flight Operations (Sjoberg)

Chief, Flight Control Division (Eugene F. Kranz, acting)

Chief, Landing and Receiving Division (Hammock)

Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis Division (Mayer)

Chief, Flight Support Division (Dunseith)

Director, Lunar Exploration Working Group (Hodge); office added in Sept. 1968

Manager, MSC White Sands Test Facility Operations (Raines)

Important points regarding Phase VI: During 1968, Gilruth reorganized the center's administrative staff

arm. Wesley J. Hjornevik, long-time assistant director for administration at MSC, became associate

director, with directors for administration and program control reporting to him. An advanced program

office was added to explore mission possibilities beyond the Apollo era. Faget got the help of three assistant directors in managing the multifaceted engineering and development directorate.

* These six phases represent composites for each time period. Refer to appendix A and other NASA

historical publications for complete organization charts (especially helpful for the early years is "Key

Management Progression involving Project Mercury," app. 8, James M. Grimwood, Project Mercury: A

Chronology, NASA SP-4001 (Washington, 1963), pp. 215-21). These-six phases emphasize operational

and developmental activities rather than administrative and staff activities. See the notes following each

phase for a summary of the important changes for each time period.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 121

BUDGET

For general information on the NASA budget and the budget charts in this

book, consult chapter 1, pages 7 to 11. Other charts that may assist the researcher interested in the cost of NASA's manned spaceflight program include budget tables in

chapter 1 for Atlas, Atlas-Agena, Jupiter, Little Joe I, Little Joe II, Redstone,

Saturn I, Saturn IB, Saturn V, and Titan II; see chapter 4 for budget tables for Scout

Reentry Heating Project, Project FIRE, lifting bodies, Project RAM, human factor

systems, and X-15; chapter 5 provides budget information for manned flight tracking network operations and manned network equipment and components. For a

more detailed breakdown of the flight project budgets, consult the NASA annual

budget estimates. Review the bottom notes of the following charts carefully before

making conclusions about totals for any particular project or year.

The total cost of NASA's manned spaceflight programs and in particular the

cost of the lunar landing, is a figure sought frequently by friends and foes of the

agency. Because it was such a huge undertaking with a fixed deadline and because it

demanded quantum state-of-the-art leaps in several fields (especially computerization and miniaturization), the costs were high. Totals for any one program are hard

to determine, but NASA issued the following figures for its major manned ventures:

Mercury, $392.6 million; Gemini, $1.283 billion; and Apollo, $25 billion ($21.35

billion through the first lunar landing in July 1969). If we add another $2.6 billion

for Skylab and $250 million for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, the grand total for

the "expendable-generation" manned spaceflight program was $29.5 billion. _1 These

totals include facilities, salaries, research and development, operations, and hardware (spacecraft and launch vehicles) expenditures. The following charts are concerned with only OMSF research and development monies (spacecraft, some launch

vehicle costs, and supporting development).
122 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-4.

Total Manned Spaceflight Costs

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 46 416

1960 ...... 84 428

1961 107 750 --- 130 596a

1962 234 245 --- 563 050

1963 876 887 b --- 1 483 446

1964 2 931 800 c 2 817 100¢ 2 713 052

1965 3 0i i 900 3 011 900 2 949 019

1966 3 249 485 3 219 485 3 002 232

1967 3 022 800 3 022 800 3 024 000

1968 3 009 200 2 871 700 2 809 230

alncludes $124 330 000 for Project Mercury, and $6 266 000 for advanced manned spaceflight.

b Includes $13 259 000 for Project Mercury, and $863 628 000 for advanced spaceflight.

c The OMSF budget for FY 1964 was divided among manned spacecraft systems (see following charts),

launch vehicle and propulsion systems (see chapter 1), aerospace medicine (request, $16 700 000;

authorization, $11 000000), integration and checkout (request, $153 000000; authorization,

$125 000 000); and systems engineering (request and authorization, $37 000 000). The budget was usually

divided among the various flight projects (Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and advanced programs).
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 123

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I
124 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-6.

Total Mercury Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 46416 a

1960 ...... 84 328 a

1961 107 750 a 107 750 a 124 330

1962 74 245 a --- 31,060 b

1963 25 439 c 13 259 ___d

aln the FY 1961 and FY 1962 budget estimates, the Mercury budget was in two parts: advanced

technical development and flight research.

bIncludes $16 460 000 for a "one-day mission," a Mercury mission of longer duration than the initial

flights. At one time, four such missions were planned for 1963. MA-9, lasting more than 34 hours, was

considered the Mercury one-day mission, but the designation was not widely used.

CIncludes $12 180 000 for the "one-day mission" from the advanced manned spaceflight budget; see

note "b" above.

dNot included as an item in the FY 1965 budget estimate, however, it was estimated in the FY 1964

budget estimate that $3 342 000 and $17 957 000 would be programmed in FY 1963 for Mercury and a

"one-day mission," respectively. No funds were programmed after FY 1963.

Table 2-7.

Mercury-Spacecraft Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 22 299

1960 ...... 61 850

1961 35 290 --- 60474

1962 32000 ...... a

1963 12069 7569 c __d

aThe Mercury budget was not itemized in the FY 1964 budget estimate; total programmed was

$31 060 000, which included funds for a "one-day mission."

blncludes $4 500 000 from the advanced manned spaceflight budget for a "one-day mission."

¢Does not include funds for a "one-day mission."

dMercury was not included as an item in the FY 1965 budget estimate. It was estimated in the FY 1964

budget estimate that $21 299 000 would be programmed for Mercury for FY 1963, which included funds

for a "one-day mission." No funds were programmed after FY 1963.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-8.

Mercury-Operations Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

125

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 7a

1960 ...... 3193 b

1961 39 670 c --- 30 283 d

1962 28 235 e ...... f

1963 13 370 g 5690 a __i

aFor tracking network operations and equipment.

bIncludes $7 850 000 for recovery operations, $19 635 000 for network operations, and $750 000 for

network operational implementation.

Clncludes $24 670 000 for tracking network operations and equipment, and $15 000 000 for recovery

operations.

d Includes $25 254 000 for tracking network, and $5 029 000 for recovery operations.

e Includes $353 000 for recovery operations, $145 000 for network operations, and $2 695 000 for network operational implementation.

fThe Mercury budget was not itemized in the FY 1964 budget estimate; total programmed was

$31 060 000, which included funds for a "one-day mission."

glncludes $2 490 000 for flight operations, and $3 200 000 for recovery operations, plus $7 680 000

from the advanced manned spaceflight budget to support a "one-day mission."

hDoes not include funds to support a "one-day mission."

i Mercury was not included as an item in the FY 1965 budget estimate. It was estimated in the FY 1964

budget estimate that $21 299 000 would be programmed for Mercury for FY 1963, which included funds

for a "one-day mission." No funds were programmed after FY 1963.

Table 2-9.

Mercury-Supporting Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 3270 a

1960 --- 3419 b

1961 7140 c 2737 b

1962 2510 b ___d

alncludes $170 000 for biological and human engineering studies, and $3 100 000 for a Mercury

development program.

b For advanced technical development.

c Includes $2 090 000 for biological and human engineering studies, $4 050 000 for a Mercury development project, $800 000 for advanced reentry configuration development, and $200 000 for reentry

guidance and control system technical development.

dThe Mercury budget was not itemized in the FY 1964 budget estimate. Total programmed was

$31 060 000, which included funds for a "one-day mission." No funds were programmed after FY 1962.
126 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-10.

Mercury-Launch Vehicles Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 20 840

1960 --- 15 867

1961 25 650 30 836

1962 11 500 ___a

"The Mercury budget was not itemized in the FY 1904 budget estimate. Total programmed was

$31 060 000, which included funds for a "one-day mission." No funds were programmed after FY 1962.

Table 2-11.

Total Gemini Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 54 959

1963 203 200 a --- 288 090

1964 306 300 306 300 418 900

1965 308 400 308 400 308 400

1966 242 100 242 100 ___b

1967 40 600 40 600 ___c

a From the advanced manned spaceflight budget.

bNot included as an item in the FY 1968 budget estimate. However, it was estimated in the FY 1967

budget estimate that $226 611 000 would be programmed for Gemini in FY 1966.

CNot included as an item in the FY 1969 budget estimate. No funds were programmed after FY 1967.

Table 2-12.

Gemini-Spacecraft Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 30 329

1963 131 350a --- 205 045

1964 196 206 --- 280 520

1965 168 900 168 900 165 300

1966 122 700 122 700 ___b

1967 19 100 19 100 ___c

a From the advanced manned spaceflight budget.

bit was estimated in the FY 1967 budget estimate that $107 211 000 would be programmed in FY 1966

for Gemini spacecraft.

end funds were programmed after FY 1967.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 127

Table2-13.

Gemini-OperationsandSupportFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 239 a

1963 ...... 3936

1964 15 300 b --- 15 680

1965 28 200 28 200 27 700

1966 30 800 30 800 ___c

1967 13 000 13 000 ___d

aFor supporting development.

b Includes $700 000 for supporting development.

c It was estimated in the FY 1967 budget estimate that $30 800 000 would be programmed in FY 1966

for Gemini support.

dNo funds were programmed after FY 1967.

Table 2-14.

Gemini-Launch Vehicles Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 24 391

1963 71 850 a --- 79 109

1964 94 800 --- 122 700

1965 111 300 111 300 115 400

1966 88 600 88 600 ___b

1967 8500 8500 ___c

a From the advanced manned spaceflight budget.

blt was estimated in the FY 1967 budget estimate that $88 600 000 would be programmed in FY 1966

for Gemini launch vehicles.

CNo funds were programmed after FY 1967.
128 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-15.

Total Apollo Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 ...... 100

___b 1961 ......

1962 160 000 a --- 75 618

1963 617 164 b --- 1 183 965

1964 1 207 400 1 147 400 2 272 952

1965 2 677 500 2 677 500 2 614 619

1966 2 997 385 2 967 385 2 940 985

1967 2 974 200 2 974 200 2 922 600

1968 2 606 500 c 2 521 500 d 2 556 030

aThe first request for Apollo submitted to Congress was for $29 500 000; the request was increased in

response to the presidential mandate that NASA land a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s.

bFrom the advanced manned spaceflight budget; there was no item labeled "Apollo" in the FY 1963

budget estimate.

c$60 000 000 was available in unobligated funds to finance Apollo, bringing the actual request to

$2 546 500 000.

dThe sum was further reduced to $2 496 000 000 by the Appropriations Conference Committee on

Oct. 25, 1967.

Table 2-16.

Apollo--Spacecraft, Command and Service Module Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 --- 100a

1961 ......

1962 47 000 60 000

1963 345 000 b 269 450

1964 661 200 545 874

1965 520 500 577 834

1966 550 000 612 799

1967 586 900 532 815

1968 494 000 393 023

a For general spacecraft design and engineering.

aFrom the advanced manned spaceflight budget.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-17.

Apollo--Spacecraft, Lunar Module Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

129

Year Request Programmed

1962 5000 a -__

1963 123 100b 13 000

1964 230 000 135 000

1965 189 000 242 600

1966 270 000 362 615

1967 388 300 539 272

1968 373 100 402 688

a For lunar landing propulsion system development.

b From the advanced manned spaceflight budget.

Table 2-18.

Apollo-Spacecraft, Other Costs, Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 --- 9869

1963 49 400 a 81 512

1964 140 200 195 701

1965 235 400 189 464

1966 298 840 258 386

1967 225 400 238 513

1968 169 200 238 989

aFrom the advanced manned spaceflight budget.

Table 2-19.

Apollo-Operations Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1963 --- 8042 a

1964 16 000 26 422 a

1965 72 900 a 96 717

1966 74 245 a 112 928

1967 154 405 184 120

1968 229 000 545 765

a Includes launch and space operations.
130 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-20.

Apollo-Supporting Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 108 000 a 1257

1963 --- 53 984 b

1964 27 292 c 106 679 b

1965 136 300 b 73 825 a

1966 148 000 b 51 400 d

1967 58 895 _ 54 300 d

1968 52 000 d ---

alncludes $63 900000 for orbital flight tests, $16 550000 for biomedical flight research, and

$27 550 000 for high-speed reentry tests.

b For systems engineering, mission control systems, and supporting technology and development.

c Includes $25 000 000 for supporting development, and $2 292 000 for research and development

facilities.

d Includes systems engineering and supporting development.

Table 2-21.

Apollo-Launch Vehicles and Engine Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 --- 2200 a

1963 99 664 b 757 977

1964 135 000 a 1 263 276

1965 1 522 500 1 434 179

1966 1 656 300 1 542 857

1967 1 518 400 1 373 580

1968 1 289 200 975 565

a Most of the OMSF launch vehicle and propulsion systems budget in the FY 1964 estimate was devoted

to Apollo launch vehicle and engine development.

b From the advanced manned spaceflight budget.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-22.

Total Apollo Applications Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

131

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1966 ...... 51 247

1967 41 900a --- 80 000

1968 454 700 347 700 ___b

aFrom the Apollo mission support request.

bNot included as an item in the FY 1970 budget estimate. However, it was estimated in the FY 1969

budget estimate that $253 200 000 would be programmed for Apollo applications in FY 1968.

Table 2-23.

Apollo Applications-Space Vehicles Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1966 --- 8500

1967 --- 37 700

1968 263 700 ___a

alt was estimated in the FY 1969 budget estimate that $86 000 000 would be programmed for Apollo

applications space vehicles in FY 1968.

Table 2-24.

Apollo Applications--Mission Support Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1966 --- 2400

1967 --- 4700

1968 50 300 ___a

alt was estimated in the FY 1969 budget estimate that $28 200 000 would be programmed for Apollo

applications mission support in FY 1968.
132 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-25.

Apollo Applications--Experiments Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1966 --- 40 347

1967 --- 37 60O

1968 140 700 ___a

a It was estimated in the FY !969 budget estimate that $I 39 000 000 would be programmed for Apollo

applications experiments in FY 1968.

Table 2-26.

Total Advanced Missions Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 11 391

1964 ...... 21 200

1965 26 000 26 000 26 000

1966 10 000 10 000 10 000

1967 8000 8000 6200

1968 8000 2500 __-a

aNot included as a line item in the FY 1970 budget estimate. It was estimated in the FY 1969 budget

estimate that no funds would be programmed for the advanced missions program in FY 1968.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table2-27.

MannedSpaceflight-OtherCostsFundingHistory

(in thousands of dollars)

133

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ---

--- 6266 a

1962 ...... 401 413 b

1963 31 084 c ...... d

1964 1 418 100e 1 363 400f ---g

a From the advanced manned spaceflight budget: $2 020 000 for manned spaceflight technology, and

$4 246 000 for aerospace medicine.

blncludes $5 164000 for manned spacecraft systems supporting research and technology,

$386 153 000 for launch vehicle and propulsion systems, $7 854 000 for aerospace medicine, $1 250 000

for integration and checkout, and $992 000 for systems engineering.

c From the advanced manned spaceflight budget: $11 764 000 for manned spacecraft technology, and

$19 320 000 for aerospace medicine.

dThe following are estimates as per the FY 1964 budget estimate (these categories did not appear as

items in the FY 1965 estimate): aerospace medicine, $7 000 000; integration and checkout, $38 500 000;

systems engineering, $26 500 000; mission control center operations, $10 500 000; supporting research

and technology, $8 100 000; and launch vehicle and propulsion systems, $734 057 000.

elncludes $21 100 000 for manned spacecraft systems research and technology, $21 800 000 for mission control center operations, $1 168 500 000 for launch vehicle and propulsion systems, $153 000 000

for integration and checkout, $37 000 000 for systems engineering, and $16 700 000 for aerospace

medicine.

fThe authorization for launch vehicle and propulsion systems was $1 147 500, for aerospace medicine

$11 000 000, and for integration and checkout $125 000 000. For other categories the authorizations were

the same as the request (as per note "e" above).

gThese several categories were assumed by the Gemini and Apollo budgets as per the FY 1965 budget

estimate.
134 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

CHARACTERISTICS-PROJECT MERCURY

Project Mercury's goals were simply stated in 1958 when it was officially chosen

as this country's first step toward manned spaceflight: (1) launch a manned

spacecraft into earth orbit; (2) assess man's performance capabilities and his ability

to function in the space environment; and (3) recover the pilot and spacecraft safely.

In developing the ballistic-shaped spacecraft, NASA proposed to rely on existing

technology and off-the-shelf equipment when practical and to follow the simplest,

most reliable approach to system design.i2 These guidelines, of course, echoed the

advice of engineers at the Langley Research Center who had been studying the

feasibility of sending man into orbit in a nose cone-type spacecraft months prior to

NASA's organization in October 1958 (see discussion above). Designer Maxime

Faget and his colleagues favored the Air Force's Atlas missile for a Mercury launch

vehicle, and suggested a test program for both the spacecraft and the booster that

would guarantee that the hardware was "man-rated."

Mercury was not the sleek, sophisticated-looking craft that most dreamers of

manned flight would have designed. It was small (1 cubic meter in the crew compartment), a blunt cone with zero lift (2.1 meters at its widest, 3.4 meters nose to

retrorocket), and at launch it perched atop a modified ICBM. If some thought it an

ignoble way to fly-"the man in the can"-those same critics probably paled at the

thought of reentering earth's atmosphere on their backs protected by a heat shield in

preparation for a splash-down in the ocean (see figs. 2-1 and 2-2). But it was the only

approach to manned flight that could be supported by existing launch vehicles.

Boosters powerful enough to send "space planes" into orbit were still decades away.

(See table 2-28 for a chronology of key Project Mercury events.)

To prepare for the first orbital mission, originally scheduled for 1960, NASA

personnel in the Space Task Group (redesignated the Manned Spacecraft Center in

1961 and moved from Langley Research Center in Virginia to Houston, Texas)

devised a hardware test plan that called for ground simulations and flight tests. Mercury's heat shield and basic reentry attitude had to be proved, as did its environmental control system and other critical subsystems. In addition to evaluating changes

made to the basic Atlas missile, propulsion experts were charged with designing a

launch escape system that would carry the manned capsule away from a malfunctioning launch vehicle and a retrorocket system capable of supplying the impulse

necessary to bring the spacecraft out of orbit for return to earth. Beyond laboratory

and wind tunnel tests of these Mercury features conducted at the Langley, Ames,

and Lewis centers, the Space Task Group relied on ballistic flights to qualify hardware. Rather than depend exclusively on the more expensive Atlas for test flights,

NASA procured eight Redstone missiles from the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and

awarded North American Aviation a contract to build airframes for a new Mercury

test launcher, the Little Joe I.* Suborbital launches of Mercury spacecraft

boilerplate models using Little Joe began in 1959 at Wallops Island. The spacecraft

abort system was not qualified under maximum dynamic pressure with Little Joe un-

*NASA had originally planned to also include the Army's Jupiter missile in the Mercury test flight

scheme but dropped the requirement in favor of exclusive use of Redstone for suborbital missions. The

solid propellant Little Joe was used primarily to test the spacecraft abort system. (Seechap. 1 for more information on the Mercury launch vehicles.)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 135

ESCAPE TOWER

7.9 ANTENNA SECTION

RECOVERY

COMPARTMENT

3.34

RETROGRADE

PACKAGE

PRESSURIZED

_1.89

Figure 2-1. Mercury Spacecraft (dimensions in meters). The exterior shape of the Mercury spacecraft

was conical, with a segment of a sphere for the heatshield and a cylindrical afterbody at the apex

of the cone. Two crew access hatches were included, one for entrance and egress on the side of

the spacecraft and the other for exit through the cylindrical section. A large window and an instrument panel were provided for crew monitoring of flight events and systems operation. Thermal protection was provided by an ablative heatshield on the blunt face and radioactive-type shingles on

the afterbody. Environmental control was made possible in part by evaporative cooling in two separate

circuits, one for the cabin and one for the astronaut's suit. A stabilization and control system with

a three-axis gyro package erected by horizon scanners provided attitude references for the displays

and the two automatic control modes. Attitude changes were effected through a redundant system

of hydrogen peroxide-fueled reaction control engines. Three silver-zinc batteries were the source of

electrical power. Reentry retrofire maneuvers were accomplished by three solid-fuel rockets. (See

also tables 2-54 and 2-55 for more information on the spacecraft and its major subsystems.)
136 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

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MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 137

til April 1961 (Lj-5B). _3 From the Eastern Test Range (formerly the Atlantic Missile

Range) in Florida, the first attempt to launch a Mercury production capsule in a

qualification flight ended in a malfunction of the Atlas vehicle in February 1961

(MA-2). The first successful orbital test took place seven months later in September

(MA-4), followed by an all-systems two-orbit test flight in November (MA-5).

Redstone also malfunctioned during its first Mercury test in November 1960

(MR-l), but performed more satisfactorily one month later (MR-1A). Redstone

boosters would send NASA's first astronauts into space on suborbital missions in

1961. (See table 2-29 for a list of Mercury development flights.)

Manufacture of the spacecraft was assigned to McDonnell Aircraft Corporation

in January 1959, one of 11 firms to submit proposals to NASA (see table 2-56 for a

list of major contractors). STG personnel were assigned to the contractor's facilities

in St. Louis, where they worked together to produce 20 Mercury spacecraft. The

builders of the spacecraft had to allow for the incorporation of a life support system

(100 percent oxygen supplied as a gas at a pressure of 258 mm mercury, with

removal of carbon dioxide and humidity by lithium hydroxide canisters) and flight

couches that conformed to each astronaut's body. The inclusion of redundant

systems and manual as well as automatic controls where possible was another important requirement. 14 McDonnell delivered the last spacecraft to the launch complex in

April 1963.*

Qualifications for astronauts to man Mercury spacecraft were first established

in January 1959: a candidate had to be under 40 years of age, less than 180 centimeters (5'11'3 tall, in excellent physical condition, holder of a bachelor's degree or

its equivalent, a graduate of test pilot school, and a qualified jet pilot with 1500

hours of flight time. From the files of 508 military test pilots, a NASA committee

found 110 apparently qualified candidates, of which 69 were interviewed. Of these,

56 took a battery of written exams; 32 were left in March to undergo mental and

physical testing. By April, the field had been narrowed to 7 men, who reported to

the Space Task Group at Langley for training.t The astronaut training program in-

*This capsule was to have been used for MA-10, which was cancelled in June 1963.

tThe NASA astronaut candidate evaluation committee was led by Charles Donlan, assistant director of

the STG. He was assisted by Warren North, a test pilot-engineer, Stanley C. White and William S. Augerson, flight surgeons, Allen O. Gamble and Robert B. Voas, psychologists, and George E. Ruff and Edwin

Z. Levy, psychiatrists. The Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Albuquerque,

New Mexico, and the Aeromedical Laboratory, Wright Air Development Center, Dayton, Ohio, were

used to conduct many of the physical tests during the evaluations; NASA specialists were supported by

military medical personnel. STG Director Gilruth endorsed the final list of seven candidates and passed it

to Abe Silverstein, director of space flight development, and Administrator Keith Glennan for final

review in April 1959. The Mercury astronauts named later that month were M. Scott Carpenter (Lt.,

Navy), L. Gordon Cooper (Cpt., USAF), John H. Glenn, Jr. (Lt. Col., USMC), Virgil I. Grissom (Cpt.,

USAF), Walter M. Schirra, Jr. (Lt. Com., Navy), Alan B. Shepard, Jr. (Lt. Com., Navy), and Donald K.

Slayton (Cpt., USAF).

Medical personnel played an important part during astronaut training. They measured, monitored,

or tested every bodily function, component, and product. To monitor the astronaut's body temperature

(with a rectal thermistor), respirations (with a pneumograph on MA-8 and MA-9), heart action (with electrocardiographic electrodes), and blood pressure (with a unidirectional microphone and cuff during

MA-7, MA-8, and MA-9) during flight, new biomedical sensors were developed. To supplement this

data, the flight surgeon could also evaluate the astronaut's actions, his voice quality, and his answers to

specific questions. Scientists and doctors were especially interested in determining man's physiological

responses to weightlessness, acceleration and deceleration forces, radiation, and stress.
138 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

cluded classroom studies in rocket propulsion, space physics, and other

astronautical sciences, briefings on spacecraft systems, time on fixed and moving

simulators and trainers, sessions on a centrifuge, and egress and survival

exercises._5. Approximately three months before each flight, the designated pilot

and his backup began specific preparations for the mission. Crew members also

were assigned to mission control and tracking network stations to serve as capsule

communicators (cap coms), the voice links with the spacecraft. In addition, the

astronauts worked with technicians from McDonnell Aircraft to ensure that the

spacecrafts' form-fitting flight couches were suitable and with B. F. Goodrich,

maker of the Mercury pressure suits. Systems, proccdures, and equipment were

evaluated continuously by the engineers, astronauts, and manufacturers during

training sessions. One other important aspect of the astronaut's life was medical

maintenance and monitoring. Flight crew surgeons determined the astronaut's

readiness for flight, monitored his health during the mission, and evaluated his condition upon recovery. _6

The Department of Defense cooperated with NASA during Project Mercury on

several fronts. Their most visible role was as supplier of the launch vehicles (Atlas

from the Air Force and Redstone from ABMA). The agency was totally dependent

on military launchers for its early manned program. Launch operations and communications was another area in which the Air Force shared its expertise and

facilities at Cape Canaveral. NASA's Mercury network was supplemented by

military tracking stations and equipment. Recovery of the astronaut and his craft

from the Atlantic was largely the Navy's assignment. Astronaut selection and training was also accomplished with the assistance of medical experts from the services.

To coordinate the many operational activities that required Department of Defense

support, the commander of the Atlantic Missile Range Test Center was designated

DoD representative for Project Mercury operations by the Secretary of Defense. A

Mercury Support Planning Office was staffed by officers from the services participating in Mercury.17

Before committing the Mercury spacecraft to a manned orbital mission, NASA

further qualified the capsule with two manned suborbital flights. Sent on a ballistic

trajectory by a Redstone launch vehicle on May 5, 1961, Alan Shepard became the

first American space traveler. MR-3 was followed by Virgil Grissom in MR-4 in

July. With this second successful Mercury-Redstone mission, Gilruth and his STG

advisors decided against any further suborbital tets; they were ready for orbital

operations. After three postponements due to bad weather, MA-6 took John Glenn

to earth orbit on February 20, 1962. In a little less than five hours, Glenn accomplished the "standard" three-orbit Mercury mission. With MA-6, Project Mercury met its basic objectives- the hardware had functioned properly and Glenn had

suffered no harmful effects from his flight. Scott Carpenter completed another

three-orbit mission (MA-7) in May, followed by a six-orbit shot (MA-8) by Walter

Schirra in October, The last Mercury flight, MA-9, was also referred to as the "oneday mission." _a Gordon Cooper, surpassing the one-day goal with a 34-hour flight

(22 orbits) in May 1963, brought the Mercury project to a close. (See tables 2-30

through 2-35 for mission details.) Relying on experiences with each successive flight,

the manned spaceflight team had improved spacecraft systems and the biomedical

equipment, modified the astronaut's suit and couch, and augmented the tracking net

to cover MA-9's extra orbits. Procedures and hardware were evolving toward the

next step in NASA's manned program, Gemini.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 139

As discussed above, the Space Task Group was established in 1958 to manage

Project Mercury. Even though the team was located at Langley Research Center,

Robert Gilruth, leader of the group, reported directly to NASA Headquarters. The

STG was declared an independent operation in January 1961 and was assigned a new

name and a permanent home in November, the Manned Spacecraft Center, in

Houston, Texas. James Chamberlin as engineering chief and chair of the Capsule

Coordination Committee assumed a large share of the project's management in

1959. In a reorganization in November 1961, Kenneth Kleinknecht became manager

of the Mercury Program Office. He was assisted by chiefs for engineering operations, project engineering, and engineering data and measurement (see also table 2-3

for information on the changing organization of STG-MSC).

Three useful sources for the reader interested in Project Mercury are the following NASA publications: Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles

C. Alexander, This New Ocean; A History of Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201

(Washington, 1966); Grimwood, Project Mercury; A Chronology, NASA SP-4001

(Washington, 1963); and NASA, Mercury Project Summary including Results of the

Fourth Manned Orbital Flight, May 15 and 16, 1963, NASA SP-45 (Washington,

1963). The summary volume is a compilation of papers given at the October 3-4,

1963, Mercury conference held in Houston.

Table 2-28.

Chronology of Key Project Mercury Events*

Date Event

Oct. 6, 1958

Oct. 7, 1958

Oct. 21, 1958

Oct. 23, 1958

Nov. 5, 1958

Nov. 14, 1958

Nov. 24, 1958

Nov. 26, 1958

Dec. 11, 1958

Langley Research Center personnel opened negotiations with the Army

Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) to procure Redstone and Jupiter launch

vehicles for a manned satellite project; on the 17th they began discussions

with the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division regarding procurement of Atlas

vehicles.

NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan approved plans for a manned

satellite project.

A bidders conference was held concerning a Little Joe launch vehicle to be

used for development testing of the manned capsule. Design work was completed by December 1.

Preliminary specifications for a manned spacecraft were distributed to industry. Another set of specifications was mailed on Nov. 14 to 20 firms that

wanted to be considered bidders. Deadline for proposal submission was

December 11.

The Space Task Group (STG) was officially formed at Langley to manage the

manned program.

NASA requested DX priority procurement rating for the manned spacecraft

project, which was accorded on April 27, 1959.

The STG ordered one Atlas launch vehicle for a development launch of a

boilerplate spacecraft model (Big Joe); nine Atlas vehicles would be required

according to a December 8 memo. A total of 15 had been approved by FY

1962.

The name "Mercury" was agreed on for the manned project.

Eleven firms submitted proposals for a manned spacecraft. STG members

began assessing them on the 12th; they forwarded their findings to NASA

Headquarters on the 30th.
140 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-28.

Chronology of Key Project Mercury Events* (Continued)

Date Event

Dec. 29, 1958

Jan. 5, 1959

Jan. 9, 1959

Jan. 16, 1959

Jan. 29, 1959

Feb. 12, 1959

March 8, 1959

March 31, 1959

Apr. 2, 1959

Apr. 12, 1959

Apr. 19, 1959

July 22, 1959

Aug. 21, 1959

Sept. 9, 1959

Oct. 4, 1959

Nov. 1959-Jan. 1960

Nov. 4, 1959

Nov. 8-Dec. 5, 1959

Dec. 4, 1959

Jan. 15, 1960

May 9, 1960

June 20, 1960

July 29, 1960

Sept. 1960

Nov. 8, 1960

Nov. 21, 1960

Dec. 19, 1960

Jan. 3, 1961

Jan. 31, 1961

NASA awarded a contract to North American Aviation for the design and

construction of the Little Joe I airframe (letter of intent dated December 31,

1958). The first two airframes were delivered on May 28, 1959.

Guidelines were established for choosing astronaut candidates.

McDonnell Aircraft Corporation's proposal for developing and producing

the Mercury spacecraft was chosen as the winning bid. Preliminary negotiations began on the 14th, with a contract being signed on February 6. By FY

1962, 26 spacecraft had been ordered. Also on the 9th, NASA and Department of Defense (DoD) officials met to coordinate requirements for

spacecraft tracking.

NASA ordered eight Redstones and two Jupiters for Mercury from the

Army; the requirement for the Jupiters was dropped on July 1, 1959.

The Little Joe test program was drafted; it was updated on April 14, 1959.

NASA and Navy officials met to discuss Mercury recovery needs; a NASANavy committee met formally for the first time on the 17th.

The first abort test of a full-scale model of the Mercury spacecraft was conducted at Wallops Island. On the 1 lth, a full-scale pad-abort test took place.

STG officials met with Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) personnel to discuss

launch requirements.

NASA held a preliminary briefing for prospective bidders on the Mercury

tracking network.J" Also on the 2d, it was announced that the selection of

seven Mercury astronauts had been made; the candidates were announced

publicly on the 9th. Training began on the 27th.

A second full-scale beach abort was successful.

The STG organized a Mercury Capsule Coordination Office under James A.

Chamberlin; a Capsule Review Board, Paul E. Purser, chairman, was also

formed.

NASA selected B. F. Goodrich Company as contractor for the Mercury

pressure suit. Specifications were issued on October 2, 1959, and production

began in May 1960. Also on the 22d, another successful pad-abort test took

place using an escape rocket made by Grand Central Rocket Company.

Little Joe 1 (L J-l) beach-abort was unsuccessful.**

Big Joe 1 was successful.

L J-6 was successful.

The general design work on the Mercury couch was completed.

LJ-IA was unsuccessful.

Tentative design and layout of the Mercury control center was completed.

L J-2 was successful.

NASA approved an "Overall Plan for Department of Defense Support for

Project Mercury Operations"; DoD approval came in March.

A beach-abort test was successful.

Tests of the spacecraft environmental control system were begun.

Mercury-Atlas 1 (MA-1) was unsuccessful.

Pressure suits were tested to determine final adjustments; a number of improvements had been suggested and changes made by April 1963. The suit

evolved with the program.

L J-5 was unsuccessful.

Mercury-Redstone 1 fMR-1) was unsuccessful.

MR-IA was successful.

The STG was declared a separate NASA field element.

MR-2 was successful.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table2-28.

Chronologyof KeyProjectMercuryEvents*(Continued)

141

Date Event

Feb.21,1961

March18,1961

March24,1961

Apr.12,1961

Apr.25,1961

Apr.28,1961

May5,1961

May25,1961

July21,1961

Aug.1961

Sept.13,1961

Nov.l, 1961

Nov.29,1961

Jan.15,1962

Feb.1962

Feb.20,1962

May24,1962

July1,1962

Sept.18,1962

Oct.3,1962

May15-16,1963

June12,1963

Oct.3-4,1963

MA-2 was successful. Also on the 21st, astronauts John H. Glenn, Jr., Virgil

I. Grisson, and Alan B. Shepard, Jr., were selected to begin training for the

first manned flight.

LJ-5A was unsuccessful.

A Mercury Redstone-Booster Development (MR-BD) test was successful.

Soviet cosmonaut Yuri A. Gagarin made an orbital flight on Vostok 1.

MA-3 was unsuccessful.

LJ-5B was successful.

MR-3, piloted by Shepard, successfully completed NASA's first manned

suborbital mission (see table 2-30).

President John F. Kennedy called for an accelerated space program, leading

to a manned lunar landing before the end of the decade.

MR-4, manned by Grissom, successfully completed a suborbital mission (see

table 2-31).

A site selection team evaluated locations for a Manned Spacecraft Center;

Houston was chosen as the best site in September.

MA-4 was successful.

The STG was redesignated the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC); Robert R.

Gilruth was retained as director.

MA-5, the last unmanned development test, was successful. Also on the 29th,

Glenn was selected as pilot of the first orbital mission.

Organization of MSC was completed.

Kenneth S. Kleinknecht was appointed Project Mercury manager.'_t

MA-6, manned by Glenn, successfully completed NASA's first manned orbital mission (see table 2-32).

MA-7, with M. Scott Carpenter onboard, successfully completed an orbital

mission (see tabler 2-33).

Relocation of the MSC group from Langley Research Center to the Houston

site was completed.

Donald K. Slayton was designated coordinator of astronaut activities at

MSC.

MA-8, manned by Walter M. Schirra, Jr., successfully completed an orbital

mission (see table 2-34)

MA-9, manned by L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., successfully completed an orbital

mission lasting more than 34 hours, concluding the Mercury flight program

(see table 2-35).

NASA Administrator James E. Webb announced that because Mercury had

accomplished its goals, MA-10 would not be flown. McDonnell's Mercury

spacecraft contract was terminated the next day.

A Project Mercury summary conference was held in Houston.

*For a more detailed calendar of events, see James M. Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology,

NASA SP-4001 (Washington, 1963).

tFor further details on events that led to the establishment of the Manned Space Flight Network, see

table 5-24.

**For further details on this and other developmental flights, consult table 2-29.

_i'Kleinknecht replaced James Chamberlin, who was reassigned to the new Project Gemini office as

manager. Chamberlin's STG titles had been chief of the engineering division and chairman of the Capsule

Coordination Committee, effectively making him "project manager" of Mercury.
142 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table2-29.

DevelopmentalTests/Flights,ProjectMercury

LaunchDate Test/

(location) Flight Objectives/Results

Aug.21,1959 LJ-1 Unsuccessfulbeachaborttest.Whentheescaperocketfired

(Wallops) prematurelyduringthecountdown,thevehicleroseto an

Sept.9,1959 BigJoe1

(ETR)

Oct.4,1959

(Wallops)

LJ-6

Nov.4,1959 LJ-1A

(Wallops)

Dec.4,1959 LJ-2

(Wallops)

Jan.21,1969 LJ-1B

(Wallops)

May9,1960

(Wallops)

July 29, 1960

(ETR)

Nov. 8, 1960

(Wallops)

Nov. 21, 1960

(ETR)

altitude of 600 m and landed some 600 m from the launch site.

Successful launch (suborbital) of a full-scale instrumented

Mercury boilerplate spacecraft to an altitude of 160 km; capsule survived reentry heat of more than 5800 ° K.

:Successful launch of a boiierpiate Mercury (suborbital) to

check the integrity of the launch vehicle airframe and motor, to

verify launch operations, and to test the destruct system.

Suborbital test of the abort maneuver under high aerodynamic

load conditions (repeat of L J-l). Maneuver was not accomplished at the desired pressure.

Successful suborbital test of spacecraft-escape tower during

high-altitude abort. Entry dynamics and the effects of acceleration on a rhesus monkey (Sam) were also studied.

Successful beach abort test (repeat of L J-l) with a rhesus

monkey (Miss Sam) onboard. The Mercury helicopter recovery

system was also exercised.

Successful performance evaluation of the escape system,

parachute-landing system, and recovery operations in an offthe-pad abort. McDonnell's first production spacecraft was

used in the test.

Launch of a Mercury production capsule was unsuccessful due

to launch vehicle failure.

Unsuccessful test of spacecraft abort under most severe launch

conditions. The escape rocket ignited prematurely, and the

spacecraft did not detach from the vehicle until impact.

Premature booster cutoff caused the vehicle to settle back

down on the pad after barely leaving the ground. The Mercury

capsule was reused in MR-IA.

Dec. 19, 1960 Successful suborbital reentry test (repeat of MR-l).

(ETR)

Jan. 3, 1961

(ETR)

Feb. 21, 1961

(ETR)

March 18, 1961

(Wallops)

March 24, 1961

(ETR)

Apr. 25, 1961

(ETR)

Apr. 28, 1961

(Wallops)

Sept. 13, 1961

Beach abort

(Mercury

spacecra_ 1)

MA-I

(spacecraft 4)

LJ-5

(spacecraft 3)

I_R-I

(spacecraft 2)

MR-1A

(spacecraft 2)

MR-2

(spacecraft 5)

MA-2

(spacecraft 6)

LJ-5A

(spacecraft 14)

MR-BD

MA-3

(spacecraft 8)

LJ-5B

(spacecraft 14A)

MA-4

Suborbital flight of fully operational Mercury with chimpanzee

(Ham) onboard. Although excessive booster velocity carried

the spacecraft higher and farther than programmed, the capsule and passenger were recovered after their 16-rain. flight.

Successful suborbital test of Mercury-Atlas configuration.

Second unsuccessful attempt to test spacecraft abort system

under most severe conditions. Premature escape rocket ignition

was again the cause of the failure.

Successful booster development test flight of the Redstone,

qualifying the vehicle for manned missions.

Orbital capsule test was unsuccessful due to launch vehicle

failure; the abort and recovery system was proved.

Successful test of abort system under maximum dynamic

pressure (reuse capsule from LJ-5A).

Successful one-orbit test of the tracking network (reused
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-29.

Developmental Tests/Flights, Project Mercury

143

Launch Date Test/

(location) Fright Objectives/Results

(ETR) (spacecraft 8A)

Nov. 2, 1961 MA-5

(ETR) (spacecraft 9)*

spacecraft from MA-3).

Successful two-orbit flight to test all Mercury systems; a third

orbit was not completed due to an abnormal roll rate. A chimpanzee (Enos) passenger was recovered in good condition.

*Spacecraft 10 was used at McDonnell's St. Louis facility in an environmental test; 12B had been

scheduled for a manned one-day mission which was cancelled (12B was not delivered); 15B had been

scheduled for a manned one-day mission also, which was cancelled after the successful MA-9 (15B not

delivered); 17 was delivered to Cape Canaveral in April 1963 to be used as parts support for planned oneday missions; 19 was not delivered when the manned orbital mission for which it was scheduled was

cancelled after the successful MA-8.

Table 2-30.

Mercury-Redstone 3 (MR-3) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #): May 5, 1961 (5)

Spacecraft designation: Mercury capsule 7

Unofficial spacecraft

designation: Freedom 7

Launch vehicle

designation: Mercury-Redstone 7

Spacecraft weight (kg): 1832.5

Spacecraft shape,

dimensions (m): conical

width at base, 2.1

length, 3.4

Crew: Alan B. Shepard, Jr.

Backup crew: John H. Glenn, Jr.

Cap com: Donald K. Slayton (Mercury Control Ctr.)

Max. alt. (km): 187.42

Range (km): 487.26

No. of orbits: suborbital

Length of mission: 00:15:22

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch May 5 9:34:13 a.m., EST

main engine shutoff 9:36:35

capsule separation

initiation of retrofire

splashdown

Distance traveled (km):

Time in weightlessness:

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

00:02:22

9:36:45.5 00:02:32.5

9:38:57 00:04:44

9:49:35 00:15:22

1006

approx. 00:04:00

Results:

27°13.7'N, 75°53'W (5.6 km from target)

USS Champlain (crew onboard in 15 min.)

During a suborbital flight, evaluate Mercury astronaut's performance and

advance the qualities of the capsule and its systems.

Mission was performed as planned.
144 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-31.

Mercury-Redstone 4 (MR-4) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #): July 21, 196t (5)

Spacecraft designation: Mercury capsule 11

Unofficial spacecraft

designation: Liberty Bell 7

Launch vehicle

designation: Mercury-Redstone 8

Spacecraft weight (kg): 1824.4

Spacecraft shape,

dimensions _" see t_hlo 2-30 _lll]. - ....

Crew: Virgil 1. Grissom

Backup crew: Glenn

Cap com: Shepard (Mercury Control Ctr.)

Max. alt. (km): 190.76

Range (km): 487.08

No. of orbits: suborbital

Length of mission: 00:15:37

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch July 21 7:20 a.m., EST

main engine shutoff 7:22:22

capsule separation 7:22:32.4

initiation of retrofire 7:24:45.8

splashdown 7:35:37

Distance traveled (km): 1014

Time in weightlessness: 00:04:54

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

Results:

Reference:

00:02:22

00:02:32.4

00:04:45.8

00:15:37

27°32'N, 75°44'W (9.3 km from target)

USS Randolph (crew onboard in 20 min.)

Evaluate pilot's reaction to spaceflight and his performance as an integral

part of the flight system.

The only event that marred the flight was the loss of the capsule during

recovery operations when the explosive side egress hatch activated

prematurely while Grissom was waiting for the recovery helicopter. The

spacecraft sank after Grissom left it. He was recovered after being in the

water 3 or 4 minutes. Two attempts to launch the mission on July 18 and

19 were scrubbed due to inclement weather.

STG, "Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Mercury-Redstone No. 4

(MR-4)," Aug. 6, 1961.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-32.

Mercury-Atlas 6 (MA-tO Characteristics

145

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Unofficial spacecraft

designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimensions (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap corns:

Apogee/perigee (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

Feb. 20, 1962 (14)

Mercury capsule 13

Friendship 7

Atlas 109-D

1934.7

see table 2-30

Glenn

M. Scott Carpenter

Shepard (Mercury Mission Ctr.), Grissom (Bermuda), Walter M. Schirra,

Jr. (California), L. Gordon Cooper, Jr. (Muchea)

261.14/161

3

01:28:29

04:55:23

main engine shutoff

spacecraft separation

initiation of retrofire

splashdown

Distance traveled (km):

Time in weightlessness:

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch Feb. 20 9:47 a.m., EST

9:48:09.6 00:02:09.6

9:51:03.6 00:15:13.6

2:20:08 p.m. 04:33:08

2:42:23 04:55:23

130 355

04:38:00

21°26'N, 68°41'W (74 km from target)

USS Noa (crew onboard in 20 rain.)

Evaluate performance of man-spacecraft system in a three-orbit mission,

evaluate effects of spaceflight on astronaut, obtain astronaut's evaluation

of spacecraft's operational suitability.

Results: Three launch attempts were cancelled because of inclement weather on

Jan. 27 and 30 and Feb. 14. Only two mechanical problems bothered

Glenn on MA-6; a yaw attitude control jet apparently clogged, forcing

him to use the manual system; and a faulty switch indicated that the heat

shield had been prematurely released when it had not.

Reference: MSC, "Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Mercury-Atlas No. 6

(MA-6), Part I-Mission Analysis," March 5, 1962.
146 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-33.

Mercury-Atlas 7 (MA-7) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Unofficial spacecraft

designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimensions (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

May 24, 1962 (14)

Mercury capsule 18

Aurora 7

Atlas 107-D

1925.1

see table 2-30

Carpenter

Schirra

Grissom (Mercury Control

(Muchea), Cooper (Guaymas)

268.55/160.84

3

01:28:32

04:56:04.8

Or.), Shepard (California), Slayton

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch May 24 7:45 a.m., EST

main engine shutoff 7:47:06.6 00:02:06.6

spacecraft separation 7:50:09.9 00:05:09.9

initiation of retrofire 12:17:36.5 04:32:36.5

splashdown 12:41:04.8 04:56:04.8

Distance traveled (km): 130 933

Time in weightlessness: approx. 04:30:00

Landing point: 19°27'N, 63°59'W (400 km from primary target)

Recovery ship: USS Pierce (crew onboard in 3 hr.)

Mission objectives: Same as for MA-6, plus further exercise and evaluate performance of the

Mercury tracking net (see table 3-32).

Results: Launch of MA-7 met with three postponements on: May 7 (checkout

problems with Atlas), May 17 (modifications were found to be necessary

to the parachute deployment system), and May 19 (irregularities with the

heater temperature control device in the Atlas flight control system).

Three anomalies were experienced during the flight: random failure of the

circuitry associated with the pitch horizon scanner, excessive fuel usage,

and a landing 400 km beyond the predicted point.

Reference: MSC, "Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Mercury-Atlas No. 7

(MA-7), Part I-Mission Analysis," June 15, 1962.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table2-34.

Mercury-Atlas 8 (MA-8) Characteristics

147

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Unofficial spacecraft

designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

Oct. 3, t962 (14)

Mercury capsule 16

Sigma 7

Atlas 113-D

1961.6

see table 2-30

Schirra

Cooper

Slayton (Mercury Mission Ctr.), Grissom (Hawaii), Glenn (California),

Shepard (Coastal Sentry Quebec), Carpenter (Guaymas)

283.04/161

6

01:28:55

09:13:11

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch

main engine shutoff

spacecraft separation

initiation of retrofire

splashdown

Distance traveled (km):

Time in weightlessness:

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

Results:

Reference:

Oct. 3 7:15 a.m., EST

7:17:08.6 00:02:08.6

7:20:17.9 00:05:17.9

4:06:30 p.m. 08:51:30

4:28:11 09:13:11

247 748

approx. 09:30:00

32°06'N, 174°28%V (7.4 km from target)

USS Kearsarge (crew onboard in 45 min.)

Evaluate performance of man-spacecraft system during a 6-orbit mission;

evaluate effects of extcnded orbital spaceflight on astronaut; obtain additional astronaut evaluation of capsule and its systems; evaluate network

and support forces, and establish their suitability for extended orbital

flight.

The only difficulty experienced during the mission was in attaining the

correct pressure suit temperature adjustment. The MA-8 spacecraft was

modified slightly to allow for the use of low-thrust reaction control jets

only during manual operations; two high-frequency antennas also were

mounted to improve communications.

MSC, "Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Mercury-Atlas No. 8

(MA-8), Part I--Mission Analysis," Oct. 23, 1962.
148 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table2-35.

Mercury-Atlas 9 (MA-9) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Unofficial spacecraft

designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee (kin):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

May 15, 1963 (14)

Mercury capsule 20

Faith 7

Atlas 130-D

1964.4

see table 2-30

Cooper

Shepard

Schirra (Mercury Control Ctr.), Grissom (Guaymas), Glenn (Coastal Sentry Quebec), Carpenter (Hawaii)

267.1/161.48

22

01:28:45

34:19:49

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch

main engine shutoff

spacecraft separation

initiation of retrofire

splashdown

Distance traveled (km):

Time in weightlessness:

1 :ling point:

1 wery ship:

Mission objectives:

Results:

Reference:

May 15 8:04 a.m., EST

8:06:12.4 00:02:12.4

8:09:05.3 00:05:05.3

May 16 6:02:59 p.m. 33:58:59

6:23:49 34:19:49

939 385

approx. 34:00:00

27°20'N, 176°26'W (8.1 km from target)

USS Kearsarge (crew onhoard in 45 rain.)

Evaluate effects of l-day orbital flight on astronaut; evaluate modifications made to spacecraft for mission; obtain astronaut's evaluation of

suitability of spacecraft; assess effectiveness of net.

There was one previous attempt to launch MA-9 on May 14; a ground

support problem and a computer anomaly at the Bermuda tracking station led to postponement. Because of a possible short circuit, Cooper

reentered the atmosphere using manual controls, the first- astronaut to do

so; he landed 6400 meters from the prime recovery ship.

MSC, "Postlaunch Memorandum Report for Mercury-Atlas No. 9

(MA-9), Part I-Mission Analysis," June 24, 1963.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-36.

Project Mercury Flight Experiments

149

Experiment Mercury-Atlas

6 7 8 9

Astronaut observations x

Light visibility observations x x

Ground flare visibility x

Air glow observations x

Flashing light experiment x

Photography studies x x x

Infrared weather photography x

Dim-light photography x

Horizon definition photography x

Zero g liquid behavior x

Tethered inflatable balloon x

Radiation studies x x

Ablative materials investigation x

CHARACTERISTICS- PROJECT GEMINI

Long before the first American astronaut was boosted into orbit, engineers at

the Space Task Group and at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation were making changes

on paper to the Mercury design that would lend it to longer, more useful missions.

In late 1961, these engineers were given the opportunity to fit their "improvements in

the abstract" to a set of specific mission goals. President Kennedy's decision to exhibit American technical prowess through a manned expedition to the moon had

given NASA a revised timetable for finding answers to a broad range of questions.

What effect would several days of weightlessness have on a crew? If a spacecraft

were not sent to the moon directly but relied on maneuvers in earth orbit to prepare

it for a translunar trajectory, how complicated would rendezvous and docking in

space be?* 19 Could an astronaut perform tasks outside his spacecraft? Gemini

would be NASA's vehicle for investigating these and other unknowns. (See table

2-37 for a chronology of key events.)

At McDonnell Aircraft, contractor to NASA for the Mercury spacecraft,

designers had two advanced craft in mind. One would require a minimum number of

changes to the basic Mercury spacecraft, which would extend its mission lifetime.

The second called for major modifications that would provide space for a second

crewman, more consumables, and experiment hardware. Mercury Mark II, as this

upgraded design was called, would also be a more controllable spacecraft during

reentry, although it would retain its predecessor's ballistic shape. When NASA

*Besides direct ascent and earth orbit rendezvous modes for reaching the moon, one other possibility, lunar orbit rendezvous, gained wide support among NASA personnel in 1962 and was later chosen as

the best solution. See the discussion of the Apollo program elsewhere in this chapter for more information.
150 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Headquarters approved a development plan for Mercury Mark II in December 1961,

the scheme had expanded to include subsystems that would allow the spacecraft to

rendezvous and dock with a target vehicle and perform a controlled touchdown on

land rather than on water. Perhaps the most significant change, however, was the

modular approach to spacecraft subsystems. To save weight and space in Mercury,

hardware had been fit into the spacecraft as best as it could be, with components of

one subsystem often interspersed among others. Removing or testing one component could lead to the removal and retesting of many. In the new design, a system

could be dismantled, changed, or verified as a distinct part without disturbing its

neighbors. McDonnell's new contract with NASA called for 13 spacecraft (see fig.

2-3 for spacecraft details).

To launch the larger, heavier (3500-kilogram class) "Gemini," the new spacecraft's

name as of January 1962, the Air Force would contribute its Titan missile. More

powerful than Mercury's Atlas launch vehicle, Titan used hypergolic fuel, which was

less dangerous on the pad, precluding the need for an escape rocket (instead, ejecADAPTER

MAT)NG

SECTION

(.34)

!

Ftgure 2-.

5.74 -- _1

_----- ADAPTER(2.286)MODULE .... = = RE-ENTRY(3.545)MODULE

I RE-ENTRY ] I

( CONTROL

]i SYSTEM SECTION|

SECTION _ SECTtON

_ _-- _- ABLATIONSHIELD / SECTION

FAIRING_ -- I _jL_

10o SLOPE

General Arrangement of the Gemini Spacecraft (dimensions in meters). The conical Gemini

spacecraft had two major assemblies: the adapter module, which was jettisoned in two parts before

reentry; and a reentry module. Heat resistant titanium and magnesium were used to fabricate the

spacecraft, with externally-mounted shingles (Rene 41 on the conical section; beryllium on the small

end) giving extra protection. The vehicle's primary protector during reentry was a silicone elastomer

ablative heatshield on the large blunt end of the reentry module. Two access hatches were provided

in the cabin section (reentry module), each fitted with windows. Spacecraft attitude was controlled

with eight Ill-newton thrusters and translation along any axis by s_ 445-newton thrusters and two

378-newton thrusters. Four retrograde rockets for reentry deceleration were located in the retrograde

section of the adapter module. Electrical power was provided by silver-oxide batteries and a fuel

cell built by General Electric (see also tables 2-54 and 2-55 for more information on major spacecraft

systems). From P. W. Malik and G.A. Sourly, Project Gemini; A Technical Summary, NASA CR-1106

(Washington, 1968), p. 5.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 151

tion seats and parachutes would take Gemini crews away from malfunctioning

boosters). The Titan II ICBM, however, was still in the development stage, with the

first of 33 research and development flights taking place in March 1962. The Air

Force and the Martin Company, prime contractor for the Titan, spent months

massaging the design to rid it of its problems. Its tendency to oscillate longitudinally

(called the pogo effect) made the missile unsafe for manned use, as did its potential

second-state combustion instability and a number of other minor design flaws.

Troubles with the launch vehicle forced mission planners to substitute unmanned

flights for the first two missions to verify further the Gemini launch vehicle.* By the

spring of 1964, Titan was ready. 20

The mechanics of rendezvous and docking became Gemini's most important objective when lunar orbit rendezvous was chosen over direct ascent or earth orbit

rendezvous for the Apollo mission mode. One rendezvous and docking maneuver

would take place shortly after leaving earth orbit enroute to the moon; a second

would be required in lunar orbit. NASA chose another Air Force vehicle to serve as

Gemini's target in orbital exercises. Agena, a second stage manufactured by

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company for the Air Force, would be launched into

orbit where it would be available for maneuvers. Agena was considered especially

suitable because it had the capability to restart its engines (NASA required five

restarts for Gemini); its propulsion system could thus be used to maneuver the two

vehicles while they were docked (see fig. 2-4 for spacecraft details). Gemini was pro-

*For more information on the Titan vehicle, see chap. 1.

AFT SECTION

N

AI-rlTUDE CONTROL GAS TANKS_

_SHRkOUD "BOOSTER ADAPTER

Figure 2-4. Gemini Agena Target Vehicle. The Gemini Agena Target Vehicle (GA TV) was 10.28

meters long with launch shroud and booster adapter intact, Z92 meters long in orb#. Its diameter

was 1.52 meters. Total thrust from its primary propulsion system and two secondary engines was

73,000 newtons. Equipment added to the standard Agena D upper stage for the Gemini program

included a docking collar, compatible radar transponder, strobe lights, secondary propulsion system,

ground control equipment, and a multi-restartable engine (see also chap. 1 for more information

on the Agena vehicle as an upper stage).
152 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

vided with an orbital attitude and maneuvering system (OAMS), a series of

thrusters, by which the crew could adjust its attitude and orbit. Agena and the

spacecraft maneuvering system were the source of many problems; they were over

budget and late. And difficulties with target vehicles continued throughout most of

the operational phase of the program. 2t

Land landings were a goal Gemini officials had to abandon. Paraglider, a

stowable, flexible wing (similar in shape to a hang glider), presented too many

design problems. It was a totally new concept for which Gemini did not have the

necessary time and money. North American Aviation, the contractor for paraglider,

was instructed to downgrade its development plan for the wing in February 1964.

Gemini would rely on a system of parachutes for water landings as had Mercury.

The extravehicular activity (EVA) planned for Gemini astronauts was applicable to Apollo operations and to any advanced orbital program that NASA

might consider for the future. Astronauts could be asked to retrieve experiment

packages from other vehicles or be forced to make inspections or repairs to their

craft. And biotechnicians assigned to Apollo needed more data on the environmental control requirements for space suits and portable life support systems. Because

of hardware delays, EVA was not conducted until the second Gemini flight (GT-4).

Astronauts found this activity more fatiguing than experts had predicted, and

throughout the program hardware improvements were affected to make EVA

easier. *22

The final Gemini program plan included 10 manned missions, two crewmen per

flight. To supplement the seven original Mercury astronauts, NASA added nine men

to the corps in September 1962 and another 14 in October 1963.t Training exercises

for the missions included classroom studies and many sessions in the dynamic crew

procedures simulator, which provided crew members with high-fidelity simulations

of the several phases of the missions (launch, rendezvous, experiments activity, reentry). Crew training for EVA was conducted in a one-g environment in mockups of

the spacecraft, in altitude chambers, and on air-bearing platforms. NASA

astronauts also trained in Air Force zero-g test aircraft. Limited use was made of

underwater neutral bouyancy training for the last Gemini crews. As was the case

with Mercury, Gemini astronauts worked closely with engineers, technicians, operations people, and physicians during the program. 23

Gemini manned operations filled two years. Following two unmanned flights

(see table 2-38) to prove the integrity of the launch vehicle and spacecraft, the first

two Gemini pilots took part in Gemini-Titan 3 (GT-3) in March 1965. Virgil Grissom

and John W. Young piloted their craft on a short three-orbit mission. The new

spacecraft was judged fit. On GT-4 in June, James A. McDivitt and Edward H.

*There were two classes of EVA. One was called "standup" and did not involve leaving the

spacecraft. The crew member opened the hatch and performed various tasks while still in the cabin. "Umbilical" EVA involved leaving the spacecraft, tethered to it by a life line. One modification to Gemini that

made EVA easier was the addition of more restraint straps and handholds outside the spacecraft. Handheld maneuvering units were tested on GT-4 and GT-IO. These gas-expulsion devices could produce up to

8.89 newtons of thrust. An astronaut maneuvering unit devised by the Air Force was carried on GT-9A

but not evaluated because the crew member conducting EVA was bothered by visor-fogging and

overheating. This backpack unit had pitch, roll, and yaw controls, with 20 newtons of thrust.

See the section on the Apollo program for more on astronaut selection.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 153

White, II, spent four days in orbit and conducted the first extravehicular activity.

They were followed two months later by Gordon Cooper and Charles Conrad, Jr.,

in a seven-day mission. The first attempt to conduct a mission with the Agena target

vehicle failed when the target did not go into orbit in October 1965. In its place, a

dual manned spacecraft mission was performed in December. GT-7with Frank Borman and James A. Lovell, Jr., aboard rendezvoused with GT-6A manned by Walter

M. Schirra, Jr., and Thomas P. Stafford. In addition to their successful joint exercise, the GT-7 crew set an endurance record of more than 13 days in space. The

docking of GT-8 and an Agena target vehicle in March 1966 was marred by a

spacecraft thruster malfunction. Astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and David R. Scott

had to undock and use their reentry thrusters to control their rolling spacecraft; this

led to an early return to a secondary landing area. In May, another Agena failure led

to a backup mission plan. Stafford and Eugene A. Cernan in GT-9 attempted to

dock with a contingency target (an Augmented Docking Target Adapter built by

McDonnell and launched by an Atlas), but its launch shroud failed to jettison, leaving the docking cone covered. Cernan performed tasks outside the spacecraft for

more than two hours, and GT-9 accomplished rendezvous maneuvers. Crewmen

Young and Michael Collins conducted the first completely successful docking mission aboard GT-IO in July 1966. During the next mission two months later, GT-11

and an Agena target docked during Gemini's first orbit. Conrad and Richard F.

Gordon, Jr., then maneuvered the docked vehicle into a high-altitude orbit. The last

crew, Lovell and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., in GT-12, also docked successfully with their

target.* Gemini missions became almost routine for the press and public; for the

launch and test teams at Cape Kennedy and for the mission controllers in Houston it

never became routine, but it did become operational (see tables 2-39 through 2-48

for mission details).

The lengthy missions planned for Gemini and the spacecraft's increased payload

capacity prompted NASA officials to sponsor an experiments program for manned

spaceflight missions. The agency solicited proposals for investigations that required

crew participation from universities, other government agencies, private research

groups, and its own field centers. Once the Gemini Experiments Office (part of the

Gemini Project Office, later called the Experiments Program Office and moved to

the science and applications directorate at MSC) had determined an experiment's

suitability and had identified missions that could accommodate it, the Manned

Space Flight Experiments Board at NASA Headquarters made a specific flight

assignment, t Implementing approved experiments into the mission plan and into the

spacecraft hardware was MSC's task. A total of 52 different experiments was flown

on Gemini, many on more than one mission. Of the 52, 17 were classified scientific,

27 technological (in support of spacecraft development or operational techniques),

and 8 medical (in addition to routine medical monitoring). The Department of

* Gemini crews completed 10 rendezvous maneuvers using 7 different rendezvous modes. They completed 9 docking exercises.

i The Manned Space Flight Experiments Board, organized in January 1964 to support Gemini and

Apollo, also collected proposals submitted by MSC, the Office of Space Science and Applications, the

Space Medicine Office, and the Office of Advanced Research and Technology and transmitted them to

the Gemini Experiments Office. In turn, the Gemini Experiments Office consulted recovery operations,

flight crew support, medical, and flight operations to determine a proposal's feasibility.
154 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Defense was the largest contributor outside NASA with 15 investigations, all in the

technological category. GT-12 carried the largest number of experiments, and the

crew spent 30 percent of its flight time performing them. The various photography

experiments, of which at least one was flown on all missions but the first, provided

investigators and the public with the extensive series of "space photographs," more

than 2400 images. 24 (See table 2-49.)

Because of Project Gemini's use of two Air Force launch vehicles, the Air Force

played a larger part in project management than the service had in Mercury. In addition, the Navy and the Air Force supported launch, tracking, and recovery operations. After several months of dispute over DoD's role in Gemini, a January 1963

joint agreement established a NASA-DoD Gemini Program Planning Board to coordinate the two groups' activities. 25

At NASA Headquarters for most of the project's lifetime, George E. Mueller,

associate administrator for manned spaceflight, also acted as Gemini program director. Mueller was assisted by Special Assistant Samuel H. Hubbard and by directors

for program control, systems engineering, test, flight operations, and reliability and

quality. At the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, James Chamberlin served as

Gemini's first manager. Chamberlin had worked with the technical people at

McDonnell in St. Louis when NASA first considered upgrading the Mercury design.

In 1964, when Gemini, plagued by several major hardware problems, started running over budget and behind schedule, Charles Mathews took over the manager's

job and reorganized the program office. Personnel from MSC monitored progress

at the Martin Company in Baltimore (Titan II), at Lockheed in California (Agena

target vehicle), at McDonnell in St. Louis (Gemini spacecraft), and at the Cape.

Kenneth Kleinknecht, Mathews' deputy in the Gemini Project Office, was supported

by managers for program control, spacecraft management, and vehicles and missions. (See also tables 2-2 and 2-3.)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 155

Table 2-37.

Chronology of Key Project Gemini Events*

Date Event

May 25-26, 1959

Aug. 12, 1959

Apr. 5, 1960

Apr. 14, 1961

May 8, 1961

May 17, 1961

Nov. 1, 1961

Nov. 21, 1961

Dec. 7, 1961

Dec. 15, 1961

Dec. 26, 1961

Jan. 3, 1962

Jan. 31, 1962

During its first meeting, a NASA committee chaired by Harry J. Goett (Ames

Research Ctr.) considered possibilities for a post-Mercury manned spaceflight

project. Ideas included an enlarged Mercury craft that could support a crew of

two for three days.

The Space Task Group's (STG) New Projects Panel instructed the Flight Systems

Division of STG to initiate a program that would lead to a second-generation

spacecraft with advances over the Mercury vehicle. The Mercury spacecraft contractor, McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, was also studying possible modifications that would improve the vehicle.

The STG issued specifications by which to modify the Mercury spacecraft (e.g.,

the addition of a reentry control navigation system). Besides reentry control,

designers also wanted to include orbital controls so that orbital rendezvous

techniques would be possible. (Rendezvous was later seen as a necessary requirement for a lunar mission and included as an objective for Gemini.)

Following discussions between NASA and McDonnell personnel in February

regarding an advanced Mercury design, NASA issued a study contract to

McDonnell for improving the Mercury. Their work would be concentrated on

two versions of an advanced spacecraft: one with minor changes that would sustain one man for 18 orbits; and a second that would be capable of more advanced missions with two men, requiring more radical modifications. The improved Mercury concept came to be called Mercury Mark 11.

Personnel from the Martin Company, manufacturer of the Titan missile system

for the Air Force, briefed NASA officials on the Titan and its possible applications to the future manned program. During July, Martin submitted a proposal

for a Titan-boosted Mercury-type vehicle.

To allow for a controlled descent on land of a manned spacecraft, the STG

issued a statement of work for a design study of a "paraglider" landing system.

The design study (conducted at Goodyear Aircraft Corp., North American Aviation, Inc., and Ryan Aeronautical Co.) became phase one of a paraglider

development program.

STG was redesignated the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC).

NASA issued a letter contract to North American to proceed with phase II-A of

the paraglider development program; the final contract was awarded on

February 9, 1962.

NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans approved a Mercury Mark

II development plan prepared by the STG in October. The plan called for a twoman version of the Mercury spacecraft capable of longer missions to be launched

by a modified Titan II; the spacecraft would conduct orbital rendezvous and

docking maneuvers with an Agena B target vehicle placed in orbit by an Atlas

booster. A controlled land landing of the returning spacecraft was an additional

project objective. Flights would begin in 1%3.

NASA awarded McDonnell a letter contract for the development of 12 Mark 1I

spacecraft. The final contract was not signed until April 2, 1963 (it called for 13

spacecraft, one of which would be used for ground testing).

MSC directed the Air Force Space Systems Division to authorize its launch vehicle contractors (primarily Martin) to begin the work necessary to modify the

Titan II for the Mercury Mark I1 program. A letter contract with Martin for 15

launch vehicles was issued on January 19, 1962.

"Gemini" became the official designation of the Mercury Mark II program. On

the 15th, a Gemini Project Office was established at MSC, with James

Chamberlin as manager.

MSC notified the Marshall Space Flight Center that it should procure through

the Air Force 11 Agena B target vehicles and Atlas boosters for Gemini. The Air

Force Space Systems Division awarded a letter contract to Lockheed Missiles and
156 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-37. (Continued)

Chronology of Key Project Gemini Events*

Date Event

March 16, 1962

March 27, i962

March 31, 1962

April 4, 1962

May 1962

July 1962

Aug. 2, 1962

Aug. 14, 1962

Aug. 15-16, 1962

Sept. 17, 1962

Oct. 15, 1962

Dec. 1962

Dec. 17, 1962

Jan. 17, 1963

March 1963

March 21, 1963

May 1963

Space Company for 8 modified Agenas on May 1. Marshall was actively involved in the Atlas-Agena procurement cycle until January 1963, when MSC

assumed the responsibility.

The Air Force successfully conducted the first full-scale test launch of a Titan 11

ICBM. In all, 33 Titan research and development flights took place, the last on

April 9, 1964. From the standpoint of a Gemini mission, 22 would be judged successful.

Air Force and NASA official_ _igued a Gemini Operational and Managcmcnt

Plan that outlined the roles NASA and DoD would play in the program. DoD

was responsible for the Titan II and Atlas-Agena B launch vehicles from

development through launch and for range and recovery support.

The Gemini spacecraft configuration was formally frozen.

MSC awarded B. F. Goodrich a contract for the development of prototype

Gemini pressure suits. The first suit was delivered on November 6.

Tests began at Ames Research Center to evaluate a half-scale paraglider wing.

Tests ran through July. North American also began drop tests of the emergency

parachute system for their half-scale paraglider. North American was authorized

to begin phase II-B of the paraglider program on June 20.

During Gemini launches, ejection seats rather than escape rockets would be used

to carry astronauts away from a malfunctioning booster. Simulated off-the-pad

ejection tests began in July at the Naval Ordnance Test Station.

NASA and Air Force officials decided to substitute the uprated, more versatile

Agena D stage for use as the Gemini target vehicle.

North American began flight tests of the half-scale paraglider test vehicle.

A formal review of McDonnell's engineering mockup of the Gemini spacecraft

was held in St. Louis.

MSC announced the selection of nine more astronauts to supplement the original

group of seven. The flight crew training program for Gemini and Apollo, the

lunar exploration program, would be managed at MSC in Houston.

NASA awarded a contract to International Business Machines to provide the

grouted-based computer system for Gemini and Apollo. The computing center

and mission control for Gemini and Apollo would be at Houston.

Deployment flight tests of the half-scale paraglider test vehicle were unsuccessful. A NASA team inspected the full-scale test model and requested 24

modifications. An advanced paraglider trainer was also under development at

North American.

A newly formed Scientific Experiments Panel met to solicit proposals for experiments to be performed during Gemini and Apollo. The first Gemini experiments were approved in February 1964.

NASA and DoD officials signed a second agreement defining Gemini responsibilities and establishing a NASA-DoD Gemini Program Planning Board (first

meeting, Feb. 8). While NASA would continue to manage the program, the

agreement gave DoD a part in spacecraft development, pilot training, preflight

checkout, launch, and flight operations, in addition to its role as launch vehicle

provider.

Because of budget problems and a series of failures with the paraglider test vehicle, the paraglider development plan was revised: paraglider would not be used

until the 10th rather than the 7th mission. Some officials favored dropping the

concept completely and relying exclusively on the water-landing method.

Guidelines were established for conducting extravehicular activity during certain

Gemini missions; an operations plan was readied in January 1964.

Under a new contract for a paraglider landing system, North American began

testing a half-scale tow test vehicle. Additional ground-tow activity and

helicopter-tow tests took place at the Flight Research Center in California in
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table2-37.(Continued)

ChronologyofKeyProjectGeminiEvents*

157

Date Event

June13,1963

Aug.25,1963

Oct.1963

Oct.18,1963

Oct.26,1963

Dec.22,1963

Jan.1964

Apr8,1964

Apr.13,1964

Oct.1964

Jan.19,1965

March23,1965

June3,1965

Aug.21,1965

Oct.25,1965

Dec.4,1965

Dec.15,1965

Feb.23-24,1966

Feb.28,1966

August,September,andOctober.AtAmes,windtunneltestsofahalf-scale

vehiclewereconductedinJulyandAugusttoverifydesignchanges.Inadesign

engineeringinspectionn August,NorthAmericanwasrequestedomake30 modificationstothefull-scaletestvehicle.

ThecontractfortheGeminispacesuitwasawardedtotheDavidClarkCompany. A prototype suit was delivered in July.

McDonnell completed the first Gemini spacecraft. It arrived at Cape Canaveral

on October 4.

North American completed the first full-scale prototype paraglider wing and sent

it to Ames for wind tunnel tests.

Another 14 astronauts were added to the team at MSC.

The first Titan launch vehicle for Gemini arrived at the Cape; spacecraft and

launch vehicle were mechanically mated on March 5, 1964.

Charles Mathews was appointed manager of the Gemini Project Office, having

been acting manager since March 19 when Chamberlin became an advisor to the

MSC director.

North American began development flights of the full-scale paraglider test vehicle; only 6 of the 25 tests were completely satisfactory. In February, NASA

eliminated all plans for paraglider from the Gemini schedule; Gemini would rely

on water landings. While the concept was still judged a sound one, paraglider

hardware development and qualification could apparently not be completed in

time for Gemini.

A successful unmanned orbital test (Gemini-Titan 1) of the launch vehicle and

spacecraft was conducted from the Eastern Test Range (ETR). No recovery was

planned (see table 2-38 for details on this and other developmental flights).

It was announced that Virgil Grissom and John Young would make the first

manned Gemini flight.

The manned spaceflight tracking network as configured for Gemini was exercised.

A successful unmanned suborbital test (GT-2) of the reentry systems was

launched from ETR. The spacecraft was recovered from the Atlantic.

GT-3, manned by Grissom and Young, successfully demonstrated the integrity

of the spacecraft in a three-orbit mission (see table 3-39).

James A. McDivitt and Edward H. White, II, in GT-4 conducted the first longduration mission. White demonstrated extravehicular activity (EVA). After four

days of activities, the crew splashed down in the Atlantic (see table 2-40).

The next mission, GT-5, with Gordon Cooper and Charles Conrad, Jr., lasted

twice as long. The crew evaluated the rendezvous guidance and navigation

system; landing was on the 29th (see table 2-41).

An attempt to orbit a Gemini-Agena D target vehicle as part of the GT-6 mission

was unsuccessful because of an engine malfunction shortly after stage

separation. The launch of GT-6 was postponed and a review board formed to

investigate the failure.

In addition to further demonstrating long-duration flight, GT-7, with Frank

Borman and James A. Lovell, Jr., at the controls, acted as a substitute target

vehicle for GT-6A. After 14 days, the spacecraft made its landing (see table

2--42).

Walter M. Schirra, Jr., and Thomas P. Stafford on GT-6A accomplished

rendezvous and stationkeeping maneuvers with GT-7. The mission ended on the

16th (see table 2-43).

A mid-program conference was held at MSC.

Elliott M. See, Jr., and Charles A. Bassett, II, the two astronauts chosen for the

ninth mission, were killed when their T-38 jet trainer crashed in the fog near St.

Louis.
158 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table2-37.

Chronologyof KeyProjectGeminiEvents*

Date Event

March16,1966

May17,1966

June1,1966

June3,1966

July18,1966

Sept.12,1966

Nov.11,1966

Feb.1-2,1967

InthefirstmissiontosuccessfullyutilizetheAgenatargetvehicle,NellA.

Armstrong and David R. Scott docked their GT-8 spacecraft to the Agena D

stage. Because of a spacecraft thruster malfunction, however, the crew was

forced to undock after 27 minutes and use the reentry control system to control

their spacecraft. The mission was terminated early; landing took place in the

Pacific some 10 hours into the flight (see table 2-44).

Because of a short in the servo control circuit, the target vehicle planned for use

with GT-9 did not achieve orbit. In its place, NASA decided to launch an

augmented target docking adapter, a backup to the Agena vehicle, which was

built by McDonnell.

The alternative docking target was launched successfully, but the launch of GT9A was postponed by a ground equipment failure.

In GT-9A, Stafford and Eugene A. Cernan began their rendezvous mission.

Because the launch shroud was still attached to the docking adapter when the

crew reached it, they could not dock. Several secondary rendezvous objectives

and an EVA exercise were accomplished. Landing took place on the 6th (see

table 2-45).

An Atlas-Agena target vehicle and GT-IO were both successfully launched from

ETR. Pilots Young and Michael Collins docked their spacecraft with the Agena

about six hours later. The mission ended on the 21st (see table 2-46).

An Atlas-Agena D and GT-II were launched successfully. Astronauts Conrad

and Richard F. Gordon, Jr., docked their spacecraft with the target vehicle and

met all mission objectives. The mission ended on the 15th (see table 2-47).

In the last Gemini mission, an Atlas-Agena target vehicle and GT-12 with Lovell

and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., aboard were launched during the afternoon.

Rendezvous, docking, and EVA were accomplished. Splashdown took place on

the 15th (see table 2-48).

The Gemini Project Office was abolished on the 1st, and a two-day summary

conference was held at MSC.

*For a more detailed calet_lar of events, see James M. Grimwood and Barton C. Hacker with Peter

J. Vorzimmer, Project Gemini Technology and Operations; A Chronology, NASA SP-4002

(Washington, 1969).

Table 2-38.

Developmental Flights, Project Gemini

Launch Date Flight Objectives/Results

(location)

April 8, 1964

(ETR)

Jan. 19, 1965 (ETR)

GT-I (Gemini Successful orbital test of the Titan II launch vehicle,

spacecraft 1) spacecraft structural integrity, and launch vehicle-

(Gemini launch spacecraft compatibility (no recovery operations plann

vehicle 1) ed; reentry and disintegration 3 V2 days after launch).

GT-2 (spacecraft 2) Successful suborbital reentry test at maximum heating

(GLV 2) rate; spacecraft was recovered after parachute landing

in the Atlantic.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-39.

Gemini-Titan 3 (GT-3)

159

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Unofficial spacecraft

designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimensions (m):

March 23, 1965 (19)

Gemini 3

Molly Brown

GLV-3

3225

conical with a cylindrical rendezvous-recovery section fitted to the nose of

the cone and a trapezoidal retrorocket-equipment section fitted to the

cone's base

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap corns:

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km): 225.8/161.3

No. of orbits: 3

Period: 01:28:12

Length of mission: 04:52:31

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch March 23 9:24 a.m., EST

main engine shutoff 9:26:32

orbital insertion 9:29:54

initiation of retrofire 1:57:23 p.m.

splashdown 2:16:31

Distance traveled (km): 128 748

max. width, 3.05

min. width, 0.82

length, 5.74

Virgil I. Grissom, John W. Young

Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Thomas P. Stafford

L. Gordon Cooper (Cape), Roger B. Chaffee (Houston)

00:02:32

00:05:54

04:33:23

04:52:31

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objective:

Results:

Reference:

22°26'N, 70°51'W (111 km from target)

USS Intrepid (crew onboard in 70 min.)

Evaluate ability of Gemini spacecraft to support crew of two; conduct orbital maneuvers; manually control reentry; execute three experiments.

There was one brief hold on the day of launch while a sensor on an oxidizer line was adjusted. The mission was carried out as planned.

Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

GT-3," MSC-G-R-65-2, Apr. 1965.
160 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-40.

Gemini-Titan 4 ( GT-4) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

June 3, 1965 (19)

Gemini 4

GLV-4

3574

see table 2-39

James A. McDivitt, Edward H. White I1

Frank Borman, Jame_ A. Lovell, Jr.

Clifton C. Williams, Jr. (Cape), Grissom (Houston)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch June 3 10:15:59 a.m., EST

main engine shutoff 10:18:31 00:02:32

orbital insertion 10:22:05 00:06:06

initiation of retrofire June 7 11:56:00 a.m. 97:40:01

splashdown 12:12:11 97:56:12

Distance traveled (km): 2 590 561

EVA time: 00:36:00

Landing point: 27°44'N, 74°11'W (81 km from target)

Recovery ship: USS Wasp (crew onboard in 57 min.)

Mission objective: Demonstrate and evaluate spacecraft systems for a period of approx.

imately four days; evaluate effects of prolonged exposure of crew to space

environment; demonstrate EVA; conduct stationkeeping and rendezvous

with second stage of launch vehicle; demonstrate capability of orbital attitude and maneuvering system to operate as backup to retrograde rocket

system; execute 11 experiments.

Results: One 76-minute hold was experienced during launch while a problem with

the launch vehicle erector tower was investigated. No attempt was made

to rendezvous because of a fuel shortage after the stationkeeping exercise.

Also, a computer-controlled reentry was not made because of an inadvertent alteration of the computer's memory (a rolling entry was performed).

The EVA was performed by White.

Reference: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini IV," MSC-G-R-65-3, July 1965.

281.9/162.2

62

01:20:54

97:56:12 (4 + days)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-41.

Gemini-Titan 5 (GT-5) Characteristics

161

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

Reference:

Aug. 21, 1965 (19)

Gemini 5

GLV-5

3605

see table 2-39

Cooper, Charles Conrad, Jr.

Neil A. Armstrong, Elliot M. See, Jr.

Grissom (Cape); McDivitt, Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., Armstrong (Houston)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch Aug. 21 8:59:59 a.m., EST

main engine shutoff 9:02:33 00:02:34

orbital insertion 9:05:55 00:05:56

initiation of retrofire Aug. 29 7:27:42 a.m. 190:27:43

splashdown 7:55:13 190:55:14

Distance traveled (km): 5 371 990

Landing point: 29°44'N, 69°45'W (270 km from target)

Recovery ship: USS Champlain (crew onboard in 89 min.)

Mission objectives: Demonstrate and evaluate performance of spacecraft for a period of eight

days; evaluate rendezvous guidance and navigation system with radar

evaluation pod; evaluate effects of prolonged exposure of crew to space

environment; execute 17 experiments.

Results: A launch attempt on August 19 was postponed due to weather conditions

and problems with loading cryogenic fuel for the fuel cell. During the mission, problems developed with the fuel cell that precluded rendezvous

with the radar evaluation pod; instead the crew rendezvoused with a

"phantom" target vehicle. Otherwise, the mission was successful.

Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini V," MSC-G-R-65-4, Oct. 1965.

349.8/161.9

120

01:29:35

190:55:14 (7 + days)
162 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-42.

Gemini- Titan 7 ( G T- 7) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap corns:

Dec. 4, 1965 (19)

Gemini 7

GLV-7

3663

see table 2-39

Borman, Lovell

VV titre, Ml_hae, Cu..,_

Alan L. Bean (Cape); See, Eugene A. Cernan, Charles A. Bassett I1

(Houston)

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km): 328/161.5

No. of orbits: 206

Period: 01:29:23

Length of mission: 330:35:01 (13 + days)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch Dec. 4 2:30:03 p.m., EST

main engine shutoff 2:32:39 00:02:36

orbital insertion 2:36:11 00:06:08

initiation of retrofire Dec. 18 8:28:07 a.m. 329:58:04

splashdown 9:05:04 330:35:01

Distance traveled (km): 9 200 459

Landing point: 25°25'N, 70°7'W (12 km from target)

Recovery ship: USS Wasp (crew onboard in 33 min.)

Mission objective: Conduct a long-duration flight of 14 days, evaluating spacecraft and crew

performance; execute 20 experiments; serve as a target for GT-6A rendezvous and stationkeeping maneuvers.

Results: Rendezvous with GT-6A took place on December 15-16. The crew experienced a number of minor hardware problems on this long-duration

flight, including difficulty with the fuel cell, an onboard tape recorder

failure, trouble with two attitude thrusters, and difficulty with experiment

equipment. (See also table 2-43.)

Reference: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini Vii," MSC-G-R-66-1, Jan. 1966.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 163

Table 2-43.

Gemini-Titan 6A (G T-6A ) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #): Dec. 15, 1965 (19)

Spacecraft designation: Gemini 6

Launch vehicle

designation: GLV-6

Spacecraft weight (kg): 3546

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m): see table 2-39

Crew: Schirra, Stafford

Backup crew: Grissom, Young

Cap coms: see table 2-42

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km): 260/161.5

No. of orbits: 16

Period: 01:28:42

Length of mission: 25:51:24 (1 + day)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch Dec. 15 8:37:26 a.m., EST

main engine shutoff 8:40:03 00:02:37

orbital insertion 8:43:25 00:05:59

initiation of retrofire Dec. 16 9:53:24 a.m. 25:15:58

splashdown 10:28:50 25: 51:24

Distance traveled (km): 723 883

Landing point: 23°35'N, 67°50'W (13 km from target)

Recovery ship: USS Wasp (crew onboard in 66 min.)

Mission objectives: Rendezvous with GT-7, performing a number of orbital maneuvers;

execute three experiments.

Results: On October 25, the launch of GT-6 was cancelled when the Agena target

vehicle (GATV 5002 and TLV 5301) with which the spacecraft was to

rendezvous and dock failed to go into orbit. NASA officials revised their

plans for the spacecraft and elected to use it in conjunction with GT-7, a

long-duration mission scheduled for December. GT-7 would act as a

target for GT-6A rendezvous maneuvers. A launch attempt on December

12 failed because of a minor launch vehicle hardware problem. The next

attempt on the 15th was successful. Rendezvous with GT-7began about 6

hours after launch (at one point the two spacecraft were within .3 meters

of one another). The crew remained inside the spacecraft during recovery

operations.

Reference: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini VI-A," MSC-G-R-66-2, Jan. 1966.
164 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-44.

Gemini-Titan 8 ( GT-8) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #): March 16, 1966 (19)

Spacecraft designation: Gemini 8

Launch vehicle

designation: GLV-8

Spacecraft weight (kg): 3788

Spacecraft shape,

dimensions (m):

Crcw:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km): 271.7/159.8

No. of orbits: 7

Period: 01:28:50

Length of mission: 10:41:26

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

GATV launch March 16 10:00:03 a.m., EST

launch 11:41:02

main engine shutoff 11:43:36

orbital insertion 11:47:36

initiation of retrofire 9:45:49 p.m.

splashdown 10:22:28

Distance traveled (km): 292 015

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

Results:

Reference:

GATV: March 16, 1966 (14)

GATV-5003

TLV-5302

8097

see table 2-39 cylindrical

diam., 1.52

Armstrong, David R. Scott length in orbit, 7.92

Conrad, Richard F. Gordon, Jr.

R. Walter Cunningham (Cape), Lovell (Houston)

00:02:34

00:06:06

10:04:47

10:41:26

25°14'N, 136°0'E (2 km from secondary target)

USS Mason (crew onboard in 3 hr.)

Rendezvous and dock with Agena target vehicle; execute 10 experiments

during a three-day mission; conduct EVA.

There was a one-day delay in launching the spacecraft due to minor problems with spacecraft and launch vehicle hardware. GT-8 successfully

docked with the GATV 6 hours, 34 minutes after Gemini liftoff. Because

of problems with the spacecraft control system, the crew was forced to

undock after approximately 30 minutes. The spacecraft-target vehicle

combination had begun to encounter increasing yaw and roll rates. The

crew regained control of their spacecraft by using the reentry control

system, which prompted an early landing in a secondary landing area in

the Pacific. No EVA was performed.

Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini VIII," MSC-G-R-66-4, Apr. 1966.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-45.

Gemini-Titan 9A (GT-9A) Characteristics

165

Date of launch (ETR pad #): June 3, 1966 (19)

Spacecraft designation: Gemini 9

Launch vehicle

designation: GLV-9

Spacecraft weight (kg): 3750

Spacecraft shape,

dimensions (m): see table 2-39

Crew: Stafford, Cernan

Backup crew: Lovell, Aldrin

Cap coms: Aldrin (Cape, Houston); Armstrong,

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km): 266.7/158.7

No. of orbits: 45

Period: 01:28:47

Length of mission: 72:20:50 (3 + days)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

ATDAlaunch June 1 10:00:02 a.m., EST

launch June3 8:39:33 a.m.

main engine shutoff 8:42:05 00:02:32

orbital insertion 8:45:40 00:06:07

initiation of retrofire June 6 8:26:17 a.m. 71:46:44

splashdown 9:00:23 72:20:50

Distance traveled (km): 2 020 741

EVA time: 02:07:00

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

Results:

Reference:

ATDA: June 1, 1966 (14)

ATDA

TLV-5304

1088

cylindrical

diam., 1.52

length in orbit, 3.41

Lovell, Gordon (Houston)

27°52_, 75°0'W (.7 km from target)

USS Wasp (crew onboard in 52 min.)

Rendezvous and dock with a target vehicle; conduct EVA; execute seven

experiments; test the Air Force astronaut maneuvering unit.

GT-9 was postponed when TLV 5303 with GATV 5004 malfunctioned on

May 17. In its place, a substitute target was used for GT-9A; the

Augmented Target Docking Adapter (ATDA) was launched by an Atlas

on June 1; however, GT-9A was not launched on the same day as planned

due to a guidance system computer problem. After a brief hold, the

spacecraft was launched on the 3d. Upon maneuvering with the target,

the crew discovered that the launch shroud protecting the ATDA had not

been jetissoned, precluding any attempts to dock. Instead GT-9A performed a number of rendezvous maneuvers, including a Simulation of

lunar module rendezvous (Apollo). During EVA maneuvers, Cernan's

visor became fogged, and he was unable to test the Air Force maneuvering unit. The crew remained inside their spacecraft during recovery operations. The original crew for GT-9, Elliott M. See and Charles Bassett,

were killed in an airplane crash on February 28, 1966. The backup crew

was named to the prime crew positions.

Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini IX-A," MSC-G-R-66-6, July 1966.
166 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-46.

Gemini-Titan 10 (GT-IO) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

July 18, 1966 (19)

Gemini 10

GATV: July 18, 1966 (14)

GATV-5005

GLV- 10 TLV-5305

3763 8097

see tables 2-39 and 2-44

Young, Collins

Bean, Williams

Cooper (Cape, Houston), Aldrin (Houston)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

GATV launch July 18 3:39:46 p.m., EST

launch 5:20:26 a.m.

main engine shutoff 5:22:59 00:02:33

orbital insertion 5:26:38 00:06:12

initiation of retrofire July 21 3:30:50 p.m. 70:10:24

splashdown 4:07:05 70:46:39

Distance traveled (km): 1 968 823

EVA time: 01:29:00 (umbilical, 00:39:00; standup, 00:50:00)

Landing point: 26°45'N, 71°57'W (6 km from target)

Recovery ship: USS Guadalcanal (crew onboard in 28 min.)

Mission objectives: Rendezvous and dock with an Agena target vehicle; conduct dual

rendezvous maneuvers using the target vehicle's propulsion systems; conduct EVA; practice docking maneuvers; execute 15 experiments; evaluate

various docked spacecraft systems.

Results: Docking took place about 6 hours after GT-IO liftoff. Because more fuel

was used than planned during the first rendezvous exercise the spacecraft

remained docked with the GATV for 39 hours so that it could take advantage of the target vehicle's propulsion system for docked maneuvers. The

spacecraft also rendezvoused with GATV 5003 from the GT-8 mission,

which had been in orbit since March 1966. During umbilical EVA, Collins

retrieved an experiments package from GATV 5003.

Reference: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini X," MSC-G-R-66-7, Aug. 1966.

268.7/159.8

43

01:28:47

70:46:39(2+ days)
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 167

Table 2-47.

Gemini-Titan 11 (GT-11) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap corns:

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

Sept. 12, 1966 (19)

Gemini 11

GLV-11

3798

TLV-5306

8097

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

GATV launch Sept. 12 8:05:01 a.m., EST

launch 9:42:27

main engine shutoff 9:45:00 00:02:33

orbital insertion 9:48:28 00:06:01

initiation of retrofire Sept. 15 8:24:03 a.m. 70:41:36

splashdown 8:59:35 71:17:08

Distance traveled (km): 1 983 565

EVA time: 02:43:00 (umbilical, 00:33:00; standup, 02:10:00)

Landing point: 24 ° 15'N, 70°0'W (5 km from target)

Recovery ship: USS Guam (crew onboard in 24 min.)

Mission objectives: Rendezvous and dock with an Agena target vehicle during the first orbit;

conduct docking practice, including docked maneuvers at a high altitude;

conduct a tethered-vehicle test during EVA; execute 11 experiments;

demonstrate automatic reentry.

Results: The mission was postponed twice; on September 9 due to a small leak in

the first-stage oxidizer tank of the GLV; and on the 10th due to a

suspected malfunction of the autopilot on the GLV. On the day of

launch, there was a 16-minute hold due to a suspected leak around the

command pilot's hatch. Once under way, the mission went as planned

with a successful first-orbit docking. The GATV propulsion system put

the two spacecraft into a high-altitude orbit (1373.3/289.5 km) 401⁄2

hours into the mission. During EVA, astronaut Gordon tethered the two

spacecraft together with a 30-meter line. Automatic reentry was successful.

Reference: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini XI," MSC-G-R-66-8, Oct. 1966.

276.3/159.6

44

01:28:59

71:17:08 (2+ days)

GATV: Sept. 12, 1966 (14)

GATV-5006

see tables 2-39 and 2-44

Conrad, Gordon

Armstrong, William A. Anders

Williams (Cape), Young, Bean (Houston)
168 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-48.

Gemini-Titan 12 ( GT-12) Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR pad #):

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cap coms:

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km):

No. of orbits:

Period:

Length of mission:

Nov. 11, 1966 (19)

Gemini 12

GATV: Nov. 11, 1966 (14)

GATV-5001

GLV-12 TLV-5307

3763 8097

see tables 2-39 and 2-44

Lovell, Aldrin

Cooper, Cernan

Stuart A. Roosa (Cape); Conrad, Anders (Houston)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

GATV launch Nov. 11 2:07:58 p.m., EST

launch 3:46:33

main engine shutoff 3:49:08 00:02:35

orbital insertion 3:52:40 00:06:07

initiation of retrofire Nov. 15 1:46:31 p.m. 93:59:58

splashdown 2:21:04 94:34:31

Distance traveled (km): 2 574 950

EVA time: 05:30:00 (umbilical, 02:06:00; standup, 03:24:00)

Landing point: 24°35'N, 69°57'W (5 km from target)

Recovery ship: USS Wasp (crew onboard in 30 min.)

Mission objectives: Rendezvous and dock with an Agena target vehicle; conduct EVA three

times; practice docking; accomplish tethered-vehicle stationkeeping; perform docked exercises with the GATV propulsion system, including highaltitude maneuvers; use controlled reentry technique.

Results: Initial docking took place about 4 1⁄4 hours into the mission. High-altitude

docked maneuvers were cancelled when flight controllers noted fluctuations in GATV's primary propulsion system; instead an eclipse of the sun

was photographed on the 10th orbit. The crew experienced problems with

the fuel cell and the orbital attitude and maneuvering system. Aldrin's

EVA went as planned, as did reentry.

Reference: Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, "Gemini Program Mission Report

Gemini XII," MSC-G-R-67-1, Jan. 1967.

270.6/160.8

59

01:28:52

94:34:31 (3 + days)
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table 2-49.

Project Gemini Flight Experiments

169

Results1"

Gemini-Titan

No* Experiment 3 4 5 6A 7 8 9A 10 11 12

M-I Cardiovascular conditioning X X

M-3 lnflight exercise X X X

M-4 Inflight phonocardiogram X X X

M-5 Body fluid bioassays X X P X

M-6 Bone demineralization X X

M-7 Calcium balance study X

M-8 Inflight sleep analysis P

M-9 Human otolith function X X

MSC- 1 Electrostatic charge X X

MSC-2 Proton electron spectrometer X P

MSC-3 Triaxis magnetometer X X X X

MSC-4 Optical communication P

MSC-5 Lunar UV spectral reflectance N

MSC-6 Beta spectrometer X P

MSC-7 Bremsstrahlung spectrometer X X

MSC-8 Color patch photography X

MSC-10 2-color earth's limb photography X

MSC-12 Landmark contrast measurement N N

T-1 Reentry communications X

T-2 Manual navigation sightings X

'D-1 Basic object photography X

D-2 Nearby object photography N

D-3 Mass determination N X

D-4 Celestial radiometry X X

D-5 Star occultation navigation N X

D-6 Surface photography X

D-7 Space object radiometry X X

D-8 Radiation in spacecraft X X

D-9 Simple navigation N X

D-10 Ion-sensing attitude control X X

D-12 Astronaut maneuvering unit P

D-I 3 Astronaut visibility N X

D-14 UHF-VHF polarization N P

D-15 Night image intensification N X

D-16 Power tool evaluation N N

S-1 Zodiacal light photography X N X X
170 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table2-49.

ProjectGeminiFlightExperiments(Continued)

Results*

Gemini-Titan

No* Experiment 3 4 5 6A 7 8 9A 10 11 12

S-2 Sea urchin egg growth P

S-3 Frog egg growth P X

S-4 Radiation and _ro-g on blood X X

S-5 Synoptic terrain photography X X X X X X X

S-6 Synoptic weather photography X X X X X X X

S-7 Cloud top spectrometer X N

S-8 Visual acuity X X

S-9 Nuclear emulsion N X

S-10 Agena micrometeorite collection N N X X

S-I I Airglow horizon photography X P X

S-12 Micrometeorite collection X N X

S-13 UV astronomical camera X X P

S-26 Ion wake measurement X X

S-29 Librations region photography X

S-51 Sodium vapor cloud N

S-30 Dim light photography/orthicon N X

S-64 Sunrise UV photography N

N/A Eclipse photography (contingency

experiment added by crew) p

*The letter prefixes to the experiment numbers correspond to the following: M=manned

spaceflight; MSC = Manned Spacecraft Center; T= technological; D= Department of Defense; and

S = scientific.

tX = experiment performed successfully

P = experiment performed partially

N = experiment not performed
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 171

Characteristics-The Apollo Program

NASA's first 10-year plan, drawn up by the headquarters Program Planning Office in late 1959, scheduled manned circumlunar missions and permanent earthorbiting space stations for the late 1960s. Manned exploration of the moon's surface

was reserved for the next decade, when the "super boosters" considered necessary

for lunar landing missions would be operational. Advanced planners forecast that a

direct-ascent flight from earth to the moon would require more than 50 million

newtons of thrust; Atlas, which was being readied for Project Mercury, was capable

of only 1.6 million newtons (see the discussion of Project Mercury elsewhere in this

chapter). Furthering the development of large rocket engines and establishing a national space vehicle program that would provide increasingly powerful boosters were

critical first steps to the moon. 26 In 1959, NASA proposed to develop four boosters

that would fulfill all the agency's heavy-payload needs during the coming years.

Nova, the most powerful and the least defined of the four, would boost man directly

to the moon.* From the Army Ballistic Missile Agency came another scheme for

lunar missions that did not require a vehicle in the Nova class. Instead of launching

the lunar spacecraft in one package in a direct ascent to the moon, Wernher von

Braun suggested assembling a vehicle in earth orbit from propulsion and spacecraft

components put there by boosters much smaller than the proposed Nova. From orbit (in zero gravity), it would require far less thrust to send a spacecraft on its way to

the moon. The clustered-engine booster von Braun had in mind was Juno V. Working in-house with proponents of both lunar mission modes, NASA designers began

conceptualizing an advanced spacecraft that would take man beyond earth.t (See

table 2-50 for a listing of key program events.)

In July 1960, manned spaceflight officials held the first of several conferences at

which they acquainted industry with NASA's plans for circumlunar missions and

"Apollo," the designation given the agency's advanced spacecraft. Apollo would be

designed to support three astronauts for up to 14 days on a lunar reconnaissance

mission. Three contractors were chosen that fall to prepare feasibility studies for

such a spacecraft. Meanwhile in Alabama, von Braun's rocket team was transferred

to NASA and instructed to continue development of its family of clustered-engine

rockets, which had been redesignated Saturn. New studies suggested that multistage

Saturns might be powerful enough for NASA's lunar program. Judged by some to

be an unneccessary complication, a third method for reaching the moon had surfaced that year at the agency's Langley Research Center. Direct ascent and earth orbit rendezvous both assumed landing the entire spacecraft package on the moon,

along with the large amount of propellant that would be required to lift the returning spacecraft off the moon. Rather than fly this very heavy configuration, Langley

researchers suggested a much smaller two-part spacecraft. From orbit around the

moon, crewmen in a lunar module would separate from the main spacecraft and

land on the moon; when surface operations were completed they would return to the

* The four vehicles were Vega and Centaur, which were upper stages, and Saturn and Nova, which

were multistage launchers. For more information, see chap. 1.

1"STG engineers were led by Mercury designer Maxime Faget. Jack Heberlig drafted the first hardware guidelines for the Apollo command center spaceflight.
172 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

orbiting ship, leaving behind the craft's landing legs. Before their return to earth,

the crew would jettison the module. While such a scenario would require a more

modest launch vehicle than Nova and only one launch rather than the multiple

launches characteristic of earth orbit rendezvous, it also demanded the precise coordination of two vehicles far from earth. If the crew should miss in their attempt to

rendezvous, the returning lunar module could just drift off into space, warned the

opponents of lunar orbit rendezvous. .27

Days after the Martin Company, General Electric, and the Convair/Astronautics Division of General Dynamics submitted Apollo feasibility

studies to NASA, President John Kennedy made a speech that dramatically affected

the agency's plans for lunar missions. 2s Before Congress on May 25, 1961, the president called for an accelerated space program that would land a man on the moon

before the end of the decade, a program that would prove America's technical prowess to the world. NASA was still nine months away from orbiting a man about earth,

and Apollo was in its earliest stages of definition. To accomplish a manned landing

by 1969 would require an enormous effort and a huge purse.

Reacting to Kennedy's challenge, NASA assigned several new committees and

working groups the task of evaluating the three mission modes proposed for a lunar

landing. 29Although the agency went ahead with its plans to invite 12 firms to bid for

the Apollo spacecraft contract, the vehicle's final configuration would depend on

what route it would take to its destination and by what means. _ It was quickly determined that NASA would not have time to develop a Nova-class launch vehicle.

Apollo would have to depend on a three- or four-stage version of Saturn. As for

mission mode, this left earth orbit rendezvous as the clear favorite at NASA Headquarters and the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, while the Manned

Spacecraft Center in Houston, the new home and designation of the Space Task

Group, began to see the practicality of lunar orbit rendezvous. Of the five teams that

submitted proposals to design and manufacture the Apollo command and service

modules, NASA chose the Space and Information Systems Division of North

American Aviation. ** The day before the decision was announced on November 27,

1961, the manned spacecraft team had expanded the Apollo contract statement of

work considerably to include all major spacecraft subsystems. North American

would have to employ a small army of subcontractors to provide many of Apollo's 2

million functional parts (see fig. 2-5 for a description of the Apollo spacecraft and

table 2-56 for a list of contractors).

On January 15, 1962, two new offices were opened at the Manned Spacecraft

Center. In addition to the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office (ASPO), NASA

* A fourth mission mode suggested by personnel at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory involved assembling on the moon an earth-return vehicle from components deposited there by unmanned landers. Lunar

surface rendezvous was not seriously considered for Apollo.

_The first contract NASA let for Apollo was to the Instrumentation Laboratory of MIT (Aug. 1961)

for the development of a guidance and navigation system. It was recognized that this system was a long

lead-time item that would be required regardless of which mission mode was chosen.

** The definitive contract with North American, signed on Aug. 14, 1963, called for 11 mockups of

the CSM, 15 boilerplate models, and 11 spacecraft.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 173

LAUNCH

ESCAPE

SYSTEM

10.06

| COMMAND

3.63

MODULE

SERVICE

6.88 MODULE 25.88

SPACECRAFT

LM

ADAPTER

8.53

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I I

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INSTRUMENT UNIT .91

Figure 2-5. Apollo Spacecraft (dimensions in meters). This drawing represents the Apollo stack at

launch. The launch escape system (3 solid-propellant motors) was included to propel the command

module to safety in the event of an aborted launch. If it were not required, the LES was jettisoned

shortly after launch. The command module, equipped with 3 couches, served as the crew compartment and control center. A forward docking ring and harch allowed the spacecraft to dock with

the lunar module (stowed in the spacecraft LM adapter during launch). The command module was

capable of attitude control about 3 axes (with its I0 reaction control system engines) and some lateral

lift translation in the atmosphere. Made from aluminum, the command module had 2 hatches and

5 windows. Thermal protection during reentry was provided by ablative heatshields of varying

thicknesses. The service module provided the primary propulsion and maneuvering capability for

the spacecraft. Most of the consumables (oxygen, hydrogen, propellant) was also stored in this module.

Prior to reentry, the crew jettisoned the service module. Inside the spacecraft LM adapter, the lunar

module was stowed. The instrument unit, part of the launch vehicle, contained guidance, navigation, and control equipment. (See also tables 2-54 and 2-55 for more information on major spacecraft

subsystems and spacecraft characteristics.)
174 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

established a Gemini Project Office in Houston to manage a Mercury follow-on program that would prove useful to Apollo (see discussion of Gemini elsewhere in this

chapter). The two-man Gemini flights scheduled to begin the next year would

demonstrate that man could tolerate lengthy stays in a weightless environment and

that two spacecraft could rendezvous and dock. Having abandoned direct ascent as

a method for reaching the moon, NASA would have to rely on rendezvous, either in

earth orbit or lunar orbit, and it was an unproven operation. Much of Apollo's hardware would represent a new generation of spacecraft components, but many of

Apollo's operations- in space and on the ground-would be tested during Gemini.

Although work on many of the Apollo CSM's subsystems was under way in early 1962, the spacecraft builders had to wait until that summer to finalize the vehicle's

external configuration. After months of campaigning by John C. Houbolt and

others from the Langley Research Center, Apollo managers were finally convinced

that lunar orbit rendezvous offered them the best chance of meeting the 1969

deadline for a landing.* One Saturn V (a three-stage vehicle previously designated

Saturn C-5) would boost the Apollo stack, including a lunar module (LM, pronounced lem) stowed aft of the CSM (see fig. 2-6 for a description of the LM). Early

along the translunar path, the CSM would separate from the adapter section that

held the lunar craft, turn around, and dock nose first with the LM. They would

travel to the moon in this docked position. From lunar orbit, the LM with two

crewmembers would make the trip to the surface, while the remaining astronaut

continued to orbit in the CSM waiting for the LM's return. The LM's ascent stage

would bring the two lunar explorers back to the CSM. Before entering a trans-earth

trajectory, the crew would jettison the lander module. The service module would be

abandoned before reentry, and the three would make a water landing in the command module. In July, the Manned Spacecraft Center invited 12 companies to submit plans for the Apollo lunar module. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation

was judged the winner in November.

Research and development flights for Apollo and its Saturn launcher stretched

from October 1961 to April 1968 (see table 2-51). Little Joe II, a booster designed

specifically for the Apollo test program, was used to evaluate the launch escape and

abort system. Scout and Atlas-Antares launch vehicles put payloads into suborbital

trajectories to test Apollo's reentry configuration and its heatshield. In July 1966,

the two-stage Saturn IB, suitable for launching earth-orbit missions, was judged acceptable. Saturn V's first test came in November 1967, when it orbited an unmanned

CSM (Apollo 4). Apollo mission plans in 1967 called for incremental steps beyond

the research and development flights. In low earth orbit, a crew would first assess

the CSM's performance (C mission), then the combined performance of the CSM

and the LM (D mission). In high earth orbit, a crew would again put the CSM and

the LM through their paces (E mission). Only then would Apollo astronauts journey

to the moon in a circumlunar mission (F mission). Lunar landing was the last goal

(G mission). Such a scheme would demand near-capacity operations during 1968

and 1969 at NASA's new launch facilities on Merritt Island at the Kennedy Space

Center.

*MSC engineers favored lunar orbit rendezvous because it promised the highest payload efficiency,

the smallest size for the landing module, and the least compromise on spacecraft design. Headquarters

determined that this mode would cost 10 to 15 percent less than direct ascent or earth orbit rendezvous.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 175

DOCKING WINDOW

S-BAND

STEERABLE

ANTENNA

RENDEZVOUS

RADAR ANTENNA

S-BAND IN-FLIGHT

ANTENNA (2)

WINDOW

FORWARD

HATCH

FORWARD

DOCKING

DROGUE

ASSEMBLY

ANTENNA

DOCKING

TARGET

RCS THRUST

CHAMBER

ASSEMBLY

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GEAR

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STATE 'r

DESCENT' 6.9

STAGE

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LANDING

PAD (.95

DIAM)

LADDER

EGRESS

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ENGINE

SKIRT

Figure 2-6. Apollo Lunar Module (dimensions in meters). Because the lunar module (LM) wouM

operate only in space, its designers couM ignore the aerodynamic streamlining demanded by behicles

that flew in Earth's atmosphere. Un ungainly looking vehicle was the result. The two-stage spacecraft

carried to the vicinity of the moon by the Apollo command and service module (CSM)--the points

of interface being the apex of the conical command module and the top surface of the LM ascent

stage---was designed to land two of the three Apollo crewmen on the surface in a controlled fashion.

From lunar orbit where it was released by the CSM, the LM's descent and ascent stages functioned

as a unit. During surface operations, the ascent stage served as a home for the astronauts, when

it was time to return to the orbiting CSM the descent stage provided a launch platform for the

ascent stage. It took more than two years to design the LM, with its makers fighting weight gain

long after a configuration was approved. The most troublesome, critical, and heavy of the LM's

components were its entines--18 of them (1 large engine for each stage: descent propulsion system

at 43,900 newtons thrust, ascent propulsion system at 15,500 newtons," and 16 smafl attitude control

engines clustered in quads around the ascent stage). Propellant for these systems accounted for more

than 70 percent of the LM's total weight of 1,500 kilograms (propulsion for the variable-thrust descent engine along came to nearly 55 percent). The ascent stage was basically cylindrical (4.29-meter

diameter) but with angular faces; its aluminum skin was encased by a mylar thermal-micrometeorite

shield. The cruciform structure of the descent stage supported the descent engine and 4 propellant

tanks. Four legs, the struts of which were filled with crushable aluminum honeycomb for absorbing

the shock of landing, were capped by footpads. The descent stage was also constructed of aluminum

alloy. A ladder attached to one of the legs gave the crew access to the surface. A docking tunnel

(0.81-meter diameter) was provided for crew transfer between the command module and the LM

ascent stage. After the surface operations were completed and the crew returned via the ascent stage

to the CSM, the LM was jettisoned. A LM was included on a manned Apollo mission for the first

time in March 1969 (Apollo 9); the first manned lunar landing took place in July 1969 (Apollo

11). For more information on spacecraft systems, see table 2-55.
176 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

At North American, work was under way on two versions of the command and

service module: Block I for earth-orbit operations and Block II for lunar missions.

The prime contractor's greatest problem was ensuring the compatibility of

thousands of interfaces, those points at which two or more components were joined.

Grumman's greatest difficulty was weight gain on the lunar module. Development

of propulsion units for the CSM and the LM was another stumbling block. When

schedules started to slip and hardware problems failed to disappear, NASA expressed its dissatisfaction with North American. In early 1966, the agency converted

both North American and Grumman's contracts from cost-plus-fixed-fee to costplus-incentive-fcc in an attempt to improve performance at the firms.

By early 1967, hardware and software schedules were keeping better pace with

NASA's mission plans. Ground personnel and astronaut training had begun; the

new mission control center in Houston was in operation. Long-duration missions

and rendezvous and docking had been proved during Gemini flights. Unmanned

Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter spacecraft were sending much needed data on the lunar

surface to Apollo technicians and scientists. Apollo's first crew, Virgil I. Grissom,

Edward H. White, and Roger B. Chaffee, was due to fly an earth-orbital mission in

February. Tragically, however, a fire claimed the lives of these astronauts and

forced the agency to review its lunar exploration program meticulously. In a

simulated countdown of CSM 204 on January 27, 1967, arcs from electrical wiring

in an equipment bay on the command module started a fire (no single ignition point

was identified); in the 100 percent oxygen atmosphere the crew died in minutes of

asphyxia. Faced with its first tragedy, the agency convened an Apollo 204 Review

Board to investigate, which in turn established 21 task panels to scrutinize every

aspect of the accident, from the configuration of spacecraft during the test to the

disposition of the surviving service module. Led by Floyd L. Thompson, the board

in its final report, submitted in April, called for a number of significant hardware

design, test operations, and flight plan changes. Redefinition of the Block II CSM

was also demanded. Tests in 100 percent oxygen environments had already been forbidden.* Specific recommendations included the restriction of combustible

materials in the command module, simplifying crew egress procedures, testing for

fire safety on full-scale mockups of a reconfigured CSM, and an in-depth review of

the environmental control system. For five months, a NASA team oversaw Block II

work at North American. 3°

Apollo began to fly in November 1967 with the first "all-up" orbital test of the

Saturn V (Apollo 4), followed by an equally successful orbital trial of the lunar

module (Apollo 5). The second Saturn V-launched mission (Apollo 6) did not meet

its objectives, however, because of several launch vehicle malfunctions. Apollo 7,

now slated to carry the first crew into earth orbit, passed its flight readiness review in

early October 1968. Walter Schirra, Donn F. Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham

were at the controls of the Block II CSM on October 11 when it was put into orbit by

a Saturn IB. During the 1 l-day mission, the spacecraft performed admirably, allowing the crew to complete all their test objectives (see table 2-52). Months before this

first flight, George Low, Apollo spacecraft project manager at MSC, made a deci-

*Future tests would be performed at 60 percent oxygen-40 percent nitrogen levels; launch operations

would also be conducted using this ratio; 100 percent oxygen would be reserved for flight operations.
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 177

sion to accelerate the schedule if the first flight were successful. If NASA wanted to

reach the moon before 1970, it would have to sacrifice some of the intermediate

steps. Apollo 8, the second manned mission, would orbit the moon.

On December 21, 1960, Apollo 8 with Frank Borman, James Lovell, and

William A. Anders aboard, was boosted along its translunar path. After 69 hours of

flight, the crew reached their destination, the first men to travel to the vicinity of the

moon. After some 20 hours in lunar orbit, Apollo 8 returned to earth for a

December 27 splashdown in the Pacific (see fig. 2-7 and table 2-53). Apollo 8, a

milestone mission, was the last flight in NASA's first decade.

NASA's corps of astronauts grew considerably during the Apollo years. The

first addition to the original seven Mercury pilots was on September 17, 1962, when

nine men joined the group to fly Gemini and Apollo missions. They were supplemented by another 13 on October, 18, 1963. Prompted by the scientific community, four scientist-astronauts (two physicists, one physician, and one geologist)

were signed on in June 1965 for lunar landing flights. The largest single group of

pilot-astronauts (18) joined NASA on April 4, 1966. Another seven were chosen on

August 4, 1967 to fill support and backup crew slots. .31 There were three Apollo

crew positions for each mission: commander, command module pilot, and lunar

module pilot. The prime and backup crews followed the one spacecraft that had

been assigned for their flight through its testing program at the factory and through

preparations at the launch site. This kept the crew up to date on modifications that

were made to spacecraft hardware. In addition to "living with their spacecraft," the

astronauts had to train for their specific missions on simulators and trainers, keep

physically fit, and maintain proficiency in flying jet aircraft. To help them coordinate these many activities, each crew had a support crew assigned to it. As they

had during Mercury and Gemini, Apollo astronauts acted as "capsule communicators" at mission control during the flights, serving as voice links between

spacecraft and ground control.

In a 1962 summer study conference sponsored by NASA and the National

Academy of Sciences, scientists concluded that the most important tasks that would

face Apollo astronauts once they reached the moon would involve educated observations of natural phenomena, the collection of samples, and the installation of

monitoring instruments. From these general guidelines, an Ad Hoc Working Group

on Apollo Experiments built its recommendations for Apollo science: (1) the examination of physical and geological properties in the area near the spacecraft; (2)

geological mapping; (3) investigation of the moon's interior; (4) studies of the lunar

atmosphere; and (5) radio astronomy from the surface. Evaluating proposals for experiments, developing an Apollo lunar surface experiments package, integrating experiments with spacecraft hardware, and preparing special facilities on earth in

which to examine lunar samples kept a cadre of scientists and engineers busy for

years before the first Apollo landing. Apollo 7 and 8, which were basically engineering missions, did not carry scientific equipment, with the exception of biomedical

* On August 13, 1969, a final group of four astronauts was added to the NASA team as Apollo support crew members. These men transferred from the USAF Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program, which had been cancelled.
178 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 179

sensors and cameras.* In fact, until the first landing and return were accomplished,

enthusiasm for mission science took a decided second place to concerns for engineering and operational matters. The success of the post-1968 missions, however,

"stimulated a more vigorous interest in the solar system and established the study of

the moon as a modern interdisciplinary science. ''32

A November 1961 agency-wide reorganization put George Low in charge of

spacecraft and flight missions in the NASA Headquarters Office of Manned Space

Flight (OMSF). Reporting to Low was John H. Disher, assistant director for Apollo

spacecraft development. When George MueUer took over as associate administrator

of manned spaceflight in 1963, he kept hold of the Apollo program reins until its

growth demanded a full-time program director. General Samuel C. Phillips was

chosen as director in October 1964, a post he would keep for many years (see table

2-2). Houston's Manned Spacecraft Center was responsible for executing the program. The Apollo Project Office added in September 1960 grew in importance with

a 1961 reorganization (see table 2-3). Charles W. Frick was MSC's first Apollo

manager. Joseph F. Shea, assisted by Robert Piland and William A. Lee, saw the

program through its formative years (1963-1966). When George Low took over as

manager of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office at MSC in April 1967, he faced

the aftermath of the Apollo 204 accident and a compromised flight schedule.

Apollo's circumlunar mission in 1968 was testimony to Low's ability to make bold

decisions.

Every NASA center made some contribution to Apollo, but MSC, the Marshall

Space Flight Center, and the Kennedy Space Center were the major participants (see

also chapter 5 for a discussion of the roles the Goddard Space Flight Center and the

Jet Propulsion Laboratory played in Apollo tracking and data acquisition). In late

1964, MSC's Florida Operations Office was absorbed in a reorganization of KSC;

Kurt H. Debus as director of launch operations managed Apollo's activity at the

Cape.t Marshall, provider of the launch vehicle, was directed by von Braun, who as

leader of the Saturn team, had a very personal interest in Apollo.t "33 Apollo

managers geared their activities to correspond with a series of reviews, inspections,

and certifications that served as key checkpoints for spacecraft design and hardware

production. The six steps were preliminary and critical design reviews, flight article

configuration inspection, certification of flight worthiness, design certification

review, and flight readiness review. This last two-part review confirmed the

readiness of hardware and facilities for each mission. 34 Cooperating with NASA officials at each of these checkpoints was a legion of contractor and subcontractor

employees whose job it was to ready the spacecraft for launch. North American

Aviation (later called North American Rockwell) led the command and service

module team, Grumman the lunar module team (see table 2-56 for a listing of contractors).

*Apollo 7 carried experiments S-005, synoptic terrain photography, and S-006, synoptic weather

photography; Apollo 8 carried S-151, cosmic ray detector, and the crew conducted lunar mission

photography.

i'Other launch sites that were used during the Apollo testing program were Wallops Station and

White Sands Test Facility.

** Marshall also supervised Apollo support activities at the Michoud Assembly Facility in New

Orleans, the Mississippi Test Facility at Bay St. Louis, and the Slidell Computer Facility, Slidell, Louisiana.
180 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-50.

Chronology of Key Apollo Program Events*

Date Event

Dec. 3, 1958

Jan. 19, 1959

Feb. 5, 1959

Apr. 1959

June 8, 1959

June 18, 1959

Aug. 12, 1959

Dec. 31, 1959

March 15, 1960

Apr.-May 1960

May 25, 1960

July 25, 1960

July 28-29, 1960

Oct. 17, 1960

Oct. 25, 1960

An Army-NASA agreement established that the Army Ordnance Missile

Command (AOMC), of which Wernher von Braun's rocket team was a part,

was to be responsive to NASA requirements for launch vehicles.

NASA awarded North American Aviation, Inc., a contract to develop a

large-class single-chamber rocket engine, called the F-I (to be used in the proposed Nova launcher). The F-1 was static-fired for the first time on March 3.

A Working Group of Lunar Exploration was established by NASA.

A Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight was organized to

assist with long-range planning and basic research. Chaired by Harry J.

Goett of Ames Research Center, the group met for the first time on May

25 -26.

The Army, in developing a plan for establishing manned lunar outposts

(Project Horizon), predicted that the first landing could take place in 1965.

NASA authorized the AOMC to study possibilities for using the proposed

Saturn launch vehicle for lunar missions. These studies were discussed at a

meeting of NASA's Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight

later that month.

The Space Task Group's (STG) New Projects Panel, chaired by H. Kurt

Strass, met for the first time to discuss future manned programs. The panel

recommended that work start immediately on an advanced capsule and

assigned panel member Alan B. Kehlet to begin a program that would lead to

a second-generation three-man capsule with a potential for near-lunar return

velocities. Kehlet presented his initial findings at a meeting of the panel on

September 28.

A Saturn Vehicle Team led by Abe Silversteln recommended that NASA pursue development of the Saturn C-I.

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency's Development Operations Division (von

Braun's group) and the Saturn program were transferred to NASA; the facility was named the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC).

STG personnel wrote guidelines for the design of an advanced spacecraft.

STG formed an Advanced Vehicle Team with Robert O. Piland as leader.

This team would make preliminary design studies for an advanced vehicle

capable of carrying several crew members.

"Apollo" was chosen as the name for NASA's advanced manned spaceflight

program, which included plans for a manned lunar landing and a permanent

space station.

The first of a series of NASA-Industry Program Plans Conferences was held

to acquaint industry with the agency's plans for advanced spacecraft and circumlunar missions.

At NASA Headquarters, a small working group was formed by George M.

Low, chief of manned spaceflight, to establish ground rules for manned

lunar landings, determine spacecraft weights, specify launch vehicle requirements, and prepare a development plan.

NASA selected three contractors-Convalr/Astronautics Division of

General Dynamics Corporation, General Electric Company, and Martin

Company - to prepare feasibility studies of an advanced manned spacecraft.

These companies were chosen from 14 who submitted proposals on October 9
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 181

Table2-50.

Chronologyof Key Apollo Program Events* (Continued)

Date Event

Nov. 1960

Dec. 10, 1960

Jan. 9, 1961

Jan. 19, 1961

May 5, 1961

May 15-17, 1961

May 25, 1961

June 10, 1961

July 18-20, 1961

July 20, 1961

July 28, 1961

Aug. 1961

in answer to a request for proposals issued on September 13. Technical

assessment panels and an evaluation board judged the proposals.

Technical Liaison Groups were established by STG to coordinate work and

discussions among center employees involved with advanced spacecraft

design. Nine groups were formed.

Personnel at Langley Research Center briefed STG members on an alternative to direct ascent to the moon: lunar orbit rendezvous. (Other mission

modes under discussion were earth orbit rendezvous and direct ascent.) The

lunar orbit rendezvous mode reduced launch vehicle power requirements.

Later that month Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation funded an inhouse study of lunar orbit rendezvous. Langley and STG personnel met again

to discuss this mode on January 10.

A newly formed Manned Lunar Landing Task Group led by Low met for the

first time to consider how the objective of a lunar landing fit into the agency's

future plans and to prepare a position paper on the subject for FY 1962

budget hearings. Their report, submitted on February 7, suggested that a

manned lunar landing could be accomplished during the 1960s using direct

ascent or earth orbit rendezvous (Saturn C-2, three or four stages).

MSFC awarded contracts to Douglas Aircraft Company and Chance Vought

Corporation to study the earth orbit rendezvous mode for manned lunar and

interplanetary missions.

STG completed its first draft of general requirements for the Apollo

spacecraft.

The Martin Company, GE, and Convair/Astronautics submitted their final

feasibility studies of an advanced spacecraft.

In a speech before Congress, President Kennedy called for new long-range

goals for the space program, including a lunar landing before the end of the

decade.

The Lundin Committee, established by NASA the day of Kennedy's speech,

completed a study of vehicle systems that could support manned lunar landings. The committee preferred earth orbit rendezvous as a means for putting

together a lunar vehicle package, using two or three Saturn C-3 launches.

Another study group, the Fleming Committee, appointed on May 2, concluded that a lunar landing was feasible before 1970.

A NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Conference was held for representatives

of 300 potential Apollo contractors.

A NASA-Department of Defense (DoD) Large Vehicle Planning Group,

directed by Nicholas E. Golovin, was established to study large vehicle

systems such as those needed for a direct ascent mission to the moon.

NASA invited 12 companies to submit proposals due on October 9 for the

Apollo spacecraft prime contract.

An Ad Hoc Task Group for Study of Manned Lunar Landing by Rendezvous

Techniques reported that the earth orbit rendezvous mode offered the earliest

possibility for a lunar landing. Meanwhile, John C. Houbolt of Langley

made another presentation on lunar orbit rendezvous to STG.
182 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-50.

Chronology of Key Apollo Program Events* (Continued)

Date Event

Oct. 27, 1961

Nov. 15, 1961

Nov. 20, 1961

Nov. 28, 1961

Jan. 15, 1962

Jan.-June 1962

Feb. 6, 1962

March 1962

March 2-3, 1962

Apr. 11, 1962

Apr. 16, 1962

Apr. 25, 1962

June 7, 1962

June 22, 1962

Saturn SA-1 (first stage with a dummy second stage) was launched successfully. The booster was a cluster of eight H-1 engines. (See table 2-51 for details

on this and other Apollo-Saturn developmental flights.)

In a letter to NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Houbolt

made his case for the lunar orbit rendezvous mode for Apollo.

A working group led by Milton W. Rosen, director of launch vehicles and

propulsion in the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), reported that the

direct ascent mode for a lunar landing was the most promising, using the proposed Nova.

NASA chose the Space and Information Systems Division of North

American Aviation to design and build the two-module Apollo spacecraft.

North America's proposal had been selected by technical assessment panels

and a source evaluation board over those submitted by four other teams:

General Dynamics/Astronautics Avco Corporation; General Electric Missile

and Space Vehicle Department-Douglas-Grumman-Space Technology

Laboratories; McDonnell Aircraft Corporation-Lockheed Aircraft

Corporation-Hughes Aircraft Company-Chance Vought; and the Martin

Company. On the previous day, the Apollo spacecraft statement of work had

been expanded substantially. North American's letter contract was signed on

December 12, the definitive contract on August 14, 1963.

An Apollo Spacecraft Project Office (ASPO) was established at the Manned

Spacecraft Cemer (MSC), STG's new designation, with Charles W. Frick as

manager.

Grumman conducted another in-house study of lunar orbit rendezvous

techniques.

Houbolt and Charles W. Mathews of MSC made a presentation on lunar orbit rendezvous to the Manned Space Flight Management Council.

NASA Headquarters approved plans for the development of a Little Joe 11

test launch vehicle with which to verify various Apollo spacecraft systems.

General Dynamics/Convair was awarded a contract to design and manufacture the vehicle on May 11.

At a meeting at NASA Headquarters, lunar orbit rendezvous was reviewed as

a possible mission mode for Apollo. It would require a single Saturn C-5

(three stages).

Kennedy assigned the Apollo program the highest national priority category

(DX) for procurement action.

MSC representatives made a lunar orbit rendezvous presentation at MSFC;

additional presentations were made at Headquarters in May.

Saturn SA-2 with a water-filled second stage was launched successfully.

MSFC's von Braun recommended that the lunar orbit rendezvous mode be

adopted for Apollo.

The Manned Space Flight Management Council announced that it favored

lunar orbit rendezvous. Other NASA officials agreed, and on July 11 the

agency announced that this mode had been selected for Apollo. A lunar

module capable of landing two men on the moon's surface and returning

them to the orbiting command and service module would be required.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 183

Table 2-50.

Chronology of Key Apollo Program Events* (Continued)

Date Event

July 25, 1962

Sept. 17, 1962

Sept. 26, 1962

Nov. 7, 1962

Nov. 16, 1962

Feb.-March 1963

Feb. 27, 1963

March 28, 1963

Sept. 4, 1963

Sept. 16-18, 1963

Oct. 18, 1963

Oct. 30, 1963

Nov. 1, 1963

Jan. 29, 1964

Feb. 3, 1964

Apr. 14, 1964

Apr. 28-30, 1964

May 28, 1964

Sept. 18, 1964

Sept. 30, 1964

Jan. 6-8, 1965

June 29, 1965

Nov. 1965-Jan. 1966

MSC invited 11 firms to submit proposals due on September 4 for an Apollo

lunar excursion module.

Nine new astronauts were added to NASA's flight team.

NASA announced plans for constructing the Mississippi Test Facility for

testing the Saturn stages.

NASA selected Grumman to build the lunar module. Grumman was chosen

over eight other firms. A definitive contract was signed on March 11, 1963.

Saturn SA-3 with a water-filled second stage was launched successfully.

The MSC Lunar Surface Experiments Panel, formed to study and evaluate

proposals for lunar surface investigations, met for the first time.

NASA established an Apollo Mission Planning Panel to develop mission

design, coordinate trajectory analyses, and produce contingency plans for all

manned missions.

Saturn SA-4 was launched successfully (last first-stage test of Saturn I).

At MSC, a Manned Spacecraft Criteria Board was established to determine

engineering, design, and procedural standards for spacecraft systems.

The first lunar module mockup review was held at Grumann.

NASA selected another 14 astronauts for training for Gemini and Apollo.

NASA cancelled plans for four manned earth orbital missions launched by

Saturn I vehicles. The first manned Apollo test flight would be powered by a

Saturn IB.

Apollo's launch escape system was successfully tested at White Sands (Pad

Abort-l).

Saturn SA-5 with a powered second stage was launched successfully (second

stage put into orbit).

NASA selected 14 more astronauts for Gemini and Apollo.

FIRE 1, a reentry heating test of an Apollo-shaped vehicle, was carried out

successfully.

A mockup review of the Block I (earth orbital) Apollo command and service

module (CSM) was held at North American; a second review followed on

July 8-9.

The first orbital flight of an Apollo boilerplate model with a Saturn 1 (A-IOI)

took place successfully.

Test A-I02 took place successfully.

A review of a Block II (lunar mission) Apollo CSM mockup was held. NASA

gave North American a formal go-ahead for manufacture on November 23.

NASA held a preliminary design review of the Block II CSM.

NASA announced the selection of six additional astronauts for Apollo; these

newest astronauts were chosen because of their academic training in the

sciences (only four became active).

The critical design review of the lunar module was conducted by five teams:

structures and properties; communications, instrumentation and electrical

power; stabilization and control, navigation and guidance, and radar; crew

systems; and mission compatibility and operations.
184 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-50.

Chronology of Key Apollo Program Events* (Continued)

Date Event

Nov. 30, 1965

Dec. 6-17, 1965

Dec. 15, 1965

Jan. 14, 1966

Feb. 26, 1966

July 5, 1966

Aug. 25, 1966

Oct. 19, 1966

Jan. 23, 1967

Jan. 27, 1967

Feb. 5, 1967

Apr.-Aug. 1967

Nov. 9, 1967

Jan. 22, 1968

March 6-7, 1968

The first of two Apollo mission simulators was shipped from the Link Group

of General Precision to MSC.

The critical design review of the Block I1 CSM (mockup 27A) was held.

In a letter to North American President J. L. Atwood, Apollo Program

Director Samuel C. Phillips expressed NASA's dissatisfaction with the firm's

progress with the manufacture of the Apollo spacecraft and the Saturn S-II

stage.

Grumman's lunar module contract was converted from cost-plus-fixed-fee to

cost-plus-incentive-fee; North American's contract was likewise changed on

the 21st.

A suborbital launch vehicle development test of the Saturn IB was carried

out; an Apollo CSM served as payload (AS-201).

A successful orbital launch vehicle development test of the Saturn IB (for a

time called Uprated Saturn I) was conducted (AS-203).

A second suborbital test of the Saturn IB was launched successfully (AS-202).

It was announced that the crew of the first manned Apollo mission, AS-204,

would be Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White, II, and Roger B. Chaffee. The

earth-orbital flight was scheduled for February 12, 1967.

A Lunar Mission Planning Board established at MSC met for the first time.

During a pre-launch test of AS-204 at Launch Complex 34 at the Kennedy

Space Center, fire swept through the command module, killing all three crew

members (Grissom, White, and Chaffee). The next day a review board was

formed to investigate the accident; Floyd L. Thompson, director of Langley,

was appointed chairman. On February 1, MSC instructed contractors and

other government agencies to stop all MSC-related manned testing in highoxygen environments.

The Apollo 204 Review Board submitted its final report. Arcs from electrical

wiring in an equipment bay on the command module had started the fire; in

the 100 percent oxygen atmosphere the crew had died of asphyxia due to inhalation of toxic gases. The board's report included a number of significant

suggestions for hardware and operational changes.

A NASA task team charged with overseeing Block II CSM redefinition

worked at North American to provide input on detail design, overall quality

and reliability testing, and scheduling. Astronaut Frank Borman led the

group.

Apollo 4, the first "all-up" orbital test of the Saturn V vehicle, was conducted

successfully. The command module's reentry simulated the most severe conditions that were expected on a lunar-return trajectory.

Apollo 5, the first development test flight that included a lunar module in the

payload, was launched successfully with a Saturn lB. The lunar module,

S-IVB stage, and launch vehicle instrument unit were put into orbit. A second

unmanned lunar module flight was cancelled.

Design certification reviews of CSM 101 (to be flown on the first manned

Apollo flight) and LM-3 were held at MSC.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 185

Table2-50.

Chronologyof KeyApolloProgramEvents*(Continued)

Date Event

Apr.4,1966

Aug.9-17,1968

Oct.3,1968

Oct. 11-22, 1968

Dec. 21-27, 1968

The Saturn V-launched Apollo 6 mission did not meet its primary objectives

because of launch vehicle malfunctions. The CSM was put into orbit and

recovered from the Pacific.

In a series of top-level meetings initiated by ASPO Manager George Low, it

was decided that the second manned Apollo mission (Apollo 8) would be a

lunar-orbit mission if all went well on the Apollo 7 earth orbital flight. Plans

made in late 1967 did not call for a lunar mission until the fourth manned

flight, but Low and others argued that if they were to meet the end-of-thedecade deadline they would have to seek as soon as possible firsthand

knowledge of communications, navigation, and thermal control in deep

space. The decision for a December 1968 lunar orbit mission was not made

public until November 12.

The flight readiness review for Apollo 7 was held at KSC, with crew and vehicle being declared ready for the mission.

Apollo 7, the first manned Apollo flight, was conducted successfully with

Astronauts Walter Schirra, Donn F. Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham at

the controls (before the 204 fire and the death of the crew, these three men

had been scheduled to pilot the second flight). During their nearly 11 days in

orbit, the crew made a live television broadcast from their spacecraft and performed all their test objectives. The Block II CSM was launched by a Saturn

IB (see table 2-52).

Apollo 8 became the first manned spacecraft to circle the moon. Frank Borman, James Lovell, and William Anders reached the moon in 69 hours and

orbited the satellite for 20 hours. Splashdown was in the Pacific (see table

2-53.
186 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-51.

Developmental Tests and Flights, the Apollo Program

Launch Date Flight/Test Objectives/Results

Oct. 27, 1961 SA-1

(ETR)

Apr. 25, 1962 SA-2

(ETR)

Nov. 16, 1962 SA-3

(ETR)

March 28, 1963

(ETR)

July 20, 1963

(Wallops)

Aug. 28, 1963

(White Sands)

Nov. 7, 1963

(White Sands)

Jan. 29, 1964

(ETR)

Apr. 14, 1964

(ETR)

May 13, 1964

(White Sands)

May 28, 1964

(ETR)

Aug. 18, 1964

(Wallops)

Sept. 18, 1964

(ETR)

Dec. 8, 1964

(White Sands)

May 19, 1965

(White Sands)

May 22, 1965

(ETR)

SA-4

Scout Reentry Heating Experiment (R-3)

Little Joe I1 (LJ-II)

Pad Abort-1 (boilerplate spacecraft 6)

SA-5

FIRE 1

Apollo A-O01

(BP-12)

Apollo A-101

(SA-6) (BP-13)

R-4

Apollo A-102

(SA-7) (BP-15)

Apollo A-002

(BP-23)

Apollo A-003

(BP-22)

FIRE 2

Successful launch vehicle development test (Saturn

C-I); dummy second stage.

Successful launch vehicle development test (Saturn

C-1); water in dummy second stage was released into the

ionosphere (Project Highwater).

Successful launch vehicle development test (Saturn

C-I); water in dummy second stage was released (Project Highwater).

Successful launch vehicle development test (Saturn I)

final test of the Saturn I booster stage.

Unsuccessful suborbital reentry test of Apollo heatshield material; the failure was due to launch vehicle

malfunction.

Successful flight qualification test of Little Joe I1

booster; it carried a dummy payload that simulated an

Apollo spacecraft; plans called for using the LJ-II as an

Apollo test vehicle.

Successful test of Apollo launch escape system (LES)

with a boilerplate model of the spacecraft (no launch

vehicle was required).

Successful launch vehicle development test of Block 1

vehicle (Saturn I); a powered second stage was put into

orbit.

Successful suborbital reentry test of an Apollo-shaped

reentry vehicle at speeds of 40 000 km/hr; an AtlasAntares vehicle launched FIRE 1.

Successful suborbital LES test, using the LJ-II and a

CSM boilerplate model.

Orbital compatibility test of an Apollo boilerplate

model and a Saturn 1; reentry took place on June 1 after

54 orbits.

Successful suborbital reentry test of Apollo heatshield

materials.

Successful orbital compatibility test of an Apollo

boilerplate model and Saturn I; the LES was also

demonstrated; reentry took place on Sept. 22 after 59

orbits.

Successful test of the Apollo LES using L J-11.

During a planned high-altitude test of the Apollo abort

system, the LJ-II vehicle malfunctioned; the LES functioned and lifted the spacecraft clear of the defective

launcher.

Successful suborbital reentry test of an Apollo-shaped

reentry vehicle at speeds of 40 000 kin/hr.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT 187

Table 2-51.

Developmental Tests and Flights, the Apollo Program (Continued)

Launch Date Flight/Test Objectives/Results

June 29, 1965 Pad Abort-2

(White Sands) (BP-23A)

Jan. 20, 1966 Apollo A-004

(White Sands)

Feb. 9, 1966 R-5

(ETR)

Feb. 26, 1966 AS-201

(ETR) (CSM-009)

July 5, 1966 AS-203

(ETR)

Aug. 25, 1966 AS-202

(ETR) (CSM-O 11 )

Nov. 9, 1967 Apollo 4

(ETR) (AS-501)

(CSM-017)

Jan. 22, 1968 Apollo 5

(ETR) (AS-204) (LM-I)

Apr. 4, 1968 Apollo 6 (AS-502)

(ETR) (CSM-020)

Successful test of the LES to function from the launch

pad; no launch vehicle was required.

Successful medium-altitude test of the Apollo LES, using an LJ-II.

Successful suborbital reentry test of heatshield

materials.

Successful suborbital launch vehicle development

(Saturn IB); the command module was recovered.

Successful orbital launch vehicle development test

(Saturn IB, or Uprated Saturn I); data were returned on

the S-IVB stage and the instrument unit; engine restart

capability was demonstrated; the S-IVB stage

fragmented during a 4th-orbit pressure differential test

of the bulkhead.

Successful suborbital launch vehicle development test

(Saturn IB); the Apollo heatshield and the spacecraft

rapid restart capability were also evaluated; the command module was recovered.

Successful orbital launch vehicle development test

(Saturn V); the reentry simulated the most severe conditions expected during a lunar return trajectory; the command module was recovered on Nov. 9.

Successful orbital launch vehicle development test

(Saturn IB) and spacecraft development test; the LM

was tested for the first time and recovered on Jan. 24.

Unsuccessful attempt to perform a launch vehicle

development test (Saturn V); failure was due to severe

up-and-down vibrations of the vehicle during first-stage

thrust, early shutdown of second-stage engines, and

failure of the third-stage engine to restart; the command

module was recovered on Apr. 4.
188 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-52.

Apollo 7 Characteristics

Date of launch (ETR complex #):

Official mission designation:

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

command module:

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cam corns:

Oct. 11, 1968 (34)

AS-205

CSM-101

Saturn IB 205

20 553

truncated cone service module: cylindrical with extended

!englh_ 3.63 engine nozzle

diameter of base, 3.9 length, 6.88

diameter, 3.9

Walter M. Schirra, Jr., commander; Donn F. Eisele, CM pilot; R.

Walter Cunningham, LM pilot

Thomas P. Stafford, John W. Young, and Eugene A. Cernan

Stafford, Ronald E. Evans, William R. Pogue, John L. Swigert,

Young, Cernan

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km): 285/227

No. of orbits: 163

Period: 01:29:08

Length of mission: 260:09:03 (10+ days)

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch Oct. II 11:02:45 a.m., EST

S-IB cutoff (inboard)

S-1B cutoff (outboard)

S-IVB cutoff

orbital insertion

S-IVB-CSM separation

deorbit maneuver initiated Oct. 22

CM-SM separation

splashdown

Distance traveled (km):

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

Results:

Reference:

11:05:05.7 00:02:20.7

11:05:09.3 00:02:24.3

11:13:01.8 00:10:16.8

11:13:11.8 00:10:26.8

1:57:47 p.m. 02:55:02

6:42:01.3 a.m. 259:39:16.3

6:46:18.8 259:43:33.8

7:11:48 260:09:03

7 323 000

27°32'N, 64°04'W (3 km from target)

USS Essex (crew onboard in 60 min.)

Demonstrate CSM-crew performance; demonstrate crew-space

vehicle-mission support facilities performance during a manned

CSM mission; demonstrate CSM rendezvous capability; execute

two experiments.

All primary mission objectives were achieved.

MSC, "Apollo 7 Mission Report," MSC-PA-R-68-15, Dec. 1968.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table2-53.

Apollo 8 Characteristics

189

Date of launch (ETR complex #):

Official mission designation:

Spacecraft designation:

Launch vehicle

designation:

Spacecraft weight (kg):

Spacecraft shape,

dimension (m):

Crew:

Backup crew:

Cam coms:

Dec. 21, 1968 (39A)

AS-503

CSM-103

Saturn V 503

43 663 (includes LM Test Article)

see table 2-52

Frank Borman, commander; James A. Lovell, CM pilot; William

A. Anders, LM pilot

Nell A. Armstrong, Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., Fred W. Haise, Jr.

Michael Collins, Thomas K. Mattingly, II, Gerald P. Carr, Armstrong, Aldrin, Vance D. Brand, Haise

Apogee/perigee at

insertion (km):

No. of orbits:

Lunar orbit parameters (km):

Period (average):

No. of orbits:

Length of mission:

Mission events (date, time, ground elapsed time):

launch Dec. 21 7:51:00 a.m., EST

190/180

1.5

312/111 (initial), 112/111 (orbits 3-10)

02:01:06

10

147:00:42 (6 + days)

S-IC cutoff (center) 7:53:05.9

S-IC cutoff (outboard) 7:53:33.8

S-II cutoff 7:59:44

S-IVB cutoff 8:02:25

earth orbital insertion 8:02:35

translunar injection ignition 10:41:37.1

S-IVB-CSM separation 11:11:59.3

lunar orbit insertion ignition Dec. 24 4:59:20.4 a.m.

transearth injection ignition Dec. 25 1:10:16.6 a.m.

CM-SM separation Dec. 27 10:19:48 a.m.

splashdown 10:51:42

Distance traveled (kin): 933 000

00:02:05.9

00:02:33.8

00:08:44

00:11:25

00:11:35

02:50:37.1

03:20:59.3

69:08:20.4

89:19:16.6

146:28:48

147:00:42

Landing point:

Recovery ship:

Mission objectives:

Results:

Reference:

8°7.5'N, 165°1.2'W (2 km from target)

USS Yorktown (crew onboard in 80 min.)

Demonstrate crew-vehicle-support facilities performance during a

manned Saturn V mission with CSM; demonstrate performance of

nominal and selected backup lunar orbit rendezvous mission activities; execute two experiments.

All primary mission objectives were achieved, and the crew

became the first to travel to the vicinity of the moon.

MSC, "Apollo 8 Mission Report," MSC-PA-R-69-1, Feb. 1969.
190 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-54.

Size and Performance Comparisons of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo

Apollo Apollo

Mercury Gemini CSM LM

Weight at reentry (kg) 1208 2165 566.8 NA

Volume, habitable (m 3) 1.02 1.56 5.94 4.53

Mission duration, max. (days) 1 _A 133A 12V2 3

Crew size 1 2 3 2

Cabin atmosphere 100070 02 100070 02 100070 02 100070 02

Suit usage cabin backup cabin backup cabin backup cabin backup

ejection EVA crew transfer

EVA crew transfer surface

Propulsion, main maneuvering solid retro solid retro service descent

and retro, AV (m/sec) 98.8 99.1 propulsion propulsion

system system

1951 2135

ascent

propulsion

system

1850

Propulsion, reaction control 30 967 entry command 782 483

system for auxiliary maneuvers vehicle module

and attitude control, total 90 478 256 714

impulse (newtons/sec) orbital service

maneuvering module

1 077 524 1 653 828

Lift/drag, entry ballistic 0.17-0.09 0.28-0.38 NA

(Mach 24-6) (Mach 36-6)

From Maxime A. Fagnet, "An Overview of United States Manned Spaceflight from Mercury to the

Shuttle," paper, 32d Congress, International Astronautical Federation, Rome, Sept. 6-12, 1981.
MANNEDSPACEFLIGHT

Table2-55.

MajorSubsystemComparisonforMercury,Gemini,andApollo

191

Mercury Gemini Apollo Apollo

CSM LM

Entry shape blunt cone w/ same as Mercury blunt cone NA

cylindrical (CM)

afterbody

Thermal fiberglass ablator silicone ablator like multilayer

protection on blunt face; elastomer ablator Gemini's of reflective

high-temperature (otherwise same varying insulation

shingles elsewhere as Mercury) thickness

around CM

Launch escape solid-fuel rocket ejection same as NA

system mounted on tower seats Mercury

Life support 100°70 02; water 100% O:; same as 10007o 02; water

evaporators for radiator and Gemini sublimators for

cooling evaporators for cooling

cooling

Attitude control hydrogen peroxide hypergolic same as

monopropellant; propellants; Gemini, but same as SM

redundant ablatively radiatively coast system

systems cooled engines; cooled engines

redundant entry in coast system

systems

Maneuver NA thrusters using SM propulsion, ascent propulsion

propulsion same fuel as for pressure-fed (15 568)

(Newtons) attitude control hypergolics 10 throttleable

(423) (91 184) descent engines

(2224 each)

Retrograde 3 solid-fuel 4 solid-fuel (maneuver NA

propulsion rockets rockets propulsion

used)

Onboard control body-mounted 4-gimbal 3-gimbal same as CM, but

gyro inertial inertial w/rendezvous

stabilization; platform; platform and landing

horizon scanner horizon scanners; digital auto- radars

reference digital computer; pilot and

rendezvous radar computer;

optical alignment;

VHF ranging

Electrical power 3 silver-zinc fuel cells w/ same as 4 descent and 2

batteries backup batteries Gemini ascent batteries

Communications UHF, VHF voice same as unified S- same as CM,

and PAM tele- Mercury, except band; VHF plus extrametry; C- and S- PCM telemetry voice vehicular

band tracking;

command link
192 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-55.

Major Subsystem Comparison for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo (Continued)

Mercury Gemini Apollo Apollo

CSM LM

Landing system

Pressure suit

l drogue, 1 main, 1 drogue, 1 2 drogue, 3 4-leg landing

1 reserve chutes; main chutes; main chutes; gear w/

landing bag crushable crushable crushable

structure structure; honeycomb

stroke couch

backup to cabin EVA-type w/ EVA-type w/ EVA-type w/

atmosphere umbilical umbilical independent

control life support

From John H. Boynton and Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, "Systems Design Experience from Three Manned

Space Programs," paper 69-1077, AIAA 6th Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, Oct. 20-24, 1969.

Table 2-56.

Major Contractors for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo Spacecraft

Contractor Mercury Gemini Apollo

Aerojet-General Corp., SM engine

Space Propulsion Div.

Atlantic Research Corp.

Avco Corp., Space

Systems Div.

Bell Aerospace Corp.,

Bell Aerosystems Co.

Bellcomm, Inc.

escape tower

rocket, posigrade

rocket

reaction control (Agena

system propulsion)

Bendix Corp. instrumentation

Boeing Co.

David Clark Co., Inc.

Collins Radio Co.

Eagle-Picher Co.

Electro-Mechanical

Research, Inc.

communications

hardware

batteries

Garrett Corp., environmental

AiResearch Manufacturing control system

Co. (ECS)

General Electric Co.

space suits

voice

communications

batteries

data

transmission

system

ECS

fuel cell,

engineering

services

CMheatshield

LM ascent stage

engine

systems engineering and analysis

support to Hq

lunar surface experiments

package, CSM instrumentation

technical integration and

evaluation

communications and

data subsystem

post-entry and storage batteries

ECS

reliability and quality

assurance
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 193

Table 2-56

Major Contractors for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo Spacecraft-- (Continued)

Contractor Mercury Gemini Apollo

General Motors Corp.

AC Electronics Div.

B. F. Goodrich Co.

Grumman Aircraft

Engineering Corp.

Hexcel Products, Inc.

Honeywell, Inc.

Minneapolis-Honeywell

Regulator Co.

International Business

Machine Corp.

International Latex Corp./

ILC Industries

Lockheed Propulsion

Co./Lockheed

Missiles & Space Co.

McDonnell Aircraft

Corp./McDonnell

Astronautics Co.,

McDonnell Douglas Corp.

Marquardt Corp.

Massachusetts Institute

of Technology,

Instrumentation

Laboratory

space suits

stabilization

system

escape tower

motor

spacecraft

(prime)

guidance and navigation

system

LM (prime)

core assembly

honeycomb shield

rate gyros, stabilization and

attitude and attitude control system

control

electronics

onboard computer [instrument unit 6,

[mission control mission control center]

center]

space suits

(Agena target launch escape motor,

vehicle) pitch control motor

spacecraft

(prime)

LM reaction control system

SM reaction control system

CSM guidance and

navigation system design

J. A. Maurer, Inc.

D. B. Milliken Co. camera

Motorola, Inc. command

receivers

North American

Aviation, Inc.,

Rocketdyne Div.

North American Aviation,

Inc., Space & Information

Systems Div.

Northrop Corp., Ventura landing and

Div. recovery system

cameras

digital command digital command

system system

reentry control

system, orbit

attitude and

maneuvering system

CSM (prime)

landing system landing system
194 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 2-56.

Major contractors for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo Spacecraft (Continued)

Contractor Mercury Gemini Al_ollo

Radio Corporation of pulse code

America, Aerospace modulator

Communications and recorder

Controls Div.

Raytheon Co.

Space Technology

Laboratories, Inc.

Studebaker-Packard

Corp., Cincinnati

Testing and Research

Laboratory

Thiokol Chemical Corp.

TRW Systems Inc.

United Aircraft Corp.,

Hamiltom Standard Div.

United Aircraft Corp.,

Pratt & Whitney Aircraft

Div.

Weber Aircraft Corp.

Westinghouse Electric

Corp.

heatshield

retrograde rocket retrograde rockets

ejection seat

system

rendezvous radar

and transponder

television equipment,

LM guidance system,

communications hardware

CSM guidance and

navigation digital

computer

LM descent stage

engine

launch escape tower

motor

trajectory analysis

LM ECS

CSM fuel cell

powerplants
CHAPTER TH REE

SPACE SCIENCE

AND APPLICATIONS
CHAPTER THREE

SPACE SCIENCE

AND APPLICATIONS

With the launching of small sounding rockets in the 1940s, scientists were able

to extend their observations and measurements into the upper atmosphere. When

larger rockets became available, they were put to work carrying sophisticated instrument packages to even higher altitudes. Rockets and spacecraft were "revolutionary

tools," which were used on a large scale by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) when the agency was established in 1958. _ Taking advantage

of the momentum inspired by the International Geophysical Year, which saw the

launching of the first Explorer and Vanguard satellites, NASA managers organized

a space science program around the several disciplines that would benefit from

sounding rocket, satellite, probe, and manned spaceflight projects. The agency

made a conscious effort to build its scientific programs along the guidelines suggested by the nation's leading scientists, and continued throughout its first 10 years

to seek outside advice and support. Applying this new wealth of scientific return to

practical uses was another part of NASA's mandate as a body supported by public

funds.

The legislation that called for the establishment of a civilian space agency

directed the new administration to expand the body "of human knowledge of

phenomena in the atmosphere and space," a broad dictim. 2 Most of the scientists

and engineers who hoped to achieve this goal came to NASA from other government

agencies, namely the Naval Research Laboratory, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,

and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Members of the Naval

Research Laboratory's Vanguard division and the upper atmosphere sounding

rocket team formed the nucleus around which the Goddard Space Flight Center

(originally called the Beltsville Space Center) in Maryland was built. Goddard's personnel were responsible for many of NASA's unmanned spacecraft projects and

sounding rocket experiments, in addition to operating a satellite tracking network.

Besides working in the field of propulsion, specialists at the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, were also involved with the Army's early

satellite program. When JPL was assigned to NASA in 1958 as a contractor facility,

its scientists became part of the agency's unmanned lunar and planetary exploration

team. JPL also found a network for communicating with lunar and planetary

spacecraft. The Langley Research Center, which had been part of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, also played a role in the unmanned space program when its personnel began taking part in NASA's lunar and planetary projects

197
198 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

in the 1960s. Unmanned space science payloads were launched from Wallops Station, the Eastern Test Range, and the Western Test Range.*

Along with facilities and personnel, NASA inherited some ongoing space

science projects-the Vanguard satellite, various sounding rocket investigations,

and the Air Force's Pioneer deep space probe. Building on these activities, NASA's

managers and scientists were able to shape a space science program that embraced

many areas of research: geodesy, meteorology, atmospheric and ionspheric physics,

magnetospheric research, lunar and planetary science, solar studies, galactic

astronomy, and bioscience. For management purposes, NASA throughout its

reorganizations of the space science and applications program grouped these

disciplines and their related flight projects into several divisions--physics and

astronomy, lunar and planetary, life sciences, meteorology, communications, and

applications. Thus organized and funded, "NASA proceeded to attack the scientific

problems of the atmosphere and space that the scientists.., deemed most important and most likely to produce significant new information," with the approval of

Congress. 3

To ensure that NASA's space science program reflected the interests and concerns of the nation's scientists, the agency's managers invited several advisory groups

to take part in program planning. The National Academy of Science's Space Science

Board was an important and influential source of input, but NASA also established

a series of advisory committees that involved a broader segment of the scientific

community. The subcommittees of the Space Science and Applications Steering

Committee were highly specialized groups that could furnish advice in a number of

particular fields, while an Astronomy Missions Board and a Lunar and Planetary

Missions Board offered broader commentary on NASA's programs. Working relations between NASA and its various advisory bodies were not always smooth, and

friction among those bodies was not unknown. But, it is generally agreed that the

content of NASA's science programs accurately mirrored the priorities and objectives of most American space scientists. In addition to the scrutiny given them by advisory groups, NASA's space activities were analyzed by the president's science adviser, the Space Science and Technology Panel of the President's Science Advisory

Committee, the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the House

Committee on Science and Astronautics, and the Senate Committee on Aeronautical

and Space Sciences.

"Pure scientists" do not always concern themselves with the practical applications of their research, but NASA managers in justifying the budgets for their

science programs often were forced to explain to Congress what the public could expect in return for tax dollars spent on space science. As funds for the space program

and other large government programs not directly related to defense or public

welfare became harder to obtain in the late 1960s and as the Apollo lunar expeditions took more and more of the agency's budget, it became increasingly important

to realize some practical benefits from scientific projects. NASA had to balance the

desirability of basic research, which could answer fundamental questions about the

nature of matter and the forces of the universe and which might have some unforeseen practical benefits, and the need for applied research, which could be geared

toward a planned application. Both were critical components of the agency's scien-

* See chapter 1 for details on the launch vehicles used for space science and applications missions.
SPACESCIENCEAND APPLICATIONS 199

tific program? Meteorology and communications are two obvious fields to which

NASA's scientific research was applied that benefited the public. Land and water

management, cartography, forestry, and aircraft design are other examples. NASA,

a research and development organization, relied on other government agencies, industry, and universities for the actual appliction of its work to products or services.

Space science was always an integral part of NASA's organization. Until late

1961, space science was part of the Office of Space Flight Development, becoming a

directorate by itself in a November 1961 reorganization of the agency. Homer E.

Newell, Jr., led the space science team from 1958 until October 1967. In March

1960, life sciences was organized as a separate directorate, but in November 1961 it

became part of the space science program. There were separate directors for space

science and for applications from November 1961 until June 1963, when the two interests were combined into one office. Directors and division directors were responsible to Associate Administrator Newell for their various program areas and flight

projects. In October 1967, John E. Naugle became responsible for the management

of space science and applications as the associate administrator. 5 (See table 3-1 for

details on how the organization of space science and applications evolved through

1968.)

NASA's space science missions experienced their share of failures during the late

1950s, but by the end of the next decade the agency saw 80.8 percent of its scientific

and applications experiments to successful or partially successful conclusions (this

figure does not include sounding rocket projects). However, there was more to the

success story than perfect launches and the operation of complex equipment.

Beyond the tally of successful flights were the many discoveries made in several

areas of study as a result of new data returned from scientific satellites and probes

and the practical applications of these discoveries that have made new products and

services possible. Add to this the overall progress made in the earth and planetary

sciences that have advanced man's knowledge and understanding of the universe and

opened new fields for investigation. While scientific and applications missions consistently took second place to manned spaceflight in NASA's search for funds, for

most of the agency's first 10 years it was the science and applications program that

provided the larger return on the nation's investment in space. 6
200 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-1.

Five Phases of Space

Science and Applications Management,

NASA Headquarters

Phase I

Oct. 1958-Jan. 1960

Administrator/Deputy Administrator/Associate Administrator

Director, Space Flight Development (Abe Silverstein)

Assistant Director, Space Science(s) (Homer E. Newell, Jr.)

Chief, Space Science Programs (Morton J. Stoller)

Chief, Planetary Science Program (John F. Clark)

Chief, Science Program Analysis (Nicholas E. Manos)

Chief, Astronomy and Astrophysics (Gerhard F. Schilling)

Phase 1I

Feb. 1960-Oct. 1961

Administrator/Deputy Administrator/Associate Administrator

Director, Space Flight Programs (Silverstein)

Deputy Director, Space Flight Programs (Newell)

Assistant Director, Program Planning and Coordination (D. D. Wyatt; Edgar M. Cortright, acting, June 1961)

Assistant Director, Applications and Manned Flight Programs (NeweU D. Sanders); office

dropped in 1961 and replaced by Advanced Technology Programs (Sanders) and Manned Space

Flight Programs (George M. Low)

Assistant Director, Space Flight Operations (Edmond C. Buckley)

Assistant Director, Satellite and Sounding Rocket Programs (Stoller)

Assistant Director, Lunar and Planetary Programs (Cortright)

Director, Life Sciences Program (Clark T. Randt); established March 1960

Assistant Director, Bioengineering (Alfred M. Mayo); office dropped in mid-1961 (Mayo became

acting director for life sciences)

Assistant Director, Grants and Contracts (Freeman H. Quimby); office dropped in mid-1961

Assistant Director, Space Biology (Quimby); established in mid-1961

Assistant Director, Program Planning and Coordination (G. Dale Smith); established in mid-1961

Assistant Director, Aerospace Medicine (Frank Voris); established in mid-1961

Phase III

Nov. 1961-Oct. 1963

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Director, Space Sciences (Newell)

Deputy Director, Space Sciences (Cortright)

Director, Grants and Research Contracts (Thomas L. K. Smull)

Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion (Donald H. Heaton; Richard B. Morrison, June

1962)
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-1.

FivePhasesof Space(Continued)

201

Director,GeophysicsandAstronomyPrograms(JohnF.Clark;JohnE.Naugle,May1962)

Director,ProgramReviewandResourcesManagement(JohnD.Nicolaldes)

Director,LunarandPlanetaryPrograms(OranW.Nicks)

Director,BiosciencePrograms(OrrE.Reynolds)

Director,Applications(Stoller)

Director,MeteorologicalSystems(MorrisTepper)

Director,CommunicationsSystems(LeonardJaffe)

Director,ProgramReviewandResourcesManagement(CarlFreedman)

Director,FutureApplications(vacant);officedroppedinNov.1962

Director,IndustrialApplications(LouisB.C.Fong,Nov.1962);officedroppedinApril1963

PhaseIV

Nov.1963-Sept.1967

Administrator/DeputyAdministrator

AssociateAdministrator

AssociateAdministrator,SpaceScienceandApplications(Newell)

DeputyAssociateAdministrator,SpaceScienceandApplications(Cortright)

DeputyAssociateAdministrator(Sciences),SpaceScienceandApplications(Naugle);office

establishedinMay1966

Director,Sciences(Clark;Naugle,acting,July1965);officedroppedinMay1966

Director,Applications(RobertF.Garbarini);officereplacedin1964(Garbarinibecamedirectorofengineering)

DivisionDirector,BiosciencePrograms(Reynolds)

DivisionDirector,CommunicationsandNavigationPrograms(Jaffe);officedroppedin1966

Director,PhysicsandAstronomy(Naugle;JesseMitchell,May1966)

Director,GrantsandResearchContracts(Smull);officedroppedin1967

Director,LaunchVehiclesandPropulsionPrograms(Morrison;VincentL.Johnson,Aug.

1964)

Director,LunarandPlanetaryPrograms(Nicks)

DivisionDirector,MannedSpaceScience(WillisB.Foster);officedroppedin1967

DivisionDirector,MeteorologicalPrograms(Tepper);officedroppedin1966

DivisionDirector,ProgramReviewandResourcesManagement(EldonD.Taylor)

Director,VoyagerProgram(Nicks);officeestablishedinmid-1967

PhaseV

Oct.1967-Dec.1968

Administrator/DirectorAdministrator

AssociateAdministrator

AssociateAdministrator,SpaceScienceandApplications(Naugle)

DeputyAssociateAdministrator,SpaceScienceandApplications(Nicks)

DeputyAssociateAdministrator(Sciences),SpaceScienceandApplications(Naugle;HenryJ.

Smith,April1968)
202 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-1.

Five Phases of Space (Continued)

Deputy Associate Administrator (Engineering), Space Science and Applications (Johnson)

Assistant Associate Administrator (Manned Flight Experiments), Space Science and Applications

(Foster); office dropped in mid-1968

Director Advanced Programs (Pitt Thome)

Director

Director

Director

Director

Director

Director

Director

Program Review and Resources Management (Taylor)

Bioscience Programs (Reynolds)

Space Applications (Jaffe)

Launch Vehicles and Propulsion Programs (Joseph B. Mahon)

Voyager Program (Donald P. Hearth); office dropped in late 1968

Lunar and Planetary Programs (Hearth)

Physics and Astronomy Programs (Mitchell)

Table 3-2.

Science and Applications

Satellites and Probes, 1958-1968

Number of Missions

Mission Type Successful a Partially Unsuccessful a Total

Successful a

Geophysics and astronomy b 53 2 14 69

Lunar and planetary 22 4 12 38

Communications c 13 2 2 17

Meteorology 20 0 1 21

Bioscience 1 1 0 2

Applications Technology 2 2 0 4

Total 111 11 29 151

aAs reported in Kennedy Space Center, A Summary of Major NASA Launchings, KSC Historical,

report 1 (Kennedy Space Center, rev. 1970).

blncludes a number of international missions.

Clncludes Telstar and INTELSAT.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 203

BUDGET

Each year, NASA's managers confronted the Bureau of the Budget and

members of Congress with their wish list of scientific projects.* They needed funds

for basic research, for the development of spacecraft and experiment hardware, and

for launch vehicles. President John F. Kennedy's decision in May 1961 to assign

NASA the task of landing a man on the moon before the end of the decade pushed

science projects that did not directly support the lunar landing into a decidedly second place in the budget queue. For most of the agency's first decade, Apollo, the

manned lunar venture, would have priority. However, NASA's scientists still

managed to assemble a respectable program in several fields of research. For each of

these disciplines, budget tables are provided in this chapter, along with tables for individual flight projects (e.g., in the discipline of lunar and planetary studies, Ranger

was a flight project.)t For a more detailed breakdown of flight projects budgets consult the NASA annual budget. In addition to funds for flight projects, each

discipline was also granted money for supporting research and advanced studies.

The following categories represent the changing organization of NASA's space

science and applications program. Review the many bottom notes of the budget

tables carefully before making conclusions about totals for any particular project or

fiscal year. Summary information can be found in tables 3-3 and 3-4.

* It would be useful to review the introduction to the budget section in chap. 1 for general information on NASA's budget and on the sources and format used for the budget tables in this book.

t If a project's activity were limited to two years, it is included in a miscellaneous category for the appropriate discipline.
204 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-3.

Total Space Science and Applications Funding History _

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 87 246 b

1960 62 244 62 244 95 767 c

1961 131000 d 13100If 216 190 e

1962 414 619 f 414 619 f 429 067

1963 604444 594 044 615 345

1964 857 200 767 075 615 922

1965 776 900 745 650 732 362

1966 797 515 773 015 759093

1967 661 400 663 650 607 100

1968 694 600 638 400 g 562 850

a For those years before there was an Office of Space Science and Applications, totals have been figured

by adding together the funds requested, authorized, or programmed for the various space science, applications, and research projects; see following notes for details.

b Includes $3 995 000 for research grants and contracts, which was used for "the conduct of fundamental and applied research necessary for advancing aeronautical and space technology." Research grants

and contracts were replaced in part by the sustaining university program in the FY 1965 budget estimate.

In the FY 1963 and 1964 estimates, there was no corresponding budget item. The total also includes

$21 944 000 for Vanguard, which in 1959 was funded as a program separate from scientific satellites.

c Includes $4 869 370 for research grants and contracts; see further note b above.

d Includes $10 000 000 for research grants and contracts; see further note b above. After the Authorization Conference Committee approved the $131 000 000 budget for FY 1961, the appropriation conference committee awarded an additional $29 000 000 in a supplemental appropriation in June 1960.

elncludes $5 000 000 for research grants and contracts; see further note b above; this was the amount

established in the FY 1962 budget estimate; by the FY 1963 budget estimate this category had been

dropped.

flncludes $7 600 000 for research grants and contracts; see further note b above.

STotal reduced to $538 000 000 by the appropriation conference committee in October 1967.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 205

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206 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

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SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-5.

Research Grants and Contracts Funding History _

(in thousands of dollars)

207

Year Reque_ Programmed

1959 --- 3995 b

1960 --- 4869

1961 10000 ___c

1962 7600 ---

aTo utilize the capabilities of nongovernment organizations in carrying out research; dropped as a

category by FY 1963.

blncludes $966 510 provided under salaries and expenses.

Clt was estimated in the FY 1962 budget estimate that $5 000 000 would be programmed in FY 1961 for

research grants and contracts; this category had been dropped by the FY 1963 estimate.

Table 3-6.

Physics and Astronomy (Scientific Satellites) Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 43 249 b

1960 22 800 22 800 20 241

1961 41 700 41 700 54 398

1962 72 700 72 700 97 775

1963 175 165 175 165 147 689

1964 194 400 194 400 148 623

1965 190200 177 450 139 082

1966 172 100 165 900 142 753

1967 131 400 129900 129 800

1968 147 500 145 500c 139 500

aln the FY 1961-63 budget estimates, this program was called scientific satellites; in the FY 1964-65

estimates it was renamed geophysics and astronomy; it was changed to physics and astronomy in the FY

1966 estimate.

bIncludes $21 944 000 for Vanguard, which in 1959 was funded as a program separate from scientific

satellites.

c FY 1960 appropriation reduced to $130 000 000 by the appropriations conference committeee in October 1967.
208 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-7.

Physics and Astronomy Supporting Research and

Technology and Advanced Studies Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 2675 b

1960 ...... 4012 ¢

1961 800(# --- 13 001 e

1962 12 369 f --- 5200

1963 33 679 s 33 679 s 13 581

1964 15 200 15 200 17 666

1965 14 800 14 800 21 057

1966 25 200 25 200 20 594

1967 22 900 22 900 20 365

1968 19 900 19 900 22 904

aprior to the FY 1964 budget estimate, supporting research was budgeted as advanced research (FY

1962-63), development of advanced instrumentation/advanced technical development (FY 1961-63), and

scientific and technical studies (FY 1961).

blncludes $1 520 000 for development of advanced instrumentationadvanced technical development,

and $1 155 00 for scientific and technical studies.

c Includes $2 332 000 for development of advanced instrumentationadvanced technical development,

and $1 680 000 for advanced research.

a Includes $6 000 0120 for development of advanced instrumentation/advanced technical development,

and $2 000 000 for scientific and technical studies.

elncludes $6 207 000 for development of advanced instrumentation/advanced technical development,

and $6 794 000 for advanced research.

flncludes $8 326 000 for development of advanced instrumentation/advanced technical development,

and $4 043 000 for advanced research.

Includes $16 261 000 for development of advanced instrumentation/advanced technical development,

and $17 418 000 for advanced research.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-8.

Total Physics and Astronomy Flight Projects Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

209

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 40 574 b

1960 ...... 16 228

1961 33 700 c --- 41 397

1962 60 331 --- 92 575

1963 141 486 141 486 134 108

1964 179 200 179 200 130 957

1965 175 400 162 650 d 118 025

1966 143 900 137 700 ¢ 120 159

1967 106 500 105 000 107 700

1968 125 600 123 600 113 696

a In the scientific satellites program, a flight project was defined as a payload.

blncludes $8 540 000 for Juno II vehicles and $2 120 000 for Thor-Able vehicles as part of the flight

research program and $21 944 000 for Vanguard, which in 1959 was funded as a program separate from

scientific satellites.

Clncludes $3 000 000 for Atlas-Agena B vehicles, $3 000000 for Thor-Agena B vehicles, and

$3 500 000 for Scout vehicles as part of the flight research program.

dThe House authorization committee suggested that NASA was requesting funds for FY 1965 for projects that were scheduled too far in the future to warrant immediate monies. Included in this category were

Orbiting Solar Observatories, Orbiting Astronomical Observatories, and Orbiting Geophysical Observatories.

e The House authorization committee suggested that NASA was requesting funds for FY 1966 for projects that were scheduled too far in the future to warrant immediate monies. Included in this category were

Orbiting Astronomical Observatories and Orbiting Geophysical Observatories. The Senate authorization

committee, however, restored funds for the Orbiting Geophysical Observatories.

fThe House authorization committee suggested that failures with the Orbiting Astronomical Observatories and Orbiting Geophysical Observatories warranted a decrease in the funds requested. The Senate

authorization committee, however, restored the funds.

Table 3-9.

Physics and Astronomy Soundings Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 7765

1963 ...... 11 513

1964 13 300 13 300 16 950

1965 15 000 15 000 16 867

1966 17 000 17 000 19 300

1967 19 000 19 000 20 000

1968 22 000 22 000 20 000

aBefore the FY 1964 estimate, physics and astronomy soundings were budgeted under the general

category sounding rocket program (see table 3-57).
210 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-10.

Explorer-Class Satellites Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 6 252 b

1960 ...... 12 965 ¢

1961 13 735 d --- 19 925 e

1962 10 698 f --- 4 483 g

1963 4729 h --- 32 811

1964 20 600 s 20 600g_ 15 526

1965 31 900 31 900 21 565

1966 25 700 25 700 18 592

1967 23 000 23 000 18 224

1968 21 600 21 600 17 532

alncluded in this category, in addition to Explorer satellites, are funds spent from FY 1959-1963 on

satellite projects that were listed in the budget estimates under names other than Explorer but that subsequently were flown as Explorers, and some projects that were not flown but were in the Explorer class.

b Includes $5 000 000 for Explorer 6, $557 000 for an ionospheric beacon satellite, $220 000 for an

ionospheric direct measurements satellite, $180 000 for an advanced radiation belt satellite, $145 000 for

an atmospheric structures satellite, and $150 000 for a radiation belt satellite.

Clncludes $2 267 000 for Explorer 6, $1 420 000 for Explorer 7, $51 000 for a 3.66-meter sphere,

$565,000 for a radiation balance experiment, $829 000 for an energetic particles satellite, $2 487 000 for

an ionospheric beacon satellite, $1 942 000 for an ionospheric direct measurements satellite, $565 000 for

an atmospheric structures satellite, $2 185 000 for a gamma ray astronomy satellite, $225 000 for a Scout

micrometeroid satellite; $125 000 for an air density drag measurements satellite, and $304 000 for a fixedfrequency topside sounder.

d Includes $270 000 for an ionospheric beacon satellite, $256 000 for an ionospheric direct measurements satellite, $712 000 for an advanced radiation belt satellite, $765 000 for an atmospheric structures

satellite, $100 000 for a radiation belt satellite, $520 000 for a gamma ray astronomy satellite, $1 690 000

for a polar geophysical satellite, $912 000 for a topside sounder, and $8 510 000 for seven unspecified

Scout payloads.

elncludes $3 142 000 for an energetic particles satellite, $2 052 000 for an ionospheric beacon satellite,

$1 954 000 for an ionospheric direct measurements satellite, $3 506 000 for a gamma ray astronomy

satellite, $2 854 000 for a Scout micrometeoroid satellite, and $4 794 000 for topside sounders.

flncludes $496 000 for an energetic particles satellite, $50 000 for an ionospheric direct measurements

satellite, $463 000 for an atmospheric structures satellite. $80 000 for a Scout micrometeoroid satellite,

and $9 609 000 for topside sounders.

gln the FY 1964 budget estimate, all projects in this class were under the heading "Explorers and

Monitors."

h Includes $336 000 for an energetic particles satellite, $558 000 for an atmospheric structures satellite,

$2 983 000 for an ionospheric monitor, and $852 000 for topside sounders.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-11.

Orbiting Solar Observatories Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

211

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 250

1960 ...... 1863

1961 2480 a --- 3917

1962 4167 --- 5742

1963 15 506b --- I0 900

1964 17 400 17 400 20 005

1965 22 I00 19 600 16 597

1966 37 000 37 000 19 052

1967 II 900 II 900 I0 106

1968 II 900 II 900 II 332

alncluded $550 000 for a solar observatory satellite, and $1 930 000 for a solar geophysical satellite.

bIncludes $11 687 000 for an advanced solar observatory.

Table 3-12.

Orbiting Astronomical Observatories Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 ...... 346

1961 4445 --- 7472

1962 22 775 --- 38 221

1963 45 668 --- 39 250

1964 52 900 52 900 35 608

1965 51000 44000 32 644

1966 32 500 26 300 22 300

1967 29 200 27 700 27 700

1968 40600 40 600 44768

Table 3-13.

Orbiting Geophysical Observatories Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 ...... 401

1961 1580 --- 5358

1962 18 517 --- 25 729

1963 58 595 --- 39 634

1964 61 800 61 800 42 868

1965 55 400 52 150 30 352

1966 31 700 31 700 28 215

1967 23 400 23 400 24 770

1968 20000 20000 20 064
212 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-14.

Miscellaneous Physics and Astronomy Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 23 412 a

1960 ...... 654 b

1961 1480 c --- 4560 a

1962 4174 e --- 10 635 f

1963 13 355g ......

1964 13 200 h 13 200 h ---

1965 .........

1966 .........

1967 .........

1968 200(Y __i ___

alncluded $1 468 000 for general payload instrumentation and $21 944 000 for Vanguard, which in

1959 was funded as a program separate from scientific satellites.

b lncludes $2000 for a Jupiter nuclear emulsions project, $10 000 for integration of the emulsion

package, $445 000 for a recoverable nuclear emulsions probe, and $197 000 for electron density profile

probes.

c Includes $260 000 for general payload instrumentation and $1 220 000 for a geodetic satellite.

alncludes $89 000 for modifying an X-15 for an astronomy payload, $167 000 for Vanguard 3,

$2 673 000 for international ionospheric satellite UK-I, $60 000 for international project satellite UK-2,

and $4 571 000 for electron density profile probes.

e Includes $1 231 000 for international ionospheric satellite UK 1, $1 000 000 for international project

satellite UK-2, $420 000 for international project satellite UK-3, $1 330 000 for a recoverable nuclear

emulsions probe, and $193 000 for electron density profile probes.

fFor international satellite projects.

glncludes $338 000 for international ionospheric satellite UK-1, $5 247 000 for international project

satellite UK-2, $1 654 000 for international project satellite UK-3, $1 719 000 for international satellite

no. 4, and $4 397 000 for geoprobes.

hlncludes $7 000 000 for international satellite projects and $6 200 000 for geodesy projects.

iFor Sunblazer, a small interplanetary probe project that was not authorized for budgetary reasons.

Table 3-15.

Physics and Astronomy Data Analysis Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1966 3000 3000 2000

1967 2000 2000 1735

1968 2000 2000 2900
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-16.

Total Lunar and Planetary Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

213

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 31 883

1960 ...... 49 996

1961 45000 45000 a 91 019

1962 159 899 159 899 161 784

1963 273 560 263 160 222 802

1964 322 600 274 400 205 762

1965 300 400 283 100 206 027

1966 215 615 213 115 204 300

1967 197 900 210 900 184 150

1968 142000 131 900 b 147 500

aAfter the authorization conference committee approved the $45 000 000 budget for FY 1961, the

appropriation conference committee awarded an additional $5 000 000 in a supplemental appropriation

in June 1960.

bFY 1968 appropriation was reduced to $125 000 000 by the appropriation conference committee in

October 1967.

Table 3-17.

Lunar and Planetary Supporting Research and

Technology and Advanced Studies Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 8103 b

1960 ...... 8307 c

1961 9000 d --- 17 102 e

1962 18 103 f --- 10 843

1963 320008 32000 g 22 205

1964 20000 20000 22000

1965 18 100 18 100 24 140

1966 36 800 36 800 23000

1967 40 100 40 100 22 350

1968 20 900 20900 31 800 h

cprior to the FY 1964 budget estimate, supporting research was budgeted as advanced technical

development (FY 1959-63) and advanced research (FY 1960-63).

bFor advanced technical development.

CIncludes $6 449 000 for advanced technical development and $1 858 000 for advanced research.

_For advanced technical development.

e Includes $11 670 000 for advanced technical development and $4 432 000 for advanced research.

fIncludes $12 080 000 for advanced technical development and $6 023 000 for advanced research.

gIncludes $17 000 000 for advanced technical development and $15 000 000 for advanced research.

hIncludes $12 000 000 budgeted for advanced planetary missions technology, a budget item introduced

in the FY 1970 estimate.
214 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-18.

Total Lunar and Planetary Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

_-- 23 780 a 1959 ---

_-- 41 690 1960 ---

1961 36000 a __- 73 917

1962 141 796 --- 150 941

1963 241 560 231 160 200597

1964 302 600 254 400 183 762

1965 282 300 265000 h 181 887

1966 178 815 176 315 c 181 300

1967 157 800 170 800 161 800

1968 121 100 111 000 127000

aListed as "Flight Research Program" in the FY 1962 estimate.

bThe House authorization committee suggested that NASA was requesting funds for FY 1965 for projects that were scheduled too far in the future to warrant immediate monies. Included in this category

were Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter.

CThe House and Senate authorization committee suggested that NASA reexamine its immediate need

for funds for future Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter projects.

Table 3-19.

Pioneer Lunar Probes (Atlas-Able) Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

___ 6237 a 1959 ---

1960 7140 b 7140 b 18 349 ¢

___ 5975 ¢ 1961 ---

alncludes $4 097 000 for the Atlas-Able launch vehicle.

bAmount requested and authorized for unspecified lunar probes.

c Includes funds for the launch vehicle.

Table 3-20.

Ranger Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

--- 19 542 1960 ---

--- 45066 1961 ---

1962 64 754 --- 63 430

1963 44 022 --- 88 816

1964 90000 65000 30 306

1965 10 800 10 800 11 037

1966 1415 1415 1000
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-21.

Surveyor Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

215

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ---

--- 7054

1962 53 134 -- 39 134

1963 97 378 --- 66 386

1964 97 500 89 300 70 704

1965 136 000 123 700 81 814

1966 85 600 84 I00 104 634

1967 90 400 90 400 79 942

1968 42 200 42 200 33 000

Table 3-22.

Lunar Orbiter Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 4

1964 ...... 20 000

1965 49 300 44 300 49 500

1966 37 000 36 000 58 081

1967 24 600 24 600 26 000

1968 10 000 10 000 9500

Table 3-23.

Prospector Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 575

1962 24000 ......

1963 10400 ___a ___

aDuring the authorization process, funds for Prospector, a proposed heavy lunar lander, were denied

because of its high cost and because the proposed launch vehicle, Saturn, would not be ready for some

time.
216 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-24.

Pioneer Probes Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 6804 a 6804 a 3798b

1961 ...... 462c

1962 .........

1963 ...... 2614

1964 15 000 15 000 13 600

1965 21 100 21 100 15 000

1966 8000 8000 12 700 a

1967 6700 6700 6900 a

1968 7500 d 7500 a 6000

aFund were requested and authorized for unspecified deep space probes.

b For Pioneer 5 a precursor to the later Pioneer probe series.

CFor a magnetometer probe, Explorer 10, the program's second interplanetary probe.

aFunded by the physics and astronomy budget in FY 1968-1969 estimates.

Table 3-25.

Mariner Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 14 785

1962 21 159 --- 48 377

1963 82 960 --- 42 777

1964 100 100 85 100 49 152

1965 54 100 54 100 17 368

1966 3800 3800 17 585

1967 26 100 26 100 43 188

1968 68 900 58 800 a 66 250

as10 100 1300 for two Mariner Mars flyby probe projects was not authorized because current funding

already provided for a 1969 Mariner Mars project and because the Voyager program would also provide

for the detailed exploration of Mars.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-26.

VoyagerFundingHistorya

(inthousandsof dollars)

217

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 349 ...... b

1963 6800 ...... e

1964 ___d ...... e

1965 ---f --- 7168

1966 43000 43000 17097g

1967 10000 23000 12 670

1968 71 500 g 42000 h 350

aNot to be confused with the Voyager interplanetary probe series of the 1980s; these funds were

budgeted for a large Mars lander project, which was replaced by the Viking project in 1969.

b $330 000 from supporting research and technology funds was programmed for a Voyager study, but

no funds were programmed for a Voyager flight project.

¢$3 069 000 from supporting research and technology funds was programmed for advanced studies,

which included a Voyager study; this category was not broken down further in the estimate.

d$900 000 of the supporting research and technology request was for a Voyager study; no funds were

requested for a flight project.

e$2 236 000 from supporting research and technology funds was programmed for advanced studies,

which included a Voyager study; this category was not broken down further in the estimate.

fAlthough no funds were requested for a Voyager flight project, funds from the supporting research

and technology budget were designated for a Voyager study and for sterilization studies; this category

was not broken down further.

s Voyager was listed as a separate program in the FY 1968-1970 budget estimates rather than as a lunar

and planetary flight project.

h The Senate authorization committee initially declined any funds for Voyager because of the largescale expenditures it would require over the next several years, but in response to the House authorization

committee's reasoning that the exploration of the nearby planets was one of the most significant objectives of the space program the Senate committee agreed to an authorization of $42 000 0O0. Subsequently, the House appropriations committee in August 1967 denied funds for Voyager, recognizing the financial burdens of the Vietnam conflict and other domestic needs; but the Senate appropriations committee

in October 1967 restored $36 000 000 to the appropriation. Later in October, the appropriations conference committee denied funding, thereby terminating the program.

Table 3-27.

Miscellaneous Lunar and Planetary Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 17 543 a

1960 .........

1961 36000 b ......

1962 .........

1963 .........

1964 ...... 4200 ¢

1965 11000 d 11000 d ---

alncludes $2 843 000 for Thor-Able, $3 500 000 for Atlas-Agena, and $11 200 000 for unspecified

payloads.

bIncludes $9 500 000 for Atlas-Agena and $26 500 000 for unspecified payloads.

CThis is the estimated amount programmed for FY 1964 as found in the FY 1965 budget estimate for

manned space science; by the FY 1966 estimate this item had been dropped. The manned space science

project dealt with the engineering and operational development of manned spacecraft systems.

dFor manned space science.
218 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-28.

Lunar and Planetary Data Analysis Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1968 ...... 600

Table 3-29.

Total Meteorology Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 988

1960 10 800 10 800 7930

1961 20 700 20 700 19 610

1962 50 200 50 200 34 433

1963 51 185 51 185 54 051

1964 63 700 63 700 63 177

1965 37 500 37 500 30 991

1966 42 700 42 700 35 260 b

1967 43 600 43 600 34 418 b

1968 50 400 b 45 400 b 51 063 b

aFrom FY 1959 to 1967, meteorology was funded as a program with research and flight project funds

as part of the Office of Applications or the Office of Space Science and Applications. In the FY

1968-1970 budget estimates, meteorology flight projects were funded as part of OSSA's space applications program. Research funds for meteorology came from the space application program's supporting

research and technology budget.

bFrom the space applications budget; see note a below.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 219

Table3-30.

MeteorologySupportingResearchandTechnologyandAdvanced Studies Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 170b

1960 ...... 3037 c

1961 5800 d --- 3875 e

1962 4650 f --- 3436

1963 11 413 g 11 413g 4877

1964 10 200 10 200 7754

1965 6600 6600 7311

1966 8200 8200 7470 h

1967 9100 9100 5761 h

1968 5300 ___i 5163 h

aprior to the FY 1964 budget estimate, supporting research was budgeted as advanced technical

development (FY 1959-63) and advanced research (FY 1960-63).

bFor advanced technical development.

Clncludes $1 706 000 for advanced technical development and $1 331 000 for advanced research.

dFor advanced technical development.

elncludes $3 350 000 for advanced technical development and $1 870 000 for advanced research.

flncludes $3 350 000 for advanced technical development and $1 300 000 for advanced research.

gIncludes $9 605 000 for advanced technical development and $1 808 000 for advanced research.

hAs of the FY 1968 budget estimate, funds for meterology research came from the space applications

program's supporting research and technology budget.

iAuthorized as space applications supporting research and technology, of which meteorology was a

part.

Table 3-31.

Total Meteorology Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 818

1960 ...... 4893

1961 14900 a --- 15 735

1962 45 550 --- 30 997

1963 39 772 39 772 49 174

1964 53 500 53 500 55 423

1965 30 900 30900 23 680

1966 34 500 34 500 27 790 b

1967 34 500 34 500 28 657 b

1968 45 100b 40100 b 45900 b

a Includes $5 700 000 for launch vehicles for the flight research program.

bin the FY 1968-1970 budget estimates, meteorology flight projects were funded as part of OSSA's

space applications program.
220 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-32.

Soundings (Meteorology) Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 441

1963 1468 --- 1437

1964 2500 2500 2244

1965 3000 3000 2380

1966 3000 3000 2730

1967 3000 3000 2855

1968 3000 3000 3000

aSee also the meteorology projects funded under the sounding rocket program, FY 1959-1963 (table

3-67).

Table 3-33.

TIROS-TOS Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 818

1960 ...... 3091

1961 1600 --- 3013

1962 23 300 --- 6675

_963 3390 --- 19 176

1964 7200 7200 11 506

1965 5800 5800 4100

1966 4800 4800 2500

1967 2600 2600 1292

1968 7500 7500 9100

Table 3-34.

Nimbus Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 ...... 1802

1961 7600 --- 12 722

1962 22 250 --- 23 881

1963 34 914 --- 28 561

1964 43 800 43 800 41 673

1965 18900 18 900 16000

1966 22 700 22 700 22 560

1967 23 400 23400 24 420

1968 34 500 29 500 33 700
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 221

Table 3-35.

Flight Experiments (Meteorology) Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1965 3200 3200 1200

1966 4000 4000 ---

1967 5500 5500 ---

Table 3-36.

Cooperative Applications Satellite (French Satellite FR-2) Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1967 ...... 100

1968 100 100 100

aA joint American-French project that culminated in the launching of the French meteorology satellite

CAS-1 (Eole) in 1971.

Table 3-37.

Communications Total a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 --- --- 3575

1960 4700 4700 3050

1961 5600 5600b 33 833

1962 94 600 94 600 33 I05

1963 85 377 85 377 32 075

1964 51 100 42 175 8413

1965 12 600 11 400 8079 c

1966 2800 2800 2019 d

1967 4600 c 4600c 3595 d

1968 4100 d ___e 3897 d

a From FY 1959 to 1966, the communications program (with research and flight project funds) was part

of the Office of Applications or the Office of Space Science and Applications. As of FY 1967,

meteorology and Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) projects were combined into a single OSSA

program called space applications; in the FY 1968-1970 budget estimates, communications was also part

of this program.

bAfter the authorization conference committee approved the $5 600 000 budget for FY 1961, the appropriations conference committee awarded an additional $24 000 000 in a supplemental appropriation

in June 1960.

c Includes research funds for communications and the Applications Technology Satellite.

dFrom the space applications budget.

eAuthorized as space applications, of which communications was a part.
222 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table 3-38.

Communications Supporting Research and Technology and

Advanced Studies Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 285b

1960 ...... 1522c

1961 1450d --- 21Moe

1962 4450f --- 7478

1963 5161g 5161s 3012

1964 5000 3075 1637

1965 3500 2300 2124h

1966 2500 2500 2019i

1967 4600h 4600h 3593i

1968 4100i __D 3897

aprior to the FY 1964 budget estimate, supporting research was budgeted as advanced technical

development (FY 1959-63) and advanced research (FY 1960-63).

bFor advanced technical development.

Clncludes $705 000 for advanced technical development and $817 000 for advanced research.

dFor advanced technical development.

e Includes $790 000 for advanced technical development and $1 250 000 for advanced research.

flncludes $3 650 000 for advanced technical development and $800 000 for advanced research.

glncludes $2 473 000 for advanced technical development and $2 688 000 for advanced research.

hFor communications and applications technology satellite.

i As of the FY 1968 budget estimate, funds for supporting research for communications and navigation

came from the space applications program's supporting research and technology budget.

JAuthorized as space applications supporting research and technology, of which communications was a

part.

Table 3-39.

Total Communications Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 3290 a

1960 ...... 1528

1961 4150 b --- 31 793

1962 90 150 --- 25 627

1963 80 216 80 216 29063

1964 46 100 39 100 6776

1965 9100 9100 5955

1966 300 300 ___c

alncludes $2 150 000 for boosters and $46 000 for tracking and communications for the flight research

program.

blncludes $1 300 000 for tracking and communications for the flight research program.

aAs of the FY 1968 budget estimate, communications flight projects were a part of the space applications program.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 223

Table3-40.

EchoFundingHistory

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ---

--- 1140

1960 ---

--- 1528

1961 4150 --- 8928 a

1962 4400 b ___ 6103 c

1963 135 --- 2299 d

1964 200 200 1675

1965 300 300 325

alncludes $3 200 000 for Thor and $2 200 000 for Thor-Agena launch vehicles.

blncludes $400 000 for Thor launch vehicle.

Clncludes $1 000 000 for Thor and $4 800 000 for Thor-Agena launch vehicles.

dIncludes $500 000 for Thor-Agena launch vehicle.

Table 3-41.

Relay Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 --_

--- 20 650

1962 16 350 --- 6912

1963 19 141 --- 13 751

1964 1900 1900 2590

1965 1800 1800 462

1966 200 200 ___a

alt was estimated in the FY 1967 budget estimate that $200 000 would be programmed in FY 1966 for

Relay; by the FY 1968 estimate this item had been dropped.

Table 3-42.

Rebound Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1961 1650 a 325

1962 13 250b ___c

1963 16 747d ---

aSupplemental request, of which $1 400 000 was for Atlas-Agena B launch vehicle.

b Includes $5 700 000 for Atlas-Agena B and $3 500 000 for Centaur launch vehicles.

Clt was estimated in the FY 1963 budget request that $13 500 000 would be programmed for Rebound

in FY 1962; by the FY 1964 request this item had been dropped.

d Includes $11 828 000 for Atlas-Agena launch vehicles.
224 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-43.

SyncomFundingHistory

(inthousandsof dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 12612a

1963 22688b --- 13013

1964 44000c 37000d 2511

1965 2000 2000 168

1966 100 100 ___e

alncludes $200000for an Advanced Syncomstudy.

blnciudes $18601 000for Advanced Syncom.

Clncludes $40000000forAdvanced Syncom.

dlncludes $33 000000f or Advanced Syncom.

elt wasestimatedinthe FY 1967 budgetestimatethat$1000000would be programmed inFY1966 for

Syncom; by the FY 1968 estimate thisitemhadbeen dropped.

Table 3-44.

Miscellaneous Communications Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 1890 a

1962 54 300 b ......

1963 21 505 c ......

1964 .........

1965 5000 d 5000 a 5000d

aFor a radiation measurement satellite. It was estimated in the FY 1962 budget that $5 000 000 would

be programmed for a transitional satellite system; by the FY 1963 estimate this item had been dropped.

bFor a transitional satellite system.

CFor an intermediate-altitude satellite.

dFor an early gravity gradient experiment.

Table 3-45.

Total Applications Technology Satellite Funding History _

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 8668

1964 I000 000 17 539

1965 31000 31000 24 819b

1966 28 700 28 700 35 781c

1967 26400 b 26400 b 31 239c

1968 36 800c ___d 26 330c

aAlso called Advanced Applications Satellite and Advanced Technological Satellite.

b Includes supporting research and technology funds for Applications Technology Satellites and communications.

Cln the FY 1968-1970 budget estimates, Applications Technology Satellites were funded as part of

OSSA's space applications program.

d Authorized as space applications, of which the Applications Technology Satellite project was a part.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 225

Table3-46.

ApplicationsTechnologySatelliteSupportingResearchand

TechnologyandAdvancedStudiesFundingHistory

(inthousandsof dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ---

--- 8668

1964 ---

--- 2162

1965 1100 1100 2124 a

1966 2000 2000 1350 b

1967 4600 a 4600 a 1226 b

1968 1300 b ___ 730 b

aSupporting research funds for Applications Technology Satellites and communications.

hAs of the FY 1968 budget estimate, funds for supporting research for Applications Technology

Satellites came from the space applications program's supporting research and technology budget.

CAuthorized as space applications supporting research and technology, of which the Applications

Technology Satellite project was a part.

Table 3-47.

Applications Technology Satellite Flight Program Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1964 ...... 15 377

1965 29900 29900 22 695

1966 26 700 26 700 34 431

1967 21 800 21 800 30 013

1968 35 500 35 500 25600

Table 3-48.

Total Space Applications Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 300 b

1963 ......... c

1964 3500 b 3500 b ___

1965 .........

1966 ...... 78 053

1967 ...... 71 300

1968 104200 99500 d 99 500

aAs of the FY 1968 budget estimate, the space applications program replaced the separate

meteorology, communications, and Applications Technology Satellite programs.

b For industrial applications.

Clt was estimated in the FY 1964 budget estimate that $2 370 000 would be programmed for space applications in FY 1963; by the FY 1965 estimate this item had been dropped.

d Total reduced to $88 000 000 by the appropriations conference committee in October 1967.
226 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-49.

Space Applications Supporting Research and

Technology and Advanced Studies Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1966 ...... 10 839

1967 ...... 11 030 a

1968 16 600 b 16 600 b 19 300 c

alncludes $450000for geodesy.

blncludes $900000for geodesy and $5000000for earth resources.

Clncludes $7 361 000for interdisciplinary applications.

Table 3-50.

Total Space Applications Flight Projects Funding History _

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1966 ...... 67 214

1967 ...... 60 270

1968 87 600 75 600 b 80 200

aSee also meteorology (table 3-31), communications (table 3-39), and Applications Technology

Satellite (table 3-47).

b $5 000 000 for Nimbus and $4 700 000 for geodetic satellites was undistributed in the authorization.

Table 3-51.

Geodetic Satellites Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1966 ...... 4993

1967 ...... 1600

1968 4700 __b 3400

aBefore FY 1966, this flight project was included in the Explorer class of satellites funded by the

physics and astronomy program.

bFunds not distributed in the authorization.

Table 3-52.

Miscellaneous Space Applications Flight Project Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1968 2300 a ___a 5300 b

aFor a voice broadcasting satellite, which was not authorized because the authorization committee

believed that such a venture should be commercially funded since the project obviously had commercial

applications.

bFor an earth resources survey satellite.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-53.

Total Bioscience (Life Sciences) Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

227

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 ...... 917 a

1961 2000 a --- 360 b

1962 20 620 c --- 3048

1963 4747 b --- 13 731

1964 35 200 21 200 21 479

1965 31 000 31 000 28 501

1966 31 500 31 500 34 400

1967 35 400 35 400 42 000

1968 44 300 41 800d 41 800

aFunded under research grants and contracts.

bFunded under scientific satellites (physics and astronomy).

c Funded as a separate life sciences program.

dTotal reduced to $40 000 000 by the appropriations conference committee in October 1967.

Table 3-54.

Bioscience Supporting Research and Technology and

Advanced Studies Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 195 b

1962 11 200 c --- 2915

1963 1114 b --- 11 772

1964 10 800 --- 12 979

1965 11 800 11 800 12 501

1966 15 500 15 500 11 100

1967 14 700 14 700 10 050

1968 14 300 14 300 10 122

a Before the FY 1964 budget estimate, supporting research was budgeted as advanced technical development (FY 1961-62) and advanced research (FY 1961-62).

bFunded under scientific satellites (physics and astronomy).

Clncludes $6 330 000 for advanced research and $4 870 000 for advanced technical development.

Table 3-55.

Biosatellite Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 165 a

1962 2070 --- 133

1963 3633 a --- 1959

1964 24 400 --- 8500

1965 19 200 19 200 16 000

1966 16 000 16 000 23 300

1967 20 700 20 700 31 950

1968 30 000 27 500b 30 000

aFunded under scientific satellites (physics and astronomy).

bBecause of delays and cost overruns, $2 500 000 of the funds requested for the continuation of this

project were denied.
228 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-56.

Planetary Quarantine Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1968 --- 1678

Table 3-57.

Total Sounding Rockets Funding History a

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 3556

1960 10000 10000 9681

1961 8000 8000 12 330

1962 9000 9000 ---

1963 19 157 19 157 ---

aAs of the FY 1964 budget estimate, sounding rockets as a separate program was dropped. For FY

1964-1968, see physics and astronomy soundings (table 3-10) and meteorological soundings (table 3-32).

Table 3-58.

Sounding Rocket Advanced Technical Development Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 640

1960 ...... 835

1961 1800 --- 1387

1962 420 ......

1963 1658 1685 ....

Table 3-59.

Sounding Rocket Advanced Research Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 ...... 419

1961 ...... 419

1962 320 ......

1963 784 784 ---
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-60.

Total Sounding Rockets Flight Program Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

229

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 2916 a

1960 ...... 8428

1961 6200 b --- l0 524 c

1962 8260 ......

1963 16 68_ 16 688 ---

aIncludes $1 380 000 for launch vehicles.

blncludes $3 200 000 for launch vehicles.

c Includes $2 254 000 for launch vehicles.

dIncludes $3 768 000 for launch vehicles.

Table 3-61.

Solar Physics and Astronomy Soundings Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 108

1960 --- 323

1961 1046 491

1962 450 ---

1963 592 ---

Table 3-62.

Energetic Particles and Magnetic Field Soundings Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 367

1960 --- 687

1961 460 631

1962 350 ---

1963 412 ---

Table 3-63.

Ionosphere-Plasma and Ionospheric Physics Soundings Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 168

1960 --- 335

1961 157 505

1962 420 ---

1963 1050 ---
230 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-64.

AeronomySoundingsFundingHistory

(inthousandsof dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 --- 745

1961 --- 1077

1962 980 ---

1963 1329 ---

Table 3-65.

Galactic Astronomy Soundings Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 --- 720

1961 --- 719

1962 500 ---

1963 911 ---

Table 3-66.

Meteorite-Micrometeorite Soundings Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 --- 83

1961 ......

1962 94 ---

1963 115 ---

Table 3-67.

Miscellaneous Sounding Rocket Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 ...... a

1961 226 b 365c

1962 ......

1963 1946 d ---

alt was estimated in the FY 1961 budget estimate that $115 000 would be programmed for atmospheric

soundings for FY 1960; by the FY 1962 estimate this item had been dropped.

bFor atmospheric soundings.

¢Includes $146 000 for a meterology probe, $49 000 for magnetodynamics, and $170 000 for space

chemistry studies.

dlncludes $40 000 for a meteorology probe, $405 000 for magnetodynamics, $1 386 000 for space

chemistry, and $115 000 for astrophysics studies.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-68.

SoundingRocketSupport-AnalysisFundingHistory_

(inthousandsofdollars)

231

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 894

1960 --- 5536

1961 1111 4483

1962 5466 ---

1963 6565 ---

aFundedfromflightprojectmonies.

Table3-69.

OSSALaunchVehicleDevelopmenta

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 85661

1963 ...... 105729

1964 130700 12700 111900

1965 128200 128200 96500

1966 63600 63600 57790

1967 33700 33 700 31 200

aFor more information on launch vehicles, see chapter 1.

Table 3-70.

OSSA Launch Vehicle Procurement Funding History _

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

t964 ...... 129 986

1965 ...... 154 487

1966 194 500 178 700 178 700

1967 152000 142 750 117 650

1968 165 100 157 700b 124 550

aFor more information on launch vehicle procurement, see chapter 1, table 1-21).

bTotal reduced to $145 000 000 by the appropriations conference committee in October 1967.
NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

DESCRIPTION-PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY PROGRAM

The goals of the physics and astronomy program during NASA's first 10 years

were broad: "to increase our knowledge of the environment of the earth and interplanetary space; to study the sun and to determine its influence in interplanetary

space and on the environment of the earth; to expand our knowledge of the structure

and history of the universe through astronomical observations; and to extend our

knowledge of astrophysical laws through the conduct of experiments in space. ''7 In

accomplishing these goals, the program embraced several scientific disciplines-astronomy and geodesy, solar physics, particles and fields, ionospheric

physics, and radio physics among others. Generally, NASA physics and astronomy

projects were designed to obtain new information about the stars, interplanetary

space, and the sun that was not obtainable with ground-based instruments. Supplemented by balloons and aircraft-borne experiments, the physics and astronomy

flight projects included sounding rockets, small scientific satellites (Explorers),

Pioneer probes, and geophysical, astronomical, and solar orbiting observatories

(platforms).

NASA's scientific investigations revealed a space environment full of surprises.

In 1958, the model of earth's environment as generally envisioned had an atmosphere and an ionosphere limited to low altitudes with a dipole-like magnetic

field in which the field lines presumably extended without limit into the vacuum of

space. But scientists discovered a very active region above earth containing highly

energetic particles controlled by earth's magnetic field. The solar wind, an ionized

gas, was found to be blowing in interplanetary space, which reacts with earth's

magnetic field limiting that field's extension in all directions. Observations of the

sun gave researchers new information about ultraviolet rays and x-rays and their effect on earth's environment. By sending instruments above this planet's obscuring

atmosphere, astronomers gathered new data on the sun, other stars and planets, and

the interplanetary medium. Supporting research and technology funds also made

possible theoretical work and laboratory developments not specifically related to a

given flight project. Funds for data analysis ensured that scientific returns would be

studied and the findings distributed to the scientific community.

In an agency-wide reorganization in November 1961, a director for geophysics

and astronomy programs was added to the space science directorate. John F. Clark

was director until May 1961, when John E. Naugle took the post, which he held until

May 1966 (the program was renamed physics and astronomy in June 1963). Jesse

Mitchell saw the program through the remainder of the agency's first decade. Reporting to the director were chiefs of the various disciplines (e.g., astronomy and

particles and fields) and as of June 1963 managers of flight programs (e.g., interplanetary and solar probes and solar observatories).

Explorer

The Explorer program was already under way when NASA was established in

1958. Of the five launches attempted by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, three

had returned valuable scientific data. Used for investigations of the earth's environ-
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 233

ment and terrestrial-solar-interplanetary relationships and for astronomical observations, the Explorers were the smallest of NASA's scientific satellites. Launched

primarily by Scout and Thor-Delta vehicles, 33 Explorer spacecraft successfully performed their missions from 1959 through 1968.

The design of the spacecraft (ranging from inflatable spheres to windmillshaped satellites) and its instrumentation (ranging from a single radio beacon to a

dozen complex scientific experiments) depended on the mission, and there were

several different classes of missions: energetic particles Explorers (6, 7, 10, 12, 14,

15, 26), atmospheric studies Explorers (9, 17, 19, 32), ionospheric studies Explorers

(8, 20, 22, 27, 31), micrometeoroid Explorers (13, 16, 23), interplanetary monitoring

platform Explorers (18, 21, 28, 33, 34, 45), air density-Injun Explorers (24, 25, 39,

40), radio astronomy Explorers (38), geodesy Explorers, part of the U.S. Geodetic

Satellite Program (29, 36), gamma ray astronomy Explorers (11), and solar Explorers (30, 37) (see fig. 3-1).

A single program manager oversaw both the Explorers and the sounding rocket

program within the physics and astronomy office at NASA Headquarters. From

mid-1963 until mid-1966, Marcel T. Aucremanne held this post, with John R. Holtz

taking over in May 1966. The individual projects were managed at either Goddard

Space Flight Center or Langley Research Center (see following tables for project

managers and scientists), with the launches taking place at Wallops Island, the

Eastern Test Range, or the Western Test Range.

Many of the early Explorer spacecraft were designed and built in-house at Goddard or Langley, with some of the instruments and experiments coming from university or industry participants. Two Explorer missions were jointly managed by NASA

and the Naval Research Laboratory (30, 37); the two Injun Explorers were built at

the State University of Iowa (25, 40); and one Explorer mission was part of a joint

NASA-Canadian Defense Research Board project (31). When contractors were

hired to fabricate the spacecraft or their various components, the cognizant center

oversaw the work.

The Explorers were simpler, smaller, and less expensive than the orbiting observatories also used in the physics and astronomy program. As such, they often performed preliminary surveys and gathered basic data as precursors to the more

sophisticated missions, sometimes opening new areas of scientific investigation in

the process. Many discoveries in the fields of astronomy and physics were attributed

to instruments carried by the efficient, economical Explorers.

The following tables briefly describe each Explorer mission. For more information, especially on the instruments and experiments, consult Alfred Rosenthal and

William R. Corliss, Encyclopedia of Satellites and Sounding Rockets, August 1959

to December 1969 (Beltsville, MD: GSFC (1970); Henry L. Richter, Jr., ed., Space

Measurements Survey: Instruments and Spacecraft, October 1957-March 1965,

NASA SP-3028 (Washington, 1966); and Corliss Scientific Satellites, NASA SP-133

(Washington, 1967) For the early history of Explorer and how it was related to the

Vanguard program and the International Geophysical Year, see Constance M.

Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History, NASA SP-4202 (Washington,

1970).
234 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-71.

Chronology of Explorer Development and Operations

235

Date Event

1954

July 1, 1955

July 28, 1955

Aug. 3, 1955

1956

Nov. 1957

Nov. 8, 1957

Jan. 31, 1958

March 5, 1958

March 26, 1958

July 26, 1958

Aug. 24, 1958

July 16, 1959

Aug. 7, 1959

Oct. 13, 1959

March 23, 1960

Nov. 3, 1960

Feb. 16, 1961

Feb. 24, 1961

Feb. 25, 1961

April 27, 1961

May 24, 1961

American participants in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) suggested

using a satellite for obtaining scientific information during the 1957-1958 activities.

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) and the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory (JPL) proposed a plan for launching a small satellite with

Sergeant solid-fuel rockets (2d, 3d, 4th stages) atop a Redstone booster.

U.S. officially announced plans to launch a satellite as part of the IGY.

The Department of Defense (DoD) Advisory Group on Special Capabilities

(Stewart Committee), in choosing an IGY satellite, selected the Naval

Research Laboratory's (NRL) Vanguard project over the Army's proposal,

called Orbiter.

Both the Army and Navy continued to develop their launch vehicles, the

Navy's booster being based on the Viking missile and the Army's on Redstone

(se also chapter 1).

After delays with its Vanguard launch vehicle, NRL transferred one of its

satellite experiments to ABMA for use in their satellite project, now called

Explorer. The experiment, sponsored by James Van Alien, State University

of Iowa, was integrated into a fourth-stage Sergeant motor by JPL in three

months.

DoD officially directed the Army to proceed with their Explorer program to

launch a satellite for the IGY; the modified Jupiter C launch vehicle

(Redstone Booster) would be called Juno I.

Explorer 1, the first successful U.S. satellite (13.6 kg, torpedo-shaped), was

launched by the Army with a Juno I vehicle.

A second Explorer failed to achieve orbit when the launch vehicle malfunctioned (ABMA).

Explorer 3 was launched by Juno I (ABMA).

Explorer 4 was launched by Juno I (ABMA).

The fifth Explorer failed to achieve orbit because it collided with the booster

after separation.

Explorer S-I, an energetic particles Explorer, failed when the launch vehicle

malfunctioned (ABMA).

Explorer 6 was launched, the first NASA Explorer put into orbit.

Explorer 7 was launched.

Explorer S-46, an energetic particles Explorer, failed when the launch vehicle

malfunctioned.

Explorer 8 was launched.

Explorer 9 was launched.

Explorer S-45, an ionospheric beacon Explorer, failed because of malfunction after separation from the booster.

Explorer 10 was launched.

Explorer 11 was launched.

Explorer S-45A, an ionospheric beacon satellite, failed when the launch vehicle malfunctioned.

Aug. 16, 1961 Explorer 12 was launched.
236 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-71.

Chronology of Explorer Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Aug. 25, 1961 Explorer 13 was

Oct. 2, 1962 Explorer 14 was

Oct. 27, 1962 Explorer 15 was

Radiation Belt)

Dec. 16, 1962 Explorer 16 was

April 3, 1963 Explorer 17 was

Nov. 26, 1963 Explorer 18 was

Dec. 19, 1963 Explorer 19 was

March 19, 1964

Aug. 25, 1964

Oct. 4, 1964

Oct. 9, 1964

Nov. 6, 1964

Nov. 21, 1964

Dec. 21, 1964

April 29, 1965

May 29, 1965

Nov. 6, 1965

Nov. 19, 1965

Nov. 29, 1965

May 25, 1966

July 1, 1966

May 24, 1967

July 19, 1967

Jan. 11, 1968

March 5, 1968

July 4, 1968

Aug. 8, 1968

launched.

launched.

launched as part of Project SERB (Study ofthe Enhanced

launched.

launched.

launched (first interplanetary monitoring platform).

launched.

Explorer S-66, an ionospheric measurements Explorer, failed when the

launch vehicle malfunctioned.

Explorer 20 was launched.

Explorer 21 was launched.

Explorer 22 was launched.

Explorer 23 was launched.

Explorer 24 and 25 were launched together (first successful dual launch by

NASA). This was a joint NASA-State University of Iowa project.

Explorer 26 was launched.

Explorer 27 was launched.

Explorer 28 was launched.

Explorer 29 was launched (part of the U.S. Geodetic Satellite Program).

Explorer 30 was launched (joint NASA-NRL project).

Erplorer 31 was launched with a Canadian satellite in a dual launch (joint

NASA-Canadian Defense Research Board project).

Explorer 32 was launched.

Explorer 33 was launched.

Explorer 34 was launched.

Explorer 35 was launched.

Explorer 36 was launched (part of the U.S. Geodetic Satellite Program).

Explorer 37 was launched (joint NASA-NRL project).

Explorer 38 was launched.

Explorer 39 and 40 were launched logether (joint NASA-State University of

Iowa project).
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-72.

Explorer 6 (S-2) Characteristics

237

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager,

scientists:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Aug. 7, 1959 (ETR)

Thor-Able

64.4

Irregular but symmetrical spheroid with 4 solar cell paddles extended on arms from

waste of spacecraft

spheroid diameter, .66

diameter w/paddles extended, 2.18

height, .74

paddles, .5 x .56

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Prior to July 1961

GSFC

J. C. Lindsay

Space Technology Laboratories, Inc. (STL), spacecraft

Energetic particles

Measure Van Allen belt and cosmic radiation; map earth's magetic field; acquire

data on micrometeorites; determine effect of ionosphere on radio wave propogation; provide crude television image of cloud cover.

Total of 12 experiments from the University of Chicago, STL, the University of

Minnesota, Cambridge Research Laboratories, and Stanford University.

All experiments performed satisfactorily; returned first televised cloud cover picture; first detailed study of the Van Allen belts.

Also designated Able 3.
238 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-73.

Explorer 7 (S-la) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Oct. 13, 1959 (ETR)

Juno II

41.5

Truncated cones joined at bases

.76 × .76

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

H. E. La Gow

Army Ballistic Missile Agency, spacecraft and launch vehicle

Energetic particles

Measure sun's radiation, intensity of x-rays, and ultraviolet rays, heavy cosmic rays,

intensity of charged particles; study ionospheric composition, micrometeorite impacts, solar cell erosion; measure temperatures.

Thermal radiation balance, University of Wisconsin

Solar x-ray, NRL et al.

Cosmic ray ion chamber, Martin Co. et al.

Geiger counters, State University of Iowa et al.

Ground-based observations, University of Iowa et al.

Micrometeoroid penetration sensor, GSFC

Provided significant geophysical information on radiation and magnetic storms.

Spacecraft designed, fabricated, and tested under the direction of Ernst Stuhlinger

and Joseph Boehm, ABMA (later MSFC).

Table 3-74.

Explorer 8 (S-30) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager,

scientist:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 3, 1960 (ETR)

Juno II

40.8

2 truncated cones joined at bases

.76 × .76

Hg batteries

In orbit

GSFC

R. E. Bourdeau

Ionospheric studies

Take measurements in the ionosphere; study ionospheric properties and

micrometeorite impacts.

RF impedance probe, ion traps, Langmuir probe, rotating shutter electric field

meter, micrometeoroid detector, and micrometeoroid microphones, all GSFC experiments

Micrometeoroid influx rate measured; layers of helium discovered in upper atmosphere.

Spacecraft was built at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC).
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-75.

Explorer 9 (S-56a) Characteristics

239

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions(m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments:

Results:

Remarks:

Feb. 16, 1961 (Wallops)

Scout

36.3

Sphere (inflated with nitrogen)

Diameter, 3.66

Batteries plus solar cells

Before July 1961

LaRC-GSFC joint project

William J. O'Sullivan, LaRc

G. T. Schjeldahl

Atmospheric studies

Determine density of atmosphere by measuring air drag on an inflatable sphere; test

launch for the Scout vehicle.

Radio beacon only, no instrumentation (passive)

Balloon and fourth stage of launch vehicle achieved orbit, but the radio beacon failed; the satellite was tracked optically and useful data were obtained.

See also Echo communications satellite for background information on the

spacecraft's design.

Table 3-76.

Explorer 10 (P-14) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager,

scientist:

Contractors:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

March 25, 1961 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

35.4

Sphere atop a supporting tube joined to a drum

Sphere diameter, .33

Drum diameter, .49

Total height, 1.32

Batteries

June 1968

GSFC

James P. Heppner

Varian Associates, rubidium vapor magnetometer

Schonstedt Engineering Co., fluxgate magnetometers

Energetic particles (also called Magnetometer-Plasma Probe)

Gather information on earth's magnetic field and interplanetary magnetic fields and

on the way these fields interact with electrically charged particles thrown outward by

the sun.

Rubidium vapor magnetometer, GSFC

Fluxgate magnetometers, GSFC

Plasma probe, MIT

Data transmitted for 52 hours; demonstrated existence of geomagnetic cavity in

solar wind and existence of solar proton streams.
240 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-77.

Explorer 11 (S-15) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractors:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

April 27, 1961 (ETR)

Juno II

43.1, including 5.8-kg 4th-stage rocket

3-sectional octagonal box with .43-meter plate on top and instrument column attached to 1.12-meter-long 4th-stage Sergeant rocket

Overall length, 2.26

Box, .3 x .6 × .43

Instrument column, .52 x .15

NiCd batteries

In orbit

GSFC-MSFC joint project

John Coogan, GSFC

Bill Greever, MSFC

J. E. Kupperian, Jr., GSFC

MIT, gamma ray telescope

Raymond Engineering Laboratory, tape recorder

Gamma ray astronomy

Detect and map extraterrestrial high-energy gamma rays; measure high-energy gamma ray albedo of atmosphere.

Gamma ray telescope, MIT

Detected first gamma rays from space.

Table 3-78.

Explorer 12 (S-3) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Aug. 15, 1961 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

37.6

Octagonal platform atop a truncated cone with 4 solar panels extending from sides

.43 x .7 x .7

AgCd battieres plus solar cells

Sept. 1963

GSFC

Paul Butler

F. B. McDonald

Contractor: Raymond Engineering Laboratory, Inc., spacecraft structure

Class of Explorer : Energetic particles

Objectives: Study physics of fields and energetic particles by observing solar wind, interplanetary magnetic field, and particle population of interplanetary space, and

trapped radiation regions.

Experiments Proton analyzer, ARC

responsible Fluxgate magnetometer, University of New Hampshire

institution: Cosmic ray instruments, State University of Iowa

Geiger and scintillation counters, GSFC

Ion-electron detectors, GSFC

Results: Normal operation; 2568 hours of data received and significant geophysical data on

radiation and magnetic fields provided.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-79.

Explorer 13 (S-55a) Characteristics

241

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant

center:

Project manager:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Aug. 25, 1961 (Wallops)

Scout

83.9, including 22.7-kg spent motor case

Cylindrical, with instruments in nose

.61 x 1.9

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Aug. 28, 1961

LaRC

Charles T. D'Aiutolo

Micrometeoroid

Gather information on micrometeoroids 385-965 kilometers above earth;

study dust particles; test Scout vehicle.

Cadmium sulphide cell detector, GSFC

Wire grid detector, GSFC

Piezoelectric detector, LeRC

Pressurized cell detectors, LaRC

Foil-type detectors, LeRC

Orbit lower than planned; no significant data returned.

Table 3-80.

Explorer 14 (S-3a) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (In):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientists:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Oct. 2, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

40.4

Octagonal platform atop a truncated cone with 4 solar panels

.43 x .7 x .7

AgCd batteries plus solar ceils

July 1, 1966

GSFC

Paul G. Marcotte

F. B. McDonald

Raymond Engineering Laboratory, Inc., spacecraft structure

Energetic particles

Continuation of Explorer 12"s mission; gather information on radiation, solar particles, and the solar wind.

Proton analyzer, ARC

Fluxgate magnetometer, University of New Hampshire

Trapped particle radiation study, State University of Iowa

Various radiation detectors, GSFC

Studied earth's radiation belt as planned.
242 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-81.

Explorer 15 (S-3b) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m)

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Oct. 27, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

45.4

Octagonal platform atop a truncated cone with 4 solar panels

.43 x .7 x .7

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

John W. Townsend, Jr.

W. Hess

Raymond Engineering Laboratory, Inc., spacecraft structure

Energetic particles

Make detailed measurements of artificial radiation belt created by Starfish highaltitude nuclear test of July 9, 1962; determine effects of radiation on solar cells.

Electron energy distribution, GSFC, Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL)

Electron angular distribution, BTL

Omnidirectional electron-proton detector, University of California, San Diego

Directional electron-proton detector, UCSD

Ion-electron detector, GSFC

Fluxgate magnetometer, University of New Hampshire

Solar cell damage, BTL

Good data on artificial radiation bek obtained although spacecraft's despin system

failed to operate.

Fabricated from Explorer 14 spare parts; part of Project SERB (Study of Enhanced

Radiation Belt).

Table 3-82.

Explorer 16 (S-55b) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Dec. 16, 1962 (Wallops)

Scout

100.7

Cylindrical

1.93 x .58

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

LaRC

Earl Hastings

Micrometeoroid

Determine micrometeoroid puncture hazards to spacecraft skin samples; gather information on dust particles; compare performance of protected and unprotected

solar cells.

Foil gauge detectors, LeRC

Cadmium sulphide cells, GSFC

Impact detectors, LaRC

Wire grids, GSFC

All experiments functioned as planned; 16 micrometeoroid penetrations were

registered during the first 29 days of flight.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 243

Table 3-83.

Explorer 17 (S-6) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project managers:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

April 2, 1963 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

185.5

Spherical

Diameter, .89

AgZn batteries

Nov. 24, 1966

GSFC

N. W. Spencer, J. E. Cooley

Budd Co., spacecraft structure

Atmospheric studies (also called Aeronomy Satellite)

Determine diurnal and spatial variations of electron density and temperature; determine the neutral parameters-density, composition, pressure, temperature-in the

regions between 250 and 900 km.

Mass spectrometers, GSFC

Pressure gauges, GSFC

Langmuir probes, GSFC

Confirmed that earth is surrounded by a belt of neutral helium at an altitude of

250-900 km.

Table 3-84.

Explorer 18 (IMP-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 26, 1963 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

62.6

Octagonal platform with solar panels

.3 x .71 x .71

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Dec. 30, 1965

GSFC

Paul Butler

F. B. McDonald

Interplanetary monitoring platform

Study magnetic fields, solar wind, and cosmic rays beyond the influence of earth's

magnetic field; obtain information about space radiation intensities and distribution.

Ion and electron probes, GSFC

Fluxgate magnetometers, GSFC

Cosmic ray telescope, University of Chicago

Geiger counter and ion chamber, University of California

Plasma probe, MIT

Scintillator and geiger telescopes, GSFC

Radium vapor magnetometer, GSFC

Plasma analyzer, ARC

First accurate measurements of the interplanetary magnetic field and shock front.
244 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-85.

Explorer 19 (AD-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer :

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 20, 1963 (WTR)

Scout

43.1

Spherical (inflatable)

Diameter, 3.66

NiCd batteries plus solar ceils

May 10, 1981

LaRC

Claude W. Coffee, Jr.

William J. O'Sullivan

G. T. Schjeldahl

Atmospheric studies (also called Atmospheric Density Satellite)

Determine air density of upper atmosphere; study heating effects in upper atmosphere due to influx of energetic particles and ultraviolet radiation.

Radio beacon only, no instrumentation (passive)

Achieved desired orbit but lost ability to transmit; first sighted in Australia on Dec.

20; some data obtained through optical tracking.

See also Echo communications satellite for background information on the

spacecraft's design.

Table 3-86.

Explorer 20 (S-48) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions:

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Aug. 25, 1964 (ETR)

Scout

44.5

Conical main body with. l-meter ball-shaped ion mass spectrometer and .25-meter

tapered boom

Main body, .83 x .66

Overall length, 1.18

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

John J. Jackson

Airborne Instruments Lab., Cutler-Hammer, Inc., spacecraft

Ionospheric studies

Measure irregularities in the topside of earth's ionosphere.

Fixed frequency sounder, Central Radio Propagation Laboratory, National Bureau

of Standards

Ion probe, University College, London

Galactic radio noise receiver, GSFC

Helped to map the topside of the ionosphere.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-87.

Explorer 21 (IMP-B) Characteristics

245

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Oct. 4, 1964 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

61.7

Octagonal platform with 4 solar panels

.3 x .71 × .71

Solar panels, .66 x .46

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

Jan. 30, 1966

GSFC

P. Butler

F. B. McDonald

Interplanetary monitoring platform

Study magnetic fields, solar wind, and cosmic rays beyond the influence of earth's

magnetic field; study magnetic field interactions with solar plasma; obtain information regarding space radiation intensities and distribution.

Same as for Explorer 18 (table 3-84).

Useful data obtained, but spacecraft failed to achieve required orbit.

Table 3-88.

Explorer 22 (BE-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Oct. 9, 1964 (WTR)

Scout

52.2

Octagonal with 4 solar panels extending from sides

Shell diameter, .46

Shell height, .3

Solar panels, .25 × 1.68

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

F. T. Martin

R. E. Bourdeau

Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins, spacecraft

Ionospheric studies (also called Beacon-Explorer)

Conduct ionospheric and geodetic research for a minimum of 1 year.

Ionospheric beacon, University of Illinois, et al.

Electron density, GSFC

Laser tracking, GSFC

More than 80 international observing stations participated; successful.
246 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-89.

Explorer 23 (S-55c) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 6, 1964 (Wallops)

Scout

133.8 (including spent 4th-stage motor)

Cylindrical

2.34 x .61

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

June 29, 1983

LaRC

Earl Hastings, Jr.

Micrometeoroid

Measure micrometeoroid penetration

Pressurized cells, LaRC

Impact detectors, LaRC

Capacitor detectors, LaRC

Cadmium sulphide cells, GSFC

Obtained data on penetratiom as planned.

Table 3-90.

Explorer 24 and 25 (AD-Injun B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 21, 1964 (WTR)

Scout

Explorer 24, 8.6

Explorer 25, 40.8

Explorer 24, spherical (inflatable)

Explorer 25, roughly spherical with 40 flat surfaces

Explorer 24, diameter, 3.66

Explorer 25, diameter, .61

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Explorer 24, Oct. 18, 1968

Explorer 25, in orbit

LaRC

Claude W. Coffee, Jr.

Gerald M. Keating

Explorer 24, G. T. Schjeldahl

Explorer 25, State University of Iowa

Air density-lnjun

Provide information on complex radiation-air density relationships in the upper atmosphere.

Explorer 24, radio beacon only, no instrumentation (passive).

Explorer 25, 16 radiation sensors, State University of Iowa

First successful dual launch; all instruments performed as planned.

Joint NASA-State University of Iowa project; see also Echo communications

satellite for background information on Explorer 24's design.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 247

Table3-91.

Explorer 26 (EPE-D) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Dec. 21, 1964 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

45.8

Octagonal platform atop a trucated cone with 4 solar panels extending from sides;

.86-meter tube mounted on top to support magnetometer

.43 x .7 x .7

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Gerald W. Longanecker

Leo R. Davis

Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., electrical integration

Energetic particles

Determine how high-energy particles are injected, trapped, and lost in the Van Allen

Belt; determine penetration depth of high-energy solar protons into the geomagnetic

field.

Electron-proton angular distribution and energy spectra, BTL, GSFC

Electron-proton directional-omnidirectional detector, University of California, San

Diego

Magnetic field measurements, University of New Hampshire

Ion-electron detector, GSFC

Solar cell damage, BTL

Experiments performed as planned, continuing the work of earlier satellites in the

energetic particles series.

Table 3-92.

Explorer 27 (BE-C) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientists:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

April 29, 1965 (Wallops)

Scout

60.8

Octagonal with 4 solar panels extending from sides

.46 x .3

Solar panels, .25 x 1.68

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Frank T. Martin

Robert E. Bourdeau, R. Newton

Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins, spacecraft

Ionospheric studies (also called Beacon-Explorer)

Study for a minimum of 1 year variations of electron density and orbital perturbations in order to deduce the size and shape of earth and the nature of its gravitational

field.

Same as for Explorer 22 (table 3-88).

Experiments functioned as planned.
248 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-93.

Explorer 28 (IMP-C) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

May 29, 1965 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

59

Octagonal with 4 solar panels

.71 x .71 x .2

Solar panels, .7 x .51

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

July 4, 1968

GSFC

Paul Bulter

Frank B. McDonald

Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., electrical integration

Interplanetary monitoring platform

Study radiation environment of cislunar space and quiescent properties of interplanetary magnetic field; develop solar flare prediction capability for Apollo.

Same as for Explorer 18 (table 3-84).

Placed in a highly eccentric orbit, the spacecraft returned data on earth's

magnetosphere.

Table 3-94.

Explorer 29 (GEOS-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 6, 1965 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta (TAD)

174.6

Octahedron topped by a truncated pyramid with 18-meter extendable boom

1.22 x .81

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

C. H. Looney

Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins, spacecraft

Geodesy

Compare tracking system accuracies; study gravitational field; improve geodetic

datum accuracies.

Flashing-light beacon, corner cube quartz reflector, radio transmitters for doppler

shift detector, radio range transponder, range and range-rate transponder, all GSFC

experiments

All systems functioned with good data returned.

Also called GEOS 1; part of the U.S. Geodetic Satellite Program, with coordinated

tracking accomplished by NASA, DoD, and the Department of Commerce.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-95.

Explorer 30 (SE-A) Characteristics

249

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 19, 1965 (Wallops)

Scout

56.7

2 hemispheres separated by a .089-meter equatorial band

Diameter of each hemisphere, .61

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

NASA Hq.

Marcel T. Aucremanne

R. W. Kreplin, Naval Research Laboratory

NRL

Solar

Monitor solar x-rays during the International Quiet Sun Year.

X-ray ion chamber photometer, NRL

X-ray geiger counters, NKL

Lyman-alpha ion chamber, NRL

Successful return of data on solar x-rays and ultraviolet rays.

Joint NASA-Naval Research Laboratory Project.

Table 3-96.

Explorer 31 (DME-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 29, 1965 (WTR)

Thor-Agena B

98.9 (plus 146.5-kg Alouette)

Explorer 31, octagonal with a spherical ion mass spectrometer

Alouette 2, roughly spherical

Explorer 31, .76 x .64; overall height, 1.17

Alouette 2, diameter, 1.07; height, .86

Solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Evart D. Nelson

J. E. Jackson

Explorer 31, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins, spacecraft

Ionospheric studies (also called Direct Measurements Satellite)

Sound the topside of the ionosphere using topside sounder and measurement techniques.

Explorer 31, Thermal ion and electron probes, GSFC

Electrostatic probe, GSFC

Electron probe, University College, London

Spherical ion mass spectrometer, University College

Magnetic ion mass spectrometer, NRL

Energetic current monitor, GSFC

Functioned as planned, with the Alouette still in orbit and available for use in 1970.

Joint NASA-Canadian Defense Research Board project; dual mission called ISIS-X

(International Satellite for Ionospheric Studies); see also table 3-126.
250 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-97.

Explorer 32 (AE-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments:

Results:

May 25, 1966 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

220

Spherical

Diameter, .89

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

N. W. Spencer

L. H. Brace

Atmospheric studies

Study structure and physics of upper atmosphere (220-1050 km).

Redhead ion gauges, ion gauges, electrostatic probes, ion mass spectrometer, all

GSFC experiments.

Experiments performed well, but spacecraft achieved a higher apogee than planned

due to a long second-stage burn.

Table 3-98.

Explorer 33 (IMP-D) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

July 1, 1966 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

93.4

2-piece axial-thrust tube with a Delta attach-flange on one end and a retromotor

flange on the other connected to an octagonal equipment deck with 4 solar cell paddles and 2 booms for magnetometers

Width with paddles extended, 2.78

Height, 1.12

Battery plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

P. G. Marcotte

N. F. Ness

Interplanetary monitoring platform (anchored)

Anchor satellite in orbit about moon; measure solar plasma flux, energetic particles,

magnetic fields, and cosmic dust; explore variations of moon's gravity field.

Fluxgate magnetometers, GSFC, ARC

Thermal ion probe, GSFC

Ion chamber, UCLA

Tubes plus p-on-n junction, State University of Iowa

Faraday-cup probe, MIT

Spacecraft failed to achieve lunar orbit, but the highly eccentric earth orbit into

which it was injected allowed for the return of data on solar plasma, energetic particles, and magetic fields.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 251

Table 3-99.

Explorer 34 (IMP-F) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

May 24, 1967 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

73.9

Octagonal platform with 4 solar cell paddles and 2 booms for magnetometers

Diameter, .71

AgCd battery plus solar ceils

May 3, 1969

GSFC

Paul Butler

Frank B. McDonald

Interplanetary monitoring platform

Study solar and galactic cosmic radiation, solar plasma, and energetic particles

within the magnetosphere and interplanetary magnetic field.

Total of 11 experiments from Bell Telephone Laboratories, Southwest Center for

Advanced Studies, GSFC, University of Maryland, State University of Iowa, and

TRW.

Returned 170 000 hours of data; launched during class three period of bright solar

flares.

Table 3-100.

Explorer 35 (IMP-E) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

July 19, 1967 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta

104.3

Octagonal with 4 solar panels

.71 × .71 x .86

AgCd battery plus solar cells

In lunar orbit

GSFC

Paul G. Marcotte

Norman F. Ness

Aerospace Div., Westinghouse Electric Corp., integration

Interplanetary monitoring platform (anchored)

Anchor satellite in orbit around moon; measure solar plasma flux, energetic particles, magnetic fields, and cosmic dust.

Magnetometers, GSFC, ARC

Thermal ion detector, GSFC

Ion chambers and geiger tubes, UCLA

Geiger tubes and p-on-n junction, State University of Iowa

Micrometeoroid detector, Temple University

Faraday cup, MIT

Inserted into lunar orbit on July 22; no detectable lunar magnetic field discovered.
252 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-101.

Explorer 36 (GEOS-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Program scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Jan. 11, 1968 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta

2O8.7

Octahedron topped by a truncated pyramid with a 9-meter extendable boom

1.22 x 1.22 x .81

NiCd batteries plus solar ceils

In orbit

NASA Hq.

J. D. Rosenberg

Nancy Roman

Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins, spacecraft

Geodesy

Compare tracking system accuracies; study earth's gravitational field; improve

geodetic datum accuracies.

Optical beacon, radio doppler, range transponder, range and range-rate

transponder, C-band transponder, and laser corner reflector, all GSFC experiments

All experiments returned data as planned.

Also called GEOS 2; part of the U.S. Geodetic Satellite Program.

Table 3-102.

Explorer 37 (SE-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Program scientist:

Contractors:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

March 5, 1968 (Wallops)

Scout

88.5

12-sidedcylinder

.76 × .69

NiCd batteriesplussolarceils

In orbit

NASA Hq.

J. Holtz

H. Glaser, NASA Hq.; R. W. Kreplin, Naval Research Laboratory

NRL

Solar

Monitor the sun's x-ray emissions.

Scintillation counter, x-ray photometer, geiger counters, and

photometers, all NRL experiments

Experiments returned data as planned.

Joint NASA-NRL project.

ultraviolet
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 253

Table 3-103.

Explorer 38 (RAE-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Program scientists:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

July 4, 1968 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta

275.3 (including 79.4-kg apogee kick motor)

Cylindrical with 4 solar paddies and 4 228-meter antennas

.91 × .79

NiCd batteries plus solar ceils

In orbit

GSFC

John T. Shea

Robert G. Stone

Space and Electronics Div., Fairchild Hiller Corp., spacecraft structure and antenna

assemblies

Radio astronomy

Monitor low-frequency cosmic radio noise using large deployable antennas; monitor

radio noise emitted by sun, Jupiter, and Earth.

Nine-step receivers, burst receivers, electron trap, impedance probe, and

capacitance probe, all GSFC experiments

Successfully deployed antennas and damper boom on Oct. 8; deleted sharply

beamed sporadic low-frequency radio signal from Jupiter.

Table 3-104.

Explorer 39 and 40 (AD-Injun E) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Program scientist:

Contractor:

Class of Explorer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Aug. 8, 1968 (WTR)

Scout

Explorer 39, 9.4

Explorer 40, 71.2

Explorer 39, spherical (inflatable)

Explorer 40, 6-sided cylinder

Explorer 39, diameter, 3.66

Explorer 40, .74 x .76

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Explorer 39, June 22, 1981

Explorer 40, in orbit

LaRC

Claude W. Coffee, Jr.

William A. Whelpley, State University of Iowa

Explorer 39, G. T. Schjeldahl

Explorer 40, State University of Iowa

Air density-Injun

Study complex radiation-air density relationships in upper atmosphere in polar

regions.

Explorer 39, radio beacon only, no instrumentation (passive)

Explorer 40, particle differential energy analyzer, solid-state detector, VLF receiver,

and spherical particle analyzers, all State University of Iowa experiments

Dual launch; studied interaction of solar radiation with the atmosphere during the

solar maximum.

Joint NASA-State University of Iowa project; see also Echo communications

satellite for background information of Explorer 39's design.
254 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Orbiting Solar Observatories

The dominant position of the sun in our solar system and its profound effect on

earth's atmosphere has made it the subject of extensive examinations by space agency scientists. To study the sun, NASA planned an earth-orbiting platform-smaller

and less sophisticated than the proposed Orbiting Astronomical Observatories (see

elsewhere in this chapter) - equipped with instruments to measure solar radiation,

x-rays, gamma rays, and dust particles. 8

Called a "streetcar" satellite because it could carry interchangeable scientific instruments aboard as passengers, the Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) consisted of

two main sections. The lower wheel-like structure was composed of nine wedgeshaped compartments, five of which housed scientific apparatus. Three spheres on

extended arms held pressurized nitrogen for stabilization. The top part of the

spacecraft was a stable fan-shaped array to which silicon solar cells were attached.

Experiments that required a fixed orientation with respect to the sun could be

housed in this section. In 1962, 1965, and 1967, four OSOs were orbited successfully

by Thor-Delta launchers, sending back a wealth of data about the sun and sun-earth

relationships.

Managed at NASA headquarters by the physics and astronomy directorate,

OSO 1 was the responsibility of Irwin Cherrick, program manager. From June 1963

through 1965, Richard E. Halpern was OSO program manager, and Dixon L. Forsythe was solar observatories manager from January 1965 until mid-1967, when C.

Dixon Ashworth assumed these duties (Ashworth managed both astronomical and

solar observatory programs from December 1967). The Goddard Space Flight

Center was responsible for the individual flight projects (see the following tables for

project managers), with the launches taking place at the Eastern Test Range. Ball

Brothers Research Corporation of Boulder, Colorado, designer of the spacecraft,

was the prime contractor. The firm has worked with Goddard on the design even

before the first OSO contract was awarded in October 1959. The experimenters involved with the program were from Goddard, NASA's Ames Research Center, the

University of Rochester, the University of California at San Diego, Harvard, the

Naval Research Laboratory, the University of Minnesota, the University of New

Mexico, the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory, MIT, the University of

Michigan, University College (London), and American Science and Engineering,

Inc.

The Orbiting Solar Observatories opened a new era in solar astronomy, but the

spacecraft had its limitations. To carry larger instruments with high spectral and

spatial resolution, NASA proposed in 1962 an advanced OSO to carry on observations beyond the eight planned OSOs. After Goddard specialists had completed

negotiations with Republic Aviation Corp. for such an advanced spacecraft, the

project was cancelled because of budget cuts in late 1965. However, each succeeding

OSO flight offered investigators new opportunities to confirm their data and improve their instruments. In addition, OSO 4 was able to carry 90 kilograms more

payload than OSO 1.

For more information, consult GSFC, Orbiting Solar Observatory Satellite,

OSO 1, the Project Summary, NASA SP-57 (Washington, 1965); [Alfred Rosenthal

and William R. Corliss], Encyclopedia of Satellites and Sounding Rockets, August

1959 to December 1969 (Beltsville, MD: GSFC [1970]); and Corliss, Scientific

Satellites, NASA SP-133 (Washington, 1967).
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 255

Table 1-105.

Chronology of Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO)

Date Event

April 16, 1959

Aug. 17, 1959

By Sept. 30, 1959

Oct. 1959

March 7, 1962

Aug. 15, 1962

Oct. 22, 1962

Feb. 6, 1964

April 14, 1964

Feb. 3, 1965

April 16, 1965

Aug. 25, 1965

Aug. 30, 1965

Oct. 1, 1965

Dec. 15, 1965

March 8, 1967

Oct. 18, 1967

April 10, 1968

Measurements of the sun from a spacecraft with pointing controls were included among NASA's immediate space science flight program objectives.

An Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) was included in an "Office of Space

Sciences Ten Year Program" document (pp. VII-15 through 17, table VII-8)

as one of the solar physics projects underway at the Goddard Space Flight

Center (GSFC), with Ball Brothers Research Corp. being considered a potential prime contractor; the first launch was tentatively scheduled for December

1960.

Goddard and Ball Brothers had completed part of the preliminary engineering for an OSO to weigh about 136 kilograms.

The first contract with Ball Brothers for OSO instrumentation was signed

($250 000, initial funding); additional contracts were awarded in 1961.

OSO 1 was launched successfully.

NASA awarded three study contracts for the design of a new series of

spacecraft with which to study the sun (Ball Brothers, Republic Aviation, and

Space Technology Laboratories, $100 000 each).

NASA and Republic initiated discussions for a development studies contract

for an advanced OSO ($1.9 million estimated contract).

The General Accounting Office reported to Congress that NASA had incurred $799 000 in unnecessary costs on OSO because of mismanagement.

OSO-B's third-stage launch vehicle motor (X-248) ignited accidentally while

mated to the spacecraft at Goddard; three men were killed. Some parts were

salvaged for OSO-B2.

OSO 2 was launched successfully.

NASA signed a contract with Ball Brothers to build two more OSOs ($9.6

million).

OSO-C failed to achieve orbit due to launch vehicle malfunction.

NASA negotiated with Ball Brothers to purchase three more OSOs, bringing

the total to eight.

Goddard and Republic completed negotiations for an advanced OSO ($58.4

million, estimated contract).

An advanced OSO development program was cancelled because of budgetary

considerations.

OSO 3 was launched successfully.

OSO 4 was launched successfully.

A request for proposals for OSO-H was issued by Goddard.
256 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-106.

OSO 1 (OSO-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager,

scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

March 7, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

199.6

2 main sections, each capable of movement; fan-shaped sail with solar cells atop a

lower wheel-like structure composed of 9 wedge-shaped compartments; 3 stabilization arms

Upper Section, diameter, 1.12

Lower section, diameter, 1.12; height, .23

Overall height, .95

NiCd batteries plus solar ceils

Oct. 8, 1981

GSFC

John C. Lindsay

Ball Brothers Research Corp., spacecraft and integration

Measure solar electromagnetic radiation in ultraviolet, x-ray, and gamma ray

regions; investigate dust particles in space; improve future spacecraft design.

X-ray spectrometer, GSFC

Gamma ray monitor, GSFC

X-ray monitors, GSFC

Dust particle experiment, GSFC

Emissivity stability, ARC

Photoelectric error sensor stability, Ball Brothers

Solar radiation, GSFC

Solar ultraviolet radiation, GSFC

Solar gamma ray radiation, GSFC

Earth horizon sensor, GSFC

High-energy gamma ray, University of Rochester

Neutron flux, University of California at San Diego

Proton-electron flux, University of California at San Diego

Collected 2000 hours of data; detected rapid fluctuations in the x-ray flux emitted by

the sun and a correlation between the temperature of earth's upper atmosphere and

the intensity of ultraviolet radiation from the sun striking the atmosphere. Tracking

and data operations for the spacecraft ceased on August 6, 1963.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-107.

OSO 2 (OSO-B2) Characteristics

257

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Feb. 3, 1965 (ETR)

Thor-Deka

247.2

2 main sections, each capable of movement; fan-shaped sail with solar cells atop a

lower wheel-like structure composed of 9 wedge-shaped compartments; 3 stabilization arms

Upper section, diameter, 1.12

Lower section, diameter, 1.12; height, .23

Overall height, .95

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

L. T. Hogarth

John C. Lindsay

Ball Brothers Research Corp., spacecraft and integration

Continue studies of solar x-ray, gamma ray, and ultraviolet emissions, with added

capability to scan entire solar disc and part of the corona.

Ultraviolet spectrometer, Harvard

Solar x-ray and ultraviolet imaging, NRL

White light coronograph, NRL

Zodiacal light, University of Minnesota

High-energy gamma ray, University of New Mexico

Low-energy gamma ray, GSFC

Astronomical ultraviolet spectrometer, GSFC

Emissivity stability, ARC

Successful return of data from 4100 orbits; placed in coasting mode on November

29, 1965 after exceeding its operating life expectancy by 50 percent.
258 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-108.

0S0-3 (OSO-E) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

March 8, 1967 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

284.4

2 main sections, each capable of movement; fan-shaped sail with solar cells atop a

lower wheel-like structure composed of 9 wedge-shaped compartments; 3 stabilization arms

Upper section, diameter, 1.12

Lower section, diameter, 1.12; height, .23

Overall height, .95

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Apr. 4, 1982

GSFC

L. T. Hogarth

W. E. Behring

Ball Brothers Research Corp., spacecraft and integration

Obtain high-resolution spectral data

X-ray spectrometer, GSFC

Ultraviolet spectrometer, Air Force Cambridge Research Lab

Gamma ray telescope, MIT

Particle detector and gamma ray telescope, University of Rochester

X-ray telescope, University of California, San Diego

Solar x-ray detector, University of Michigan

Technological instrumentation, ARC

Observed changes in the ultraviolet spectrum during solar flares; collected data

significant for aeronomy; still transmitting scientific data on command.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 259

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientists:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Table 3-109.

OSO 4 (OSO-B2) Characteristics

Oct. 18, 1967 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

276.7

2 main sections, each capable of movement; fan-shaped sail with solar cells atop a

lower wheel-like structure composed of 9 wedge-shaped compartments; 3 stabilization arms

Upper section, diameter, 1.12

Lower section, diameter, 1.12; height, .23

Overall height, .95

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

June 15, 1982

GSFC

L. T. Hogarth

W. E. Behring

Ball Brothers Research Corp., spacecraft and integration

Obtain high-resolution spectral data

Ultraviolet spectrometer-spectroheliograph, Harvard

Solar x-ray spectroheliograph, ASE (?)

Solar x-ray spectrometers, NRL; University College (London)

Geocorona hydrogen Lyman alpha telescope, NRL

X-ray monitor, NRL

Earth proton-electron telescope, University of California

Solar monochromator, University College (London)

Returned the first photographs of the corona over the whole face of the solar disc;

still provides data on command.

Orbiting Astronomical Observatories

Since Galileo began telescopic observations in the mid-17th century, observers

have been monitoring and measuring atmospheric phenomena. With the advent of

rocket-launched observatories, scientists were able to enhance the quality of their

results by placing their instruments above earth's obscuring atmosphere. Experiments borne by balloons, sounding rockets, and high-flying aircraft gave investigators brief glimpses above the atmosphere, but what was needed was a large

stable orbiting platform on which they could place their telescopes, photometers,

and other measuring devices. The Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) was

one of the first long-range projects planned by NASA's Office of Space Sciences.

Octagonal in shape with solar paddies, the aluminum OAO spacecraft was

precisely stabilized and had a hollow cylindrical central tube in which experiments

could be housed. The spacecraft was designed to point in any direction with an accuracy of 1 minute of arc during the observation of an individual star, with the accuracy being increased to 0.1 second of arc using sensors associated with the experiment instrumentation. Of the two OAOs launched during NASA's first 10 years, the

first failed one and a half days into the mission because of a power system malfunction. The loss of this complex, expensive observatory without any data having been
260 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

returned led to an extensive review of the spacecraft's design and some systems

modifications. OAO 2 was a highly successful spacecraft, providing an abundance

of information on ultraviolet, gamma ray, x-ray, and infrared radiation, on the

structure of stars, and on the distribution and density of the interstellar medium.

A physics and astronomy project, the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory was

managed at NASA Headquarters by Allan H. Sures from June 1963 until early 1966,

when C. Dixon Ashworth took this position (Ashworth managed both OAO and

OSO from December 1967). While personnel at Ames Research Center prepared the

preliminary engineering specifications for OAO, technical management of the flight

projects was assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center in February 1960 (see the

following tables for project managers). Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.,

Bethpage, New York, was the prime contractor for OAO. Major.subsystem contractors included General Electric, Radio Corporation of America, IBM, Westinghouse,

and Kollsman Instrument Corp. The scientific investigators were recruited from

Goddard, Lockheed, MIT, the University of Wisconsin, and the Smithsonian

Astrophysical Observatory.

For more information, see Alfred Rosenthal and William R. Corliss, Encyclopedia of Satellites and Sounding Rockets, August 1959 to December 1969

(Beltsville, MD: GSFC, 1970); Corliss, Scientific Satellites, NASA SP-133

(Washington, 1967); Robert S. Rudney, "A Preliminary History of the OAO Program (1966-1968)," NASA HHN-115, Sept. 1971, prepared for NASA Historical

Off.; GSFC, The Observatory Generation of Satellites, Session H of a Special

Astronautics Symposium Held at the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, December 27,

1962, during the 129th Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Washington, 1963); and James E. Kupperian, Jr., and

Robert R. Zeimer, "Satellite Astronomy," International Science and Technology

(March 1962): 48-56.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 261

Table 3-110.

Chronology of Orbiting Astronomical Observatories (OAO) Development and Operations

Date Event

May 15, 1958

Oct. 1958

March 1959

April 1959

Dec. 1, 1959

Feb. 1960

Apr. 1960-

Sept. 1960

Oct. 10, 1960

Oct. 1960-

June 1961

April 1961

Jan. 1962

Aug. 7, 1962

Oct. 29, 1962

Feb. 24, 1964

June 16, 1964

April 9, 1965

May 12, 1965

In a preliminary study, the staff at the Langley Memorial Aeronautical

Laboratory (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) suggested that

the new civilian space agency consider stabilized and oriented astronomical

observatories as a long-range goal with practical equipment being provided

by 1960.

NASA established a working group under Nancy Roman to study the

feasibility of launching large orbiting astronomical observatories.

Stable orbiting platforms with telescopes to make observations in the infrared, optical, ultraviolet, and x-ray regions of the spectrum beyond earth's

obscuring atmosphere were proposed as part of the space sciences long-range

flight program.

An OAO project briefing was held at NASA Hq. for potential industry participants to provide further information on requirements and planning (150

attendees).

Technical management of OAO was assigned to the Goddard Space Flight

Center.

Having circulated OAO design specifications, NASA evaluated the 11 proposals received for an OAO spacecraft. Experiments suitable' for an OAO

were under way at Goddard, Princeton, the University of Wisconsin,

Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, and the University of Michigan

Observatory.

NASA announced plans to negotiate with Grumman Aircraft Engineering

Corp. for a contract for a 1360-kilogram OAO $23 million contract

estimate).

Grumman negotiated four subsystem development contracts: General Electric, spacecraft stabilization and control; Radio Corp. of America, television

scanner; IBM, data processing; and Westinghouse Electric Corp., ground

operating equipment.

Booz-Allen Company was awarded a contract for a study of an independent

NASA reliability control program for OAO.

Kollsman Instrument Div. was awarded a contract for the primary mirror for

the OAO telescope.

GE announced that the control system for OAO had completed its first

simulated flight tests.

Three photometers developed for OA0 were flight-tested on an Aerobee

sounding rocket launched from Wallops Island.

General Dynamics/Astronautics was awarded a contract for the OAO shroud

system.

NASA ordered a third OAO from Grumman and took an option for two

more ($20 million, estimated contract for one spacecraft; $50 million for

three).

Grumman was given the go-ahead to convert its prototype OAO into a flightready spacecraft to be called OAO-A2.

Grumman was awarded a contract for a fourth OAO.
262 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-110.

Chronology of Orbiting Astronomical Observatories (OAO) Development and Operations

(Continued)

Date Event

April 8, 1966

April 21, 1966

Dec. 23, 1966

Jan.-June 1967

April 30, 1968

Dec. 7, 1968

0.40 1 was launched successfully and placed in circular orbit. After 1 1⁄2 days

(22 orbits), the spacecraft power system failed when the battery overheated.

No data were returned.

A NASA review board was established to examine observatory-class

satellites.

NASA announced that Atlas-Centaur would replace Atlas-Agena D as the

launch vehicle for future OAO missions; it would be capable of boosting 40

percent more payload.

OAO-A2 underwent extensive systems redesign to prepare it for flight; the

launch date was slipped from 1967 to late 1968.

NASA ordered two additional Centaur rockets from General Dynamics

Astronautics for OAO.

OAO-2 was launched successfully and placed in orbit. All systems and experiments functioned as planned.

Table 3-111.

OAO 1 (OAO-A1) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

April 8, 1966 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

1769

Octagonal with 6 solar panels

3.1 × 5.2

Width with solar panels extended, 6.4

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert R. Ziemer

James E. Kupperian

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., prime

General Electric Co., stabilization and control subsystem

Radio Corp. of America, TV scanner

IBM, data processing

Westinghouse Electric Corp., ground operating equipment

Kollsman Instrument Corp., primary mirror in OAO telescope

Make precise telescopic observations above the atmosphere; of special interest were

emission and absorption characteritics of the sun, stars, planets, rebulae, and interplanetary and interstellar media in the infrared, ultraviolet, x-ray, and gamma ray

regions of the spectrum.

Broad-band photometric studies of ultraviolet, University of Wisconsin

Gamma ray telescope, MIT

X-ray proportional counter, Lockheed

Gamma ray telescope, GSFC
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-111.

OAO 1 (OAO-A1) Characteristics (Continued)

263

Results:

Remarks:

Spacecraft failed after 1V2days (22 orbits) because of battery malfunction; when the

battery overheated the power supply system would not respond to ground commands to switch over to the two backup batteries; no data received.

As a result of this failure, 0.40 2"s power system was redesigned. OAO l's loss

forced NASA's managers to function as a review team as they scrutinized and

reworked a design they had previously judged to be satisfactory.

Table 3-112.

OAO 2 (OAO-A2) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

' Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 7, 1968 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

1995.8

Octagonal with 8 solar panels

3.1 x 5.2

Width with solar panels extended, 6.4

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., prime

For subsystem contractors, see 0.40 1 (table 3-111).

Survey ultraviolet spectra and helium content of hot, young stars; study ultraviolet

spectra of giant stars; study distribution and density of interstellar gas.

Ultraviolet photometer package, University of Wisconsin, Smithsonian

Astrophysical Observatory Celescope (4305mm telescopes with TV imaging

photometers)

All systems and experiments functioned as planned, providing among other things a

detailed map of a significant portion of the celestial sphere; spacecraft was turned

off on February 13, 1973, after the experiments' power system failed, but the

spacecraft had far exceeded its expected lifetime.

Changes in the design resulted in less dependence on ground commands, better experiment efficiency, and an ability to work around component failures.
264 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Orbiting Geophysical Observatories

NASA's early scientific satellites were necessarily tailor-made to suit the

available launch vehicles and the scientific instruments required for the specific investigations. Besides leading to a variety of configurations, this practice was not a

particularly economic way to build spacecraft. Engineers at the Goddard Space

Flight Center in 1959-1960 suggested a standardized satellite design into which many

experiments could be incorporated (called the "streetcar" principle); the same basic

satellite could be used for several different missions. Since the satellites could be

fabricated independently of the scientific instruments and on more of a massproduction scale, it would save time and money. As geophysical studies covered

such a broad range of investigations (atmospheric composition, solar emissions,

radio astronomy) and required many different measurements, this field would be

well served by such a versatile spacecraft.

Called the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO), the large spacecraft could

house 20 or more experiments. Scientists also had their choice of orbits-polar

(POGO), or highly eccentric, or eliptic (EGO). This made observations possible near

earth or in cislunar space. Three-axis stabilization of the .9 x .9 x 1.8-meter OGO

could accommodate investigations that demanded precise orientation for long

periods. Several booms and antennas added to the craft's versatility. Unfortunately,

all five OGO spacecraft flown in the agency's first decade encountered attitude control problems, and the spacecraft spun about their axes instead of orbiting in a stable

manner. This seriously degraded or reduced to zero the data available from many of

the experiments. OGO 6 flown in 1969, however, was highly successful. Despite

their technical problems, OGO 1 through 5 sent back over a million hours of data

that helped scientists gain a broader understanding of earth and earth-sun relationships and made precise measurements of magnetic and electric fields, cosmic rays,

and solar particles.

OGO, a physics and astronomy program, was managed at NASA Headquarters

by C. Dixon Ashworth from mid-1963 until mid-1966, by Marcel T. Aucremanne

until September 1968, and then by Thomas L. Fischetti, who acted as manager

through the remainder of the agency's first 10 years. Goddard monitored the prime

contractor, TRW of Redondo Beach, California, and the scientific investigators, in

addition to integrating the many scientific instruments into the spacecraft (see

following tables for project managers). Major subcontractors included Gulton Industries, battery cells; Minneapolis-Honeywell, gyroscopes; American Standard,

Advanced Technology Div., horizon scanners; ITT Industrial Products Div., power

converters; Bendix Eclipse Pioneer Div., reaction wheels; Hoffman Electronics,

solar cells; Kinetics, static inverters; RCA, Astro-Electronics Div., tape recorders;

and Ampex, tape transporters.

Although the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory program was not as successful

nor as efficient as its initiators had planned, it rewarded most of the scientists involved with a steady stream of significant measurements and observations. OGO

also represented a significant step in the evolution of satellites-from tailor-made

one-instrument packages to automated orbiting laboratories.

The best single source on OGO, especially concerning the scientific instruments,

is John E. Jackson and James I. Vette, OGO Program Summary, NASA SP-7601

(Washington, 1975). It has an extensive bibliography.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 265

Table 3-113.

Chronology of Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO)

Development and Operations

Date Event

May 15, 1958

April 1959

Mid-1959-

mid-1960

July 1960

Aug. 30, 1960

Dec. 21, 1960

April 1961

Dec. 19, 1961

Aug. 3, 1962

Dec. 1963

April 1964

June 1964

Sept. 5, 1964

Oct. 14, 1965

Oct. 24, 1965

Jan. 24, 1966

April 1966

June 6, 1966

July 27, 1966

Aug. 1966

July 28, 1967

In a preliminary study, the staff at the Langley Memorial Aeronautical

Laboratory (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) suggested that

the new civilian space agency consider a large satellite-platform with stable

orientation for geophysical meausurements as a long-range goal.

An orbiting observatory was recognized as a long-range flight project by

NASA's Office of Space Science for measuring particle flux, solar radiation,

and magnetic and electric fields.

Personnel at the Goddard Space Flight Center did preliminary design work

on a new-generation satellite with a standard structure into which many experiments could be integrated from mission to mission.

Eccentric and polar orbit missions were considered for ionospheric physics

investigations.

A bidder's conference was held at Goddard for 17 companies interested in

constructing an Orbiting Geophysical Observatory, a 450-kilogram-class

satellite.

NASA issued a letter contract to Space Technology Laboratories, Inc. (later

a division of TRW) to proceed with preliminary analytical and design studies

for three OGOs ($15 million).

NASA and STL agreed on a 400-kilogram box-like structure for OGO with

movable solar panels and extendable booms.

NASA selected 19 experiments for OGO-A.

TRW received a definitive contract for OGO.

Experiments installed in the first spacecraft underwent environmental

testing.

NASA began negotiations with TRW to provide a fourth and fifth OGO.

OGO-A was transported to the Kennedy Space Center for final assembly,

checkout, and integration with the launch vehicle.

OGO 1 was launched into eccentric orbit, but an attitude control system

failure left the spacecraft in a fixed position.

OGO 2 was launched into polar orbit.

OGO 2 ceased operations after its attitude control system gas supply was

depleted; the spacecraft was put into a spin mode with some of its experiments still working.

NASA began contract negotiations with TRW for a sixth OGO.

OGO l's batteries failed, leaving three experiments operational.

O(70 3 was launched into eccentric orbit.

OGO 3 was placed into a fixed spin mode after its attitude control system

failed.

The House Science and Astronautics Committee on NASA Oversight began

inquiries into spacecraft failures, including OGO 1, 2, and 3.

OGO 4 was launched into polar orbit; attitude control problems detected

after orbital insertion were corrected by ground control.
266 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-113.

Chronology of Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO)

Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Aug. 8, 1967

Sept. 19, 1967

Nov. 1967

Jan. 29, 1968

March 4, 1968

NASA modified TRW's fixed-price contract to a fixed-price-incentive contract.

All four OGOs transmitted data simultaneously for the first time.

OGO 2 was shut down and put into a standby mode.

Funds were approved for one additional OGO; after a proposed sixth mission

the program would be phased out.

OGO 5 was launched into eccentric orbit.

Table 3-114.

OGO 1 (OGO-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Type of orbit:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Areas of

investigation:

Number of

experiments:

Results:

Sept. 5, 1964 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

487

Rectangular parallelepiped with 2 6.7-meter and 4 1.8-meter booms for experiment

sensors, plus several antennas and 2 solar paddles

.9 x .9 x 1.8

Length with booms extended, 18

Width with solar panels extended and experiment booms, 15

Solar panels, 1.83 x 2.29

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Eccentric (EGO)

In orbit

GSFC

Wilfred E. Scull

George H. Ludwig

Space Technology Laboratories (later a div. of TRW), prime, plus 10 major subcontractors

In a highly eccentric orbit, make measurements and observations in earth's atmosphere and magnetosphere and in interplanetary space beyond earth's magnetic

field.

Cosmic rays, radio astronomy, solar emissions, and composition of interplanetary

medium

20

The immediate failure of 2 booms to deploy properly caused the unscheduled use of

attitude control gas, leaving the spacecraft in a fixed position. Because of this orientation, solar aspect was_periodically unfavorable, resulting in a regular low-power

period of 6 weeks every 4V2 months. Although 6 of the 20 experiments could not

function as planned, the data returned were judged to be valuable. Experiments

were turned off November 25, 1969.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-115.

OGO 2 (OGO-C) Characteristics

267

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Type of orbit:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Areas of

investigation:

Number of

experiments:

Results:

Oct. 14, 1965 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Agena D (TAT)

520

Rectangular parallelepiped with 2 6.7-meter and 4 1.8-meter booms for experiment

sensors, plus several antennas and 2 solar paddles

.9 × .9 x 1.8

Length with booms extended, 18

Width with solar panels extended and experiment booms, 15

Solar panels, 1.83 x 2.29

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

Polar (POGO)

Sept. 17, 1981

GSFC

Wilfred E.Scull

N. W. Spencer

TRW, prime, plus 10 major subcontractors

Take geophysical measurements of the near-earth environment during a period of

low solar activity to study earth-sun relationships.

Particles and fields, solar emissions, and magnetic field measurements (as part of International Quiet Sun Year World Magnetic Survey)

20

Because of difficulties in maintaining earth-lock with the horizon scanners, the attitude control gas supply was exhausted by October 23, and the spacecraft began to

spin, rendering five experiments useless and degrading six others. Two experiments

had failed soon after launch. Battery failure occurred by April 1966, leaving eight

experiments operational. Before the spacecraft was shut down and put on standby in

November 1967, it had produced more than 72 000 hours of data. Operations were

terminated on November 1, 1971.
268 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-116.

OGO 3 (OGO-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Type of orbit:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Areas of

investigation:

Number of

experiments:

Results:

June 6, 1966 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

515

Rectangular parallelepiped with 2 6.7-meter and 4 1.8-meter booms for experiment

sources, plus several antennas and 2 solar paddies

.9 × .9 x 1.8

Length with booms extended, 18

Width with solar panels extended and experimen_t booms, !5

Solar panels, 1.83 x 2.29

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

Eccentric (EGO)

In orbit

GSFC

Wilfred E. Scull

G. H. Ludwig

TRW, prime, plus 10 major subcontractors

Make correlated measurements within the magnetosphere and interplanetary space.

Micrometeorites, optical and radio emissions, ionosphere, magnetic fields, trapped

radiation, plasma, and cosmic rays

21

Maintained planned 3-axis stabilization for 46 days; a failure in the attitude control

system in July 1966 forced the spacecraft into a permanent spin mode. By June

1969, data acquisition was limited to half of the orbit. Before operations were

suspended in December 1969, 15 of the 21 experiments were still operating with

more than 375 000 hours of data returned. Operations were terminated on February

29, 1972.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-117.

OGO 4 (OGO-D) Characteristics

269

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Type of orbit:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Areas of

investigation:

Number of

experiments:

Results:

July 27, 1967 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Agena D (TAT)

562

Rectangular parallelepiped with 2 6.7-meter and 4 1.8-meter booms for experiment

sensors, plus several antennas and 2 solar paddles

.9 x .9 × 1.8

Length with booms extended, 18

Width with solar panels extended and experiment booms, 15

Solar panels, 1.83 x 2.29

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

Polar (POGO)

Aug. 16, 1972

GSFC

Wilfred E. Scull

N. W. Spencer

TRW, prime, plus 10 major subcontractors

Take geophysical measurements in the near-earth environment and study earth-sun

relationships during a period of increased solar activity.

Cosmic rays, magnetic field, radio measurements, and the atmosphere-ionosphere

20

An attitude control problem detected after orbital insertion was corrected by ground

control, and 3-axis stabilization was maintained for 18 months, after which the tape

recorder failed. The spacecraft was placed in a spin-stabilized mode in January 1969

and put on standby status in October 1969 with 3 reactivations in 1970 and 1971.

Operations were terminated on September 27, 1971.
270 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-118.

OGO 5 (OGO-EB) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Type of orbit:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Areas of

investigation:

Number of

experiments:

Results:

March 4, 1968 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

611

Rectangular parallelepiped with 2 6.7-meter and 4 1.8-meter booms for experiment

sensors, plus several atennas and 2 solar paddles

.9 x .9 x 1.8

Length with booms extended, 18

Width with solar panels extended and experiment booms, 15

Solar panels, 1.83 × 2.29

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

Eccentric (EGO)

In orbit

GSFC

Wilfred E. Scull

J. P. Heppner

TRW, prime, with 10 major subcontractors

Conduct many diversified geophysical experiments to obtain a better understanding

of earth as a planet; study earth-sun relationships.

Particles and fields, radio astronomy, and solar emissions

25

All systems operated normally for 41 months. The attitude control system failed in

August 1971, and the spacecraft was placed on standby mode the following October,

with a period of reactivation in 1972. Provided first observations of the hydrogen

cloud surrounding earth and first detailed measurements of electric fields at the

shock and magnetosphere boundaries. Most successful OGO to date. Operations

were terminated on July 14, 1972.

Sounding Rockets

The sounding rocket story begins long before NASA's organization in 1958. As

early as July 1929, Robert H. Goddard included two measuring instruments on one

of his test rockets, and in 1933 Mikhail K. Tikhonoravov, a Russian, launched a

liquid-fuel sounding rocket. At last, scientists could send their instruments into and

above earth's atmosphere to make in situ measurements. Early investigators had

taken their measuring devices to high mountains and exploited high-flying balloons

when they became available, but this still limited their area of study to about 40

kilometers, the maximum balloon altitude. But rockets, which could surpass that

altitude several times, could be instrumented and fired along a vertical or nearly vertical trajectory, taking measurements on the way up and again as the rocket fell back

to earth (a vertical profile).

The further refinement of small rockets after World War II offered scientists

vehicles that could carry a few hundred kilograms of instruments to altitudes exceding 250 kilometers for several minutes of observation time above the atmosphere.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 271

As scientists learned to build compact, sturdy instruments, rocket designers further

improved vehicle control systems and extended the altitudes rockets could reach by

increasing their power. Hundreds of rocket soundings gave specialists clues about

the composition of the ever-changing upper atmosphere and ionosphere, and crude

pictures of weather patterns taken of high altitudes hinted at the practical value

these vehicles would have. But it was during the International Geophysical Year

(IGY), July 1957 to December 1958, that the first "concerted systematic application

of sounding rockets to upper atmosphere and space research" took place. The U.S.

alone launched 200, with other countries firing hundreds more. High-altitude wind

patterns were measured, along with pressure, density, and other parameters of the

atmosphere. Regions of electron densities were mapped and new theories about

earth's magnetic field established. Several kinds of solar emissions were studied, and

some limited micrometeoroid influx data were obtained. But this explosion of scientific information obtained from soundings was overshadowed by the introduction of

earth-orbiting satellites flown by the Soviet Union and the United States during the

IGY.

The advantages of satellites were obvious. They could stay in orbit for long

periods of time, reaching higher altitudes and giving investigators a look at the

geographical "big picture." But sounding rockets, though not as glamorous as

satellites or manned flights, continued to be popular, useful research tools. Sounding rockets were simpler than most satellites with fewer mechanical interfaces to

match. Because they could be mass produced and launched without lengthy preparations, there was a shorter lead time for the experimenter; he did not have to plan

years ahead for a sounding rocket flight as was often required for satellite payloads.

And sounding rockets were much less costly, allowing universities, private research

laboratories, and industries who could not afford multimillion-dollar satellites to

take advantage of space research. Finally, some investigations could be adapted

more easily to the brief flights of sounding rockets; also, satellites could not operate

below 250 kilometers, leaving this region to be investigated and measured by soundings.

When NASA came into being in 1958, some members of the Naval Research

Laboratory Rocket-Sonde Research Branch, formed in 1945 to develop small

rockets that could carry scientific instruments, were transferred to NASA and

assigned to the new Beltsville Space Center (called Goddard Space Flight Center

after 1959) in Maryland. This group formed the core of the agency's sounding rocket

team, and management of sounding projects became a permanent Goddard assignment. Within the space and satellite applications directorate at Goddard, sounding

rockets were part of the Spacecraft Integration and Sounding Rocket Division,

which was led by Robert C. Baumann (formerly part of NRL's Project Vanguard

team) during the center's first decade. He was assisted by Karl R. Medrow, head of

the sounding rocket branch. At NASA Headquarters from 1958 through 1961,

sounding rockets were under the purview of the Office of Space Flight Programs.

Morton J. Stoller was assistant director for satellites and sounding rocket programs

in 1960-1962. In a 1962 reorganization, William C. Spreen became chief of

meteorological soundings within the Office of Applications, and Spreen continued

to manage this part of the sounding program through various Headquarters

reorganizations. The scientific soundings were managed by the physics and

astronomy director. In mid-1963, John R. Holtz became program manager for Explorer and sounding rockets and remained in this post through 1968.
272 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Sounding rocket data contributed to many fields of investigation (see table

3-119), including aeronomy, biology, fields and particles, ionospheric and solar

physics, and astronomy. The investigators and their instruments came from a great

many places in the U.S. and from several foreign countries. Universities were well

represented, as were private and corporate laboratories that could make use of highaltitude research data. Japan, New Zealand, Australia, India, Pakistan, Israel, Germany, France, Argentina, and Brazil sponsored or participated in sounding rocket

experiments with NASA. Scientists at Goddard, of course, were the most frequent

users of small instrumented rockets. Besides soundings for scientific purposes, the

vehicles were also used to flight-test experiments or components that were due to fly

on satellites. And measurements of radiation taken by soundings supported Mercury

and Apollo manned missions. As rockets and instruments became more and more

sophisticated, the number of soundings increased-from 16 in 1959, to 93 in 1963,

to 174 in 1968.

The rockets NASA used for soundings from 1959 to 1968 were relatively simple

and very small when compared to standard launch vehicles used to boost satellites

and manned spacecraft. The Aerobee family, developed by Aerojet in the late 1940s,

was used extensively to carry a variety of payloads weighing up to 227 kilograms to a

maximum altitude of 483 kilometers. A series of all-solid-propellant sounding

rocket configurations using the Nike booster paired with an Apache, Asp, Cajun, or

Tomahawk upper stage sent hundreds of scientific payloads of up to 45 kilograms to

an altitude up to 322 kilometers. Other vehicles flown by NASA included the small

Arcas (meteorological soundings), the Astrobee 1500, the Canadian-built Black

Brant IV, the large Javelin and Journeyman (also called the Argo series), and the

British Skylark (see following tables for more information). All the slender rockets

had three or four stabilizing fins, but attitude control, telemetry, and recovery

systems varied from vehicle to vehicle.

Many sounding rockets were small and could be launched from any number of

ranges without long lead times or elaborate preparations. Some could even be

launched from ships, and the tiny Arcas was tube-launched. Launch facilities at

Wallops Island, Virginia, Fort Churchill (Canada), and White Sands, New Mexico,

were used most often by NASA; however, many soundings were launched from

other American ranges and from Puerto Rico, Brazil, Australia, Norway, Pakistan,

and Sweden. Rail launching was the method of firing required by most sounding

rockets.

For more information on the early history of American sounding rockets, see

Homer E. Newell, Jr., High Altitude Rocket Research (New York: Academic Press,

1953); and Newell, ed., Sounding Rockets (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). For a

look at NASA's sounding rocket program, see William R. Corliss, NASA Sounding

Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary, NASA SP-4401 (Washington, 1971);

Alfred Rosenthal and William R. Corliss, Encyclopedia of Satellites and Sounding

Rockets, August 1959 to December 1969 (Beltsville, MD: GSFC [1970]); and Rosenthai, Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Centel, NASA

SP-4301 (Washington, 1968), pp. 121-30, 181-202. (These three books have comprehensive lists of NASA sounding rocket missions.) For information on sounding

rocket launches at Wallops, see Joseph A. Shortal, A New Dimension; Wallops

Island Flight Test Range: The First Fifteen Years, NASA Ref. Pub. 1028

(Washington, 1978), pp. 541-614.
273

SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

T

I
274 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-119.

Number of Soundings by Field of Investigation

Year

lO-year

Discipline total

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

Aeronomy 5 10 21 30 35 51 45 31 28 31 287

Biology 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5

Energetic particles 0 16 1 0 2 16 15 14 11 21 96

Fields 0 2 3 0 1 9 13 5 12 12 57

Galactic astronomy 0 4 5 4 5 11 10 1 i 16 19 85

Ionospheric physics 4 8 10 14 27 22 46 25 20 21 197

Meteorology 0 5 13 14 11 34 53 59 57 48 294

Radio astronomy 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 7

Solar physics 0 4 1 2 6 1 5 9 10 12 50

Test and miscellaneous 7 11 14 13 6 7 2 3 6 7 76

Total 16 60 70 78 93 152 191 158 162 174 1154

From William R. Corliss, NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary, NASA SP-4401

(Washington, 1971), p. 146.

Table 3-120.

Sounding Rocket Projects Summary, 1959-1968

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 10-yr Success

Total (%)

Aerobee 4 8 2 14 92

Aerobee 150/150A 4 11 8 20 30 26 29 29 35 37 229 94

Aerobee 300/300A 3 2 1 2 2 1 11 100

Aerobee 350 1 1 2 100

Arcas 13 9 16 6 44 95

Arcon 6 6 100

Astrobee 1500 1 1 2 1 5 80

Black Brant IV 2 2 100

Iris 2 1 1 4 75

Javelin 1 5 8 2 2 7 7 6 9 4 51 94

Journeyman 1 2 1 1 2 7 100

Nike-Apache 5 11 36 76 92 57 48 50 375 98

Nike-Asp 5 10 8 3 1 27 63

Nike-Cajun 24 23 37 20 38 43 43 35 38 301 97

Nike-Tomahawk 3 12 15 30 60 98

Skylark 4 4 100

1 2 1 2 6 12 83 Special (other) ....

Totals 16 60 70 78 93 152 191 158 162 174 1154

From Alfred Rosenthal and William R. Corliss, Encyclopedia of Satellites and Sounding Rockets,

August 1959 to December 1969 (Beltsville, MD: GSFC [1970]), p. 320.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-121.

ChronologyofSoundingRocketsDevelopmentandOperations

275

Date Event

1919

July 17, 1929

1933

Dec. 1934

1935

Jan. 1944

1944-1945

July 1945

Sept. 26, 1945

Dec. 17, 1945

Jan. 16, 1946

Feb. 22, 1946

April 16, 1946

May 17, 1946

Aug. 1946

Nov. 24, 1947

May 3, 1949

1952-1953

Robert H. Goddard suggested in A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes

that rockets could be used for upper atmosphere research.

An aneroid barometer and a thermometer were included on a test of one of

Goddard's rockets, which attained an altitude of 52.1 meters.

Mikhail K. Tikhonoravov launched an instrumented liquid-fueled sounding

rocket in the Soviet Union.

The A-2 rocket, a predecessor to the V-2, was launched by the German

Army.

Russian F. A. Tsander designed an instrumented rocket that reached an

altitude of 11 kilometers.

The U.S. Army Signal Corps expressed a need for a high-altitude sounding

rocket that could carry 11.3 kilograms of meteorological instruments.

Germany used the V-2 (A-4) rocket as a weapon during World War II; it

could carry 907 kilograms of explosives to an altitude of about 322

kilometers.

Live tests of the Baby Wac (Corporal) being designed by the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory for upper atmosphere research were performed.

The first launch of a Wac Corporal was successful; it reached an altitude of

70 kilometers.

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Rocket-Sonde Research Branch was

formed to develop a sounding rocket to carry scientific instmments.

An informal meeting was held at NRL to discuss the possibility of working

with the Army Ordnance Department in implementing a scientific research

program to use with the captured German V-2s, which the Army would

launch from White Sands, New Mexico. After agreeing to cooperate with the

Army, the group established a V-2 Upper Atmosphere Research Panel on

February 27, which would include representatives from government, industry, and universities.

Aerojet Engineering submitted a proposal to the Applied Physics Laboratory

of Johns Hopkins to develop a sounding rocket capable of carrying a payload

weighing from 136 to 680 kilograms to an altitude of 182 880 meters.

First U.S. launch of a V-2. A total of 67 V-2s were fired from White Sands as

part of the Hermes program.

Aerojet was awarded a contract for 20 liquid-fuel rockets; 15 would go to the

Applied Physics Laboratory and 5 to NRL; the Aerojet rocket was called

Aerobee.

The Navy awarded contracts to Glenn L. Martin Co. and Reaction Motors

for the construction of a rocket called Viking designed by NRL; NRL's

rocket was capable of launching a payload larger than Aerobee's. The

original contract called for 10 Vikings.

First full-scale Aerobee launch took place.

Launch of Viking l from White Sands.

Aerojet developed an improved rocket, the Aerobee-Hi, for the Air Force

and Navy.
276 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-121.

Chronology of Sounding Rockets Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

1953

Nov. 19, 1953

1954

April 8, 1955

June 20, 1956

July 6, 1956

July 1957-

Dec. 1958

Feb. 18, 1958

Oct. 25, 1958

Dec. 28, 1958

July 1959

July 22, 1960

March 1, 1965

June 18, 1965

Dec. 10, 1967

May 7, 1968

NACA's Pilotless Aircraft Research Division mated a Nike I guided missile to

the Deacon motor to form the Nike-Deacon configuration, which could

launch 23 kilograms to an altitude of 111 kilometers.

First firing of a Nike-Deacon took place.

The University of Michigan's Aeronautical Engineering Department was

funded by the Air Force to convert the Nike-Deacon into a sounding rocket.

First launch of a Nike-Deacon took place.

First firing of the Cajun motor took place. When the Cajun was combined

with the Nike I guided missile, the resulting rocket could lift 23 kilograms to

167 kilometers.

First launch of a Nike-Cajun took place.

During the International Geophysical Year (IGY), the U.S. launched 210

sounding rockets (mainly Aerobee His -the improved version of the Aerobee

150-and Nike-Cajuns).

First firing of the improved Aerobee (Aerobee 150) took place. It was capable

of launching 18 kilograms to 160 kilometers.

First firing of the Aerobee 300 took place, an Aerobee 150 with a motor from

the Sparrow missile.

Some members of NRL's Rocket-Sonde Branch were transferred to NASA

and assigned to the Beltsville Space Center (later called the Goddard Space

Flight Center).

First firings of the Arcas rocket developed by the Army and the Navy took

place.

First firing of the Iris rocket designed by NRL (pre-NASA design) took place.

It could send 45 kilograms to 320 kilometers.

NASA launched its first small Arcas rocket.

First launch of the Aerobee 350 sounding rocket took place.

NASA launched a sounding rocket (an Aerobee 150) equipped with the solar

pointing Aerobee rocket control system (SPARCS) developed at Ames

Research Center.

NASA launched its first British Black Brant IV.
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Vanguard

Project Vanguard was initiated in the mid-1950s by the Naval Research

Laboratory (NRL) in response to interest in orbiting an artificial satellite, as expressed by the international scientific community and the military. In September

1955, NRL was given official authorization by the Department of Defense to build a

satellite and launch vehicle, both to be called Vanguard, for use during the International Geophysical Year (IGY), July 1957 through December 1958. At that early

date, before the final configuration of the Vanguard satellite had been determined,

James Van Allen, George Ludwig, and others at the State University of Iowa submitted a plan for a cosmic ray observation experiment weighing about 23 kilograms

for an IGY satellite.

In November 1955, NRL announced that its 10-kilogram spherical satellite

could accommodate only a 1-kilogram scientific package. NRL scientists proposed

to conduct basic environmental studies with instruments capable of measuring surface and internal temperatures, surface erosion, and internal pressures with the first

Vanguards. Another prospective investigator wanted to determine the variation in

the intensity of solar Lyman-alpha radiation during each revolution of the satellite.

In February 1957, a panel of scientists led by Van Allen suggested that the first of

the four Vanguards planned for the IGY carry the equipment for the environmental

studies and the radiation experiment. The second would house a scaled-down version of Van Allen's cosmic ray observer and one other experiment. There were many

worthwhile proposals for investigations from which to choose.

Delays in perfecting the Vanguard launch vehicle forced NRL to readjust the

launch schedule for the first mission several times. The Soviet Union in the meantime, orbited its first Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957. In response to Sputnik 1

and Vanguard's delays, the Department of Defense gave the Army authority to proceed with all haste in launching its proposed satellite (see table 3-71). On January 3,

1958, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency launched Explorer 1 with a modified

Redstone missile. Less than two months later on March 17, the 1.8-kilogram

Vanguard 1 also was successfully boosted into orbit.

In October 1958, Project Vanguard and the NRL team responsible for the

satellite and launch vehicle were transferred to NASA. The new agency oversaw the

launch of Vanguard 2 on February 17, 1959, which did not achieve the desired orbit

but transmitted data for 18 days, the unsuccessful launches of two Vanguards in

April and May 1959, and the successful Vanguard 3, a 23.7-kilogram scientific

payload orbited on September 18, 1959.

When Project Vanguard and the NRL team were transferred en masse to

NASA, the project was assigned to the new Beltsville Space Center (later called Goddard Space Flight Center) in Maryland. John P. Hagen, head of the project at NRL

since 1955, continued in this position as project director at Goddard.

For a chronology of events, see table 1-90, which deals primarily with the

development of the Vanguard launch vehicle. Vanguard 2 and 3 are described in the

following tables. The Minitrack tracking network devised for Vanguard is discussed

in chapter 5. For further information, see Constance M. Green and Milton Lomask,

Vanguard: A History, NASA SP-4202 (Washington, 1970).
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-124.

Vanguard 2 Characteristics

287

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project director:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Feb. 17, 1959 (ETR)

Vanguard

9.75

Spherical

Diameter, .51

Hg batteries

In orbit

GSFC

John P. Hagen

Record cloud formations over the surface of earth by means of photo cells.

Cloud cover, U.S. Army Signal R&D Lab.

A wobbling motion of the satellite initiated by the launch vehicle's third stage, which

reignited and bumped the satellite, made it impossible to interpret the cloud cover

data returned. Transmissions stopped on March 7, 1959.

Table 3-125.

Vanguard 3 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project director:

Objectives:

Experiments,

r_sponsible

institution:

Results:

Sept. 18, 1959 (ETR)

Vanguard

22.7

Spherical

Diameter, .51

AgZn batteries

In orbit

GSFC

John P. Hagen

Measure earth's magnetic field, x-rays from the sun, and environmental conditions

in space.

Magnetometer, GSFC

Solar x-ray, NRL

Environmental measurements, GSFC

Micrometeroid detectors, GSFC

Transmitted data for 85 days, providing a comprehensive survey of magnetic fields,

a detailed location of the lower edges of the Van Allen Belt, and an accurate count

of micrometeorite impacts; the satelfite was put into orbit with the third stage.
288 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Other Physics and Astronomy Projects

In addition to Explorer, OAO, OSO, OGO, Vanguard, and sounding rockets,

NASA sponsored several other small physics and astronomy projects.

The agency attempted to orbit two Beacon 3.66-meter inflatable spheres to

study atmospheric density in 1958 and 1959. A cylindrical shell housed the folded

Mylar satellite before it was to be released and filled with nitrogen. An October 22,

1958, launch was attempted by a Juno I, but failed when the upper stages of the

vehicle separated prematurely, and an August 14, 1959, try with a Juno II was met

with booster and attitude control system malfunctions. A third Beacon (S-66), of

another configuration, also failed in 1964 (table 3-138). The early Beacons were

under the project direction of Langley Research Center, with support from the Jet

Propulsion Laboratory; the 1964 attempt was sponsored by Goddard Space Flight

Center. NASA did orbit four balloon-like satellites as Explorer 9, 19, 24, and 39

(tables 3-75, 3-85, 3-90, 3-104). The two successful Beacon-Explorers (Explorer 22

and 27) were ionospheric investigations; they were not balloon-shaped (tables 3-88,

3-92). (See also Echo communications satellite.)

In 1961, the Scout launch vehicle boosted two probes, P-21 and P-21A, into

suborbital trajectories. They provided data on the densities of the electron field and

radiowave propagation (tables 3-135, 3-136).

Geodetic earth-orbiting satellites (GEOS) were also part of the physics and

astronomy program. See Explorer 29 and 36 (tables 3-94, 3-101) for information on

GEOS 1 and 2. For PAGEOS 1, a 30.5-meter balloon satellite was used as a tracking

beacon for geodesy experiments, see table 3-137. For a discussion on geodetic

satellites, see elsewhere in this chapter.

During its first 10 years of operation, NASA cooperated with the governments

of many foreign countries-setting up NASA tracking stations around the world,

launching scientific or applications payloads for countries that did not have the

technology or adequate vehicles and launching facilities, incorporating the experiments of foreign scientists on NASA flights, collaborating on sounding rocket

programs, and sharing the data returned from American experiments. Another area

of cooperation was the international satellite program. The first joint project

culminated in the launching of Ariel 1 in April 1962, a United States-United Kingdom venture, followed by Ariel 2 and 3 in 1964 and 1967 (tables 3-128, 3-129,

3-130). The Canadian Alouette 1 and 2 were launched by NASA in 1962 and 1965

(tables 3-126, 3-127). San Marco 1 and 2 were put into orbit for Italy in 1964 and

1967 (tables 3-139, 3-140). NASA orbited FR-1 for France in 1965 (table 3-133). In

May 1967, NASA attempted to launch the first satellite designed and built by the

European Space Research Organization (ESRO),* but the solar astronomy-cosmic

ray investigator (ESRO 2A) failed to achieve orbit because the Scout vehicle's third

stage malfunctioned. A second attempt was successful. ESRO 2B (also called IRIS)

was orbited in May 1968 (table 3-132). A third European satellite, ESRO 1 (also

called Aurorae), was lauched by NASA in October 1968, and a fourth, HEOS 1,

capable of sampling the interplanetary medium, was sent to its eccentric orbit by the

United States in December 1968 (tables 3-131, 3-134).

*The 10 members of ESRO were Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,

Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 289

Table 3-126.

Alouette 1 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager,

scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Sept. 28, 1962 (WTR)

Thor-Agena B

144.7

Oblate spheroid

Diameter, 1.1

Height, .86

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

John E. Jackson

De Haviland Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication (contract with Canadian Defence Research Board)

Measure electron density distribution in the ionosphere and study for one year the

variations of electron density distribution with time of day and latitude under varying magnetic auroral conditions; obtain galactic noise measurements; study flux of

energetic particles and investigate whistlers (VLF).

Topside sounder, Defence Research Telecon Establishment (Can.)

Energetic particle counters, Defence Research Telecon Estab.

VLF receiver, National Research Council (Can.)

Cosmic noise receiver, Defence Research Telecon Estab.

All experiments operated as planned with excellent data return; still available for use

in 1970.

Joint NASA-Canadian Defence Research Board project; first spacecraft designed

and built by a country other than the U.S. or USSR.
290 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-127.

Alouette 2 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 29, 1965 (WTR)

Thor-Agena B

146.5

Oblate spheroid

Diameter, 1.07

Height, .86

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Evart D. Nelson

John E. Jackson

De Haviland Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication (contract with Canadian Defense Research Board)

To sound the topside of the ionosphere; continuation of the mission started by

Alouette 1.

Topside sounder, Defence Research Telecon Establishment (Can.)

Galactic and solar radio noise receiver, Defence Research Telecon Estab.

VLF receiver, Defence Research Telecon Estab.

Energetic particle detectors, Naval Research Laboratory

Electrostatic probe, GSFC

Excellent data return; still available for use in 1970.

Joint NASA-Canadian Defence Research Board project (known as 1SIS-International Satellites for Ionospheric Studies). Alouette 2 was launched with Explorer 31

(table 3-96).
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 291

Table 3-128.

Ariel 1 (UK-I) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientists:

UK project

manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

April 26, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

59.9

Cylindrical with a spherical section at each end, plus 4 solar paddles and 2

1.22-meter booms

Cylinder, .27 x .58

Spheres, .14 x .13

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

May 24, 1976

GSFC

R. C. Baumann

R. E. Bourdeau

M. O. Robbins

Washington Technological Associates, spacecraft structure

Ionospheric investigations; measure electron density and temperature and the composition of positive ions; monitor ultraviolet radiation and x-rays; measure cosmic

rays.

Cosmic ray detector, Imperial College

Electron density plasma probe, University of Birmingham

Ionospheric composition probe, University College

Solar emissions measurement, University College

Electron temperature density probe, University College

X-ray counters and gages, University of Leicester

Much useful data on the ionosphere were returned, including information on a new

ion layer at an altitude of 725-800 kilometers; satellite was damaged by an American

atomic test in September 1962 but transmissions continued until June 1964; restarted

in August 1964 for two months.

Joint NASA-U.K. project; first international satellite.
292 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table 3-129.

Ariel 2 (UK-C) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

UK project

manager:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 18, 1967 (Wallops)

Scout

59.9

Cylindrical with a spherical section at each end, plus 4 solar paddles and 2

1.22-meter booms

Cylinder, .27 × .58

Spheres, .14 x .13

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Nov. 18, 1967

GSFC

Emil Hymoqitz

Lawrence Dunkelman

M. O. Robbins

Washington Technological Associates, spacecraft structure

Westinghouse Electric Corp., several satellite subsystems and integration

Measure vertical distribution of the ozone; study galactic radio noise; measure

micrometeroid flux.

Galactic radio noise receiver, University of Cambridge

Ozone photometers and spectrometer, Air Ministry

Micrometeoroid detectors, University of Manchester, Jodrdl Bank

Made a global survey of the ozone; designed for a longer life than Ariel 1.

Joint NASA-U.K. project
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-130.

Ariel 3 (UK-E) Characteristics

293

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

May 5, 1967 (WTR)

Scout

89.8

Cylindrical main body with a dome on top, plus 4 honeycomb vanes attached to the

bottom of the main structure

Diameter, .58

Height, .89

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Dec. 14, 1970

GSFC

R. C. Baurnann

Siegfried Bauer

Space Research Management Unit, UK Science Research Council assigned

spacecraft design and fabrication to Royal Aircraft Establishment

Measure vertical distribution of molecular oxygen in earth's atmosphere; map largescale R-F noise sources; investigate VLF radiation; measure ionozation density and

temperature above the F2 maximum; investigate terrestrial radio noise.

Ion chamber, Meteorological Office

Radio receivers, University of Manchester, University of Sheffield, and Radio

Research Station

R-F plasma probe, University of Birmingham

Much useful data on the upper atmosphere were returned; transmitter was turned

off after 28 months.

Joint NASA-U.K. project.
294 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-131.

ESRO 1 (Aurorae) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project director:

Project scientist:

Oct. 3, 1968 (WTR)

Scout

85.8

Cylindrical with truncated cones at each end

Diameter, .76

Overall height, 1.5

Span with booms extended, 2.4

Battery plus solar cells

June 26, 1970

GSFC

H. L. Eaker

L. H. Meredith

Project coordinator:J. Talentino

Objectives: To study the aurora borealis and other related phenomena of the polar ionosphere.

Experiments High-altitude particle experiments (5), Radio and Space Research Station (England),

responsible Kiruna Geophysical Observatory (Sweden), Technical University of Denmark,

institution: University of Bergen (Norway), Norwegian Space Committee

Auroral photometry, Norwegian Institute of Cosmic Physics

Ionospheric experiments (2), University College (England)

Results: Returned data as planned; outlived its expected lifetime of six months.

Remarks: Satellite designed and built by ESRO (European Space Research Organization) and

launched by NASA. ESRO 2B (IRIS) was launched before ESRO 1 (table 3-132).
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table 3-132.

ESRO 2B (IRIS) Characteristics

295

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientists:

May 16, 1968 (WTR)

Scout

74.2 (plus 14.9-kg separation system)

Cylindrical, 12-sided

Diameter, .76

Height, .85

NiCd battery plus solar cells

May 8, 1971

GSFC

H. L. Eaker

L. H. Meredith

Project coordinator:J. Talentino

Objectives: To conduct solar astronomy and cosmic ray studies.

Experiments Monitor of energetic particle flux, Imperial College (England)

responsible Solar and Van Allen Belt protons, Imperial College

institution: Solar and galactic alphas particles and protons, Imperial College

Primary cosmic ray electrons, University of Leeds (England)

Hard solar x-rays, University of Leicester, University of London (England)

Soft solar x-rays, University of Utrecht (the Netherlands)

Flux and energy spectrum of solar and galactic cosmic ray particles, Centre d'l_tudes

Nucleaires de Saclay (France)

Results:

Remarks:

Returned data as planned.

First launch of an ESRO-(European Space Research Organization-) designed-andbuilt spacecraft. The launch was accomplished by NASA for ESRO. IRIS, the

ESRO designation for the payload, stands for International Radiation Investigation

Satellite. ESRO 2B was launched before ESRO 1 (table 3-131). A previous attempt

on May 29, 1967 to launch a similar payload (ESRO 2A) failed when the Scout's

third stage malfunctioned.
296 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-133.

FR-1 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (In):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project director:

Project scientist:

Project director,

CNES:

Project director,

CNES:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 6, 1965 (WTR)

Scout

61

2 truncated octagonal cones joined by an octagonal central section

Diameter from corner to corner, .69

Height, 1.3

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In Orbit

GSFC

Samuel R. Stevens

R. W. Rochelle

Jean-Pierre Causse

Xavier Namy

To investigate the characteristics of very low frequency (VLF) electromagnetic wave

propagation in the ionosphere and to study irregularities in the distribution of

ionozation in the magnetosphere.

VLF experiment, electron density probe, rendezvous experiment with OGO 2 and

the Canadian Alouette satellites, Centre National d'I_tudes des Telecommunications

Returned data as planned.

Satellite designed and built by the French Centre National D'l_tudes Spatiales

(CNES) and launched by NASA.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-134.

HEOS 1 Characteristics

297

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientists:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 5, 1968 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

109

Flat cylinder with an axial boom

.75 x .13

AgCd batteries plus solar cells

Oct. 28, 1975

GSFC

R. J. Gross

B. Taylor

Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke GmbH (Munich), prime contractor to ESRO

Study interplanetary radiation, solar wind, and magnetic fields outside the

magnetosphere during the period of maximum solar activity.

Fluxgate magnetometer, Imperial College, University of London

Barium-copper oxide release, Max Plank Institute

Cerenkov scintillator telescope, Imperial College

Solid-state telescope, Imperial College and Centre D'l_tudes Nuclaires de Saclay

Electrostatic analyzer, University of Brussels

Radio telescope and Cerenkov counter, University of Milan and Centre D' l_tudes

Nuclaires de Saclay

Good data returned until October 1975; barium cloud experiment performed on

March 18, 1969.

HEOS stands for Highly Eccentric Orbit Satellite; launched for ESRO (European

Space Research Organization) by NASA.

Table 3-135.

P-21 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Oct. 19, 1961 (Wallops)

Scout

42.6

8-sided frustrum

.38 x .84

NiCd batteries

Oct. 19, 1961

GSFC

John E. Jackson

Siegfried J. Bauer

Measure electron densities; investigate radio wave propagation under daytime conditions.

Radio frequency probe, GSFC

Radio wave propagation, GSFC

Probe achieved altitude of 7891 kilometers and transmitted good data; electron density information was collected to about 2778 kilometers.

Also considered a sounding.
298 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-136,

P-21A Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

March 29, 1962 (Wallops)

Scout

42.6

8-sided frustrum

.38 x .84

NiCd batteries

March 29, 1962

GSFC

John E. Jackson

Siegfried J. Bauer

Measure electron density profile and ion density and intensity in the atmosphere

under nighttime conditions.

Radio wave propagation, GSFC

Radio frequency probe, GSFC

Ion trap, GSFC

Probe achieved altitude of 7241 kilometers; determined that characteristics of the

ionosphere differ sharply from daytime when the temperature of the ionosphere is

much cooler.

Also considered a sounding.

Table 3-137.

PAGEOS 1 (PAGEOS-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

June 23, 1966 (WTR)

Thor-Agena D

56.7 (110.7 with canister)

Spherical (inflatable)

Diameter, 30.48

None (passive)

In orbit

LaRC

D. L. Clummons, Jr.

G. T. Schjeldahl, sphere

Goodyear Aerospace Corp., canister

In support of the National Geodetic Satellites Program, serve as a passive point

source of light for a worldwide network of optical observation stations (56); stations

then would provide geometric geodesy measurements for defining the precise shape

of the planet and for preparing maps.

No active payload.

Successfully served as a target for optical tracking; still being used in 1972 for experiments.

See also Echo communications satellite for information on the background of the

spacecraft's design.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-138.

S-66 Polar Ionosphere Beacon Characteristics

299

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Program scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

March 19, 1964 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

54.4

Octagnal with 4 solar panels

Body diameter, .457

Height, .305

Panels, .254 x 1.676

NiCd battery plus solar cells

Did not achieve orbit

GSFC

Frank T. Martin

Robert E. Bourdeau

Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory

Survey earth's ionosphere; observations would be made by 81 ground stations in 32

countries; other experiments were designed to measure electron density and

temperatures and to provide geodetic information.

Laser and doppler tracking, GSFC and NASA Hq. (OART)

Electron measurement, GSFC

Failed to orbit because of a launch vehicle (third-stage) failure.

Would have been called Explorer 20 had the mission been successful. First Delta

failure in 23 consecutive launches.

Table 3-139.

San Marco 1 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 15, 1964 (Wallops)

Scout

113.4

Spherical

Diameter, .66

Hg batteries

Sept. 13, 1965

GSFC

A. J. Caporale, Hq.

Centro Ricerche Aerospaziale, University of Rome, spacecraft design and fabrication (Italian contract)

Measure air and electron density of upper atmosphere; study radio wave propagation.

Accelerometer, University of Rome, Faraday rotation, University of Florence

All systems performed as expected.

Italian satellite launched by NASA.
300 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-140.

San Marco 2 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

April 26, 1967 (Formosa Bay, Indian Ocean; near coast of Kenya)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

129.3

Spherical

Diameter, .66

Batteries

Oct. 14, 1967

GSFC

A. J. Caporale, Hq.

Centro Richere Aerospaziale, University of Rome, spacecraft design and fabrication

(Italian contract)

Measure upper atmosphere air density, electron density; study radio wave propagation.

Air density triaxial balance, University of Rome, Electron content and wave propagation, University of Florence

All experiments returned data as expected.

Italian satellite launched by NASA; first satellite to be launched from a sea platform.

DESCRIPTION- LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROGRAM

Beyond the examination of our own planet's upper atmosphere, the unmanned

exploration of earth's moon and the other planets was an especially attractive goal

for NASA's space scientists. Telescopes and other instruments sent into orbit around

earth had relayed clearer, improved images of these distant bodies and new information about the interplanetary medium. This wealth of new data, plus increasingly

powerful launch vehicles and improved telemetry systems, recording devices, and

scientific instruments, made it possible for man's machines to explore new worlds.

The Soviet Union's success with Sputnik and Luna spacecraft added an extra sense

of urgency to NASA's early plans for lunar and interplanetary investigation.

Schemes for sending automated spacecraft to the vicinity of the moon certainly

predate NASA. The moon was one of the goals military launch vehicle specialists

and civilian scientists alike had in mind when it became apparent that powerful

boosters capable of launching large payloads could be perfected over time. In the

spring of 1958, advanced planners at the Langley Memorial Aeronautical

Laboratory, part of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics were suggesting that the new civilian space agency being organized launch a 34-kilogram

probe to the vicinity of the moon to acquire "scientific information on the

characteristics of space between the earth and the moon, and on the physical,

biological, and chemical characteristics of the moon itself." Probes would be followed by orbiters and then landers. A secondary benefit from these scientific investigations, of course, would be data that could also be applied to manned
SPACESCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 301

spaceflight. There were many unknowns. How many meteorites would a spacecraft

encounter during its trip to the moon? Precisely what was the moon's mass? What

was the radioactivity level at the surface? What were the constituents of the atmosphere? Would the crust be made of volcanic rock or dust? For many participants and bystanders, unmanned exploration and the search for answers to scientific questions were overshadowed by the glamor of manned expeditions. As early as

the summer of 1959, the Office of Space Science recognized this: "If one goal were

to be selected which would most influence the overall NASA program during the

next decade it would be manned flight to the moon. The manned space flight program, the program of unmanned lunar exploration and the booster development

program are all oriented toward this goal." The Langley people believed that NASA

could take its first steps in this direction by late 1959, with landers reaching the

moon "within a few years. ''9

NASA's early attempts to send a probe to the moon were unsuccessful. From

the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency, NASA had inherited a lunar probe program called Pioneer. Launch vehicle malfunctions in 1958

prevented three Pioneer probes from obtaining the velocity necessary to escape

earth's gravity, and Pioneer 4 in early 1959 did not pass close enough to the moon

for its photoelectric scanner to operate. Three more attempts in 1959 and 1960 with

Atlas-Able vehicles also were failures. It was 1964 before NASA had an unqualified

success. Ranger 7 orbited the moon sending back good-quality photographs and impacted on the lunar surface on command. Two other Ranger missions were carried

out successfully, followed by five lunar Orbiters, also successful. Five of the seven

Surveyor spacecraft soft-landed on the moon in 1966-1968. Much of the lunar surface was photographed, and millions of bits of scientific data were telemetered to

earth, the sheer bulk of which led to the establishment of the Lunar Science Institute

in 1968 to serve as a center for the analysis and study of data being generated by un_

manned and manned lunar programs.

Beyond the moon were more unknowns: the other planets, our sun, the medium

surrounding them. The first thing scientists wanted to determine was the

astronomical unit, the semi-major axis of earth's orbit about the sun, so that interplanetary trajectories could be plotted precisely. The size of the planets, the composition of their atmospheres, and their physical, biological, and chemical properties were other subjects for investigation. The early planners again suggested a threetiered approach: trackable spacecraft that would escape earth's gravitational field

but remain in a nearby orbit of the sun, followed by planetary orbiters of the nearby

planets, and finally by landers. _0 This was basically the approach NASA followed.

Five very successful Pioneer interplanetary probes were sent on a variety of missions

from 1960 through 1968. A Mariner spacecraft passed by Venus in 1962 and another

took 22 photographs of Mars as it passed by that planet in 1964. Another Mariner

flew by Venus in 1967. NASA's plans for a Mars Voyager lander were cancelled in

1967 by a budget cut demanded by Congress, but it was replaced by Project Viking,

which would send two orbiter-landers to the Red Planet in the 1970s.

NASA in its initial organization had a chief of planetary science programs, John

F. Clark. In an early 1960 reorganization, Edgar M. Cortright was named assistant

director for lunar and planetary programs. In November 1961, Oran W. Nicks

assumed this position, managing the programs until late 1967. With the growing importance of the Apollo Program and the conclusion of the automated lunar exploration program, lunar science was assigned to the Office of Manned Space Flight in
302 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

December 1967. R. J. Allenby became assistant director for lunar science under Lee

R. Scherer, director for Apollo lunar exploration, both of whom were formerly of

the Office of Space Science and Applications. Donald P. Hearth was named director

of planetary programs. Managers of the various flight programs reported to him.

Project managers were named at the appropriate centers-the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory, Langley Research Center, and Ames Research Center.

Pioneer

There were two separate Pioneer programs-lunar and interplanetary. The

former started before NASA was established when President Dwight D. Eisenhower

approved Department of Defense plans for a lunar probe program in March 1958.

The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division and the Army Ballistic Missile Agency were

assigned three and two probes, respectively. The prime objective was to place a

payload in the vicinity of the moon with scientific instruments designed to measure

radiation, temperature, and micrometeorite distribution. Space Technology

Laboratories joined with the Air Force in designing the Thor-Able launch vehicle

and its lunar-bound payloads (the payloads were incorporated in Able fourth stages

and were sometimes referred to as the Able series of lunar probes). The Air Force

failed to place any of its three probes in a lunar trajectory during 1958. On October

1, 1959, the new civilian space agency was assigned the management responsibility

for the lunar probe program, but NASA delegated authority back to the Air Force

and Army. The Army-Jet Propulsion Laboratory team also failed to put its first

small conical probe into a lunar trajectory in 1958, and its second probe in 1959 did

not pass close enough to the moon for its instruments to record any data on the nearlunar environment.

In 1960, a spherical probe with a NASA Goddard Space Flight Center experiment package was sent to explore interplanetary space. Aboard were instruments

that would measure radiation, magnetic fields, cosmic dust, and solar phenomena.

Pioneer 5 was a success. Even before it began its journey around the sun, specialists

at NASA's Ames Research Center, Moffett Held, California, were exploring the

possibilities of a new series of solar probes. In November 1962 NASA Headquarters

approved a series of five interplanetary Pioneer probes and assigned their management to Ames. Built by TRW (formerly Space Technology Laboratories) and

equipped with scientific instruments from universities and other NASA centers, four

Pioneers were launched successfully from 1965 through 1968 (the fifth in the series

failed when the booster malfunctioned in 1969), returning valuable data on solar

plasma, solar and galactic cosmic radiation, magnetic and electric fields, and cosmic

dust. Because of the Pioneers' unexpectedly long lives, they returned information

beneficial to scientists studying the solar minimum as part of the International Quiet

Sun Year (1964-1965) and the solar maximum (1969-1970).

Although NASA had formal authority for the early lunar probes, they essentially were managed by the Army and the Air Force, since their development was

already well under way before NASA came into being. During 1960 when Pioneer 5

was launched, Roger C. Moore was in charge of planetary science in the NASA

Headquarters Lunar and Planetary Program Office, and the project was managed at

Goddard. Glenn A. Reiff became Mariner-Pioneer program manager at Head-
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 303

quarters in 1963 for the second Pioneer series. In 1966 and 1967, however, Reiff

devoted all his energies to Mariner 4 and 5, and management of Pioneer was assigned to the physics and astronomy program under Marcel T. Aucremanne's direction. Reiff resumed authority for Pioneer in 1968. Charles F. Hall led the Ames

Pioneer team from its first informal study of solar probes in 1960. TRW was the

prime contractor for the design and fabrication of the interplanetary Pioneers

(Herbert Lasser of TRW was responsible for the spacecraft's configuration).

For more information on the interplanetary Pioneers, see William R. Corliss,

The Interplanetary Pioneers, 3 vols., NASA SP-278, 279, and 280 (Washington,

1972); and TRW Systems Group, Pioneer Handbook, 1965-I969 (Ames Research

Center, 1968).

Table 3-141,

Chronology of Pioneer Development and Operations

Date Event

March 27, 1958

1958

July 9, 1958

Aug. 17, 1958

Oct. 1, 1958

Oct. 11, 1958

Fall 1958

Nov. 8, 1958

Dec. 6, 1958

Feb. 1959

March 3, 1959

The Secretary of Defense announced that the Advanced Research Projects

Agency of the Department of Defense would proceed with several programs

for launching unmanned spacecraft. One of these programs, which called for

three lunar probes, was assigned to the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division;

two other probes were assigned to the Army. The Air Force planned to

use a Thor-Vanguard launch vehicle for the lunar probes, which would be

launched during the International Geophysical Year.

Space Technology Laboratories was awarded a contract by the Air Force for

designing and building the probe and modifying the second and third stages

of the launch vehicle, which came to be called Thor-Able.

First successful test launch of Thor-Able.

Attempted launch of a small lunar probe failed when the Thor-Able I vehicle

exploded 77 seconds after liftoff.

The lunar probe program was assigned to NASA, which delegated authority

back to the Army and the Air Force.

Pioneer I was launched on an Air Force Thor-Able I; because the second and

third stages of the vehicle did not separate evenly, the probe did not reach the

velocity required for a lunar trajectory. The lunar probe program was officially called Pioneer by this time, but the individual spacecraft were still

sometimes referred to as Ables.

The Atlas-Able launch vehicle combination was suggested as a possible

launcher for NASA's lunar probe.

Pioneer 2 launch by an Air Force Thor-Able I was unsuccessful; the third

stage of the vehicle failed to ignite, and the probe did not reach the required

altitude.

Pioneer 3 launch by an Army Juno II was unsuccessful; the first stage of the

vehicle cut off prematurely, and the probe did not reach the required altitude.

Negotiations were conducted between the Air Force-NASA team and Space

Technology Laboratories for two Able stages and payloads.

Pioneer 4 launch by an Army Juno II was successful, but the probe did not

pass close enough to the moon for its instruments to function.
304 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-141.

Chronology of Pioneer Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Nov. 26, 1959

May 1960

Sept. 14, 1960

Sept. 25, i960

Dec. 15, 1960

March 11, 1960

April 1962

Nov. 6, 1962

Nov. 9, 1962

Jan. 29, 1963

Feb. 1, 1963

July 23, 1963

Aug. 5, 1963

April 1964

July 30, 1964

Dec. 5, 1965

Dec. 15, 1965

Feb. 22, 1966

April 28, 1966

Aug. 17, 1966

Dec. 13, 1967

Nov. 8, 1968

An attempt to launch a lunar orbiter with an Atlas-Able was unsuccessful;

the payload shroud broke away 45 seconds after liftoff (Able 4).

Ames Research Center begun an informal study of solar probes.

Ames Solar Probe Team was formed.

An attempt to launch a lunar orbiter with an Atlas-Able was unsuccessful;

the second stage of the vehicle malfunctioned (Able 5A).

An attempt to launch a lunar orbiter with an Atlas-Able was unsuccessful;

the first stage of the vehicle malfunctioned (Able 5B).

Pioneer 5 launch was successful (interplanetary probe).

TRW completed a feasibility study for Ames on designing an interplanetary

Pioneer.

NASA approved a new series of interplanetary Pioneers and assigned

management responsibility to Ames.

Project approval document for the Pioneer series was signed.

A request for proposals for building the spacecraft was issued.

A request for proposals for experiments to be carried on the Pioneer missions

was issued.

An initial set of experiments for Pioneer was selected.

TRW received a letter contract for the fabrication of five Pioneer spacecraft

($1.5 million, maximum contract value).

The final spacecraft design review was held.

A definitive contract with TRW was approved.

The first of the Pioneer spacecraft arrived at the Kennedy Space Center.

Pioneer 6 launch was successful.

The fifth spacecraft was eliminated from TRW's contract due to budget cuts.

TRW's contract was amended further; a fifth spacecraft would be constructed from spare parts.

Pioneer 7 launch was successful.

Pioneer 8 launch was successful.

Pioneer 9 launch was successful.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-142.

Pioneer 1 Characteristics

305

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Oct. 11, 1958 (ETR)

Thor-Able

38.3

2 truncated cones joined by a cylindrical midsection

.74 x .46

Batteries

Oct. 12, 1958

NASA Hq.

Space Technology Laboratories, under contract to the Air Force Ballistic Missile

Division

Lunar (also known as Able 2)

Place a probe with instrumented payload in orbit around the moon; measure radiation, micrometeorite flux, and magnetic fields.

Ion chamber, magnetometer, temperature sensor, TV scanner, micrometeorite sensor, all AFBMD experiments.

Did not achieve required velocity for a lunar trajectory because of launch vehicle

malfunction (second and third stages did not separate evenly); some data returned

on the Van Allen Belt and other phenomena before reentering 43 hours after launch.

NASA had delegated authority for this lunar probe mission back to the Air Force.

Table 3-143.

Pioneer 2 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 8, 1958 (ETR)

Thor-Able

39.2

2 truncated cones joined by a cylindrical midsection

.74 x .46

Batteries

Nov. 8, 1958

NASA Hq.

Space Technology Laboratories, under contract to the Air Force Ballistics Missile

Divison

Lunar (also known as Able 3)

Place a probe with instrumented payload in orbit around the moon; measure radiation, micrometeorite flux, and magnetic fields.

Ion chamber, magnetometer, temperature sensor, micrometeorite sensor, proportional counter, all AFBMD experiments, plus image scanning TV, STL.

Did not achieve required velocity for a lunar trajectory because of launch vehicle

malfunction (third stage failed to ignite); briefly returned data that indicated that

earth's equatorial region has higher flux and energy levels than previously believed.

NASA had delegated authority for this lunar probe mission back to the Air Force.
306 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-144.

Pioneer 3 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 6, 1958 (ETR)

Juno II

5.9

Conical

.51 x .23

Hg batteries

Dec. 7, 1958

NASA Hq.

Jet Propulsion Laboratory for Army Ballistic Missile Agency, spacecraft

Lunar

Place a probe with instrumented payload in the vicinity of the moon and obtain data

on Van Allen radiation belts.

Geiger counters, photoelectric sensor trigger, ABMA experiments.

Did not achieve required velocity for a lunar trajectory because of launch vehicle

malfunction (premature cutoff of first stage); transmitted data on dual bands of

radiation around earth; reached an altitude of 102 322 kilometers; reentered after 36

hours.

NASA had delegated authority for this Pioneer lunar probe mission back to the

Army.

Table 3-145.

Pioneer 4 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

March 3, 1959

Juno II

6.1

Conical

.51 x .23

Hg batteries

In orbit around the sun

NASA Hq.

Jet Propulsion Laboratory for Army Ballistic Missile Agency, spacecraft

Lunar

Place a probe with instrumented payload in the vicinity of the moon; obtain data on

the Van Allen radiation belts; determine extent of radiation in the vicinity of the

moon; test a photoelectric sensor.

Geiger counters, photoelectric sensor trigger, ABMA experiments.

Passed within 59 500 kilometers of the moon, not close enough for its photoelectric

scanner to be effective; sent back excellent data on radiation; was tracked for 82

hours to a distance of 655 000 kilometers.

NASA had delegated authority for this Pioneer lunar probe mission back to the

Army.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-146.

Pioneer 5 Characteristics

307

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project director,

scientist:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

March 11, 1960 (ETR)

Thor-Able

43

Spherical with 4 solar panels

Diameter, .66

With solar panels extended, diameter, 1.4

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit around the sun

GSFC

J. C. Lindsay

Space Technology Laboratories, under contract to NASA and the Air Force Ballistic

Missile Division

Interplanetary (also known as Able 6)

Place probe in orbit around the sun between Earth and Venus; transmit data on

radiation, magnetic fields, cosmic dust distribution, and solar phenomena in interplanetary space.

Cosmic ray telescopes, magnetometer, ionization chamber and geiger-MueUer tube,

micrometeorite counter, thermistors, and photoelectric cell aspect indicator, all

GSFC experiments

Sent back excellent data on interplanetary space.

Table 3-147.

Pioneer 6 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Dec. 16, 1965 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

62.14

Cylindrical with 3 2.09-meter booms and 2 antennas

.95 x .89

Battery plus solar cells

In orbit around sun

Ames Research Center (ARC)

Charles F. Hall

TRW, spacecraft fabrication

Interplanetary, first of the new series

Make synoptic measurements of the interplanetary milieu as it was affected by the

sun; record solar occultation of the spacecraft as seen by earth tracking stations; explore area ahead of earth as it orbits around the sun.

Single-axis fluxgate magnetometer, GSFC

Faraday-cup plasma probe, MIT

Plasma analyzer, ARC

Cosmic ray telescope, University of Chicago

Cosmic ray-anesotropy detector, Graduate Research Center of the Southwest

Radio wave propagation, Stanford University

Celestial mechanics, JPL

All experiments returned good data.
308 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-148.

Pioneer 7 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (In):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Aug. 17, 1966 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

62.75

Cylindrical with 3 2.09-meter booms and 2 antennas

.95 x .89

Battery plus solar cells

In orbit around the sun

ARC

Charles F. Hall

TRW, spacecraft fabrication

Interplanetary

Make synoptic measurements of the interplanetary milieu as it was affected by the

sun; analyze geomagnetospheric tail and lunar occultation.

Same as for Pioneer 6 (table 3-146).

All experiments returned good data; tail of earth's magnetosphere was detected 5.25

million kilometers from earth.

Table 3-149.

Pioneer 8 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Dec. 13, 1967 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

65.36

Cylindrical with 3 2.09-meter booms and 2 antennas

.95 x .89

Battery plus solar cells

In orbit around sun

ARC

Charles F. Hall

TRW, spacecraft fabrication

Interplanetary

Make synoptic measurements of the interplanetary milieu as it was affected by the

sun; analyze geomagnetospheric tail and lunar occultation.

Single-axis fluxgate magnetometer, GSFC

Plasma analyzer, ARC

Cosmic ray telescope, Graduate Research Center of the Southwest

Radio wave propagation, Stanford University

Cosmic ray gradient detector, University of Minnesota

Electric field detector, TRW

Cosmic dust detector, GSFC

Celestial mechanics, JPL

All experiments returned good data; generally the experiment instrumentation was

improved on this mission and two new experiments were added. A TETR 1 satellite

designed to serve as a target for the new Apollo tracking network also was launched

with Pioneer 8.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-150.

Pioneer 9 Characteristics

309

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Type of Pioneer:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 8, 1968 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

65.36

Cylindrical with 3 2.09-meter booms and 2 antennas

.95 x .89

Battery plus solar cells

In orbit around the sun

ARC

Charles F. Hall

TRW, spacecraft fabrication

Interplanetary

Make synoptic measurements of the interplanetary milieu as it was affected by the

sun; record solar occultation of the spacecraft as seen by earth tracking stations; explore area ahead of earth as it orbits around the sun.

Triaxial fluxgate magnetometer, ARC

Plasma analyzer, University of Chicago

Cosmic ray-anesotropy detector, Graduate Research Center of the Southwest

Cosmic ray gradient detector, University of Minnesota

Radio wave propagation, Stanford University

Electric field detector, TRW

Cosmic dust detector, GSFC

Celestial mechanics, JPL

All experiments returned good data. A TETR 2 satellite designed to serve as a target

for the new Apollo tracking network was also launched with Pioneer 9.

Ranger

Project Ranger, like the early Pioneers, was established in response to increasing scientific interest in the moon and to the successful lunar flight program of the

Soviet Union. The design of the spacecraft was first suggested during studies done at

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) when advanced planners were considering

Vega-launched lunar and planetary missions. After the Vega launch vehicle program

was cancelled (see chapter 1) in favor of the Air Force Atlas-Agena B in December

1959, the design group at JPL was directed to adapt its Vega lunar spacecraft and

experiment packages to an Atlas-Agena B mission. Lunar photography was considered a prime objective since it would support future manned lunar landings and

provide a valuable scientific data base.

The lunar program, tentatively named Ranger in 1960 and assigned to JPL,

called for two lunar near-misses, or probes (called Block I), and three impact missions (Block II). Ranger 1 and 2 were to be launched in highly elliptical earth orbits

that would take them near the moon so that their eight scientific instruments could

measure radiation, solar emissions, and magnetic fields in the cis-lunar environment

and serve as a test for the new hexagonally-shaped solar-powered spacecraft.

Because of launch vehicle failures, the first two Rangers (1961) were boosted only
310 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

into low earth orbit, to reenter shortly thereafter. The next three Rangers, the capsules for which were built by the Aeronautics Division of Ford Motor Company,

also failed. Equipped with television camera systems provided by RCA, Ranger 3

and 4 impacted the moon, but without the ability to transmit telemetry. Ranger 5

missed the moon by 725 kilometers. Block III spacecraft carried only a televsion

system-no other onboard experiments-in an effort to simplify the mission and ensure a successful lunar impact with photographs. Even before Ranger 6, too, failed

to return any data, NASA Headquarters directed JPL to terminate its follow-on

Ranger activities, which had called for Block IV and V spacecraft that could survive

a hard landing. The failures of all six Rangers led to investigations by Congress,

JPL, and independent boards appointed by NASA. With an increased number of

design and hardware reviews, revised schedules, closer monitoring of the subcontractors, and more intense participation by NASA Headquarters personnel, Ranger

7, 8, and 9 were all highly successful missions. They returned over 17 000 highquality images of the lunar surface, which were studied by hundreds of scientists and

by manned spaceflight specialists looking for their first Apollo lunar landing site.

Early program failures, budget cuts, and plans for Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor programs forced NASA to terminate Ranger after the third successful mission.

Newton W. Cunningham led the NASA management of Ranger as program

manager within the Office of Lunar and Planetary Programs. At JPL, J. D.

Burke, who had been deputy director of the Vega program, was Ranger project

manager from October 1960 until December 1962, when Harris M. Schurmeier took

the post. JPL not only oversaw the work of many subcontractors, but also performed most of the spacecraft integration and testing in-house and established a

deep space tracking network with which to communicate with the spacecraft.

For more information, see R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Impact: A History of Project

Ranger, NASA SP-4210 (Washington, 1977); and Hall, Project Ranger: A

Chronology, JPL HR-2 (Pasadena, CA: JPL, 1971).
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 311

Table 3-151.

Chronology of Ranger Development and Operations

Date Event

April 1958

Feb. 6-7, 1959

Dec. 11, 1959

Dec. 21, 1959

Jan. 12, 1960

Jan. 21, 1960

Jan. 26, 1960

Feb. 5, 1960

March 1, 1960

March 8, 1960

March 25, 1960

April 27, 1960

May 7, 1960

June 30, 1961

July 12, 1961

Aug. 23, 1961

Nov. 18, 1961

Dec. 1, 1961

Jan. 26, 1962

April 23, 1962

June 1962

JPL's Functional Design Group was established to study possibilities for a

160-kilogram spacecraft capable of a Mars mission.

NASA Headquarters and JPL officials established management responsibilities for Vega and proposed payloads for lunar and deep space missions.

Lunar probes would be followed by lunar orbiters and then lunar landers,

with the first probe mission tentatively scheduled for August 1960.

The Vega launch vehicle program was cancelled in favor of Atlas-Agena B.

JPL was directed to establish a post-Vega lunar and interplanetary flight program with missions through 1962. High-resolution photography was judged

the most urgent goal of this new program. Five Atlas-Agena B-launched

lunar reconnaissance missions were suggested for 1961-1962.

NASA chose eight experiments for the first two near-lunar missions.

The first of two lunar near-misses (Block I) was scheduled for February 1961,

with the first of three impact missions (Block II) scheduled for August 1961.

The lunar spacecraft was tentatively designated Ranger. C. I. Cummings and

J. D. Burke were named program director and deputy director of JPL's new

Lunar Program Office.

NASA Headquarters officially approved the Agena B program and gave JPL

permission to proceed with Ranger.

JPL awarded study contracts for Ranger design to North American Aviation,

Hughes Aircraft, and the Aeronautics Div. of Ford Motor Co.; reports were

due on April 15.

Sterilization guidelines were established.

A letter contract was awarded to RCA for a lunar impact TV camera system.

JPL awarded a contract to Ford for the development of five rough-landing

capsules ($4.8 million, contract value).

The first mission was slipped to July 1961.

JPL plans for Ranger follow-on missions, the first flight of which was

scheduled for January 1963, were delivered to Headquarters; included were

four Ranger missions (Block III) with emphasis on lunar photography. Headquarters approved these follow-on plans in August.

First launch of an Atlas-Agena B was successful.

Ranger 1 was launched on the fifth countdown; the spacecraft did not

achieve its planned orbit.

Ranger 2 was launched on the fourth countdown; the spacecraft did not

achieve its planned orbit.

Final approval was given for four experiments for the Block II Rangers.

Ranger 3 was launched; lunar impact was not achieved.

Ranger 4 was launched; telemetry transmissions before impact failed.

Initial planning was started for a Block IV series. Northrop contributed a

preliminary design study for a soft-landing capsule. Tentative launch dates

(1964) were released in October; by late fall as many as 20 flights were being

considered.
312 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-151.

ChronologyofRangerDevelopmentandOperations(Continued)

Date Event

Oct. 18, 1962

Oct. 29, 1962

Dec. 7, 1962

Feb. 12-13, 1963

March 8, 1963

July 12, 1963

Dec. 13, 1963

Jan. 30, 1964

Feb. 2-3, 1964

Feb. 16, 1964

April-May 1964

July 28, 1964

Feb. 17, 1965

March 21, 1965

Ranger 5 was launched; it did not impact on the moon.

Headquarters established a Ranger board of inquiry, who submitted its final

report on November 30.

H. M. Schurmeier was named JPL project manager, replacing Burke.

At a Ranger reprogramming meeting, it was decided that Block Ill and IV

spacecraft would be impacting-photography missions, with additional experiments incorporated into 1V only; planning for Block V (12 hard landers)

was approved.

Northrop was selected to provide support for Block III and V and to

fabricate Block V spacecraft.

Headquarters directed JPL to terminate all its efforts on impact missions

beyond Block III. While Block V- redesignated Block IV- landers were not

eliminated, JPL was asked to study the possibility.

Headquarters directed JPL to cancel all activities beyond Block Ill.

Ranger 6 was launched successfully, but it transmitted no telemetry before

impact.

JPL and independent Ranger 6 review boards were established. The independent board's final report was issued in March.

A TV subsystem for the next Ranger spacecraft was returned to RCA for

reexamination.

The House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics Subcommittee on NASA Oversight investigated Project Ranger.

Ranger 7 was launched successfully with good data return.

Ranger 8 was launched successfully with good data return.

Ranger 9 was launched successfully with good data return.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-152.

Ranger 1 Characteristics

313

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Aug. 23, 1961 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

306.18

Hexagonal base with 2 trapezoidal solar panels and 1 pointable high-gain antenna

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 5.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Aug. 29, 1961

JPL

J. D. Burke

Block I

Test spacecraft systems for a lunar probe; collect data on solar plasma, particles,

magnetic fields, and cosmic rays near the moon and in deep space.

Electrostatic analyzer for solar plasma, JPL

Photoconductive particle detectors, State University of Iowa

Rubidium vapor magnetometer, GSFC

Triple coincidence cosmic ray telescope, University of Chicago

Cosmic ray integrating ionization chamber, California Institute of Technology

and JPL

X-ray scintillation detectors, Sandia Corp.

Micrometeorite dust particle detectors, GSFC

Lyman alpha scanning telescope, Naval Research Laboratory

Injected into low earth orbit rather than highly eccentric orbit because of launch

vehicle malfunction (Agena stage failed to restart); some spacecraft systems were

checked out successfully and some data returned before reentry.

Table 3-153.

Ranger 2 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 18, 1961 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

306.18

Hexagonal base with 2 trapezoidal solar panels and 1 pointable high-gain antenna

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 5.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

JPL

J. D. Burke

Block I

Test spacecraft systems for a lunar probe; collect data on solar plasma, particles,

magnetic fields, and cosmic rays near the moon and in deep space.

Same as for Ranger 1 (table 3-152).

Injected into low-earth orbit rather than highly eccentric orbit because of launch

vehicle malfunction (Agena stage altitude control system failed); little significant

data received.
314 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-154.

Ranger 3 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Shape:

Dimensions (In):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Jan. 26, 1962 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

Hexagonal base with 2 trapezoidal solar panels, 1 pointable high-gain antenna, a

radar altimeter antenna, and a landing capsule

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 5.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

In orbit around the sun

JPL

J. D. Burke

Aeronutronic Div., Ford Motor Co., lunar capsule subsystem

Radio Corporation of America-Astro-Electronics Div., TV camera subsystem

Block II

Collect in-flight data on gamma rays; make a rough landing on the moon at a

predetermined sight; transmit data on seismic activity and temperature and TV pictures prior to impact.

TV cameras, JPL et al.

Gamma ray spectrometer, University of California at San Diego et al.

Single-axis seismometer, California Institute of Technology and Columbia University

Surface scanning pulse radio, JPL

Injected into lunar trajectory at excessive velocity because of launch vehicle

malfunction (Atlas guidance system failed); missed the moon by 37 000 kilometers;

a failure in the spacecraft central computer and sequencer caused the high-gain

antenna to lose its earth orientation so the signals were too weak for proper

transmission; useful spectrometer data on radiation were received on January 27-28.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 315

Table 3-155.

Ranger 4 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

April 23, 1962 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

331.12

Hexagonal base with 2 trapezoidal solar panels, 1 pointable high-gain antenna, a

radar altimeter antenna, and a landing capsule

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 5.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

JPL

J. D. Burke

Aeronutronic Div., Ford Motor Co., lunar capsule subsystem, Radio Corp. of

America-Astro-Electronics Div., TV camera subsystem

Block II

Collect in-flight data on gamma rays; make a rough landing on the moon at a

predetermined sight; transmit data on seismic activity and temperature and TV pictures prior to impact.

Same as for Ranger 3 (table 3-154).

Results: The spacecraft impacted the backside of the moon on April 26; a possible failure of

the spacecraft central computer and sequencer caused the master clock to stop; no

telemetry was received.
316 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-156.

Ranger 5 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Oct. 18, 1962 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

342.46

Hexagonal base with 2 trapezoidal solar panels, 1 pointable high-gain antenna, a

radar altimeter antenna, and a landing capsule

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 5.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

In orbit around the sun

JPL

J. D. Burke

Aeronutronic Div., Ford Motor Co., lunar capsule subsystem

Radio Corp. of America-Astro-Electronics Div., TV camera subsystem

Block II

Collect in-flight data on gamma rays; make a rough landing on the moon at a

predetermined sight; transmit data on seismic activity and temperature and TV pictures before impact.

Same as for Ranger 3 (table 3-154).

Ranger power failure rendered all systems and experiments useless; spacecraft

passed within 725 kilometers of the moon; four hours of data were received from the

gamma ray experiment before battery depletion.

Table 3-157.

Ranger 6 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Jan. 30, 1964 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

364.69

Hexagonal base with 2 rectangular solar panels, pointable high-gain antenna, and

omnidirectional low-gain antenna

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 4.6

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

JPL

H. M. Schurmeier

Radio Corp. of America-Astro-Electronics Div., TV camera subsystem

Block III

Obtain television pictures of the lunar surface before impact for scientific study and

for the support of Apollo.

TV cameras, University of Arizona, U.S. Geological Survey, Unversity of California at San Diego, JPL

Ranger TV cameras failed; spacecraft impacted in Sea of Tranquility area on

February 2, 1964; no data were returned.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-158.

Ranger 7 Characteristics

317

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

July 28, 1964 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

365.6

Hexagonal base with 2 rectangular solar panels, pointable high-gain antenna, and

omnidirectional low-gain antenna

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 4.6

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

lmpacted on moon

JPL

H. M. Schurmeier

Radio Corp. of America-Astro-Electronics Div., TV camera subsystem

Block III

Obtain television pictures of the lunar surface before impact for scientific study and

for the support of Apollo.

TV cameras, University of Arizona, U.S. Geological Survey, University of California at San Diego, JPL

Spacecraft transmitted 4316 high-quality photographs of the moon; impacted Sea of

Clouds area on July 31; findings indicated that the lunar surface would be suitable

for a manned landing.

Table 3-159.

Ranger 8 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Feb. 17, 1965 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

366.87

Hexagonal base with 2 rectangular solar panels, pointable high-gain antenna, and

omnidirectional low-gain antenna

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 4.6

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

JPL

H. M. Schurmeier

Radio Corp. of America-Astro-Electronics Div., TV camera subsystem

Block Ill

Obtain television pictures of the lunar surface before impact for scientific study and

for the support of Apollo.

TV cameras, University of Arizona, U.S. Geological Survey, University of California at San Diego, JPL

Spacecraft transmitted 7137 photographs of the moon; impacted in Sea of Tranquility area on Feb. 20, 1965.
318 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-160.

Ranger 9 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Type of Ranger:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

March 21, 1965 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

366.87

Hexagonal base with 2 rectangular solar panels, pointable high-gain antenna, and

omnidirectional low-gain antenna

Diameter, 1.5

Overall height, 3.6

Full span, 4.6

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

JPL

H. M. Schurmeier

Radio Corp. of America-Astro-Electronics Div., TV camera subsystem

Block III

Obtain television pictures of the lunar surface before impact for scientific study and

for the support of Apollo.

TV cameras, University of Arizona, U.S. Geological Survey, University of California at San Diego, JPL

Spacecraft transmitted 5814 photographs; impacted in crater of Alphonsus on

March 24, 1965.

Final mission of Project Ranger.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 319

Lunar Orbiter

The Surveyor lunar orbiter project as approved in 1960 was a two-part undertaking. An orbiter would be used for lunar reconnaissance and a lander for surface

exploration. However, development problems with the Centaur launch vehicle, early

failures with Project Ranger, and increasing demands from the Office of Manned

Space Flight for information on the lunar surface that would assist them in finding

landing sites for Apollo, led Office of Space Sciences personnel to look for an alternative to the Surveyor orbiter. In 1962 and 1963, working groups at Headquarters

and NASA's Langley Research Center were formed to study the requirements of an

orbiter mission and suggest a center to manage its development and operations, and

by March 1963 designers at Langley had completed plans for a lightweight orbiter.

This was the Virginia center's first major spaceflight project, and the personnel

at Langley were especially anxious for it to be a successful one. Proposals from five

companies for an orbiter were studied during 1963, with a contract being awarded to

the Boeing Company in May 1964. This also was Boeing's first spacecraft venture.

The 385-kilogram orbiter constructed by Boeing carried a photography system

developed by Eastman Kodak and three scientific experiments sponsored by Langley

and JPL-selenodesy (the lunar equivalent to geodesy), meteoroid detection, and

radiation measurement. While the scientific and photographic returns of the Lunar

Orbiter missions would, of course, be of high interest to scientists, the data would

contribute to the Surveyor lander project and to the Apollo lunar landings, the agency's most popular and visible program. Lunar Orbiter 1 through 5 were all successful, returning hundreds of high- and medium-resolution orbital photographs of

the moon that were orders of magnitude better than those returned by Ranger or

Surveyor. By the end of the third mission, the manned program's requirements of

Lunar Orbiter had been met. In addition to prospective landing sites, other areas of

the moon were photographed, and by the end of the project a broad systematic

survey had been accomplished, including the moon's dark side. Scientists and

designers of lunar landers received much useful data on radiation, gravity, and

micrometeorites, and the manned program's tracking network had several opportunities to practice tracking a spacecraft in the vicinity of the moon.

The highly successful Lunar Orbiter was managed at NASA Headquarters by

the Office of Lunar and Planetary Programs, with Lee R. Scherer as program

manager. At Langley, C. H. Nelson served as project manager. The Boeing Company was the prime spacecraft contractor, with Eastman Kodak supplying the essential photographic subsystem and RCA providing the communications subsystem.

For more information on Lunar Orbiter, see Bruce K. Byers, Destination Moon:

A History of the Lunar Orbiter Program, NASA TM X-3487 (Washington, 1977).
320 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-161.

Chronology of Lunar Orbiter Development and Operations

Date Event

May 1958

May 1960

Sept. 1962

Oct. 1962

Jan. 1963

Feb. 1963

March 1963

Aug. 30, 1963

Sept.-Nov. 1963

Dec. 20, 1963

May 7, 1964

Oct. 1964

Feb. 1965

July 25, 1986

Aug. 10, 1966

Nov. 6, 1966

Feb. 4. 1967

May 4, 1967

July 24, 1967

Aug. 1, 1967

Long-range planners at the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

suggested that the new civilian space agency being formed should send orbiters to the moon to gather data on its mass, magnetic field, and radioactivity and general information on its surface, with the first mission taking place

by 1960.

NASA approved the Surveyor lunar program, to consist of an orbiter and a

lander for photographic coverage and surface exploration. JPL was assigned

responsibility for the project (see table 3-167).

Because of problems with Ranger at JPL, demands from the Apollo program

for more detailed information on the lunar surface, and delays in the

development of the Centaur launch vehicle on which the Surveyor orbiter

would be launched, the Office of Space Sciences (OSS) was examining alternate hardware and launch vehicles for a lunar orbiter mission. An OSS working group was formed to study the problem.

A joint Office of Manned Space Flight-Office of Space Sciences working

group was formed to study the requirements for an Agena-class orbiter. The

OSS group recommended giving Space Technology Laboratories (STL) a

study contract for an orbiter, which NASA did.

Langley Research Center personnel were asked to study the feasibility of that

center managing a lunar orbiter project.

STL's study was reviewed at a major planning meeting at Langley.

Langley formulated a project approval document for a lightweight orbiter

mission; five companies began to develop proposals.

A request for proposals for an orbiter mission and spacecraft was released to

industry, and a Lunar Orbiter Project Office was established at Langley

under the direction of Clifford H. Nelson.

A Langley Source Evaluation Board studied proposals from Hughes Aircraft, Boeing, TRW (of which STL was now a division), Martin Co., and

Lockheed for orbiters and from Eastman Kodak for a photographic system

to be used with the proposed Boeing orbiter. The board favored Boeing's proposal and recommended it to Headquarters.

Boeing was selected as prime contractor for the Lunar Orbiter and the launch

shroud.

Boeing's contract was signed by NASA's administrator ($75.8 million, contract value).

A subcontract was awarded to Eastman Kodak for the photographic subsystem. A Lunar Orbiter preliminary spacecraft design review was held.

A subcontract was awarded to RCA for the communications subsystem.

A flight readiness review for the first spacecraft was held at the Kennedy

Space Center.

Lunar Orbiter I was launched successfully with good data return.

Lunar Orbiter 2 was launched successfully with good data return.

Lunar Orbiter 3 was launched successfully with good data return.

Lunar Orbiter 4 was launched successfully with good data return.

Plans for a possible sixth mission were not approved by Headquarters.

Lunar Orbiter 5 was launched successfully with good data return.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-162.

Lunar Orbiter I Characteristics

321

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Aug. 10, 1966 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

385.6

Truncated cone with 4 solar panels projecting from base 2-part primary structuremain equipment mounting deck, and an upper module supported by trusses and an

arch)

Stowed, 1.64 x 1.67

With Antennas and panels deployed, 5.6 x 3.7

NiCd battery plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

Langley Research Center (LaRC)

Clifford H. Nelson

Boeing Co., prime

Eastman Kodak, TV camera subsystem

Radio Corp., of America, communications subsystem

In lunar orbit, obtain high- and medium-resolution photographs of various types of

lunar terrain suitable for Surveyor and Apollo landing sites; provide information on

gravitational field through tracking exercises; measure radiation and detect

micrometeorites.

610-ram Panoramic and 80-ram Xenotar lenses, LaRC

Selenodesy, LaRC, JPL

Meteoroid detection, LaRC

Radiation measurement, LaRC

Transmitted 207 images of the lunar surface covering 41 000 square kilometers of

candidate Apollo sites and 4.9 million kilometers of the far side of the moon; highresolution images were smeared, medium-resolution excellent. Mission was terminated by crashing the spacecraft onto the surface on October 29 (perilune, 58

kilometers).

First U.S. spacecraft to enter lunar orbit.
322 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-163.

Lunar Orbiter 2 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Po wer source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

cen ter:

Project manager:

Con tractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 6, 1966 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

385.6

Truncated cone with 4 solar panels projecting from base (2-part primary structure- main equipment mounting deck, and an upper module supported by trusses

and an arch)

Stowed, 1.64 x 1.67

With antennas and panels deployed, 5.6 x 3.7

NiCd battery plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

LaRC

Clifford H. Nelson

Boeing Co., prime

Eastman Kodak, TV camera subsystem

Radio Corp. of America, communications subsystem

In lunar orbit, obtain high- and medium-resolution images of various types of lunar

terrain suitable for Surveyor and Apollo landing sites; provide information of

gravitational field through tracking exercises; measure radiation and detect

micrometeorites.

Same as for Lunar Orbiter 1 (table 3-162).

Transmitted 211 high- and medium-resolution photographs and monitored radiation in the lunar environment; photographed i 3 primary Apollo target sites (36 000

square kilometers). Mission was terminated by crashing the spacecraft onto the

lunar surface on October 11, 1967 (perilune, 196 kilometers).
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 323

Table 3-164.

Lunar Orbiter 3 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Feb. 4, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

385.6

Truncated cone with 4 solar panels projecting from base (2-part primary structuremain equipment mounting deck, and an upper module supported by trusses and an

arch)

Stowed, 1.64 x 1.67

With antennas and panels deployed, 5.6 x 3.7

NiCd battery plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

LaRC

Clifford H. Nelson

Boeing Co., prime

Eastman Kodak, TV camera subsystem

Radio Corp. of America, communications subsystem

In lunar orbit, obtain high- and medium-resolution photographs of various types of

lunar terrain suitable for Surveyor and Apollo landing sites; provide information on

gravitational field through tracking exercises; measure radiation and detect

micrometeorites; provide target for tracking network.

Same as for Lunar Orbiter 1 (table 3-162).

Transmitted 211 medium- and high-resolution images of Apollo and Surveyor landing sites; only 72°70 of the total planned images were taken due to malfunction in

readout system on February 24. Mission was terminated by crashing the spacecraft

onto the surface on October 9 (perilune, 55 kilometers).
324 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-165.

Lunar Orbiter 4 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

May 4, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

385.6

Truncated cone with 4 solar panels projecting from base (2-part primary structure-main equipment mounting deck, and an upper module supported by trusses

and an arch)

Stowed, 1.64 x 1.67

With antennas and panels deployed, 5.6 × 3.7

NiCd battery plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

LaRC

Clifford H. Nelson

Boeing Co., prime

Eastman Kodak, TV camera subsystem

Radio Corp. of America, communications subsystem

Obtain a broad systematic photographic survey of the moon, assessing various surface features; gather data on gravity, micrometeorites, and radiation.

Same as for Lunar Orbiter 1 (table 3-162).

Transmitted 193 medium- and high-resolution images, 99% of the planned number

by June 1; southern polar region photographed for the first time. Mission was terminated by crashing the spacecraft onto the surface on October 6 (perilune, 2705

kilometers).
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-166.

Lunar Orbiter 5 Characteristics

325

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Aug. 1, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

385.6

Truncated cone with 4 solar panels projecting from base (2-part primary structuremain equipment mounting deck, and an upper module supported by trusses and an

arch)

Stowed, 1.64 x 1.67

With antennas and panels deployed, 5.6 × 3.7

NiCd battery plus solar cells

Impacted on moon

LaRC

Clifford H. Nelson

Boeing Co., prime

Eastman Kodak, TV camera subsystem

Radio Corp. of America, communications subsystem

Obtain photographs of scientifically interesting areas on both sides of the moon;

gather data on gravity, micrometeorites, radiation; provide a target for tracking exercises.

Same as for Lunar Orbiter 1 (table 3-162).

Transmitted 212 medium- and high-resolution images of lunar surface until August

28; these images completed coverage of the far side. Mission was terminated by

crashing the spacecraft into the surface on January 31, 1968 (perilune, 194

kilometers).

Last mission of the Lunar Orbiter series.

Surveyor

Originally perceived in 1960 as an orbiter-lander project that would yield

photographs of the lunar surface and scientific information on the moon's environment and its structure, Surveyor as flown was a lunar lander project that supported

NASA's manned Apollo missions. Langley Research Center's Lunar Orbiter replaced the Surveyor orbiter (see table 3-161). In its initial configuration, the

Surveyor soft-lander would have carried several scientific instruments to the moon,

but weight constraints and the growing importance of Apollo eliminated most of

Surveyor's scientific objectives. Before men could be sent on a lunar expedition,

spacecraft designers needed information on the moon's crust and its bearing limits,

its soil, magnetic properties, and radar and thermal reflectivity. Equipped with a

television camera, sampling scoop, magnetic footpads, and an alpha-scattering instrument, Surveyor would supply the designers with these critical data.

In early 1961, NASA chose Hughes Aircraft's proposal for a Surveyor lander

and began mission planning at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for seven lunar
326 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

flights, the first of which was planned for launch on Atlas-Centaur in 1963. Unfortunately, the new Centaur stage did not cooperate, and repeated schedule delays

with the launch vehicle forced Surveyor managers to postpone the lander's first mission. Surveyor's designers also had to pare down the spacecraft's size so that it was

compatible with Centaur's more limited lifting capabilities-from an original 1134

kilograms with a 156-kilogram payload to a 953-kilogram spacecraft with 52

kilograms of instruments. It was 1966 before Atlas-Centaur was operational, but the

new booster launched all seven Surveyors into the proper trajectories.

Surveyor lander was roughly triangular in shape with two equipment compartments and a vertical mast to hold a solar panel and several antennas° The threemeter-high craft was supported on three landing legs with shock absorbers and footpads. Its controlled landing was accomplished by three vernier engines and a

retrorocket. The first two landers were equipped with only a television camera

(capable of both 25- and 6-degree fields of view) for taking post-landing

photographs. Surveyor 1 landed on the moon on June 2, 1966, three days after it

started its journey from the Eastern Test Range. Transmitting more than 10 000

high-quality images, it remained operational until the following January. Trouble

with the vernier engines caused the second lander to crash into the moon, but

Surveyor 3 with added features returned an abundance of data. Besides 6315

photographs, the earth-bound specialists received information on the composition

and surface-bearing strength of the lunar crust as the television camera focused on a

surface sampler as it dug trenches in the soil and on thermal and radar reflectivity.

Surveyor 4 failed; minutes before it was due to land something went wrong, and the

spacecraft either exploded or crashed onto the moon's surface. The last three missions all returned thousands of photographs and supplied data on chemical elements

in the soil, touchdown dynamics, and the surface's magnetic properties. Mission

specialists had a great deal of control over the Surveyor spacecraft and could correct

its trajectory if needed and otherwise maneuver it. Surveyor 6was even restarted and

moved three meters on the surface. Apollo designers had met all their objectives

with Surveyor by the end of the sixth flight, and NASA managers cancelled any

follow-on Block II or III missions. Scientists, too, especially geologists, benefitted

from the vast photographic archives made possible by Surveyor (some of the

photographs were in color). Surveyor 7 landed in an area of high scientific interest

outside the Apollo target area.

Surveyor was managed by the NASA Headquarters Office of Lunar and

Planetary Programs within the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA).

Benjamin Milwitzky served as program manager. At JPL, Walker E. Gibberson led

the Surveyor team in its early days, with Robert J. Parks taking over in 1965.

Howard H. Haglund assumed the role in late 1966. Hughes Aircraft Company was

the prime spacecraft contractor.

No single source can be suggested for further reading, but several volumes

published by NASA record the results of the project. Among them, the following is

perhaps the most useful: NASA, Office of Space Science and Applications, comp.,

Surveyor Program Results, NASA SP-184 (Washington, 1969).
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 327

Table 3-167.

Chronology of Surveyor Development and Operations

Date Event

May 1960

July 1960

Jan. 19, 1961

March 6, 1962

May 8, 1962

Mid-1962

Early 1963

Nov. 27, 1963

Dec. 11, 1964

Aug. 11, 1965

Feb. 1, 1966

April 7, 1966

May 11, 1966

May 30 1966

June 1, 1966

Sept. 20, 1966

Dec. 13, 1966

April 17, 1967

July 14, 1967

Sept. 8, 1967

Nov. 7, 1967

Jan. 7, 1968

June 28, 1968

NASA approved the Surveyor launch program to consist of two parts-an

orbiter for photographic coverage and a lander for surface exploration. The

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was assigned project responsibility for

Surveyor and for Ranger.

Four Surveyor study contracts were awarded to Hughes Aircraft, North

American, Space Technology Laboratories, and McDonnell Aircraft, with

JPL providing design requirements. Eight study contracts for experiment

proposals also were let.

Hughes was selected as contractor to build seven Surveyor landers; a letter

contract was issued on March 1. The first launch was scheduled for August

1963 on an Atlas-Centaur.

Martin-Marietta Corporation was selected to build a thermoelectric

generator for use on Surveyor.

The first Atlas-Centaur test launch was unsuccessful.

Because of Centaur development problems, early failures with Ranger, and

increasing demands for information on the lunar surface for Apollo, the orbiter portion of Surveyor was dropped and replaced by Lunar Orbiter, to be

managed at Langley Research Center. Problems with the Centaur stage

forced the postponement of the first Surveyor launch.

Initial testing of the first proof test model was completed.

The second Atlas-Centaur test launch was successful.

Atlas-Centaur launched a Surveyor model successfully.

Atlas-Centaur launched a Surveyor model successfully, putting the dummy

spacecraft into a highly elliptical orbit to simulate lunar transfer orbit.

A soft-landing retrorocket system was tested successfully by Hughes and

JPL.

Atlas-Centaur launched a Surveyor model, but the vehicle failed to achieve

double ignition, and the dummy spacecraft remained in earth orbit.

The Surveyor spacecraft accomplished a soft-landing test under its own

power.

Surveyor 1 was launched successfully, landing on the moon on June 2.

A General Accounting Office report charged NASA with spending $2.5

million on Surveyor experiments it had not required.

Surveyor 2 was launched successfully, but the spacecraft crashed into the

lunar surface on September 22 due to vernier engine failure.

NASA dropped plans for three additional Surveyors (Block II) and a possible

Surveyor rover because of good results with later Ranger spacecraft, Lunar

Orbiters, and Surveyor I and because of budgetary considerations.

Surveyor 3 was launched successfully, landing on the moon on April 19.

Surveyor 4 was launched successfully, but the spacecraft failed minutes

before its scheduled landing.

Surveyor 5 was launched successfully, landing on the moon on September 10.

Surveyor 6 was launched successfully, landing on the moon on November 9.

Surveyor 7 was launched successfully, landing on the moon on January 9.

JPL's Surveyor project office was closed.
328 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-168.

Surveyor 1 (Surveyor-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

May 30, 1966 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

995.2

Triangular aluminum frame containing 2 equipment compartments supported by 3

landing legs with footpads; a vertical mast supported a solar panel and antennas

Height, 3

Width with legs extended, 4.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Landed on the moon June 2, 1966

JPL

Robert J. Parks

Hughes Aircraft Co., prime

Demonstrate spacecraft capability to maneuver, communicate, and soft-land on the

moon; photograph surface.

TV cameras, GSFC, LaRC, JPL, U.S. Geological Survey, Lamont Geological

Observatory, University of Chicago

Soft-landed on the moon June 2 in the Ocean of Storms area; returned more than

10 000 high-quality images and selenological data; completed primary mission July

13 with communications reestablished periodically through January 1967.

First spacecraft to soft-land on the moon.

Table 3-169.

Surveyor 2 (Surveyor-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Sept. 20, 1966 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

995.2

Triangular aluminum frame containing 2 equipment compartments supported by 3

landing legs with footpads; a vertical mast supported a solar panel and antennas

Height, 3

Width with legs extended, 4.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Impacted onto the moon Sept. 22, 1966

JPL

Robert J. Parks

Hughes Aircraft Co., prime

Demonstrate spacecraft capability to maneuver, communicate, and soft-land on the

moon; photograph surface.

TV cameras, GSFC et al.

Spacecraft crashed onto the lunar surface on September 22 when one of its three vernier engines failed to ignite during a mid-course maneuver.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-170.

Surveyor 3 (Surveyor-C) Characteristics

329

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

April 17, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

997.9

Triangular aluminum frame containing 2 equipment compartments supported by 3

landing legs with footpads; a vertical mast supported a solar panel and antennas

Height, 3

Width with legs extended, 4.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Landed on the moon April 19, 1967

JPL

H. H. Haglund

Hughes Aircraft Co., prime

TV cameras, U.S. Geological Survey

Surface sampler, California Institute of Technology

Soft-landed on the moon April 19, 1967, within an Apollo landing area; returned

6315 images and data on a soil sample; experiments functioned until early May when

lunar night began. The visual range of the TV cameras was extended by the use of

two flat mirrors.

Table 3-171.

Surveyor 4 (Surveyor-D) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

July 14, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

1037.4

Triangular aluminum frame containing 2 equipment compartments supported by 3

landing legs with footpads; a vertical mast supported a solar panel and antennas

Height, 3

Width with legs extended, 4.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Impacted onto the lunar surface July 16, 1967

JPL

H. H. Haglund

Hughes Aircraft Co., prime

Soft-land on the moon in Sinus Medii; obtain photographs of surface; conduct vernier engine experiment; manipulate surface with scoop and observe with TV camera;

obtain touchdown dynamics information and thermal and radar reflectivity data.

TV cameras, U.S. Geological Survey

Surface sampler, California Institute of Technology

Hight was successful until two seconds before retrorocket burnout, two and onehalf minutes before scheduled landing; spacecraft impacted the moon, possibly after

an explosion.
330 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table 3-172.

Surveyor 5 (Surveyor-E) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Sept. 8, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

1006

Triangular aluminum frame containing 2 equipment compartments supported by 3

landing legs with footpads; a vertical mast supported a solar panel and antennas

Height, 3

Width with legs extended, 4.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Landed on the moon Sept. 10, 1967

JPL

H. H. Haglund

Hughes Aircraft Co., prime

Soft-land on moon; obtain TV photos of the surface; conduct vernier engine experiment; determine abundance of chemical elements in soil; obtain touchdown

dynamics information and thermal and radar reflectivity data.

TV cameras, U.S. Geological Survey

Alpha-scattering instrument, University of Chicago

Surface sampler, California Institute of Technology

Magnetic footpads, JPL

Soft-landed on the moon in Sea of Tranquility area on September 10; returned

18 000 images, some converted to color; obtained data on lunar surface radar and

thermal reflectivity; performed other investigations as planned. Complete signal was

lost on December 16, 1967.

Table 3-173.

Surveyor 6 (Surveyor-F) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 7, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

1008.3

Triangular aluminum frame containing 2 equipment compartments supported by 3

landing legs with footpads; a vertical mast supported a solar panel and antennas

Height, 3

Width with legs extended, 4.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Landed on the moon Nov. 9, 1967

JPL

H. H. Haglund

Hughes Aircraft Co., prime

Soft-land on moon; obtain TV photos of the surface; conduct vernier engine experiment; determine abundance of chemical elements in soil; obtain touchdown

dynamics information and thermal and radar reflectivity data.

Same as for Surveyor 5 (table 3-172)

Soft-landed in Sinus Medii area on November 9; returned 29 500 images of the lunar

surface, Earth, Jupiter, and several stars; obtained data on touchdown dynamics

and surface characteristics; on November 17 the spacecraft was restarted and moved

about 3 meters. Signals were lost on December 14, 1967.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-174.

Surveyor 7 (Surveyor-G) Characteristics

331

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Jan. 7, 1968 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

1040.1

Triangular aluminum frame containing 2 equipment compartments supported by 3

landing legs with footpads; a vertical mast supported a solar panel and antennas

Height, 3

Width with legs extended, 4.2

AgZn batteries plus solar cells

Landed on the moon Jan. 9, 1968

JPL

H. H. Haglund

Hughes Aircraft Co., prime

Soft-land on moon; obtain TV photos of the surface; manipulate lunar material

with the surface sampler; obtain touchdown dynamics information and thermal and

radar reflectivity data.

Same as for Surveyor 5 (table 3-172).

Landed near lunar crater Tycho on January 9; returned 21 274 images, including

some stereo pictures of the surface and of rocks that were of special interest; lightscattering experiment failed to contact surface, but the sampling arm manipulated it

into position. Signal was lost on February 20, 1968.

Last mission of the Surveyor series.

Mariner

Exploration of earth's nearest planetary neighbors was a goal entertained by

NASA scientists from the agency's earliest days. Missions to Venus and Mars would

require more sophisticated spacecraft than the Explorers sent into orbit around

earth or the sun to measure and observe the phenomena of interplanetary space.

Spacecraft directed toward earth's moon and the other planets would require complex communications, data storage, and guidance and control equipment, computers, and scientific instruments with which to sound distant atmospheres. The

weight of this new hardware would require a launch vehicle more powerful than

those available to NASA in the early 1960s. From the first preliminary studies, space

agency planners built their designs for Mariner planetary explorers around the

powerful Centaur upper stage under development at General Dynamics. And it was

Centaur's availability, or lack of it, that determined the direction the first 10 years of

planetary mission planning would take.

From 1960 through 1968, 10 distinct Mariner projects were approved, but

troubles with Centaur and the budget caused the cancellation of four of them. The

first Mariners--"A," a Venus flyby mission, and "B," instrumented Mars and Venus

landings-were proposed in 1960, but they never became flight projects. Proposals

for Mariner-Venus 1962 (also called Mariner R) led to the launches of Mariner I and

2, Venus flyby projects. Only Mariner 2 reached its target, returning 42 minutes of
332 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

dataabouttheatmosphereandsurfaceof theplanet.Mariner 3 and 4, flyby missions, were approved in late 1962 as Mariner-Mars 1964. Again, only one of the pair

was successful. Mariner 4 reached Mars in 228 days, sending back 21 Y2 photographs

of the Red Planet's surface and information about its atmosphere. Mission planners

and scientists, anxious to send orbit-landers to Mars and Venus, designed a heavy,

sophisticated spacecraft called Voyager in 1962, but Voyager plans were never

translated into flight hardware. Money and launch vehicles were once again the

problems. The proposals or cancellations of Mariner-Mars 1966 (flyby), Advanced

Mariner 1969 (Mars orbiter-lander), Mariner-Venus 1967 (flyby), Mariner-Mars

1969 (flyby), Mariner-Mars 1971 (orbiter), and Mariner Venus-Mercury 1973 (flyby)

were all affected in some way by Voyager's postponements and cancellation. The

one other Mariner launched during NASA's first decade was Mariner 5, which took

advantage of the 1967 Venus launch windows. The spacecraft flew by this cloudshrouded planet on October 19, 1967 and reported on its atmosphere, mass, and

solar wind interaction.

The first five Mariners were in the 200-260-kilogram class and were launched by

Atlas-Agena B or D vehicles. Their hexagonal or octagonal frame bases held scientific instruments designed by personnel from NASA's centers and from American

universities. Solar panels provided spacecraft powers, and the Deep Space Network

at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was responsible for tracking and communications. Many companies contributed components to the Mariners, acting as

subcontractors to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, where the spacecraft were

assembled and tested.

At NASA Headquarters, the Mariner program was managed by Fred D. Kochendorfer of the Office of Lunar and Planetary Programs until 1963, when Donald P.

Hearth began acting as Pioneer and Mariner manager. Glenn A. Reiff took over in

1965. In mid-1967, Reiff took responsibility for Mariner-Mars 1967 only, and

Newton W. Cunningham managed Mariner-Mars 1969, with Earl W. Glahn becoming manager of Mariner-Mars 1971 in late 1968. At JPL, Jack N. James was

Mariner project manager until January 1965, when Dan Schneiderman assumed the

job.

For an overall look at Mariner history, see chapters 2, 3, 6, and 9 of Edward C.

and Linda N. Ezell, On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958-1978, NASA

SP-4212 (Washington, 1984). Many NASA publications have been issued on the

Mariner projects and their results; three useful ones are JPL, Mariner-Venus 1962

Final Project Report, NASA SP-59 (Washington, 1965); JPL, Mariner-Mars 1964

Final Project Report, NASA SP-139 (Washington, 1967); and JPL, Mariner-Venus

1967 Final Project Report, NASA SP-190 (Washington, 1971).
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-175.

Mariner Proposals, 1960-1968

333

Proposal Year Mission Results

Proposed*

Mariner A 1960 Venus flyby (1962, Cancelled in 1961 because of the

1964, 1965) unavailability of Centaur.

Mariner B 1960 Mars or Venus Replaced by Mariner-Mars 1966 prolander (1964) posal.

Mariner-Venus 1962 1961 Venus flyby (1962) Led to the launches of Mariner 1 and 2 in

(also called 1962.

Mariner R)

Mariner-Mars 1964 1962 Mars flyby (1964) Led to the launches of Mariner 3 and 4 in

1964.

Mariner-Mars 1966

(to replace

Mariner B)

Advanced Mariner

1969 (to replace

Mariner-Mars 1966)

Mariner-Mars 1969

(in answer to

Voyager postponement)

Mariner-Venus 1967

(in answer to

Voyager postponement)

Mariner-Mars 1971

(in answer to

Voyager cancellation)

Mariner VenusMercury 1973

(proposed by the

Space Science

Board)

1963 Mars flyby (1966)

1964 Mars orbiter-lander

(1969)

1965 Mars flyby (1969)

1965 Venus flyby (1967)

1967 Mars orbiter (1971)

1968 Venus and Mercury

flybys (1973)

Cancelled in 1966 and replaced by a proposal for Advanced Mariner 1969.

Cancelled in 1964 for budgetary reasons.

Led to the launches of Mariner 6 and 7 in

1969.

Led to the launch of Mariner 5 in 1967.

Led to the launches of Mariner 8 and 9 in

1971.

Led to the launch of Mariner 10 in 1973.

*Does not necessarily indicate official proposal; for further details see table 3-176.
334 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-176.

Chronology of Mariner Development and Operations

Date Event

1958-1959

May 19, 1960

July 1960

July 15, 1960

Nov. 1960

Feb. 1961

Aug. 1961

Aug. 30, 1961

Early 1962

April 9, 1962

May 1962

July 22, 1962

Aug. 27, 1962

Nov. 1962

March 1, 1963

March 14, 1963

April 11, 1963

May 6, 1963

June-Dec. 1963

Dec. 19, 1963

Jan. 1964

July 28, 1964

Aug. 2, 1964

Sepl. 11, 1964

Nov. 5, 1964

Nov. 19, 1964

Several feasibility studies for unmanned lunar and planetary missions

resulted in conceptual designs for spacecraft using the planned Atlas-Centaur

launch vehicle; the earliest mission was scheduled for 1962 to Venus.

NASA's planetary program was named Mariner.

A study was begun at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for a Mariner A

mission that would fly by Venus in 1962 and a Mariner B mission for an instrumented landing on Venus or Mars in 1964.

Mariner A and B were approved by NASA Headquarters.

JPL completed the preliminary design of Mariner A.

Revised plans for Mariner A called for missions to Venus in 1962, 1964, and

1965; revised plans for Mariner B dropped the Venus landing from consideration.

A study was begun at JPL for a Mariner-Venus 1962 flyby mission (also called Mariner R), which led to Mariner 1 and 2.

Mariner A was cancelled due to the projected unavailability of the AtlasCentaur; Mariner-Venus 1962 was approved.

JPL began a design study for a Mariner-Mars 1964 craft for a flyby mission

to Mars, which led to Mariner 3 and 4.

Mariner B's Mars landing option was dropped and the Venus landing reconsidered.

Mariner-Venus 1962 spacecraft were delivered to KSC.

Mariner 1 launch was unsuccessful when the launch vehicle malfunctioned.

Mariner 2 launch was successful; the spacecraft passed by Venus on

December 14.

The Mariner-Mars 1964 project was tentatively approved.

A project approval document for Mariner-Mars 1964 was signed; the AtlasAgena launch vehicle was substituted for Atlas-Centaur, which was still

behind schedule.

The Mariner B mission was changed to a pre-Voyager checkout flight to Mars

with a lander.

The selection of 10 experiments for Mariner-Mars 1964 was announced.

A Mariner-Mars 1966 flyby project was proposed, which took the place of

Mariner B.

A Mariner-Mars 1964 spacecraft proof-test model was assembled and testing

begun.

Mariner-Mars 1966 was approved.

Initial plans for an Advanced Mariner 1969 orbiter-lander mission to Mars

were formulated.

Mariner-Mars 1966 was effectively cancelled, with official termination coming on September 4; it would be replaced by Advanced Mariner 1969.

A project approval document for Advanced Mars 1969 was signed.

Mariner-Mars 1964 spacecraft arrived at the Kennedy Space Center.

Mariner 3 launch was unsuccessful due to the failure of the shroud to jettison

properly.

Lewis Research Center undertook the supervision of Lockheed's design and

development of a metal shroud for the next Mariner launch; the metal shroud

would replace the fiberglass one that had failed on Mariner 3.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-176.

Chronology of Mariner Development and Operations (Continued)

335

Date Event

Nov. 20, 1964

Nov. 28, 1964

Dec. 22, 1965

Dec. 25, 1965

March 28, 1966

June 14, 1967

Nov. 1967

June 1968

Aug. 23, 1968

Nov. 14, 1968

Advanced Mariner 1969 was cancelled because of budgetary considerations.

Mariner 4 was launched successfully; the spacecraft passed by Mars on July

14, 1965.

A Mariner-Mars 1969 flyby project _was tentatively approved when the

Voyager Venus-Mars project was postponed (this led to Mariner 6 and 7).

A Mariner-Venus 1967 flyby project was approved when the Voyager VenusMars project was postponed (this led to Mariner 5).

A project approval document for Mariner-Mars 1969 was signed.

Mariner 5 launch was successful; the spacecraft passed by Venus on October

19.

Mariner-Mars 1971 was proposed after cancellation of Voyager (this led to

Mariner 8 and 9).

Mariner Venus-Mercury 1973 was proposed by the Space Science Board (this

led to Mariner 10). The first Mariner-Mars 1969 spacecraft was assembled.

A project approval document for Mariner-Mars 1971 was signed.

JPL was authorized to begin work on Mariner-Mars 1971.

Table 3-177.

Mariner I (Mariner R-I) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

July 22, 1962 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

202.8

Hexagonal frame base with 2 solar panels; antennas mounted atop the base

Base, 1.04 x .36

Overall height, 3.66

Span with panels deployed, 5.05

AgZn battery plus solar cells

Destroyed on range

JPL

Jack N. James

In-house (JPL) construction and testing of components built by many subcontractors.

Send spacecraft to near-vicinity of Venus; establish and maintain two-way communications with the spacecraft throughout flight; obtain data on the environment

in interplanetary space and near Venus; survey the planet's surface characteristics.

Microwave radiometer, JPL et al.

Infrared radiometer, JPL et al.

Fluxgate magnetometer, JPL, California Institute of Technology

Energetic particle detectors, JPL, CalTech, State University of Iowa

Cosmic dust detector, GSFC

Solar plasma spectrometer, JPL

Booster deviated from course and was destroyed by range safety officer 290 seconds

after liftoff.
336 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-178.

Mariner 2 (Mariner R-2) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Po wet source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks."

Aug. 27, 1962 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena B

202.8

Hexagonal frame base with 2 solar panels; antennas mounted atop the base

Base, 1.04 x .36

Overall height, 3.66

Span with panels deployed, 5.05

AgZn battery plus solar cells

in orbit around sun

JPL

Jack N. James

In-house (JPL) construction and testing of components built by many subcontractors.

Send spacecraft to near-vicinity of Venus; establish and maintain two-way communications with the spacecraft throughout flight; obtain data on the environment

in interplanetary space and near Venus; survey the planet's surface characteristics.

Same as for Mariner 1 (table 3-177).

Passed within 34 762 kilometers of Venus on December 14 and made a 42-minute instrument survey of the atmosphere and surface of the planet before going into

heliocentric orbit; made comprehensive measurements of the solar wind; transmissions received until January 4, 1963, from a maximum distance of 87.4 million

kilometers.

First spacecraft to scan another planet.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-179.

Mariner 3 (Mariner C, Mariner-Mars 1964) Characteristics

337

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 5, 1964 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

260.8

Octagonal base with 4 solar panels

Base, 1.27 x ,46

Overall height, 2.89

Span with panels deployed, 6.88

AgZn battery plus solar cells

In orbit around sun

JPL

Jack N. James

In-house (JPL) construction and testing of components built by many subcontractors.

Fly by Mars and study the planet's atmosphere and surface; develop operational

techniques for interplanetary missions; take measurements of the interplanetary environment; provide engineering experience in spacecraft operations during longduration flights away from the sun.

Cosmic dust detector, GSFC, Temple University

Cosmic ray telescope, University of Chicago

TV system, California Institute of Technology

Plasma probe, MIT, JPL

Magnetometer, JPL, UCLA

Trapped radiation detector, State University of Iowa

Ionization chamber, California Institute of Technology, JPL

Occultation, JPL, Cornell, Stanford University

Spacecraft failed to jettison and battery power dropped; there was no indication that

the solar panels were able to open and replenish power supply, and communications

were lost; spacecraft in permanent heliocentric orbit.
338 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-180.

Mariner 4 (Mariner D, Mariner-Mars 1964) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source."

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives."

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 28, 1964 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

260.8

Octagonal base with 4 solar panels

Base, 1.27 × .46

Overall height, 2.89

Span with panels deployed, 6.88

AgZn battery plus solar cells

In orbit around sun

JPL

Jack N. James

In-house (JPL) construction and testing of components built by many subcontractors.

Fly by Mars and study the planet's atmosphere and surface; develop operational

techniques for interplanetary missions; take measurements of the interplanetary environment; provide engineering experience in spacecraft operations during longduration flights away from the sun.

Same as for Mariner 3 (table 3-179).

Spacecraft flew by Mars on July 14, 1965, with 9844 kilometers being the closest approach; dense-packed lunar-type impact carriers discovered on the 1% of Mars visible in the 22V2 photographs received; ionosphere and atmosphere measured

somewhat less dense than expected; carbon dioxide thought to be a major constitutent of the atmosphere; solar plasma probe ceased working after 8 days. Mission was

terminated in December 1967.

First close-up images of Mars.

Other Lunar and Planetary Projects

Two other lunar and planetary projects were funded during the 1960s by

NASA's space science and applications program, but not beyond the paper study

phase. At one time, the unmanned lunar program called for three vehicles- Ranger,

Surveyor, and Prospector. Prospector, first funded in 1961, was the next step

beyond a Surveyor soft-lander. Launched by Saturn and weighing some 2270

kilograms, Prospector would "rove across the land, pick samples, deposit instrumented packages, take many close looks at the surface, detonate explosive

charges at various points for seismic measurements, and report all its findings back

to Earth." _t Prospector's designers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) even had

plans for a sample return task for the craft, and by 1963 Apollo planners wanted to

use the large spacecraft to store equipment that the astronauts would require when

landing on the moon. The first Prospectors were scheduled for launch in 1965-1966.

When Congress cut more than $23.5 million from the FY 1963 lunar and planetary

budget, this third class of unmanned lunar spacecraft was eliminated from the

roster.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-181.

Mariner 5 (Mariner E, Mariner-Venus 1967) Characteristics

339

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center."

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

June 14, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

244.9

Octagonal frame base with 4 solar panels and antennas

Base, 1.27 x .46

Overall height, 2.89

Span with panels deployed, 5.48

AgZn battery plus solar cells

In orbit around sun

JPL

Dan Schneiderman

In-house (JPL) construction and testing of components built by many subcontractors.

Fly by Venus within 3218 kilometers to provide data on atmosphere, radiation, and

magnetic field; return data on interplanetary environment before encounter with

Venus; provide first exercise of turnaround ranging technique of planetary distance.

Ultraviolet photometer, University of Colorado et al.

S-ban occultation, JPL, GSFC, Stanford University

Dual frequency occultation, Stanford University

Magnetometer, JPL et al.

Plasma probe, MIT, JPL

Trapped radiation detector, State University of Iowa

Celestial mechanics, JPL

Spacecraft passed within 4000 kilometers of Venus providing data on atmospheric

structure, radiation, and magnetic field; mass of Venus was further defined by processing flyby trajectory data; solar wind interaction with Venus shown to be different

from earth interaction. Mission was terminated in December 1967.

Voyager, as an advanced mission concept for planetary exploration, was first

considered in the spring of 1960. It was proposed that as early as 1967 this

1100-kilogram spacecraft orbit Mars or Venus and drop a landing capsule to the

planet's surface. Delays with developing the Saturn launch vehicle, the growing importance and cost of Apollo, and an ever-tightening federal budget stood in

Voyager's way. Supporting research and technology funds were used to pay for

preliminary design studies in FY 1962-1963, but for FY 1966 NASA had requested

$43 million for Voyager. By FY 1968, the price had risen to $71.5 million, the sum

needed to start full-scale design and development for Voyager's first flight to Mars,

rescheduled for 1973. Congress balked. With an expensive manned lunar project

under way that was as yet unproved, Congress would not allow NASA to undertake

another large venture. And Voyager promised to be large; so large, in fact, that a

separate program office had been established to manage it.

Before Voyager was cancelled on August 29, 1967, thousands of man-hours of

work and millions of dollars had been spent at JPL on defining the best approaches

for a combination orbiter-lander investigation of Mars (the Venus mission had been

dropped from consideration). The data generated did not go to waste, however.

Project Viking personnel who would oversee two Viking orbiter-lander missions to
340 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Mars in 1976 would make use of the many mission design studies, hardware and

scientific evaluations, and landing site surveys conducted in Pasadena. At NASA

Headquarters, Donald P. Hearth acted briefly as Voyager program manager before

Oran W. Nicks was named to that position in 1968. Donald P. Burcham led the effort at JPL, where Voyager design studies prepared by General Electric, Avco, and

others were evaluated.

For further information on Voyager, see chapter 4 of Edward C. and Linda N.

Ezell, On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958-1978, NASA SP-4212

(Washington, 1984).

DESCRIPTION--LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM

Except for a brief time (March 1960 to October 1961) during NASA's first I0

years, the life sciences was not centrally organized as a program on par with manned

spaceflight or space science, but was variously divided among the Office of Space

Science and Applications (OSSA), the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), and

the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART). Life sciences meant

many things at NASA, and it was this multitude of different interpretations that

kept it from becoming a strong program in its own right. For the team charged with

sending man into space and eventually to the moon, life science investigations could

help answer many questions: What kind of environment would man require inside

his spacecraft? What were the effects of prolonged weightlessness on the cardiovascular system? What were the maximum acceleration forces he could withstand

during launch and reentry?* Crew training and selection would also require a

medical doctor's expertise, as would monitoring the health of a crew in flight.

Management of "aerospace medicine" was assumed by NASA's manned spaceflight

experts. The designers of flight garments, spacecraft systems, and hardware with

which astronauts and pilots would work also needed the advice of specialists who

understood the physical and psychological needs and limits of man. Such

"bioengineering" projects were sponsored by OMSF and the advanced research and

technology office. The study of terrestrial life forms exposed to the conditions of

space (space biology) and the search for extraterrestrial life (exobiology) was left to

the agency's space scientists.

As most of the space biologist's work was done in laboratories under controlled

conditions that simulated the environment of space, not many flight projects were

totally devoted to biological payloads. Some experiments were performed on sounding rockets (e.g., BIOS 1, a 1961 Journeyman-launched reentry experiment sponsored by the Goddard Space Flight Center) and on high-altitude balloon flights (with

monkeys, hamsters, insects, and microscopic specimens being sent aloft). The one

spaceflight project funded exclusively by the life sciences program, Biosatellite, was

*Long before NASA was established, the Air Force had set up several aviation and aerospace

medicine institutions committed to answering the same kind of questions. For more information on Air

Force programs in this field and how the existence of Air Force medical research centers affected NASA's

organization in the early 1960s, see John A. Pitts, The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space

Program to 1980, NASA SP-4213 (Washington, 1985), chapters l and 2.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 341

judgedonlyapartialsuccess(eefollowingtables).Scientistsattemptedto observe

theeffectsof prolongedweightlessnessandradiationonthegrowthof plantsand

animalscarriedonsmallsatellites,butaretrorocketfailureterminatedthefirst mission, and bad weather and hardware problems contributed to the second spacecraft's

early return. Much of the data that was generated by the space biology program in

laboratories and with other small flight experiments was directly applicable to the

design of manned spacecraft and life support equipment and to aerospace medicine.

Exobiology was a more "purely" scientific endeavor, and it did not contribute to

the manned spaceflight program. But finding life elsewhere in the solar system

would most certainly have had a profound impact on scientists concerned with

discovering the origins and composition of earth-based life forms. Exobiologists

studied data returned by lunar and interplanetary spacecraft and pored over

photographs of the moon, Venus, and Mars for clues, chemical or geological, that

might lead them to some extraterrestrial life or to an environment that seemed conducive to harboring carbon-based life. With the increasing sophistication of interplanetary spacecraft capable of long-duration flights, scientists began designing

hardware for life-detecting instruments that could be sent near or to Venus and

Mars. Project Voyager would have been the exobiologists' first opportunity for a

lander mission on another planet, but its cancellation in 1967 put a temporary end to

years of work on Mars- and Venus-bound experiments. Most of this activity,

however, was redirected to Project Viking in the 1970s.

Before March 1960, biology and biotechnology was the exclusive concern of

manned spaceflight and advanced technology directorates, but in the spring of 1960

Administrator T. Keith Glennan took the advice of his Bioscience Advisory Committee and established a separate Office of Life Sciences, with Clark T. Randt as

director (see table 3-1). Five assistant directors (for bioengineering, grants and contracts, space biology, program planning, and aerospace medicine) were assigned to

Randt. This office would supplant the Special Committee on Life Sciences, which

had been formed by Glennan in 1958 to serve as an advisory body to Project Mercury personnel. The Bioscience Advisory Committee also recommended that NASA

establish a central laboratory for life sciences research. Ames Research Center in

California was chosen as the most likely site for such a facility, and Richard S.

Young was assigned to Ames in early 1961 to establish more formal life sciences activities there. However, the first new facilities at Ames were not constructed until

1963-1964. These new laboratories were equipped with the tools required by space

biologists and exobiologists, including a large animal shelter (vivarium) to house the

thousands of laboratory animals required for research.

With the change of administrations in Washington in November 1961 came a

change in NASA's organization. The new administrator, James E. Webb, abolished

the Office of Life Sciences Programs and reassigned the personnel throughout the

agency, mainly to the new Office of Manned Space Flight. A director of bioscience

programs, Orr E. Reynolds, was named in the space sciences directorate, but his

staff and budget were small. Reynolds served as the head of NASA Headquarters'

bioscience program throughout the remainder of NASA's first decade and beyond.

Reporting to Reynolds were chiefs of exobiology, environmental biology, physical

biology, behavioral biology, and planetary quarantine.

For further reading, see the following: on how life sciences fit into NASA's

space science and applications program, Homer E. Newell, Jr., Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, NASA SP-4211 (Washington, 1980), chap.
342 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

16;onAmesResearchCenter'srolein thelifesciences,EdwinP.Hartman,Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, NASA SP-4302

(Washington, 1970), pp. 321-23, 325, 426-28, 478-87, 496-502; and Elizabeth A.

Muenger, Searching the Horizon: A History ofAmes Research Center, 1940-1976,

NASA SP-4304 (Washington, 1985), chap. 5; and on space medicine, John A. Pitts,

The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980, NASA

SP-4213 (Washington, 1985); on exobiology, Edward C. and Linda N. Ezell On

Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958-1978, NASA SP-4212 (Washington,

1984), chap. 3; and on NASA's changing organization, Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 (Washington, 1966).

Biosatellite

First with balloons and later with sounding rockets and airplanes, biologists and

physicians had been observing the effects of high altitudes on living specimens for

many years before NASA was organized. In an environmentally controlled

spacecraft, scientists could study phenomena that were relative to their laboratory

investigations but often impossible to simulate on earth (for example, prolonged

weightlessness). Internal discussions among NASA personnel concerning a

recoverable biological probe or satellite mission date from early 1959, with a National Academy of Sciences Space Science Board summer study group endorsing the

suggestion in 1961. During such a mission, specialists could observe the effects of

radiation and weightlessness on plants, insects, and small animals and study how living systems react to being deprived from their normal day-night cycle.

Six Biosatellite flights were approved by NASA in 1962 and the project assigned

to Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California.* The missions would become

increasingly complex over time, progressing from two 3-day flights with a payload

of plant and insect matter, to two 21-day flights with a more sophisticated general

biology package, and culminating in two 30-day flights with a primate on board.

The response from the scientific community for experiments was enthusiastic, with

some 170 proposals being submitted for consideration. The 3-day missions could accommodate 14 relatively simple experiments (13 were actually flown); 4 investigations could be selected for the 21-day missions; and 4 areas of investigation were

allowed for the 30-day primate mission. In January 1964 after more than a year's

evaluation, the Bioscience Program Office at NASA Headquarters recommended 22

experiments to be included in the Biosatellite program.

Experiments on the first two flights would be exposed to one of two environments: radiation and weightlessness, or weightlessness only with no radiation.

Provisions were made in the capsule for an essentially radiation-free area to house

control experiments or those that did not require exposure to radiation, for an area

where radiation exposures were to be precisely timed (1 rad/day), and for an area

*For more on this project's management and the conflict it raised between the Office of Space

Science and Applications and the Office of Advanced Research and Technology, see John Pitts, The

Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Progam to 1980, NASA SP-4213 (Washington, 1985),

pp. 82-84.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 343

that wouldbeconstantlyirradiatedby a gammamatter.Wasps,flour beetles,

drosophilae,spiderwortplants,breadmold,andlysogenicbacteriawereusedforthe

radiation-weightlessnessexperiments.Generalbiologyinvestigations(noradiation)

wereaccomplishedwith frogeggs,amoebae,wheatseedlings,andpepperplants.

The21-daymissionswerenot flown,buta greatdealof workwasdoneon

readyingtheirexperimentpayloadsbeforetheywerecancelled.Theinvestigators

hadplannedto studytheeffectsof subgravityonmammalbody(whiterats)compositionandbiorhythms,ahigherplant(arabidopsis)lifecycle,andthegrowthand

developmentof humantissuecells(liverandrespiratory).

Onlyoneof the30-dayprimatemissions(Biosatellite3) was launched, and that

took place in the post-1968 period. Like all complex missions, it required a long lead

time during which to prepare the payload. Biosatellite Ys objectives were to determine the physiological effects of orbital flight on a subhuman primate (Macaque

nemestrina), to provide information about possible hazards to manned flight, and to

observe basic physiological phenomena. Of special interest were neurophysiological,

cardiovascular, and metabolic functions.

A request for proposals for the design and development of the Biosatellite

spacecraft was issued to industry in March 1963, with three firms (General Electric,

Northrop Aircraft Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation) being

awarded preliminary design study contracts the next month. GE's plans for a twosection craft were approved that summer and a letter contract awarded in March

1964. A reentry vehicle carrying the experiment capsule, equipped with retrorocket

and heat shield, would return the payload to earth, while an adapter section housing

the bulk of the spacecraft's systems would remain in orbit. A parachute-aerial

recovery system was adapted for Biosatellite from an existing Air Force capability.

Recoveries were targeted for the Pacific with a post-recovery laboratory available at

Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The capsule had to be delivered to the investigators

waiting at Hickam within six hours of the deorbit maneuver. General Electric's initial cost projection of $24 million had been grossly miscalculated. While the basic

spacecraft did not pose many unforeseen design problems or expenses, the development and integration of so many experiments from so many different organizations

led to ever-increasing costs and delays. Biologists and engineers were not accustomed to working together and did not communicate well, and biologists were not

familiar with the complexities and restrictions of spaceflight hardware. Biosatellite 1

was not sent on its way until September 1967, nearly two years late. Both 21-day

missions were eliminated because of money and time problems and an increasingly

critical Congress. And funds for only one primate mission were made available.

The launch and orbital phases of the Biosatellite 1 mission were successful, but

the retrorocket system failed, and the capsule did not reenter as planned. Although

teams searched the area of Australia and the Tasman Sea where the spacecraft

should have reentered when its orbit decayed in January 1967 (Operation Lost Ball),

nothing was found and no data were returned from the flight. The next year,

Biosatellite 2 was more successful, but the spacecraft did not complete all its required orbits. During its second day of flight, Biosatellite 2 frequently refused to accept commands, and meteorologists reported that a tropical storm was due to hit the

prime recovery area soon. Fearing that they might lose all contact with the satellite,

the flight control team commanded the recovery vehicle to deorbit one day early.

Recovery was complete on September 9, 1967. The Biosatellite 3 mission, launched
344 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

in 1969, did not go according to plan either. On the eighth day of flight, the primate

appeared unresponsive, and the team called the spacecraft down.

Managment of the Biosatellite project was static during its seven years. At

Headquarters, Thomas P. Dallow was Biosatellite chief, reporting to Director of

Bioscience Programs Orr Reynolds. Charles A. Wilson, taking over for retiring

Carlton Bioletti, led the team at Ames Research Center as project manager from

March 1965 until the project's termination. Project Biosatellite was under the direction of Ames's assistant director for development rather than the assistant director

for life sciences.

The best single source for further information is J. W. Dyer, ed., Biosatellite

Project Historical Summary Report (Moffett Field, CA: Ames Research Center,

1969).

Table 3-182.

Chronology of Biosatellite Development and Operations

Date Event

April 1959

Nov. 1960

Summer 1962

July 1962

Oct. 1962

Dec. 1962

Jan. 1963

March 1, 1963

April 11, 1963

May 1963

Aug 21, 1963

Jan. 16, 1964

Feb. 1964

March 19, 1964

NASA's Office of Space Science included among its goals a recoverable

payload mission that would subject living things to the environment of space.

In a planning document, the Office of Space Hight Programs suggested a

flight project with biological experiments to study the effects of space environment on living things (frog eggs, germinating seeds, bacteria, algae).

Several contracts were let for studies.

The Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences considered

methods by which NASA could held solve basic biological problems and suggested the study of the effects of weightlessness, disassociation of living

systems from day-night cycles, and radiation on various living things.

NASA announced that specialists at its centers were studying plans for a

biological project of three to six flights.

Ames Research Center was assigned the management of a biological satellite

project, unofficially called Biosatellite.

Six Biosatellite flights (3-, 21-, and 30-day missions) launched by Thor-Delta

vehicles were approved by NASA Headquarters, with the first launch

scheduled for late 1965. The Bioscience Subcommittee of NASA's Space

Science Steering Committee reviewed preliminary proposals for experiments.

The name Biosatellite was officially reserved for the project.

A request for proposals was issued for design and development studies of a

Biosatellite spacecraft.

General Electric, Northrop Aircraft Corp., and Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

were awarded eight-week preliminary design study contracts.

Panels of specialists convened to evaluate further proposals for experiments

to be carried on Biosatellite missions.

GE was selected for negotiations for a Biosatellite contract.

The Bioscience Programs Office recommended 22 experiments for the three

classes of missions.

Payload selection was made by the Office of Space Science and Applications.

GE was awarded a letter contract for design and fabrication of six spacecraft.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-182.

Chronologyof BiosatelliteDvelopmentandOperations(Continued)

345

Date Event

Dec.14,1966

Jan.1967

Spring1967

Sept.7,1967

July30,1968

July-Aug. 1968

Dec. 16, 1968

Biosatellite 1 was launched successfully, but controlled reentry was not

achieved three days later because a retrorocket failed.

A failure analysis review board was established.

Publicity was generated over Biosatellite cost overruns.

Biosatellite 2 was launched successfully; the payload was recovered on

September 9, one day ahead of schedule because the spacecraft was not

responding satisfactorily to commands and because inclement weather

threatened the recovery area.

GE's contract was modified to cover continuation of work on four remaining

spacecraft.

A month-long laboratory test of systems designed to maintain a primate for a

30-day mission was completed.

NASA terminated plans for Biosatellite C and D 21-day missions.

Table 3-183.

Biosatellite 1 (Biosatellite-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Po wer so urce:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

r_._ponsible

institution:

Results:

Dec. 14, 1966 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta (TAD)

381 (reentry vehicle, 199.6; adapter section, 181.4)

Cylindrical cone adapter and instruments section, plus a blunt-cone reentry vehicle

with heat shield

Adapter section, length, 2.06; diameter, 1.02-1.45

Reentry vehicle, length, 1.22; diameter at base, 1.02

Total length, 2.44

Diameter at point of mating with Delta, 1.37

AgZn batteries

Feb. 15, 1967

Ames Research Center (ARC)

Charles A. Wilson

C. M. Wignet

General Electric, prime

Observe the effects of weightlessness and gamma radiation on the growth of plants

and animals over a three-day period; recover payload.

Total of 13 experiments using pepper plants, spiderworts, corn and wheat seedlings,

amoeba, frog eggs, mold, flour beetles, wasps, bacteria, and fruit flies; the experiments came from several universities, private labs, and ARC

No useful data were obtained because a retrorocket failure prevented the controlled

return of the payload.
346 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-184.

Biosatellite 2 (Biosatellite-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle."

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Sept. 7, 1967 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta (TAD)

381 (reentry vehicle, 199.6; adapter section, 181.4)

Cylindrical cone adapter and instruments section, plus a blunt-cone reentry vehicle

with heat shield

Adapter section, length, 2.06; diameter, 1.02-1.45

Reentry vehicle, length, 1.22; diameter at base, 1.02

Total length, 2.44

Diameter at point of mating with Delta, 1.37

AgZn batteries

Oct. 4, 1967

ARC

Charles A. Wilson

C. M. Wignet

General Electric, prime

Observe the effects of weighlessness and gamma radiation on the growth of plants

and animals over a three-day period; recover payload.

Same as for Biosatellte 1 (table 3-183).

Because of decreasing communications reception and bad weather in the recovery

area, the capsule was deorbited ahead of schedule; the capsule was recovered on

September 9, with all specimens surviving. Some specimens did show the effects of

being submitted to prolonged weightlessness, apparently related to the rapidity of

cell processes; both enhancing and antagonistic effects were shown on various

specimens from radiation exposure experiments.

DESCRIPTION -METEOROLOGY PROGRAM

Meteorology is a field to which space science has been conspicuously applied.

As defined by Morris Tepper, leader of NASA's meteorology program during the

agency's first decade, meteorology is "concerned with the observation, description,

explanation and prediction of the atmosphere, specifically its state and its

motion." __ Early observers used ground readings, kites, and balloons (radiosondes)

to gather information on wind, temperature, barometric pressure, precipitation, and

other factors that affected local weather conditions and coordinated their findings

as best they could. But it was obviously necessary to collect data from larger areas

and from greater altitudes to generate more accurate forecasts. With the development of airplanes and then rockets, plus improved global communications networks, the meteorologist had new tools. Weather-sensing instruments carried on aircraft could be sent expeditiously over long distances, and sounding rockets could

take measurements above 30 kilometers and photograph the cloud cover (first accomplished in 1947). But the greatest boon to meteorology was the satellite, a plat-
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 347

formhighaboveearththatcouldrecordcontinuouslyandoveralargeareacloud

coverandothercriticalreadings.

A weathersatellitehadbeenproposedasapossibleprojectfor theInternational

GeophysicalYear(1957-1958),andtheNavalResearchLaboratoryflewa cloud

coverexperimentonits Vanguard 2 satellite in 1959. Interested in reliable weather

forecasts and the reconnaissance abilities of satellites, the military community had

been studying the feasibility and effectiveness of television-equipped weather

satellites since the late 1940s and had contracted with several private firms for

preliminary hardware and mission studies. Having been awarded such a contract by

the Air Force in 1951, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) went on to perform

independent research that led to the development of an orbital camera system. Their

efforts attracted the attention of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). A

joint RCA-ABMA project led to the construction of the prototype satellite Janus,

the forerunner of the Tiros satellite. When NASA was established in 1958, it inherited this weather satellite project.

Project Tiros (Television Infra-Red Observation Satellite) was highly successful,

from its first research and development flight in 1960 through its operational use as

a Weather Bureau-Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA) satellite

in 1965-1969. Nimbus, a second-generation meteorology observatory, was first orbited in 1964 (see also Applications Technology Satellite). The other half of NASA's

meteorology flight program was sounding rockets. Being primarily concerned with

the region below 105 kilometers for temperature and other readings, some NASA

scientists benefited from the frequent use of small, inexpensive Arcas rockets for the

bulk of their soundings. Satellites could not provide data about the upper

stratosphere or the mesophere since their orbits exceeded approximately 100

kilometers. Small sounding rockets carried balloon payloads aloft, which were

ejected, inflated, and then tracked by radar. Density of the air and wind velocity

were determined by the balloon's rate of descent and motion. Sensors carried by

small rockets recorded temperature and other characteristics during their flights up

and down, giving investigators vertical profiles of a particular area. In 1965,

NASA's small meteorology sounding rockets were launched from 14 different sites

around the world-from Point Barrow to McMurdo Sound, and from Midway

Island to Ascension Island. With larger sounding rockets such as the Nike-Cajun,

experimental techniques were improved, new hardware tested, and readings taken in

the upper atmosphere. By listening to acoustic grenades ejected from rockets,

specialists computed the wind and the temperature of the intervening air. In another

experiment, rockets released trails of sodium vapor that were tracked by ground

observers and recorded on film, yielding data on wind speed and direction. Air density and pressure circulation systems, the influence of tidal forces on the atmosphere, and geographical and seasonal variations in the atmospheric structure

were other areas of research to which the meteorology sounding rocket was applied.

The NASA Headquarters meteorology program was variously organized during

the 1958-1968 period, but Morris Tepper was its only director. Until mid-1961, the

program was part of the Applications and Manned Flights Programs Office, under

the Office of Space Flight Programs. In 1971, meteorology was one of the elements

of the satellite and sounding rocket program, part of the Office of Space Flight Programs. From late 1961 until May 1963, Tepper's people were a division of the new

Office of Applications, and with the organization of the Office of Space Science and

Applications (OSSA) in mid-1963 meteorology was assigned to it until 1966. The
348 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

program finished out the decade as part of the Space Applications Programs Office

of OSSA. William K. Widger was in charge of meteorological satellites until 1962;

Michael L. Garbacz assumed these duties in 1963. William C. Spreen was the

meteorology sounding rockets manager for most of the decade. Richard L. Haley

worked as advanced technology and projects manager or as Nimbus program

manager from 1964. Meteorology flight projects were assigned to the Goddard

Space Flight Center, where they were managed first by the aeronomy and

meteorology division, part of the Office of Space Science and Satellite Applications

(William G. Stroud, chief), and then from 1965 on by the projects directorate.

Since the data returned by the meterology satellites were of immediate use to

many parties, NASA worked with various agencies to ensure that the information

was disseminated through the National Weather Satellite Center to the proper

authorities and users and that the agency met the needs of the Department of

Defense, ESSA (formerly the Department of Commerce Weather Bureau), and

other groups. Interagency coordination committees further oversaw and reviewed

the government's requirements. Since weather forecasting was by necessity a global

undertaking, NASA also worked with private international meterological organizations and foreign government agencies in setting up workshops, establishing sounding rocket launch facilities and recovery operations, and developing direct data

readout capabilities.

Tiros/TOS/ESSA

The development of weather reconnaissance satellites was initiated several years

before NASA was established in 1958. In 1956, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency

(ABMA) awarded a contract to the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) that

would allow the company to continue the development and fabrication of a weather

satellite it had been studying since 1951. With the creation of the Advanced Research

Projects Agency (ARPA) by the Department of Defense in early 1958, authority for

RCA's Project Janus was transferred to this new group. By the time NASA assumed

responsibility for the nation's weather satellite programs in April 1959, RCA's

satellite had advanced through several design configuations-from a rod-shaped

9-kilogram payload that would be boosted by a Jupiter C missile, to a 39-kilogram

spin-stabilized disk (Janus II) that would be launched by a Juno II, to a much

heavier disk-shaped satellite (the Tiros configuration). This last design was slated at

first for launch by a Juno IV vehicle (development of which was dropped) and then

by a Thor-Able. Less than a year after NASA started managing the Tiros (Television

Infra-Red Observation Satellite) project, Tiros 1 was launched successfully from the

Eastern Test Range. Nine more research and development flights followed

(1961-1965), culminating in the first Tiros Operational System (TOS) launch in 1966

(ESSA 1). But even by the 1962 flight of Tiros 4, the U.S. Weather Bureau was able

to send daily transmissions of cloud cover maps provided by NASA to weather services around the world, and by April 1965 had issued more than 2100 storm bulletins

to some 50 countries based on Tiros data. Early fears voiced by the Soviet Union

that Tiros was no more than a "spy in the sky" were clearly unfounded since the images sent to earth by the weather satellite showed only the largest of geographical

features beneath the weather systems.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 349

ThebasicconfigurationoftheTirossatellitechangedlittleovertheyears.It was

an18-sidedhatbox-shapedcylinderwithadiameterof 1.07metersandaheightof

.48to .57meter,weighing120to 147kilograms.Tiroswascoveredwithsolarcells

that chargednickelcadmiumbatteries,whichpoweredthe criticaltwo-camera

televisionsystem.Onthefirsteightmissions,thecamerasweremountedonthebottom of thespacecraft,but on Tiros 9 the two cameras were positioned on the

satellite's curved outer ring pointing in opposite directions; as the spacecraft turned

on its side it rolled through space like a slow-turning wheel on an imaginary track

(the so-called cartwheel mode). Early Tiros satellites were launched in east-west orbits, but later weather satellites were put into polar north-south paths, which provided more ideal photographic lighting conditions and better coverage. The television system became more sophisticated, too, with the addition of an automatic picture transmission (APT) system on Tiros 8, which allowed for the transmission of

real-time cloud cover pictures to any APT ground receiver within audio range of the

satellite in a fashion similar to radio photograph transmissions. An advanced

vidicon camera system (AVCS) could take 6 or 12 pictures per orbit at 260-second

intervals, each image covering an area 3160 by 3160 kilometers, thereby obtaining

global coverage. Images were stored in an onboard tape recorder for transmission to

the National Environmental Satellite Center. In addition to the television cameras,

some Tiros spacecraft carried infrared-scanning and temperature-probing instruments.

The Weather Bureau (later the Environmental Science Services Administration)

participated in the Tiros project from its beginnings in the late 1950s, and this

Department of Commerce agency was responsible for disseminating data returned

by satellites to weather services and scientists. A formal agreement on an operational

satellite system was first reached by NASA and the Weather Bureau in March 1964.

Once Tiros became operational, the Bureau assumed its management, while NASA

was charged with spacecraft-launch vehicle development and procurement on a costreimbursable basis. Tiros Operational System missions (ESSA 1 through 9) were all

successful, providing daily information on cloud cover, upper winds, pressure, and

precipitation on a global scale. This kind of data made possible daily weather

forecasts, storm and marine advisories, gale and hurricane warnings, cloud

analyses, and polar and Great Lakes navigational information.

At NASA Headquarters, Morris Tepper as chief of meteorology programs was

in charge of Tiros management, sharing the responsibilities with William K. Widget

in 1962. In mid-1963, Michael L. Garbacz was named flight project program

manager and led the Tiros-TOS team at Headquarters for the remainder of the

decade. Tiros, assigned to the Goddard Space Flight Center, was managed by

William G. Stroud (Tiros 1), Rudolf A. Stampfl (Tiros2), Robert M. Rados (Tiros3

through ESSA 1), and William W. Jones (ESSA 2 through 8). RCA served as prime

spacecraft contractor.

For further reading on the early history of Tiros, see John H. Ashby, "A

Preliminary History of the Evolution of the TIROS Weather Satellite Progam,"

NASA HHN-45, Aug. 1964; and GSFC and U.S. Weather Bureau, Final Report on

the Tiros I Meteorological Satellite System, NASA TR-R-131 (Washington, 1962).
350 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

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SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 351

Table 3-185.

Chronology of Tiros/TOS/ESSA

Development and Operations

Date Event

1946

1951

1956

Feb. 1958

March 1958

Summer-Winter 1958

April 13, 1959

Sept. 26, 1969

March 7, 1960

April 1, 1960

Oct. 10, 1960

Nov. 23, 1960

June 1961

July 12, 1961

April 15, 1962

June 19, 1962

Sept. 18, 1962

Feb. 12, 1963

June 19, 1963

Dec. 21, 1963

March 20, 1964

July 15, 1964

Jan. 22, 1964

July 2, 1965

In a report for the Air Force, Douglas Aircraft (Project RAND) suggested

that weather forecasting could be one of the uses to which orbiting satellites

could be put.

RAND contracted with the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) to study

the feasibility of using cameras on orbiting satellites.

RCA, acting on its own, submitted proposals to the Department of Commerce Weather Bureau and the military for a television-equipped weather

reconnaissance satellite. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) contracted with RCA for work on such a spacecraft (called Janus), to be launched with Jupiter C in the spring of 1958.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) assumed responsibility for

the television satellite project, with new emphasis being placed on its use as a

meteorology satellite.

RCA redesigned Janus for use with the Juno II launch vehicle (Army Ordnance Missile Command); the satellite effort as redirected toward a

meteorology mission was called Tiros (Television Infra-Red Observation

Satcllite).

Tiros was assigned a new more powerful launch vehicle-first Juno IV,

which was cancelled, and then Thor-Able. RCA's contract with ARPA called

for the manufacture of 10 satellites.

Project Tiros was transferred to NASA, with Goddard Space Flight Center

being assigned project management responsibility.

The first flight model of Tiros was readied for systems integration.

Tiros A-I was shipped to the launch facility in Florida.

Tiros 1 was launched successfully.

An interagency meeting was held on the establishment of an operational

meteorology satellite system.

Tiros 2 was launched successfully.

NASA awarded a letter contract to RCA for four Tiros satellites.

Tiros 3 was launched successfully.

The U.S. Weather Bureau began daily international transmissions of cloud

cover maps based on Tiros 4 photographs.

Tiros 5 was launched successfully.

Tiros 6 was launched successfully; for the first time two Tiros satellites were

in operation simultaneously.

RCA was awarded a letter contract for _even Tiros satellites.

Tiros 7 was launched successfully.

Tiros 8 was launched successfully.

NASA and the Weather Bureau reached an agreement on an operational

satellite system, utilizing an improved Tiros.

RCA was awarded a contract for the Tiros Operational Satellite (TOS) program.

Tiros 9 was launched successfully (first of the cartwheel-mode spacecraft).

Tiros 10 was launched successfully (funded by the Weather Bureau).
352 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table3-185.

Chronologyof Tiros/TOS/ESSA

DevelopmentadOperations(Continued)

Date Event

Feb.3,1966

Feb.28,1966

May11,1966

Oct.2,1966

Jan.26,1967

April20,1967

Nov.10,1967

Aug.16,1968

Dec.15,1968

ESSA 1 was launched successfully (first satellite of the TOS system, all of

which would be funded by the Environmental Science Services Administration, formerly the Weather Bureau).

ESSA 2 was launched successfully.

NASA announced that it would negotiate with RCA for a design study of an

improved Tiros.

ESSA 3 was launched successfully.

ESSA 4 was launched successfully.

ESSA 5 was launched successfully.

ESSA 6 was launched successfully.

ESSA 7 was launched successfully.

ESSA 8 was launched successfully.

Table 3-186.

Tiros 1 (Tiros-A-l) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Project scientist:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

April 1, 1960 (ETR)

Thor-Able

122.5

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 x .48

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

W. G. Stroud

H. I. Butler

RCA-Astro-Electronic Products Div., prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Test experimental TV techniques leading to an eventual worldwide meteorological

information system.

2-camera TV system

Transmitted 22 952 images over 89 days April l-June 17; provided first global cloud

cover images from near-circular orbit.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 353

Table 3-187.

Tiros 2 (Tiros-B, -A-2) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager."

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Nov. 23, 1960 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

127

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 x .48

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Rudolf A. Stampfl

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Test experimental TV techniques and infrared equipment leading to an eventual

worldwide meteorological information system

2-camera TV system

Wide-field radiometer, GSFC

Scanning radiometer, GSFC

Transmitted 36 156 images over 376 days; (November 23, 1960-December 4, 1961);

combined infrared and photographic measurements; wide-angle photography

substandard, but useful cloud pictures received.

Table 3-188.

Tiros 3 (Tiros-C, -A-3) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

July 12, 1961 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

129.3

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 × .48

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Develop satellite weather observation system; obtain photographs of earth's cloud

cover for weather analysis; determine amounts of solar energy absorbed and emitted

by earth.

2-camera TV system

Omnidirectional radiometer, University of Wisconsin

Wide-field radiometer, GSFC

Scanning radiometer, GSFC

Transmitted 35 033 images over 230 days (July 12, 1961-February 1962); one

camera failed, but the other worked until February 1962; spotted 50 tropical storms

during hurricane season 1961.
354 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-189.

Tiros 4 (Tiros-D, -A-9) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager."

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Feb. 8, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

129.3

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 x .48

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Develop principles of a weather satellite system; obtain cloud cover and radiation

data for use in meteorology.

2-camera TV system

Omnidirectional radiometer, University of Wisconsin

Wide-field radiometer, GSFC

Scanning radiometer, GSFC

Transmitted 32 593 images over 161 days; early photos excellent because of new

wide-angle lens, but images became less clear after June 14, 1962; photos used in

weather analyses in support of Project Mercury; data also used in a joint U.S.

Weather Bureau-Canadian Department of Transportation ice reconnaissance of the

St. Lawrence River.

Table 3-190.

Tiros 5 (Tiros-E, -A-50) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weigh t (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

June 19, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

129.7

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 × .56

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Develop principles of a weather satellite system; obtain cloud cover data for use in

meteorology.

2-camera TV system

Omnidirectional radiometer, University of Wisconsin

Wide-field radiometer, GSFC

Scanning radiometer, GSFC

Transmitted 58 226 images over 321 days; spotted 5 tropical storms worldwide during August; launched at a higher inclination than previous Tiros satellites to provide

greater coverage of the August-September hurricane season.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-191.

Tiros 6 (Tiros-F, -A-51) Characteristics

355

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Sept. 18, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

127.5

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 × .56

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Develop principles of a weather satellite system; obtain cloud cover data for use in

meteorology.

2-camera TV system

Transmitted 68 557 images over 389 days; one camera failed December 1, 1962; provided data for hurricane season; provided operational support for the Army's Project Swift Stride cold regions study, for Columbia University and Texas A&M projects, and for Project Mercury.

Table 3-192.

Tiros 7 (Tiros-G, -A-52) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

June 19, 1963 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

134.7

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 × .56

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Launch satellite capable of viewing earth's surface, cloud cover, and atmosphere by

TV cameras and radiation sensors; control satellite attitude by magnetic means; acquire and process collected data.

2-camera TV system

Omnidirectional radiometer, University of Wisconsin

Electron temperature probe, GSFC

Transmitted 125 331 pictures over 1809 days; coverage extended to 65 degrees N and

65 degrees S latitudes; launch date selected to provide maximum coverage during the

hurricane season in the northern hemisphere; electron temperature probe malfunctioned after 26 days; tracked hurricanes in 1963, 1964, and 1965; provided support

for Ranger, Mariner, and Gemini missions.
356 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-193.

Tiros 8 (Tiros-H, -A-53) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Dec. 21, 1963 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

120.2

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 x .56

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Launch satellite capable of viewing cloud cover and atmosphere by TV cameras; acquire and process collected data from satellite and control its attitude by magnetic

means; evaluate automatic picture transmission (APT) system.

2-camera TV system and APT system

Transmitted 102 463 images over 1287 days; first of the series to carry real-time experimental camera subsystem (APT), which could be queried by multiple local

ground stations with APT receivers.

Table 3-194.

Tiros 9 (Tiros-l, -A-54) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

cell ter:

Project manager."

Con tractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Jan. 22, 1965 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

138.3

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 x .48

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Evaluate new cartwheel configuration Tiros spacecraft; explore the use of sunsynchronous orbits.

2-camera TV system

Transmitted 88 892 images over 1238 days; increased coverage; ejected into elliptical

polar orbit.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-195.

Tiros 10 (OT-I) Characteristics

357

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

July 2, 1965 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

131.5

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 x .48

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

Provide additional operational data for Weather Bureau requirements; prove out

Tiros Operational System.

2-camera TV system

Transmitted 79 874 pictures over 730 days; more daily data on typhoon and hurricane breeding areas.

First Weather Bureau-funded Tiros spacecraft.

Table 3-196.

ESSA 1 (OT-3) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Feb. 3, 1966 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

138.3

18-sided polyhedron

1.07 × .56

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert M. Rados

RCA, prime spacecraft and TV cameras

ESSA operational satellite.

2-camera APT TV system

Transmitted 111 144 images over 861 days.

Funded and managed by ESSA.
358 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-197.

ESSA 2 (OT-2) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Dimension s (m):

Date of reentry:

Project manager:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Feb. 28, 1966 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

131.5

1.07 × .57

In orbit

William W. Jones

ESSA operational satellite.

All systems operated as planned.

See table 3-196 for spacecraft description.

Table 3-198.

ESSA 3 (TOS-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weigh t (kg):

Dimensions (m):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Oct. 2, 1966 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TA1D)

147.4

1.07 x .57

In orbit

ESSA operational satellite; included advanced vidicon camera system (AVCS);

replace ESSA 1.

All systems operated as planned; transmitted 97 076 images over 241 days.

See tables 3-196, 3-197 for spacecraft description.

Table 3-199.

ESSA 4 (TOS-B)

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Dimensions (m):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Jan. 26, 1967 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

131.5

1.07 × .57

In orbit

ESSA operational satellite; two ATP camera systems; replace ESSA 2.

All systems operated as planned, but one camera system became inoperable on

January 29, 1967; transmitted 27 129 images over 110 days.

See tables 3-196, 3-197 for spacecraft description.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-200.

ESSA 5 (TOC-C) Characteristics

359

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Dimensions (m):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

April 20, 1967 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

147.4

1.07 × .57

In orbit

ESSA operational satellite; two AVCS; replace ESSA 3.

All systems operated as planned.

See tables 3-196, 3-197 for spacecraft description.

Table 3-201.

ESSA 6 (TOS-D) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Dimensions (m):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Nov. 10, 1967 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

129.7

1.07 × .57

In orbit

ESSA operational satellite; two APT camera systems.

All systems operated as planned.

See table 3-196, 3-197 for spacecraft description.

Table 3-202.

ESSA 7 (TOS-E) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weigh t (kg):

Dimensions (m):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Aug. 16, 1968 (WTR)

Long-tank Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta

147.4

1.07 x .57

In orbit

ESSA operational satellite; two AVCS; take readings with a flat-plate radiometer;

replace ESSA 5.

All systems operated as planned.

See tables 3-196, 3-197 for spacecraft description.

Table 3-203.

ESSA 8 (TOS-F) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Dimensions (m):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 15, 1968 (WTR)

Long-tank Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta

136.1

1.07 × .57

In orbit

ESSA operational satellite; two ATP camera systems.

All systems operated as planned.

See tables 3-196, 3-197 for spacecraft description.
360 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Nimbus

Shortly after the launch of the first Tiros weather satellite in the spring of 1959,

NASA officials informed Congress of their plans for a second-generation

meteorology payload that would orbit earth on a near-polar trajectory. This new

satellite would provide sophisticated global coverage for an extended lifetime. _3 The

spacecraft's stabilization system would be designed to give the flight team greater

control over the spacecraft's position and, thereby, over the readings and

photographs Nimbus would take. In addition to automatic picture transmission and

advanced vidicon camera systems that could produce very high-quality cloud cover

photographs, Nimbus spacecraft would be equipped with high-resolution and

medium-resolution radiometers for nighttime infrared readings, which would give

meteorologists information on heat retention on a global scale. Mapping water

vapor and stratospheric temperature patterns also would be made possible with data

returned by Nimbus.

Project Nimbus, approved by NASA Headquarters officials in the summer of

1959, fell behind schedule and overran its budget, which prompted the scrutiny of

Congress. A horizon scanner, which would allow the spacecraft to be operated in a

sun-synchronous orbit, and overall hardware weight gains were the spacecraft's major problems. The butterfly-shaped Nimbus (360-410 kilograms) was developed and

fabricated by General Electric's Spacecraft Department under the direction of the

Goddard Space Flight Center. Rotating solar paddles, although they malfunctioned

on Nimbus 1, provided enough storable energy to power the spacecraft's instruments

for nighttime use. By using Nimbus cloud cover photographs, which covered almost

2 million kilometers per sequence, NASA and the Weather Bureau (and additionally

the Department of Defense) hoped to establish an operational weather observation

system. Because of early setbacks with the development of hardware and reported

plans for reducing the expected lifetime of the spacecraft, the Weather Bureau abandoned its plans and its funding support for a Nimbus Operational System (NOS) in

September 1963. NASA, however, continued Nimbus as a research and development

project aimed at developing an observatory system that would meet the future needs

of the nation's atmospheric and earth scientists.

The first Nimbus spacecraft was orbited in August 1964. The images received

from Nimbus 1 were remarkably clear and much better than Tiros images, but a

hardware problem forced the mission's premature termination on orbit 371, in the

second month of operations. By using the more powerful Thrust-augmented ThorAgena B, NASA was able to design a heavier payload for Nimbus 2. This second

spacecraft returned data for more than 32 months (1966-1969), including the

"satellite pictures" that became a popular feature on television news and weather

programs. Because a Thor engine malfunctioned on the long-tank Thorad-Agena D

during the launch of the third Nimbus, the entire vehicle was destroyed 121 seconds

after liftoff on May 18, 1968. The Nimbus B mission, repeated in 1969, was more

sophisticated than the first two, having two infrared spectrometers, an interrogation

and location system for determining the position of other man-made objects in

space, two radiometers, an ultraviolet radiation flux experiment, and an image

dissector camera system system capable of taking daytime pictures of the entire

earth with a resolution of 3.2 kilometers at picture center. The 570-kilogram satellite

was powered by a new radioisotope thermoelectric generator (SNAP-19) augmented
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 361

by solar cells.* The seven-mission Nimbus program (1964-1978) contributed widely

to the development of experiment hardware and image systems, provided scientists

with a variety of data on cloud cover, temperature, and other weather-related

phenomena, and became the nation's principal satellite program for remote-sensing

research.

Richard L. Haley, advanced technology and projects program manager since

early 1964, was named Nimbus program manager in early 1965. He saw the program

through the agency's first decade. At the Goddard Space Hight Center, William G.

Stroud was Nimbus project manager from February 1960 to August 1961, when

Harry Press took the job. General Electric was the prime contractor.

*For more on the SNAP-19 RTG and sources for nuclear onboard electric power, see chapter 4.

Table 3-204.

Chronology of Nimbus Development and Operations

Date Event

April 1959

Aug. 1959

March 8, 1960

June 1960

Fall 1960

Dec. 1960

Feb. 3, 1961

April 1961

Nov. 1961

Jan. 1962

Aug-Sept. 1962

An advanced meteorology satellite research and development project was

described by NASA at FY 1960 authorization hearings before the House of

Representatives and at FY 1959 supplementary appropriations hearings.

A Nimbus research and development program was approved by NASA

Headquarters.

The Weather Bureau solicited proposals for an engineering design study of an

infrared spectrometer for a weather statellite.

The Weather Bureau Panel on Observations over Space Data Regions issued

a report suggesting the need for a research and development satellite beyond

Tiros.

NASA issued a request for proposals for Nimbus spacecraft design.

The Radio Corporation of America (RCA) was awarded a contract for

development and fabrication of an advanced vidicon camera system (AVCS)

for Nimbus.

General Electric (GE) was selected as contractor for spacecraft fabrication

and subsystems integration for two Nimbus satellites. GE was chosen over

Temco, RCA, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., Bendix, and Republic

Aviation Corp.

The Panel on Operation Meteorological Satellites, an interagency group,

recommended expanding the Nimbus research and development project into

a Nimbus Operation System (NOS); this would be a joint undertaking

(NASA and the Weather Bureau).

A preliminary project development plan was prepared at NASA's Goddard

Space Flight Center.

The Nimbus spacecraft underwent a rigorous test program at GE. NASA and

the Weather Bureau signed an agreement providing for implementation of

NOS. The Weather Bureau approved the preliminary project development

plan.

The House of Representatives Science and Astronautics Applications Subcommittee held hearings on the effects of postponing the first Nimbus

launch.
362 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-204.

Chronology of Echo Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Dec. 1962

Jan. 1963

June 1963

July 1963

Sept. 1963

Sept. 18, 1963

Oct. 1963

Aug. 11, 1964

Aug. 28, 1964

Jan. 29, 1965

June 1965

May 15, 1966

Aug. 13, 1966

May 18, 1968

June 28, 1968

Dec. 1968

The Weather Bureau reprogrammed funds from NOS to the Tiros Operational System (TOS).

AVCS was qualified as a subsystem. The Department of Defense (DoD)

questioned the adequacy of Nimbus for military requirements.

The Weather Bureau provided NASA with DoD-Weather Bureau requirements for Nimbus.

The project development plan was revised to incorporate DoD-Weather

Bureau recommendations.

DoD and the Weather Bureau advised the Bureau of the Budget that NASA's

research and development program for meteorology satellites should be

placed under their control; the Weather Bureau advised NASA that it was

withdrawing from NOS as of October 4.

GE was awarded a contract for developing operating procedures for the Nimbus control center.

NASA advised the Weather Bureau of its intentions of continuing a Nimbus

research and development project; a revised project development plan was

approved by NASA Headquarters on October 10.

A faulty relay box in the Thor-Agena B launch vehicle postponed the first

Nimbus launch.

Nimbus 1 was launched successfully, but the spacecraft ceased operating on

September 23, 1964, because of malfunctions.

A General Acccounting Office report accused NASA of spending $1.2

million unnecessarily on Nimbus by failing to react to new spacecraft weight

design goals.

The project development plan was revised to reflect the cancellation of NOS

and operation of a second Nimbus mission.

Nimbus 2 was launched successfully.

A NASA review board and the House of Representatives Science and

Astronautics Committee NASA Oversight Subcommittee began inquiries

into OGO, OAO, and Nimbus (Nimbus 1) failures.

An attempted Nimbus launch using a long-tank Thorad-Agena D failed

because the Thor malfunctioned; the entire vehicle was destroyed 121 seconds

after liftoff.

Nimbus 2's tape recorder became inoperable.

Hittan Associates, Inc., was chosen to evaluate the SNAP-19 nuclear power

system for the Nimbus B spacecraft.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-205.

Nimbus 1 (Nimbus-A) Characteristics

363

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Aug. 28, 1964 (WTR)

Thor-Agena B

376.5

Hexagonal upper section with solar array paddles connected by a truss to a lower

housing sensory ring

Height, 2.9

Width with paddles extended, 3.4

Ring diameter, 1.52

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

May 16, 1974

GSFC

Harry Press

General Electric Co., Spacecraft Dept., prime

Prove basic spacecraft design; obtain high-resolution TV cloud mapping images;

demonstrate APT role; obtain nighttime infrared radiometer readings on a global

scale.

APT and AVCS camera systems

High-resolution infrared radiometer, GSFC

Transmitted 27 000 pictures over 27 days; data returned from all sensors as expected; mission was terminated on September 23, 1964, orbit 371, when the solar array paddies were unable to continue tracking the sun.

Table 3-206.

Nimbus 2 (Nimbus-C) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center."

Project manager:

Contractor."

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

May 15, 1966 (WTR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Agena B

413.68

Hexagonal upper section with solar array paddles connected by a truss to a lower

housing sensory ring

Height, 2.9

Width with paddles extended, 3.4

Ring diameter, 1.52

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Harry Press

GE, prime

Demonstrate long lifetime meteorology satellite observatory; demonstrate role of

direct readout of infrared nighttime cloud cover to APT ground stations; map water

vapor and stratospheric temperature patterns.

APT and AVCS camera systems

High-resolution infrared radiometer, GSFC

Medium-resolution infrared radiometer, GSFC

Transmitted 210 000 images over 978 days; all systems operated as expected.
364 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

DESCRIPTION-COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM

As early as 1945, writer-scientist Arthur C. Clarke proposed that an active communications satellite be developed to assist with the relaying of long-distance

transmissions, and by the early 1960s the need for such high-altitude relays could not

be ignored. Because of its elevation, a satellite could offer a simultaneous line-ofsight connection between two points that are shielded from one another by the

curvature of the earth. Two kinds of satellites were possible: passive satellites that

would act as mirrors, retransmitting no more than they intercepted, and active

satellites that would receive and amplify a signal before retransmitting it to the

ground. _4 During the 1950s, the Navy established a communications system that

used the moon as a passive reflector for radar waves (Communication by Moon

Relay), and the Air Force launched an Army-built active communications satellite

experiment (Project Score, 1958), by which President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent

taped Christmas greetings. Advanced planners at the National Advisory Committee

for Aeronautics (NACA) recommended in the spring of 1958 that the new space

agency take an active part in satellite communications research with studies of channel requirements, reflector and active relays, and radio wave propagation. They

thought that a passive reflector could be launched by NASA as early as FY 1959.15

Project Echo was NASA's first flight experiment in the communications field.

The first launch of a large reflector balloon took place in 1960. NASA's Relay and

Syncom satellites began providing active relay capabilities in 1962 and 1963. Also in

1962, the agency launched two Telstar satellites for the American Telephone &

Telegraph Company (AT&T). Like weather satellites, orbiting communications

relays were directly and immediately applicable to the general public's welfare.

Demonstrations of what this new technology could accomplish were a popular part

of the program; these included television, teletype facsimile, and voice operations.

On television sets around the world, viewers watched as astronaut L. Gordon

Cooper was recovered from his Mercury capsule after orbiting the earth (1963, via

Relay 1), as Pope Paul VI visited the Middle East (1964, via Relay 1), as Khrushchev

toured Poland (1964, via Relay 2), and as Olympic athletes competed in Tokyo

(1964, via Syncom 3). Special demonstrations soon gave way to daily routine service.

NASA launched six INTELSATS for the Communications Satellite Corporation

(COMSAT) in 1965-1968, establishing a global operational network of communications satellites capable of voice (240 channels), television, and teletype facsimile

transmissions.

COMSAT, which served as the operational arm of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), was authorized by Congress in

August 1962 to exploit the commercial possibilities of the new communications

satellite field. Allocating frequencies for space communications was the responsibility of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). NASA was assigned the task

of launching these commercial spacecraft, furnishing technical assistance, and

cooperation with COMSAT on research and development projects. Within NASA,

the International Affairs Office interacted with the State Department in arranging

for the many ground stations required around the world for various communications satellite projects. The National Communications System coordinated U.S.

government needs (see table 3-208). As shown in the organizational chart (fig. 3-5),

all these groups had to work together to deliver an operational communications

system.

366 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

SPECIAL ASSISTANT

TO THE PRESIDENT

FOR

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

DIRECTOR OF

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

MANAGEMENT

[ E.ASST DIRECTOR, I

OFFICE OF I

E2GE___C_:LAN2,N_J

ASSISTANT FOR

NATIONAL

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

MANAGER,

NATIONAL

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

I

DEPARTMENT

OF

DEFENSE

DEFENSE

COMMUNICATIONS--

SYSTEM

I i

ARMY NAVY

EXECUTIVE

AGENT

NCS

[

DIRECTOR,

DEFENSE

COMMUNICATIONS

AGENCY

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY

OF

DEFENSE

I --- --'-I .... I' 1

I i I I i' I I

GENERAL I DEPARTMENT I NATIONAL AERONAUTICS i

FEDERAL I

SERVICES I OF - AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION I STATE I & SPACE I

ADMINISTRATION I AGENCY I

FEDERAL TELE- I DIPLOMATIC TELE- /NATIONAL AERONAUTICS & IFEDERAL I

COMMUNICATIONS .JcoMMUNICATIONSJ SPACE ADMINISTRATION =.IAVIATION AGENCY-/

SYSTEM SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS

I

AIR FORCE

Figure 3-5. The National Communications Systems encompasses total Federal assets.

At NASA Headquarters, communications satellites were the concern of the Office of Space Flight Development until a reorganization in 1962 placed them under

the purview of the Office of Applications. In June 1963, communications and

navigation programs became a directorate of the new Office of Space Science and

Applications (OSSA). In a 1966 reorganization of OSSA, communications programs became part of the Space Applications Programs Office. Until January 1966,

Leonard Jaffe led the Headquarters communications team through its various

management reassignments. A. Marion Andrus, associated with advanced communications systems since the early 1960s, was named program chief in 1966. Joseph

R. Burke was satellite projects program manager from 1963 through 1965; from

1966 through 1969 Wayne C. Mathews, John Kelleher, and Jerome Friebaum all

took a turn as manager. A separate navigation satellite manager, Eugene Ehrlich,

assumed responsibility for this special class of communications satellites in late 1965

(by March 1966 this office had been expanded to include traffic control activities).

Goddard Space Flight Center was assigned the hardware development and program

management of the various communications satellites. Goddard's Office of Space

Science and Satellite Applications oversaw the communications satellite projects until 1965, when the projects directorate assumed the task. Goddard had responsibility

for launching the INTELSAT series and providing related services, while COMSAT

controlled operations.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 367

In 1963, OSSA combined the responsibility for navigation and communications

satellites, their technical requirements being very similar. With increasing traffic in

the air and on the sea, it was becoming necessary to develop a system by which a central body could monitor and control traffic in congested areas and respond to

emergency situations. Plans called for an operational system by the early 1970s.

Large direct broadcast (real-time) satellites made up another class of communications satellites under study at NASA in the 1960s. Advanced planners were calling

for flight projects to begin in the 1970s.

A general introduction to communications satellites can be found in J. R.

Pierce, The Beginnings of Satellite Communications (San Francisco: San Francisco

Press, Inc., 1968).

Table 3-207.

Comparison, Relay, Telstar, Syncom

Item Relay Telstar Syncom

Orbit

Attitude

Control

Output

Power

Baseband

Width

Channel

Disposition

Operating

Modes

Elliptical

Magnetic coil

10 Watts, TWT

3 MCS, wideband

96 KCS 2-way telephone

Two identical transponders only

one usable at a time, each having

one wideband (TV) and two

narrow-band (12 telephone) channels, one for each direction

TV 1-way or,

300 data channel

l-way or,

12 telephone circuits

2-way

Elliptical Circular, 22 300 mi.

Magnetic coil Nitrogen jets

3 Watts, TWT 2 Watts, TWT

3 MCS 4 KC per channel

One wideband (TV)

channel; for 2-way

phone, signal strength

at satellite is equalized

by adjusting transmitter

power

TV 1-way or,

wideband data I-way

or, 60 telephone

circuits 2-way

Two telephone channels, one for each

direction

One 2-way telephone

circuit

Frequencies 1725 Up 4390 Up 7363 Up

(MCS) 4170 Down 4170 Down 1815 Down
368 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-208.

Organizational Interactions

Communication & Navigation Satellite Programs

NASA Flight Programs

ECHO RELAY SYNCOM

ITU

NAV CSC PARTICIATS PROGRAM PROGRAM PATION

DOD X X X X X

STATE X X

TREASURY X

INTERIOR X

COMMERCE X

FAA X X X

USIA X X X

FOC X X X

BROADCASTERS X X X

COM SAT CORP X X

FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS X X X X

SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY X X X X

NAT'L SPACE COUNCIL X X X X X X X

DIR. TELECOMM'S.

MGMT. X X X X X X X

NAV = Joint Navigation Satellite Committee

CSC =Communications Satellite Corp.

ITU =International Telecommunication Union

From NASA Hq., "Program Review Document, Communication & Navigation Programs," Sept. 22,

1964. p. 21.

Echo

Echo was NASA's first communications satellite flight project. The balloon-like

passive reflector was initially sponsored by the National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics (NACA) as an International Geophysical Year (IGY) air density experiment. In 1956 at NACA's Langley research facility, William J. O'Sullivan, after

assessing the value of prospective IGY experiments designed to measure the density

of earth's atmosphere, proposed that a low-density inflatable structure that could be

tracked optically would serve as a good measure of aerodynamic drag. Twice attempts were made to launch O'Sullivan's spheres along with IGY payloads, but

launch vehicle malfunctions with Juno I and Vanguard thwarted the Langley team's

efforts.*

If a satellite of the type O'Sullivan envisioned were equipped with small radio

beacons, it could be followed by radar and optical means, significantly increasing

*An attempt on August 14, 1959, to launch a Beacon inflatable satellite also failed because Juno ll's

fuel supply was depleted prematurely. The air density experiment was finally realized as Explorer 9

(February 16, 1961), Explorer 19 (December 19, 1963), and Explorer39 (August 8, 1968).
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 369

the period during each orbit it could be tracked. And if the satellite carried a reflector or acted as a reflector as a whole, sending back radar signals to a specific point, it

could be tracked day or night. According to O'Sullivan, "it was a simple next step"

to consider using the satellite for communications purposes. _7 As early as April

1958, NACA Director Hugh L. Dryden had told Congress that such a passive

satellite could be orbited and inflated in space. To be sure, Langley's air density

balloon would have to grow considerably in size to provide the maximum surface

from which to bounce signals, and the surface would have to possess increased

reflectivity characteristics. John R. Pierce of Bell Telephone Laboratories had been

contemplating such a communications experiment since 1955, and by 1959 Bell and

the new civilian space agency, which had inherited NACA's balloon project, were

working together on a passive communications satellite project called Echo.

Technicians at Langley (now a part of NASA) had three major requirements in

designing a balloon satellite that measured 30.48 meters in diameter and would inflate in orbit into a perfectly smooth surface: a suitable material for the sphere, an

inflation system, and a canister in which to launch the folded-up balloon. And since

there was no way to run ground tests that simulated the space environment on such a

large sphere, NASA would have to relay on suborbital flight tests. The G. T.

Schjeldahl Company fitted and cemented together 82 _eparate fiat gores of

aluminized Mylar film (.5 millimeter thick) supplied by E. I. Dupont to form the

Echo sphere. Benzoic acid was selected as the sublimating agent (i.e., going from a

solid to a gaseous state without liquifying) that would be used to inflate the structure. Kaiser-Fleetwing manufactured a spherical metal canister impregnated with

plastic to contain the deflated satellite. The Langley crew assembled the first Echo

test model by the fall of 1959. In October, it was launched to an altitude of 400

kilometers (Project Shotput), where the sphere ruptured. On the fourth try (April

1960), the balloon inflated successfully at 375 kilometers. After a first launch attempt failed, Echo 1 was placed in orbit and inflated on August 12, 1960. For the

next four and a half months, it was utilized for experiments by Bell Telephone

Laboratories in New Jersey and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California. Even

after the balloon's skirt had been damaged repeatedly by micrometeoroids and its orbit affected by solar wind, Echo 1 was used to reflect a variety of communications

signals to and from ground stations around the globe.* As it was visible from the

ground, it also served as a popular symbol of the peaceful and practical uses of space

research.

The second-generation Echo was larger (41.15-meter diameter), heavier, and

more durable. Fabricated from 106 gores of Mylar three layers thick bonded between two sheets of soft aluminum foil, the improved Echo maintained its rigidity

for a longer time. Pyrazol was used as the inflating medium, and a new canister was

made by the Grumman Aircraft Company from magnesium forgings. First testinflated in a dirigible hanger, the new Echo was tested several times under suborbital

conditions (Project Big Shot). Echo 2 was put into orbit on January 25, 1964, and

used successfully for more than a year by a number of groups for communications

*The Echo 1 configuration was also used for PAGEOS 1, launched on June 23, 1966. It served as a

point source of light for a tracking network; the resulting data were used for mapping and other geodetic

purposes (table 3-137).
370 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

tests, including a cooperative investigation by American, Soviet, and British

specialists.

In early 1963, NASA managers cancelled plans for an advanced passive communications satellite* when it learned that the Department of Defense had dropped

its active satellite project, Advent. Since an active repeater satellite powered by solar

cells in synchronous orbit clearly had more potential as a commercial communications system, NASA would direct its research to that area.

At NASA Headquarters, Echo was managed by Leonard Jaffe's office, with

Joseph R. Burke as satellite projects program manager. Overall project management

was assigned to Goddard Space Flight Center, with Langley Research Center being

responsible for the payload.

*NASA had let several feasibility study contracts to determine the best shape, structure, and

materials for a future passive communications satellite. The agency briefly contemplated a three-balloon

experiment dubbed Rebound.

Date

Jan. 26, 1956

April 22, 1958

April 15, 1958

May 1958

Oct. 22, 1958

April 13, 1959

April-Sept. 1959

Oct. 28, 1959

Jan. 16, 1960

Feb. 27, 1960

Table 3-209.

Chronology of Echo Development and Operations

Event

William J. O'Sullivan of NACA's Langley Memorial Aeronautical

Laboratory considered a low-density inflatable structure to measure

aerodynamic drag as a possible experiment for the International Geophysical

Year (IGY).

NASA Director Hugh Dryden in testimony before the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration said that large aluminized

balloons could be inflated after being placed in orbit and used for communications tests.

Launched by a Nike-Cajun, a 3.66-meter inflatable sphere was successfully

erected.

NACA launched a 4.l-kilogram inflatable sphere to an altitude of 80

kilometers.

An attempt to launch a 3.66-meter inflatable sphere (called Explorer 6, but

not the same spacecraft that was launched in August 1959) failed when the required orbit was not achieved.

Because of Vanguard launch vehicle malfunctions, an attempt to place a

.76-meter inflatable sphere into orbit failed.

Personnel at NASA's Langley Research Center constructed a 30.48-meter inflatable sphere satellite.

NASA launched a 30.48-meter inflatable sphere to an altitude of 400

kilometers with a Sergeant-Delta; the sphcrc ruptured (Project Shotput).

NASA launched a 30.48-meter inflatable sphere to an altitude of 400

kilometers with a Sergeant-Delta; the sphere ruptured (Project Shotput).

NASA launched a 30.48-meter inflatable sphere to an altitude of 400

kilometers; radio transmissions were reflected via the sphere from Holmdel,

New Jersey, to Round Hill, Massachusetts, before it ruptured (Project Shotput).
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-209.

Chronologyof EchoDevelopmentadOperations(Continued)

371

Date Event

April1,1960

May13,1960

July15,1960

Aug.12, 1960

Feb. 21, 1961

May 18, 1961

Jan. 15, 1962

Sept. 28, 1962

Oct. 20, 1962

Dec. 5, 1962

Feb. 25, 1963

May 13, 1963

Aug. 12, 1963

Jan. 25, 1964

A 30.48-meter inflatable sphere was launched and inflated successfully by

NASA at 380 kilometers (Project Shotput).

An attempt to launch an Echo satellite failed when the Thor-Delta vehicle

malfunctioned.

Hughes Aircraft Co. was awarded a seven-month contract for developing

techniques to rigidize structures so that they would maintain their reflectivity

in sunlight or shadow.

Echo 1 was launched successfully; experiments were performed on August

18.

NASA awarded a contract to the G. T. Schjeldahl Co. for nine inflatable

spheres for Project Echo.

The first test inflation of an improved Echo balloon was conducted in a

dirigible hanger.

A suborbital test of a modified Echo inflation system was launched by a

Thor-Agena from the Western Test Range (Project Big Shot).

Plans were announced for launching two Echo-type helium balloons to determine skin smoothness characteristics for an advanced Echo.

A 30.48-meter Echo /-type balloon was launched; it ruptured at 35

kilometers.

The U.S. and the USSR agreed to cooperate in the coming year's experiments

with Echo.

NASA announced that in light of the formation of the Communications

Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and the cancellation of the Department of

Defense Advent active communications satellite project, the agency would

focus its efforts on synchronous-orbit active satellites. NASA cancelled advanced passive and intermediate-altitude communications satellite projects.

Langley issued a request for proposals for a feasibility study for an inflatable

lenticular passive communications satellite.

Schjeldahl was selected to build three second-generation Echo satellites, a

project which was cancelled.

Echo 2 was launched successfully.
372 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-210.

Echo ! (Echo A-11) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

centers:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

August 12, 1960 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

75.9 (plus 10.9-kilogram canister)

Spherical (inflatable)

Diameter, 30.48

Beacon transmitters powered by NiCd batteries plus solar cells

May 24, 1968

GSFC, project management

LaRC, payload

Robert J. Mackey, Jr.

E. I. Dupont, aluminized Mylar polyester film

G. T. Schjeldahl Co., fabrication

Kaiser-Fleetwings, Inc., canister

Radio Corporation of America, tracking beacons

Inject a passive communications reflector into circular orbit; test feasibility of using

passive satellites as passive reflectors of radio and television signals for long-range

transmissions.

Communications experiments were conducted between Bell Telephone Laboratories

and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

Demonstrated use of radio reflector for global communications; numerous successful transmissions; visible to the naked eye; orbit characteristics perturbed by

solar pressure due to high area-to-mass ratio. It remained 100°70 useful for 41/2

months, but some experiments were conducted after that time even though the

satellite's skin had begun to deteriorate and it had lost some of its shape.

Table 3-211.

Echo 2 (Echo C) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Jan. 25, 1964 (WTR)

Thor-Agena B

243.6 (plus 348.4-kilogram canister, beacons, and other equipment)

Spherical (inflatable)

Diameter, 41.15

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

June 8, 1969

GSFC, project management

LaRC, payload

Herbert L. Ecker

E. I. Dupont, aluminized Mylar polyester film

G. T. Schjeldahl Co., fabrication

Viron Div., Geophysics Corp. of America, inflation system

Aero Geo Astro Corp., beacons

Grumman Aircraft Co., canister

Demonstrate rigidization technique applicable to passive communications satellites;

advance the state of the art represented by Echo 1.

Communications experiments were conducted by Bell Telephone Laboratories, Collins Radio Co., Naval Research Laboratory, Lincoln Laboratory, U.S. Air Force,

and the Naval Electronics Laboratory.

Successfully inflated and used for many communications experiments; tracking also

provided data on the upper atmosphere; joint experiments with the Soviet Union

and the United Kingdom took place in 1964.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 373

Telstar

In October 1960, American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) asked

the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for approval of its plans for an active communications satellite experiment. The following January, the FCC allocated

AT&T the frequencies it had requested, and in July NASA announced that it would

launch and track two Bell Telephone Laboratories-designed satellites (Telstars) for

AT&T on a reimbursable basis. With Telstar, AT&T hoped to demonstrate the

transmission of multichannel two-way telephone, television data, and facsimile

signals via satellite and gain experience with very large ground station antennas. In

addition to its microwave repeater and other communications-related instruments,

Telstar was equipped with an array of sensors and measuring devices by which to

study the characteristics and intensity of radiation in the Van Allen Belt. Bell built a

large ground antenna in Maine, and communications agencies in England, France,

and Germany constructed ground stations that would operate with Telstar and with

the experimental active communications satellite (Relay) NASA was planning to

launch in the near future. NASA stations that were being built in Brazil, Italy, and

elsewhere for Relay also could be used for Telstar.

From its first day in operation, July 10, 1962, Telstar 1 was used successfully for

a variety of experiments and tests. In November, the satellite's command channel

began acting erratically and on the 23d ceased responding. The following January,

however, transmissions resumed unexpectedly for a few weeks; it was theorized that

radiation had affected Telstar's performance. Telstar 2 was launched on May 7,

1963. Specialists immediately began a series of tests and demonstrations involving

ground stations in England, France, Italy, Japan and the U.S. Although affected

periodically by radiation damage, the satellite remained operational for two years.

Telstar was a commercially financed project. NASA provided only the support

requested by AT&T. At NASA Headquarters, Telstar was managed by Satellite

Projects Program Manager Joseph R. Burke. Charles P. Smith was the project

manager at the Goddard Space Flight Center, where NASA's Minitrack network was

used for Telstar tracking operations.
374 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-212.

Chronology of Telstar Development and Operations

Date Event

1959

Aug. 24, 1959

1960

Oct. 21, 1960

Jan. 19, 1961

July 27, 1961

Aug. 23-24, 1961

Oct. 18, 1961

Dec. 1961

June 5, 1962

July 10, 1962

Dec. 30, 1962

May 7, 1963

An ad hoc group was formed at Bell Telephone Laboratories to study the

feasibility of developing an active communications satellite.

A Bell company memorandum outlined plans for an active repeater communications satellite experiment.

Bell experimented with and tested many of the components for the active

satellite that would become Telstar.

The Federal Communication_ Commission (FCC) was asked to approve

plans for an American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) satellite experiment,

which would use the Bell satellite.

FCC authorized the AT&T experiment and allocated it frequencies for one

year.

NASA announced that it would launch and test two AT&T active communications satellites on a reimbursable basis.

The Senate Commerce Committee heard testimony from NASA officials and

the assistant attorney general on Telstar costs.

The AT&T satellite was officially designated Telstar.

The West German Post Office announced that it would construct a ground

station near Munich that could be used with Telstar and NASA's Relay communications satellite.

NASA announced plans for a cooperative program for testing Relay and

Telstar.

Telstar 1 was launched successfully; demonstrations of television transmissions began shortly after launch.

AT&T announced plans to launch a second satellite in the spring of 1963.

Telstar 2 was launched successfully.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-213.

Telstar 1 Characteristics

375

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

July 10, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

77.1

Roughly sphen_.al with 72 flat faces

Diameter, .88

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Charles P. Smith

Bell Telephone Laboratories built the spacecraft for American Telephone &

Telegraph Co.

Advance the art of long-range communications by satellite; measure radiation in

and near the inner Van Allen Belt; measure radiation damage to transistors.

Proton-electron detectors, solar aspect sensor, silicon transistors, all Bell Telephone

Laboratories experiments.

Part of the communications system suffered radiation damage from the July 9,

1962, high-altitude Starfish nuclear test and was silent from November 23, 1962, to

January 3, 1963; more than 300 technical tests and over 400 demonstrations were

conducted successfully.

First commercial satellite launched by NASA.

Table 3-214.

Telstar 2 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Po wer source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

May 7, 1963 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

79.4

Roughly spherical with 72 flat faces

Diameter, .88

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Charles P. Smith

Bell Telephone Laboratories built the spacecraft for American Telephone &

Telegraph Co.

Continuation of first mission; study effects of radiation and means of extending the

useful life of an active communications satellite; check new ground equipment

Proton-electron detectors, Bell Telephone Laboratories

Transmitted black and white and color television and voice signals between stations

in the U.S., France and England; used until May 1965 although radiation periodically affected the satellite's performance.
376 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Relay

Along with passive communications satellite experiments (Echo), NASA

planned a modest low-altitude active satellite project for the early 1960s. The

Department of Defense had responsibility for a synchronous-orbit satellite system

(Advent), so the space agency confined its research and development activities to

low- and medium-altitude communications satellites. In November 1960, NASA

awarded a contract to Space Technology Laboratories for a feasibility design study

for an active communications satellite, and by the following January officials were

briefing industry on the agency's requirements for Project Relay. As a result of the

Soviet Union's "space spectaculars" of 1961 and President John F. Kennedy's subsequent support of a strong U.S. space program, NASA's communications satellite

program received supplementary funds that made it feasible to support active

satellite research. In May 1961, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) was

awarded a contract to fabricate three Relay satellites.

Relay was designed with three objectives in mind: to test transoceanic communications, to measure radiation in its orbital path, and to determine to what extent these high- and low-energy electrons and protons would damage the satellite's

solar cells and diodes (8.6 of Relay rs 78 kilograms were devoted to radiationmeasuring devices and solid-state component testing equipment). The roughly

spherical Relay satellites were built with redundance as a major feature; they carried

two sets of every major system of circuits. Relay's most important component, the

microwave repeater, received frequency-modulated signals from one or two ground

stations, amplified these signals, tripled their deviation, and retransmitted them.

Test stations for sending and receiving transmissions were in the U.S. (Andover,

Maine; Mojave, California; and Nutley, New Jersey); Fucino, Italy; Goonhilly

Downs, England; Pleumeur-Bodou, France; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Raisting, Germany; and Isbaraki Prefecture, Japan. To coordinate and define the main international experiments and demonstrations that would be performed via Relay, an International Ground Station Committee was formed.

Thor-Delta vehicles launched Relay 1 (December 13, 1962) and Relay 2 (January

21, 1964) into elliptical orbits, from which they successfully retransmitted television,

telephone, and digital signals. Relay 1 did not function properly at first because of

an abnormal power drain on its storage batteries, but the problem was traced to the

voltage regulator in a transponder. A second transponder was used as a backup, and

the mission went on as planned. By March 1963, Relay 1 had fulfilled its mission objectives and went on to transmit the first transpacific television signals between

Japan and the U.S. in November. In fact, Relay 1 worked too well. It would not respond to commands to turn itself off in December 1963 and continued relaying

signals until February 1965. Relay 2 was equipped with upgraded solar cells designed

to extend the satellite's power supply, and its traveling wave tubes, power regulation

system, and radiation shielding were also of an improved design. The second Relay's

initial public demonstration took place on January 29, 1964, when a portion of the

winter Olympics at Innsbruck, Austria, was televised and transmitted to the U.S. via

Relay and ground stations in France and Maine. After a successful demonstration

career, Relay 2 was retired in the fall of 1965.

Relay was managed at NASA Headquarters by Joseph R. Burke (Relay 1) and

Donald P. Rogers (Relay 2), working in Leonard Jaffe's Office of Communications
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 377

and Navigations Programs. At Goddard Space Flight Center, Joseph Berliner and

Wendell S. Sunderlin were project managers for Relay 1 and 2, respectively.

For further reading, see GSFC, Final Report on the Relay I Program, NASA

SP-76 (Washington, 1965); and GSFC, Relay Program Final Report, NASA SP-151

(Washington, 1968).

Table 3-215.

Chronology of Relay Development and Operations

Date Event

Nov. 21, 1960

Late Nov. 1960

Jan. 13, 1961

Jan. 25, 1961

Feb. 1961

May 18, 1961

Dec. 1961

June 5, 1962

Dec. 13, 1962

Jan. 21, 1964

Feb. 25, 1964

The Unmanned Spacecraft Panel of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, an interagency body, issued a "Statement on NASA Program

Philosophy on Communications Satellites," in which NASA expressed its intentions to develop low-altitude active repeater satellites.

NASA awarded a contract to Space Technology Laboratories for a

spacecraft design study of an active communications satellite system that

would lead to a commercial communications satellite system.

Preliminary specifications for a low-altitude communications satellite (Relay)

were drawn up at the Goddard Space Flight Center.

Industry was briefed on the requirements for Project Relay, and a request for

quotations was issued. The project was officially named Relay.

NASA signed agreements with the U.K. and France to establish government

programs for testing communications satellites in 1962 and 1963 (Relay and

Rebound).

NASA awarded a contract to the Radio Corporation of America (RCA),

Astro-Electronics Division, for the development of three Relay spacecraft.

The West German Post Office announced that it would construct a ground

station near Munich to be used with AT&T's Telstar and Relay.

NASA announced a cooperative program for testing Relay and Telstar.

Relay 1 was launched successfully.

Relay 2 was launched successfully.

Goddard recommended not launching a third Relay (the backup satellite);

since Relay I and 2 and Project Syncom were meeting their schedules and objectives there was no need for a third Relay mission.
378 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-216.

Relay 1 (Relay A-15) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Dec. 13, 1962 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

78

8-sided prism topped by an octagonal truncated pyramid with a .46-meter mast on

one end

Prism maximum diameter, .74; height, .43

Pyramid height, .41

Overall height, 1.3

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Joseph Berliner

Radio Corp. of America, Astro-Electronics Div., spacecraft fabrication

Investigate wide-band communications between intercontinental stations; develop

operational experience in using active satellite communications system; measure

energy particles; determine effects of energy particles and radiation on selected electronic components.

In addition to the microwave communications experiments:

Radiation monitor, Bell Telephone Laboratories, State University of Iowa

Diode damage, Bell, GSFC

Solar cell damage, GSFC

Proved that a satellite can be used successfully as a microwave repeater; some mapping of the electron and proton fields was accomplished; conducted 2000 technical

tests and 172 successful demonstrations; tests were terminated in February 1965; an

initial power drain problem was overcome by ground control.

Syncom

Specialists in communications at Hughes Aircraft Company, as elsewhere,

agreed that an active repeater satellite in geostationary orbit, where it was always

visible to its ground stations, was highly desirable. But the California-based experts

thought it could be done with the satellite technology and launch vehicles available

in the early 1960s. Since the Army's large 450-kilogram Advent satellite (under

development at General Electric) had already been chosen as the nation's

synchronous-orbit communications satellite project, NASA officials could only

listen politely to Hughes' proposal for its Syncom project in early 1960.

A task group at Hughes led by Harold A. Rosen and Donald Williams had been

working on the design of Syncom since late 1958. Having sold their ambitious project to the management at Hughes, they informally approached NASA for the first

time with their proposal in November 1959, and during the next two years they made

repeated presentations to the civilian space agency, the Department of Defense

(DoD), the President's Committee on Science, Bell Telephone Laboratories, the

Stanford Research Institute, and others in an effort to gain support for their

satellite. The people at Hughes believed so strongly in their proposal that they even

made plans at one time to buy a Scout launch vehicle from NASA and launch their
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-217.

Relay 2 (Relay-B) Characteristics

379

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Result:

Jan. 21, 1964 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

85.3

8-sided prism topped by an octagonal truncated pyramid with a .46-meter mast on

one end

Prism maximum diameter, .74; height, .43

Pyramid height, .41

Overall height, 1.3

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Wendell S. Sunderlin

Radio Corp. of America, Astro-Electronics Div., spacecraft fabrication

Investigate wide-band communications between ground stations by means of lowaltitude orbiting spacecraft; measure the effects of the space environment on the

system.

In addition to the microwave communications experiments:

Radiation damage, GSFC

Proton and electron detectors, Bell Telephone Laboratories

Directional and omnidirectional electron and proton detectors, University of

California at La Jolla

Television, teletype facsimile, and digital data transmissions were made with

satisfactory results; conducted more than 1500 technical tests and 95 demonstrations; retired in September 1965.

own payload from a Pacific island near the equator. By the spring of 1961, it was

becoming clear to the Army that Advent was still several years away from being

ready, partly due to delays with the Centaur stage of the launch vehicle, and already

over budget. Meanwhile, NASA's Leonard Jaffe had become convinced that Syncom was the logical next step for the agency's communications satellite program.

With President John F. Kennedy's mandate to accelerate the communications

satellite program and DoD support of a NASA synchronous-orbit project, the path

was cleared for Hughes. By August 1961, NASA had named Hughes its contractor

for Project Syncom.

At an altitude of about 35 800 kilometers above the equator, the Syncom

satellite could orbit at the same relative speed of earth, appearing to be always in one

location. In this position, a single satellite could give communications coverage to

appxoximately one-third of the globe. This altitude also would ensure that the

satellite's solar cells received the sun's rays continuously. Precise spacecraft attitude

control, a necessity, was achieved by spin stabilization and two attitude control jets.

Another activity critical to Syncom was the development of a lightweight traveling

wave tube. J. T. Mendel at Hughes was charged with designing this component,

which had to weigh less than half a kilogram. DoD, taking advantage of those

systems that were already being readied for Advent, offered to provide and pay for

the entire ground station complex, the stations, crews, and the control center
380 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

necessary for conducting experiments with Syncom. Two 9.14-meter parabolic

antennas at Lakehurst, New Jersey, and aboard the USNS Kingsport would intercept signals. The NASA-Hughes-DoD team was given 13 months to prepare for

the first launch.

Syncom 1 with its many redundant systems was launched on February 14, 1963,

by a Thor-Delta launch vehicle. The orbit planned for the first Syncom was not a

truly synchronous one. Since NASA still did not have a stable of powerful launchers, the angle of orbit injection would be influenced by the location of the Eastern

Test Range launch site, 30 degrees north of the equator. The satellite would appear

to move about 30 degrees north, then 30 degrees south, swinging every 24 hours in a

huge figure eight, the center of which would remain approximately stationary over

the equator. As part of the ground station complex, the USNS Kingsport would be

able to track the satellite through this figure-eight configuration. But the ground

crew lost all contact with Syncom 1 seconds after the satellite's apogee motor fired.

Apparently, the kick of the apogee rocket knocked out the onboard electronics

equipment. Consequently, NASA directed that a number of changes be made to the

second spacecraft, including measures to maintain radio contact in case of main

power failure. Syncom 2, launched in July 1963, transmitted excellent telephone,

teletype, and facsimile signals, as well as video signals, even though the satellite was

not designed for this particular capability. The third Syncom, the last in the series,

was put into a true geostationary orbit by the more powerful Thrust-augmented

Thor-Delta. It, too, operated perfectly.

By late 1964, NASA had completed its slate of tests and demonstrations with the

Syncom system. Since the Army had cancelled its Project Advent in 1963, the

military was interested in using Syncom for its operations in Asia. DoD communications specialists were impressed by the reliability of the system and the high-quality

transmissions over long distances that a relay at synchronous altitude allowed. If the

ground station complex were supplemented with highly transportable stations that

could be rushed to remote isolated areas, Syncom could be very useful during

military activities. On April 1, 1965, the Syncom was officially transferred to the

Department of Defense. 18

At NASA Headquarters, Syncom was managed from Leonard Jaffe's office by

Robert E. Warren (Syncom 1), Joseph R. Burke (Syncom 2), and Henry N. Stafford

(Syncom 3). Alton E. Jones led the Goddard Space Flight Center team during the

first two missions, with Robert J. Darcey managing the third.

For more information on the background of the project, see Edgar W. Morse,

"Preliminary History of the Origins of Project Syncom," NASA HNN-40, Sept. l,

1964.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 381

I I I I

z '

0 c01-o

0

Z -

_o

I--

Z tr _ i.=-

_ I'--A tr

_ -

>..m> .

tr t_ _ t._

N

I--

0

0

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tO O_ O_

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382 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-218.

Chronology of Syncom Development and Operations

Date Event

Late 1958

1959

Sept. 25, 1959

Feb. 4, 17, 1960

March 1, 1960

April-May 1960

July 11, 1960

Aug. 16, 1960

Oct.-Dec. 1960

Spring 1961

June 23, 1961

Aug. 10, 1961

Aug. 21, 1961

March 1, 1962

Nov. 9, 1962

Dec. 1962

Jan. 1963

Feb. 14, 1963

Feb. 25, 1963

July 26, 1963

Aug. 19, 1964

Dec. 31, 1964

A task group led by Harold A. Rosen was established at Hughes Aircraft

Company to investigate communications satellite experiments beyond the

company's work on advanced radar.

Rosen and Donald Williams at Hughes studied the problems associated with

a synchronous-orbit active communications satellite.

Hughes informally proposed its Syncom to NASA.

Hughes made formal presentations to NASA.

Hughes authorized its engineers to proceed with the development of Syncom

without NASA's support.

Hughes made Syncom presentations to the Department of Defense (DoD).

Hughes made Syncom presentations to the President's Science Advisory

Committee.

Hughes made another presentation to NASA, and Administrator T. Keith

Glennan suggested that Hughes apply its activities to a low-altitude satellite

project.

Hughes made Syncom presentations to GT&E, Bell Telephone Laboratories,

IT&T, Stanford Research Institute, Aerospace Corporation, the U.S. Air

Force, and to British military and civilian delegations.

Leonard Jaffe at NASA Headquarters urged agency managers to adopt a

synchronous-orbit satellite.

DoD announced its support of a NASA synchronous-orbit communications

satellite project.

Goddard Space Flight Center personnel prepared a preliminary project

development plan in coordination with the U.S. Army Advent Management

Agency for a Syncom project.

Hughes was named NASA contractor for Syncom.

In Senate hearings, Hughes advocated that any future public communications satellite corporation should adopt Syncom as its primary system.

Hughes reported that the final assembly of the first Syncom spacecraft had

been completed.

A simulated Syncom training mission was undertaken.

NASA announced that the first launch of Syncom would take place the next

month.

Syncom I was launched successfully, but contact with the spacecraft was lost

when the apogee motor was fired to place the satellite in the required orbit.

NASA announced that in light of the formation of the Communications

Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and DoD's cancellation of Advent, the

agency would focus its efforts on synchronous active communications

satellites and cancel passive and intermediate-altitude projects.

Syncom 2 was launched successfully.

Syncom 3 was launched successfully.

NASA began the transfer of the Syncom system to DoD for use in Asia and

the Indian Ocean; the transfer was completed by April l, 1965.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS

Table3-219.

Syncom 1 (Syncom-A) Characteristics

383

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Feb. 14, 1963 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

68 (at apogee motor burnout, 39)

Cylindrical (2 concentric cylinders), with an apogee motor nozzle protruding at one

end

.74 x .66

Overall height including antennas and apogee motor, 1.7

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Alton Jones

Hughes Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication

Obtain experience using communications satellites in a 24-hour synchronous orbit;

flight-test new techniques for satellite attitude and control; develop transportable

ground facilities.

No scientific experiments.

Communication with the satellite was lost 20 seconds after the firing of the apogee

rocket; it was sighted traveling in a near-synchronous orbit.

Table 3-220.

Syncom 2 (Syncom-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remark:

July 26, 1963 (ETR)

Thor-Delta

66.7 (at apogee motor burnout, 39)

Cylindrical (2 concentric cylinders), with an apogee motor nozzle protruding at one

end

.74 x .66

Overall height including antennas and apogee motor, 1.17

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Alton Jones

Hughes Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication

Continuation of the Syncom I mission.

No scientific experiments.

Orbit and attitude control achieved; data, telephone, and facsimile transmissions excellent; television video signals were also transmitted although the satellite was not

designed for this capability.

Operation assumed by the Department of Defense in April 1965.
384 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-221.

Syncom 3 (Syncom-C) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contraclor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Aug. 19, 1964 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta

65.8 (at apogee motor burnout, 37.6)

Cylindrical (2 concentric cylinders), with an apogee motor nozzle protruding from

one end

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert J. Darcey

Hughes Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication

Continuation of Syncom 2 mission; with the added goal of placing the spacecraft into a true synchronous orbit; provide an experimental communications link between

the U.S. and the Far East, as requested by DoD.

No scientific experiments.

Orbit and attitude control were achived; the satellite was put into near-equatorial

synchronous orbit; data, telephone, and facsimile transmissions were excellent;

television video signals were transmitted through wide-band transponder, including

coverage of the 1964 Olympic games in Tokyo.

Last of the series. Operations assumed by the Department of Defense in April 1965.

See also INTELSAT and Applications Technology Satellite (ATS).

INTELSAT

In August 1962, Congress authorized the formation of the Communications

Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) to manage the commercial applications of the nation's communications satellite program. By late 1963, COMSAT had issued a request for proposals to industry for an engineering design for a commercial communications satellite system. Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and Bell

Telephone Laboratories were funded to study random medium-altitude satellites,

TRW and ITT phased medium-altitude satellites, and Hughes Aircraft Company

synchronous-orbit satellites. _9

Since global communications necessarily involved many countries, the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) was established in

August 1964 to develop, implement, and operate an international communications

satellite system (see fig. 3-7). Each member nation (63 members in September 1968)

of INTELSAT owned an investment share of the consortium proportional to its international traffic in a global satellite system. Individual nations owned and

operated their own ground stations. COMSAT, as the management and operations

arm of INTELSAT, continued with its plans for a family of commercial satellites.

NASA's part in this scheme was a critical but limited one: the agency would launch

the communications payloads on a reimbursable basis.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 385

As a result of its work on the NASA-managed Project Syncom, Hughes was

able to submit a sophisticated proposal for COMSAT's first synchronous-orbit

spacecraft. Called INTELSA T I (also Early Bird), the 38-kilogram satellite could

maintain 240 two-way telephone circuits, but from only two stations at a time.

INTELSATI, launched on April 6, 1965, was used for over 31⁄2 years (spacecraft

estimated lifetime had been 18 months). The next step in the INTELSAT series

called for a larger, more powerful spacecraft with a wider band width capable of

providing coverage over a greater area. Multiple-access capability was also introduced; each spacecraft transponder carried four 6-watt traveling wave tubes that could

operate simultaneously. The first of four INTELSAT II satellites was launched in

October 1966. A third series, built by TRW, was even larger. Each of three

INTELSAT III satellites had a nominal capability of 1200 telephone circuits, obtained by using a new antenna system. While the spacecraft body was spinning, its

antenna was despun to point always at earth. The first of this series was launched in

September 1968. With three spacecraft operating above the Pacific, the Atlantic,

and the Indian Oceans, a truly global communications system was an accomplished

fact by 1969 (see fig. 3-8). A fourth model of the INTELSAT spacecraft was being

planned for the 1970s (see fig. 3-9 for a comparison of the different INTELSAT

spacecraft). 20

NASA's activities were limited to launching and initial tracking operations. J. J.

Kelleher managed the Early Bird launch for NASA Headquarters, and Wayne C.

Mathews served as program manager for the INTELSAT II series. Jerome Friebaum

assumed this post in June 1968. At the Goddard Space Flight Center, Charles P.

Smith was project manager.

91

SIGNATORY

OWNERS _= ur _._r,,,_]l_

IIIIIII1 "

CINTRIBUTIO _ INTELSAT

71SIGNATO_'------_Y -- L,.,_TI11_ _

5NON-SIGNATORY _ _W_I_PA_NIb I

us .s i ,

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT

ORGAN SERVICES

(SECRETARY CONTRACTOR

GENERAL) (COMSAT)

CONTRACTORS

SPACECRAFT&

LAUNCH SERVICES

R&D

Figure 3-7. International Telecommunications Satellite Organ&ation (INTELSA T)financ&l

arrangements, simplified cash flow diagram, as of 1975.
386 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

m
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 387

INTELSAT I

YR OF 1st LAUNCH 1966 1967 1966

DIA 72.1 142 142

DIMENSIONS (cm) HGHT 59.6 67.3 104

AT LAUNCH 68 162 293

MASS (kg) IN ORBIT 38 86 1 52

IMPROVED LONG-TANK

LAUNCH VEHICLE THOR-DELTA THOR-DELTA THOR-DELTA

PRIMARY POWER (W) 40 75 120

TRANSPONDERS 2 1 2

BW/TRANSPONDER (MHz) 25 130 225

ANTENNA OMNI-SGUINTED OMNI DESPUN

COVERAGE N, HEMISPHERE GLOBAL GLOBAL

e.i.r.p./BEAM (dBW) 11.5 15.6 23

NO. OF TEL. CIRCUITS 240 (NO 240 1200

MULT. ACCESS)

DESIGN LIFETIME (YR) 1.5 3 5

COST/CIRCUIT YEAR ($000) 30 10 2

INTELSAT IVA

INTELSAT III INTELSAT IV

INTELSAT_II _] i

1971 1975

238 238

282 (DRUM) 282 (DRUM

528 (OVERALL) 590 (OVERALL)

1385 1469

7DO 790

ATLAS/CENTAU RATLAS/C ENTAUR

4OO 5O0

12 20

36 32-26

DESPUN DESPUN

GLOBAL & GLOBAL &

SPOT BEAMS HEMI BEAMS

22.5 (GLOBAL) 22 (GLOBAL)

33.7 (SPOT BEAM)29 (HEMI BEAM)

4000 6000

7 7

1 1

Figure 3-9. Evolution of the INTELSA T family of communications satellites.

From B.L Edelson, H. I4I. Wood, and C.J. Reber, "Cost Effectiveness in Global Satellite Communications,"

paper, International Astronautical Federation 26th Congress, Sept. 21-27, 1975, p. 3.
388 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-222.

Chronology of INTELSAT Development and Operations

Date Event

Aug. 31, 1962

Feb. 1, 1963

Dec. 22, 1963

Dec. 1963

March 1964

July 1964

Aug. 20, 1964

Nov. 1964

Dec. 1964

April 6, 1965

Sept. 30, 1965

Dec. 16, 1965

Dec. 29, 1965

July 1966

Oct. 22, 1966

Jan. 11, 1967

March 22, 1967

Sept. 27, 1967

The Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) was authorized by

Congress.

COMSAT Corp. was incorporated.

COMSAT issued a request for proposals for an engineering design study for

a commercial communications satellite system.

Hughes Aircraft Co. submitted a proposal to COMSAT for the development

of an initial communications satellite for commercial use (synchronous

orbit).

COMSAT awarded Hughes a contract for the development and fabrication

of the proposed Early Bird experimental operational communications

satellite.

Satellite design studies were begun by the Radio Corporation of America

(RCA) and Bell Telephone Laboratories (random medium-altitude satellites),

TRW and ITT (phased medium-altitude satellites), and Hughes

(synchronous-orbit satellites) for COMSAT; reports were due on March 1,

1965.

The International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT)

was established, of which COMSAT was the management services-operations

arm.

Six companies submitted proposals for COMSAT ground stations.

NASA and COMSAT signed a formal agreement outlining their cooperation

on a satellite project, with an initial launch planned for March 1965.

INTELSA T I (Early Bird) was launched successfully.

COMSAT asked the Federal Communications Commission for authority to

fund four new satellites to provide private communications services and to

support NASA's Project Apollo.

COMSAT and TRW opened negotiations for a contract that called for the

development and fabrication of a second-generation satellite to be used in a

global communications satellite system.

COMSAT issued a request for design study proposals for a multipurpose

communications-navigation satellite.

NASA and COMSAT reached an agreement on the launching of two more

INTELSAT satellites.

INTELSA T II-A was launched, but it failed to achieve synchronous orbit,

limiting the spacecraft's usefulness.

INTELSA T II-B was launched successfully.

INTELSA T II-C was launched successfully.

INTELSA T II-D was launched successfully.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-222.

Chronology of INTELSAT Development and Operations (Continued)

389

Date Event

Feb. 1968

April 1968

Sept. 18, 1968

Oct. 4, 1968

Dec. 18, 1968

COMSAT opened bids for the design of INTELSATS 1II, IV, and V.

COMSAT reopened bidding on a proposed INTELSAT Ili1⁄2, designed to

supplement the INTELSAT II1 system until the advanced INTELSAT IV was

ready. Hughes, Lockheed, and TRW bid on INTELSAT IV.

The launch of INTELSATIIlF-1 was unsuccessful because the launch vehicle failed; the spacecraft and launch vehicle were destroyed.

A contract between COMSAT and Hughes for the INTELSAT IV series was

approved by INTELSAT.

INTELSA T III F-2 was launched successfully.

Table 3-223.

INTELSA T I Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

April 6, 1965 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta

68 in orbit

Cylindrical

.72 × .6

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Charles P. Smith

Hughes Aircraft Co. for COMSAT (who represented INTELSAT)

Establish a commercial communications system.

No scientific experiments.

Went into commercial operation on June 28, linking North America and Europe;

transmitted telephone, color and black and white television, teletype, and facsimile

signals; used for four years.

NASA provided launching, initial tracking, and associated services on a reimbursable basis; satellite operation was the responsibility of COMSAT. Also called

Early Bird.
39O ,NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-224.

INTELSA T II-A Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant _,_SA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Oct. 26, 1966 (ETR)

Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

87.1 in orbit (162.2 at launch)

Cylindrical

1.42 x .67

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Charles P. Smith

Hughes Aircraft Co. for COMSAT (who represented INTELSAT)

Commercial communications; Pacific link.

No scientific experiments.

Satellite failed to achieve synchronous orbit due to a malfunction of the apogee kick

motor, which limited use to approximately 8 hours daily. Capable of handling television data transmissions or up to 240 voice channels; part of its capacity was purchased by NASA for Apollo support.

NASA provided launching, initial tracking, and associated services on a reimbursable basis; satellite operation was the responsibility of COMSAT. Also called

Lani Bird.

Table 3-225.

INTELSA T II-B Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Jan. 11, 1967 (ETR)

In orbit

Commercial communications; Pacific link.

Placed in geosynchronous orbit over the Pacific; used for Apollo support.

NASA provided launching, initial tracking, and associated services on a reimbursable basis. See table 3-224 for spacecraft description.

Table 3-226.

INTELSA T II-C Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

March 22, 1967 (ETR)

In orbit

Commercial communications; Atlantic link.

Placed in geosynchronous orbit over Atlantic.

NASA provided launching, initial tracking, and associated services on a reimbursable basis. Also called Atlantic 2. See table 3-224 for spacecraft description.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-227.

INTELSA T II-D Characteristics

391

Date of launch

(location):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Sept. 27, 1967 (ETR)

In orbit

Commercial communications; Pacific link.

Placed in geosynchronous orbit over Pacific.

NASA provided launching, initial tracking, and associated services on a reimbursable basis. Also called Pacific 2. See table 3-224 for spacecraft description.

Table 3-228.

INTELSA TIII F-I Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor."

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Remarks:

Sept. 18, 1968 (ETR)

Long-tank Thrust-augmented Thor-Delta

146.1 in orbit

(286.7 at launch)

Cylindrical

1.42 x 1.04

Overall height with antennas, 1.98

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Spacecraft destroyed

GSFC

Charles P. Smith

TRW Systems Group, TRW, Inc., for COMSAT (who represented INTELSAT)

Commercial communications; Atlantic link.

No scientific experiments.

When the launch vehicle control system malfunctioned, the entire vehicle was

destroyed by the range officer.

NASA provided launching and associated services on a reimbursable basis. An

earlier designation for this satellite was INTELSAT III-A.

Table 3-229.

INTELSA T III F-2 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Date of reentry:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Dec. 18, 1968 (ETR)

In orbit

Commercial communications; Atlantic link.

Placed in geosynchronous orbit over Atlantic; capacity of 1200 telephone circuits.

NASA provided launching, initial tracking, and associated services on a reimbursable basis. See table 3-228 for spacecraft description.
392 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

DESCRIPTION-APPLICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

SATELLITE (ATS) PROGRAM

Shortly after the Syncom project was approved by NASA, designers at Hughes

Aircraft Company began investigating ways in which the basic configuration might

be exploited in the future. Officials at Goddard Space Flight Center were enthusiastic about expanding the capabilities of this yet-to-be-tried synchronous-orbit

satellite to include a multiple communications access capability between fixed points

and a phased-array antenna. NASA Headquarters approved a feasibility study for

such a spacecraft in 1962. Early the following year, Hughes personnel were anxious

for the agency to sanction an Advanced Syncom flight project, but their proposals

were poorly timed. Heated debates were raging in Congress during FY 1964 budget

appropriations hearings over NASA's relations with the newly organized Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), which had been charged by Congress to establish a commercial operational communications network. Some

members of Congress believed that the privately-run COMSAT, which seemingly

had a monopoly in the communications satellite field, would be the sole benefactor

of NASA's advanced research and development communications projects; as they

saw it the government space agency would be subsidizing a private corporation.

NASA countered that its mandate was to further the state of the art; the agency had

no intentions of getting into the "communications satellite business." NASA's

authorization for Advanced Syncom was $7 million less than the request, and

managers at Headquarters decided to avoid future open criticism by dropping their

plans for an advanced communications flight project.

Advanced Syncom, however, was a sound design, and specialists at Hughes,

Goddard, and NASA Headquarters sought ways to integrate their ideas for communications, meteorology, and navigation-traffic control satellites into a single

package that could be carried on one spacecraft. In February 1964, NASA officials

signed off on a project approval document for an Advanced Technological Satellite,

which was renamed Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) that spring. The

Department of Defense (DOD) also played a part in influencing NASA to redirect its

plans from a synchronous-orbit communications satellite to a multipurpose project.

Military officials had become convinced that Syncom, while highly useful, was also

very vulnerable; feasibly it could be manuevered, interfered with, or put out of

commission by an enemy ground station. For more secure communications, the

military planned some 60 randomly spaced medium-altitude satellites. DoD

specialists also were interested in an experimental gravity-gradient stabilized

spacecraft, one plane of which would always face earth; and the military suggested

that NASA explore this area of spacecraft design.*

In May 1964, Hughes was instructed to build five Applications Technology

Satellites, which would accomodate a variety of communications, meteorology, and

*A gravity-gradient stabilized spacecraft required long booms attached to a main body that would

respond to earth's gravitational pull. Those booms nearest earth would tend to remain pointed at earth

since the gravity exerted on them would be slightly greater than that exerted on the booms most distant

from earth. This would keep the spacecraft fixed with one plane always facing earth, another always facing away.
SPACESCIENCEANDAPPLICATIONS 393

scientific experiments. General Electric set to work designing a gravity-gradient

system, and NASA sent letters to over 1000 prospective investigators explaining the

multiple opportunities afforded them by ATS. The next two years saw the first

spacecraft readied for launch, more than 60 investigations chosen for flight (see

table 3-230), and the fabrication of experiment hardware by Control Data Corporation, Philco, and Bell Aerospace. NASA's Lewis Research Center was contributing a

small ion engine that was to be tested for stationkeeping maneuvers, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory was supplying the apogee motors for ATS as it had for the Syncom satellites. Ground stations were readied at Rosman, North Carolina, and in

California's Mojave Desert. Sylvania was chosen to build a transportable ground

system, which would be used in Toowoomba, Australia. _

A TS 1, launched in December 1966, was put into synchronous orbit over the

equator (Pacific). Equipped with a collection of environmental measurement

devices, communications hardware (VHF, FM, and microwave), and cameras for

collecting weather data (including a joint NASA-Environmental Science Services

Administration experiment), the first ATS performed all its operations successfully.

More than 10 years later, it and A TS 3 were still being used for a variety of applications tasks, including transmitting medical data for isolated patients, supporting

manned spaceflight activities (in the late 1960s), and providing communications

links in emergency situations. A TS 3, launched in November 1967, carried a payload

similar to that of A TS 1 into synchronous orbit over the Atlantic. It returned excellent high-resolution photographs along with other data. A gravity-gradient

stabilization system and an experiment sponsored by DoD to measure albedo and

electromagnetic radiation were first included on A TS 2, but a launch vehicle

malfunction prevented that spacecraft from obtaining the proper orbit. ATS 4,

similarly configured, likewise suffered launch vehicle failure and did not achieve orbit. Ground controllers were able to test-fire the new ion engine included in a

payload for the first time on A TS 4 before the spacecraft reentered the atmosphere.

Unexpectedly during the 1969 flight of ATS 5, large amounts of spacecraft fuel were

expended to stabilize the satellite in its parking orbit. Fearing they would have trouble controlling the satellite, the flight team inserted it into synchronous orbit at the

very first opportunity, rather than waiting for the planned orbit insertion. The

spacecraft continued to tumble, however, jeopardizing some of the primary experiments. Although the first series of five Application Technology Satellites was

fraught with launch vehicle and attitude control problems, the spacecraft itself was

judged highly successful. A TS 1 and 3 outlasted their planned operations schedule

several times and, as noted above, were used for a number of purposes that were not

anticipated at the time of the project's initiation. A TS 1 and 3 also have been moved

many times to provide services to several areas of the globe. A second-generation

ATS was on the drawing boards as early as 1964.

When Joseph R. Burke joined NASA Headquarters in 1961, he was assigned to

the Syncom and advanced Syncom projects. He was a natural candidate for ATS

program manager and served in that position through the first ATS flight series. At

the Goddard Space Flight Center, Robert J. Darcey, a member of the center's Syncom team, was project manager for the first three missions. By the time A TS 4 was

launched, he had become chief of Goddard's ATS office; Don V. Fordyce was project manager for ATS-D and ATS-E.

The first series of Applications Techology Satellites made it clear to Govern-
394 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

mentagenciesandprivateconcernsthat fundingspaceresearchanddevelopment

projectscouldbea wiseinvestment.Benefitsmoreimmediatelytangiblethannationalprestigeandscientificdiscoveriescouldberealizedin severalfieldsfrom a

multipurposesatellite.Accurateweatherforecasting,studiesof waterresources,

forestsandlanduse,precisepositioningof air andwatervesselsfor navigationand

trafficcontrol,televisionbroadcasting,point-to-pointcommunications,geodesy,

cartography-alltheseareaswouldgainfromNASA'searlyexperienceswiththe

ApplicationsTechnologySatellite.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-230.

Applications Technology Satellite Experiments

395

EXPERIMENT

SPACECRAFT

A B C D E

Microwave Communications

VHF Communications

WEFAX (see also meteorology experiments)

Ground to Aircraft

Propagational Effect of VHF

Navigational Systems

STADAN Calibration

Millimeter Wave Communications

Meteorological Experiments

Spin Scan Cloud Cover Experiment (SSCCE)

Black and White

Color

Advanced Videcon Camera System (AVCS)

WEFAX

Image Dissector Camera System (1DCS)

OMEGA Position Location Experiment (OPLE)

Image Orthican Day/Night Camera

Gravity Gradient

Antenna

Phased Array

Mechanically Despun

Nutation Sensor

Subliming Solid Jet

Hydrazine Rocket

Resistojet

Ion Engine

Reflectometer

Self-Contained Navigation System

Environmental Measurements Experiments

Omnidirectional Particle Telescope (UCSD)

Omnidirectional Particle Telescope (Aerospace)

Particle Detector (BTL)

Proton/Electron Spectrometer (U. of Minn.)

Solar Cell Damage (GSFC-Dr. Waddel)

Thermal Coatings (GSFC-J. Triolo)

Ion Detector (Rice Univ.)

Magnetometer (UCLA)

VLF Detector (BTL)

Cosmic Radio Noise (GSFC-Dr. Stone)

Electric Field Measuremet (GSFC-Dr. Aggson)

Trapped Radiation Detector (UCB)

Proton/Electron Detector (Lockheed)

Spacecraft Charge Measurement (GSFC-Dr. Aggson)

X X X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

From Gilbert D. Bullock, comp. and ed., "ATS Program Summary," rev. April 1968, p. 12.

BTL = Bell Telephone Laboratories

STADAN =Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition Network

UCB = University of California at Berkeley

UCSD = University of California at San Diego

WEFAX = Weather facsimile
396 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-231.

Chronology of Applications Technology

Satellite (ATS) Development and Operations

Date Event

Oct.-Nov. 1961

Feb. 1962

June 1962

June 18, 1962

Feb. 14, 1963

March 8, 1963

Spring 1963

April 1, 1963

May 1963

June 27, 1963

July 26, 1963

Sept. 1963

Fall 1963

Nov. 1, 1963

Feb. 13, 1964

May 1964

May 13, 1964

May 14, 1964

June 26, 1964

Aug. 19, 1964

Aug. 1964

Oct. 4, 1964

Aug. 11, 1965

Aug. 25, 1965

Sept. 1965

Hughes Aircraft Company personnel began investigating ways to improve

the existing configuration of Syncom.

Hughes proposed an advanced Syncom to NASA Headquarters and Goddard

Space Flight Center personnel.

A project development plan for an advanced stationary communications

satellite was prepared at Goddard.

A project approval document was issued for the study of an advanced

synchronous-orbit satellite. Hughes was selected to prepare a feasibility study

for an advanced Syncom.

Syncom 1 went silent shortly after its apogee motor was fired.

Hughes presented plans'to NASA Headquarters for an advanced Syncom

flight program, with the first launch scheduled for the second half of 1964.

Congressional debates took place over the relationship between NASA's

communications research and development program and the Communications Satellite Corp. (COMSAT).

Leonard Jaffe testified at congressional hearings that NASA was interested

in using an advanced synchronous-orbit satellite to accomplish communications and meteorology tasks.

Hughes's design study contract for advanced Syncom was extended through

August; in June it was extended again until October.

Hughes proposed an intermediate Syncom.

Syncom 2 was launched successfully, and the feasibility of the basic

spacecraft demonstrated.

Goddard supported an advanced Syncom in recommendations to Headquarters.

NASA terminated its plans for an advanced Syncom flight project, and personnel at Goddard, Headquarters, and Hughes studied ways to reorient the

advanced Syncom design to include more areas of research.

A four-month feasibility study for integrating requirements for several areas

of research into one flight program was started at Hughes; advanced Syncom

came to be called Advanced Technological Satellite.

A project approval document for Advanced Technological Satellite was

issued.

The program was unofficially renamed Applications Technology Satellite

(ATS).

A NASA letter contract was issued to Hughes for development and fabrication of the ATS spacecraft.

General Electric was selected to design and build a gravity-gradient stabilization system for ATS.

NASA issued a request for proposals from scientists for experiments to be

carried on five ATS spacecraft (a second request to industry was issued in

September).

Syncom 3 was launched successfully.

Goddard personnel submitted a proposed procurement plan for an advanced

ATS to NASA Headquarters.

The name Applications Technology Satellite was officially approved.

Control Data Corp., Philco, Bell Aerospace, and Electro-Optical Systems,

Inc., were selected by NASA to prepare feasibility studies for ATS experiment hardware.

Sylvania was chosen to build a transportable ground system for ATS.

NASA issued a request for proposals for a second-generation ATS.
SPACESCIENCEAND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-231.

Chronology of Applications Technology

Satellite (ATS) Development and Operations (Continued)

397

Date Event

March 1, 1966

Dec. 6, 1966

April 5, 1967

Nov. 5, 1967

May 22, 1968

Aug. 10, 1968

Aug. 12, 1968

Summer 1968

GE, Fairchild-Hiller, and Lockheed were selected to receive six-month

feasibility design study contracts for a second-generation ATS. Studies were

to be completed in December.

A TS 1 was launched successfully.

The launch of A TS 2 was unsuccessful because the second stage of the launch

vehicle malfunctioned; the satellite was not put into the correct orbit.

A TS 3 was launched successfully.

NASA selected Fairchild-Hiller, GE, and Lockheed for competitive contract

negotiations to develop spacecraft designs for ATS-F and ATS-G.

The launch of A TS 4 was unsuccessful because the Centaur stage of the

launch vehicle failed; the satellite was not injected into the required orbit.

An A TS 4 failure review board was established by NASA's Office of Space

Science and Applications.

The National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council conducted a

space applications summer study.

Table 3-232.

A TS 1 (ATS-B) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center."

Project manager:

Contractor."

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results."

Dec. 6, 1966 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

351.5 in orbit (737.1 at launch including adapter)

Cylindrical

1.47 × 1.52

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert J. Darcey

Hughes Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication

Conduct a variety of experiments on a spin-stabilized spacecraft in geostationary

orbit.

See table 3-230.

Placed into synchronous orbit over the equator (Pacific); the 15 experiments

(meteorology, communications, and control technology) all operated successfully;

still in operation more than 10 years later.
398 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-233.

A TS 2 (ATS-A) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch veh&le:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Ey,periments

responsible

institution:

Results:

April 5, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

323.4 in orbit (369.9 at launch)

Cylindrical with 2 long booms and 2 solar panels

1.83 x 1.42

Overall length with booms extended, 76.81

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Sept. 2, 1968

GSFC

Robert J. Darcey

Hughes Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication

Evaluate gravity-gradient system for spacecraft stabilization; evaluate simultaneous

transmission of voice, television, telegraph, and digital data; evaluate using gravitygradient satellite for meteorology applications; obtain data on earth's albedo and

electromagnetic radiation in space (DoD).

See table 3-230.

Because the launch vehicle's second stage engine malfunctioned, the spacecraft was

not inserted into a circular orbit; some experiments returned data, but the mission

was judged unsuccessful.

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentrv:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments

responsible

institution:

Results:

Table 3-234.

A TS 3 (ATS-C) Characteristics

......................

Nov. 5, 1967 (ETR)

Atlas-Agena D

362 in orbit (714 at launch)

Cylindrical

1.47 x 1.37

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

In orbit

GSFC

Robert J. Darcey

Hughes Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication

In near-stationary equatorial orbit, perform communications, meteorology,

stabilization and pointing technology, orbital technology, and space environmental

degradation experiments.

See table 3-230.

Transmitted excellent high-resolution photographs and other data as planned: put

into synchronous orbit over the Atlantic; still in use more than 10 years later.
SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS

Table 3-235.

A TS 4 (ATS-D) Characteristics

399

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager."

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments,

responsible

institution:

Results:

Aug. 10, 1968 (ETR)

Atlas-Centaur

385.4 in orbit (834.6 at launch with adapter)

Cylindrical with 2 long booms and 2 solar panels

1.83 × 1.42

Overall length with booms extended, 76.81

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Oct. 17, 1968

GSFC

Don V. Fordyce

Hughes Aircraft Co., spacecraft design and fabrication

Evaluate gravity-gradient stabilization system; evaluate a day-night camera system

for meteorology; transmit simultaneous voice, television (black and white and

color), telegraph, and digital signals; test ion engine for in-orbit stationkeeping

maneuvers; evaluate additional ground station at the Radio Research Laboratory,

Kashima, Japan.

See table 3-230.

Because the Centaur stage failed to ignite, the spacecraft did not reach the desired

orbit; the cesium propellant ion engines were tested successfully.

DESCRIPTION-GEODETIC INVESTIGATIONS

Satellites are also a useful research tool for geodesists. By coordinating tracking

data collected on a global scale, specialists can determine the exact positions of particular points on earth's surface, the exact shape of the planet, and the locations

where the gravitational field is anomalous. This information gives cartographers the

many reference points required to prepare a 1:25 000 scale map of the planet. Such

precise measurements also are necessary to calculate launch trajectories. In addition,

geologists can profit from information on deviations from the normal pull of gravity; such anomolies hint at what kind of materials lay beneath the earth's crust.

In 1965, NASA established a National Geodetic Satellite Program to coordinate

the activities of those government agencies (namely NASA, the Department of

Defense, and the Department of Commerce) that required geodetic data and the

several groups working in the field (the National Geodetic Survey, Ohio State

University, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, and the European Satellite

Triangulation Network among others). NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center with

its tracking and data acquisition facilities was assigned a major responsibility for the

agency's part in the national program. Jerome D. Rosenberg, who directed the national effort, was also geodetic satellites program manager at NASA Headquarters.

Vanguard 1 provided the first geodetic data for investigators in the U.S., when

analysis of its orbit indicated that earth's equatorial bulge was not quite as large as

previously calculated and that the southern hemisphere was flatter than the northern

half. This gives earth its pear shape. Although tracking data from all orbital
400 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

spaceflights are applicable to the geodesist's mission, NASA devoted three flight

projects exclusively to geodesy investigations-two Explorers and a passive balloon

project. Explorer 29 and Explorer 36 (also called GEOS 1 and GEOS 2) were

equipped with flashing light beacons and radio equipment by which to track them

(see tables 3-94, 3-101). PAGEOS 1, passive like the Echo balloons, was tracked optically by stations around the world (table 3-137). The Explorer satellites helped

geodesists define earth's gravity and pinpoint the magnitude and location of significant irregularities, improve tracking capabilities, and more accurately determine

datum points. By simultaneously photographing the light source provided by the

passive PAGEOS 1 with two or more widely separated ground-based cameras,

specialists determined the relative spatial coordinates of each camera position. It

took five years to collect enough data to provide a purely geometric determination

of the planet's shape. In addition to geometric and gravimetric applications, information gathered by geodetic satellites was also useful to scientists working in the

fields of earth geophysics and geology, meteorology and aeronomy, space dynamics

and astronomy, and oceanography. For example, such data were helpful in determining continental drift, ice motion in Antarctica and Greenland, and snow and ice

accumulation. Additionally, the findings were used to select the best sites for deepspace-probe tracking stations.

For a detailed report on the subject, see S. W. Henriksen, ed., National

Geodetic Satellite Program: A Report Compiled and Edited for NASA by the

American Geophysical Union, 2 pts., NASA SP-365 (Washington, 1977).
CHAPTER FOUR

ADVANCED RESEARCH

AND TECHNOLOGY
CHAPTER FOUR

ADVANCED RESEARCH

AND TECHNOLOGY

More than any other directorate, NASA's advanced research and technology

arm was tailored after a pattern established by the National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics (NACA). Although NASA's research agenda necessarily emphasized

those problems posed by spaceflight, the agency also was charged with continuing

the role NACA had played for 43 years in the field of aeronautics. Congress had approved NACA's formation in 1915 to address a variety of problems that the airplane

and its new technology had brought to the military, the fledgling aviation industry,

and the increasing number of civilian users of aircraft. From an advisory body that

was limited to proffering opinions on such policy matters as licensing agreements

and civil aviation legislation and to coordinating the research efforts and requirements of others, NACA had evolved into a national research organization with

its own aeronautical laboratory by 1920. Sharing the fundamental work of "uncovering the basic, underlying, scientific principles applicable to all kinds of aviation" with the National Bureau of Standards, subcommittees within NACA claimed

responsibility for various research topics-powerplants for aircraft, aerodynamics,

materials and structures, aircraft construction, and operating problems-with

aerodynamics and wind tunnel research being NACA's major field of interest for

several decades. 1 In the mid-1940s, the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division at

NACA's Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory expanded its duties to include

the study of guided missiles and rockets.* By the time its functions were assumed by

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958, NACA was conducting

a wide variety of research at four centers across the country.t

Certainly harder to define and usually less visible than the activities of NASA's

manned program or of the space science and applications program, the basic and applied research conducted under the auspices of the agency's Office of Advanced

Research and Technology (OART) was equally important. Without it, NASA

specialists could not have provided in a timely fashion the advanced electronic

equipment, engines, attitude control devices, and related items for the sophisticated

missions NASA conducted during its first decade. Basic research (that which had no

application to any specific mission and ranged from very fundamental studies into

*Through its Research and Development Board, the military assumed major responsibility for the

new field of missiles and rockets and for nuclear propulsion and supersonic flight.

tFor more information on NACA, seeAlex Roland, Model Research: A History of the NationalAdvisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, NASA SP-4103 (Washington, 1985).

403
404 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

thenatureandpropertiesofatomstotheanalysisof differentmetalsuitableforthe

wingsofsupersonicaircraft)andappliedresearch(missionoriented)necessarilyprecededtheconstructionof hardwareandthedetailedplanningof missions,oftenby

manyyears.Orperhapsit didnotleadto hardwaredevelopmentaall,butto solvingsomeproblemin appliedmathematicsor physics.In 1967,some80percentof

OART'sbudgetwentto futuremissionsupport,15percentto proposedmissionextensionandnewstarts,and5 percento currentmissionsupport.In additionto

OART'sownresearchprojects,thisofficealsoreviewedandcoordinatedthesupportingresearchandtechnology(SRT)workbeingdonebyprojectofficesin other

directorates.SRT fundspaid for fundamentalscientificstudies,supporting

technologytasks"intendedtomeetparticulartechnologicalobjectives..,inagiven

time-frame,in anticipationof theneedsof futureNASAmissions,"andadvanced

developmentprojectsthatrequiredlongleadtimes.2

Broadlyspeaking,OARTmanagerswerechargedwithachievingfourgoals:(1)

understandingthegeneralphenomenaunderlyingaeronauticalandspacevehicle

technology;(2)reducingthisunderstandingto designmethodsor procedures;(3)

testingvehiclecomponentsto obtainnewdata;and(4)usingthesedatato develop

advancedsubsystems.3Specifically,OART'svariousdivisionsaddressedsuchtopics

asbasicresearch,nuclearpropulsion,aeronautics,chemicalpropulsion,electronics

andcontrolsystems,spacepower,andhumanfactorresearch.

Theorganizationof theOfficeof AdvancedResearchandTechnology*was

relativelystaticfrom1963through1968.JohnW.Crowley,formerNACAassociate

directorof research,servedasNASA'sfirstresearchdirector.Uponhisretirementin

lessthanayear,IraAbbott,twhohadalsobeenwithNACAHeadquarters(ince

1947),becamedirector.In August1962,RaymondL. Bisplinghofftookthepostof

OARTdirector,to besucceededbyMacC.Adamsin October1965andJamesM.

Beggsin June1968(seetable4-1).

Beginningin 1968,severalchangeswereinitiatedwithinOARTto simplify

workingproceduresandto coordinatemoreefficientlyNASA'smanydiverse

researchprojects.Thenumberof OARTcongressionalbudgetlineitemswasreducedfrom8 to 3; thenumberof workunits-the basisfor OARTreportingby the

centers-wasreducedfrom5000to 500;aresearchcouncilwasestablishedtoensure

amorebalancedoverallprogram;andprogamdivisiondirectorsweredelegatedincreasingauthorityto issueinstructions.Thesechangeswereintendedto giveOART

programsa focusandaconsistencytheyhadsometimeslacked.4

Alongwith theNACA personnelbasedin Washington,thenewspaceadministrationinheritedtheNACAemployeesandfacilitiesof fourresearchcenters.

Becauseof theirnature,manyof theprojectsbeingconductedat thesecentersin

1958whenNASAassumedauthorityfor themwereassignedto theresearchdirectorate.LangleyMemorialAeronauticalLaboratorynearHampton,Virginia,had

beenNACA'sfirst fieldstation.RenamedLangleyResearchCenterbyNASA,the

*Before the Office of Advanced Research and Technology was established in the November 1961

agencywide reorganization, research tasks had been assigned to the Office of Aeronautical and Space

Research, renamed the Office of Advanced Research Programs in 1959.

"fAbbott chaired the NACA Ad Hoc Committee on NASA Organization, commonly called the Abbott Committe, from April to August 1958. This committee's suggestions contributed to the new agency's

initial structure.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 405

centerwasinvolvedwith basicresearchin a numberof areas.*Moffett Field,

California,wasthesiteof NACA'ssecondlaboratory,namedAmesAeronautical

Laboratoryin 1944(formerlycalledMoffett FieldLaboratory).AmesResearch

CenterbecameNASA'sfacilityforbasicandappliedresearchin thephysicalandlife

sciences.NACA'sAircraftEngineResearchLaboratory(renamedLewisFlightPropulsionLaboratoryin 1948)beganoperationsin Cleveland,Ohio,in 1942.Asthe

LewisResearchCenter,thefacilitycontinuedto specializein advancedpropulsion

andspacepowersystemsforNASA.NACAemployeeswerefirstassignedto theAir

Forcefacilityat Muroc,California(latercalledEdwardsAir ForceBase)in 1946,

whenagroupfromLangleywentwesto assistwiththerocket-poweredX-1flight

researchprogram.TheHigh-SpeedFlightStationbecameNASA'sFlightResearch

Center.tInvestigatorsat theFlightResearchCenterwereconcernedwith special

problemsencounteredduringaeronauticalflight,vehiclereentryandlanding,and

mannedspaceflightwithinandbeyondtheatmosphere.In additionto theseolder

researchfacilities,in 1964NASAformallyopeneditsElectronicsResearchCenter in

Cambridge, Massachusetts, to strengthen the agency's capabilities in this important

field.**5

Planning a balanced, useful advanced research and technology program

demanded more than the internal coordination and evaluation of NASA's many advanced missions requirements and the identification of problem areas where improvements in technological capabilities could enhance mission performance or

decrease costs. OART managers also had to look to the military tt, to other government agencies (particularly the Federal Aviation Agency, the Department of

Transportation, which absorbed the FAA in 1967, and the Atomic Energy Commission), to such organizations as the National Academy of Sciences and the President's

Science Advisory Committee***, and to universities and private companies active in

aerospace research to determine their research requirements and to solicit their support. To establish a smooth working relationship among the many external groups

that could influence OART's program, several research advisory committees were

formed to provide technical advice and assistance in many subject areas such as fluid

mechanics, aircraft aerodynamics, chemical propulsion systems, materials, and aircraft operating problems.ttt As did the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office of Space Science and Applications, OART did not rely exclusively on in-house

personnel and facilities to do its work, but let contracts to qualified industrial concerns and research organizations.

Quantitative assessment of the first 10 years of NASA's advanced research and

technology program is impossible. We have no tally of flight projects, unless we

*Wallops Station (renamed Wallops Flight Center in 1974) wasestablished as a Langley subsidiary in

1945. Used primarily as a launching center by NASA, Wallops was also responsible for some advanced

aeronautical research projects.

tThe Flight Research Center was renamed the Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center in 1976.

**Budget reductions forced NASA to close the Electronics Research Center in 1969.

t For example, NASA was a nonvoting member of the Interservice Group for Flight Vehicle Power.

* ** For example, in 1967 PSAC recommended that NASA's advanced research and technology program

be maintained at a higher level.

t t t In 1968, Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, former director of OART, was named to chair a new Research

and Technology Advisory Council. Work of the group was divided among seven committees, which functioned much as the research advisory committees had.
406 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

counted every airplane, helicopter, launch vehicle, and spacecraft that benefited in

some way from an OART research project-and the benefits would range from improved ailerons and flight couches to new rocket motors to concepts for landing on

the surface of Mars. This chapter will discuss the major research projects that were

under way during 1958-1968 and indicate how this research was used to develop new

flight subsystems or hardware or how it contributed to the solution of flight problems.

Table 4-1.

Three Phases of Advanced Research and

Technology Management, NASA Headquarters

Phase I

Oct. 1958-Oct. 1961

Administrator/Deputy Administrator/Associate Administrator

Director, Aeronautical and Space Research (John W. Crowley; Ira H. Abbott, July 1959); office renamed Advanced Research Programs in 1959

Assistant Director, Aerodynamics and Flight Mechanics (Milton B. Ames: Herman H. Kurzweg,

Sept. 1960)

Assistant Director, Power Plants (Emerson W. Conlon)

Assistant Director, Structures and Materials and Aircraft Operating Problems (Richard V. Rhode)

Chief, University Research (Lloyd A. Wood); office renamed Research Grants and Contracts in

mid-1959 and dropped in 1961

Phase II

Nov. 1961-Oct. 1963

Administrator/Deputy Adminstrator

Associate Administrator

Director, Advanced Research and Technology (Abbott; Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Aug. 1962)

Director Nuclear Systems (Harold B. Finger)

Director. Aeronautical Research (John P. Stack; Charles H. Zimmerman, June 1962)

Director. Propulsion and Power Generation (William H. Woodward; John L. Sloop, Feb. 1962)

Director Program Review and Resources Management (Boyd Myers II)

Director Space Vehicles (Ames)

Director Electronics and Control (Albert J. Kelley)

Director Biotechnology and Human Research (E. B. Konecci); office added in July 1962"

Director Research (Kurzweg)

Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (Finger)
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 407

Table4-1.

ThreePhasesof AdvancedResearchand

Technology Management, NASA Headquarters (Continued)

Phase III

Nov. 1963-Dec. 1968

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Associate Administrator, Advanced Research and Technology (Bisplinghoff; Mac C. Adams, Oct.

1965; James M. Beggs, June 1968)

Deputy Associate Administrator (Operations) (Myers)

Deputy Associate Administrator (Aeronautics) (Charles W. Harper); office added in May 1967

Division Director, Aeronautical Research (Albert J. Evans, acting; Harper, Oct. 1964;

Evans, May 1967)

Division Director, Biotechnology and Human Research (Konecci; Walton L. Jones, Oct.

1964)

Division Director, Chemical Propulsion (Adelbert Tischler); office added in Jan. 1964

Division Director, Electronics and Control (Kelley; Francis J. Sullivan, May 1965)

Division Director, Nuclear Systems and Space Power (Finger; Woodward, April 1967);

office renamed Space Power and Electric Propulsion in April 1967

Division Director, Programming and Resources Management (Powell M. Lovell; Merrill

H. Mead, 1964; Walter C. Scott, 1965; William E. Hanna, Jr., 1967; Paul E. Cotton,

1968)

Division Director, Research (Kurzweg)

Division Director, Space Vehicle Research and Technology (Ames)

Division Director, Mission Analysis (Leonard Roberts); office added in 1967"*

Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (Finger; Milton Klein, March

1967)

Division Director, Space Flight Programs (R. D. Ginter); office added in 1967 and

renamed Special Programs in 1968

Director, Research and Technology Support (Clarence R. Morrison); office added in

1967 and dropped in 1968

*Prior to July 1962, Alfred M. Mayo was serving as a special assistant to the director of OART to activate an Office of Bioresearch.

**As of February 1965, many advanced planning and mission analysis tasks were assigned to the Mission Analysis Division at Ames Research Center. This group identified options for future planning and

estimated the time in which a certain technology would be needed.
408 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

BUDGET

For general information on the NASA budget and the budget charts in this

chapter, consult chapter 1. For a more detailed breakdown of flight project budgets,

consult the NASA annual budget estimates. Review the bottom notes of the following charts carefully before making conclusions about the totals for any specific project or area of research.

Advanced research and technology funds were divided among broad disciplines;

for example, basic research, space vehicle systems, and aeronautics. The budget was

further broken down by research field or research project; for example, fluid

physics, lifting bodies, and hypersonic aircraft. For each discipline, a total budget

chart is provided, along with individual project charts. The following categories

represent the changing organization of OART. For instance, space power was combined with nuclear-electric systems as of the FY 1966 budget estimate (consult table

4-3).

As explained above, projects in other directorates also were awarded supporting

research and technology funds. For these figures, see the budget charts under the appropriate discipline; for example, table 3-46 deals with Applications Technology

Satellite supporting research and technology and advanced studies.

Table 4-2.

Advanced Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ---

--- 2528 a

1960 ...... 36 650 b

1961 61 345 a 61 345 a 64 983 ¢

1962 107 070 d 107 070 d 91 592

1963 106 672 e 106 672 e 271 560

1964 331 200 317 200 317 201

1965 320 300 316 900 331 328

1966 277 700 297 400 288 596

1967 278 300 286 300 268 150

1968 345 500 342 465 f 315 022

a Total for aeronautical and space research (support of NASA plant and research grants and contracts);

see also table 1-31 for research related to launch vehicles.

bTotal for aeronautical and space research (support of NASA plant and research grants and contracts)

plus spacecraft technology; see also table 1-31 for research related to launch vehicles.

CTotal for spacecraft technology and aircraft and missile technology; see also table 1-31 for research

related to launch vehicles.

dTotal for support of NASA plant, research grants and contracts, and spacecraft technology.

eTotal for spacecraft technology and aircraft and missile technology.

fThe appropriations conference committee reduced the final total to $301 500 000 on October 25,

1967.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 409

Project

Table 4-3.

Programmed Costs by Advanced Research and Technology Project

(in thousands of dollars)

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

Support of

NASA Plant

Basic Research

Research grants and

contracts

Fluid physics

Electrophysics

Materials

Applied

mathematics

Space Vehicle Systems

SRT

Scout reentry

heating

FIRE

Scout-launched

meteoroid

experiments

Pegasus

Small flight

experiments

Lifting body tests

Electronic Systems

SRT

RAM

Scanner

SOCS

Gemini optical

communications

Human Factor

Systems SRT

Small flight projects

Nuclear-Electric

Systems SRT

SNAP-8

MECCA

Electric engine

development

SERT

Space Power SRT

Solar and

Chemical Power

SRT

Nuclear Rockets

SRT

Kiwi

NERVA

RIFT

NRDS

Chemical Propulsion

SRT

Small flight project

M-l engine

Large solid motor

Aeronautics

SRT

X-15

Hypersonic ramjet

2271 27 762 ___a ..................

257 4869 ........................

............ 6716 7887 7803 7538 4875 4957

............ 3160 3986 4039 4726 7290 7245

............ 7080 9582 8034 8438 7811 7819

............ 740 1198 1355 1298 1425 1444

--- 4019 b 25 376 h 12 620 20 226 24 951 25 707 26 450 26 777 34 lO0

...... 500 3000 c 1383 305 400 3000 1800 ___d

......... 3969 e 13 912 f 7037 1811 .........

--- 878 g 3940 362 175 .........

...... 3940 9900 13 690 70 ......

h

750 295 1724 1959 1010 3000 4262 ---

......... 1200 1400 1000 1000 ___i

--- 4933 15 535 26 380 23 222 29 848 32 302 37 557

______j ___k 1305 450 900 1300 1000 500

---J --- 110 1800 1500 1152 295 ---

...... 121 ...............

............... 70 ............

--- 1984 9678 13 200 12 160 13 000 14 765 18 228

--- 420 112 000 1160 1900 1500 1600

--- 8210 19 463 26 749 36 770 38 200 34 940 42 385

--- 6103 15 994 15 465 19 150 4000 5500 ___1

...... 1248 ___m ............

--- 2575 ___n ...............

--- 3570 ° 3188 p 3467 2300 3000 --- 1350

--- 6302 8335 ---q ---q .........

__r ___

--- 1400

...... 1791 12 878 21 261 20 891 20644 16 506 12 500

...... 4669 3856 1700 ............

...... 19 316 41 884 48 820 35 370 35 356 34 162 37 500

...... 1000 10 847 6645 ............

............ 750 739 2000 2332 4000

...... 7003 14 392 21 970 24 762 32 950 30 688 33 537

......... 330 30 30 .........

...... 16 705 s 35000 24000 24 910 2000 ......

............... t 26 800 4750 2950 3500

--- 30000 u 996 6580 9195 8163 10 186 35900 66 800

_-_ 7000v ___w 5580 9_0 1425 883 ___x ___y

............... 2712 5000 ......
410 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-3.

Programmed Costs by Advanced Research and Technology Project

(in thousands of dollars) (Continued)

Project 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1978

Supersonic

transport ...... 100 1958 2513 8821 19 953 12 331 __z ___aa

z bb

XB-70A ..................... 9896 ......

V/STOL ...... 757 __cc 925 2879 2987 3200 __dd ___ee

aEstimate as per the FY 1962 budget estimate was $48 203 000; by the FY 1963 estimate this category

was dropped.

b For spacecraft technology.

c For launch vehicles.

d$2 206 000 was programmed for Scout-launched reentry technology flight experiments from the

space vehicle aerothermodynamics budget.

c Included $2 400 000 for the Atlas-Antares launch vehicle.

f Included $4 000 000 for the Atlas-Antares launch vehicle.

glncluded $800 000 for the launch vehicle.

h$1 336 000 was programmed for small flight experiments from the space vehicle aerothermodynamics budget.

i$1 200 000 was programmed for lifting body tests from the space vehicle aerothermodynamics

budget.

)Funded as a small space vehicle flight experiment.

kS1 635 000 was programmed for RAM from operation of installation funds.

187 500 000 was programmed for SNAP-8 technology in the SRT budget.

mlt was estimated in the FY 1965 budget estimate that $600 000 would be programmed for small

nuclear-electric propulsion and power flight projects (MECCA); this category was dropped in the FY

1966 budget.

nlt was estimated in the FY 1964 budget estimate that $5 500 000 would be programmed for electric

engine development projects; this category was dropped in the FY 1965 budget estimate.

°Included $1 500 000 for the Scout launch vehicle.

Plncluded $6 700 000 for the Scout launch vehicle.

q Included with nuclear-electric systems.

rlncluded with space power and electric propulsion systems.

Slncluded as part of the liquid propulsion program in the FY 1963 request, as part of the OMSF

launch vehicle and propulsion systems program in the FY 1964 request, and as part of the OAR'Ichemical propulsion program in the FY 1965-1968 requests.

tFunded by the U.S. Air Force.

UFor aircraft and missile technology.

vFor X-I 5 hypersonic environmental studies.

w$539 000 was programmed for X-15A research from the operation of installations budget.

x$6 280 000 was programmed for hypersonic aircraft technology supporting research from the

research and technology budget (formerly SRT).

Y$3 448 000 was programmed for the X-15 from the hypersonic aircraft research and technology

budget (formerly SRT).

z$14 040 000 was programmed for supersonic aircraft technology supporting research from the

aeronautics research and technology budget (formerly SRT).

aa$24 050 000 was programmed for supersonic aircraft technology supporting research from the

aeronautics research and technology budget (formerly SRT).

bbof the $24 050 000 programmed for supersonic aircraft technology supporting research from the

aeronautics research and technology budget (formerly SRT), $10 000 000 was for the XB-70A.

cc$182 000 was programmed for V/STOL from the operation of installations budget.

dd$4 440 000 was programmed for V/STOL from the aeronautics research and technology budget

(formerly SRT).

_$7 057 000 was programmed for V/STOL from aeronautics research and technology funds

(formerly SRT).
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-4.

Supportof NASAPlantFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)a

411

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 2271

1960 ...... 27762

1961 51345 51345 ___b

1962 89110 89110 ---

aIncludesthefollowingcategories:transportation,cmmunicationsservices,othercontractualservices,suppliesandmaterials,andequipment.ThesefundsweredistributedamongallNASAinstallations

andwereusedforawidevarietyofexpenses.

bEstimatespertheFY1962budgetwas$48203000;bytheFY1963estimatethiscategoryhad

beendropped.

Table4-5.

TotalBasicResearchFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 257 a

1960 ...... 4869 a

1961 10 000 a 10 000a ___b

1962 7600 a 7600a ___c

1963 ___c ___c 17 696

1964 ___c ___c 22 653

1965 21 000 21 000 21 231

1966 22 000 22 000 22 000

1967 23 000 23 000 21 401

1968 23 500 21 465d 21 465

aFor research grants and contracts in the following fields: physical science, cosmological science,

bioscience, engineering science, socioeconomic studies, propulsion science, and miscellaneous.

bEstimate as per the FY 1962 budget estimate was $5 000 000; by the FY 1963 estimate this category

had been dropped.

CNo corresponding line item.

d Final total was decreased to $20 000 000 by the appropriations conference committee on October

25, 1967.

Table 4-6.

Basic Research Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 17 696

1964 ...... 22 653

1965 21 000 21 000 21 231

1966 22 000 22 000 22 000

1967 23 000 23 000 21 401

1968 23 500 21 465 21 465
412 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-7.

BasicResearchSupportingResearchandTechnology--FluidPhysicsFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 6716

1964 ...... 7887

1965 7800 7800 7803

1966 8000 8000 7538

1967 8200 8200 4875

1968 8615 ___a 4957

a Authorization not broken down by individual supporting research and technology project.

Table 4-8.

Basic Research Supporting Research and Technology--Electrophysics Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 3160

1964 ...... 3986

1965 4000 4000 4039

1966 4100 4100 4726

1967 4800 4800 7290

1968 4740 ___a 7245

a Authorization not broken down by individual supporting research and technology projects.

Table 4-9.

Basic Research Supporting Research and Technology-Materials Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 7080

1964 ...... 9582

1965 8000 8000 8034

1966 8600 8600 8438

1967 8500 8500 7811

1968 8655 __a 7819

a Authorization not broken down by individual supporting research and technology projects.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 413

Table 4--10.

Basic Research Supporting Research and Technology-Applied Mathematics

Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ---

--- 740

1964 ---

--- 1198

1965 1200 1200 1355

1966 1300 1300 1298

1967 1500 1500 1425

1958 1490 ___a 1444

a Authorization not broken down by individual supporting research and technology projects.

Table 4-11.

Total Space Vehicle Systems Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ---

--- 1904 a

1960 5000 b 5000 b 4019 c

1961 21 200 a 21 200 a 27 126 c

1962 10 360 c 10 360 c 20 762

1963 54 084 c 54 084 c 43 990

1964 61 962 53 462 45 714

1965 38 800 37 000 d 44 193

1966 35 000 35 000 35 000

1967 36 000 36 000 33 909

1968 37 000 36 000 e 34 100

aFor vehicle systems technology.

bFor space systems technology.

CFor spacecraft technology.

aAuthorization not broken down by line item to indicate from what projects the $1 800 000 was sub-

_racted. All line items are noted to be undistributed.

eTotal was reduced further to $35 000 000 by the appropriations conference committee on October

25, 1967.
414 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-12.

Space Vehicle Systems Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 1904 b

1960 5000 c 5000 c 4019 d

1961 21 200 b 21 200 b 25 376 d

1962 10 360 d 10 360 d 12 620

1963 30 894 d 30 894 d 20 226

1964 37 762 37 762 24 951

1965 26 300 ___e 25 707

1966 24 000 24 000 26 450

1967 28 700 28 700 26 777

1968 29 000 ___e 34 100f

aSRT funds supported work in several fields: spacecraft and launch vehicle aerothermodynamics,

spacecraft and launch vehicle loads and structures, space vehicle environmental factors, advanced space

vehicle concepts, and space vehicle design criteria.

bFor vehicle systems technology.

CFor space systems technology.

d For spacecraft technology advanced research.

eAuthorization not broken down by line item.

fAll items were described as research and technology projects (there were no flight project

categories): space vehicle aerothermodynamics, $11 815 000; space vehicle structures, $9 779 000; space

environmental protection and control, $10 754 000; and space vehicle design criteria, $1 752 000.

Table 4-13.

Space Vehicle Systems Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 1750

1962 ...... 8142

1963 23 190a 23 190a 23 764

1964 24 200 i 5 700 20 763

1965 12 500 ___b 18 486

1966 11 000 11 000 8550

1967 7300 7300 7132

1968 8000 ___b ___c

aFor spacecraft technology flight projects.

bAuthorization not broken down by line item.

CAll items in the budget were described as research and technology projects rather than flight projects (see table 4-12, note O.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table 4-14.

Space Vehicle Systems Flight Projects-Scout Reentry Heating Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

415

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 500

1962 ...... 3000 a

1963 2500 b --- 1383

1964 1500 c 1500c 305

1965 2000c ___d 400

1966 5000 5000 3000

1967 4800 4800 1800

1968 4500 ___d ___e

a For launch vehicle.

blncludes $2 000 000 for launch vehicle.

Clncludes $1 000 000 for launch vehicle.

d Authorization not broken down by line item.

e $2 206 000 was programmed for Scout-launched reentry technology flight experiments in the space

vehicle aerothermodynamics SRT budget.

Table 4-15.

Space Vehicle Systems Flight Projects--FIRE Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 3969a

1963 I0 200b --- 13912c

1964 12 500d 4000 7037

1965 3000e ---f 1811

1966 500 500 ---

aIncludes $2 400 000 for Atlas-Antares launch vehicle.

bFor flight-reentry-at-hyperbolic-velocities project, of which $4 000 000 was for an Atlas launch

vehicle.

c Includes $4 000 000 for Atlas-Antares launch vehicle.

dFor an Advanced FIRE, of which $1 700 000 was for an Atlas-Agena launch vehicle. Advanced

FIRE was not approved by Congress.

e Includes $1 110 000 for Atlas-Antares launch vehicle.

fAuthorization not broken down by line item.
416 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-16.

SpaceVehicleSystemsFlightProjects-Scout-LaunchedMeteoroidExperiments

FundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 878b

1963 3500c --- 2805

1964 950d 950 362

1965 ...... 175

aSee also table 3-10. These funds were for Explorer 23.

blncludes $800 000 for tile launch vehicle.

¢Includes $2 000 000 for launch vehicle.

dlncludes $500 000 for the launch vehicle.

Table 4-17.

Space Vehicle Systems Flight Projects-Project Pegasus Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 3940

1964 4250 4250 9900

1965 2600 ___b 13 690

1966 2500 2500 70

a Also listed as "Saturn-Launched Meteoroid Experiments" in the budget estimates.

bAuthorization not broken down by line item.

Table 4-18.

Space Vehicle Systems Flight Projects-Lifting Bodies Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1964 950 a 950 a 1200

1965 1900 ___b 1400

1966 1000 1000 1000

1967 1000 1000 1000

1968 1000 ___b ___c

a For space vehicle recovery.

oAuthorization not broken down by line item.

¢$1 200 000 was programmed for lifting body flight research from the space vehicle aerothermodynamics technology research budget.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-19.

SpaceVehicleSystemsFlightProjects-OtherSmallProjectsFundingHistory

(inthousandsof dollars)

417

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 750a

1962 ...... 295b

1963 6990c --- 1724d

1964 4050e 4050e 1959f

1965 3000g ___h 1010i

1966 2000j 2000j 3000_

1967 1500i 1500i 4262i

1968 2500i ___h ___k

aIncludes$500000forradioattenuationmeasurements,$5000forTrailblazerreentryproject,and $700000forhorizonsensors.

blncludes$719000forexperimentsdealingwithbehaviorandhandlingofcryogenicpropellants,

$113000forwindshearmeasurements,$535000forameteorologysimulationexperiment,$84000fora

reentrydetectionexperiment,ad$273000forameteoroidpenetrationprobe. cIncludes$400000forenvironmentalexperiments(ofwhich$2000000wasforaScoutlaunch

vehicle),$1950000forengineeringtestflightexperiments,$140000forarecoverablemicrometeoroid

probe,$700000forhorizonsensors,and$200000foraTrailblazerreentryproject. dForameteoroidpenetrationprobe.Inaddition,$925000wasprovidedfromoperationofinstallationsfunds.

elncludes$550000forenvironmentalexperiments,$1650000forexperimentsdealingwiththe behaviorofcryogenicpropellants,$600000forwindshearmeasurements,$600000forameteorsimulationexperiment,$200000foraTrailblazerreentryproject,and$450000forameteoroidpenetration

probe.

flncludes$1050000forexperimentsdealingwiththebehaviorofcryogenicpropellants,$117000

forwindshearmeasurements,$640000forameteorsimulationexperiment,$63000forreentrydetec- tion,and$89000forameteoroidpenetrationprobe.

gIncludes$640000forexperimentsdealingwiththebehaviorofcryogenicpropellants,$200000for

windshearmeasurements,$610000forameteorsimulationexperiment,$150000forreentrydetection, and$140000forsecondaryenvironmentalexperiments.

hAuthorizationnotbrokendownbylineitem.

iForplanetaryentrytechnologyandheatshieldmaterialstechnology.

JIncludes$95000forwindshearmeasurements,$325000formeteorsimulationexperiment,and $1580000formaterialsndstructurestests.

ks1 336 000 was programmed for parachute-decelerator flight experiments from the space vehicle

aerothermodynamics technology research budget.
418 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-20.

TotalElectronicSystemsFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 4933

1963 ...... 17 071

1964 30 362 30 362 28 700

1965 28 400 27 000 a 25 622

1966 34 400 34 400 32 300

1967 36 800 36 800 33 597

1968 40 200 39 200 b 38 057

aThe authorization was not broken down by line item to indicate from what projects the $1 400 000

was subtracted.

bThe authorization was not broken down by line item to indicate from what projects the $1 000 000

was subtracted. The total was reduced further to $35 000 000 by the appropriations conference committee on October 25, 1967.

Table 4-21.

Electronic Systems Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 4933

1963 ...... 15 535

1964 26 612 26 612 26 380

1965 25 400 ___a 23 222

1966 30 000 30 000 29 848

1967 34 000 34 000 32 302

1968 39 200 ___a 37 557

aAuthorization not broken down by line item.

Table 4-22.

Electronic Systems Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ......... a

1962 .........

1963 ___a ___ 1536

1964 3750 3750 2320

1965 3000 ___b 2400

1966 4400 4400 2452

1967 2800 2800 1295

1968 1000 ___b 500

aSee table 4-19.

bAuthorization not broken down by line item.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-23.

ElectronicSystemsFlightProjects-ProjectRAMFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

419

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ......... a

1962 ......... b

1963 ...... 1305

1964 2000 ___c 450

1965 2000 ___c 900

1966 3400 3400 1300

1967 1300 1300 1000

1968 400 ___c 500

aSee also table 4-19.

b$1 635 000 was programmed for Project RAM from operation of installations funds.

CAuthorization not broken down by line item.

Table 4-24.

Electronic Systems Flight Projects-Project SCANNER Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ......... a

1962 .........

1963 __a ___ 110

1964 1750 ___b 1800

1965 1000 __b 1500

1966 1000 1000 1152

1967 1000 c 1000 ¢ 295

1968 600c ___b ___d

aSee also table 4-19.

b Authorization not broken down by line item.

c For earth coverage horizon measurements.

d No corresponding line item.

Table 4-25.

Electronic Systems Flight Projects-Other Small Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1963 --- 121a

1964 --- 70 b

a For spacecraft orientation control system (SOCS) project.

bFor Gemini optical communications experiment.
420 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-26.

TotalHumanFactorSystemsFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1960 ......... a

1961 ___b ......

1962 ...... 2404

1963 ...... 9790

1964 18 200 13 200 13 200

1965 16 200 15 500 13 320

1966 14 900 14 900 14 900

1967 17 000 17 000 16 265

1968 21 000 21 000 19 828

a$917 000 was programmed for biosciences, which included some human factors research, in the

research and grants budget.

b$2 000 000 was requested for biosciences, which included some human factors research, in the

grants and contracts budget.

Table 4-27.

Human Factor Systems Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Yea r Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 1984

1963 ...... 9678

1964 18 200 13 200 13 200

1965 13 200 ___a 12 160

1966 13 000 13 000 13 000

1967 15 500 15 500 14 765

1968 19 500 19 500 18 228

aAuthorization not broken down by line item.

Table 4-28.

Human Factor Systems Small Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 420

1963 ...... 112

1964 .........

1965 3000 ___a 1160

1966 1900 1900 1900

1967 1500 1500 1500

1968 1500 1500 1600

aAuthorization not broken down by line item.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-29.

TotalSpacePowerandElectricPropulsionFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

421

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 20458

1963 ...... 39893

1964 68768 68768 45963

1965 48100 47100b 58220

1966 27000 33000 45200

1967 42500 44500 40440

1968 45000 44000 43735

aThiscategorywascallednuclear-electricsystemsuntiltheFY1967budgetestimate.AsoftheFY

1966estimate,fundsforspacepowerwereaddedtothenuclear-electricsystemsbudget.AsoftheFY

1967estimate,fundsforsolarandchemicalpowerwereaddedtothiscategory.Seealsotable1-31.

bTheauthorizationwasnotbrokendownbylineitemtoindicatefromwhatprojectsthe$1000000

wasubtracted.

Table4-30.

SpacePowerandElectricPropulsionSupportingResearchandTechnologyFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 8210

1963 ...... 19463

1964 20 018 20 018 26 749

1965 25 000 ___a 36 770

1966 24 000 24 000 38 200

1967 37 000 37 000 34 940

1968 34 200 ___a 42 385

aAuthorization not broken down by line item.

Table 4-3 I.

Space Power and Electric Propulsion Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 12 248

1963 ...... 20 430

1964 48 750 48 750 19 214

1965 23 100 ___a 21 450

1966 3000 9000 7000

1967 5500 7500 5500

1968 10 800 ___b 1350

aAuthorization was not broken down by line item.

bThere was no line authorization for SERT; $9 700 000 was authorized for SNAP-8.
422 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-32.

SpacePowerandElectricPropulsionFlightProjects--SNAP-8FundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 6103

1963 ...... 15 994

1964 24 000 a 24 000 a 15 465

1965 18 000 __b 19 150

1966 000 6000 4000

1967 5500 7500 5500

1968 9700 9700 ___c

a$9 000 000 of the total was set aside specifically for flight evaluation, of which $500 000 was for a

Thor launch vehicle.

bAuthorization not broken down by line item.

c$7 500 000 was programmed for SNAP-8 technology in the supporting research and technology

budget.

Table 4-33.

Space Power and Electric Propulsion Flight Projects-Project SERT Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Request Authorization Programmed

...... 357&

...... 3188 b

15 35ff 15 350c 3467

5100 ___d 2300

3000 3000 3000

000 --- 000

1100 __d 1350

aTotal includes $1 500 000 for Scout launch vehicles.

b Total includes $6 700 000 for Scout launch vehicles.

CTotal includes $600 000 for Scout launch vehicles.

d Authorization not broken down by line item.

Table 4-34.

Space Power and Electric Propulsion Flight Projects-Other Small Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 2575a

1963 ...... 1248 b

1964 9400 c 9400 c __ _d

a For electric engine development.

b For Project MECCA. In addition, it was estimated in the FY 1964 budget estimate that $5 500 000

would be programmed for electric engine development projects; this category was dropped in the FY 1965

budget estimate.

Clncludes $8 000 000 for electric engine development and $1 400 000 for Project MECCA.

d It was estimated in the FY 1965 budget estimate that $600 000 000 would be programmed for small

nuclear-electric propulsion and power flight projects (MECCA); this category was dropped in the FY

1966 budget estimate.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-35.

TotalSpacePowerFundingHistory

(inthousandsof dollars) a

423

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 6302

1963 ...... 8335

1964 16 524 16 524 ___b

1965 13 000 12 500 ___b

a Combined with the nuclear-electric systems budget as of the FY 1966 budget estimate. See also table

1-31.

bSee table 4-29.

Table 4-36.

Space Power Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 6302

1963 ...... 8335

1964 16 524 16 524 ___a

1965 13 000 12 500 __a

a See table 4-30.

Table 4-37.

Total Solar and Chemical Power Funding History

(in thousands of dollars) a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1964 ...... 14 000

1965 .........

1966 14 200 14 200 ___b

aAs of the FY 1967 budget estimate, this category was combined with the nuclear-electric systems

budget.

bSee table 4-29.

Table 4-38.

Solar and Chemical Power Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Yea r Request Authorization Programmed

1964 ...... 14 000

1965 .........

1966 14 200 14 200 ___a

a See table 4-30.
424 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-39.

TotalNuclearRocketsFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 26 776

1963 ...... 69 465

1964 96 687 94 187 79 176

1965 58 000 57 000 b 57 000

1966 58 000 58 000 58 000

1967 53 000 53 000 53 000

1968 74 000c 73 000d 54 000

aSee also table 1-31.

bThe authorization was not broken down to indicate from what projects the $1 000 000 was subtracted.

CNASA's original request for nuclear rockets was $46 500 000. Because the NERVA rocket engine

was considered to be an especially important item by the administration, the request was increased.

dThe authorization was not broken down to indicate from what projects the $1 000 000 was subtracted. The total was reduced further to $46 500 000 by the appropriations conference committee on

October 25, 1967. See note c above.

Table 4-40.

Nuclear Rockets Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

--- 1791 1962 ---

1963 ...... 12 878

1964 22 687 22 687 21 261

1965 23 000 ___a 20 891

1966 22 000 22 000 20 644

1967 16 900 16 900 16 506

1968 23 000 b ___a 12 500

a Authorization not broken down by line item.

bNASA's original request was $16 500 000. Because the nuclear rocket program was considered to be

an especially important item by the administration, the request was increased.

Table 4-41.

Nuclear Rockets Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

--- 24 985 1962 ---

--- 56 587 1963 ---

1964 74 000 71 500 57 915

1965 35 000 ___a 36 109

1966 36 000 36 000 37 356

1967 36 100 36 100 36 494

1968 51 000 ___a 41 500

aAuthorization was not broken down by line item.

bNASA's original request was $30 000 000. Because the NERVA rocket engine program was considered to be an especially important item by the administration, the request was increased.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 425

Table 4-42.

Nuclear Rockets Flight Projects-Kiwi Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 --- 4669

1963 --- 3856

1964 1000 1700

Table 4-43.

Nuclear Rockets Flight Projects--RIFT Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 --- 1000

1963 --- 10 847

1964 12 000 6645

Tabie 4-44.

Nuclear Rockets Flight Projects--NERVA Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 19 316

1963 ...... 41 884

1964 60 000 __a 48 820

1965 34 500 ___a 35 370

1966 35 000 35 000 35 356

1967 33 100 33 100 34 162

1968 47 000b ___a 37 500

a Authorization not broken down by line item.

bNASA's original request for NERVA was $26 000 000. Because the NERVA rocket engine program

was considered to be an especially important item by the administration, the request was increased.

Table 4-45.

Nuclear Rockets Flight Projects-Nuclear Rocket Development Station Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1964 1000 ___a 750

1965 500 ___a 739

1966 1000 1000 2000

1967 3000 3000 2332

1968 4000 ___a 4000

i

aAuthorization not broken down by line item.
426 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-46.

TotalChemicalPropulsionFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)a

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 7003

1963 ...... 49 722

1964 22 497 24 497 46 000

1965 59 800 62 800 76 502

1966 30 000 43 700 39 700

1_067 37 000 41 000 33 638

1968 38 0130 41 000 b 37 037

aSee also table 1-31.

bThe total was subsequently reduced to $35 000 000 by the appropriations conference committee on

October 25, 1967.

Table 4-47.

Chemical Propulsion Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 ...... 7003

1963 ...... 14 392

1964 22 497 24 497 21 970

1965 21 800 25 800 24 762

1966 30 000 30 000 32 950

1967 33 500 33 500 30 688

1968 38 000 38 000 33 537

Table 4-48.

Chemical Propulsion Flight Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1963 ...... 35 330

1964 ...... 24 030

1965 38 000 37 000 51 740

1966 --- 13 700 6750

1967 3500 7500 2950

1968 --- 3000 3500
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-49.

ChemicalPropulsionFlightProjects-M-IEngineFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)a

427

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1962 26 000 b --- 16 705

1963 55 316 --- 35 000 c

1964 45 000 --- 24 000

1965 25 000 d ___e 24 910

1966 ---f 7500 2000

alncluded as part of the liquid propulsion program in the FY 1963 request, as part of the OMSF

launch vehicle and propulsion systems program in the FY 1964 request, and as part of the OART

chemical propulsion program in the FY 1965-1968 requests.

b Supplementary request.

CThis amount was programmed for experimental engines, of which the M-1 was the major project.

dThe total amount requested for experimental engines, of which the M-I was the major program,

was $38 000 000.

e The total amount authorized for experimental engines, of which the M-I was the major project, was

$37 000 000. There is no indication in the chronological budget history for FY 1965 from which project

the $1 000 000 was subtracted. See also table 4-50.

fAlthough NASA did not request funds in FY 1968 for the M-I, Congress authorized $7 500 000 for

the project.

Table 4-50.

Chemical Propulsion Flight Projects-Large Solid Motor Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1964 ......... a

1965 13000b ___c 26 800

1966 000 6200 4750

1967 3500 7500 2950

1968 000 3000 3500

aFunded previously by the U.S. Air Force.

bThe total amount requested for experimental engines, of which the large solid motor was one project, was $38 000 000.

CThe total amount authorized for experimental engines, of which the large solid motor was one project, was $37 000 000. There is no indication in the chronological budget history for FY 1965 from which

project the $1 000 000 was subtracted. See also table 4-49.

Table 4-51.

Chemical Propulsion Flight Projects-Other Small Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1963 --- 330

1964 --- 30

1965 --- 30
428 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-52.

TotalAeronauticsFundingHistory

(inthousandsof dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 37 857 a

1962 ...... 2954

1963 52 588 a 52 588 a 15 598

1964 16 200 ___b 21 795

1965 37 000 37 000 35 240

1966 42 400 42 200 41 496

1967 33 000 35 000 35 900

1968 66 800 66 800 c 66 800

aFor aircraft and missile technology.

bAuthorization not broken down by line item.

CTotal was reduced to $65 000 000 by the appropriation conference committee on October 25, 1967.

Table 4-53.

Aeronautics Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 30 000 a

1962 ...... 996

1963 39 500 b 39 500 b 6580

1964 9910 9910 9195

1965 9400 9400 8163

1966 8300 8300 10 186

1967 9000 11 000 c 35 900 d

1968 18 600 18 600 66 800 e

aFor aircraft and missile technology advanced research ($15 200 000 for supersonic commercial

transport, $2 300 000 for V/STOL aircraft, $3 500 000 for multicapability aircraft, and $1 000 000 for

hypersonic aircraft) and advanced technical development ($8 000 000).

bFor aircraft and missile technology advanced research ($18 000 for supersonic commercial transport, $4 500 000 for V/STOL aircraft, $4 500 000 for multicapability aircraft, and $3 000 000 for hypersonic aircraft) and advanced technical development ($9 500 000).

CThe increase was to fund supporting research for the SST, V/STOL, and hypersonic ramjet

projects.

dAII line items are described as research and technology projects (there are no flight project monies):

advanced research and technology, $3 730 000; general aircraft technology supporting research,

$200 000; V/STOL aircraft technology supporting research, $5 550 000; subsonic aircraft technology

supporting research, $6 100 000; supersonic aircraft technology supporting research, $14 040 000; and

hypersonic aircraft technology supporting research, $6 280 000.

CAll line items are described as research and technology projects (there are no flight project monies):

advanced research and technology, $12 800 000; general aviation aircraft technology, $450 000; V/STOL

aircraft technology, $7 057 000; subsonic aircraft technology, $7 905 000; supersonic aircraft

technology, $24 050 000; and hypcrsonic aircraft technology, $14 538 000.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-54.

AeronauticsFlightProjectsFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdoUars)

429

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 7857 a

1962 ...... 1958

1963 13 088 a 13 088 a 9018

1964 6290 6290 12 600

1965 27 600 27 600 27 077

1966 33 900 33 900 31 310

1967 24 000 26 000 b ___c

1968 48 200 48 200 ___c

aFor aircraft and missile technology flight projects.

bThe increase was to fund the SST, V/STOL, and hypersonic ramjet projects.

CAll line items are described as research and technology projects; there are no flight project monies.

See table 4-53, notes d and e.

Table 4-55.

Aeronautics Flight Projects--X-15 Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 7000 a

1962 ........ b

1963 8000 a 8000 a 5580

1964 900 900 900

1965 900 900 1425

1966 900 900 883

1967 900 900 __c

1968 5000 d 5000 d ---_

aFor X-15 hypersonic environmental studies.

b$539 000 from the operation of installations budget was programmed for the X-15.

c$6 280 000 was programmed for hypersonic aircraft technology supporting research; see table 4-53,

note d.

dlncludes $1 000 000 for a Delta X-15.

eof the $14 538 000 programmed for hypersonic aircraft technology supporting research, $4 338 000

was for the X-15; see table 4-53, note e.
430 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-56.

Aeronautics Flight Projects-Supersonic Transport Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 100 a

1962 ...... 1958 b

1963 1600 a 1600 a 2513

1964 3790 3790 8821

1965 24 700 24 700 19 953

1966 16 000 16 000 12 331

__ d 1967 14 100 ___c

1968 11 100 11 100 ___e

aFor B-58 flight simulation of supersonic transport operation.

b$299 000 from the operation of installations budget was also programmed for the SST.

CAn increase in the authorization ($2 000 000) was to be used for the SST, V/STOL, and hypersonic

ramjet projects.

d$14 040 000 was programmed for supersonic aircraft technology supporting research; see table

4-53, note d.

e$24 050 000 was programmed for supersonic aircraft technology supporting research; see table

4-53, note e.

Aeronautics Flight

(in

Table 4-57.

Projects-V/STOL Funding History

thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1961 ...... 757

1962 ......... a

1963 1988 1988 925

1964 1600 1600 2879

1965 2000 2000 2987

1966 2000 2000 3200

1967 5000 ___b ___c

1968 7100 7100 __d

a$182 000 from the operation of installations budget was programmed for V/STOL.

bAn increase in the authorization ($2 000 000) was to be used for the SST, V/STOL, and hypersonic

ramjet projects.

c$5 550 000 was programmed for V/STOL technology supporting research; see table 4-53, note d.

d$7 057 000 was programmed for V/STOL technology supporting research; see table 4-53, note e.

Table 4-58.

Aeronautics Flight Projects--Hypersonic Ramjet Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1965 ...... 2712

1966 5000 5000 5000

1967 2000 ___a ___b

1968 7000 7000 ___b

aAn increase in the authorization ($2 000 000) was to be used for the SST, V/STOL, and hypersonic

ramjet projects.

bSee table 4-53, notes d and e.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Table 4-59.

Aeronautics Flight Projects-XB-70 Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

431

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1966 10000 10000 9896

1967 2000 2000 __a

1968 10000 10000 ___b

a$14 040 000 was programmed for supersonic aircraft technology supporting research; see table

4-53, note d.

bof the $24 050 000 programmed for supersonic aircraft technology supporting research,

$10 000 000 was for the XB-70; see table 4-53, note e.

Table 4-60.

Aeronautics Flight Projects-Other Small Projects Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1967 ......... a

1968 8000 b 8000 b ___c

aof the $6 100 000 programmed for subsonic aircraft supporting research, $4 400 000 was for aircraft noise reduction and $1 716 000 was for quiet engine research; see table 4-53, note d.

blncludes $3 500 000 for aircraft noise reduction, $2 000 000 for quiet engine development,

$2 000 000 for the F-106, and $500 000 for the F-111.

CSee table 4-53, note e.

DESCRIPTION-BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

In the early 1960s, basic research tasks were often the responsibility of applied

research divisions within the Office of Advanced Research and Technology; for example, research in fluid physics was supported by the spacecraft technology budget.

But the FY 1963-1968 budgets provided funds for four distinct categories of basic

research-fluid physics, electrophysics, materials, and applied mathematics. The

overall purpose of basic research was not to contribute to some specific mission or

discipline, but to "institute and administer" fundamental research with the aim that

the increase and distribution of scientific knowledge would lead to a better

understanding of the physical and mathematical laws that governed all NASA's

projects. 6

With the November 1961 agencywide reorganization, Hermann H. Kurzweg

was named OART's director of research at NASA Headquarters. He was still serving in this capacity in 1968. Although it was never a heavily funded program,

various basic research projects were supported at all NASA's research centers and by

a large number of contractors.
432 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Fluid Physics

Providing fundamental information and understanding of the many different

flow processes of liquid and gas mixtures involved in aircraft, spacecraft, and propulsion systems operation (especially during entry or reentry into an atmosphere)

was the research objective in the field of fluid physics. Work in this area often cut

across the conventional discipinary lines of fluid mechanics, chemistry, and physics.

Researchers at Ames, Langley, and Lewis Research Centers and at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory contributed to solving a variety of aircraft and spacecraft design

problems.

The measurement of radiation characteristics, heat, viscous and electrical conductivities, and chemical reaction rates of different planetary gas mixtures at very

high temperatures (as with the interaction of air and a fast-moving vehicle) gave

scientists and engineers data that proved useful in determining the stresses a vehicle

would have to overcome during reentry into earth's atmosphere or entry into some

extraterrestrial atmosphere. Information on convective and radiant heat transfer

was used by designers to select the best configuration for spacecraft entry cones and

protective heat shields and the ablative materials from which they were made. The

application of fluid physics principles gave propulsion experts clues by which to

understand the mechanism of combustion instability in liquid-fuel rocket engines. A

knowledge of high-temperature ionized gases (plasmas) was essential to the design of

electromagnetic gas accelerators and certain energy converters (this subfield of fluid

physics is called plasma physics).

Turbulent boundary layer behavior was another field under investigation; using

new data, researchers contributed to a more reliable design for hypersonic aircraft

and engine inlets and nozzles. Measuring the energy and momentum transferred by a

particle to a surface during impact produced information critical to a number of

design issues, such as determining the orbital lifetime of satellites and predicting

heating and thrust loss from attitude control rockets. NASA researchers at the field

centers and their contractors completed many studies, measurements, and observations by using theoretical models and by conducting laboratory experiments in wind

tunnels and shock tubes and with other sophisticated equipment. 7

Alfred Gessow (formerly with NACA since 1944) was the long-time chief of

fluid physics research within OART's basic research program (he served the

aerodynamics and flight mechanics program in the same capacity in NASA's early

years). In January 1967, Gessow became assistant director for physics and

mathematics in the same program office. James E. Danberg took the position of

chief of fluid dynamics research until mid-1967, when John T. Howe assumed the

job.

Electrophysics

The electrophysics program was concerned with theoretical and experimental

basic physics research devoted to exploring and explaining the macroscopic and

atomic electric behavior of solids, liquids, and magnetic force fields, either static or

dynamic. Information from this kind of research was generally applicable to
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 433

engineering advances in such fields as space power, radiation effects, and electronic

communications. Laboratory work in electrophysics was conducted at the Lewis,

Langley, Ames, and Electronics Research Centers and at the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory, and at the facilities of many contractors. The University of Chicago,

the Johns Hopkins University, University of Michigan, Stanford University,

Virginia Polytechnic Institute, William and Mary College, University of Virginia,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Columbia University were major participants.

Research into the mechanisms of energy transfer in the atomic levels of solids

and gases led investigators to new sources for the stimulated emission of coherent

electromagnetic waves (lasers) in the region from gamma ray to millimeter

wavelengths. In turn, this led to the development of new signal sources for electronic

communications and spacecraft navigation devices. Superconductors (zero electrical

resistance at very low temperatures) made of niobium-tin were scrutinized by NASA

and contractor scientists to determine the precise relationship of the current and the

magnetic field. It was believed that the magnetic fields produced by superconducting

coils could be used to shield spacecraft from solar particle radiation; other potential

applications for superconductors included their use on electric power lines, rotating

electrical motors and generators, and gyroscopes. Electron movement through

titanium dioxide placed between aluminum films also was being studied to determine if a device capable of detecting long wavelength infrared radiation could be

developed. Many other research tasks with possible applications to space science and

vehicle design were conducted during the decade, including the study of antimatter,

high-frequency acoustic waves, lasers, and the fission-electron cell. Another area of

research that caught the attention of NASA electrophysicists concerned the electrical

forces responsible for the high velocity of tornado clouds.

One man, Harry Harrison, led the electrophysics research team during NASA's

first 10 years. He held the position of chief for electrophysics in OART's basic

research program office.

Materials

Developing lightweight materials that could withstand extreme temperatures,

stresses, corrosion, and radiation was a critical task facing NASA during the

1958-1968 period. OART's basic research program contributed to this effort by supporting materials research, which ranged from very basic studies associated with the

ways in which atoms were arranged to investigations of the failure of a particular

material and how that failure was influenced by the environment in which it

operated. Of the basic research programs, materials research could be most directly

applied to hardware development. Personnel at the Lewis, Langley, Ames, and Electronics Research Centers, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Goddard Space Flight

Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center worked in the field of materials research.

Contractors that assisted them included the University of Washington, Michigan

State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Case Institute of

Technology, Naval Ordnance Test Station, and the Martin Company.

Aircraft, spacecraft, and launch vehicles were exposed to harsh and unique environments that demanded the special attention of designers and engineers: extreme
434 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

heatand cold,highspeeds,weightlessnessandgreataccelerationsof gravity,

ultravioletradiationandotherkindsof emissions,andcollisionswithmeteorites.

Notonlywastheoutersurfaceor skinaffected,butinternalcomponents(engine

nozzles,turbineblades,fuel tanks,and electronicequipment)weresubjectto

damageaswell.Oneof themostbasicthingsaresearcherin thisfieldcoulddowas

determinehowamaterial'satomicandmoleculararrangementaffectedthepropertiesof thatmaterial,whetherit beapolymer,alloy,crystalline,orceramic.Under

stressorexposureto radiation,howdidthearrangementchange?Howdiddifferent

materialsinteractwhenmeldedor whenotherfiberswereintroducedto strengthen

thematerial?All mannerof laboratoryexperimentswereconductedonavarietyof

samplematerialsto observetheirreactionsto specificonditions.Byexaminingthe

arrangementof atomsin crystalsof unlubricatedsolids,researcherscouldsuggest

methodsbywhichto cutdownonwearandfriction.Materialsexpertsdiscovered

thatcoatingobjectswith foamedceramicsinsulatedthemfrom intenseheatand

vibration.Byusingaverysensitivemicrophonethatcoulddetectthesoundofcrackingmetal,scientistsdevelopedamethodfor determiningexactlywhenacrackstarts

to developinapieceof metalunderstress.NewsuperalloysthatresistheatandcorrosionweretheproductsofNASAresearcherslookingfornewmaterialswithwhich

to makeenginesfor supersonictransportsandverticaltakeoffandlandingaircraft.

Fundamentalresearchof theelectronicpropertiesof materialsforcircuitryin communicationsdeviceswasanotherareaof study.

A formalmaterialsresearchofficewasfirstestablishedaspartof thestructures

andoperatingproblemsprogramof theOfficeof AdvancedResearchPrograms.

GeorgeC. Deutsch,whohadbeenpartof therefractorymaterialsbranchat Lewis

ResearchCenter,wasnamedchief.WhenOARTwasformedin November1961,

Deutschbecamechiefof materialsresearchin thebasicresearchprogram.In

January1967in a programreorganization,Deutschbecameassistantdirectorfor

materialsciencesandengineering,withRalphNashassumingthejob of materials

scienceschiefandJamesJ. Ganglerbecomingmaterialsengineeringchief.

Applied Mathematics

Research in applied mathematics was concerned with the development of improved mathematical techniques for the solution of physical problems, such as

determining launch trajectories or the optimum shape of an aircraft wing. NASA's

basic research program in applied mathematics included investigations in ordinary

and partial differential equations, numerical analysis, celestial mechanics, and

statistics, with mathematicians at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space

Flight Center, and the Ames, Lewis, and Langley Research Centers participating. As

with other area of research, contracts and grants were awarded to universities and

research organizations to assist the agency with this work.

Specialists in gravitational and orbital mathematics addressed the complex

theories necessary for predicting the motion of any object moving under the influence of gravitational or other forces. This research led to the ability to predict the

time required for a spacecraft to orbit some particular body or to travel a specific

distance, and was necessary in determining the most efficient and accurate launch

trajectories for lunar and interplanetary missions. Using mathematical procedures,
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 435

expertsalsocouldcalculatenergyrequirements,determinethedistortion and bending of vehicles that could be expected during launch, and assess how the spinning

rate of spacecraft in orbit would affect tracking maneuvers or how heat flow would

affect the path of a reentering spacecraft. Researchers at the Marshall Space Flight

Center developed a numerical technique called the Runge-Kutta transformation

method that was especially applicable to solving celestial mechanics problems. Ames

Research Center mathematicians developed a numerical integration technique for

solving systems of ordinary differential equations that was applied to the calculation

of flows behind normal shock waves at very high speeds and low density.

Mathematical analyses also aided aircraft and spacecraft designers. Using

mathematical formulas, engineers could determine, for instance, the optimum

aerodynamic shape for the wings of supersonic or hypersonic aircraft. Tracking and

data processing mathematics research was devoted to such problems as numerical error analysis of tracking systems and data reduction.

Applied mathematics research had one chief during the November 1961-December

1968 period--Raymond H. Wilson, Jr.

DESCRIPTION--SPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS

Milton B. Ames and his space vehicle systems team were responsible for a broad

spectrum of applied research tasks designed to identify and solve problems that

launch vehicles and spacecraft might experience during launch and ascent through

the atmosphere, flight in space, entry into the atmosphere of earth or other planets,

and landing. In addition to theoretical studies and laboratory work, this group also

conducted several flight projects and participated as investigators on three Explorer

satellite missions. Through the examination of problems with existing vehicles, these

specialists also advanced the state of the art of future space vehicle design. The program was divided into three broad areas-advanced design criteria, environmental

factors and aerodynamics (which included aerothermodynamics), and structures.

To ensure that the latest information from NASA's many research projects

could be applied to the design of future space vehicles, it was translated into space

vehicle design criteria, an organized set of engineering guides. The advanced design

criteria division was responsible for evaluating new data applicable to design problems and making that data available to engineers and designers.

The bulk of the work preformed by the space vehicle systems group was in the

field of environmental factors and aerodynamics. Aerothermodynamics specialists

investigated the special problems associated with spacecraft high-speed entry into a

planet's atmosphere, which led to research with recovery systems (parachutes,

paragliders, and flexible wings), reusable vehicles (lifting bodies), and special reentry heating spacecraft (Project FIRE and the Scout Reentry Heating Project).

Studies in this area also dealt with launch vehicle exhaust and acoustics problems.

The broad goal of the evironmental factors group was to gain a detailed understanding of the space environment in which vehicles would travel. Vehicles would have to

be protected from radiation and extreme temperatures (research with special

shielding and materials) and meteoroids (Project Pegasus meteoroid studies).
436 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Becauseweightlessnessinfluencedthebehaviorof fluids,specialistswereprompted

to studyliquidpropellantmanagement.

Space.vehiclestructuresresearchwasnecessaryto maintainthe weightof

spacecraftandlaunchvehiclesat reasonablevelsandto ensurereliabilityunder

complexstressandloadingconditions.Componenttestingundersimulatedflight

conditionswastheresearchmethodusedmostoftenbythisOARTbranch.

A fourthareaof responsibility,addedto thespacevehicleprogramin 1968,was

aerospacesafety.Planscalledfor acomprehensiveresearcheffortaimedatsafety

considerationsrelatedto aeronauticalandspacevehicleoperationsandsystems.

Thisworkwasassignedto theNASASafetyResearchandDataInstituteatLewis

ResearchCenter.a

Before the organization of OART, space vehicles research was assigned to the

aerodynamics and flight mechanics division and the structures and materials and

operating problems division of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Research, later

called the Office of Advanced Research Programs. With the establishment of the

Office of Advanced Research and Technology in November 1961, Milton Ames

(with NACA from 1936) became director of space vehicle systems and continued in

this position through the remainder of the agency's first decade. Richard V. Rhode

was Ames's long-time assistant director for advanced design criteria; Ernest O. Pearson, Jr., headed the environmental factors and aerodynamics office* until he

became deputy director at Ames in 1966, at which time Ralph W. May assumed the

post; Melvin G. Rosche led the space vehicle structures group; and H. Kurt Strass

became chief of aerospace safety in May 1968.

Advanced Design Criteria

Many of the space vehicle failures that occurred during the agency's early years

were traced to the application of inadequate or inappropriate design conditions or

procedures. To prevent structural failures, the advanced design criteria group, part

of OART's space vehicle systems program, provided designers and project managers

with a continual stream of new technical information suitably filtered from the total

mass of data available and arranged in a useful form for uniform application to

design studies. These design criteria (engineering guides) took the form of

monographs. Representative topics included solar electromagnetic radiation, buckling of thin-walled cylinders, and aerodynamic and ground-wind loads. It was the

responsibility of the advanced design criteria team to identify design problems, formulate existing technical information bearing on the problems into authoritative

guides, distribute the guides to NASA and industry users, and update them as required. This work usually fell into four broad categories: environmental factors,

structures, proplusion, and stability, guidance, and control.

Personnel at all of NASA's centers prepared advanced design criteria, with three

of the centers functioning as lead centers: Langley (structures), Lewis (propulsion),

*For a time in 1962-1963, there was an assistant director for aerodynamics (Pearson) and an assistant

director for environmental effects (May); when the two research fields were combined Pearson was

named assistant director and May programs chief.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 437

andElectronicsResearchCenter(guidanceandcontrol).TheU.S.WeatherBureau

andseveralindustryanduniversitygroupspreparedesigncriteriaundercontractto

NASA.Thisactivitywasfinancedbyspacevehiclesystemssupportingresearchand

technology(SRT)funds.RichardV. Rhodewasassistantdirectorfor advanced

designcriteriauntil1967,whenThomasV.Cooneytookthejob.WilliamJ.Underwoodservedastheassistantdirector'sdeputy.

Environmental Factors and Aerodynamics

Of the three major divisions of space vehicle systems, the environmental factors

and aerodynamics group had the broadest range of responsibilities. These specialists

were concerned with every aspect of flight from launch to landing, with particular

emphasis on understanding the environment of space and protecting the vehicle

from that environment and on reentry (or entry) and recovery. Environmental factors research included many topics-determination of the meteoroid environment

and means for protecting the vehicle against penetration, the effects of high-energy

charged-particle radiation and shielding against it, thermal vacuum effects on

spacecraft temperature control, storage of cryogenic liquids for long periods,

behavior and control of fluids under reduced gravity conditions, and structural concepts that take advantage of the very low gravitational and aerodynamic forces in

space.

Penetration of a vehicle by meteoroids was one of the early fears expressed by

spacecraft designers. While data on the velocity, density, and composition of large

meteoroids were obtained by ground-based photography and radar (Harvard College Observatory had contracts to study meteors by optical and radio reflection

techniques), more information was needed on possible meteoroid hazards in space.

While micrometeoroid detectors were included on many astronomy and physics

satellites (Vanguard, Explorer, OGO, Ariel),* three Explorers were devoted exclusively to this investigation (Explorer 13, 16, and 23; see table 3-79, 3-82, and

3-89). They carried piezoelectric, wire-grid, cadmium sulphide-cell, foil-gauge, and

impact detectors to record the size, frequency, and velocity of micrometeoroids. To

provide long-term meteorite data applicable to future manned and scientific satellite

missions, OART funded Project Pegasus, three large meteorite detection satellites.

Saturn I launch vehicles orbited the Pegasus series in 1965, with data being returned

for 13 to 15 months on meteorites in the zone 480 to 725 kilometers above earth.

Meteoroids were discovered to pose no real threat to earth-orbiting satellites, and

even less danger was expected in cislunar space. Specialists at Ames Research

Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Langley Research Center supported these

activities (for more information see space vehicle systems flight projects).

Since high-energy radiation is detrimental to sensitive equipment and hazardous

to humans, engineers sought to protect spacecraft from the radiation they would encounter in space. Research into high-energy proton and electron radiation effects

was one of the responsiblities of the OART environmental factors team, which

*Some experiments were also performed using sounding rockets and simulated meteors to determine

the heating and entry phenomena of natural meteors.
438 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

utilizedtheradiationfacilityat theGoddardSpaceFlightCenterandtheSpace

RadiationEffectsLaboratory(operatedbytheVirginiaAssociatedResearchCenter

under contract) at Langley Research Center. Researchers in industry and at the Oak

Ridge National Laboratory (Atomic Energy Commission) also were included in this

study under contract. Specialists conducted radiation environmental tests, evaluated

simulation techniques, correlated damage data, tested shielding materials, and investigated electromagnetic shielding concepts.

Another field of research funded with environmental factors and aerodynamics

monies was zero-gravity fluid behavior, specifically the effect of weightlessness on

the static and dynamic behavior of fluids and on heat transfer phenomena of liquids

and vapor. This research was applicable to problems of storing, separating, and

positioning liquids and vapors, liquid pumping systems, and venting vapors in space

vehicle propellant tanks and water supply tanks. Although most of this work was

done at Lewis Research Center's drop towers, several flight experiments with

cryogenic propellants (experiments with liquid hydrogen were of particular interest)

were conducted with sounding rockets.

Testing vehicle components and materials in a vacuum that simulated the conditions of spaceflight was also assigned to the environmetal factors people. The creation, maintenance, and measurement of a vacuum under laboratory conditions was

under study in FY 1967 and 1968. Related to this field was the study of heat transfer

by thermal radiation. Because the radiative characteristics of spacecraft surfaces are

altered by ultraviolet and other radiations in combination with a vacuum, quantitative temperature predictions for long-duration flight were difficult to obtain. In

the late 1960s, specialists were seeking ways to simulate the solar spectrum in the

laboratory so that thermal control coating materials could be tested (a half-scale

thermal model of the Mariner 4 spacecraft was used to evaluate scale modeling

techniques).

Several other secondary areas of investigation interested members of the environmental factors team, which they pursued by contributing to or evaluating the

results of scientific experiments conducted by the Office of Space Science and Applications or by sponsoring sounding rocket projects. One sounding rocket experiment took wind shear measurements in the vicinity of launching areas with Nike

rockets equipped with smoke-producing nose cones.

The other half of the environmental factors and aerodynamics story was

aerothermodynamics and aerodynamics research - primarily studies of the problems

associated with high-speed reentry into earth's atmosphere or entry into the atmosphere of Mars or Venus and the soft-landing of the spacecraft. In addition,

work on launch vehicle heating (nozzle clustering, exhaust plumes) and rocket

engine noise was carried out by this group of OART specialists.

Two Langley Research Center-managed flight research projects contributed to

aerodynamic heating technology during the 1958-1968 period. A series of six Scout

Reentry Heating Projects flights was launched in 1962-1968 (one failed because of

launch vehicle malfunctions) to measure areodynamic heat transfer to the nosecap

of a blunt-nosed reentry payload and to evaluate specific heat shield materials. The

reentry speeds of the Scout-launched payloads (ballistic trajectories only) reached

about 32 000 kilometers per hour. To obtain information applicable to shielding

spacecraft against the heat generated at reentry speeds of 40 000 kilometers per hour

or more, two reentry packages similar in shape to the Apollo command module were

launched into a ballistic trajectory by Atlas-Antares launch vehicles in 1964 and
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 439

1965.ProjectFIREwasdesignedto gatherdataontotalandradiantheatingand

radiosignalattenuationandto evaluateaberylliumheatshield.(Formoreinformation,seeunderspacevehiclesystemsflightprojects).

In additionto lookingat protectiveshieldingfor blunt-nosedcone-shaped

nonliftingspacecraft,NASAdesignersalsoinvestigatedotherpossibleconfigurationsfor futurespacecraftthat wouldgivethevehicleimprovedmaneuvering

capabilitiesduringreentryplusprotectionfromreentryheating.NASAjoinedthe

Air Forcein testingaclassofvehiclescalledliftingbodies(ormediumlift-drag-ratio

maneuveringvehicles).Includedin this testingprogramwereNASA'sM-2and

HL-10andtheAirForce'sX-24A.PersonnelatAmesandLangleyResearchCenters

participatedin designandengineeringstudiesandwindtunneltests,withflighttest

landingstakingplaceattheFlightResearchCenter(formoreinformationseeunder

spacevehiclesystemsflightprojects).

To assistwith the final landingand recoverysequencesof conventional

truncated-cone-shapedspacecraft,NASA designersand contractorslookedat

severalparachuteconfigurations.Cooperatingwith specialistsfrom themanned

spaceflightprogram,OARTpersonneltestedlargedrogueparachutescapableof

handling13600kilogramsduringawaterlanding.Butmoresteerabledeviceswould

berequiredfor mannedspacecrafttouchdownsonland,andOART specialists

studiedseveralkindsof controllable,gliding-typeparachutescalledparaglidersor

parawings.LangleyResearchCenter*wasthesiteof paragliderresearchandwind

tunneltesting,withflighttestingbeingconductedatHouston'sMannedSpacecraft

Center,FlightResearchCenter,andtheJointParachuteTestFacilityatE1Centro,

California.Sincetheparaglidermadefeasiblea controlledescentin a shallow

glide,mannedspaceflightpersonnelseriouslyconsideredit for ProjectGemini.

Severalcontractors,NorthropVenturaandB. F.Goodrichamongthem,alsoparticipatedin paragliderresearchandfabrication.9Designingaparachutesystemthat

wouldoperatein thethinatmosphereof MarswasanothertaskthatheldOART's

attention.Thedeploymentof largelightweightparachutesat relativelyhighspeeds

wouldberequiredforthelargeVoyagerMarslander.Small-scaleandfull-scaletests

of parachuteconceptsforaterminaldescentonMarswereconductedin 1966-1968.

Nikesoundingrocketsandballoonswereusedtocarrytheseparachutesaloftwhere

theyweredeployed.Specialistsat AmesandLangleyparticipatedin thisresearch.

UntilErnestO.Pearson,Jr.,becameMiltonAmes'sdeputyin 1966,heledthe

enviromentalfactorsandaerodynamicsofficewithinOART'sspacevehiclesystems

groupat NASAHeadquarters.RalphW. May,programschief,wasassistedfor

manyyearsby Clotaire Wood (vehicle technology flight experiments), Fred J.

DeMerritte (aerothermodynamics), and J. Warren Keller (environmental factors).

Space Vehicle Structures

As with other research fields, the space vehicle structures program had many

parts. Its broad objective was to identify and solve critical spacecraft and launch

*Francis M. Rogallo of Langley originated the stowable flexible-wing paraglider concept in the

1950s.
440 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

vehicle structural problems through analytical and experimental research. Major

elements of the program included advanced structural concepts and materials applications, protection against entry heating and environmental hazards, determination of critical loads and structural responses, protection against excessive vibration

and impacts, and prolonged storage of cryogenic fluids in space. Anticipating future

requirements (such as inflatable lunar structures and very long extendable boom

antennas on spacecraft) was also the responsibility of this program.

Reusable spacecraft whose critical structure could be refurbished after entry and

landing was one problem area this team investigated during NASA's first decade. In

conjunction with plans the Office of Space Science and Applications had for lander

missions to Mars and Venus, specialists also studied designs for strong, lightweight

spacecraft that could survive terminal descent into the low atmospheric pressure environment of Mars. Other topics of interest were high-frequency vibrations and

long-term storages of liquid propellants aboard spacecraft. Improved air locks, gastight liners, and reflective outer coatings are examples of the practical applications

to which this research led.

With launch vehicles, one of the big problems facing engineers was the influence

of ground winds and winds above the launching area. By experimenting with models

in wind tunnels, researchers developed methods for predicting loads on vehicles.

Thrust vectoring, fuel slosh, and aerodynamic flow instability were also studied

under laboratory conditions. Dynamic modeling technology was perhaps one of this

team's most important contributions to the space program.

Most of NASA's centers participated to some extent in space vehicle structures

research. Melvin G. Rosche directed the program from headquarters with the

assistance of Norman J. Mayer (advanced structures and materials applications),

Douglas Michel (dynamics), Douglas A. Gilstead (loads), and Howard S. Wolko

(high-temperature structures and structural mechanics).

Space Vehicle Systems Flight Projects

Pegasus. Personnel at'the Marshall Space Flight Center, physicist Ernst Stuhiinger among them, proposed a Saturn-launched meteoroid detection satellite to

NASA planners in late 1962. The original proposal called for exposing to possible

meteoroid penetrations large areas of aluminum of different thicknesses (meteoroids

range in size from microscopic particles to huge fragments). By December 1962,

NASA had requested proposals from industry for designing and constructing two

large satellites with expandable wings, which would provide more than 185 square

meters for detection equipment. Explorer 16, a meteoroid detection experiment

launched in 1962, had had only 2.3 square meters available for detectors. NASA

scientists and designers needed more data on the quantity, size, and velocity of

meteoroids so they could protect from possible hazards scientific satellites and

probes being planned for increasingly long lifetimes and manned spacecraft destined

for earth orbit and cislunar space.

Fairchild Stratos Corporation (later known as Fairchild-Hiller) was awarded a

contract to build two flight models of a Micrometeoroid Detection Satellite (MDS)

in early 1963. The satellite's wings would consist of 208 panels, each about 0.5 by 1
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 441

meter,madeof twoaluminumtargetsheetseparatedby25millimetersof plastic

foam.A polymerplasticsheetcoatedwithathinlayerofcopperwasbondedtoeach

aluminumsheet,formingacapacitorthatstoredanelectriccharge.Onpenetration

byameteoroid,thematerialremovedbytheimpactwasvaporized,whichformeda

conductinggasthatdischargedthecapacitor-registeringa"hit."Oneachsatellite,

8panelshadaluminumsheets0.381millimeterthick,17panels0.2032millimeter,

and183panels0.4064millimeter.Thesatellite'scentersection,protectedduring

launchin anApolloboilerplatecapsule,wasconnectedbyanadapterto thespent

secondstageof theSaturnlaunchvehicle,andinlaunchconfigurationthepayload

wastoppedbyadummyApollocommandmodule.

DesignatedPegasus*in July1964,thesatellitesalsoservedaspartof theSaturn

I launchvehicletestflightprogram(seetables1-63and1-64).Whenplansforusing

theSaturnI formannedflightsweredroppedin late1963,missionplannersatthe

MarshallSpaceFlightCenterproposedthatathirdPegasussatellitebelaunchedby

thelastexistingSaturnI vehicle.Thethreelaunchestookplacesuccessfullyin

February,May,andJuly1965,withthesatellitesrecordingmeteoroidpenetrations

in orbitsthatrangedfrom480to 725kilometersaboveearth.To overcomeaproblemwiththecapacitorsshortingout,animprovedcapacitorfusingarrangementwas

usedonPegasus 2; a single malfunctioning capacitor could be disconnected, leaving

the others in that group of panels operable. An extra experiment was included on

Pegasus 3" 48 recoverable subpanels mounted to 8 detector panels positioned symmetrically on each wing, 4 to a side, The subpanels (called coupons), made of

aluminum in three thicknesses and variously coated, could have been removed and

returned to earth for analysis by Gemini astronauts rendezvousing with the satellite.

However, it was determined later in 1965 that a rendezvous with Pegasus by a

Gemini crew was not possible. The extravehicular activity required was too complicated; the necessary stationkeeping operation demanded more propellant than the

spacecraft carried, and a tethering operation was ruled out because this was a

maneuver that the Gemini team had not planned or trained for; and Pegasus 3"s

altitude was too high-additional retrorockets would be needed for the manned

spacecraft, equipment that the project could not afford. All three satellites outlasted

their one-year life expectancies, with Pegasus 2 still recording hits in October 1967.

In addition to data on meteoroids, the three spacecraft also relayed information on

thermal measurements and radiation. After the detection systems ceased operating,

specialists used the engineering data still being sent by Pegasus to determine the survival rates of certain materials and equipment on the spacecraft. The satellites were

shut down in August 1968.

Concurrent with planning for the Pegasus missions were proposals from

Langley Research Center for a follow-on project to extend the measurements of

meteoroid penetrations into cislunar space. Using Saturn IB-Centaur (a launch vehicle configuration that was never flown), the researchers wanted to send two winged

spacecraft to the vicinity of the moon in 1968 and even beyond the moon into interplanetary space at a later date (the Martin Company proposed an advanced

Pegasus with four z-shaped trapezoidal panels that could be sent as far out as the

asteriod belt, some 160 million kilometers away). Budget cuts and the belief that the

*Pegasus represents a deviation from the usual practice of designating a satellite of this class one of

the Explorer series.
442 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

flux of small particles decreased rapidly with distances from earth combined to cut

short plans for any advanced meteoroid detection satellite.

Fairchild Stratos (Fairchild-Hiller) was the prime contractor; G. T. Schjeldahl

fabricated the detector panels. Marshall Space Flight Center monitored these contracts, with William G. Johnson acting as project manager. OART funded the

project.

Table 4-61.

Chronology of Pegasus Development and Operations

Date

1962

Dec. 30, 1962

Feb. 5, 1963

March 4, 1963

Dec. 1963

April 1964

July 21, 1964

Feb. 16, 1965

May 1965

May 27, 1965

July 30, 1965

March 1, 1966

July 21, 1966

Aug. 16, 1967

Oct. 31, 1967

Aug. 1968

Event

Personnel at the Marshall Space Flight Center proposed using the Saturn

vehicle to launch a micrometeoroid detection experiment.

NASA issued a request for proposals for the design and construction of a

large-surfaced micrometeoroid detection satellite.

NASA announced it would negotiate with Fairchild Stratos Corp. to build

two flight models of a micrometeoroid detection satellite.

NASA awarded Fairchild a contract for the construction of such a satellite,

unofficially called Pegasus.

Marshall personnel considered using the SA-10 vehicle for a third Pegasus

satellite.

NASA Headquarters approved a third Pegasus. The Martin Co. was awarded

a contract by Langley Research Center for a design study of an advanced

Pegasus that would be launched by a Saturn IB-Centaur to investigate

cislunar and interplanetary space.

The name Pegasus was officially approved by NASA for the micrometeoroid

satellite project.

Launch of Pegasus 1 was successful.

NASA awarded a phase two contract to Martin for an advanced Pegasus

study.

Launch of Pegagus 2 was successful.

Launch of Pegasus 3 was successful.

The last hit was recorded on Pegasus 1; only engineering data were recorded

thereafter.

Marshall let a contract to Emerson Electric to study the feasibility of Gemini

astronauts visiting Pegasus to retrieve panels for return and analysis.

The last hit was recorded on Pegasus 3; only engineering data were recorded

thereafter.

The last hit was recorded on Pegasus 2; only engineering data were recorded

thereafter.

All Pegasus satellites were turned off.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-62.

Pegasus Characteristics

443

Pegasus 1 Pegasus 2 Pegasus 3

Date of launch (location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions(m):

Power source:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments:

Results:

Remarks:

Feb. 16, 1965 May 25, 1965 July 30, 196'_

(ETR) (ETR) (ETR)

Saturn I Saturn 1 Saturn I

(SA-9) (SA-8) (SA-10)

2675 plus:

Attached second stage, 6575

Instrument unit, 1180

Boiler plate Apollo module, 1435

Propellant, 700

Fuselage-shaped center section with 2 wings, which were folded and

stowed during launch

Length of center stage and attached second stage, 22

Width, wing tip to wing tip, 29

Width of wing, 4.3

NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Sept. 17, 1978 Nov. 3, 1979 Aug. 4, 1969

MSFC

William G. Johnson

Fairchild Stratos (later known as Fairchild-Hiller), prime

G. T. Schjeldahl, detector panels

Detect the frequency, velocity and size of meteoroids at an altitude of

480-725 kilometers.

Capacitor detectors

All three satellites returned information on meteoroid penetrations, plus

data on the Van Allen radiation belts, earth albedo, and thermal control

systems. The satellites were silenced in Aug. 1968.

Through October 1967, a total of 2265 hits had been recorded. Pegasus 1

started sending signals again intermittently in June and July 1977.

Scout Reentry Heating Project. The effects of high-velocity reentry heating and

the search for materials that could withstand reentry had long been a concern of

specialists at Langley Research Center, even before the facility became part of

NASA. It was an even more crucial concern for manned spaceflight. Speeds in excess of 33 800 kilometers per hour had been reached under laboratory conditions in

the early 1960s, but actual flight experiments would be necessary to duplicate the

conditions a manned crew might face on their return from earth orbit or the moon.

In 1961, space vehicle systems engineers and manned spacecraft designers perceived

a four-stage program for gathering pertinent data on reentry heating and the ability

of specific materials to withstand the reentry environment. First and already under

way were experiments in wind tunnels and laboratories. Second was a Scoutlaunched* reentry project scheduled for December 1961 to September 1962, followed by an Atlas-Agena B-launched Project FLARE (Flight Investigation of Apollo

*Plans called for a five-stage Scout; the vehicle as developed included only four stages. However, the

designers might have been considering a velocity package that would have given the reentry payload increased speed as a "fifth stage."
444 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Reentry Environment) in 1963. With FIARE, velocities approaching those of a

returning lunar spacecraft would be examined. The last step called for Saturn C-Is

to launch boilerplate models of the Apollo spacecraft as a final test of the heat

shield.

Taking advantage of the Langley-developed Scout launcher, a team at the

Virginia center proceeded with the second step of the program. They sent five reentry heating experiments into ballistic trajectories in 1962-1968 to measure heat

transfer and to test heat shield materials and configurations. Funds were first programmed for the Scout Reentry Heating Project (sometimes called the Supercircular

Reentry Research Project) in FY 1961. The first of five planned flights was launched

on March 1, 1962, from Wallops Island.* In approximately 4 minutes the reentry

vehicle reached apogee altitude, at which time the third stage ignited. About 51⁄2

minutes later, Scout's fourth stage ignited, followed shortly by the firing of the reentry vehicle's rocket (sometimes called the Scout's fifth stage). This spherical

.43-meter rocket motor developed by the Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake,

California, gave the payload its final burst of speed as it reentered the atmosphere

1290 kilometers from Wallops at 30 500 kilometers per hour. Thermocouples

mounted on R-1 and R-2 (launched on August 31, 1962) measured the aerodynamic

heat transfer to the nose cap of the small blunt-nosed conical reentry payload during

the brief reentry heating period. Real-time and recorded telemetry were received at

stations on Wallops Island and Bermuda and aboard a range telemetry ship. Radar

and optical coverage also were used to gather information. The flights lasted only

about 8 minutes, with 90 seconds of telemetry. No attempt was made to recover the

payloads, which splashed down in the Atlantic near Bermuda. To assist in

evaluating the results of the experiments, a series of six Arcas sounding rockets was

launched from Bermuda before and after the flights of R-I and R-2 to measure air

temperature and density in the reentry area.

In addition to 24 temperature-measuring thermocouples, the next three reentry

payloads were equipped with ablation sensors. Ablation is a physical and chemical

reaction that takes place during reentry in which part of the heat shield material protecting the spacecraft is lost. The materials used for the heat shield on R-3, R-4, and

R-5 were of the charring ablator type, a plastic resin material with added substances

such as fiberglass. Charring ablator heat shields protect a spacecraft in several ways.

When exposed to extreme heat, the material begins to decompose chemically, absorbing some heat in the process. During decomposition, gases form that act as an

insulating blanket. At the surface of the shield, a charred layer of coke-like material

develops, capable of operating at very high temperatures to radiate heat away from

the spacecraft. The uncharred layers provide another layer of insulation. R-3, along

with its four-stage Scout launcher, was destroyed when the launch vehicle malfunctioned seconds after liftoff on July 20, 1963. Launched on August 18, 1964, R-4

reached a maximum speed of 31 400 kilometers per hour during its 11-minute flight.

The low-density charring ablator material (AVCOAT 5026-39 H/G) used to protect

this spacecraft was being considered for the Apollo spacecraft. Telemetered data

were received by Wallops Island, Langley Research Center, Bermuda, and ships and

aircraft operated by the Air Force and NASA. Radar and optical coverage were also

'ffhe first reentry experiment, R-I, was a secondary experiment on this eighth Scout development

flight; proving the launch vehicle was the primary mission goal.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 445

employed.Reachinga speedof 29600kilometersperhour,R-5tookan8-minute

flightonFebruary9, 1966.Thermocouplesandvariousablationsensorssentinformationonthelow-densityphenolic-nyloncharringablatorusedfor theheatshield

to severaltelemetrystations.AswithR-1andR-2,soundingrocketdatawereobtainedatthereentryareanearBermuda.A secondaryadioattenuationeffectsexperimentonR-4andR-5monitoredthevoltagestandingwaveratioduringthereentry blackoutperiod.

Thesixthreentrypayloadwasquitedifferentfromtheothers.BuiltbyGeneral

Electricfor Langley,thepointedconicalspacecraftwas4meterslongandsimilarin

shapeto missiles,reentryvehicles,andhypersonicaircraftbeingconsideredforthe

future. Labeledthe TurbulentHeatingExperimentProject,R-6 was usedto

establishbaseline(oranchor-point)dataonboundarylayertransitionandturbulent

heatingratesduringthereentryof a sleekneedle-nosedvehicle.Thedatafromthis

experimentwereusedto correlateandextendgroundtestresults.R-6carriedthermocouples,pressureports,andaccelerometers.Theprimarydataperiodbeganatan

altitudeof 36600metersatavelocityof22000kilometersperhour,1000kilometers

downrange;it wasoverat 15000meters.All dataweretelemeteredin realtime.Informationcollectedby Arcassoundingrocketsandhigh-altitudeand standard

weatherballoonssupplementedR-6'sfindings.

With laboratory,wind tunnel, and flight projectdata,designersin the

1958-1968periodwereableto choosethematerialbestsuitedfortheApolloreentry

heatshieldandwerebeginningto analyzewaysto dispenseheatfrom moreadvancedspacecraftandaircraftconfigurations.TheScoutReentryHeatingProject

wasmanagedat LangleyResearchCenter.AndrewG. Swansonwasproject

managerfor R-1andR-2;JosephM. HallissymanagedR-3,R-4,andR-5,whileE.

C.HastingsledtheR-6team.Forthefirstfivepayloads,LangleyResearchCenter

providedthespacecraft;GeneralElectricfabricatedthesixth.ServingtheNASA

HeadquartersOfficeof AdvancedResearchandTechnologyasthefirst projectofficerfor thisseriesof experimentswasCharlesD'Aiutolo,followedbyB.E.Quass

(R-3,R-4,R-5)andJ. Levine(R-6).
446 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-63.

Chronology of Scout Reentry Heating

Project Development and Operations

Date Event

Aug. 1961

Fall 1961

March 1, 1962

Aug. 31, 1962

July 20, 1963

Aug. 18, 1964

Spring-Summer 1965

Dec. 16, 1965

Feb. 9, 1966

March 8, 1966

April 27, 1968

Dec. 1968

A preliminary project development plan for Project FLARE (Flight Investigation of Apollo Reentry Environment) included a series of Scout-launched

reentry experiments in 1963, to precede the higher-velocity Atlas-launched

experiments.

NASA Headquarters approved the Scout Reentry Heating Project and

assigned project management to Langley Research Center.

Launch of R-1 was successful.

Launch of R-2 was successful.

An attempt to launch R-3 was unsuccessful because the launch vehicle

malfunctioned; the entire vehicle was destroyed.

Launch of R-4 was successful.

Studies were under way at Langley that were designed to investigate the

usefulness of extending the project to include two more flights; two more

flights were approved that fall.

NASA issued a request for proposals for the design and fabrication of a sixth

reentry experiment to be housed in a slender cone.

Launch of R-5 was successful.

NASA selected the Missiles and Space Division of General Electric to build

the R-6 spacecraft, one prototype, and one backup.

Launch of R-6 was successful.

Langley officials investigated the possibility of using the R-6 backup for a

seventh reentry experiment.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 447

Table 4-64.

Scout Reentry Heating Project

R-I R-2 R-3 R-4 R-5

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Reentry experiment:

With rocket motor:

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Base diameter:

Nose diameter:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments:

Results:

March 1, 1962 Aug. 31, 1962 July 20, 1963 Aug. 18, 1964 Feb. 9, 1966

(Wl) (Wl) (Wl) (wl) (Wl)

Scout Scout Scout Scout Scout

(ST-8) (S-114) (S-II0) (S-129R) (S-141C)

70.4 70.4 77 82.6 95.3

158.8 158.8 170.1 145.1 156.5

Blunt-nosed cone

0.94

0.514

0.29

Ballistic trajectories

LaRC

Andrew G. Swanson Joseph M. Hallissy

Naval Ordnance Test Station, payload rocket motor

(LaRC) provided the reentry payload.)

To gather information on heat transfer during high-velocity reentry and to

evaluate various heat shield materials.

Temperature-measuring thermocouples (R-I through R-5)

Springwire ablation sensors (R-3 through R-5)

Lightpipe ablation sensors (R-5)

R-1 and R-2 were successful in returning heat transfer data; R-3 failed because

the launch vehicle malfunctioned; R-4 and R-5 successfully tested various heat

shield materials.
448 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-65.

Scout Reentry Heating Project (R-6) Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Base diameter:

Nose tip radius

(mm):

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager."

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments:

Results:

April 27, 1968 (WI)

Scout (S-164C)*

272.2

Slender pointed cone with 10 degrees total angle

3.96

0.69

2.54

Ballistic trajectory

LaRC

E. C. Hastings

General Electric Missile and Space Division, prime

To gather information on heat transfer during high-velocity reentry of a slendershaped configuration that resembled designs being considered for future aircraft

and spacecraft.

Temperature-measuring thermocouples

Pressure ports

Accelerometers

Returned data as planned.

*A three-stage Scout launched R-6 (four stages was the standard configuration).

Project FIRE (Flight Investigation Reentry Environment). In 1960, advanced

planners proposed using the Atlas-Agena B launch vehicle to send a recoverable

reentry package on a ballistic path to gather information on reentry heating at nearescape velocities. The reentry capsule would be made of Mercury spacecraft components, and the experiments would give Project Mercury personnel extra experience with tracking and data acquisition procedures. This idea was abandoned in

1961 in favor of an experiment dubbed Flight Investigation of Apollo Reentry Environment, Project FLARE (also briefly called Project Calorie). Plans called for

four Atlas-Agena B-launched flights in 1963. The recoverable payload would resemble a small Apollo command module (a truncated cone) and be fitted with a

beryllium calorimeter-heat shield. By early 1962, the project had been redesignated

Project FLARE, the launch vehicle had been changed to Atlas-Antares,* and the

number of missions had been reduced to two. Funds were first programmed for

FIRE in FY 1962.

Project FIRE reentry payloads reached speeds in excess of 40 000 kilometers per

hour, the velocity a spacecraft returning from the moon was expected to reach. Outfitted with multilayer heat shield-calorimeters, the FIRE vehicles measured radiative

and conductive heat transfer and returned data on the radiant energy and spectral

*I'hc Antares stage was an ABL X-259 motor, also used as Scout's third stage. FIRE was the only

NASA project that utilized the Atlas-Antares configuration. The ballistic trajectory called for did not require the more powerful Atlas-Agena B, and the Antares stage could be procured more inexpensively

than the Agena B.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 449

content of the hot gas cap, that area just ahead of a reentering body that is heated by

energy transferred from the vehicle. Secondary objectives included measuring the

response of heat shield materials to the reentry environment and monitoring radio

attenuation effects during the reentry blackout period. The blunt end of the truncated cone consisted of three beryllium calorimeters, which were instrumented with

thermocouples interleaved with three phenolic asbestos ablative heat shields. All but

the last two layers were designed to burn away or be jettisoned during the 45-second

high-heating reentry period. By periodically jettisoning heat shield layers to expose

fresh calorimeters to the reentry environment, readings on the heating phenomena

were taken during the earliest portion of reentry, at the peak, and near the end of the

heating period. Two radiometers measured total radiant energy, and a spectral

radiometer relayed data on reentry heating caused by radiation from the hot gases

and the chemical content of the gases. Each FIRE reentry vehicle carried 258 thermocouples.

At launch, the Antares velocity package was connected to the Atlas stage by an

adapter, and the reentry vehicle was fitted to the cylindrical Antares. The Antares

stage separated from the Atlas booster about 5 minutes after launch, with ignition of

the second stage taking place at about 26 minutes; separation of the reentry vehicle

from the Antares stage came about 1 minute later. Traveling at 40 000 kilometers

per hour, the spacecraft headed for splashdown near Ascension Island in the south

Atlantic. In addition to the onboard sensors, information also was gathered from

Ascension Island with a telespectrograph, a light-gathering telescope equipped with

a slitless spectrograph. This instrument measured the spectrum of light generated

during reentry in the visible and near-infrared wavelength ranges, defining the

chemical constituents of the incandescent gas.

FIRE 1 was launched on April 14, 1964, from the Eastern Test Range. The

321⁄2-minute flight was successful, and a Nike-Apache sounding rocket launched

from Ascension Island gathered supplementary data on weather conditions near the

reentry area after splashdown. FIRE 2, on May 22, 1965, validated the findings of

the first mission during its 32-minute flight. Heat shield ejection times were revised

slightly on FIRE 2, and the reentry vehicle was instrumented with additional

pressure sensors. After the successful flight, another Nike-Apache was launched

from Ascension to measure density, temperature, pressure, and wind conditions.

The two FIRE experiments provided data that indicated that the radiation and the

temperatures that would be experienced during an Apollo spacecraft reentry were

less severe than had been expected. Spacecraft engineers made use of this information in designing and qualifying Apollo's heat shield. FY 1964 funds for an advanced

FIRE that would have duplicated the reentry of spacecraft from interplanetary missions at an even greater velocity were not approved by Congress.

Project FIRE was managed by Langley Research Center. Herbert A. Wilson,

Jr., was project manager for FIRE 1, David G. Stone for FIRE 2. Under contract to

Langley, Chance Vought Corporation of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., fabricated the

velocity package; Republic Aviation built the reentry vehicle; General

Dynamics/Astronautics served as integration manager. At NASA Headquarters in

the Office of Advanced Research and Technology, Ralph W. May, Jr., was FIRE

program manager.
450 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-66.

Chronology of FIRE

Development and Operations

Date Event

Sept. 1960

Aug. 1961

Sept. 13, 1961

Feb. 18, 1962

March 29, 1962

Nov. 20, 1962

April 14, 1964

Summer 1964

May 22, 1965

An entry test vehicle project was proposed by NASA personnel. Mercury-like

payloads, launched into ballistic trajectories by Atlas-Agena B vehicles,

would reenter the atmosphere at near-escape speeds, allowing researchers to

investigate reentry heating.

Langley Research Center personnel prepared a preliminary development plan

for Project FLARE (Flight Investigation of Apollo Reentry Environment).

The plan called for four small recoverable reentry payloads that resembled

Apollo command modules in shape. A beryllium calorimeter-heat shield

would be tested and temperature measurements taken at velocities reaching

11 000 meters per second.

NASA Headquarters proposed designating the Apollo reentry environment

experiments Project Calorie, a name which was not adopted.

NASA announced plans for Project FIRE (Flight Investigation Reentry Environment), as the reentry experiment had been renamed. Atlas D boosters

would launch two reentry vehicles into ballistic trajectories in 1963-1964.

Republic Aviation was named prime contractor for FIRE reentry vehicles

and Chance Vought contractor for the FIRE velocity package (Antares second stage).

General Dynamics/Astronautics was named contractor for FIRE systems integration.

Launch of FIRE 1 was successful.

Republic Aviation and Chance Vought were given the go-ahead to begin

work on the second FIRE velocity reentry vehicle and velocity package.

Launch of FIRE 2 was successful.

Lifting Bodies. When considering designs for hypersonic aircraft, NACA

aeronautical engineers in the early 1950s studied the lifting body-glider configuration along with other more conventional aircraft designs. Lifting bodies are wingless

vehicles that obtain aerodynamic life from their shape alone. When designers turned

to the problems spacecraft would face as they returned through earth's atmosphere

at high speeds, a gliding, maneuverable spacecraft was one of the three basic designs

that seemed promising. Although the relatively simple ballistic configuration, which

could take advantage of existing missiles for launching, won the contest for the Mercury design over the skip and glider designs, many specialists at NASA's Ames and

Langley Research Centers continued to study the reentry glider concept. Combining

the best features of the ballistic and glider shapes, Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. at Ames

designed a new lifting body configuration in 1957 that he believed could serve as a

second-generation spacecraft-a blunt-nosed, flat-topped, deep-bottomed vehicle

he called the M-I. Unlike the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo spacecraft (blunt,

nonlifting, high-drag vehicles that entered the atmosphere like projectiles without

aerodynamic controls), an M-l-class spacecraft could glide through the reentry environment at a lower speed with greater pilot control, landing more like an aircraft.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Table 4-67.

Project FIRE Characteristics

451

FIRE 1 FIRE 2

Date of launch (location): Apr. 14, 1964 May 22, 1965

(ETR) (ETR)

Launch vehicle: Atlas-Antares Atlas-Antares

(Atlas 263D) (Atlas 264D)

Weight (kg):

Reentry vehicle:

With velocity package:

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Length with velocity package:

Diameter of base of cone:

Length of cone:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objectives:

Experiments:

Results:

90.7 86.2

1995.8 2005.8

Cylindrical velocity package with a truncated-cone reentry package

3.66

0.658

0.53

Ballistic trajectories

LaRC

Herbert A. Wilson, Jr. David G. Stone

Republic Aviation, reentry vehicle

Chance Vought, velocity package

General Dynamics/Astronautics, systems integration

To obtain research data on total and radiative heating, radio signal attenuation, and material behavior of an Apollo-shaped reentry vehicle

at speeds of 40 000 kilometers per hour.

Temperature-measuring thermocouples (258)

Radiometers

Pressure sensors

Telespectrograph (ground-based)

Data were obtained from both flights are planned.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, specialists at Langley and Ames conducted

studies independent of one another of several lifting body designs and ran wind tunnel tests on various scale models.

Egger's design for a reentry vehicle caught the attention of engineer Robert Dale

Reed at NASA's Flight Research Center (FRC) in California. Reed built several

small models of this lifting body and suggested that the design could be flown in a

towed fashion for testing.* In turn, Reed's models intrigued several of the Air Force

and NASA test pilots stationed at Edwards Air Force Base.l" By the fall of 1962,

FRC Director Paul F. Bilke had approved the construction of a lightweight full-scale

lifting body to be designated the M2-F1 (M for manned; F for flight model). With

the assistance of a local glider manufacturer, Sailplane Corporation of America,

engineers built the M2-F1 in-house at FRC from plywood and tubular steel and sent

it to Ames for wind tunnel verification tests. The first successful ground-towed experiments, which used an uprated Pontiac convertible as the towing vehicle, were

*Ground-towing had been used successfully at FRC to test out steerable parachute concepts.

l'The Air Force Flight Test Center was at Edwards Air Force Base.
452 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

carried out in April 1963, with the first air-towed flight via a C-47 taking place the

following August. Equipped with an ejection seat, the half-coned M2-F1 was towed

to an altitude of 3048 meters and released for about 3 minutes of free flight, using its

tricycle landing gear to set down on the dry lake beds of Edwards. Over two Years,

five pilots flew the vehicle (labeled the "flying bathtub") during hundreds of flight

experiments (ground- and air-towed).

The next step in FRC's lifting body program called for the construction of an

M-2 flight vehicle of heavier all-metal construction. Norair Division of Northrop

built the 2300-kilogram M2-F2 lifting body in 1964-1965, and specialists at Ames

conducted a series of wind tunnel tests on the new vehicle in early 1966. In July, the

M2-F2 was carried aloft under the wing of a B-52 and released at 14 000 meters for a

successful first flight. The amount of free flight time was still very limited, but with

rudder and flaps and the vehicle's high-lift body four test pilots maneuvered the

M2-F2 for landings at Edwards. On the 16th flight experiment on May 10, 1967, the

pilot crash-landed without his landing gear down, after an unusually low flare

maneuver executed to recover from a lateral oscillation. The vehicle turned over

several times, injuring the pilot and the craft. In the spring of 1968, NASA Headquarters authorized a Northrop-FRC team to restore the damaged M2-F2.

Redesignated the M2-F3, the lifting body was repaired and flown again in

1970-1972.

From their studies of lifting body designs at NASA's Langley Research Center,

advanced researchers had come up with a configuration they called HL-10 (HL for

horizontal landing); it was the 10th design they examined in the spring of 1962.

Though similar in general shape, size, and weight to the M2-F2, Langley's vehicle

was round on top and flat on the bottom (the opposite of the M2), plus it had a third

vertical tail fin (in the center) and more of a delta-wing shape overall. It did not have

the M2's bubble-type cockpit canopy. Northrop built the HL-10 and the M2-F2

under the same contract, completing the HL-10 in early 1966. The test-flight phase

of the Virginia center's lifting body project also was conducted at FRC, with the first

successful flight on December 22, 1966. Nearly 15 months went by before the second

experiment took place, while engineers ground-tested the vehicle further and

modified the design somewhat to increase its stability. From 1966 to 1970, the

HL-10 (sometimes called a "flying flatiron") was flown 37 times by 5 test pilots. As

with the M2, the HL-10 was launched from under the wing of a B-52. To test the lifting body concept at greater speeds and altitudes, the HL-10 and M2-F2 were both

designed to accommodate a jet engine. In November 1968 on the vehicle's 13th

flight, HL-10 experiments were expanded to include powered flight. Augmented by

an XLR-11 jet engine, the HL-10 could travel at 1915 kilometers per hour at 24 000

meters.

The Air Force also was interested in the lifting body concept as it applied to

future spacecraft designs. Project Dyna-Soar (for dynamic soaring), the Air Force's

first entry in the manned lifting body program, had been designed around a Titan-

.launched vehicle to be built by Boeing. Designated the X-20 in the summer of 1962,

the first launch of Dyna-Soar was to have taken place in 1966, but this project was

cancelled in December 1963 because it had become too expensive and overly complex, The Air Force redirected its energies to Project START (Spacecraft

Technology and Advanced Reentry Test), whose first product was the SV-5D

PRIME (Precision Recovery Including Maneuvering Entry). Later called the X-23A,

this lifting body was made by Martin Marietta and test launched (unmanned) on an
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 453

Atlas launch vehicle in 1967. The wedge-shaped X-24A, a modified and enlarged

X-23A, was ready for manned flight tests in 1969. NASA and the Air Force had

been officially coordinating their manned lifting body programs since early 1964,

sharing testing facilities, pilots, and test results. An agreement between NASA and

the Air Force on testing NASA's M2-F2 and HL-10 was reached in April 1965, and it

was extended to include the Air Force X-24A in November 1967. NASA's Flight

Research Center had responsibility for maintenance, instrumentation, and ground

support of its craft, while the Air Force Flight Test Center assumed responsibility

for the launch aircraft, support aircraft, medical assistance, the rocket power plant,

and the pilot's personal equipment. The two organizations shared management of

the overall flight operations, flight data analysis, test range support, and advanced

planning.

The many theoretical studies, wind tunnel tests, and lifting body flights that

NASA conducted or sponsored in 1958-1968 proved the feasibility of an advanced

reusable spacecraft (or space transportation system, as it was being called in the late

1960s) based on the gliding reentry mode. Feasibility studies initiated by several

NASA centers looked at such refinements of the lifting body concept as increasing

its size to accommodate a larger crew and payload. Although NASA Headquarters

officials decided in 1966 not to approve an orbital flight test of the lifting body configuration,* the extensive flight test program with the M2, HL-10, and X-24 series of

vehicles gave pilots and designers experience with developing improved procedures

and mechanical controls for reentry and landing maneuvers that some futuregeneration spacecraft would surely require.

At NASA Headquarters, Milton B. Ames, director of OART's space vehicle

systems directorate, had overall responsibility for the lifting body program.

Langley's Eugene S. Love and Ames's Alfred Eggers and Clarence A. Syverston

played key roles in designing and testing lifting body configurations. The team at the

Flight Research Center, always a small group, was led by John McTigue. NASA

pilot Milton O. Thompson played an important role throughout the program as

pilot, researcher, and manager.l°

*It was not clear at this time what direction the post-Apollo manned program would take, and agency

officials were hesitant to invest in costly manned projects beyond the use of available Apollo hardware

and technology.
454 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-68.

Chronology of Lifting Body Development and Operations

Date Event

Summer 1952

1954-1955

1955

1956-1957

June 10-13, 1957

Mid-late 1957

Oct. 15, 1957

1958-1960

April 11-14, 1960

1961-1962

Spring 1962

Summer 1962

Oct. 1962

March 1, 1963

March 1963

NACA engineers at Ames Aeronautical Laboratory began wind tunnel experiments with several possible configurations for spacecraft, including a

gliding craft. Their conclusion was that a blunt-bodied vehicle rather than a

sharp-nosed one would survive the heat of atmospheric reentry.

Specialists at Ames conducted theoretical analysis and wind tunnel research

on the impact of reentry heating on hypervelocity missiles.

Langley engineers conducted basic studies of flat-bottomed vehicles in the

mid- and high-angle-of-attack reentry regimes.

NACA engineers at the Langley, Lewis, and Ames laboratories carried out

feasibility and design studies in cooperation with the Air Force Air Research

and Development Command. The spacecraft design most favored was a flattop round-bottom configuration. (In a January 1957 summary report in

which the Ames people described this configuration, a minority report from

Langley favoring a nonlifting spherical capsule was included.)

At an American Rocket Society meeting, Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., a research

scientist at Ames, compared ballistic, skip, and glide vehicles, concluding

that a blunt-nosed slender vehicle with low-aspect-ratio delta wings (highly

swept, blunt leading edges) and a vertical tail would be most suited for

manned spaceflight.

Realizing the glider configuration would be too heavy for existing launch

vehicles, Eggers revised his design to combine features of the ballistic and

glider crafts. The result was a semiballistic vehicle, blunt but with a certain

amount of aerodynamic lift, with a nearly flat top and a round bottom for

heat protection. This design was known as the M-I.

At a NACA conference at Ames, three schools of thought were evident regarding the shape a manned spacecraft should take: (1) a delta-wing flatbottom glider (favored by many at Langley)*; (2) a ballistic capsule (considered by the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division of Langley to be the

quickest solution to finding a workable-launchable-configuration);_ and

(3) a compact low lift-to-drag vehicle with little or no wings and a blunt nose

(Eggers's M-I design).

Specialists at Ames continued testing models of lifting bodies in wind tunnels

and in the atmosphere entry simulator, continually refining the designs.

An Air Force-NASA Joint Conference on Lifting Manned Hypervelocity and

Reentry Vehicles was held at Langley Research Center.

Robert Dale Reed at NASA's Flight Research Center (FRC) built small

models of the M-I design and demonstrated the possibility of towing a

lightweight lifting body for testing purposes.

Personnel at Langley began to study a lifting body configuration they called

HL-10.

FRC was planning to construct several lightweight full-scale glider vehicles

for a lifting body flight test program.

FRC management approved the construction of a test-flight model of the

M-I; it was designated the M2-FI. Fabrication began in-house with the

assistance of Sailplane Corporation of America.

An attempt to ground-tow the M2-FI was unsuccessful because of its poor

lateral control.

The Air Force proposed to NASA that the two agencies jointly manage the

Air Force X-20 program.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 455

Table 4-68.

Chronology of Lifting Body Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

April 5, 1963

Aug. 16, 1963

Dec. 18, 1963

Jan. 7, 1964

Feb. 19, 1964

April 14, 1964

April 20, 1964

April 21, 1964

Summer 1964

June 18, 1964

Nov. 11, 1964

Feb. 1, 1965

March 26, 1965

April 19, 1965

April 30, 1965

June 15, 1965

Jan. 1966

Jan. 18, 1966

March 23, 1966

April 8, 1966

April 18, 1966

July 12, 1966

Dec. 22, 1966

The M2-F1 was ground-towed successfully for the first time.

The M2-FI was carried aloft to 4000 meters on a C-47 and released for its

first glide to a controlled landing.

Langley personnel suggested that the center sponsor a study of hypersonic

lifting vehicles with propulsion systems.

NASA established an Ad Hoc Committee on Hypersonic Lifting Vehicle with

Propulsion.

FRC issued a request for proposals for developing two advanced lifting

bodies.

A subpanel for coordinating manned lifting reentry vehicle studies was

established by the Manned Space Flight Panel of the Aeronautics and

Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB).

A project approval document for the lifting body program was signed by

NASA Headquarters officials.

Norair Division of Northrop was chosen by NASA to build two advanced

lifting bodies-one M2 and one HL-10-for a flight test program (contract

awarded on June 2, 1964).

NASA engineers conducted design studies for incorporating the XLR-I 1 jet

engine into the lifting bodies being constructed.

The AACB ad hoc committee on lifting reentry vehicles submitted their final

report.

Ames Research Center issued a request for proposals for a feasibility study of

lifting body "space shuttle" vehicles with emphasis on aerodynamic

characteristics.

FRC issued a request for proposals for two preliminary feasibility studies for

a manned lifting reentry vehicle.

Ames issued a request for proposals for a study of the protective equipment

required on a "space shuttle" lifting body.

A NASA-Air Force agreement on testing the M2-F2 and HL-10 was signed.

FRC awarded McDonnell Aircraft Company and Northrop contracts for

feasibility studies for a manned lifting body flight program.

A roll-out ceremony was held at Northrop for the M2-F2.

Langley issued' a request for proposals for a study on how the size of a lifting

body would influence research potential and project costs.

Northrop delivered the HL-10 to FRC.

The first captive flight with the M2-F2 attached to a B-52 took place at FRC.

NASA selected the Martin Company to study the costs, crew size, and complexity of a flight research program that used a manned lifting body.

NASA Headquarters decided not to proceed with plans for an orbital flight

test of a lifting body configuration, as had been suggested by the project personnel.

The M2-F2 successfully performed its first flight; it was released from a B-52

at 14 000 meters.**

The HL-10 successfully performed its first flight at FRC. By this time, the

M2-F2 had been flown 14 times.
456 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-68.

ChronologyofLiftingBodyDevelopmentandOperations(Continued)

Date Event

May10,1967

July11,1967

Nov.7,1967

March1968

Feb.-April1968

March15,1968

Oct.23,1968

Nov.13,1968

Dec.9,1968

Duringthe16thM2-F2testfight,thepilotwasforcedto makea

350-kilometer-per-hourlandingwiththelandinggearup;thecraftrolledover

sixtimes,injuringthepilot.Thevehiclewassubsequentlyrebuiltasthe

M2-F3.

MartinCompany'sX-24(SV5-P)liftingbodysponsoredbytheAirForcewas

rolledoutforinspection. NASA was to participate in flight tests at FRC.

The NASA-Air Force agreement was extendcd to include testing of the

X-24A.

NASA Headquarters gave its authorization to restore the damaged M2-F2.

The X-24A underwent wind tunnel tests at Ames.

Flights resumed with the HL-10 after the craft had been modified to improve

its stability.**

First attempt to fly a powered HL-10 failed because the XLR engine shut

down prematurely.

First successful powered flight of the HL-10 took place at FRC.

The HL-10 took its 14th flight.

*This design would become the Air Force X-20 lifting body. Northrop was interested in pursuing this

concept. The Martin Company was the firm finally selected to build the lifting body configuration.

"[With modifications, this design became the Mercury truncated cone flown by NASA.

**See table 4-72 for a flight log of M2-F2 and HL-10 activity.

Table 4-69.

M2-F1 Lifting Body Characteristics

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Width:

Height:

Weight (kg):

Construction:

Controls:

First Flight:

Ground-tow:

Air-tow:

Times flown:*

Ground-tow:

Air-tow:

Test pilots:

Cognizant

NASA Center:

Program manager."

Project leader:

Contractor:

Mode of operation:

130-degree half-cone body with a blunt nose and vertical tail fins

6.1

3.96

3

513

Plywood, tubular steel, fiberglass

2 vertical rudders for yaw; 2 trailing-edge flaps for pitch; 2 elevons working in synchronization for pitch and in opposition for roll

April 5, 1963

Aug. 16, 1963

400

100

Milton O. Thompson, Charles Yeager, William H. Dana, Fred Haise, Bruce A.

Peterson, Tom Millick

ARC (design)

FRC (flight testing)

Robert Dale Reed

Vic Horton

Sailplane Corporation of America, hull

Ground-towed or air-towed (C-47)

*Approximate number of experiments.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table4-70.

M2-F2LiftingBodyCharacteristics

457

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Width:

Height:

Weight (kg):

Construction:

Controls:

First flight:

Last flight:

Times flown:

Test pilots:

Cognizant

NASA Center:

Program manager:

Contractor:

Remarks:

Mode of operation:

Half-cone body (flat top, round bottom) with blunt nose and vertical tail fins

6.75

2.92

2.69

2300 (with water ballast test tanks full, 4100)

Aluminum

Rudder on outer face of each fin for yaw; upper flaps for roll control and pitch trim;

full-length pitch flap on lower surface of tail

July 12, 1966

May 10, 1967

16

Milton O. Thompson, Bruce A. Peterson, Donald Sorlie, Jerauld R. Gentry

ARC (design)

FRC (flight testing)

John McTigue

Northrop Corporation, prime

Repaired after a crash-landing in May 1967 damaged the vehicle: it was redesignated

the M2-F3; flights were resumed in mid-1970.

Released in mid-air from under the wing of B-52

Table 4-71.

HL-10 Lifting Body Characteristics

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Width:

Height:

Weigh t (kg):

Construction:

Controls:

First flight:

Last flight:

Times flown:

Test pilots:

Cognizant

NASA Center:

Program manager:

Contractor:

Remarks:

Mode of operation:

Half-cone body (round top, flat bottom) with blunt nose and three vertical tail fins

6.75

4.597

3.48

2400 (with water ballast test tanks full, 4100)

Aluminum

Thick elevon between each fin and center fin for pitch and roll; split rudder on

center fin for yaw and speed brake

Dec. 22, 1966

July 17, 1970

37

Bruce A. Peterson, Jerauld R. Gentry, John A. Manke, William H. Dana, Peter

Hoag

LaRC (design)

FRC (flight testing)

John McTigue, FRC

Northrop Corporation, prime

In the fall of 1968, an XLR-I 1 engine was installed to give the HL-10 the capability

of powered flight (it was still launched from a B-52, however); the first powered

flight took place on October 23, 1968, but the attempt failed because the engine shut

down prematurely; a second attempt on November 13, 1968 was successful.

Released in mid-air from under the wing of a B-52
458 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-72.

MS-F2 and HL-10 Flight Log, 1966-1968

No. Date Flight Pilot Max. Max. Max. Flight Remarks

no.* alt. speed Mach time

(m)t (km/hr) (sec.)

1966

July 12

2 July 19

3 Aug. 12

4 Aug. 24

5 Sept. 2

6 Sept. 16

7 Sept. 20

8 Sept. 22

9 Sept. 28

10 Oct. 5

11 Oct. 12

12 Oct. 26

13 Nov. 14

14 Nov. 21

15 Dec. 22

1967

16 May 2

17 May 10

1968

18 March 15

19 April 3

20 April 25

21 May 3

22 May 16

23 May 28

24 June 11

25 June 21

26 Sept. 24

M-l-8 Milton O. 13 700 727 0.64 216

Thompson

(NASA)

M-2-9 Thompson 13 700 634 0.59 245

M-3-10 Thompson 13 700 655 0.61 278

M-4-11 Thompson 13 700 716 0.67 241

M-5-12 Thompson 13 700 748 0.70 226

M-6-13 Bruce A. 13 700 750 0.71 210

Peterson

(NASA)

M-7-14 Donald 13 700 678 0.63 211

Sorlie

(USAF)

M-8-15 Peterson 13 700 702 0.66 233

M-9-16 Sorlie 13 700 713 0.67 225

M-10-17 Sorlie 13 700 690 0.61 234

M-II-18 Jerauld R. 13 700 702 0.66 226

Gentry

(USAF)

M-12-19 Gentry 13 700 641 0.60 260

M-13-20 Gentry 13 700 714 0.68 229

M-14-21 Gentry 13 700 735 0.69 235

H-I-3 Peterson 13 700 734 0.69 186

M-15-23 Peterson 13 700 660 0.62

M-16-24 Peterson 13 700 649 0.61

H-2-5 Gentry 13 700 682 0.60

H-3-6 Gentry 13 700 732 0.68

H-4-8 Gentry 13 700 739 0.69

H-5-9 Gentry 13 700 732 0.68

H-6-10 Gentry 13 700 719 0.67

H-7-11 John A. 13 700 697 0.65

Manke

(NASA)

H-8-t2 Manke 13 700 697 0.65

H-9-13 Gentry 13 700 679 0.63

H-10-17 Gentry 13 700 723 0.68

First M2-F2

flight

First 360 °

approach

First HL-10

flight

231

222 Crash landing

injured pilot

and craft

242

241

257

245

264

245

245

271

245 First flight

with XLR-I 1

engine (engine

not activated)
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Table 4-72. (Continued)

MS-F2 and HL-10 Flight Log, 1966-1968

459

No. Date Flight Pilot Max. Max. Max. Flight Remarks

no. * alt. speed Mach time

(m)l (km/hr) (sec.)

27 Oct. 3 H-II-18 Manke 13 700 758 0.71 242

28 Oct. 23 H-12-20 Gentry 12 100 723 0.66 188

29 Nov. 13 H-13-21 Manke 13 000 842 0.84 385

30 Dec. 9 H-14-24 Gentry 14 450 871 0.87 393

First powered

flight attempt;

premature shutdown of engine

First successful

powered flight;

(2 chambers ran

186 sec.)

Powered flight

*Vehicle letter code plus flight number of that particular vehicle plus B-52 carrier flight number

(M = M2-F2 and H = HL-10).

tThe altitude at which the lifting body was released from the B-52 carrier.

DESCRIPTION-ELECTRONICS AND CONTROL PROGRAM

When the Office of Advanced Research and Technology was organized in

November 1961, one of the research areas given emphasis for the first time was electronics. NASA had inherited expertise in many fields when it was formed in 1958,

but electronics was not one of them. To be sure, there were specialists working on

propulsion, guidance systems, and other critical areas who were experts when it

came to electronics, but their primary concern was with the larger system, not with

its particular electronic components. It was estimated that some 40 percent of the

cost of launch vehicles, 70 percent of the cost of satellites, and 90 percent of the cost

of tracking and data acquisition equipment was for electronic components, and unfortunately most of NASA's early hardware failures could be traced in part to some

electronic malfunction. Early flight experience indicated that there were significant

differences between the reliability requirements of electronic instruments used on

earth and those used in space. The agency needed some in-house, centrally-located

expertise in this field, which affected guidance and navigation equipment, communications and tracking, instrumentation and data processing, and vehicle control

and stabilization.

NASA was, of course, committed to contracting with industry and universities

for research in all fields, including electronics, but the agency needed to develop

some level of competence by which to direct this work and to evaluate the end products. In the early years of space vehicle development, electronics technology borrowed from aeronautics and missile programs was sufficient, but with demands for increasingly sophisticated hardware the old equipment-as adapted by specialists at

NASA's centers-could only be used as a stopgap. NASA engineers often needed

unique items, often in small quantities, that would survive the rigors of launch, ex-
460 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

posure to the harsh environment of space, and atmospheric reentry. Private companies were seldom interested in making one-of-a-kind or extremely-limitedproduction items, and university research in electronics was not expanding at a fast

enough rate. When Albert J. Kelley was appointed NASA's first director of electronics and control, he was charged with assessing the agency's needs and

capabilities in basic electronics research and then proposing whatever steps would be

necessary to ensure that all elements of the space program could be satisfied by inhouse competence.

Not surprisingly, Kelley's fall 1962 report called for a significant increase in electronics research within NASA. Rather than step up electronics research at the

several NASA centers that had requirements in this field or assign a particular center

the role of coordinator of electronics research in addition to its other functions,

Kelley recommended that a new research facility be established that would be

dedicated to electronics. Electronics was too important to become an appendage to

some existing center, and many specialists- managers and technical people-agreed

that electronics work would be most successful if it were centralized in one location.

This new center would be capable of providing agencywide leadership and act as an

information channel for new requirements and new data. Administrator James E.

Webb agreed with Kelley's analysis, but also was acutely aware of the possible

political problems that a proposal for a new NASA center might bring. NASA did

not immediately request funds for the new facility in the FY 1964 budget (which was

being prepared in the fall of 1962), but planned to reprogram from other sources the

money it might need in the early phases of the new center's development (estimated

at $5 million for the first year). Selecting a prime site for the research center was not

difficult, but getting the site approved was a long, often unpleasant affair. Webb,

Kelley, and others agreed that Boston offered the best environment for an electronics center. MIT, Harvard, and many industrial concerns that also conducted

electronics research would be close by, which would contribute to a productive

research and development atmosphere. Members of Congress, however, heatedly

argued for other sites and delayed approval for NASA's new center until spring

1964.11 The Electronics Research Center (ERC) was formally activated on

September 1, 1964 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.*

The Electronics Research Center, with Winston E. Kock as director and Albert

Kelley as deputy director, parceled the research tasks into several logical divisions:

systems, components, guidance and control, instrumentation and data processing,

and electromagnetic research. At headquarters, Francis J. Sullivan became OART's

director for electronics and control. Reporting to the director were chiefs for

guidance and navigation (later guidance and control), control and stabilization (later

requirements and systems), communications and tracking (later microwaves and optics), and instrumentation and data processing; electronics technology and components was a fifth division added in 1968.

All NASA centers participated to some extent in electronics research or component testing, with ERC serving as the prime investigator, coordinator, and clearinghouse.t ERC worked closely with its many contractors as new components were

* ERC absorbed NASA's North Eastern Office, which since August 14, 1962, had acted as the agency's liaison with industry in the northeastern states.

J Because of post-Apollo budget reductions, NASA was forced to close ERC in 1970. The facilities

were transferred to the Department of Transportation.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECI4NOLOGY 461

developed and tested to meet specific project needs and as basic research was expanded to include such new fields as microwaves and optics. When test conditions

could not be adequately simulated in the laboratory, OART funded flight projects

to verify new hardware or theories. These included Project RAM (Radio Attenuation Measurements), with two flights in the 1958-1968 period, SCANNER, and

other small experiments sent aloft on sounding rockets or incorporated into satellite

payloads on a noninterfering basis. Most of the research conducted in the electronics

and control program was funded by supporting research and technology monies.

Guidance and Control

From the initial planning for manned lunar missions and long-life scientific

satellites, it was obvious that launch vehicles and spacecraft would have to be

equipped with instruments that would stabilize them during all phases of flight and

guide them, either automatically or manually, to their destinations. Guidance

systems research was directed toward designing simple, lightweight, reliable sensors,

reference elements, and associated components that made up an onboard guidance

system. By studying sensors and control mechanisms, control systems researchers

sought to optimize flight stabilization techniques, improve visual displays, and

develop adaptive automatic controls. Personnel at several NASA centers worked in

this area of research. At the Electronics Research Center two laboratories supported

guidance and control studies: the Guidance Laboratory and the Control and Information Systems Laboratory.

Work on guidance systems was generally divided among four categories: inertial

reference sensors and systems, navigation techniques and displays, electromagnetic

sensors, and guidance theory and trajectory analysis. Work on developing improved

gyroscopes (cryogenic and electrostatic) was going on at Marshall Space Flight

Center and at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory before the projects were transferred to

ERC. The electrostatic gyro was flight-tested in aircraft in 1968. The sun, stars, and

planets, primary targets for space navigation and reference systems, are located

automatically by onboard electromagnetic sensors or electro-optical star trackers or

manually with hand-held sextants. Finding the simplest and most reliable systems

for navigation on a manned flight was a major goal of the 1960s. In addition, several

experiments were performed that measured the radiance characteristics of earth's

horizon to serve as a basis for developing highly accurate navigation and attitude

control sensors.

Three major tasks faced control systems specialists: research into very highperformance automatic control systems necessary to achieve the precise pointing

characteristics required of communication satellites, development of manual control

systems in which the crew played an active part, and furthering the study of control

and information theory. One important development in this area was the control

moment gyro, a momentum storage device used to stabilize the Apollo telescope

mount (which became a major experiment and structural element on Skylab) or

other large spacecraft. Gravity gradient stabilization (as employed by some Application Technology Satellites) also was investigated, at the Air Force's suggestion.

Mathematical modeling was used by researchers in their analysis of pilot performance with different manual control systems and various information display

devices.
462 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Communications and Tracking and Data Acquisition

Long-life, lightweight communications systems capable of handling ever increasing loads were of concern to all NASA centers. At Goddard Space Flight

Center, researchers incorporated OART-funded experiments into satellites to test

communications and tracking systems for advanced scientific satellites (S-66, Explorer 22, and Explorer 27 are examples; see tables 3-138, 3-88, and 3-92). Concern

over the blackout period caused by ionized plasmas during vehicle reentry led OART

to fund a series of radio attentuation measurements (Project RAM), with several

launches in the pre-1969 period (for more information see electronics and control

flight projects). Optical and microwave communications devices were under study at

Goddard, MIT, IBM, and General Electric. When the Electronics Research Center

was built, two special facilities-the Microwave Radiation Laboratory and the

Space Optics Laboratory-took over many of these research tasks. Research on

deep space communications and tracking was a special concern of the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory. Researchers at JPL and ERC were particularly interested in managing

the very high data rates required for the real-time transmission of high-resolution

images and scientific experiments data. High-power microwave tubes and electrooptical systems were two possible answers. JPL researchers perfected a video film

converter and associated digital computer equipment for recovering high-quality image data from the noisy and distorted television signals received from spacecraft (a

prototype of this image enhancement system was used in Project Ranger; an improved version was carried on Mariner 4). Other areas of research included the

search for improved computer processing and data transmissions, more efficient onboard telemetry techniques, new microminiaturized instruments, and the development of thin-film laminated ferrite materials for use in computer memories.

Building larger (or longer) antennas for spacecraft and ground stations was particularly important to tracking specialists, once the initial problems of real-time optical tracking and the accurate determination of spacecraft orbital parameters had

been solved. Multiple array antennas and microwave antennas were studied at

Langley Research Center, Goddard, and JPL. Researchers were studying the

feasibility of 64-meter ground antennas and 9-meter spacecraft antennas.

Instrumentation and Data Processing

Scientists and engineers both required reliable instruments with which to

measure the environment in which the spacecraft was operating and to monitor the

vehicle's performance. Electronics researchers were continually searching for ways

to increase the accuracy of these many and varied instruments, extend their measurement range, improve energy and signal conversion, reduce their size and power consumption, and ensure component compatibility. Some products of this research include miniaturized self-contained biomedical sensors, compact mass spectrometers

and gas chromatographs, miniature accelerometers, and small solid-state television

cameras. All NASA's centers were participants in this research or the application of

the resulting new technology. ERC established an Instrumentation Research

Laboratory with several advanced simulators with which to test new components.

NASA's computer specialists constantly reviewed the agency's growing needs
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 463

for data handling and processing, on the ground and onboard spacecraft. Computer

technology was forced to advance rapidly with the space program. In the early

1960s, NASA specialists used computers to calculate trajectories or to control a

launch, but by the end of the decade they required a system that could process and

store the millions of bits of information per second that a television camera could

produce. In addition to lightweight high-performance computers, the agency needed

high-capacity onboard data storage devices. Researchers also looked for ways to

compress data mathematically so that it could be transmitted in less time. A longrange research task in this field was the development of optical techniques for

spacecraft computer memories. Automated flight-failure warning systems for aircraft also were under study. Another group of experts monitored man-computer interactions. In addition to work at NASA's other centers, ERC set up a Computer

Laboratory to conduct basic and applied research to meet computer and data processing requirements of future NASA missions.

Electronic Techniques and Components

Reliability was the chief concern of researchers working in the techniques and

components field. The technology of microelectronics and the materials and processes used to fabricate the components of a microelectronic system were of special

interest. These specialists also developed test procedures for inspecting parts made

by contractors and methods for analyzing electrical failures. Research to extend the

reliable lifetime of parts was under way, as well. Work at ERC's Electronics Components Laboratory was divided into four branches: solid-state, materials, vacuum

devices, and electromechanical.

Electronics and Control Flight Projects

Improved and new electronic components were tested on almost every NASA

flight project, as were new techniques for tracking, communications, and data processing. However, proving some minor new electrical part or system was hardly ever

listed as a prime mission objective. But in addition to early tracking experiments

designed for Beacon-Explorer satellites (S-66, Explorer 22, and Explorer 27), three

flight experiments in the 1958-1968 era were linked to the electronics and control

program.

Project SCANNER. The objective of Project SCANNER (also called Horizon

Definition Research Project) was to make detailed measurements of earth's horizon

radiation profile and to determine the existence of relatively stable gradients in the

profile that could be used to design precise horizon sensors. Project SCANNER was

undertaken as an extension of laboratory research on horizon characteristics to

verify theoretical predictions of the existence and nature of radiation gradients. Two

ballistic flights, launched from Wallops Island in 1966 by modified Scout launchers,

measured the energy radiated from the horizon.* The data collected allowed re-

*The Air Force was conducting similar experiments with the support of the Ohio State University

Research Foundation. The Air Force planned six Trailblazer (Air Force designation for its Scout launch

vehicle and the same vehicle used by NASA for SCANNER) flights for 1966-1967.
464 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

searchers to draw an accurate correlation between theoretical predictions and experiments. Project management came from Langley Research Center (see table

4-73).

Earth Coverage Horizon Measurement. This project was designed to extend the

limited measurements attained with Project SCANNER and with X-15 borne instruments. The investigators wanted to make a comprehensive measurement of

earth's horizon radiance profile over a broad range of seasonal and latitudinal variations. Project definition studies were under way in 1967-1968.

Project RAM (Radio Attenuation Measurement). During atmospheric reentry,

a spacecraft experiences a brief period of communications blackout when the gas

surrounding the vehicle becomes ionized because of intense heating. The attenuation

suffered by radio signals (electromagnetic waves) traversing this plasma sheath is

due to the free electrons in the plasma, which collide with other gas particles. The

density of the electrons determines the degree of radio energy absorption and reflection. Speed and the angle of reentry also affect the length of the blackout period. A

manned spacecraft returning from a lunar mission would reenter at such high speeds

and at such a shallow angle that the crew could be out of contact with the recovery

team for several (7-11) critical minutes. To study the blackout problem, the Office

of Advanced Research and Technology initiated Project RAM in FY 1961.

The first two series of ballistic flight experiments obtained data on the plasma

sheath at reentry velocities in the 5500-meter-per-second range and demonstrated the

utility of techniques such as varying the aerodynamic shape of the body, using

higher radio frequencies, and injecting water around the reentering vehicle. To support RAM A and B flights (1961-1964), specialists at Langley Research Center explored the transmission of microwave signals through ionized plasma under conditions that simulated reentry. In addition, on Gemini 3, the first manned Gemini

Table 4-73.

Project SCANNER Characteristics

Flight 1 Flight 2

Date of launch Aug. 16, 1966

(location): (Wl)

Launch vehicle: Trailblazer

(USAF Scout)

Weight (kg): 250

Shape: Cylindrical with a conical nose

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Diameter at base of cone:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objective:

Experiments:

Results:

Dec. 9, 1966

(WI)

Trailblazer

(USAF Scout)

250

3.05 3.05

0.76 0.76

Ballistic trajectories

LaRC

Howard J. Curfman, Jr.

Honeywell Systems & Research Division, prime

To obtain data during a ballistic flight needed to design and develop

improved horizon-scanning instrumentation for future spacecraft

stabilization systems.

2-channel radiometer

Star mapper telescope

Infrared horizon sensors

Both flights were successful and returned data as planned.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 465

flight(March23,1965),aRAMexperimentwasconducted.Waterwassprayedin

extremelybrief, timedpulsesat differentflow ratesin the hot gasenvelope

surroundingthespacecraftonitsreentry.Thisincreasedthestrengthof C-bandand

UHFtelemetrysignals,buttheresultsof theexperimentwereinconclusive.OART

calledfor athirdseriesofRAMreentryflightsatincreasingvelocities.Approvalfor

RAMCwasgrantedin late1964.

Inadditiontogroundexperimentsandtheoreticalanalyses,planscalledfor two

ballisticreentryflights.Launchedby Scoutvehicles,theRAM reentrypayloads

traveledat themedium-velocityrange(7600-8200meterspersecond).Thefirst experiment(October19,1967)againattemptedto measuretheeffectivenessof injectingwaterintotheplasma(it usedX-bandradiofrequencyinsteadof S-band).RAM

C-2(August22,1968)measuredelectronandionconcentrationsin theflowfieldat

variouspointsalongthereentrypathwithmicrowavereflectometers.Approvalfor a

thirdflightexperimentcamein mid-1969.RAMC-3carriedfreonandwaterinjection experimentson September30,1970.All RAM flightexperimentswereperformedsuccessfullyandtheresultscomparedto similarDepartmentof Defenseexperimentdata.With thisinformation,specialistscouldmoreaccuratelypredict

high-altitudeflowfieldcharacteristicsandworkonthedesignof apracticalliquid

injectionsystemto helpfuturespacecraftovercometheblackoutproblem.

RAMwasaLangleyproject,withTheoE.Simsservingasprojectmanager.The

spacecraftwereassembledin-house.FundscameinitiallyfromOART'sspacevehiclesystemsbudget,butaftertheelectronicsandcontrolprogramwasestablished

RAM wasfundedfrom its budget.JackLevinewasOART's project officer for

RAM at NASA Headquarters (see tables 4-74 and 4-75).

Table 4-74.

Project RAM A and B Characteristics

RAM A-1 RAM A-2 RAM B-1 RAM B-2 RAM B-3

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Aug. 30, 1961 Feb. 21, 1962

(WI) (WI)

Hybrid vehicle sometimes

called RAM A*

Weight (kg): approx. 34 approx. 34 80 112 112

Shape: hemispherically blunted blunt-cone cylinder

9 degree half-angle cone

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Objective:

Results:

Sept. 21, 1962 May 28, 1963 April 10, 1964

(Wl) (WI) (WI)

hybrid vehicle sometimes called RAM Bt

3.7 (with the 4th stage)

Ballistic trajectories

LaRC

1.7

Theo E. Sims

To explore the communications blackout problem experienced during

spacecraft reentry at velocities up to 5500 meters per second.

All experiments except B-1 returned data as expected; RAM B-I was unsuccessful because the launch vehicle's second stage malfunctioned.

*This four-stage vehicle consisted of a Castor XM 33E3 first stage with two auxiliary Recruit XM 19

engines, two XM 45 stages, and another Recruit XM 19 as the fourth stage. It was 19.8 meters tall and

weighed 6500 kilograms.

tThe Ram B vehicle had three stages: a Castor E-8 first stage, an Antares (X-254-AI) second stage,

and an Alcor (A J-10) third stage. Launched by the rail method, the vehicle was 12.8 meters tall and

weighed 6000 kilograms. It was similar to the Air Force Blue Scout.
466 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-75.

ProjectRAMC Characteristics

RAMC-1 RAMC-2

Date of launch (location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Length:

Largest diameter:

Smallest diameter:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA center:

Project manager:

Contractor:

Objective:

Experiments:

Results:

Oct. 19, 1967 Aug. 22, 1968

(Vii) (WI)

Scout Scout

(S-159C) (?)

117 120

hemispherical cone

13.9

0.66

0.3

Ballistic trajectories

LaRC

Theo E. Sims

Ling-Temco-Vought, systems integration

To explore the communications blackout problem experienced during

spacecraft reentry at velocities up to 8200 meters per second.

VHF telemetry transmissions

X-band transmissions

L-, S-, and K a- band transmissions (C-2 only)

water injection (C-1 only)

Langmuir probe

All experiments returned data as planned.

DESCRIPTION-HUMAN FACTOR SYSTEMS PROGRAM

The establishment in mid-1962 of OART's human factor systems program-a

catchall title for research in the fields of man-system integration, biotechnology, the

human body, and advanced concepts for manned spacecraft systems-was only one

aspect of NASA's participation in life sciences activities. How the life sciences came

to be divided among the Office of Manned Space Flight (aerospace medicine), the

Office of Space Science and Applications (bioscience), and the Office of Advanced

Research and Technology is a complicated story. When NASA was formed in 1958,

its most immediate and obvious need in the life sciences field was medical specialists

who could help engineers design a Mercury spacecraft that would support an

astronaut and who could help choose, train, and monitor the health of the agency's

pilots and astronauts. Man, a critical component of the total engineering configuration and the overall operational plan, had to be integrated into a man-machine

system, a system designed with man's needs, capabilities, and limitations considered

as critical engineering constraints. Obviously, this was the responsibility of the

Space Task Group, an organization at Langley Research Center charged with

NASA's first manned project (this group later became the nucleus of the Manned

Spacecraft Center in Houston). A biomedical team, the Aeromedical Consultants

Staff, was organized as part of the Space Task Group in November 1958 to under-
ADVANCEDRESEARCHAND TECHNOLOGY 467

take the medical and human factors work that was required.* In the late 1950s,

NASA managers had no precise idea as to what the future held for the manned program and, therefore, had given little thought to the advanced research that would be

needed for future manned systems; emphasis was on Mercury and today's requirements.

Faced with the need to coordinate the Space Task Group's biomedical activities

with NASA Headquarters program planning and prompted by advice from his staff

and special advisory groups (and charges from academia that basic research in

biology was being ignored), NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan sought to centralize and strengthen the agency's life sciences program by creating an Office of

Life Sciences Programs in March 1960 (on par with the Office of Space Flight Programs). But the experiment was short-lived. The office was abolished in August 1961

for several reasons: lack of support, financial and managerial; unclear lines of

authority; and no precise goals for the future. An agencywide reorganization in

November 1961 in response to a major expansion in the scope of the manned program gave bioscience a more secure niche as part of the Office of Space Sciences. t

The Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) was given authority for aerospace

medicine. Advanced human factor research, however, was not given a place in

OART until July 1962 (see fig. 4-1). This tripartite organization of the life sciences

would survive through the rest of the agency's first decade, but not without a great

deal of destructive competition between bioscience (OSSA) and human factor

systems (OART) for limited funds and managerial support. And relations between

the human factor researchers and OMSF's biomedical people was seldom an easy

one. To make matters worse, some members of Congress always suspected that

NASA's research in advanced human factor systems only duplicated that being conducted by the Air Force, while the Air Force felt it was competing with the civilian

agency for dwindling research dollars. It was a difficult set of circumstances under

which to work, but NASA's advanced human factor specialists did manage to contribute to the lunar exploration program and to the design of advanced systems for

spacecraft and aircraft.

The basic premise assumed by researchers in OART's human factor systems

program was that man was a critical component of the spacecraft; together they

were a man-machine system. Research activities fell into four categories. (1) Man-

*The Air Force had long beeninterestedin aerospace medicineand human engineering.A department of spacemedicinewas establishedin 1950at the USAFSchoolof AviationMedicine,Wright Air

Force Base. In the early1950sat theAviation(laterAerospace)MedicalLaboratoryat Wright-Patterson,

researchers were investigatingthe possible effects of spaceflight on man. At the AeromedicalField

Laboratory at HollomanAir ForceBasein 1948,specialistsbegan theirinvestigationsof the effectsthat

the space environment would haveon subhuman organisms.Althoughthe Navy had little interest in

spaceflightbefore 1957,three Navyinstitutionswereconductingresearchthat would proveapplicableto

the spaceprogram. TheNavalSchoolof AviationMedicine,the Navy'scenterfor flightsurgeontraining,

sponsored studiesof the effectsof high stressand extremeenvironmentson pilots. Biomedicalresearch

and development work was conducted at the Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory (human

research)and at the Naval EquipmentCenter (biotechnology).

tSee also chapter 3, pages 252-62,for more information on the OSSAbiosciencesprogram.
468 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

machine integration studies were concerned with "critical points of contact of man

with his vehicle," that is, the interfaces that "involve man's health, comfort, survival, observation, decision-making, integrative and manipulative skills," and the

ways "in which man's limitations may affect this system." Of particular interest were

studies of how well an astronaut could perform "routine" tasks outside the

spacecraft and on the lunar surface. At Langley, specialists simulated a one-sixth

gravity environment to evaluate man's ability to work and use tools on the moon. At

the Manned Spacecraft Center, neutral buoyancy simulators were used in training to

determine the possible impacts of weightlessness on crew activity. Requirements for

long-term interplanetary and lunar bases was another topic of interest, as was aircraft safety. (2) Biotechnology, the design and engineering of life support systems,

protective equipment, information displays, communications devices, and controls

for manual operations, was an area in which the engineer and the medical specialist

worked closely. These experts determined what effect man's needs would have on

spacecraft design. Space suits also came under this group's purview, along with portable life support systems for extravehicular activity. The most visible of

I

OFFICE OF

SPACE SCIENCE

i_mmmo

I

DIRECTOR,

BIOSCIENCES

DIVISION

NASA ADMINISTRATOR I

i

!

ADVANCED RESEARCH

AND TECHNOLOGY

I

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF

BIOTECHNOLOGY AND

HUMAN RESEARCH

I

DIRECTOR,

AMES LIFE

SCIENCES LABORATORY

OFFICE OF MANNED

SPACE FLIGHT

1

DIRECTOR,

DIVISION OF

AEROSPACE

MEDICINE

I

! I

c-iic- CENTER CREW

MEDICAL SYSTEMS

OPERATIONS DIVISION

m m_ INDICATES DIRECT LINE

Figure 4-1. NASA Life Sciences Elements, August 1962. * The reorganization of 1961-1962 created

three separate, functionally independent life sciences components and placed them under the management jurisdiction of three different program office administrators.

* From John Pitts, The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980, NASA Sp-4213

(Washington, 1985), p. 79.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 469

biotechnology projects was the search for a regenerative life support system.

Langley personnel were testing a closed regenerative system built by General

Dynamics/Astronautics in the late 1960s capable of housing a crew of four for 100

days. (3) Human research was perhaps the most general category of the four. The

objective here was to understand the physiological and psychological reactions of

man to long-term exposure to the hostile environment of space and the rigors of

flight, and to predict how these reactions would affect his performance and well being. The phenomena under examination were many: zero gravity, extreme acceleration forces, vibration, solitary confinement, radiation, artificially-produced atmospheres. Radiobiology and acceleration research were of special importance.

Researchers also investigated how lengthy space missions would affect metabolism,

nutritional needs, and the cardiovascular system. (4) The final area of research was

called advanced concepts, but as all OART's work was "advanced" we can take this

title to mean research on systems that would require even greater advances in the

state of the art. Bionics and cybernetics were among the fields studied in the search

for new ways to further integrate man into the operational systems of spacecraft and

aircraft. Inflatable space suits and direct eye or nerve-impulse control over

spacecraft instruments are examples of futuristic concepts under study in 1964-1968.

The human factor systems team did not sponsor any major flight projects, but it

did have funds for small biotechnology flight experiments to supplement the

laboratory work conducted at Ames, Langley, the Manned Spacecraft Center, and

elsewhere.* These experiments (testing new components, observing the effects of a

particular environment on a subhuman organism, evaluating some new material)

were flown by sounding rockets, balloons, and high-speed aircraft or on satellites

and manned flights where the configuration allowed. One project involved the collection of physiological data from a large number of individuals who spent long

periods of time under stressful conditions representative of those encountered during spaceflight. For several months, students at the Air Force Aerospace Test Pilots

School at Edwards Air Force Base wore special instruments that monitored certain

body systems. With these data, specialists developed new standards for "normal"

heartbeat, blood pressure, and respiration for astronauts functioning for prolonged

periods under stress.

Eugene B. Konecci was OART's first director for human factor systems

research, taking the job in July 1962. He strongly favored the systems approach to

solving the life sciences problems of manned spaceflight. He viewed man and the

vehicle as individual total systems made up of numerous subsystems. The ultimate

object of life sciences research and development, as Konecci saw it, was to optimize

the integration of man and spacecraft in terms of their subsystems. Orr Reynolds,

director of OSSA's bioscience program, saw life sciences research on a more general

and purely scientific scale. These two men, with their basic academic disagreements,

competed for funds and facilities; there was little cooperation between the two

groups. Walton L. Jones took over the human factor systems post in October 1964.

Answering to the director were chiefs for man-system integration, biotechnology,

human research, and advanced concepts.

*John Pitts in The Human Factor argues that Ames Research Center with its special life sciences

facilities more directly supported bioscience investigations than human factor research.
470 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

DESCRIPTION-SPACE POWER AND PROPULSION PROGRAM

In the 1960s, NASA's advanced planners were predicting that future spaceflight

projects would send increasingly heavy payloads on lengthy interplanetary and lunar

missions. To send manned spacecraft to the outer reaches of our solar system and to

support lunar and orbital laboratories, NASA would require boosters much more

powerful than the 1960s-era chemical rockets plus lightweight onboard power

systems that produced megawatts of electricity. Research leading to advanced power

and propulsion systems, originally under the direction of NASA's radioisotope vehicle offices (see chap. 1), was assigned to OART in 1961. Larger chemical rockets,

more efficient solar cells, solid- and liquid-core nuclear reactors, generators, and

spacecraft stationkeeping propulsion devices were among the topics investigated by

several OART divisions. Most of these projects were expensive, long-term, and complex. They often required close coordination with other government agencies, and

usually the technology under development was not applicable to any ongoing flight

projects. The great expense and the lack of specific requirements for the new systems

made this field difficult to defend against the scrutiny of budget conscious managers

and members of Congress. But if the U.S. wished to continue its role as a peaceful

space-exploring and space-exploiting nation, NASA would have to initiate in the

1960s research that would lead to the development of new technology it would require in the 1970s and 1980s. As NASA managers and mission planners had

discovered with the Centaur upper stage, propulsion systems required particularly

long development lead times.

The changing management structure of OART's power and propulsion divisions

reflected the agency's changing attitude toward different energy sources. After

OART was established in 1961, Harold B. Finger became director of nuclear systems

(in addition to being manager of the joint Atomic Energy Commission-NASA Space

Nuclear Propulsion Office, which he had headed since August 1960), and W.H.

Woodward became director of propulsion and power generation. In 1963, Finger

and Woodward's offices joined forces in a new nuclear systems and space power

division, while authority for advanced chemical propulsion went to the Adelbert O.

Tischler in a new chemical propulsion division. The next year Finger and Woodward's operation was streamlined somewhat, and in 1967 the division name was

changed to space power and electric propulsion (see table 4-76). Finger, Woodward,

and Tischler were all former NACA propulsion specialists who had spent their early

careers at the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory before coming to Washington as

headquarters managers.

Advanced propulsion experts were looking to three fields for systems that would

provide power to boost spacecraft weighing up to 4500 kilograms to escape velocity.

In addition to operating lunar ferries that could transport some 1.8 million kilograms

of payloads over a six-year period between earth and the moon, NASA wanted to send

orbiters to all the planets in the solar system and heavy landers to Mercury, Venus, Mars,

Jupiter's moons, and Pluto, and eventually men 'to Mars (see table 4-77). Electric upper

stages offered one solution for sending these large payloads on their way. Teamed with

conventional chemical or advanced nuclear boosters, an electric propulsion system could

be used very efficiently in a zero gravity environment. Electric propulsion was also being considered for spacecraft onboard propulsion (for stationkeeping and attitude con-
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 471

Table 4-76.

Changing Organization of OART Advanced Propulsion and

Power Systems Divisions, 1961-1968

Nov. 1961-1962

Director, Advanced Research and Technology

Director, Nuclear Systems (Harold B. Finger)

Deputy Director, Nuclear Systems (W. H. Woodward, 1962)

Assistant Director Electric Thrust Systems (I. R. Schwartz)

Assistant Director Electric Power Systems (Fred Shulman)

Assistant Director Flight Test Systems (C. H. Seaton)

Assistant Director Electrical Rocket Flight Systems (James Lazar)

Assistant Director Nuclear Rocket Flight Systems (David Novik)

Assistant Director Nuclear Flight Safety Program (Thomas B. Kerr)

Technical Assistant Electric Propulsion and Power Systems (Harold P. Hipsher)

Director, Propulsion and Power Generation (Woodward; John L. Sloop, 1962)

Assistant Director, Liquid Propulsion Systems (Henry Burlage)

Assistant Director, Space Power Technology (Walter C. Scott)

Assistant Director, Solid Power Technology (Robert W. Ziem)

1963-1968

Administrator, Advanced Research and Technology

Director, Nuclear Systems and Space Power (Finger; Woodward, 1967); office renamed Space Power

and Electric Propulsion in 1967

Deputy Director, Nuclear Systems and Space Power (Woodward); office dropped in 1968

Assistant Director, Nuclear Power Systems (Shulman)

Assistant Director, Electric Thrusters Systems (Lazar)

Assistant Director, Vehicle Technology (Nuclear and Space Power Systems) (Novik); office dropped

in 1967

Assistant Director, Nuclear Flight Safety Evaluation (Kerr)

Assistant Director, Solar and Chemical Power Systems (Scott; Arvin H. Smith, 1964)

Director, Chemical Propulsion (Adelbert O. Tischler)

Assistant Director, Liquid Propulsion Technology Program (Burlage; Robert S. Levine, 1966)

Assistant Director, Liquid Propulsion Engineering Systems (James R. Flannagan; Ward W. Wilcox,

1966)

Assistant Director, Solid Propulsion Technology Program (Ziem)

Assistant Director, Solid Propulsion Engineering Systems (William Cohen)

1961-1968

Director/Administrator, Advanced Research and Technology

Manager, AEC-NASA Nuclear Programs OffiCe (Finger; Milton S. Klein, 1967)

Facilities Officer (Edwin G. Johnson)

Safety Officer (Ralph S. Decker)

Chief, NERVA Engine Branch (H. R. Schmidt; Walter S. Scheib, 1962; William R. Slivka, 1963)

Chief, Advanced Engine Branch (F. C. Schwenk)

Technology Utilization Officer (Samuel Snyder); office added in 1967
472 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

trol maneuver). During NASA's fh'st decade, electric systems such as these moved beyond

theoretical and laboratory studies to rudimentary hardware tests with Project SERT

(Space Electric Rocket Test). Experimental electric thrusters were carried on Applications Technology Satellites (ATS) payloads. Electric systems, researchers believed, could

be highly reliable and lightweight. A hybrid system that combined solar cells with electric propulsion hardware was also being studied in the late 1960s.

Table 4-77.

Booster Requirements for Advanced Missions

Type of Rocket

Target Electric Nuclear Chemical

No. of Length of No. of Length of No. of Length of

Boosters mission Boosters mission Boosters mission

Saturn (days) Saturn (days) Saturn (days)

IB V IB V IB V

A. Lunar ferries

(1 800 000 kg total in

6 yr.)

Moon

B. 900-kg orbiters

Mercury

Venus

Mars

Jupiter, Ganymede

Jupiter

Saturn, Titan

Saturn, outer ring

Uranus, Titania

Uranus

Neptune, Triton

Neptune

Pluto

C. 4500-kg landers

Mercury

Venus

Mars

Ganymede

Titan

Titania

Triton

Pluto

D. Manned Mars

roundtrips

Earth reentry

37 000 m/sec

25 000 m/sec

-- 35 - - 56 - - I00

R

D

D

B

l D

1

1

- 1

- 1

- 1

- 1

- 1

165 - 1 60 - 1

130 - 1 30 1 -

170 - 1 80 1 -

590 - 1 250 1 --

i 100 No mission No mission

850 - 1 600 1 -

1000 - 1 900 - 1

1270 - 1 2000 - 1

1490 - l 2000 No mission

1850 No mission No mission

2170 No mission No mission

2160 No mission No mission

410

280

260

550

780

1200

1740

2030

m

B

R

m

B

B

No mission

No mission

65

55

125

500

1100

1200

2000

- 3 420 -- 4 420 -- 9 420

- 5 450 -- 14 420 -- 123 420

75 -- 2 90

30 -- 1 40

90 -- 1 120

250 -- 1 300

700 -- 1 850

2000 -- 1 2000

No mission

No mission
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 473

A second field under investigation by propulsion specialists was nuclear

systems. Graphite solid-core reactors and engines seemed the most likely nuclear

technology on which to base an extremely powerful launcher. NASA began participating in the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Project Rover in 1960 when

the two government agencies established a joint nuclear rocket program. NASA supported the AEC's Kiwi reactor tests, hoping to fly a nuclear stage in Project RIFT

(Reactor-in-Flight-Test) to evaluate the engine around which the NERVA (Nuclear

Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications) launcher would be built. The space agency

assumed responsibility for the nonreactor components these projects would demand, for combining the reactor and other hardware into engine systems, for total

vehicle development, and for providing the required propellants. The AEC was

charged with the nuclear reactor research and engineering work.

A third area of advanced propulsion research was chemical, increasing the size

and power of conventional solid- and liquid-fuel engines. Two important chemical

propulsion projects of interest to NASA advanced planners were the M-1 engine

(liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen) and a large solid-fuel motor (the "260-inch" engine).

With new chemical systems, specialists also planned to uprate existing launch

vehicles with strap-on engines and assist motors and improve onboard spacecraft

propulsion systems. Enriching liquid hydrogen and kerosene with fluorine (creating

FLOX) was another OART project, but this technology was turned over to the Ofrice of Space Science and Applications for possible use with Centaur.

Onboard spacecraft electric power was the other half of the advanced propulsion and power story. There was an immediate need for improved solar cell-battery

systems, as scientific and applications payloads became increasingly sophisticated

and large, requiring more and more power. Approximately one-third of the payload

weight of a satellite was normally devoted to the power system, so the growth of the

size of chemical batteries and solar panels was necessarily limited. Also, solar cells

could be used only when sunlight was available (the battery was charged by. solar

energy for use when the spacecraft was in darkness or needed extra power). Advanced planners were thinking in terms of missions that would take interplanetary

craft further and further from the sun, and the equipment required for such advanced missions would demand megawatts of electricity (in the 1960s spacecraft designers had to be content with a few hundred watts of onboard power). Besides improved solar and solar-battery systems, researchers were investigating the use of

nuclear-generated electricity. There were two options: radioisotope generators

(RTG) and reactors. In an RTG, radioisotopes such as plutonium decay and produce heat, which is converted to electrical energy; a reactor generates heat by splitting the nuclei of uranium or plutonium. AEC researchers had been investigating

these two kinds of energy conversion since the 1950s, calling their power systems

SNAPs (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power). In their search for high-power

lightweight electricity producers, OART personnel turned to the AEC for both

RTGs and reactors. Working together, NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission

studied SNAPs for Nimbus weather satellites and the Apollo lunar sample package

(SNAP 19 and 27), as well as systems for future-generation spacecraft (SNAP 50).

These advanced propulsion-power research and development projects were

complex, expensive undertakings that demanded the participation of most of

NASA's research centers. Lewis Research Center in Cleveland took the lead role in

the advanced propulsion field. Although many of OART's chemical propulsion

projects had originally been assigned to the Marshall Space Flight Center, the
474 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

developmentof thelargeSaturnfamilyof launchvehiclesfor Apolloforcedthat

center'sattentionawayfromthebulkof future-systemsresearchin 1961.Nuclear

propulsiontestingwascarriedout in Nevadaat AEC facilitiesandat NASA's

speciallybuiltNuclearRocketDevelopmentStation(NRDS).Nuclearsystemscontractswereletandmanagedby theAEC-NASASpaceNuclearPropulsionOffice

(SNPO).Lewiswasalsothe primarycenterfor electricpowerandpropulsion

research.

Electric Propulsion

Since it takes considerably less thrust to put a mass in motion once it is in zero

gravity, advanced researchers at NASA considered developing relatively low-power

electric propulsion systems for spacecraft. As an upper stage of a launch vehicle

(prime propulsion), an electric propulsion unit could boost a payload out of earth

orbit, and an onboard electric propulsion system could "fine-tune" spacecraft during

maneuvers or lift satellites to higher orbits (auxiliary propulsion). Prime and auxiliary propulsion systems are based on the same operating principle: electric power

generated by a solar or nuclear device is fed to a thruster system, of which there are

three kinds-electrothermal, electrostatic, and electromagnetic.* Electrothermal

thrusters, of which resistojets were the most highly developed example in the 1960s,

could produce specific impulses of thrust lasting 150 to 850 seconds. Electrostatic

and electromagnetic thrusters produced impulses lasting 3000 to l0 000 seconds. A

small resistojet was included on A TS 1 in December 1967, but it was damaged during the mission. Evaluation of the system was inconclusive. Resistojets were tested

successfully in 1968 on later ATS flights, and a cesium propellant contact ion

thruster was carried on ,,ITS 4. Because the gravity-gradient-stabilized ATS

spacecraft had two very long booms, stationkeeping maneuvers were accomplished

with extremely low thrust (4.448 x 10 5 newtons) to minimize torque distrubances

to the booms.

OART specialists were suggesting in 1967 that the addition of a solar-electric

stage capable of 4 to 28 kilowatts of power to an Atlas-Centaur, a Titan IIIC, or a

Saturn IB-Centaur would greatly increase the payload capacity of these configurations without adding much weight to the vehicle. In this concept, lightweight solar

arrays were the power source for the electric propulsion system, teamed with either a

resistojet or an electron-bombardment thruster. As with ion thrusters, electronbombardment thrusters develop thrust by accelerating charged particles. Although

the resultant thrust is not enough to lift the engine's own weight on earth, it is sufficient in weightless, frictionless space to propel large payloads over vast distances at

, high speeds. In the late 1960s, researchers were striving for low specific impulses t

*Electrothermal thrusters produce heat by passing the propellant over a hot metal surface and expanding it through a nozzle. Electrostatic and electromagnetic thrusters produce heat by accelerating the

propellant by means of electrical forces and reactions.

I Specific impulse is defined as the velocity imparted to the propellant divided by gravitational acceleration.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 475

and high efficiency. But electric propulsion was also recognized for its growth

potential. For example, a launch vehicle consisting of a nuclear booster and a

megawatt-class electric upper stage would reduce both mission time and launch vehicle weight on some future manned voyage to Mars. At Lewis Research Center,

30-kilowatt and 150-kilowatt thrusters were being evaluated to determine if more

powerful electric propulsion systems were feasible. At the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory in California, specialists established a program in 1968 they called Solar

Electric Propulsion Systems Technology (SEPST) to find the best propulsion system

for unmanned planetary flyby spacecraft.13

Project SERT (Space Electric Rocket Test). SERT was an integral part of the

electric propulsion team's technology development program. SERT l's basic goal

was to prove that an ion beam could be neutralized by injecting electrons, thereby

producing thrust. Because researchers could not duplicate in the laboratory the exact

conditions of spaceflight that this test demanded, NASA Headquarters approved a

flight test of an electric propulsion engine, with the first launch scheduled for late

1962. With the transfer of the project from Marshall Space Flight Center to Lewis

Research Center in November 1961, the first mission was slipped to 1964, giving

engineers at Lewis and Hughes Research Laboratories more time to build the two

kinds of ion thrusters that would be tested. Lewis specialists constructed a mercury

electron bombardment thruster, and Hughes was responsible for a cesium contact

ion thruster. The summer 1964 ballistic test, which lasted 47 minutes, proved the

Lewis electron bombardment design; the cesium thruster, however, failed to

operate.* SERT1 demonstrated that the ion thruster concept would work. Plans for

repeat tests were dropped, but Lewis set SERT2 into motion shortly thereafter, with

official approval coming in the fall of 1966. SERT2, originally scheduled for a later

1968 launch, would demonstrate the long-term operation of electric thrusters in

space (two 1-kilowatt mercury bombardment ion engines powered by a 1.5-kilowatt

solar array) and provide information on how the propulsion system interacted with

other spacecraft systems. This earth orbital mission was launched on February 3,

1970.

Nuclear Propulsion

NASA's search for a nuclear-powered launch vehicle was one of the agency's

most controversial undertakings. It met both ardent support and disapproval in

Congress and was the subject of many debates in congressional committees, at the

Bureau of the Budget, and within NASA itself. The agency's managers recognized

that they should investigate how advances in atomic research would affect space

power and propulsion systems and how new atomic hardware could be applied to

NASA missions. In August 1960, NASA joined with the Atomic Energy Commission to form the joint Space Nuclear Propulsion Office to serve as an interface between the two agencies (see fig. 4-2). Thereby, NASA could monitor, evaluate, test,

*Subsequently, the Air Force flew a cesium contact ion thruster in a hardware development test,

which functioned as predicted.
476 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

and eventually adopt new propulsion and power technology developed by AEC. Advanced planners believed that for the post-Apollo period the agency would need

powerful boosters for manned interplanetary and solar system escape missions.

Nuclear propulsion systems, they reasoned, could provide 890 000 to 1 100 000

newtons of thrust.

The Air Force and AEC had long been interested in developing a nuclear rocket.

Calling their effort Project Rover, research was well under way on various nuclear

reactors at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and Livermore Radiation Laboratory

when NASA was established. In 1958, the civilian agency inherited the Air Force's

role in Rover, basically assuming responsibility for every aspect of the nuclear

rocket program except reactor research and engineering, which was AEC's domain.

The grand plan (see table 4-65) called for the development and ground-testing of increasingly sophisticated reactors (Kiwi and Phoebus), a flight test of a nuclear upper

stage (RIFT), and the launch of a nuclear vehicle (NERVA). For several reasons--

expense, complexity, safety questions, lack of specific applications-funds for

nuclear propulsion were cut from the agency's budget request several times, slimmTable 4-78.

Chronology of SERT Development and Operations

Date Event

July 17, 1961

Nov. 1961

Summer 1962

Aug. 1962

Dec. 1962

July 20, 1964

Oct. 16, 1964

Dec. 23, 1964

Oct. 4, 1966

July 18, 1967

Feb. 1968

Marshall Space Flight Center announced the selection of RCA's AstroElectronics Division as contractor for developing a payload capsule for flight

testing electric propulsion engines. Four flights were planned, with the first to

be launched in late 1962. Hughes Research Laboratories and Lewis Research

Center were developing engines to be tested on the spacecraft.

The electric propulsion project was transferred from Marshall to Lewis.

NASA Headquarters officials signed the project approval document for

Project SERT (Space Electric Rocket Test).

Lewis issued a request for proposals for a 12-month research program to

develop and test an ion rocket engine system of the electron bombardment

ionization type.

The Air Force attempted to test an ion engine during a ballistic flight test; the

engine failed to start (engine built by Electro-Optical Systems, Inc.).

Launch of SERT 1 was successful; the Lewis engine performed as planned,

but the Hughes engine failed to respond to commands to start.

A second SERT/-class flight was cancelled because the July experiment had

accomplished the program's basic goal.

The Air Force successfully tested a cesium thruster in a ballistic test.

Lewis was authorized to proceed with a SERT2 project, an orbital ion engine

test to last six months (1968). Lewis was assigned the task of designing two

engines for SERT2.

Lewis awarded various SERT2 systems contracts to Fairchild-Hiller Corp.,

Hughes Aircraft Corp., Westinghouse Electric Corp.'s Aerospace Electrical

Div., and Cutler-Hammer Corp.'s Airborne Instruments Div.

Lockheed Missiles and Space was awarded a contract for adapting the Agena

stage for use in SERT2.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 477

ing the venture down from a flight hardware program to a technology research and

development project.

The reactor is the key component of a nuclear rocket propulsion system. The

nucleus of an atom is composed of particles held together by tremendous bonds of

energy, and when these bonds are broken the nucleus splits apart, or fissions. Great

quantities of heat and radiation are released when elements such as uranium or

plutonium are fissioned. When this activity takes place within a confined

space- such as rods within a graphite-lined container, a reactor* - the resultant heat

energy can be controlled and used to heat a propellant. The propellant, liquid

hydrogen, for example, is pumped through the reactor. Heated, the propellant expands and exits at a high velocity through a nozzle. During the 1960s, atomic researchers searched for heat-resistant materials from which to construct the reactor

and sought to design a pumping system that could handle the very cold liquidhydrogen propellant. Other reactor configurations were considered, such as a

gaseous-core reactor and a tungsten solid-core reactor, but it was the graphite solidcore reactor that captured most of the AEC and NASA's attention.

The Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, a participant in nuclear research as it

related to possible applications to aeronautics since the 1940s (as part of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics), had acquired the Army's Plum Brook

nuclear research reactor. In 1958 when NASA began participating in the nuclear

rocket program, the AEC was building a reactor and the complex facilities needed to

test it in the deserts of Nevada on Jackass Flats. Plum Brook, therefore, did not play

a major role in the nuclear rocket program.

*Graphite, inexpensive and easy to fabricate, has the unique quality of gaining strength as the

temperature increases. However, hydrogen can erode the carbon from the graphite, causing it to collapse.

The graphite in a reactor would have to be covered by a coating of some protective material.

Table 4-79.

SERT 1 Characteristics

Date of launch

(location):

Launch vehicle:

Weight (kg):

Shape:

Dimensions (m):

Diameter of

baseplate:

Date of reentry:

Cognizant NASA

center:

Project manager:

Contractors:

Objective:

Experiments:

Results:

July 20, 1964 (WI)

Scout (ABL X-258 4th stage)

170

Experimental equipment was mounted on both sides of a circular baseplate

0.762

Ballistic trajectory

LeRC

Harold Gold

RCA, Astro-Electronics Div., spacecraft assembly

Hughes Research Laboratories, cesium contact ion thruster

To determine the feasibility of ion beam neutralization in space.

Mercury electron bombardment thruster (LeRC)

Cesium contact ion thruster (Hughes)

The mercury electron bombardment thruster produced thrust as predicted,

operating for 30 minutes during the 47-minute ballistic flight; the cesium contact ion

thruster failed to respond to commands.
478 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

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ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 479

Kiwi A, the first step in AEC's reactor test program, was designed to

demonstrate that a high-power reactor could heat a propellant quickly and stably to

high temperatures, to establish basic testing procedures, and to determine the basics

of graphite-hydrogen interaction. Kiwi A (100-megawatt power level) passed its first

hot test* in the summer of 1959, convincing many that a nuclear rocket was possible.

During the two years that it took to develop and test Kiwi A, work was being conducted simultaneously on the larger Kiwi B (1000-megawatt power level), which

would utilize liquid hydrogen as a propellant. A Kiwi B-class reactor would be

suitable for use in the upper stage of a launch vehicle.t AEC-NASA specialists saw

the development of a structurally sound reactor core to be their most urgent task and

pursued three new core concepts in 1960: Kiwi Bl, B2, and B4.** NASA's first hardware task associated with the Kiwi B reactor was providing a turbopump that could

deliver liquid hydrogen to the reactor quickly and in great quantities without increasing the temperature of the propellant through friction before it entered the

reactor. Before it gave up its part in Rover, the Air Force had assigned the development of a pumping system to the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation,

but NASA favored assigning the pump to personnel at Lewis Research Center. At

AEC's request, however, NASA funded Rocketdyne's effort as a backup.

At this juncture, still smarting from the Soviet Union's early successes with

Sputnik, lawmakers, policy advisers, and technical specialists were closely examining the country's launch vehicle technology. Project Rover tt with its promiseofgreat

power-but very long lead time and high price tag-was considered less critical to

the immediate success of the U.S. space program than the development of large

chemical rockets. Rover's most visible supporter was Senator Clinton P. Anderson,

who came to the defense of the nuclear rocket program many times, capturing funds

for NASA's part in it when the budget situation looked bleakest. Chemical rockets

were a priority item for the 1960s, but many experts believed that future vehicles

would be powered by nuclear means. It was agreed in 1960 that NASA and AEC

should proceed with an incremental program leading to the development of a

nuclear rocket engine.* ° °Harold B. Finger, of Lewis' compressor and turbine division

and a leader of that center's nuclear rocket study group, went to Washington to

manage the joint venture. In August 1960, the agencies signed a memorandum of

understanding establishing the Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. The next year

*"Hot" tests were conducted with the fuel cell in the reactor; "cold" tests were run without the fuel

cell to evaluate the nonnuclear components of the reactor.

tNASA planners reasoned it would be safer to use a nuclear reactor in an upper stage; an accident

with a nuclear booster on the launch pad would contaminate the area and endanger launch operations

personnel.

**The B4 was also called Phoebus for a time, a name that was adopted for an advanced graphitecore reactor program (AEC) in the mid-1960s.

tt This designation was not used widely by OART; instead the program was referred to by the several

stepping stones that would lead to a nuclear rocket--Kiwi, RIFT, and NERVA.

*** AEC would continue to favor a higher priority program with operational capability by the late

1960s.
480 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

broughttheKennedyadministration'sevenmoreambitiousdriveto surpassthe

Sovietsin space.Besideslandingamanonthemoonby1969,NASAwasdirectedby

theyoungpresidentto readyaflight-ratednuclearocketby1965.Thisgoalwould

demandtestingof KiwiBin 1963,aprototypevehiclein 1964,andaflightvehiclein

1965,aschedulethatleftlittle timefor incremental,reiterativetesting.

To meetheflightgoal,Fingerandhis colleaguessetto workfindinganindustrygroupthatcouldbuildthelargenumberof reactorsandenginestheAECNASAteamwouldrequire.AEC'sLosAlamoslaboratorydidnothavethemanpoweror thefacilitiesfor sucha large-scaleundertaking.SNPOfield officesin

Cleveland,Albuquerque,andnearJackassFlatswereputintooperationto manage

industrycontractsandto coordinatetheintenseactivitiesthemanagersexpectedon

severalfronts.A phase-onecontractwasletfor theNERVA(NuclearEnginefor

RocketApplications)enginein July 1961to AerojetGeneralCorporationand

WestinghouseElectricCompany.NASAfundedAerojet,whichhadresponsibility

for theoverallengineandnonnuclearcomponentsof theflightengine;AECsupportedWestinghouse,who wouldbuild the reactorto AEC'sspecifications.

Togethertheseconcernsworkedtowarda 1966-1967flightdate.

Ideas,plans,andschedulesfor KiwiBweremodifiedmanytimes.Inadditionto

testingthereactors,the 1961-1962timetablecalledfor evaluatingthe nozzles,

pumps,andcontrolsthatwouldbeincorporatedontoaKiwiC.Laborproblemsat

thecontractors'plantsandhardwaredifficultieswiththepumpandnozzlespromptedAEC officialsto performthe Kiwi B1testwith gaseousratherthanliquid

hydrogenatalowerpowerlevel.Anexplosionduringapretestcheckoutof theB1A

reactorin November1961puttheteambehindschedule,butthenextmonthfound

themrunningthe first test.A leakled to a largehydrogenfire andforceda

prematureshutdownafter only 30secondsof operation.NERVAcontractors,

finishedwiththefirst phaseof theirdevelopmentplan,werewaitingfor AECto

determinewhatreactorconfigurationwouldbeflownonthenuclearocket,but

problemswith testfacilitiesandstructuraldifficultieswithB2threwtheprogram

behindagain.Thespecialiststurnedbrieflyto theB4configuration,whichhad

greaterpowerpotential,butproblemswithitsassemblyforcedthembacktoB1.The

KiwiBIBreactor,notaseriouscontenderfor thenuclearengine,wasputthrougha

hottestwithliquidhydrogenin September1962,fromwhichthepropellantexperts

gainedconfidencein thenonnuclearcomponentsof thereactor-theturbopump,

thedrivesystem,andthenozzles-andin thetestfacility.In themidstof another

debatein WashingtonoverfundingforProjectRover,theB4Areactorfailedduring

its November1962testrun.Morethan90percentof thereactor'spartshadbeen

broken,mostlyat thecore'shotend.PresidentKennedyagreedto fundanabbreviatedflighttestprogrampendingtheresultsof B4B'stestscorein 1963.This

decisionleft RIFT (Reactor-In-Flight-Test),the testflight of a nuclearstage,

withoutfundsfor hardwaredevelopment.

Withsomuchhingingonasuccessfulhottest,Fingerandhisfellowmanagers

movedto introducea new,morecautioustestingscheme.Althoughspecialistsat

LosAlamosarguedagainstit, therevisedprogramwouldincludeextensivecomponenttestingandcoldflowtests,leadingto ahottestofB4DandB4E- whichproved

to bethelastreactorsof theKiwi series.Fromcoldtestresults,theengineersdesignedanimprovedhot-endsealto combatvibration,whichhadcausedmanyof

theirearlierproblems.B4Dreachedandmaintainedfull powerin May1964;B4E

was even more successfulthree monthslater. It was now Aerojet and
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 481

Westinghouse'sturnto incorporatethebasicKiwiB4coredesignintothecomplex

NERVAsystem.But NERVAhadbeendowngradedin December1963by the

budgetcuttersontheeastcoastfromaflight-ratedengineprojecto aresearchproject.TherewouldbenoKiwi C. RIFThadbeencancelledaltogether.

TheReactor-In-Flight-Testwasto haveincludedfour flightsof thenuclear

stagewith a Saturnbooster.LockheedMissilesandSpaceCompany,studying

nuclearocketdesignsince1957,hadbeenawardedacontractfor RIFT'sairframe

in June1962.Convair,Lockheed,theMartin Company, and Douglas Aircraft

Company, with funds from NASA, had conducted preliminary studies of a nuclear

flight test program in 1960; Lockheed and Convair did further work in 1961 for the

Marshall Space Flight Center's new Nuclear Vehicle Project Office. Marshall would

manage the development of the RIFT stage and integrate it into a Saturn vehicle.

During the first phase of their contract, Lockheed employees produced an engineering analysis development plan and test facilities definition that they hoped would

lead to the manufacture of 10 RIFT stages.* One of Lockheed's major objectives in

its early work was to determine how radiation might affect critical electronic instruments and vehicle materials. As with Kiwi, these tests would require special

facilities that would add greatly to the budget. An extensive, expensive complex

designated the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) was proposed for

RIFT and NERVA in 1962. Its operation would boost NASA's nuclear rocket

budget request even higher. RIFT did not get beyond the paper and preliminary

component test phase; the construction of the development station, however, was

approved and built. Kiwi's failure and Washington's doubts that the country needed

this expensive nuclear rocket project brought about RIFT's cancellation in late 1963.

Lockheed's contract was terminated in February 1964.

NERVA faced the same doubters and its own unique technical problems. The

nuclear engine would require massive engine test stands, which were difficult to construct and required a long lead time- like everything else connected with the nuclear

propulsion program. Because the NERVA contractors' pace was dictated by the

Kiwi team's success with finding a suitable reactor, Westinghouse and Aerojet never

got beyond preliminary studies for a flight-rated NERVA. When Lyndon B.

Johnson assumed the presidency, he was faced with balancing many demands on the

nation's treasury-an escalating war in Indochina, urban strife and racial unrest, the

Apollo lunar landing. Protecting South Vietnam from the communists of the north,

salving the cities' wounds, and getting an American astronaut to the moon were all

goals to which this country was committed. It was clearly not the time for ambitious

post-Apollo projects such as lunar bases and manned Mars landings that would require nuclear rockets. If NASA wanted to continue with a nuclear propulsion program, it would have to be a modest one.

During the next several years, the AEC and NASA continued their experiments

with nuclear reactors, albeit at a much lower funding level. The two agencies' advanced propulsion experts made slow but sure progress in defining a nuclear system

that might be used some day to launch large payloads to Mars and beyond. This

steady, if plodding, pace was more to the liking of many NASA specialists (especially at Lewis) who had been disquieted by the brief but costly flurry of Project Rover.

* The RIFT stage was to be 24.4 meters long and 11.1 meters in diameter.
482 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Westinghouse and Aerojet-General stayed on board, pursuing the technology that a

nuclear rocket engine would require, with tests being performed at the Nuclear

Rocket Development Station.* Kiwi technology was used at Los Alamos to build the

larger Phoebus reactors, which would be capable of 5000 megawatts of power. 14

Supporting research and technology funds from OART were programmed for

rocket reactor and engine component research, flight safety analyses, and vehicle

technology studies. Personnel at Lewis continued their research into other possible

reactor designs. By the end of the agency's first decade, advanced planners were

predicting that the agency would require a NERVA I engine capable of 289 000

newtons (an even larger NERVA II concept had been axed by Congress in 1967).

The nuclear rocket program suffered a cut in 1971 after another brief resurgence of

support in Washington. Its termination came in 1973.

*Ground testing of NERVA experimental reactors and engines was completed in August 1969.

Table 4--80.

Chronology of Nuclear Propulsion Program

(Kiwi, RIFT, NERVA) Research and Development

Date Event

1945

June 1946

luly 1, 1946

Jan. 14, 1947

Feb. 7, 1947

Sept. 1948

July 1953

July-Dec. 1954

Oct. 18, 1954

At the suggestion of Manhattan Project participants, the Air Force Scientific

Advisory Board studied the possible use of nuclear propulsion for rocket

systems. No action was recommended.

The Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Division of Reactor Development

requested the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins to study

the feasibility of nuclear propulsion.

North American Aviation Corp. prepared "A Preliminary Study on the Use

of Nuclear Power in Rocket Missiles."

APL's report concluded that a nuclear rocket was feasible, but expressed concern over the associated technological problems and expense.

An Air Force report investigated the "Feasibility of Nuclear Powered Rockets

and Ramjets" for the USAF MX-770 missile project. In preparing the report,

the authors investigated almost every major problem that would arise in

Project Rover.

An Air Force report recommended pursuing the development of a turbojet

rather than a nuclear rocket.

R. W. Bussard of AEC's Oak Ridge National Laboratory authored a study

on "Nuclear Energy for Rocket Propulsion," rekindling Air Force interest in

the subject.

A series of meetings was held by the Weapons Div. of AEC's Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory on the feasibility of developing nuclear rockets. The

laboratory's Reactor Division was also interested in the subject. A committee

was formed in October to look at proposals for utilizing nuclear energy for

rockets. The committee came to be known as the Condor Committee.

The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear

Missile Propulsion convened to study application of nuclear reactors to space

propulsion. Presentations were made by industry on the design of turbojets,

ramjets, and nuclear rockets.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Table 4-80.

Chronology of Nuclear Propulsion Program

(Kiwi, RIFT, NERVA) Research and Development (Continued)

483

Date Event

Fall 1954

March 1955

April 15, 1955

Oct. 18, 1955

Nov. 2, 1955

April 1956

Spring 1956

May 18, 1956

July 15, 1956

Dec. 28, 1956

Jan. 12, 1957

March 18, 1957

May 1957

H. F. Bunze of the USAF Wright Air Development Center and Frank Rom*

of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics's (NACA) Lewis

laboratory briefed the Air Force Air Research and Development Command

on the design of a nuclear-powered ICBM, after which the Air Force requested the AEC to study the subject. The AEC authorized a six-month

nuclear rocket propulsion study at Los Alamos and the Livermore Radiation

Laboratory.

The Los Alamos and Livermore studies were presented at the Air Force

Scientific Advisory Board ad hoc committee's second meeting (studies

published in April 1955 as "The Feasibility of Nuclear-Powered Long Range

Ballistic Missiles," by Los Alamos, report LAMS 1870, and as "Nuclear

Rockets," by Livermore, report UCRL 4499).

Nuclear rocket divisions were formed at Los Alamos and Livermore.

In their final report, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board ad hoc committee reaffirmed its recommendation that development work begin on a nuclear

rocket.

AEC approved programs at Los Alamos and Livermore to demonstrate the

feasibility of nuclear rocket propulsion. This effort became Project Rover.

The two laboratories pursued independent preliminary research on reactor

designs. The Air Force was considered the prospective "user agency" of any

hardware that was developed as a result of this project (Air Force management of Rover was assigned to the Propulsion Laboratory at Wright Air

Development Center).

The Department of Defense (DoD) Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

group conducted a two-week study to set 1959 as a target date for the

development of a nuclear rocket.

The Air Force assigned property it owned in Nevada to the AEC for reactor

testing; Los Alamos chose a site on Jackass Flats, Livermore at Cain Springs.

The Air Force awarded a contract to Aerojet-General Corp. to provide nonnuclear component support to Rover at Los Alamos.

The Air Force awarded a contract to the Rocketdyne Div. of North American

Aviation to provide nonnuclear component support to Rover.

At DoD's request, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project group conducted a study to determine if the military advantages of a nuclear-powered

ICBM were commensurate with the great expense involved in its development. The group's report indicated that there was no immediate application

for a nuclear ICBM but that the project should be continued for its possible

future applications. The feasibility of a reactor for nuclear propulsion could

be demonstrated by 1960-1961, according to thi s study.

DoD suggested that it reduce the level of its support of the nuclear rocket

program. The group at Los Alamos began defining their first nuclear propulsion reactor, Kiwi A.

The AEC assigned Project Rover to Los Alamos and the nuclear ramjet project to Livermore.

Construction of reactor test facilities (Test Cell A) began in Nevada.
484 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-80.

Chronology of Nuclear Propulsion Program

(Kiwi, RIFT, NERVA) Research and Development (Continued)

Date Event

Sept. 1957

Winter 1957-1958

Jan. 22, 1958

June I1, 1958

Oct. 1, 1958

Late 1958

April 1959

July 1, 1959

Fall 1959

April 29, 1960

Spring 1960

July 8, 1960

Aug. 15, 1960

Aug. 29, 1960

Oct. 10, 1960

Feb. 2, 1961

March 5, 1961

Los Alamos held the first of a series of meetings to determine goals beyond

Kiwi A.

A Rover Coordination Group was formed representing the Wright Air

Development Center, Los Alamos, AEC's Albuquerque Operations Office,

Aerojet-General, and Rocketdyne. This group began planning for technical

support of Kiwi B ill early 1958 at its first meeting.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress held hearings to

review Project Rover.

The AEC requested that the Air Force increase its support of the development of Kiwi B's turbopump and flow control system, which were to be built

by Aerojet-General and Rocketdyne.

The executive order that created NASA also transferred responsibility for the

nonnuclear aspects of Project Rover from the Air Force to the new civilian

agency. NASA managers were of the opinion that Rover should be supported

as fast as the technology would allow. The AEC would continue to provide

technical direction of the reactor program within a broad framework of

guidance from NASA.

Fabrication of Kiwi A was near completion at Los Alamos; it was shipped to

Nevada and assembled there for testing.

During a checkout test of Kiwi A's flow control system, the bellows pumping

the gaseous hydrogen ruptured, causing a fire. The testing schedule was

delayed.

Kiwi A passed its first hot test successfully (5 minutes at 78 megawatts), after

which it was disassembled and inspected.

Because of the expense involved in developing it, a reactor called Dumbo

with a tungsten core was dropped from the test program. In its place, Los

Alamos introduced Kiwi A Prime (sometimes written Kiwi A_), which would

test Kiwi B's core design and protected fuel elements, and Kiwi A3, which incorporated some further design changes in the coating and core.

NASA awarded Rocketdyne a contract for a regeneratively-cooled nozzle for

Kiwi B.

Assembly and checkout of Kiwi A Prime was begun in Test Cell A.

Kiwi A Prime was hot-tested (3 minutes at 85 megawatts). The results indicated that the core design was not structurally sound.

Martin, Douglas, Convair, and Lockheed began work on RIFT (Reactor-InFlight-Test) studies for Marshall Space Flight Center.

NASA and AEC signed a memorandum of understanding establishing the

joint Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (SNPO).

Kiwi A3 underwent a hot test (5 minutes at 100 megawatts) with results

similar to Kiwi A Prime's.

NASA and AEC issued a request for proposals for the development of a

NERVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket Applications) engine.

Several contractors completed preliminary RIFT studies.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 485

Table4--80.

Chronology of Nuclear Propulsion Program

(Kiwi, RIFT, NERVA) Research and Development (Continued)

Date Event

May 25, 1961

June 9, 1961

July 1, 1961

Summer 1961

Nov. 1961

Dec. 1961

March 1962

May 1962

June 28, 1962

July 1962

Sept. 1962

Nov. 30, 1962

Dec. 7-8, 1962

Jan. 1963

March 1963

May 15, 1963

July 1963

President John F. Kennedy in a special message to Congress recommended a

supplement for Rover to be added to the FY 1962 budget (the development of

a nuclear rocket as part of an accelerated space and Atoms for Peace program had been a plank in the Democratic platform during Kennedy's campaign).

NASA and AEC selected Aerojet-General and Westinghouse as the builders

of the NERVA engine (the contract was effective on July 10). AerojetGeneral was the prime contractor, Westinghouse the reactor subcontractor.

Follow-on RIFT studies to determine a preliminary design were begun by

Martin, Douglas, Convair, and Lockheed for Marshall.

SNPO field offices in Cleveland, Albuquerque, and Nevada were staffed.

Two Kiwi BI reactors were under construction. Designs for the cores of Kiwi

B2 and B4 were being studied.

During the final checkout of Kiwi BIA, a leak of hydrogen gas caused an explosion.

Kiwi BIA underwent a hot test (30 seconds at 300 megawatts). A leak of

hydrogen caused a large fire. The NERVA phase-one contract was completed. A structural weakness was found in Kiwi B2's hot-end graphite disc.

After Kiwi B2 failed a preassembly test, it was redesigned. AEC personnel

began assembling Kiwi B4, but they encountered problems with this configuration, too.

The assembly of Kiwi B1B was begun.

NASA awarded a contract to Lockheed to design and develop the RIFT

stage.

A Kiwi B1B cold test was conducted successfully.

A Kiwi BIB hot test was run (a few seconds at 900 megawatts), during which

the core failed. Nonnuclear components of the reactor performed satisfactorily. Checkout of Kiwi B4A and assembly of B4B were begun.

A Kiwi B4A hot test was conducted (a few seconds at 600 megawatts), during

which extensive core damage was suffered.

President Kennedy was briefed on the nuclear propulsion program at Los

Alamos. As a result, he agreed to continue funding a test program, albeit an

abbreviated one, pending the results of the next reactor hot test. RIFT was

not to go beyond the study stage.

Because of the reactor failures and the importance given the next reactor hot

test by the president, SNPO reoriented the reactor test program. More emphasis was placed on component evaluation and cold tests, postponing further hot tests until later in the year.

Assembly of Kiwi B4A cold flow reactor was begun.

Kiwi B4A cold test was conducted, confirming that vibration had been the

cause of earlier core failures. Corrective redesign of B4B was initiated immediately.

Marshall awarded a study contract to Space Technology Laboratories to

define requirements for an operative nuclear propulsion system. Contracts

were also awarded to Douglas Aircraft and General Dynamics/Astronautics

for design studies of chemical-nuclear rockets.
486 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-80.

Chronology of Nuclear Propulsion Program

(Kiwi, RIFT, NERVA) Research and Development (Continued)

Date Event

Aug. 1963

Nov. 1963

Dec. 1963

Jan. 1964

Feb. 13, 1964

March 12, 1964

April 16, 1964

May 13, 1964

Aug. 28, 1964

Sept. 10, 1964

Sept. 21, 1964

Sept. 24, 1964

Oct. 15, 1964

Dec. 1964

Jan. 12, 1965

April 23, 1965

May 20, 1965

May 28, 1965

June 25, 1965

Summer 1965

Dec. 8, 1965-

March 25, 1966

March 4, 1966

May 26-

June 23, 1966

Feb. 1967

A Kiwi B4B cold test was conducted, proving out the improved hot-end seal.

SNPO approved the resumption of hot testing.

Lewis Research Center (NASA) specialists began cold tests on another reactor design at the Plum Brook Nuclear Rocket Dynamics Test Facility.

As a result of budget problems and the complex problems that were

associated with developing a nuclear rocket, Project Rover was downgraded

from a flight project to a technology development project. RIFT was cancelled (Lockheed's contract was terminated in February 1964).

Assembly of Kiwi B4D commenced.

Kiwi B4D was cold tested successfully.

Marshall awarded a contract to Lockheed to continue research of reactor inflight testing at a more modest level.

NRX-AL (NERVA Reactor Experiment AI), a reactor built by

Westinghouse, was cold tested, reconfirming that the improved hot-end gas

seal had eliminated the vibration anomaly experienced with the earlier Kiwis.

Kiwi B4D hot test was conducted (1 minute at 1000 megawatts). The only

failure experienced was with the nozzle.

Kiwi B4E hot test was conducted (10.5 minutes at 1000 megawatts).

Kiwi B4E was restarted and run for 2_A minutes at full power to gather additional data on reactor reliability.

Cold flow tests were conducted on Lewis's reactor at Plum Brook.

NRX-A2 reactor was tested at high power for 6 minutes; gaseous hydrogen

was used as the propellant.

NRX-A2 was restarted successfully.

There was some discussion in Congress on reviving RIFT, but it did not lead

to any policy changes.

The Kiwi Transient Nuclear Test was completed; this was a safety test designed to verify the behavior of a graphite-core reactor during power excursion.

NRX-A3 reactor was tested for 3V2 minutes at full power.

NRX-A3 reactor was restarted and operated at full power for 13 minutes.

NRX-A3 reactor was restarted and operated at low to medium power for 45

minutes.

A Phoebus 1A reactor built by AEC was tested for 10Y2 minutes at full

power. The test was conducted to evaluate design improvements that were to

be incorporated into the larger Phoebus 2 reactor.

Lewis began an in-house study of nuclear powered aircraft concepts to determine what progress had been made in this field since 1961. The Air Force had

expressed interest in such aircraft.

NRX/EST (NERVA Reactor Experiment/Engine System Test) breadboard

test was conducted. NRX-A4 was used in this combination reactor-system

test.

The NERVA breadboard engine system was ground-tested at full power.

NRX-A5 reactor was tested; it maintained full power (1100 megawatts) for 30

minutes.

The Phoebus IB reactor was tested; it maintained full power (1500

megawatts) for 30 minutes.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Table 4-80.

Chronology of Nuclear Propulsion Program

(Kiwi, RIVr, NERVA) Research and Devdopment (Continued)

487

Date Event

Spring 1967

June 1967

July 12-19, 1967

Dec. 1967

Spring 1968

June 26, 1968

President Lyndon B. Johnson and the congressional Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy supported increased funds for Rover, but the full Congress

did not approve them. The extra funds were not appropriated.

DoD declared that it had no plans for using a NERVA engine in its space program.

Phoebus 2 was cold-tested.

NRX-A6 reactor was tested for 60 minutes at full power (1100 megawatts).

NERVA test engines XE-I and XE-2 were being assembled for testing (testing

was scheduled to begin in 1969).

Phoebus 2A was tested for 32 minutes (12 minutes at 4000 + megawatts).

*Harold B. Finger, manager of the NASA-AEC joint Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, had been

Rom's protege.

Table 4-81.

Reactors Evaluated by AEC-NASA in Their Search for a

Reactor Suitable for NERVA, 1959-1968

Reactor Power When Tested Remarks

(max. megawatts)

Kiwi A 78 July 1959

Kiwi A Prime a 85 July 1960

Kiwi A3 b 100 Oct. 1960

Kiwi BIA 300 Dec. 1961

Kiwi BIB cold c July 1962

Kiwi B1B 900 Sept. 1962

Kiwi B4A d 600 Nov. 1962

Kiwi B4A cold May 1963

Kiwi B4B cold Aug. 1963

Kiwi B4D cold Feb. 1964

Kiwi B4D 1000 May 1964

Kiwi_E 1000 Aug.-Sept.

1964

Successful.

Core design found structurally unsound.

Core design found structurally unsound.

Hydrogen leak caused a fire; reactor shut down

after 30 sec.

Successful.

Core failed but nonnuclear components

checked out satisfactorily.

Extensive core damage was suffered; reactor

shut down after a few seconds.

Confirmed that vibration was the cause of

earlier core failures.

Proved out an improved hot-end seal.

Successful.

Successful except for a problem with the nozzle.

Successful.

NRX.A1 cold April 1964

NRX-A2 ca. 900-1000 Sept.-Oct.

1964

NRX-A3 1000 April-May

1965

NRX-A4 1100 Dec. 1965-

March 1966

Reconfirmed improved hot-end gas seal.

Tests run with gaseous hydrogen.

Successful; restarted several times.

Part of the breadboard NRX/EST test.

NRX-A5 1100 May-June 1966 Successful.

NRX-A6 1100 Dec. 1967 Successful; run for 60 minutes at full power.

..........................................................................................
488 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-81.

Reactors Evaluated by AEC-NASA in Their Search for a

Reactor Suitable for NERVA, 1959-1968 (Continued)

Reactor Power When Tested Remarks

(max. megawatts)

Phoebus IA 1000+ June 1965

Phoebus 1B 1500 Feb. 1967

Phoebus 2 cold July-Aug.

1967

Phoebus 2A 4200 July-July

1968

Tested design improvements to be incorporated

into Phoebus 2.

Tested design improvements to be incorporated

into Phoebus 2.

Successful.

Successful; run at 4000+ megawatts for 12

min.

aActually a test of the Kiwi B core design and protected fuel elements; also written as Kiwi A'.

bActually a test of Kiwi B design improvements.

CTested without fuel cells installed.

aAfter extensive damage to the reactor during hot tests, a Kiwi B4A cold-flow reactor was built and

tested to determine why the reactor had failed during the earlier tests.

Chemical Propulsion

Chemical propulsion systems, the "conventional" means for delivering payloads

into space, were also the subject of studies being conducted by NASA's advanced

researchers. How could the packaging of solid and liquid propellants be improved,

their costs reduced, their durability and efficiency increased? How much longer

could the solid-fuel motors be built? How durable could the turbopumps that feed

liquid propellants into the combustion chambers be made? What kinds of insulation

and material would make better propellant storage tanks? These and many other

questions were fed to OART's chemical propulsion group, which was divided into

four teams: liquid propulsion research and technology, liquid propulsion engineering, solid propulsion research and technology, and solid propulsion engineering.

The research teams, after experimenting with a new concept or grappling with some

specific component difficulty, passed on their findings to the engineering people,

who translated the research into hardware and tested it. This scheme helped bridge

the gap between developmental and operational systems. Because research and

engineering tasks often overlapped, as did concerns with developmental and operational systems, a strong line of communications was required among the many parties concerned with improving launch vehicles. Since uprated chemical rockets were

likely to be put into use in the near rather than the distant future, it was especially

important for NASA to coordinate its research and engineering program with the

Department of Defense, as the Air Force shared the agency's interest in a number of

chemical-propellant launchers. This coordination was achieved by the Aeronautics

and Astronautics Coordinating Board, and the Interagency Chemical Rocket Propulsion Group served this function.

Solid Propulsion Systems. Solid fuels were the mainstay of the military's missile

programs and NASA's small launch vehicle and sounding rocket efforts. Solid fuel,
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 489

amixtureof propellantandoxidizercastintothedesiredshape,wasstorableand

easyto handle.Itsweaknesswascontrollability.Researcherssoughtoimprovethe

solidrocketin severalways:by alteringthepropellantcompound(e.g.,adding

powderedmetalfuels),byincreasingthesizeandstructuralreliabilityof themotor

(e.g.,the"260-inch"motor),andbydevelopingarestartcapabilityforsolidsystems.

NASAusedsolidpropulsionunitsnotonlyfor primaryboosters,butalsoforsmall

strap-onengines,capsulescapesystems,andauxiliarypropulsionsystems.These

smallmotors,oftenusedin multiples,hadtobeveryreliableandsafe.Eachburned

foronlyashorttime.OARTspecialistsworkedtoperfectsmallpropulsionunitsfor

mannedandunmannedvehiclesduringthe1960sattheLewisResearchCenter,the

MarshallSpaceFlightCenter,andtheJetPropulsionLaboratory.Thelargesolid

motor,the"260-inch"(6.6-meter),wasthesolidpropulsiongroup'smostvisible

project.

Whenconsideringthefutureof thenation'slauchvehicleprogramin theearly

1960s,NASA andmilitaryplannerslookedto largerhigh-performanceliquidpropellantrocketstoboostheavypayloadstothemoonandbeyond.Butinaddition

to thedevelopmentof theseliquid-fuelmotorsthatNASA,in particular,required,

theAir ForceSpaceSystemsDivisionpursuedacomprehensivetechnologyprogram

to demonstratethefeasibilityof solidmotorsin the4-meterand6.6-meter-diameter

classes.Thelargerof thesetwowouldbecapableof athrustlevelof 33.36million

newtons,comparableto thefiveF-Isof theSaturnICstage.Startingin March1965

at theAir Force'srequest,NASA took over the management and funding of the

6.6-meter motor, assigning it to Lewis, while the Air Force continued the 4-meter

project.* That September, the large motor was test fired successfully for the first

time by Aerojet-General, one of two contractors originally assigned to the project by

the Air Force (a contract with Thiokol had been terminated earlier in 1965). A maximum thrust of nearly 16 million newtons was attained as the motor burned for 2

minutes. But neither NASA nor the military had a specific requirement for the

powerful motor. It was, however, a project popular with Congress, and for FY

1966, 1967, and 1968 the lawmakers authorized more funds for it than NASA requested. The large motor test-firing program was completed by FY 1967, but still no

mission for it had been found.J" The agency continued to fund it at a "sustaining"

level to preserve it as a competitive option for the booster stage of some future

launch vehicle.

Liquid Propulsion Systems. Early rocketeers were experimenting with liquid

fuels many years before America had an organized launch vehicle program.

Kerosene (RP-1) or liquid hydrogen (LH_), sprayed into a combustion chamber

along with liquid oxygen (LOX) and then ignited, is a very controllable power

source. But liquid oxygen and especially liquid hydrogen (in the cryogenic class) has

to be kept extremely cold in specially insulated tanks. It will evaporate (boil off) if it

becomes warm. NASA used RP-1/LOX engines in its early years (Atlas, Juno II,

*The Air Force called the "260-inch" motor the S-10. It was 49.38 meters long and weighed nearly 2

million kilograms loaded with its monolithic propellant grain.

_Different roles considered for the motor included use as a strap-on to Saturn, as a booster stage for

the manned lunar project, or in a half-length configuration as the first stage of the Saturn IB. None of

these possibilities proved practical because of the extra weight the large motor would have added to the

configuration.
490 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-82.

Chronology of Large Solid-Rocket Motor Research and Development

Date Event

June 1961

Winter 1961

May 4, 1962

Summer 1962

Nov. 9, 1962

Nov. 19, 1962

Jan. 15, 1963

April 1963

Nov. 1963

May 1964

July 1964

Sept. 10, 1964

Winter 1964-1965

April 1965

June 1965

Aug. 1965

Sept. 25, 1965

Nov. 1965

Dec. 1965

Jan. 1966

Feb. 23, 1966

March 10, 1966

Sept. 1966

Dec. 1966

June 17, 1967

1968

NASA and the Air Force agreed that the Air Force Space Systems Division

would develop any large solid motors that NASA might require for Apollo.

The Air Force initiated a technology development program for two solid

motors (6.6 meters and 4 meters in diameter).

A joint NASA-Air Force meeting was held to review the proposed specifications for the two motors.

The Marshall Space Flight Center intensified its study of using large solid

motors on future launch vehicles.

NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD) formally defined the general

scope of their solid-motor program.

NASA and DoD agreed that two contractors would be selected to build and

test-fire two half-length 6.6-meter motors each, followed by selection of one

of the contractors to proceed with a full-length motor program.

A request for proposals was sent to industry for the development of a large

solid motor.

Aerojet-General and Thiokol were selected for the 6.6-meter project,

Lockheed and Thiokol for the 4-meter (6.6-meter project contracts were

signed in June).

DoD requested that NASA fund the 6.6-meter project starting in FY 1965.

NASA assigned the project to OART.

Aerojet-General and Thiokol dedicated their 6.6-meter motor facilities.

Thiokol tested its motor igniter system for the 6.6-meter motor.

Lewis Research Center was assigned project management of the 6.6-meter

motor project.

The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) eliminated NASA's FY 1966 budget request

for the large motor project, but Congress subsequently authorized the agency

more funds than it had requested originally.

During a hydrotest of Thiokol's 6.6-meter motor, the motor case burst after

reaching 60 percent pressure.

NASA decided to terminate Thiokors contract because the firm could not

meet project milestones within budget.

A hydrotest of the 6.6-meter motor by Aerojet-General was successful.

The first successful firing of the 6.6-meter motor was conducted by AerojetGeneral. A maximum thrust of 15.88 million newtons was attained as the

motor burned 2 minutes.

BoB again deleted the large solid motor project from NASA's budget (FY

1967), and again Congress restored the funds.

The Air Force and NASA jointly endorsed continuing the 6.6-meter and

4-meter solid-motor projects so the technology would be available for future

missions.

NASA decided to fund a third motor firing test, using a shortened motor (test

officially approved as SL-3 on March 4).

The second 6.6-meter solid motor was successfully fired by Aerojet-General.

A 90-day transition contract was initiated with Aerojet-General (the original

contract had been completed). A contract for the third test was signed on

August 29, 1966 to cover the period through June 1967.

Aerojet-General successfully hydrotested the SL-3 motor case.

OART proposed deleting the large solid motor from the FY 1968 budget so

that the office could fund other projects likely to be cut by BoB.

The SL-3 motor was fired successfully by Aerojet-Gerneral for 80 seconds.

The motor developed 25.4 million newtons thrust and burned 726 thousand

kilograms of propellant.

The large solid-motor project was funded on a "sustaining" basis to keep it

alive as an option for future missions.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 491

Mercury Redstone, Vanguard, and Thor) for missions that would require precise

burn times, but it took propulsion specialists many years to perfect the next step up

in liquid rockets-the high-energy Centaur stage (LH2/LOX). Centaur's supercooled liquid hydrogen was difficult to handle, and the components of the RL-10

engines that would come into contact with the propellants were hard to qualify. As

were all NASA launchers, the large engines included in the various Saturn stages and

in Centaur (H-l and F-1 used RP-1/LOX; RL-10 and J-2 used LHE/LOX) were

developed and procured by the launch vehicle development office, the launch vehicle

procurement office, and the user (usually the Office of Manned Space Flight or the

Office of Space Science and Applications). But improving the state of the art of

liquid propulsion systems was the task of OART's two liquid propulsion teams assigned to the Chemical Propulsion Office.

Specialists evaluated the efficiency of various propellants and oxidizers (e.g.,

adding fluorine to liquid oxygen-FLOX-promised to add considerably to an

engine's power; so much so that OSSA assumed management of the FLOX project

in FY 1964 for Atlas-Centaur), searched for better insulators for propellant tanks,

tested multichambered engines and improved turbopumps and nozzles, investigated

the desirability of very high-pressure engines, and sought safer handling procedures

for liquid fuels. The single project that attracted the most attention in this field was

the M-1 engine, a huge motor that was slated to produce 6.67 million newtons of

thrust (the equivalent of the Saturn F-1 engine) as an upper stage. But in addition to

the M-l, the liquid propulsion experts also contributed-to the development of auxiliary engines and small-motor technology.

The M-1 engine, 8 meters long and 5 meters in diameter at the nozzle exit, was

initiated in 1961 by the Launch Vehicle Programs Office and transferred to OART

in 1964. Aerojet-General was on board as contractor for the large engine by January

1962, and later that year Lewis Research Center assumed management responsibility

of the project from the Marshall Space Flight Center. Constructing a large engine test

stand and the complicated propellant pumping and storage system that would be required for test firings was a key milestone that the contractor failed to meet. A test

stand failure in June 1964, the month during which hardware for the M-1 was to

have undergone its first hot firing, prompted NASA officials to demand that

Aerojet-General make some changes in how it was managing the test program.

Because the M-1 was another advanced propulsion project without a mission

but with an escalating budget, the agency began phasing it out in August 1965.*

NASA's budget allowed Lewis and the contractor to conduct a number of smallscale tests, leading to a full-scale thrust chamber test in August 1966, the closeout

event of the project. The M-1 was not incorporated into a launch vehicle configuration, because the agency did not have any clear post-Apollo plans that called for

such increased power.

*Advanced planners had originally considered using the M-1 in an upper stage with the Nova

booster, which was not developed, or with Saturn.
492 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-83.

Chronology of M-1 Engine Research and Development

Date Event

Fall 1961

Jan. 24, 1962

Nov. 1962

Jan. 1964

March 25, 1964

June 20, 1964

Summer 1964

Feb. 4, 1965

Aug. 6, 1965

March 24, 1966

April 18, 1966

Aug. 1966

The Office of Propulsion in the Launch Vehicle Programs Office initiated the

development of a "one million-pound [thrust]" liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen

engine. The engine was called the M-I.

NASA selected Aerojet-General as the contractor for the development and

fabrication of the M-I (a letter contract was issued in April).

Project management of the M-I was transferred from the Marshall Space

Flight Center to the Lewis Research Center.

NASA Headquarters management of the M-I was transferred from the Office of Manned Space Flight to OART.

NASA awarded contracts to Aerojet-General for the building of test facilities

and preliminary flight-rate testing of the M-I. Tests were scheduled to begin

in April 1967.

Development hardware for the M-I was ready to undergo its first hot test

when a malfunction in the liquid oxygen delivery system at the engine test

stand stopped the test midway. NASA's dismay at this failure led to management changes at Aerojet-General.

Headquarters managers started to question the need for the M-I as a flight

hardware project. It was suggested that it be downgraded to a technology

development project.

Headquarters advised Lewis to suspend the construction of major facilities

that were being planned exclusively for the M-I project.

NASA executed a project approval document to phase out the M-I project.

Funds were authorized in FY 1966 that would support tests.

Initial tests of the M-I turbopumps, the largest ever built for handling propellants, were conducted successfully at Lewis.

Aerojet-General successfully tested the M-I turbopumps.

A gaseous fluorine ignition system was used in the first full-scale thrust

chamber tests of the M-I. The test firings, heldat Lewis, were successful.

Electric Power

Along with propulsion, onboard spacecraft power was one of the ciritical

systems that paced the development of early space vehicles. Telemetry systems,

scientific experiments, spacecraft control apparatus could be only as sophisticated as

the power supply would allow. Spacecraft designers could look to three sources for

electricity: chemical, solar, and nuclear (see table 4-84).

Batteries alone, the chemical source, offered a short-term supply of electricity,

but their weight and short lifespan spoke against carrying a bank of batteries on an

orbiting vehicle. However, teamed with solar cells, attached directly to the

spacecraft or on extendable panels, the battery could offer a reliable energy source

for lengthy missions. When an orbiting spacecraft was in earth's shadow, it would

depend on energy that had been stored in the battery during each revolution. Alone,

the solar cells could supply only direct power intermittently, while in the sun. The

chemical-solar system, often tailor-made for each spacecraft, was used successfully

throughout the 1960s in numerous configurations. Some spacecraft resembled windmills with several solar paddles; others had fixed pairs of solar panels; some were
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 493

studded on all sides with solar cells. Batteries were of three types: nickel-cadmium,

silver-cadmium, and silver-zinc. In 1968, this kind of system was producing 500 to

1000 watts of electrical power, enough to operate a weather satellite or a physical

properties Explorer but hardly enough to provide a crew of astronauts en route to

Mars with the power they would need to keep life support equipment running for

months or powerful enough to operate a direct broadcast satellite. To produce

megawatts of electricity, NASA would need either very improved solar-chemical

systems or nuclear power generating systems or a combination of some kind. Two

nuclear power sources were available to the agency from the Atomic Energy Commission: radioisotope generators and reactors.

Solar cells, made from a semiconductor material (most often silicone) into

which impurities have been introduced that alter its crystalline structure, convert

sunlight directly into electricity. To improve this photovoltaic system, NASA researchers experimented with altering the shape and construction of solar cells,

sought to protect the system from radiation to lengthen its operational life, and increased the efficiency of solar cells while decreasing their mass. (In 1966, one of

OART's projects in this field was a 20-watt-per-45-kilogram solar array.) The space

agency was also working on a cell that would operate at both great distances from

the sun and very close to it (solar cells are heat sensitive). Lowering the manufacturing cost of solar cells was another important goal.

To improve batteries for spacecraft use, NASA and contractor personnel

decreased their weight and increased their operating life, magnetic compatibility,

stability at high and low temperatures, and ability to dissipate heat. Late in the agency's first decade, OART was assigned the development of a rechargeable battery

with a three-to five-year cycling capability. In addition, the agency would need batteries that would operate on the cold moon and very close to the sun. Besides

developing nondestructive test methods, the power specialists were concerned with

sterilization techniques, electrode corrosion, and component ruggedness.

The AEC-NASA partnership extended to cover spacecraft power systems

research as well as propulsion research. AEC had begun its SNAP (Systems for

Nuclear Auxiliary Power) program in the 1950s, and the Air Force had been quick to

incorporate a SNAP-1A-class RTG on a satellite in 1955. In 1960 and 1961, NASA

expressed its interest in SNAP-8, a reactor system, for future spacecraft applications

and in the SNAP-11 RTG for the Surveyor lunar orbiter. Rather than depend on

nuclear systems for immediate full-power systems, OART personnel emphasized

development of components and subsystems._5

Working with AEC and Aerojet-General, one group of experts at Lewis

Research Center spent most of 1958-1968 trying to produce an acceptable SNAP-8

prototype. While AEC worked on the reactor, NASA was responsible for the mercury Rankine converter. In July 1968, SNAP-8DR sustained a nuclear reaction for

the first time. The only other reactor-class SNAP NASA advanced researchers investigated in any depth was SNAP-50, an advanced reactor power unit capable of

300 kilowatts to 1 megawatt. NASA's support of this ambitious project, which was

of special interest to the military, was limited to the early 1960s.

NASA found the relatively less powerful RTG system (whereby heat is created

by decaying isotopes) more suitable to its needs than reactor SNAPs. Although the

agency was forced to drop its plans for a Surveyor orbiter and the SNAP-11 that

would have powered it, OART was quick to request AEC's assistance with an RTG

for the Nimbus weather satellite. SNAP-19 would contribute supplementary power
494 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

for NimbusB.TheNuclearDivisionof theMartinCompany built the RTG unit for

AEC and, with the assistance of personnel from the commission, installed it on

NASA's spacecraft in early 1968. Unfortunately, the launch went awry, and

SNAP-19 sank to the bottom of the Santa Barbara, California, channel along with

pieces of the spacecraft. Another SNAP-19, built by Isotopes, Incorporated, was

launched aboard Nimbus 3 the next year. This successful RTG would also be incorporated into the Viking Mars spacecraft in the 1970s. The Manned Spacecraft

Center was interested in an RTG for its Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package

(ALSEP) and negotiated with General Electric to provide the center with four units.

In 1968, the first flight-ready SNAP-27 was delivered for integration into the

ALSEP; it would go to the moon with the Apollo 12 crew in 1969.

Lewis Research Center assumed technical direction for most spacecraft power

research. Goddard Space Flight Center, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the

Manned Spacecraft Center were interested in specific applications of new power

systems to spacecraft or experiments they had under development. Research was

conducted at numerous contractor facilities and in-house at NASA centers. Lewis

personnel made use of the Plum Brook nuclear test center.

DESCRIPTION - AERONAUTICS

Advanced aeronautics had been the major research field of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), its only field for decades. But for

NACA's predecessor, it was of decidedly lesser importance. The ambitious "space

goals" that NASA was expected to achieve during the 1960s were given first priority.

When the Office of Advanced Research and Technology was organized in 1961,

aeronautics was assigned to it.

Table 4-84.

Power Conversion Systems under Investigation, 1958-1968

With each of the three energy sources under investigation-chemical, solar and nuclear-there were

several different means for converting the source energy to electrical energy:

CHEMICAL SOLAR

Primary batteries* Photovoltaic*

Secondary batteries* Brayton

Fuel ceils* Thermionic

Engines

NUCLEAR

RADIOISOTOPE REACTOR

Thermoelectric* Brayton

Brayton Rankine

Thermionic Thermionic

Rankine Magnetohydrodynamic conversion (MHD)

*Operational systems.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 495

The laboratories at Langley and Ames with their wind tunnels and other special

facilities had been NACA's major aeronautical research sites; personnel at Lewis in

Cleveland had worked on aircraft propulsion problems; crews at Muroc, California,

had flight-tested new rocket-powered aircraft. With the call for orbiting manned

spacecraft and lunar landings, Langley, Ames, and Lewis, along with NASA's new

centers, turned most of their energies to solving the many problems of spaceflight.

Little time and money were left for aeronautics. As the agency's first decade was

coming to a close, members of Congress began echoing the accusations of earlier,

more farsighted proponents of aeronautical research, who in the early 1960s had

predicted that if the U.S. diverted all its support to astronautics and space science

the country would start lagging behind in the competitive field of aeronautics. Some

experts believe this is exactly what happened in both military and commercial aviation _6 However, NASA did contribute significantly to several areas of aeronautical

research in 1958-1968, although this work took on an increasingly applied, as opposed to a basic research, flavor (see fig. 4-3).

Table 4-85.

SNAP Systems Used or Investigated by NASA, 1958-1968

Designation a RTG or Isotope b Core type Electrical Weight

reactor power (w) (g)

Remarks

SNAP-8 reactor

SNAP-11 RTG Ce-242

SNAP-19B RTG Pu-238

SNAP-27 RTG Pu-238

SNAP-29 RTG Po-210

SNAP-50 reactor

hydride 35 000 4460

21-25 13.6

30 13.6

63.5 30.9

500 180

fast 100 000- 2700-

nitride 1 000 000 9000

Developed for use in orbital

labs, lunar bases, communications satellites, and

deep space probes. NASA

was interested in pursuing the

development of this system

for future applications.

Engineers at JPL wanted to

incorporate this system on

the Surveyor orbiter, a project that was dropped in 1962.

Used on 1968-1969 Nimbus

weather satellites. Another

variation of the SNAP-19

would be used on the Viking

Mars lander in the 1970s.

Used to power the Apollo

Lunar Surface Experiments

Packages (ALSEPs), the first

of which was being readied

for Apollo 12 in 1968.

An advanced system being investigated by NASA for

possible Apollo applications

missions.

Investigated briefly by NASA

for possible future applications.

aEven numbers indicate a reactor-type SNAP, odd numbers an RTG-type.

bCe =cerium; Pu =plutonium; Po =polonium.
496 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

NASA's aeronautics teams were interested in pursuing problems in every regime

of flight, from the hovering of helicopters to the hypersonic capabilities of advanced

military rocket-planes. And the civilian specialists investigated topics as diverse as

aircraft structures and materials, operating problems, air traffic controller work

loads, pilot response to complex instrumentation, and possible designs for supersonic transports and military fighters. Some employees at Langley and Ames continued their work on aircraft design and testing, especially with V/STOL aircraft

(vertical/takeoff and landing craft). The Flight Research Center (FRC) at Edwards

Air Force Base, formerly NACA's Muroc High-Speed Test Flight Station, grew

from a small contingent of less than 300 specialists working in makeshift quarters in

October 1958 to a major research and test-flight facility in the mid-1960s. Over the

decade, FRC pilots and ground crews saw increasingly sopisticated aircraft on the

desert runways. Aircraft became sleeker and high-flying. They progressed from subsonic speeds, through transonic, to supersonic, and then to hypersonic. The 1960s

was an exciting, pioneering decade for spaceflight enthusiasts, but it was also a time

of advancement in the field of aeronautics.

DEVELOPMENTAL

TECHNOLOGY

CENTER

AMES

FLIGHT

LANGLEY

LEWIS

HDQTRS

APPLIED

TECHNOLOGY TOTAL

AERONAUTICS DIVISION

PROFESSIONAL

MANPOWER

93

90

266

73

15

537

R & D FUNDING

(IN THOUSANDS)

7948

3488

8348

14946

2899

37629

advanced research = exploration of new ideas not related to specific aircraft

applied technology = study of new vehicle concepts, a definition phase useful to industry to indicate the feasibility of a design

developmental technology = support to a user agency in testing and analyzing new technology

Figure 4-3. Typical Distribution of Aeronautics Resources (CY 1965)
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 497

Most of the OART managers that served the aeronautics research directorate at

NASA Headquarters during the first I0 years began their careers with NACA. John

Stack and Charles H. Zimmerman, the first two directors, were old Langley hands.

From Ames came Charles W. Harper, who was NASA's director of aeronautics

from October 1964 through April 1967, when he assumed the new post of deputy

associate administrator for aeronautics, reporting directly to the OART associate

administrator. Albert J. Evans, who had served as acting director in 1963-1964 and

later as deputy director, took the director's job again when Harper moved to his new

post. Membership in the headquarters aeronautics group was stable, with the same

chiefs leading the branches offices for many years. William S. Aiken, Jr. (NACA,

Langley) headed the operating problems office; John B. Parkinson (NACA,

Langley) oversaw the management of aerodynamics research; Harvey H. Brown was

the loads and structures man; Nelson F. Rekos represented propulsion; and James

A. Martin (NACA, Muroc) oversaw the various flight systems projects (a supersonics systems manager, Leonard Sternfield, was added in 1967). (See table 4-71 for

more information on the management structure of this directorate.) Adding a deputy associate administrator for aeronautics in 1967 was recognized as a symbol of a

renewed and greater interest in this area of research by NASA.

By mandate, NASA's primary goal in aeronautics research was to provide the

aviation community-civilian and military-with data that would lead to advanced

aircraft and safer operating proceduces. To do this, the agency had to work closely

with the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration. Many

aeronautics projects, because of their great expense and their possible applications

to several parties, were joint projects. The NASA-FAA-DoD-industry team

members did not always agree among themselves as to priorities and research techniques, but the nature of the enterprise required them to work together and share

their expertise. Throughout the first decade, there were numerous joint panels, investigative boards, and committees (technical and managerial) to coordinate the

projects that demanded group action.

Of the many projects the NASA aeronautics team contributed to, the best

known are probably the flight tests at the Flight Research Center of high-speed

research aircraft such as the X-15. But the bulk of the work was accomplished less

dramatically in wind tunnels, on drawing boards, and with computers. Langley

Research Center absorbed most of the aeronautics research and development budget

during the decade, and it was there that most of the general aviation studies took

place. NASA pilots were assigned to Langley, Ames, and FRC, and they flew experimental and specially instrumented aircraft of all classes. They worked closely

with aeronautical engineers who tested designs in wind tunnels under simulated

flight conditions before they trusted their ideas and the ideas of others to actual flying hardware. The work was unglamorous and tedious for the most part; it often led

nowhere; but it was undeniably important to a country that depended on aircraft for

transportation and defense. _7
498 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-86.

Changing Organization of the OART

Aeronautics Office, 1961-1968

Nov. 1961-Oct. 1964

Director, Office of Advanced Research and Technology

Director, Aeronautics Research (John Stack; Charles H. Zimmerman, June 1962; Albert J. Evans,

acting, June 1963)

Chief, Aerodynamics (John B. Parkinson)

Chief, Special Projects (Evans, 1962; James A. Martin, June 1963)

Chief, Operations Research (William S. Aiken); office renamed Operating Problems in 1963

Chief, Loads and Structures (Harvey H. Brown, 1962)

Chief, Propulsion and Vehicle Projects (Evans; Nelson F. Rekos, 1962); office renamed Propulsion

in 1963

Oct. 1964-April 1967

Director, Office of Advanced Research and Technology

Director, Aeronautics (Charles W. Harper)

Deputy Director, Aeronautics (Evans)

Chief, Aerodynamics (Parkinson)

Manager, Flight Systems (Martin)

Chief, Loads and Structures (Brown)

Chief, Operating Problems (Aiken); office renamed Operating Environment and System Dynamics

in 1966

Chief, Propulsion (Rekos)

May 1967-Dec. 1968

Administrator, Office of Advanced Research and Technology

Deputy Associate Administrator for Aeronautics (Harper)

Director, Aeronautical Vehicles (Evans)

Deputy Director, Aeronautical Vehicles (Aiken, Aug. 1967)

Chief, Aerodynamics (Parkinson)

Manager, Flight Systems (Martin)

Chief, Loads and Structures (Brown)

Chief, Operating Environment and System Dynamics (Aiken)

Chief, Propulsion (Rekos)

Manager, Supersonic Systems (Leonard Sternfield); office added fall 1967
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 499

General Aviation

Much of NASA's aeronautical research could be applied to nonmilitary aircraft

in the general aviation class. With the increasing numbers of commerical and

privately owned and operated aircraft came problems with pilot readiness, airport

crowding, and midair accidents. In 1965-1966, NASA participated in a national

program to improve flight safety by conducting a broad-scale evaluation of the

handling qualities of light personal aircraft. In the area of pilot readiness, researchers devised improved simulators for training exercises. The computer-driven

Movingbase Landing-Approach Simulator in operation at Ames in the late 1960s

was one example of this kind of teaching aid developed by NASA. The many accidents involving small planes, especially near airports, led the agency to search for a

low-cost collision-avoidance system. In 1968, research on such a device was underway at Langley, Ames, and the Electronics Research Center.

Research into aircraft operating problems at the NASA centers benefited all

classes of flyers. Advanced researchers at Ames and Langley studied runways under

various conditions, and their findings led to the redesign of runways to make them

safer when wet or covered with slush or snow. Aircraft engine noise was an

operating problem that gained national attention in 1966 when President Johnson

called for a solution to the noisy conditions present at large air terminals. NASA

participated in this multiagency project (Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program) by studying improvements that could be made to the terminals themselves to

combat noise and to the aircraft engines. In 1968, Lewis Research Center was requesting proposals from industry as part of its quiet engine project. Engine noise

can be reduced from two sources: the interaction of the jet exhaust with the outside

air, and the fan. Langley, too, was soliciting proposals for developing, fabricating,

and testing modified engine nacelles for commercial aircraft.18

Besides looking for the answers to specific problems, specialists at Ames and

Langley conducted research in the fields of aerodynamics and loads and structures

that was more basic in nature. Aerodynamicists studied a variety of situations and

conditions--high winds during V/STOL landings, hypervelocity flight, reentry

heating. Others analyzed the integrity of various new materials and their suitability

to various design roles. More visible than basic research or applied technology

studies was the developmental technology work that the NASA aeronautics team

did-the actual testing and analyzing of new hardware.*

V/STOL

Aircraft capable of landing and taking off vertically or with a relatively short

ground-run showed promise as military vehicles and as short-haul commercial or

civil transports. The armed conflicts in Korea and later in Indochina alerted the

*NACA had played a leading role in the military'stesting program.NACA pilots flew prototypes of

new military aircraft and worked with the services and the manufacturers in improving (or rejecting)

designs. This tradition was being revived by NASA in the late 1960s.
500 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Department of Defense to the need for aircraft that could operate from widely

dispersed, relatively unprepared sites close to the front. Large metropolitan areas

with inadequate highway systems needed a way to transport emergency crews and

commuters and goods. Experts at Langley and Ames Research Centers studied many

V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) concepts during 1958-1968, rejecting

many of the designs but steadily contributing to the state of the art. In the search for

advanced designs, specialists also found ways to improve the conventional

helicopter (for example, by introducing nonarticulated rotors).

V/STOL concepts took many forms (see fig. 4-4). Some resembled helicopters,

some bent-winged airplanes. Others sat on their tails. One way of classifying the

possible types was by comparing their methods of converting from vertical or near

V/STOL TESTBEDS

CONVAIR XFY-1A S FAIRCHILD DORNIERDO-29 SHORT SC-1

"'POGOSTICK" _ VZ-SFA

.oc_._ox_ - _' --- _ "_v'_:_°

"POGOSTICK" _ ROBERTSON

RYAN X-13 _ RYAN VZ-3RY _r'a__1_ BELLD-190 BALZAC

"VERTIJET" L_

"COLEOPTER" AVRO CAR (,.Ip_-_:" _t

" xc-lZ_A VERTAPLANE_

HILLER ' _ _ _.T.T__

X-18 _ ROLLS ROYCE _ __'_ ,.

VZ-2PH c X-lO0 _ BEDSTEAD ' . " _,

_ RUSSIAN "_ ROTODYNE _'J_ FAIRY

CURTISS WRIGHT _ FLYING

BELLATV X-200 X-19 BEDSTEAD

Figure 4-4. V/STOL Testbeds Analyzed by NASA

From "Program Review, Aeronautics Program," March 21, 1966, p. 11.
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 501

vertical flight to horizontal flight-tilting the entire craft; tilting only the rotors,

propellers, or other source of thrust; deflecting the thrust; or using dual propulsion

(one set of engines for lifting-lowering, another for driving horizontally). Possible

sources of thrust were rotors, propellers, ducted fans, jet exhausts, or some combination of these. The goal with an STOL was a steep climb out of a congested area;

a VTOL might be required to hover for long periods of time. With wind tunnels and

computers, NASA employees analyzed the various designs. The promising ones

were translated to flight prototypes and equipped with extra instrumentation for a

rigorous test flight program. NASA's investigations of V/STOLs covered

aerodynamic design, materials and structures, the power plant, handling, and

operating costs. 19

Supersonic/Hypersonic Research

Traveling faster than the speed of sound had been a goal of flyers and aircraft

designers since the early 1940s, and NACA and the services had jointly pursued that

goal with an instrumented research aircraft program. The Army-sponsored Bell

XS-1 was the first of these specially built air-launched X-series aircraft to be approved.* With the Army, Air Force, and Navy supporting them, Bell Aircraft,

Reaction Motors, Douglas Aircraft, and others became involved with designing

faster and higher-flying aircraft. NACA's part in this activity increased as the

builders entered the detail design phases of their projects and when flight-testing

began. One of the committee's major contributions in the search for high-speed aircraft was the concept of variable swept wings (1946-1947). If an aircraft's wings

could be made to move, changing their angle (sweep), the aircraft could adapt itself

to different regimes of flight.

In October 1947, pilot Charles E. Yeager broke the sound barrier. In the XS-1, he

traveled at more than the speed of sound-Mach 1.06 at 13_000 meters.t By the next

year, the scope of the research aircraft program had increased greatly to include

several types of aircraft, operational or under development. To manage this growing

activity, NACA established a Research Airplane Projects Panel that would serve as

coordinator for the committee's high-speed aircraft program and as an interface between NACA and the military. The 1950s saw NACA engineers and pilots working

*It was NACA's participation in the testing of the XS-1 in 1946in Muroc, California, that prompted

a contingent of specialists from Langley to move to this land of dry lake beds so suitable for test flights.

They became the nucleus around which NASA's Ames Flight Research Center was built in the 1960s.

tAs an airplane's speed increases, it piles up a mass of air ahead of it, formed from constantly emitted pressure disturbances that move outward from the plane. These disturbance waves move at the speed

of sound, approximately 1220 kilometers per hour at sea level, dropping to 1060 kilometers per hour at

about 12 000 meters. As an airplane approaches the speed of sound, it begins to catch up with its own

forward-moving pressure wave fronts. When flying well below the speed of sound, a plane is said to be

moving at subsonic speed; flight at velocities around the speed of sound is termed transonic; flight faster

than sound is supersonic. Hypersonic flight is generally defined as five times the speed of sound. The

common unit of measurement for the speed of sound is Mach number, the ratio of an object's speed to

the speed of sound (Mach 1.0 = the speed of sound).
502 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

withX-l, X-3,X-4,X-5,D-558-1,andD-558-2researchcraft,plusanumberof advancedmilitary bombersand fighters.*WhenNASAassumedauthorityover

LangleyandtheMurocstation,thelastof thefirst-generationX-seriesstudies

(aerodynamics,flightloads,stabilityandcontrol,operations)hadbeencompleted.

TheX-2hadreachedMach3;thedeltawingconfigurationhadbeenflown;pilots

hadventuredbeyondthe30000-meterceiling;theX-5withitsvariablesweptwings

hadbeenproved;hypervelocity(Mach5+) flightwasunderstudyat Langley.

NASAhadinheritedroundtwoof theX-seriesprogram,theX-15hypervelocity

researchaircraft,t

X-15.Asearlyas195i,RobertJ. Woodsof BellAircraftsuggestedthatNACA

sponsora hypervelocity-classreearchaircraft.Thenextyear,thecommitteexpandeditsresearchprogramto investigatethepossiblityof flightataltitudesof 19

to 80kilometers,atspeedsof Mach4to 10.Langley'sfirststudiesof hypervelocity

flightcoincidedwiththeAirForce'sinterestin thisclassof advancedaircraft.Bythe

endof 1954,NACAandthemilitaryserviceshadjointlydefinedthespecifications

forthefirsthypersonicaircraftandhadinvited12firmsto bidonitsmanufacture.

TheX-15wastobecapableof flightat76000metersat2000meterspersecond.Of

thefourcompanies(Bell,DouglasAircraft, North American Aviation and Republic

Aviation) who submitted proposals, North American's package was judged to be the

best. The firm signed a contract with the Air Force for three X-15s in December

1955. Reaction Motors (later absorbed by Thiokol) would build the power plant. By

October 1958 when NASA was established, the first X-15 was ready for roll-out, but

not with its liquid oxygen-ammonia XLR-99 engine. North American had had

relatively little trouble fabricating the X-I 5's airframe, but the powerful new engine

had proved to be a stumbling block. In its place for the interim, two XLR-I 1 engines

would power the new craft. NASA's team at Edwards Air Force Base was fortified

for the coming test flights by 80 new employees, bringing its force to near 300.

During the spring of 1959, the first X-15 was flown captively under the wing of a

B-52 to check out its onboard systems before its first glide flight in June. The first

powered flight took place in September with the second X-15.** Because of its large

fuel consumption, the X-15 was air-launched from a B-52 at 13 000 meters at about

800 kilometers per hour. t"_ The X-15 reached Mach 2.15 on its second powered flight,

but the third flight was not as successful. When an engine caught fire, the pilot made

an emergency landing, and it took three months to repair the resulting damage.

Meanwhile, the first aircraft was checked out satisfactorily and turned over to

NASA. NASA pilot Joe Walker took X-15 number one to Mach 2 on March 25,

1960, during the first true X-15 research flight. For the rest of the year, NASA and

*For details on these aircraft, see Langley Research Center, Progress in Aircraft Design since 1903

(Hampton, VA, 1974); and Flight Research Center, "Experimental Research Aircraft," n.d.

I"Round three was to have been the Air Force Dyna-Soar (X-20) orbital lifting reentry vehicle. This

project was cancelled in 1963 because of rising costs.

** North American pilot A. Scott Crossfield flew the initial checkout flights before the aircraft were

officially turned over to NASA and the Air Force.

_t Depending on the mission, the X-15's rocket engine provided 80-120 seconds of thrust; the remainder of the 10 to 11-minute flight was powerless, ending with a 300-kilometer-per-hour glide landing.

One of two flight profiles was normally used: a high-altitude plan that called for the pilot to maintain a

steep rate of climb, or a speed profile that called for the pilot to maintain a level altitude.
I ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 503

Air Forcepilotsflewthetwovehiclesregularly,exceedingMach3evenbeforethe

XLR-99engineswereinstalled.*Thethird aircrafthadmeanwhilebeenforced

backto thefactoryalready,afterit explodedin itsteststandatFRCin June.It was

notreadyfor its first flightuntilDecember1961.

NASA'stestobjectiveswith theX-15weremany.20 Instruments monitored

closely by ground crews at FRC measured the aircraft's stability, its ability to withstand heating and loads, and its controllability. Of special interest were the conditions experienced during atmospheric exit and reentry; the data collected on reentry

were used by spacecraft designers struggling with the definition of a futuregeneration reusable vehicle. In addition to the mechanics of hypersonic flight and

the performance of the X-15, however, NASA and Air Force specialists closely

observed the pilots. Operating such a sophisticated machine at six times the speed of

sound in a near-space environment was a demanding task. By studying the research

pilots' reactions to commands, their vital signs while under stress, and their overall

performance records, manned spaceflight experts collected data that influenced

astronaut training and spacecraft systems engineering. By late 1961, NASA researchers had completed their original test objectives. With two aircraft operational

and a modified and improved third X-15 on the way, the research aircraft team

broadened the X-15 program to include scientific and engineering experiments. The

joint X-15 Research Airplane Committee approved 28 experiments, ranging from

astronomy investigations with stellar photography to micrometeorite collection.

The next several years of X-15 operations saw success and tragedy. In

November 1962, X-15 number two crash-landed, injuring the pilot and extensively

damaging the plane. In the rebuilding, NASA and Air Force personnel modified the

design, adding external fuel tanks and a hypersonic ramjet engine. The improved

X-15 was expected to reach Mach 7 +. In 1963, speed and altitude records were

broken. Air Force pilot Robert M. White earned his astronaut's wings in July when

he took X-15 number three to 95 936 meters, an altitude topped by NASA pilot

Joesph A. Walker the next month. X-15 number one went beyond Mach 6 in

December 1963. The modified, rebuilt second X-15, redesignated X-15A-2, went

into operation in 1964, and with its external tanks and ramjet broke the latest speed

records. In November 1966, X-15A-2 reached Mach 6.33; less than a year later it hit

Mach 6.72, its last speed record and one that cost the aircraft its new ablative

coating. Heating also caused unforeseen problems with the ramjet. X-15A-2 did not

reach the Mach 7 + speeds that its designers had predicted. Tragedy came to the program in November 1967 when X-15 number 3 went into a spin at Mach 5 + and then

into a steep dive during reentry. Pilot Michael J. Adams (Air Force) did not regain

control of his aircraft; it broke up and the pilot was killed. NASA engineers had

hoped to convert X-15 number three into a delta-wing aircraft with a ramjet to

evaluate a second hypersonic aircraft design, but the agency cancelled these plans

after the fatal accident. Number two was grounded permanently, as well, in June

1968. NASA Headquarters had decided that the Langley-FRC research team had

nearly exhausted the X-15's potential. The $600 000 it cost per flight to operate the

aircraft could be used elsewhere. X-15 number one took its last flight on October 24,

*See table 4-88 for a log of X-15 flights.
504 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK 

1968. For many weeks thereafter, the group at FRC tried for one more flight, the 

200th, but minor mechanical problems and inclement weather thwarted their efforts. On their last attempt in December, it snowed on the desert runways.z1 

LENGTH: 15.24 m 

WING SPAN: 6.7 m 

WEIGHT, EMPTY: 22,500 kg 

WEIGHT, AT LAUNCH: 54,700 kg 

THRUST: 267,000 newtons 

Figure 4-5. Configuration of the X-I5 Research Aircraft 
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Table 4-87.

Chronology of X-15 Development and Operations

505

Date Event

Aug. 1944

Oct. 4, 1951

Jan. 30, 1952

June 24, 1952

Aug. 1952

June 1953

Aug. 1953

Oct. 1953

Fall 1953

Feb. 1954

March 9, 1954

March 15, 1954

June 1954

July 9, 1954

Sept. 13, 1954

Oct. 18, 1954

A report by German scientists Eugen S_inger and Irene Bredt supported the

design of a hypersonic rocket-propelled ground-launched global aircraft also

capable of spaceflight. It would reeenter in a semi-ballistic skip trajectory.

The iron-shaped aircraft would weigh 91 000 kilograms. (This report influenced hypersonic research conducted later by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics [NACA]. After World War II, Walter Dornberger

[war-time director at Peenemfinde] of Bell Aircraft proposed a boost-glide

vehicle based on the S_inger-Bredt design.)

Robert J. Woods of Bell suggested that NACA build a hypersonic-class

research aircraft.

Woods recommended that NACA establish a group to study Mach 5_

manned winged aircraft designs.

NACA's Committee of Aerodynamics voted to expand its research aircraft

program to include flight at altitudes of 19 to 80 kilometers at Mach 4-10 and

to devote a modest effort to studying escape-velocity flights.

NACA appointed a hypersonic research aircraft study group at the Langley

Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory (Clinton Brown, W. J. O'Sullivan,

Charles Zimmerman).

The hypersonic aircraft study group submitted a report recommending that

NACA investigate aerodynamic heating problems and undertake rocketpropelled hypersonic aircraft model tests.

Specialists at NACA's test-flight facility at Muroc, California, submitted a

proposal for a very futuristic hypersonic piggyback research aircraft.

The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board's Aircraft Panel advocated a hypersonic research aircraft program.

Douglas Aircraft Corporation's El Segundo Division was awarded a contract

by the Office of Naval Research for a feasibility study of a hypersonic

research aircraft capable of Mach 7 at 200 000 meters.

NACA's Research Airplane Projects Panel concluded that an entirely new

research aircraft capable of hypersonic speeds was desirable.

NACA directed its laboratories to submit their views on hypersonic aircraft

to headquarters.

Langley created a hypersonic research airplane study group (John V. Baker,

Maxime Faget, Thomas Toll, N. F. D0w, J. B. Whitten). Their work led to

the design that would later be adopted for the X-15.

NACA invited the military services to join them in forming a joint hypersonic

research aircraft program.

Becker submitted the Langley study group's design proposal at a joint

NACA-Air Force-Navy meeting.

The Air Force, through Wright Air Development Center, endorsed NACA's

proposal for a hypersonic aircraft, but cautioned that selection of a power

plant should be deferred until propulsion requirements were more adequately

defined. The Air Force wanted "executive responsibility" for the project.

NACA, the Air Force, and the Navy created a committee to define the

specifications for a hypersonic research aircraft (Hartley Soul6, NACA;

R. M. Wray, Air Force; Abraham Hyatt, Navy).
506 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-87.

Chronology of X-15 Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Winter 1954

Dec. 23, 1954

Dec. 30, 1954

Jan. 17, 1955

Jan. 18, 1955

May 9, 1955

May 17, 1955

Aug. 5, 1955

Dec. 9, 1955

Feb. 15, 1956

June 11, 1956

Dec. 11, 1956

Sept. 1957

Feb. 1958

April 1958

Aug. 1958

Oct. 1958

Oct. 15, 1958

March 10, 1959

April 1, 1959

NACA, Air Force, and Navy participants worked out the management

responsibilities for the project; the Air Force and the Navy would jointly

fund the design and development phases of the aircraft; NACA would have

responsibility for the technical aspects of the project. A Research Airplane

Committee would advise NACA.

A memorandum of understanding was signed by NACA, Air Force, and

Navy participants.

The Air Force Air Materiel Command Aircraft Division released an invitation to bid to 12 firms; the deadline for reply was May 9, 1955. The aircraft

was to be capable of speeds of 2000 meters per second and an altitude of

76 000 meters.

The Air Force designated the hypersonic research aircraft project the X-15.

NACA selected Arthur Vogely of Langley as project officer; the Air Force

chose Chester McCollough as project engineer.

A briefing on the X-15 project was held for industry.

Bell, Douglas, North American Aviation, and Republic Aviation submitted

proposals for an X-15.

The X-15 Research Airplane Committee decided that the Air Force would

build and equip the new test-flight range that would be required for the X-15

and that NACA would operate it.

North American's proposal was judged to be the best package, with

Douglas's proposal a close second.

North American signed a letter contract with the Air Force that called for the

development and fabrication of three X-15 aircraft.

The Air Force awarded Reaction Motors, Inc., a contract for the X-15 power

plant, a liquid oxygen-ammonia engine designated the XLR-99.

The Air Force awarded North American a definitive contract for the X-15.

North American held an X-15 mockup inspection.

Construction of the first X-15 began at North American.

Because of delays with the XLR-99 engine, the project office authorized the

use of two XLR-I 1 engines in place of the 99 for the X-15's initial flights.

NACA, the Air Force, and the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics set up a

technical advisory group to monitor the new engine's development. The Air

Force secured the cooperation of North American's Rocketdyne Div. to assist

Reaction Motors.

Thiokol Chemical Corp. absorbed Reaction Motors.

The XLR-99 engine was operating close to specifications.

The Air Force cancelled Rocketdyne's backup engine program. At NASA's

facility at the flight-test site, 80 personnel were added to the X-15 group.

Rollout of the first X-15 took place at North American's Los Angeles Div.;

the aircraft was delivered to Edwards Air Force Base the next day.

Carried under the wing of a B-52, the first X-15 was flown captively to check

out onboard systems. An electrical generator malfunctioned, terminating the

test prematurely.

A second captive flight revealed problems with the pilot's pressure suit.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 507

Table4-87.

Chronologyof X-15DevelopmentandOperations(Continued)

Date Event

April10,1959

April18,1959

May1959

June8,1959

June30,1959

July1959

Sept.17,1959

Nov.5,1959

Jan.23,1960

May1960

June 1960

June 8, 1960

Feb. 1961

Feb. 8, 1961

June 10, 1961

Aug. 1961

Sept. 1961

Oct. 4, 1961

Nov. 1961

Nov. 9, 1961

Dec. 20, 1961

March 23, 1962

Nov. 9, 1962

The second X-15 was delivered to Edwards.

The XLR-99 engine completed acceptance tests.

Flight Research Center (FRC, NASA) engineer Hubert Drake suggested using the X-15 to carry scientific and engineering experiments.

X-I 5 number one performed its first glide flight (no power); North American

pilot A. Scott Crossfield was at the controls. The pilot had some difficulty

with the landing, but the problems were easily solved.

North American completed the third aircraft.

The X-15 High Range was ready for operations (three radar tracking

facilities).

X-I 5 number two performed the first powered flight with the interim engines;

Crossfield reached Mach 2.11 and 15 954 meters.

An engine fire on X-15 number two led to an emergency landing with a partial propellant load, breaking the plane's "back." The aircraft was grounded

for repairs for three months.

X-15 number one took its first powered flight; after the mission NASA took

official delivery of the aircraft.

The XLR-99 engine was installed in the third X-15, and the aircraft was

shipped to FRC.

North American installed the XLR-99 in X-15 number two.

X-15 number three exploded in its test stand when a pressure regulator in the

ammonia tank malfunctioned. The aircraft's midsection and tail were

destroyed.

X-15 number one was returned to North American for its XLR-99 engine.

NASA accepted X-15 number two from North American.

X-15 number one was returned to FRC with its XLR-99 engine.

NASA and the Air Force established an X-15 Joint Program Coordinating

Committee to plan X-15 follow-on experiments; their report was readied by

September.

North American delivered the repaired X-15 number three to FRC; it was

equipped with a unique stability augmentation system (Honeywell MH-96

Adaptive Flight Control System), which would enable the craft to reach

higher altitudes.

The lower half of the ventral vertical fin was removed to improve pilot control of the aircraft and to allow for angles of attack greater than 20 degrees to

simulate spacecraft reentry.

NASA and the Air Force approved using the X-15 as an experiments carrier.

X-15 number two reached its design speed of Mach 6 +.

X-15 number three took its first powered flight.

The X-15 Research Airplane Committee approved the follow-on research

program.

X-15 number two crash-landed, injuring the pilot. The plane had to be totally

rebuilt. Its design was modified by the addition of external fuel tanks and a

hypersonic ramjet engine. The damaged aircraft was delivered to North

American on December 7.
5O8 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-87.

ChronologyofX-15DevelopmentandOperations(Continued)

Date Event

March25,1963

May9,1963

Feb.17,1964

Feb.18,1964

June25,1964

Jan.1966

Oct.3,1967

Nov. 15, 1967

June 27, 1968

Dec. 1968

North American was notified to proceed with the modifications that would

transform number two into a Mach 8 aircraft.

North American received a letter contract for modifications to number two.

Modified number two (X-15A-2) was delivered to FRC.

The X-l 5 Research Airplane Committee held its last formal meeting, approving the Langley hypersonic ramjet experiment for X-15A-2.

X-15A-2 took its first flight.

NASA negotiated a contract with the Martin Company for the design and

testing of an ablative coating for X-15A-2 that would protect it at speeds

above Mach 6.

X-15A-2 with the ramjet set an official world speed record of Mach 6.72. The

heating experienced at that speed caused problems with the ramjet, and the

spray-on ablative coating proved unsatisfactory. The aircraft was returned to

North American Rockwell for general maintenance and repairs, but this was

the aircraft's last flight.

Due to probable distraction and misinterpretation of instrument displays and

possible vertigo, pilot Michael J. Adams in X-15 number three went into a

spin at Mach 5+ and then into a steep dive at Mach 4.7+ during atmospheric reentry. The plane broke up, and the pilot was killed. An accident

board was convened to investigate.

X-15A-2 was returned to FRC but not flown again.

NASA decided to cancel the X-15 program. The flight team at FRC tried to

accomplish the 200th X-15 flight with number one, but minor mechanical

problems and unfavorable weather conditions prevented them from attaining

this symbolic goal.
ADVANCEDRESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Table 4-88.

X-15 Flight Log

509

No. Date Flight no.* Pilot Max. Max. alt. Remarks

Mach (meters)

1959

1 June 8 1-1-5 A. Scott .79 11 445 First glide flight.

Crossfield,

North American

2 Sept. 17 2-1-3 Crossfield 2.11 15954 First powered flight

(XLR-11 engines).

3 Oct. 17 2-2-6 Crossfield 2.15 18 831

4 Nov. 5 2-3-9 Crossfield 1.00 13 857 Engine fire forced landing with partial propellant load; some

damage on landing.

1960

5 Jan. 23 1-2-7 Crossfield 2.53 20 374

6 Feb. 11 2-4-11 Crossfield 2.22 26 858

7 Feb. 17 2-5-12 Crossfield 1.57 16 045

8 March 17 2-6-13 Crossfield 2.15 16 045

9 March 25 1-3-8 Joseph A. 2.00 14 822

Walker, NASA

10 March 29 2-7-15 Crossfield 1.96 15 235

11 March 31 2-8-16 Crossfield 2.03 15 653

12 April 13 1-4-9 Robert M. White, 1.94 14 630

Air Force

13 April 19 1-5-10 Walker 2.56 18 134

14 May 6 1-6-11 White 2.20 15 631

15 May 12 1-7-12 Walker 3.19 23 738

16 May 19 1-8-13 White 2.31 33 222

1960

17 May 26 2-9-18 Crossfield 2.20 15 631

18 Aug. 4 1-9-17

19 Aug. 12 1-10-19

20 Aug. 19 1-11-21

21 Sept. 10 1-12-23

22 Sept. 23 1-13-25

23 Oct. 20 1-14-27

24 Oct. 28 1-15-28

25 Nov. 4 1-16-29

26 Nov. 15 2-10-21

27 Nov. 17 1-17-30

28 Nov. 22 2-11-22

Walker 3.31 23 809

White 2.52 41 605

Walker 3.13 23 159

White 3.23 24 343

Forrest S. 1.68 16 168

Petersen,

Navy

Petersen 1.94 16 398

John B. McKay, 2.02 15 453

NASA

Robert A. 1.95 14 905

Rushworth,

Air Force

Crossfield 2.97 24 750

Rushworth 1.90 16 688

Crossfield 2.51 18 867

NASA took delivery

after this flight.

NASA's first research

flight.

First Air Force flight.

Reaction control system

used in flight for the

first time.

First flight with XLR-99

engine.

First engine restart with

the XLR-99.
510 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table 4-88.

X-15 Flight Log (Continued)

No. Date Flight no.* Pilot Max. Max. alt. Remarks

Mach (meters)

29 Nov. 30 1-18-31 Neil A. 1.75 14 886

Armstrong,

NASA

30 Dec. 6 2-12-23 Crossfield 2.85 18 268 This flight concluded

North American's part

of the test flight program.

31 Dec. 9 1-19-32 Armstrong 1.80 15 269

1961

32 Feb. 1 1-20-35 McKay 1.88 15 173

33 Feb. 7 1-21-36 White 3.50 23 820

34 March 7 2-13-26 White 4.43 23 607

35 March 30 2-14-28 Walker 3.95 51 694

36 April 21 2-15-29 White 4.62 32 004

37 May 25 2-16-31 Walker 4.95 32 766

38 June 23 2-17-33 White 5.27 32 827

39 Aug. 10 1-22-37 Petersen 4.11 23 835

40 Sept. 12 2-18-34 Walker 5.21 34 839

41 Sept. 28 2-19-35 Petersen 5.30 31 029

42 Oct. 4 1-23-39 Rushworth 4.30 23 774

43 Nov. 11 2-20-36 White 5.21 66 142

44 Oct. 17 1-24-40 Walker 5.74 33 101

45 Nov. 9 2-21-37 White 6.04 30 968

46 Dec. 20 3-1-2 Armstrong 3.76 24 689

Last flight with XLR-I 1

engines.

Flight made without

lower ventral.

Outer panel of left

windshield cracked.

Design speed reached.

1962

47 Jan. 10 1-25-44 Petersen .97 13 640

48 Jan. 17 3-2-3 Armstrong 5.51 40 691

49 April 5 3-3-7 Armstrong 4.12 54 864

50 April 19 1-26-46 Walker 5.69 46 939

51 April 20 3-4-8 Armstrong 5.31 63 246

52 April 30 1-27-48 Walker 4.94 75 194

53 May 8 2-22-40 Rushworth 5.34 21 458

54 May 22 1-28-49 Rushworth 5.03 30 602

55 June 1 2-23-43 White 5.42 40 416

56 June 7 1-29-50 Walker 5.39 31 577

57 June 12 3-5-9 White 5.02 56 266

58 June 21 3-6-10 White 5.08 75 194

59 June 27 1-30-51 Walker 5.92 37 704

60 June 29 2-24-44 McKay 4.95 25 359

Emergency landing;

engine malfunction.

Design altitude reached.

Unofficial world speed

record.
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY

Table 4-88.

X-15 Hight Log (Continued)

511

No. Date Flight no.* Pilot Max. Max. alt. Remarks

Mach (meters)

1959

61 July 16 1-31-52 Walker 5.37 32 675

62 July 17 3-7-14 White 5.45 95 936

63 July 19 2-25-45 McKay 5.18 25 984

64 July 26 1-32-53 Armstrong 5.74 30 145

65 Aug. 2 3-8-16 Walker 5.07 44 044

66 Aug. 8 2-26-46 Rushworth 4.40 27 699

67 Aug. 14 3-9-18 Walker 5.25 59 009

68 Aug. 20 2-27-47 Rushworth 5.24 27 097

69 Aug. 29 2-28-48 Rushworth 5.12 29 627

70 Sept. 28 2-29-50 McKay 4.22 20 787

71 Oct. 4 3-10-19 Rushworth 5.17 34 199

72 Oct. 9 2-30-51 McKay 5.46 39 685

73 Oct. 23 3-11-20 Rushworth 5.47 40 996

74 Nov. 9 2-31-52 McKay 1.49 16 444

75 Dec. 14 3-12-22 White 5.65 43 098

76 Dec. 20 3-13-23 Walker 5.73 48 890

Official world altitude

record.

This and all following

flights without lower

ventral.

Emergency landing; injured pilot and damaged

aircraft.

1963

77 Jan. 17 3-14-24 Walker 5.47 82 814

78 April 11 1-33-54 Rushworth 4.25 22 677

79 April 18 3-15-25 Walker 5.51 28 194

80 April 25 1-34-55 McKay 5.32 32 156

81 May 2 3-16-26 Walker 4.73 63 825

82 May 14 3-17-28 Rushworth 5.20 29 139

83 May 15 1-35-56 McKay 5.57 37 856

84 May 29 3-18-29 Walker 5.52 28 042

85 June 18 3-19-30 Rushworth 4.97 68 184

86 June 25 1-36-57 Walker 5.51 34 077

87 June 27 3-20-31 Rushworth 4.89 86 868

88 July 9 1-37-59 Walker 5.07 69 007

89 July 18 1-38-61 Rushworth 5.63 31 943

90 July 19 3-21-32 Walker 5.50 106 009

91 Aug. 22 3-22-36 Walker 5.58 107 960

92 Oct. 7 1-39-63 Joe H. 4.21 23 713

Engle

Air Force

93 Oct. 29 1-40-64 Milton O. 4.10 22 677

Thompson,

NASA

First flight of a civilian

above 80 km.

Inner panel of left

windshield cracked.

Unofficial world altitude record.
512 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table4-88.

X-15FlightLog(Continued)

No. Date Flight no.* Pilot Max. Max. alt. Remarks

Mach (meters)

94 Nov. 7 3-23-39 Rushworth 4.40 25 085

95 Nov. 14 1-41-65 Engle 4.75 27 676

96 Nov. 27 3-24-41 Thompson 4.94 27 371

97 Dec. 5 1-42-67 Rushworth 6.06 30 785

.......................................................................................................................................

1959

1964

98 Jan. 8 1-43-69 Engle 5.32 42 642

99 Jan. 16 3-25-42 Thompson 4.92 21 641

100 Jan. 28 1-44-70 Rushworth 5.34 32 736

101 Feb. 19 3-26-43 Thompson 5.29 23 957

102 March 13 3-27-44 McKay 5.11 23 165

103 March 27 1-45-72 Rushworth 5.63 30 937

104 April 8 1-46-73 Engle 5.01 53 340

105 April 29 1-47-74 Rushworth 5.72 30 968

106 May 12 3-28-47 McKay 4.66 22 189

107 May 19 1-48-75 Engle 5.02 59 680

108 May 21 3-29-48 Thompson 2.90 19 568 Premature engine shutdown.

109 June 25 2-32-55 Rushworth 4.59 25 390 First flight of the modified X-15A-2.

10 June 30 1-49-77 McKay 4.96 30 358

11 July 8 3-30-50 Engle 5.05 51 938

12 July 29 3-31-52 Engle 5.38 23 774

13 Aug. 12 3-32-53 Thompson 5.24 24 750

14 Aug. 14 2-33-56 Rushworth 5.23 31 486

15 Aug. 26 3-33-54 McKay 5.65 27 737

16 Sept. 3 3-34-55 Thompson 5.35 23 957

17 Sept. 28 3-35-57 Engle 5.59 29 566

118 Sept. 29 2-34-57 Rushworth 5.20 29 809

119 Oct. 15 1-50-79 McKay 4.56 25 878

120 Oct. 30 3-36-59 Thompson 4.66 25 786

121 Nov. 30 2-35-60 McKay 4.66 26 579

122 Dec. 9 3-37-60 Thompson 5.42 28 164

123 Dec. 10 1-51-81 Engle 5.35 33 670

124 Dec. 22 3-38-61 Rushworth 5.55 24 750

.......................................................................................................................................

1965

125 Jan. 13 3-39-62 Thompson 5.48 30 297

126 Feb. 2 3-40-63 Engle 5.71 29 931

127 Feb. 17 2-36-63 Rushworth 5.27 28 986

128 Feb. 26 1-53-85 McKay 5.40 46 817

129 March 26 1-53-86 Rushworth 5.17 31 059

130 April 23 3-41-64 Engle 5.48 24 293

131 April 28 2-37-64 McKay 4.80 28 224

132 May 18 2-38-66 McKay 5.17 31 120

133 May 25 1-54-88 Thompson 4.87 54 803

134 May 28 3-42-65 Engle 5.17 63 886

135 June 16 3-43-66 Engle 4.69 74 585

136 June 17 1-55-89 Thompson 5.14 33 071

137 June 22 2-39-70 McKay 5.64 47 518
ADVANCEDRESEARCHANDTECHNOLOGY 513

Table4-88.

X-15FlightLog(Continued)

No. Date Flightno.* Pilot Max. Mal.alt. Remarks

Mach(meters)

138 June29 3-44-67 Engle 4.94 85527

139 July8 2-40-72 McKay 5.19 64800

140 July20 3-45-65 Rushworth 5.40 32126

141 Aug.3 2-41-73 Rushworth 5.16 63612

142 Aug.6 1-56-93Thompson 5.15 31455

143 Aug.10 3-46-70 Engle 5.20 82601

144 Aug.25 1-57-96Thompson 5.11 65258

145 Aug.26 3-47-71 Rushworth 4.79 73030

146 Sept.2 2-42-74 McKay 5.16 73091

147 Sept.9 1-58-97 Rushworth 5.25 29627

148 Sept.14 3-48-72 McKay 5.03 72847

149 Sept.22 1-59-98 Rushworth 5.18 30571

150 Sept.28 3-49-73 McKay 5.33 90099

151 Sept.30 1-60-99 WilliamJ. 4.06 23348

Knight,USAF

152 Oct.12 3-50-74 Knight 4.62 28773

153 Oct.14 1-61-101Engle 5.08 81229

154 Oct.27 3-51-75 McKay 5.06 72207

155 Nov.3 2-43-75 Rushworth 2.31 21519

156 Nov.4 1-62-103WilliamH. 4.22 24445

Dana,

NASA

Firstflightwithexternal

tanks(empty).

1966

157 May 6 1-63-104 McKay 2.21 20 848

158 May 18 2-44-79 Rushworth 5.43 30 175

159 July 1 2-45-81 Rushworth 1.54 13 716

160 July 12 1-64-107 Knight 5.34 39 624

161 July 18 3-52-78 Dana 4.71 29 291

162 July 21 2-46-83 Knight 5.12 58 613

163 July 28 1-65-108 McKay 5.19 73 701

164 Aug. 3 2-47-84 Knight 5.03 75 895

165 Aug. 4 3-53-79 Dana 5.34 40 447

166 Aug. 11 1-66-111 McKay 5.21 76 505

167 Aug. 12 2-48-85 Knight 5.02 70 439

168 Aug. 19 3-54-80 Dana 5.20 54 254

169 Aug. 25 1-67-112 McKay 5.11 78486

170 Aug. 30 2-49-86 Knight 5.21 30 541

171 Sept. 8 1-68-113 McKay 2.44 22 311

172 Sept. 14 3-55-82 Dana 5.12 77 480

173 Oct. 6 1-69-116 Michael J. 3.00 22 982

Adams,

Air Force

174 Nov. 1 3-56-83 Dana 5.46 93 543

175 Nov. 18 2-50-89 Knight 6.33 30 145

Premature engine shutdown.

First flight with external

tanks loaded; premature

engine shutdown.

Premature engine shutdown.

Unofficial world speed

record.
514 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-88.

X-15 Flight Log (Continued)

No. Date Flight no.* Pilot Max. Max. alt. Remarks

Mach (meters)

176 Nov. 29 3-57-86 Adams 4.65 28 042

177 March 22 1-70-119 Adams 5.59 40 569

178 April 26 3-58-87 Dana 1.80 16 276

179 April 28 1-71-121 Adams 5.44 50 902

180 May 8 2-51-92 Knight 4.75 29 748

181 May 17 3-59-89 Dana 4.80 21 671

182 June 15 1-72-125 Adams 5.12 69 891

183 June 22 3-60-90 Dana 5.44 25 055

184 June 29 1-73-126 Knight 4.17 52 730

185 July 20 3-61-91 Dana 5.44 25 725

186 Aug. 21 2-52-96 Knight 4.94 27 737

187 Aug. 25 3-62-92 Adams 4.63 25 725

188 Oct. 3 2-53-97 Knight 6.70 31 120

189 Oct. 4 3-63-94 Dana 5.53 76 535

190 Oct. 17 3-64-95 Knight 5.53 85 496

191 Nov. 15 3-65-97 Adams 5.20 81 077

Electrical failure; emergency landing.

Protected by an ablative

coating.

Unofficial world speed

record; last flight of

X-15A-2.

Fatal accident; aircraft

destroyed.

1968

192 March 1 1-74-130 Dana 4.36 31 852

193 April 4 1-75-133 Dana 5.27 57 150

194 April 26 1-76-134 Knight 5.00 63 094

195 May 11 1-77-136 Dana 5.15 67 086

196 July 16 1-78-138 Knight 4.79 67 513

197 Aug. 21 1-79-139 Dana 5.01 81 534

198 Sept. 13 1-80-140 Knight 5.37 77 450

199 Oct. 24 1-81-141 Dana 5.38 77 724

*The three numbers stand for: X-15 number, free flight number, and B-52 number.

Supersonic Transport. Did supersonic aircraft have any practical applications

beyond research and defense? Was a commercial supersonic transport feasible? It

would take a national effort and many years to answer these questions. During the

mid-1960s, a supersonic transport certainly seemed possible technically, but could

one be designed, manufactured, and operated cost effectively? In March 1961,

President Kennedy had requested a position paper on the country's aeronautical

goals from Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) Administrator Najeeb E. Halaby. A

Mach 3 supersonic transport was high on the FAA's list, and the agency moved

quickly to create an SST Advisory Board to pursue this ambitious goal. But the

search for an SST also required the participation of NASA, the Department of

Defense, and industry. It was NASA's role to provide the research data and
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 515

technical support that industry needed to design and build a reliable, economical,

safe, and publicly acceptable SST.

In their studies of supersonic and hypersonic flight, engineers and designers at

NASA's Langley, Ames, and Lewis Research Centers had amassed a wealth of data

on aircraft design and high-performance power plants. At the Flight Research

Center, specialists had had firsthand experience with operating high-speed aircraft,

as had Air Force personnel at Edwards Air Force Base. NASA's advanced researchers suggested investigating three configurations for the supersonic transport: a

slender delta, a variable swept-wing craft, and a canard (horizontal stabilizing and

control surfaces located in front of the main supporting surfaces). By 1963, Ames's

and Langley's wind tunnels were being used extensively to evaluate various designs

based on these three possibilities. The FAA, meanwhile, solicited industry for SST

proposals, and in January 1964 Boeing, North American, and Lockheed submitted

their ideas. Interestingly enough, each firm had followed a different design route:

Boeing submitted a variable-sweep proposal, North American a canard based on

their XB-70, and Lockheed a double delta. It took nearly three years to evaluate

these packages. Langley participants contributed reports on what they called SCAT

(Supersonic Commercial Air Transport) configuration studies.

To complement the theoretical work, pilots at FRC flew high-speed military aircraft to get some understanding of problems that a commercial supersonic transport

might have with landings, terminal approaches, air traffic control procedures, and

handling. A General Purpose Airborne Simulator developed for NASA by Cornell

Aeronautical Laboratory also was put to use simulating flight patterns and emergency situations. One aircraft flown at FRC as part of this study program captured the

public's attention: the XB-70, a futuristic-looking strategic bomber prototype built

by North American for the Air Force (see fig. 4-6).* Designed as a replacement for

the B-52, the XB-70 proved very costly and of questionable military value. Only two

were manufactured, and they were turned over to NASA to use as research aircraft

in the late 1960s. They were flow as part of a joint Air Force-NASA research project

in support of the SST as early as June 1966.I"

Boeing's variable swept-wing SST was named the winning design in December

1966 by the FAA (General Electric would build the engine), but this decision did not

mean that the aircraft had been precisely defined. Two years later, behind schedule

and over-budget, Boeing was still making major changes to the configuration. The

FAA announced in early 1968 that the SST design required still more development

work before a prototype could be constructed. In fact, Boeing engineers had

changed their minds about the variable sweep wing; they wanted to go with a fixed-

* Other aircraft flown in SST studies at FRC were the Douglas F5D-1 Skylancer (landing studies), the

F-100C Super Sabre (handling quality studies), the North American A-SA Vigilante (approach and landing studies), and the Lockheed YF-12A Blackbird.

l'XB-70-1's first flight took place on September 21, 1964, and for two years both aircraft participated

in flight worthiness demonstrations. At Mach 3, the aircraft tended to loose their outer skin, which led to

extensive maintenance to keep them flight-ready. On June 8, 1966,XB-70-2 was involved in a mid-air collision, killing the co-pilot Carl S. Cross, USAF, and destroying the aircraft. (Joseph A. Walker, NASA,

piloting an F-104 was also killed). The remaining aircraft was not as well-suited for the research role (it

never flew beyond Mach 2.57). It was this vehicle that NASA receivedfrom the Air Force on March 15,

1967.
516 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

LENGTH: 57.6 rn

WING SPAN: 32 m

WEIGHT, LOADED: 227,000 kg

THRUST: 800,000 newtons

WING TIP FOLD-----_

"HINGE-LINE"

FAIRING

DROOPED LEADING EDGE

FRONT VIEW FLA_

CANARD SURFACE -___

GROUND ESCAPE HATCH_ -_l

 SCAP ;CAPSU, 

PITOT BOOM --_

FLIGHT VIEW

Figure 4-7. Configuration of the XB-70 Research Aircraft
ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 517

wing design instead. There were other problems, as well. Environmentalists were

concerned over the excessive noise an SST would make. NASA participated in sonic

boom studies and concluded that the SST design would have to be tailored considerably to minimize the magnitude of the shock waves. NASA, the FAA, and the

Air Force had also joined together to measure the cosmic and solar radiation environment at the altitudes an SST would fly. But money was probably the supersonic

transport managers' greatest worry. The government had funded a great many expensive studies and tests, and by the end of the 1960s it was obvious that a private

concern such as Boeing would need federal assistance to build an SST assembly line,

if an SST design was ever found that proved satisfactory to all parties. By 1971,

Congress had had enough. It dropped its support of the project, and the enterprise

was too large for a nongovernment body to pick up alone.

As far as NASA was concerned, its participation in the SST program had been

worthwhile. Its aeronautics team had been funded for several years to support the

activity, and it had collected data on high-speed flight and aircraft design that were

applicable to several fields of research. NASA had been able to procure special instrumentation for the XB-70 and other aircraft and extend its ground- and airsimulation studies considerably. By December 1968, the agency had moved to terminate its XB-70 flight program. It had been exploited to its potential in support of

SST; the aircraft was expensive to operate; and another Mach 3 + aircraft would

soon be available for FRC's research program. Personnel at the Flight Research

Center had been participating in tests of the Lockheed YF-12A Blackbird high-speed

reconnaissance aircraft since 1967, and the center would acquire two of them in

1969.

NASA participated in one other high-speed aircraft testing project during the

1960s that deserves mention here. It was the agency's only project that followed the

old NACA tradition of the 1950s of using civilian flight-test specialists to iron out

technical problems in a new weapons system. In January 1967, the Air Force sent the

sixth production F-I 11 (made by General Dynamics/Convair Aerospace) to FRC.

The advanced fighter had been suffering engine problems. FRC's testing program

led to a major engine inlet redesign. 22
CHAPTER FIVE

TRACKING AND DATA

ACQUISITION
CHAPTER FIVE

TRACKING AND DATA

ACQUISITION

Tracking and communicating with spacecraft was hardly as glamorous an

assignment as launching powerful Saturn rockets, examining the first close-up images of Mars, or participating in the recovery of a manned crew that had just returned from the moon. But these tasks in particular and the exploration of space in

general would have been impossible without a sophisticated system for monitoring

the trajectory and orbital path of vehicles in space, and for sending commands to

and receiving data from them.

During man's first decade as space explorer, spacecraft designers and scientific

investigators put together increasingly complex packages of hardware to collect data

on the environment in which the spacecraft operated and to photograph-even

televise-the scenes it encountered as it circled earth or made its way to distant

bodies. Such missions called for carefully timed commands to the spacecraft and the

reception of great streams of elecronically relayed data. To the tracking specialists'

growing number of tasks, manned spaceflight added the demand of real-time communication between mission control and orbiting astronauts. NASA accomplished

these critical tracking and data acquisition activities through three tracking networks

and a global communications system. The Space Tracking and Data Acquisition

Network (STADAN) primarily served the needs of earth satellites. The agency

established a Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) to support Project Mercury.

And at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in California, specialists managed a

Deep Space Network (DSN) by which to communicate with spacefaring vehicles

destined for the moon and beyond. These networks were never static: they responded to specific mission objectives, new technology, and budgetary constraints by expanding, taking on new equipment, or contracting as the situation dictated. Linking

NASA's many tracking stations and mission control centers was a communications

system called NASCOM.

Tracking is the process of determining the location and motion (speed and direction) of a vehicle during all phases of flight. Initial tracking observations are

especially important; from these data, controllers at the launch site and elsewhere

can determine if the vehicle is on the proper flight path and if it subsequently attains

the prescribed orbit (if that is a requirement of the mission). During early manned

flights, medical experts were concerned that prolonged space travel might adversely

affect the crews and they cautioned that 24-hour tracking and real-time communications were a must. If the crew were forced to make an emergency reentry and landing, ground personnel would need precise information on the craft's location to

521
522 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

make a speedy recovery possible. Under "routine" circumstances, reentry and landing was not as exact an operation as some manned spaceflight personnel would have

liked; but trying to find a bobbing capsule on the high seas in an emergency situation

without an initial estimate of its location provided by tracking data was unthinkable.

In the case of communications, weather, and scientific satellites, knowing the exact

location of the spacecraft at certain times was likewise critical to mission objectives;

antennas, instruments, and camera had to be in just the right place pointing just the

right way. Tracking could be accomplished optically or by one of several radio-wave

techniques.

Data acquisition, the other half of the tracker's job, is the reception at a ground

station of scientific and engineering data generated by a spacecraft. The process of

conveying data from spacecraft to earth via radio waves is called radio telemetry.

Raw data, often stored on spacecraft recorders until it can be conveniently relayed,

are coded (a common coding method used in the 1960s was the binary number

system) and converted into usable information by data reduction equipment at mission control facilities. Information is sent to the spacecraft (uplinked) in a similar

fashion. In response to commands, the spacecraft will perform some particular task:

downlink telemetry, take a pressure reading, point an antenna. 1 The process of

sending messages to a spacecraft and receiving information from it is generally

known as command and control.

These many tracking and data acquisitions procedures required that network

tracking stations have extensive arrays of antennas, radar devices, interferometers,

computers, consoles, and a small jungle of relays, switches, and other "black

boxes." But not all stations performed every possible function. Some provided only

radar support or voice communications; others acted as complete nerve centers;

some were mobile to add extra tracking hardware for special missions. All were in

direct, real-time contact with the appropriate mission control center (Goddard Space

Flight Center for earth orbital satellites; JPL for lunar and interplanetary

spacecraft; Kennedy Space Center for Project Mercury; and the Manned Spacecraft

Center for Projects Gemini and Apollo).

NASA's tracking stations were by necessity positioned all over the globe so that

contact with a spacecraft could be maintained throughout its mission, not just when

its orbit brought it over the United States (see fig. 5-1 for the location of NASA's

tracking facilities in 1966). Several of NASA's centers helped define the networks

and locate sites for stations; Goddard and JPL operated the networks (Goddard was

responsible for STADAN and MSFN, JPL for DSN). But overall management

authority for development and operations went to the Office of Tracking and Data

Acquisition (OTDA) at NASA Headquarters, where Edmond C. Buckley was in

charge. Buckley, who joined the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

(NACA) in 1930 as an instrumentation specialist at the Langley Memorial

Aeronautical Laboratory helped establish tracking facilities at Wallops Island and at

the Edwards Air Force Base-NACA High-Speed Flight Station complex. In 1959, he

came to NASA Headquarters as assistant director of spaceflight operations. The

next year Buckley's office staff was shuffled and increased, but the November 1961

agencywide reorganization brought a more significant change. Buckley's new title

was director of tracking and data acquisition; Gerald M. Truszynski became his

deputy. Truszynski had also been a NACA instrumentation expert, having worked

on ground instrumentation for the X-series aircraft range at the California testflight station. Reporting to Buckley and his deputy were chiefs or directors for
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 523

0

Z

_o

I--

g

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o@

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0

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i._

if)

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524 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

various aspects of the program: coordination and resources, operations and

facilities, communications, advanced systems. In 1968, Truszynski took the lead

position, which had been relabeled associate administrator for tracking and data acquisition in 1965. H. R. Brockett, formerly in charge of network operations, moved

up to the deputy's slot. Because tracking was a global business, Buckley and

Truszynski spent much of their time preparing for or participating in international

negotiation sessions required before NASA could operate a tracking station in a

foreign country, working closely with NASA's International Programs Office. But

most importantly, they coordinated the tracking and data acquisition needs of

NASA's several flight projects, ensuring that the networks evolved with the agency's

programs. (See table 5-1 for details on how the management of the tracking and data

acquisition program changed over the decade.)

In addition to cooperating with foreign governments (and the U.S. Department

of State) in establishing tracking stations overseas, OTDA also coordinated its requirements with the Department of Defense (DoD). Since the 1940s, the military services had been actively supporting missile research and had built tracking facilities

along their several missile ranges. When NASA began its search for station sites in

the late 1950s, agency managers agreed that where possible it would be advantageous to use military stations and equipment to augment the civilian networks. In

addition, NASA required tracking ships for the Mercury manned network (and aircraft instrumented with tracking equipment for Apollo). DoD provided the space

agency with this mobile tracking equipment and the personnel to operate them. In

September 1960 when the interagency Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating

Board came into being, a Space Flight Ground Environmental Panel was charged

with coordinating the tracking requirements and talents of NASA and DoD. At

NASA Headquarters, Frederick B. Bryant served OTDA for many years as director

of DoD coordination. The Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory was another

organization with which OTDA had a special working relationship. Under contract

to NASA, the Smithsonian's 12-station network, equipped with Baker-Nunn

cameras designed for optical satellite tracking, supported the agency's satellite network.

When NASA was established in 1958, it inherited along with several satellite and

probe projects some rudimentary systems for tracking and acquiring data. The

Vanguard team from the Naval Research Laboratory had their Minitrack radio interferometer system in operation for the International Geophysical Year. Supporting the Army's competing satellite effort, Explorer, JPL had developed a tracking

scheme called Microlock. Also at JPL, specialists had started designing a tracking

system for the Pioneer lunar probe project, with construction under way in the Mojave Desert on the first large antenna. In addition, NACA had been working with

the Air Force on the X-series research aircraft program. As part of this joint enterprise, NACA instrumentation experts had been active in defining a tracking range

for the supersonic X-15 at the High Speed Flight Station. This partnership, going

even further, had also begun to examine the tracking and data acquisition needs of

the Air Force's proposed Dyna-Soar reusable orbital vehicle. One of the new civilian

agency's first tasks was to sift through these several tracking schemes, evaluate the

technology available, and take what it needed to support its first ventures into space.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION

Table 5-1.

Four Phases of Tracking and

Data Acquisition Management, NASA Headquarters

525

Phase I

1959-June 1960

Administrator/Deputy Administrator/Associate Administrator

Director, Space Flight Development (Abe Silverstein)

Assistant Director, Space Flight Operations (Edmond C. Buckley)

Chief, Tracking Programs (Francis B. Smith)

Phase II

July 1960-Oct. 1961

Administrator/Deputy Administator

Associate Administrator

Director, Space Flight Development (Silverstein)

Assistant Director, Space Flight Operations (Buckley)

Chief, Advanced Development (vacant)

Manager, Tracking Systems (Clarence R. Morrison)

Manager, Telemetry Systems (Wallace Ikard)

Manager, Data and Computing Systems (John Sterrett)

Chief, Operations (Gerald M. Truszynski)

Manager, Network Operations (H. R. Brockett)

Manager, Interagency Operations (Norman Pozinsky)

Manager, Flight Mission Operations (Victor W. Hammond)

Manager, Communications Operations (Paul A. Price)

Phase III

Nov. t961-mid-1965

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Director, Tracking and Data Acquisition (Buckley)

Deputy Director, Tracking and Data Acquisition (Truszynski)

Chief, Program Coordination and Resources Management (David Williamson, Jr.; Thomas V.

Lucas, 1963)

Chief, National Range Support (Hammond; Frederick B. Bryant, July 1963); office dropped

in early 1965

Director, Network Operations and Facilities (Brockett, Jan. 1962)

Chief, Network Operations (James C. Bavely)

Chief, Communications and Frequency Management (Price)

Chief, Facilities and Station Implementation (Pozinsky)

Director, Program Support and Advanced Systems (Truszynski, acting; Clarence R. Morrison,

1963)

Chief, Program Support (Robert D. Briskman); office added in 1963

Chief, Advanced Systems (Robert R. Stephens); office added in 1963

Director, DoD Coordination (Bryant); office added in early 1965
526

Table 5-1.

Four Phases of Tracking and

Data Acquisition Management, NASA Headquarters (Continued)

Phase IV

Fall 1965-1968

Administrator/Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Associate Administrator, Tracking and Data Acquisition (Buckley; Truszynski, Jan. 1968)

Deputy Associate Administrator, Tracking and Data Acquisition (Truszysnki; Brockett, March

1968)

Director, Systems Planning and Development (Morrison; Robert T. Hynes, 1967; Truszynski,

acting, 1968)

Director, Program Coordination and Resources Management (Lucas)

Director, Operations, Communications, and ADP (Brockett; Charles A. Taylor, 1968)

Chief, Network Operations (Barely)

Chief, Communications and Frequency Management (Price)

Chief, ADP Management (Kenneth Webster)

Director, DoD Coordination (Bryant)

Director, Network Support Implementation (Pozinsky)

BUDGET

OTDA's budget was divided among three basic categores: research, operations,

and equipment. This organization was intact for most of the 1958-1968 period. The

network operations and equipment-components monies were divided among the

satellite, manned, and deep space networks, the communications system that linked

the stations with the control centers, data processing, and other instrumentation

needs, such as the X-15 range in California. For the first years of Project Mercury,

part of the funding for the manned tracking network came from the manned

spaceflight budget. Starting with the FY 1963 budget request, the MSFN was being

funded only by OTDA. For a more detailed breakdown of the tracking and data acquisition budget, consult the NASA yearly budget estimates. Also, review the bottom notes of the following tables carefully before making conclusions about totals

for any particular aspect of the program.*

*It would also be useful to review the introduction to the budget section of chapter 1 for general information on NASA's budget and on the sources and format used for the budget tables in this book.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 527

Table 5-2.

Total Tracking and Data Acquisition Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 3096

1960 11 500 11 500 16 189a

1961 27 100b 27 100 44 330 c

1962 38 650 d 38 650 67 302

1963 158 410 158 410 122 142

1964 231 500 218 200 194 347

1965 267 900 261 900 253 236

1966 246 200 242 321 231 065

1967 279 300 270 850 270 850

1968 297 700 290 000e 275 850

aln addition, $2 840 000 was programmed for Mercury network operational implementation and

network operations in the Mercury budget.

b In addition, $5 450 000 was requested by the manned spaceflight program for the operation of

Mercury stations.

Cln addition, $25 254 000 was programmed for tracking, data acquisition, and control network in

the Mercury budget.

aIn addition, $20 385 000 was requested for Mercury network operational implementation and network operations in the Mercury budget.

eThe appropriations conference committee further reduced the total to $270 000 000 in October

1967.
528 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table5-3.

ProgrammedCostbyTrackingandDataAcquisitionProjects

(inthousandsofdollars)

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

Supporting research

and technology 856 a 4266 b 11 512 c 9097 13 277 12 890 t3 500 13 800 13 800 12 800

Network operations

Satellite network 2060 d 5705 e 9620 9374 12 252 23 464 25 063 27 640 37 700 41 488

Manned flight

network ...... f 293 g 15 183 16 495 18 795 23 118 37 909 65 650 71 079

Deep space network --- 1341 4233 6743 8117 I 1 833 19 040 25 350 35 500 37 290

Communications --- 580 6915 8393 10 821 12 026 17 478 23 890 39 500 42 118

Data processing --- 3400 h 3006 1660 4240 6277 4625 6101 10 200 13 608

Other

instrumentation 180 i 1477 j 000 000 4018 k 5736 5930 6620 6506 5900

Equipment and

components

Satellite network ...... 7346 3940 9390 15 297 17 995 14 500 I 1 700 9478

Manned flight

network ......... 10 253 28 100 56 234 98 348 48 523 27 700 24 181

Deep space network ...... 1179 000 7636 12 004 15 168 13 420 7500 9354

Communications ...... 226 967 1925 4036 4755 7200 6000 3090

Data processing ......... 300 3316 11 065 3916 2612 5100 2164

Other

instrumentation ......... 8921 2555 m 4690 4300 3500 4000 3300

a For advanced technical development.

b Includes 5190 600 for advanced research and $4 074 600 for advanced technical development.

c For systems development.

d Includes 5610 000 for the operation of optical tracking stations.

e Includes 51 450 000 for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory network.

f52 840 000 was programmed for Mercury network operational implementation and network operations from the Mercury budget.

g In addition, $25 254 000 was programmed for tracking, data acquisition, and control network from the Mercury budget.

h For computation and data reduction.

I.For the operation of a non-NASA station (Jodrell Bank).

1Includes $800 000 for the operation of non-NASA stations, $400 000 for special operations and services, and $276 760 for spare parts,

repairs, and maintenance.

k Includes 53 568 000 for Wallops and Ft. Churchill instrumentation and $450 000 for an aerodynamics test range.

IFor launch area instrumentation.

m Includes 51 545 000 for Wallops and other instrumentation, and 51 010 000 for an aerodynamics test range.

Table 5-4.

Tracking and Data Acquisition Supporting Research and Technology Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 856a

1960 ...... 4266 b

1961 7220a --- 11 512 c

1962 13 071 d 13 071 d 9097

1963 15 950 c 15 950 c 13 277

1964 17 000 12 000 12 890

1965 15 500 15 500 13 500

1966 14 500 14 500 13 500

1967 13 800 13 800 13 800

1968 13 800 ___e 12 800

a For advanced technical development.

b Includes $190 600 for advanced research and $4 074 600 for advanced technical development.

CFor systems development.

d Includes $2 862 500 for advanced research and $10 208 000 for advanced technical development.

¢Neither the authorization nor the appropriation was broken down to indicate where the reductions

were made.
TRACKINGANDDATAACQUISITION 529

Table5-5.

TotalNetworkOperationsFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

1959 ...... 2240

1960 ...... 11923a

1961 19880b --- 24 067

1962 25 580 c 25 580 c 41 853

1963 67 815 67 815 55 943

1964 80 500 78 500 d 78 131

1965 99 800 96 300 d 95 254

1966 129 300 125 421 d 127 510

1967 199 000 190 550 d 195 050

1968 228 800 ___e 211 483

a Includes $580 200 for network communications and $3 400 440 for computation and data reduction.

b In addition, $5 450 000 was requested by the manned spaceflight program for the operation of

Mercury stations.

c Includes $9 122 900 for network communications and $2 350 000 for computation and data reduction.

dAuthorizations were not broken down further to indicate where the reductions were made.

eNeither the authorization nor the appropriation was broken down to indicate where the reductions

were made.

Table 5-6.

Network Operations-Satellite Network Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 2060 a

1960 --- 5705 b

1961 91 O0c 9620

1962 10 322d 9374

1963 17 794 12 252

1964 17 000 23 464

1965 25 600 25 063

1966 32 300 27 640

1967 33 700 37 700

1968 38 500 41 488

aIncludes $610 000 for the operation of optical tracking stations.

b Includes $1 450 000 for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory network.

c Includes $3 500 000 for the operation of optical tracking stations.

d Includes $2 250 000 for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory network.
53O NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 5-7.

Network Operations-Manned Flight Network Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 ...... a

1961 ___b 293 c

1962 ___d 15 183

1963 24 047 16 495

1964 24 000 18 795

1965 25 400 23 118

1966 35 100 37 909

1967 60 000 65 650

1968 78 000 71 079

a $2 840 000 was programmed for Mercury network operational implementation and network operations from the Mercury budget.

b $5 450 000 was requested by the manned spaceflight program for the operation of Mercury stations.

c In addition, $25 254 000 was programmed for tracking, data acquisition, and control network from

the Mercury budget.

d $20 385 000 was requested for Mercury network operational implementation and network operations in the Mercury budget.

Table 5-8.

Network Operations-Deep Space Network Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 --- 1341

1961 3500 4233

1962 3322 6743

1963 9272 8117

1964 10 000 11 833

1965 14 600 19 040

1966 23 700 25 350

1967 32 800 35 500

1968 39 800 37 290
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION

Table 5-9.

Network Operations-Other Instrumentation Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

531

Year Request Programmed

1959 --- 180a

1960 --- 1477 b

1961 7280 c ___

1962 3247 d ___

1963 --- 4018 e

1964 800 f 5736

1965 6100 g 5930

1966 6300 6620

1967 7000 6500

1968 7300 5900

a For the operation of a non-NASA station (Jodrell Bank).

b Includes $800 000 for operation of non-NASA stations, $400 000 for special operations and services, and $276 760 for spare parts, repairs, and maintenance.

c Includes $1 400 000 for operation of non-NASA stations (Jodrell Bank, Ft. Churchill, and others),

$2 100 000 for operations at the Atlantic and Pacific Missile Ranges, and $3 780 000 for miscellaneous

operational costs.

dIncludes $1 850 000 for operation of non-NASA stations, $500 000 for special operations and services, $897 300 for spare parts, repairs, and maintenance.

e Includes $3 568 000 for Wallops and Ft. Churchill instrumentation and $450 000 for an

aerodynamics test range.

fFor an aerodynamics test range.

gIncludes $5 300 000 for Wallops and Ft. Churchill instrumentation and $800 000 for an

aerodynamics test range.

Table 5-10.

Network Operations-Communications Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 --- 580

1961 --- 6915

1962 9123 8393

1963 13 234 10 821

1964 16 000 12 026

1965 18 700 17 478

1966 23 800 23 890

1967 57 000 39 500

1968 52 700 42 118
532 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Table5-11.

NetworkOperations-DataProcessingFundingHistory

(inthousandsofdollars)

Year Request Programmed

1960 --- 3400a

1961 --- 3006

1962 2350 1660

1963 3468 4240

1964 7700 6277

1965 9400 4625

1966 8100 6101

1967 8500 10 200

1968 12 500 13 608

a For computation and data reduction.

Table 5-12.

Total Equipment and Components Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Authorization Programmed

--- 8751 1961 ---

--- 16 352 1962 ---

1963 74 645 74 645 52 922

1964 134 000 127 000 a 103 326

1965 152 600 150 100 a 144 482

1966 102 400 102 400 89 755

1967 66 500 66 500 62 000

1968 55 100 ___b 51 567

a Authorization was not broken down further to indicate where the reductions were made.

bNeither the authorization nor the appropriation was broken down to indicate where the reductions

were made.

Table 5-13.

Equipment and Components-Satellite Network Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1961 --- 7346

1962 --- 3940

1963 20 230 9390

1964 22 000 15 297

1965 15 900 17 995

1966 14 700 14 500

1967 14 500 11 700

1968 10 000 9478
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION

Table 5-14.

Equipment and Components-Manned Flight Network Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

533

Year Request Programmed

1962 --- 10 253

1963 35 950 28 100

1964 84 000 56 234

1965 106 900 98 348

1966 64 000 48 523

1967 26 500 27 700

1968 24 000 24 181

Table 5-15.

Equipment and Components-Deep Space Network Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1961 --- 1179

1962 --- 000

1963 17 000 7636

1964 10 000 12 004

1965 12 000 15 168

1966 9800 13 420

1967 10 500 7500

1968 9800 9354

Table 5-16.

Equipment and Components-Other Instrumentation Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 --- 892 a

1963 --- 2555 b

1964 4000 c 4690

1965 5400 d 4300

1966 5500 3500

1967 4500 4000

1968 4500 3300

a For launch area instrumentation.

blncludes $1 545 000 for Wallops and other instrumentation and $1 010 000 for an aerodynamics

test range.

cFor launch area instrumentation.

dlncludes $3 900 000 for Wallops and other instrumentation and $1 500 000 for an aerodynamics

test range.
534 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 5-17.

Equipment and Components-Communications Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1961 --- 226

1962 --- 967

1963 1465 1925

1964 4000 4036

1965 3300 4755

1966 4400 7200

1967 7500 6000

1968 4700 3090

Table 5-18.

Equipment and Components-Data Processing Funding History

(in thousands of dollars)

Year Request Programmed

1962 --- 300

1963 --- 3316

1964 10 000 11 065

1965 9100 3916

1966 4000 2612

1967 3000 5100

1968 2100 2164

DESCRIPTION- SPACE TRACKING AND DATA

ACQUISITION NETWORK (STADAN)

During the 1940s, the Peenemunde rocket team in Germany adapted the

astronomer's methods for optical tracking and radio Doppler techniques to suit its

needs for tracking the V-2 rocket, a less than perfect but revolutionary tool of war

used against England. After the Second World War, tracking experts in the U.S. not

only improved the conventional radar and optical tracking methods employed during the war, but also looked to a new field: radio astronomy. Using radio astronomy

techniques, specialists could find and follow objects launched into space. The objects of interest were ballistic missiles.

In the late 1940s, the Army Air Corps and the Naval Research Laboratory

(NRL) were particularly interested in techniques whereby they could measure interference: the effect produced by the combination or superposition of two systems

of waves (sound or light) in which the waves reinforced, neutralized, or in other

ways interfered with each other. The instrument used to measure the velocity and

absorption of sound waves in a gas or liquid or to compare unknown light-wave
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 535

lengths with a standard wav.e length was called an interferometer (acoustic or optical). While NRL's initial studies concentrated on measuring sound waves under

water, the Army Air Corps team was interested in devising a radio wave interferometer that could be used for tracking missiles. A radio interferometer, two or

more radio telescopes (antennas) separated by known distances, could pinpoint

sources of radiation, such as that transmitted by a beacon fixed on a vehicle in

space, in the radio range (see figs. 5-2 and 5-3). The Azusa interferometry system

developed by the Army Air Corps with the assistance of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation was successfully put to use on American missile ranges. During

the early 1950s, the Navy borrowed Azusa technology for its Viking missile tracking

system, and communications experts at NRL began to consider the usefulness of the

radio interferometer in some future satellite tracking scheme.

NRL soon had an opportunity to put its advanced studies to work. A trackable

artificial satellite was the ambitious goal of the United States as part of its contribution to the International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-1958). The Army and the

Navy both submitted serious proposals for a launch vehicle and spacecraft that

might meet that goal ahead of the Soviet Union, which had also expressed an interest

in launching a satellite.

The Navy's Project Vanguard, suggested in 1955, included plans for a radio

tracking network; Project Orbiter, the Army's bid, originally called for optical

tracking only. John T. Mengel, a member of the Vanguard team, coined the name

Minitrack for its satellite tracking scheme. The spacecraft beacon by which

Vanguard would be followed on its orbits would be of minimum weight (0.37

kilogram), thus Minitrack. Telemetry reception and command would be accomplished by Yagi antennas fixed so that they could track the craft from horizon to

TO

c_y SATELLITE /

_.1

0_

A 1 B

X

TIME (OR ANGLE)

Figure 5-2. Figure 5-3.

Source: From Samual Glasstone, Sourcebook on the Space Sciences (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co.,

Inc., 1965), pp. 218-20.
536 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

horizon (rocking horse antennas). Mengel likened the Vanguard tracking antennas

to ears: "An individual locates the source of sound by virtue of the phase differences

in the sound waves, arriving at different times at his two ears. Similarly the listening

units of the minitrack system are pairs of receiving antennas, set a measured distance

apart, which indicates the direction of the signal by phase differences in the radio

waves .... -2 Processing the data that these pairs of antennas gathered would fall to

an IBM 704 computer based in a computing facility in Washington, D.C.

By late 1955 after authorization for Vanguard had been secured-due in part to

the maturity of the radio tracking plan- and after Mengel had been put in charge of

NRL's Radio Tracking Branch, the Navy tracking specialists were busy defining

where Vanguard ground stations should be built. The proposed number of stations

had grown from four to a network of nine stations that would create a "radar

fence"- a chain of overlapping antenna patterns through which an orbiting satellite

that had been launched from Cape Canaveral would have to intersect frequently. A

long north-south fence was not financially feasible for NRL, but nine stations,

several of which were to be strung along the 75th meridian within 45 degrees north

or south of the equator, would enable the trackers to compile sufficient orbital data

on satellites whose orbits did not incline more than 45 degrees. Early in 1956, the

laboratory was ready with a team that would travel to South America to locate sites

and negotiate agreements with foreign government officials.*

In March and April, NRL had negotiations under way for stations in Havana,

Panama, Quito, Antofagasta, and Santiago. Responsibility for construction was

assigned to a Project Vanguard Task Force of the Army Map Service. At the urging

of NRL, all participants had agreed to a radio frequency of 108 megahertz for the

IGY activities. In the United States, stations would be built at Blossom Point,

Maryland, at San Diego, and on two islands (Antigua and Grand Turk) near Cape

Canaveral, the launch site. This brought the number of station locales to 10, with an

1 lth being added at Woomera, Australia, for the collection of geodetic data, shortly

after the network became operational in October 1957, well in advance of the first

successful mission the following March.I"

After NASA assumed authority for Vanguard in October 1958, Mengel and his

tracking specialists were assigned to the new Beltsville Space Center, soon to be

renamed the Goddard Space Flight Center. Mengel was appointed assistant director

for tracking and data systems at Goddard, and Minitrack, over the next several

years, was transformed into a global satellite tracking network. The net was always

in a state of change: stations were added (Winkfield, Alaska, Johannesburg, Mojave, East Grand Forks, St. John's, Ft. Myers, Rosman, Brazilia) to support

satellites with orbits that took them further away from the equator or to supplement

the existing net; others were phased out (Havana, Ft. Stewart, Antofagasta, San

*The Minitrack ground equipment required at least 0.093 square kilometer with a minimum gradient

of less than I degree in the area of the antenna arrays. For 8 kilometers in all directions from the equipment, the elevation angle could not exceed 20 degrees. The site also had to be isolated from heavy electric

power installations and airways.

I"See chapters 1 and 3 for more information on Project Vanguard.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 537

Diego) when they were no longer needed or when conditions at the station became

unfavorable; collateral stations established by other countries became part of the

network as they were needed (see table 5-20 for a chronology of these events and

table 5-27 for a complete list of NASA's tracking stations). New telemetry reception

and command equipment that corresponded with new hardware and scientific instruments carried by NASA's satellites was added to certain stations as it became

available. Telemetry antennas grew in size. Station operations became more complex. Reliable communications between stations and mission control became more

critical. In 1960, the network switched to a frequency range of 136-137 megahertz, a

range set aside by the International Telecommunications Union for space research.

The Rosman, North Carolina, station, which became operational in 1963, was the

NORTH

WEST

AMBIGUITY

ARRAY

_B

101.7 m

(333.7 ft)

i

125.7 m

(412.3 ft)

Q

I

SOUTH

EAST

Figure 5-4. Layout of a typical Minitrack station. A set of four antennas positioned & a particular configuration (in this instance, a cross) can detect signals from a spacecraft entering a fanshaped volume (about 10.8 degrees in one direction and 76 degrees in a direction at right angles).

A Minitrack station had two wuch sets of antennas so that there were two fan-shaped volumes

(at an angle of 90 degrees to one another) in which a vehicle couM be detected. One set, called

equatorial (E), had the narrow dimensions of the fam beam arranged east-west; the second set,

called polor (P), was oriented north-south. Equipment at a Minitrack station included the fixed

arrays for angle tracking, one fixed antenna array for telemetry reception, a rhombic communications antenna, a ground station electronics trailor, a telemetry trailor, and associated power sources

and maintenance units.

Source: From Samuel Glasstone, Sourcebook on the Space Sciences (New York: D. Van Nostrand, Co., Inc.,

1965), pp. 220-22.
538 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

first of a second generation of satellite tracking facilities that did not require an interferometer. Its 26-meter pointable antenna would support the new observatory

class of satellites (OGO, OSO, OAO).*

As NASA's satellites became more sophisticated, data acquisition rather than

tracking became the more critical of the network's tasks, and the equipment added

to the stations reflected the change. Satellite Automatic Tracking Antennas

(SATAN)-one type for telemetry reception, a second for command-replaced the

Yagi arrays to serve either as a complement to the large dish antennas or as the prime

receiver-command antenna at stations where there were no large dishes. Since the

original Minitrack system could not cope with spacecraft sent into highly eccentric

or synchronous orbits (the latter a popular orbit for communications and weather

satellites), Goddard specialists devised an alternate tracking device called Goddard

Range and Range Rate Equipment (GRARR).t The GRARR sent a signal to the

spacecraft, which replied through a transponder. By recording the time of signal

transit to and from the satellite, distance could be determined, while Doppler

measurement could provide range rate.3 With all these changes, Minitrack was hardly a suitable name for the network any longer.

By 1964, NASA officials were using the name Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (STADAN) for the satellite net. Along with the new title came a

new trend. STADAN managers would work toward maintaining a minimum

number of stations, but they would equip those stations with the most efficient instrumentation available. The streamlining of the net precipitated the closeout of

Blossom Point, College, East Grand Forks, and Woomera stations, the transfer of

one of Alaska's 26-meter antennas to the Environmental Sciences Services Administration, and the transfer of Kano station to the Manned Space Flight Network.

From 22 stations in 1965, the system was reduced to 17 (plus a training facility at

Goddard and two collateral stations) in 1968, with more closings planned for the

next year (see table 5-19). Increased automation was one of the key tools the Office

of Tracking and Data Acquisition used to improve the remaining stations and to cut

costs. If done manually, most tracking tasks (e.g., prepass checkouts, station

switchovers from one satellite to another, recording operations) required a great

amount of switch-throwing and careful monitoring and timing. During the

mid-1960s, automation began to increase the stations' flexibility and reliability. The

end of the decade brought increased computerization to many of the stations' tracking operations. OTDA's program for implementing the first level of station computerization was known as Station Technical Operations Control. During the 1970s,

the use of computers to handle tracking and data acquisition tasks would increase

greatly.

Goddard Space Flight Center served as mission control for the satellites that

STADAN supported. 4 Before communictions between the stations and Goddard

*NASA's first 26-meter pointable antenna was built at the Alaska station in 1962 to support Nimbus

operations. Minitrack's telemetry reception antennas could not handle the large amounts of data that

were produced by picture-taking weather satellites. Rosman's two 26-meter antennas were completed in

1962 and 1964. Another was erected at Orroral Valley, Australia, in 1965.

t Under contract, Space Technology Laboratories built the first GRARR in 1961. Motorola, General

Electric, and General Dynamics/Electronics also built GRARR units for NASA. GRARR equipment was

installed at Carnarvon, Santiago, Tananarive, Fairbanks, and Rosman.
TRACKINGANDDATAACQUISITION 539

WOOMERA A N ZO_NGTLIAI__ °_jOH_NNESBURG

Figure 5-5. Minitrack stations, 1961. By this time, five of the original Minitrack stations had been

phased out and replaced (Antigua, Ft. Stewart, Grank Turk, Havana, and San Diego). A collateral station was also in operation at South Point, Hawaii.

Source: From Samuel Glasstone, Sourcebook on the Space Sciences (New York." D. Van Nostrand, Co., Inc.,

1965), p. 218.

were completely reliable, the individual stations often played the role of flight controllers. But by 1964-1965, the NASA communications system (NASCOM) was in

operation, and project participants could command their satellites from one control

center. The trend at Goddard's mission control facility in the mid-1960s was toward

establishing "project unique" control areas (i.e., separate centers for OGO, ATS,

Tiros, and other projects). Nine of these posts were in operation in 1967. To conserve funds, however, the control operations were being centralized in the late 1960s

into a Multisatellite Operations Center (the control of meteorology satellites would

remain separate from the others).

Goddard was also the site of the Network Test and Training Facility (NTTF).

Here new equipment destined for tracking stations was tested and new personnel

trained. Equipment from the Blossom Point, Maryland, prototype Minitrack station was transferred to NTTF in 1966. Tracking and data acquisition was one of

Goddard's primary functions, and John Mengel as assistant director for tracking

and data systems orchestrated the many tasks it involved. Ozro M. Covington, who

had helped instrument DoD's White Sands Missile Range in the 1940s, was Mengel's

deputy for most of the center's first decade. A 1967 reorganization that divided

satellite and manned operations left Covington as assistant director for manned

flight support.

One other element that played a part in satellite tracking from the Vanguard

days through NASA's first decade was the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
540 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table-5-19.

NASA Satellite Tracking Stations

Station Original Minitrack Primary STADAN station

station with increased

capabilities over

Minitrack*

Collateral Years

station operational

Ahmedabad

Alaska

Antigua x

Antofagasta x

Blossom Point t x

Brazilia

Carnarvon

College

College Park**

Darwin

East Grand Forks

Ft. Myers

Ft. Stewart x

Grand Turk x

Havana x

Johannesburg

Kano

Kasima Machi

Kauai

Lima x

Majunga

Mojave

Network Test and Training

Facility**

Orroral Valley

Quito x

Rosman

San Diego x

Santiago x

Singapore

Solant

South Point

St. John's

Tananarive

Toowoomba

Wink field

Woomera x

X

Project SERB

x

High-inclination

OGO

High-inclination

X

X

ISIS

ISIS

x

Indian O.-inclination

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

x 1962

1962-?

1957-61

1957-63

1956-66

1962

1964-74

1960-66

1962-64

1966-69

1960-66

1959-72

1957-59

1957-61

1957-59

1958-75

1965-66

x 1967-70

1965-

1957-69

1963-64

1960-69

1966-

1965-

1957-

1963-81

1957-60

1957-

x 1963-70

x 1963-?

x 1961-66

1960-70

1965-75

1966-69

1961-?

1957-66

*Special use indicated.

tPrototype Minitrack station.

**Not a regularly scheduled station.
TRACKINGANDDATAACQUISITION 541

Tracking Network.* This optical tracking network could be used only at dawn and

dusk under clear conditions when the sky was fairly dark (the satellite was made visible by reflected sunlight). Though its use was restricted, optical trackers could provide highly accurate data with their Baker Nunn cameras. Although the approximate

position of the satellites had to be known beforehand, the optical system was also

called on to track vehicles that did not carry radio beacons. The Smithsonian network provided support to NASA's tracking operations under contract.

*The 12 SAO stations were located at Arequipa, Peru; Comodoro Rivadavia, Argentina; Debre Zeit,

Ethiopia; Dionysos, Greece; Dodaira, Japan; Island Lagoon, Australia; Maui, Hawaii; Mt. Hopkins,

Arizona; Naini Tal, India; Natal, Brazil; Olifantsfontein, South Africa; and San Fernando, Spain. For a

history of the SAO, officially in existence since 1890, see Bessie Zaban Jones, Lighthouse of the Skies; the

Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory: Background and History, 1846-1955 (Washington: Smithsonian

Institution, 1965). See also Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History,

NASA SP-4202 (Washington, 1970), pp. 149-54.

Table 5-20.

Chronology of Space Tracking and Data

Acquisition Network (STADAN) Development and Operations

Date Event

1948

Early 1950s

1950-1955

1955

April 1955

Sept. 9, 1955

Dec. 1955

As part of the Army Air Corps MX-774 project (a forerunner of the Atlas

ICBM program), a radio interferometry tracking system was established

(called the Azusa system). A Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) team working on underwater sound (acoustic) interferometers was in contact with the

Azusa group; they informally exchanged ideas about the technology involved

in their respective projects.

The Navy borrowed the Azusa technology for its Viking missile project.

The Air Force, in establishing its missile range near Cape Canaveral, set up

tracking and instrumentation stations along an 8000-kilometer stretch. The

stations included Grand Bahama, Grand Turk, the Dominican Republic, and

Mayaguana. Tracking instruments also were installed on aircraft and ships to

augment the range.

Of the two serious American proposals for orbiting an International

Geophysical Year (IGY) satellite, NRL's Vanguard included a radio tracking

scheme derived from the Navy's Viking experiences; the Army's Orbiter proposal suggested optical tracking.

NRL specialists generated a document entitled "Proposal for Minimum

Trackable Satellite (Minitrack)." An appendix of this document discussed the

proposed Vanguard tracking system, Minitrack (the name was coined by

John Mengel, one of the report's authors).

The Department of Defense (DoD) authorized NRL to proceed with its Project Vanguard and the Minitrack system (Mengel would lead the NRL Radio

Trackitlg Branch).

The number of proposed Minitrack stations in a network primarily along the

75th meridian grew from two to nine.
542 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 5-20.

Chronology of Space Tracking and Data

Acquisition Network (STADAN) Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Spring 1956

July 1956

Oct. 1, 1957

Nov. 8, 1957

March 17, 1958

Oct. 1, 1958

1958-1961

Spring 1961

1962

An NRL team led by Winfred Berg toured South America and negotiated

agreements for six Minitrack stations (Havana, Panama, Quito, Lima, Antofagasta, and Santiago). Construction would be the responsibility of a Project Vanguard Task Force of the Army Map Service. Plans were also under

way for the operation of U.S. stations (Blossom Point, Maryland, San

Diego, and downrange stations near Cape Canaveral-Antigua and Grand

Turk). This put the number of stations at 10.

Blossom Point station went into operation, serving as a training center for

tracking operations and as a test facility for Minitrack equipment and procedures.

The Minitrack network became operational. The stations included Antigua,

Antofagasta, Blossom Point, Ft. Stewart, Grand Turk, Havana, Lima,

Quito, San Diego, Santiago, and Woomera.

In response to delays with Vanguard and the success of Sputnik, the

Secretary of Defense announced that the Army with the support of the Jet

Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) would also participate in the IGY attempt to

launch a satellite. Their project was renamed Explorer. The original optical

tracking scheme had been replaced by a system developed at JPL called

Microlock, which combined Doppler tracking and interferometer receivers.

For the early Explorer satellites (1958), three Microlock tracking stations

were established in a network called Spheredrop.

Vanguard 1 was successfully launched and tracked by NRL.

The newly established NASA assumed responsibility for Vanguard, including

its tracking network. Mengel became assistant director for tracking and data

systems at the Goddard Space Flight Center.

Minitrack was used successfully to track NASA's early scientific satellites.

Antigua and Grand Turk were phased out in July 1961; stations were added

in Alaska and East Grand Forks in 1960; Ft. Myers replaced Ft. Stewart in

1959; Cuba station was phased out in 1959; Johannesburg, Mojave, and St.

John's were added in 1960; the San Diego facility was phased out in August

1960; South Point, Hawaii, began serving as a collateral station in 1961.

NASA Headquarters managers began to search for a more appropriate name

for the satellite network; suggestions included Satellite Tracking and Instrumentation Network and Satellite Instrumentation Network.

Although Minitrack continued to be suitable for NASA's early satellite program, the agency's plans for the future called for more sophisticated payloads

and orbits that would demand more support than the Minitrack net could

give. Ahmedabad, a collateral station in India, was added; Alaska station got

a 26-meter antenna; telemetry reception equipment was erected at Brazilia to

support Project SERB (Study of the Enhanced Radiation Belt); telemetry

receiving and tape recording equipment was installed at a NASA data processing facility at College Park, Maryland; a 26-meter dish was under construction at Rosman, North Carolina. The tracking stations continued to be

called Minitrack (M/T) stations, with the entire system being generally referred to as the satellite network (or less frequently as the electronics satellite

system).
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION

Table 5-20.

Chronology of Space Tracking and Data

Acquisition Network (STADAN) Development and Operations (Continued)

543

Date Event

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

The first of a new generation of satellite tracking stations was dedicated in

October. Rosman station was established specifically to receive telemetry

from the new observatory-class satellites (OGO, OSO, OAO). Rosman did

not have a Minitrack-type interferometer. Antofagasta and Brazilia were

phased out, with equipment from the latter being installed in a new station at

Majunga, Madagascar. Collateral stations on Singapore and Solant were put

into operation.

The trend in satellite tracking was toward fewer stations, with a greater emphasis on data acquisition. Attempts were made to consolidate stations and

supply the facilities that remained in the net with improved equipment to control and handle the high data output rates of new scientific satellites. NASA's

satellite tracking system came to be known officially as the Space Tracking

and Data Acquisition Network (STADAN). A second 26-meter dish went

into operation at Rosman, and range and range-rate equipment was installed

at Carnarvon. Majunga and College Park stations were closed.

Activity was under way at three new stations in Australia: at Darwin to support OGO, in the Orroral Valley where a 26-meter dish was installed, and at

Toowoomba in support of ATS. Kano station in Nigeria was opened to get

better coverage for ISIS, an ionospheric research program. Kauai, Hawaii,

was used for the same purpose. Range and range-rate equipment was being

installed at Tananarive station. At Goddard, specialists were investigating

methods of computerizing STADAN stations so that they could process the

greater amounts of data expected from new satellites (the program for implementing the first level of station computerization was called Station

Technical Operations Control).

Six STADAN stations were phased out during the year (Blossom Point, College Park, East Grand Forks, Woomera, Kano, and one of the Alaska station's 26-meter dishes). Blossom Point's equipment was transferred to the

new Network Test and Training Facility at Goddard. Additional equipment

and a 12-meter antenna were installed at Tananarive. Transportable equipment, including a 12-meter antenna, was put into place at Toowoomba for

the ATS program. This was the last year of operation for the South Point station.

A new collateral station was put into operation at Kasima Machi by the

Japanese. At mission control at Goddard, nine project-unique control

centers were established for OSO, OGO, OAO, space physics, multisatellite

operations, atmospheric studies Explorers, ATS, Tiros, and geodetic

satellites.

At the end of NASA's first decade, 16 STADAN stations were in operation:

Alaska, Carnarvon, Darwin (phased out in 1969), Ft. Myers, Goddards' test

and training facility, Kauai, Lima (phased out in 1969), Mojave, Orroral

Valley, Quito, Rosman, Santiago, St. John's, Tananarive, Toowoomba

(phased out in 1969), and Winkfield. In addition, three collateral stations

supported STADAN at Kasima Machi, Singapore, and Solant.
544 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

DESCRIPTION-MANNED SPACE FLIGHT NETWORK (MSFN)

More than a decade before NASA Headquarters managers named the members

of the Space Task Group and charged them with leading the agency's manned space

program, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the military were

working on ground instrumentation that could be used for tracking high-speed aircraft and guided missiles. NACA's Pilotless Aircraft Research Station at Wallops

Island tracked experimental aircraft and rockets with radar as they made their way

over the Atlantic. The military established ranges in the deserts of New Mexico and

across the south Atlantic from Florida to the islands of the Bahamas

(1600-kilometer range) and later on to Barbados (8000-kilometer range). The Air

Force set up radar and telemetry equipment at several locations along the Atlantic

missile range and connected the stations by undersea cable. Equipment borne by aircraft and ships augmented the island-station system.

In the 1950s, NACA and the Department of Defense established a joint highspeed research aircraft program that called for sophisticated tracking and communications gear. In the opinion of many, the logical extension of this joint program was earth orbital flight, and accordingly, tracking specialists began to define

the global tracking network such a mission would require. To pull together the

several teams that were working on tracking schemes and instrumentation, NACA

Director Hugh L. Dryden in the spring of 1958 suggested establishing an interagency

Working Group on Ranges, Launch, and Tracking Facilities. At about the same

time, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), in answer to great interest

being shown by the military, formed an ad hoc Ground Based Information System

for Support of Manned Space Flight Committee (known as GBIS). In October 1958

when President Dwight D. Eisenhower assigned the exploration of space to the new

civilian space agency, it had a respectable well of tracking-data acquisition

knowledge from which to draw. But the steps from range to network, from studies

to operations would be giant ones.

The Space Task Group (STG), housed at Langley from its beginnings in 1958

until November 1961 when it became the nucleus of the new Manned Spacecraft

Center in Houston, had a huge task ahead of it, of which tracking was only one of

several critical parts. STG's mission planners established the base requirements for

manned flight tracking operations and put a team of specialists, the Tracking

Systems Study Group of Langley's Instrumentation Research Division, to work to

find the means and techniques to meet these criteria. Project Mercury, the first step

in NASA's manned program, had four broad tracking needs: (1) continuous

coverage by all systems from launch to orbital insertion and again during reentry

maneuvers; (2) periods of no contact not to exceed 10 minutes during the first one or

two orbits; (3) at least one contact of several minutes per orbit (preferably per hour)

during later orbits; and (4) reliance on state-of-the-art hardware that required little

or no further development. Manned spaceflight demanded two-way voice communications, telemetry trajectory measurements, and uplinked commands, and it

made these demands around the globe.

The man responsible for Mercury tracking in the early days was Edmond C.

Buckley, an instrumentation expert from Langley who had helped set up the ranges

at Wallops and at the High-Speed Flight Station in California. In January 1959, the

Space Task Group was formally relieved of the tracking responsibility for Mercury,
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 545

and Buckley and his people were established as the Tracking and Ground Instrumentation Unit (TAGIU), an organizational entity at Langley separate from the STG.

Buckley, however, was assigned a management role at NASA Headquarters soon

thereafter, and G. Barry Graves, Jr., an electronics engineer, was named TAGIU's

new leader. In addition to their own skills and knowledge, the Mercury tracking

team had two groups from whom to tap ready expertise-the satellite trackers at the

Goddard Space Flight Center, and members of the electronics industry who were

already familiar with tracking requirements and equipment through their work for

the military. Specialists from Goddard were soon applying their experiences with

communications and computers to Mercury's unique problems. Representatives

from interested companies attended a preliminary bidders' conference on tracking,

telemetry, and telecommunications needs for Mercury in early April 1959; the next

month they had in their hands official specifications for the ground instrumentation, a plan called S-45. Formal competition among potential contractors began in

June.

S-45 stressed conservative design principles and astronaut safety. Mercury

tracking stations around the globe would be equipped with proven C-band (RCA

FPS-16) and S-band (Reeves Instrument Corp. Verlort) radar units.* A new piece of

hardware, an active acquisition aid, would assist the narrow-band radars in locating

the orbiting spacecraft. Additionally, Mercury would be equipped with

transponders to ensure a strong return signal. The telemetry receivers would, of

course, be compatible with the transmitters carried on the spacecraft, all of which

would be built with off-the-shelf components. Manufacturers of the uplink command equipment were to follow the same guidelines. UHF (ultrahigh frequency)

radio was specified for the primary communications link between the spacecraft and

ground stations, with an HF (high frequency) backup and a second set of UHF

equipment available at each ground station. Communications on the ground

(telemetry, commands, radar acquisition data, tracking data, voice messages,

teletype) were to be real-time. Two IBM 7090 computers would operate at

Goddard's computing center to made the computations necessary for real-time

monitoring and spacecraft control. A backup computer would be installed at Bermuda station to help make the go/no go decision for orbital insertion if communications to and from the island should fail during that critical juncture. The Mercury

Control Center would be located at Cape Canaveral) Industry would not be called

*Radar (a contraction of "radio detection and ranging") was used to locate a spacecraft and determine its velocity and direction of movement by means of radio waves. Pulses of electromagnetic waves

were transmitted by a directional antenna at a ground station, rotated or scanned over a certain sector at a

constant rate. The pulses were reflected back to earth by the spacecraft. In the case of Mercury, the pulses

triggered a repeater radar set on the capsule, which transmitted a stronger return signal via a radio

transponder. Range was determined by measuring the time it took the radar signal to reach the target and

return. The spacecraft's direction in respect to the radar unit was determined from the direction in which

the pulse was transmitted. Velocity was determined by applying the Doppler princile and making the appropriate calculations: if the object were approaching the unit the frequency of the returned signal was

greater than the frequency of the transmitted signal; if receding the returned frequency was less; if not

moving the returned and transmitted frequencies were the same. The S-band radar operated at frequencies of 2700-3000 megacycles, the C-band at 5400-5700 megacycles. Verlort radar units were utilized for

long-range (1100 kilometers) tracking; the FPS-16s pinpointed the capsule within half a degree at 920

kilometers (as modified for NASA).
546 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

on to build the total package outlined in S-45 for a global network of 17 stations,

since some of the facilities needed to support Mercury were already in existence as

part of the military ranges. The new sites would connect the Pacific Missile Range

(California) with the Atlantic Missile Range (Florida), continue the net across

Africa, the Indian Ocean, Australia, and the Pacific. S-45 made general recommendations for the locations of new stations, but following the satellite trackers' lead the

Mercury specialists would send survey teams to choose the precise sites for their

overseas facilities. Again, NASA's International Programs Office would play a key

role in negotiating agreements in the many foreign countries that would host Mercury stations.

It did not take TAGIU long to choose a group of contractors for the construction of thc Mercury network. The planned completion date of the net, June 1, 1960,

did not leave time for lengthy evaluations. A team composed of Western Electric,

Bell Telephone Laboratories, Bendix Corporation, IBM, and Burns and Roe-doing business as WECo-was awarded a letter contract in July 1959:* WECo was

directed to construct and equip stations at Bermuda; Canton Island in the Pacific;

Corpus Christi, Texas; Grand Canary Island; Guaymas, Mexico; Kano, Nigeria;

Kauai, Hawaii; Muchea and Woomera, Australia; and Zanzibar. NASA-owned

equipment was also needed for facilities at Cape Canaveral, Grand Bahama Island,

Grand Turk Island, Eglin Air Force Base, Point Arguello, and the White Sands

Missile Range. The contractors also supplied the Wallops Island demonstration site

station with equipment, where hardware and new procedures were tested. DoD

would contribute additional ground support, plus two tracking ships (Rose Knot

Victor and Coastal Sentry Quebec) for the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

That summer, NASA requested the assistance of eight foreign governments in

establishing sites for its Mercury tracking stations, with the first technical visits taking place during the late summer and fall of 1959.t Although formal agreements

were not always speedily obtained, actual costruction was under way at all sites in

1960. For several reasons independent from the tracking operations, Mercury's

flight schedule slipped several times, giving the NASA-contractor team extra months

to ready all the ground stations and train personnel to operate them. The final

master plan called for an operational network by June 1, 1961. The last station,

*WECo (from Western Electric Company) was also sometimes called the Systems Engineering

Group. The five participants were assigned separate responsibilities as follows: Western Electric-overall

management, equipment procurement, installation and testing, ground communications system design,

and personnel training; Bell-systems analysis, command and control display design for Cape Canaveral

and Bermuda, and a flight controller-astronaut simulation system; Bendix-telemetry and site display

equipment, radar units, and capsule communication equipment; IBM-computer programming and

operation at Goddard and Bermuda and maintenance and operation of Cape Canaveral's launch and

display data subsystem; and Burns and Roe-construction, management, logistics, and operation of

nonelectric equipment. The radar units Bendix was to modify for the Mercury net were to come from

RCA and Reeves Instrument Corp. Since the relationship between RCA and Bendix, who were competitors, was not a good working one, NASA directly acquired the seven RCA FPS-16 units it required;

Bendix then modified them according to plan, lengthening their range from 460 to 920 kilometers and

adding a display and control package (the Instrumentation Radar Acquisition Kit).

1Original plans called for a station on Guadalcanal, and contact with the appropriate authorities was

made. However, for reasons of economy, this potential site was dropped for consideration before a

technical visit was made.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 547

Kano, was finished in March 1961; the net was operating in July (table 5-21 lists the

manned tracking stations; more complete information is provided in table 5-27).

By early 1961, it had become apparent that Langley was not the best place for

the Tracking and Ground Instrumentation Unit. The Space Task Group would be

leaving for Texas soon; it was also time for TAGIU to find a new home that was less

isolated from NASA Headquarters and tracking operations. Goddard Space Flight

Center was the logical choice. Tracking and data systems personnel under John

Mengel were already overseeing satellite tracking operations and Mercury communications and were slated to assume responsibility for operating the Mercury network during the third quarter of 1961. Assisting the specialists who transferred to

Goddard from Virginia was Niles R. Heller, chief of manned spaceflight support for

Mengel until 1967, when Ozro Covington took the newly created post of assistant

director for manned flight support. Only a small contingent of TAGIU personnel remained at Langley.* At headquarters in late 1961, the management of tracking and

data acquisition was centralized under Edmond Buckley. Planning and construction

over, the time had come for operations.

A concentration of five tracking facilities monitored the initial phases of a Mercury mission (see fig. 5-6). Through the Bermuda station, flight controllers determined if the conditions were satisfactory for inserting the spacecraft into orbit. If

they were not, the mission could be aborted, with the capsule making an emergency

splashdown in the Atlantic or on the African continent. If the spacecraft were put

into orbit successfully, it made its way over the Atlantic, looping over Africa

heading for Australia; from Australia the orbits swept north near the Hawaiian

Islands heading for Mexico and the southern U.S. On the final orbit, retrofire

maneuvers preparatory for landing took place as the spacecraft approached North

America, with splashdown occurring in the Atlantic. Eighteen stations were

prepared to track the typical three-orbit missions planned for Mercury.

Before the first manned orbital mission in 1962, the network had several tests.

Individual stations calibrated their equipment by tracking aircraft equipped with

Mercury-type electronics gear. Stations practiced procedures and simulated missions. The entire network participated in computer-controlled practice runs, during

which the specialists at Goddard analyzed response times and data flows, made suggestions for improvements, and called for more simulations. Mercury-Redstone

ballistic missions gave the Atlantic area stations a workout in December 1960 and

March 1961 and again in May and July when NASA put its first two astronauts into

space. The first orbital mission came on September 13, 1961. MA-4 (unmanned) was

tracked successfully by the net during its single orbit of earth. Network and STG

personnel had hoped to conduct a more thorough test of the tracking system via a

small instrumented satellite, but Mercury-Scout 1 was destroyed seconds after liftoff

on November 1, 1961. A technical error had caused the vehicle to behave erratically,

and the range safety officer had been forced to terminate the launch (see table

5-22).t There was no opportunity for a second try. 6 When the day finally came for

the first orbital manned flight, however, all network systems proved themselves.

* TAGIU leader Graves resumed his work with Langley's Instrument Research Division.

t At Langley, Barry Graves took part in planning this test.
548 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

MA-6 with John H. Glenn, Jr., aboard made three orbits on February 20, 1962,

while the network below tracked, communicated, and received data as it was designed to.t

tSee chapter 2 for more information on the manned spaceflight program.

Table 5-21.

NASA Manned Spaceflight

Tracking Stations

Station Original Used Used DoD Colocated Years

Mercury during during support w/STADAN or operational

station Gemini Apollo station DSN station (NASA only)

Antigua a

Antigua a x

Ascension a x

Ascension a

Bermuda x x

Canton Island x x

Cape Canaveral/ x x

Cape Kennedy

Carnarvon x

Corpus Christi x x

East Island b

Eglin x x

Goldstone

Grand Bahama a

Grand Bahama a x x

Grand Canary x x

Grand Turk x x

Guam

Guaymas x x

Honeysuckle Creek

Kano x x

Kauai x x

Kwajalein b

Madrid

Merritt Island

Muchea x

Patrick

Point Arguello x x

Pretoria x

San Nicolas b

Tananarive x

TEL-4

Vandenburg

Wake Island b

Wallops Island x x

White Sands x x

Woomera x x

Zanzibar x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x

x x

x x

x

x

x

x x

x

x x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x x

x

x x

x

x x

x

x x

x x

x x

x

x x

1967-70

1967-

1961-

1960-67

1961-

1964-74

1961-74

1967-

1967-70

1961-75

1961-?

1966-

1961-70

1967-

1961-67

1961-

1967-

1973-

1961-64

1961-?

196?-?

1965-75

1961-67

1961-66

1961-64
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION

Table 5-21.

NASA Manned Spaceflight

Tracking Stations (Continued)

549

Station Original Used Used DoD

Mercury during during support

station Gemini Apollo station

Colocated

w/STADAN or

DSN station

Years

operational

(NASA only)

Tracking ships:

American Mariner c x

Coastal 1 Sentry Quebec d x x x

Huntsville e x

Kingsport x x

Mercury d x

Range Tracker b x x

Redstone d x

Rose Knot Victo_ x x x

Twin Fall Victory x

Vanguard d x

Watertown e x x

Tracking aircraft:

ARIA (8)

aBoth NASA and DoD operated tracking facilities here that were used to support NASA missions.

The code letters used for the two stations always differed. See table 5-27 for information on how the stations were equipped.

b Used during Mercury 9 only.

CUsed during Mercury 8 only.

d All or part of the tracking and data acquisition instrumentation was owned by NASA.

eUsed during Mercury 8 and later modified for Apollo.

Table 5-22.

Mercury-Scout 1 (MS-l) Characteristics

Date of launch Nov. 1, 1961 (ETR)

(location):

Launch vehicle: Scout (Air Force Blue Scout)

Weight (kg): 68

Shape: Rectangular

Dimensions (m): .3 × .3 x .4

Power source: Battery

Date of reentry: N/A

Cognizant NASA LaRC (Space Task Group)

center."

Contractor:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

Ford Aeronautics Div., special Mercury instrumentation (C-band and S-band

beacons, 2 Minitrack beacons, 2 command receivers, 2 telemetry transmitters)

To provide a dynamic orbital target with which to test the Mercury tracking network

(181⁄2 hours of power available for testing operations).

Because of a technician's error before launch (connectors between pitch and yaw

rate gyros were transposed), the vehicle behaved erratically, and the range safety officer destroyed it 43 seconds after liftoff.

Also called Mercury Network Test Vehicle (MNTV). The Air Force provided the

launch vehicle and the launching operations to give the launch crews extra experience; NASA paid for the payload.
550 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

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5

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b

I
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 551

Like the satellite tracking system, the manned network changed to meet new

mission profiles. There were only two three-orbit manned Mercury flights. Since

astronauts Glenn and M. Scott Carpenter (MA-7, May 24, 1962) and their Mercury

spacecraft had experienced few problems during the first two missions, the third

flight was lengthened to 6 orbits, the fourth to 22 orbits. Since the tracks of the orbits for all missions would stay in a band of latitude of almost 66 degrees (roughly

33 °N by 33 °S), NASA did not have to provide a great amount of extra support for

the longer missions, but the network needed beefing up, especially in the Pacific.

For MA-8, the Rose Knot Victor, carrying new command equipment, was moved

from the Atlantic to the Pacific, south of Japan. Three other DoD instrumented

ships (American Mariner, Huntsville, and Watertown) were positioned near Midway

Island. These four ships assisted the network with both voice and telemetry operations. To support MA-9's 22 orbits, DoD provided NASA with supplementary

coverage from ships and ground stations. In the Pacific, Coastal Sentry Quebec,

Range Tracker, and Rose Knot Victor were added to the net, along with stations on

Wake Island, Kwajalein Island, and San Nicolas Island, California (voice only).

Twin Falls Victory operated in the Atlantic range, as did DoD facilities at Ascension

Island, Antigua, and East Island, Puerto Rico. In addition, DoD aircraft with voice

relay and radar equipment assisted during reentry and landing.

Before the Mercury stations were even operational, the Space Task Group was

thinking beyond earth orbital missions to lunar expeditions. They established an

Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Instrumentation and Tracking to study the new

problems they would face tracking and communicating with a manned spacecraft

near and on the moon. But NASA did not leap from Mercury to Apollo without an

intermediate step that allowed the agency to gain expertise with two-man crews in

larger and more sophisticated spacecraft, rendezvous maneuvers involving two

vehicles, and lengthier missions. The manned network had to expand its operations

as well during Project Gemini. By early summer 1962, specialists at Goddard were

ready with recommendations for how the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN)

should be changed to support the next step in manned flight, keeping in mind that

the network should be evolving toward a configuration that could eventually meet

Project Apollo's tracking requirements. Because Gemini's long missions would

repeatedly take the spacecraft beyond the normal limits of the Mercury stations, the

network would have to expand geographically if the project managers wanted voicecommunication time comparable to that required during Mercury. Goddard

trackers proposed less frequent voice contact, and the Gemini personnel in Houston

agreed to this constraint. For Mercury, several different frequencies had been used

for the communications subsystems (voice, telemetry, command, tracking); for the

trackers, unifying all these into a single frequency was highly desirable. But for the

designers and engineers at the Manned Spacecraft Center, this was an impossible-albeit admirable-goal that would require too many onboard systems

changes. For now, this idea was shelved. Both parties agreed to convert the analog

telemetry system to a more efficient digital system (pulse code modulation, or

PCM). Likewise, the tracking group in Maryland wanted the uplink commands in a

digital form so that station computers could handle both telemetry and command.

Because they feared software errors with the station computers, Gemini personnel

refused to go along with the command half of this scheme. Computer-driven

alphanumeric displays, however, was another area of agreement at Goddard and
552 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Houston.*Thetrackingstationswouldrequiremoreequipmentto trackandcommunicatewith twovehicles(eithera Geminispacecraftandanunmannedtarget

vehicleortwoGeminispacecraft)duringrendezvousmaneuvers.In addition,these

two-vehiclemissionswouldneedincreasedcomputersupportatmissioncontrol.For

mostof ProjectGeminiandallof Apollo,missioncontrolandmissioncomputing

wouldbecentralizedatthecenterin Houston,wherenewfacilitieswerebeingbuilt.

Goddardwouldcontinueitsroleasthetrackingoperationscenter.

Themovetowardincreasedcomputerizationanddecreasedvoicesupportmade

possiblea morecentralizednetworkwith fewerprimarystationsandmoresecondarystations.Somesitesthathadbeennecessaryfor Mercurycouldbedropped

duringGemini,althoughthosemajorfacilitiesthatstayedin thenetwouldhaveto

bebetterequipped.Someof thehardwarefromWoomerastationandtheentire

facilityatMucheawerecombinedtomadeanewprimaryAustralianstationatCarnarvon.OtherprimarystationsincludedCapeKennedy,Bermuda,GrandCanary,

Kauai,Guaymas,andCorpusChristi.Addingtheirsupportothelaunchareawere

Eglin,GrandBahama,GrandTurk, Antigua,Ascension,andRose Knot Victor

(with command capabilities). In Africa, secondary stations were operated at Kano

and Pretoria. When the Zanzibar station had to be abandonded in 1964 because of a

revolution that threatened the safety of the personnel, Tananarive in the Malagasy

Republic off the east coast of Africa became that locale's secondary station.

Woomera offered radar and voice support in Australia. Canton Island and Coastal

Sentry Quebec (with command capabilities), positioned south of Japan, helped

bridge the Pacific. At the end of the orbital track were Point Arguello and White

Sands, now secondary stations. A large industry team had the Gemini network "on

line" by the spring of 1964, in time for practice runs during a Saturn vehicle test

(SA-6), the first Gemini-Titan flight (GT-1, unmanned), and a Centaur vehicle

development mission (AC-3). All was ready in 1965 for the first manned Gemini

flight. 1 7

Gemini's first manned mission (Gemini 3), a three-orbit check-out flight, took

place on March 23, 1965. The next two flights gave the network its first lengthy exercise-62 and 120 orbits (Gemini 4 and 5, June and August 1965). In December,

Gemini 7 and 6-A conducted rendezvous maneuvers. The net was kept especially

busy in 1966 with five missions, all of which included rendezvous and docking

operations by the Gemini spacecraft with unmanned target vehicles. The centralized

network with its reduced number of primary stations proved adequate for Gemini.

Apollo, however, would force further changes on the system.

Apollo activities would include operations near earth, in cislunar space, in lunar

orbit, and on the moon's surface, most of which was beyond the manned network's

grasp as it was configured for Mercury and Gemini. But NASA had begun to consult

*During their first meeting in June 1962, Goddard tracking specialists and Project Gemini personnel

from MSC did not agree on many items on the trackers' list of proposed changes. By the time of their next

major session in June 1963, the two sides were able to work out an agreement on how the network should

be instrumented.

"lThe companies participating in the construction and equipping of the Gemini network were ITT,

Canoga Electronics Corp., Bendix Corp., Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., RCA, IBM, AT&T, Collins Radio Co., Radiation, Inc., and UNIVAC.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 553

with deep space tracking experts regarding Apollo's unique requirements as early as

1961. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, had been in the

tracking and data acquisition business since the early 1950s and had begun construction of its first 26-meter diameter dish antenna for tracking lunar probes before

NASA was established. In 1961 when the Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Instrumentation began its work, the Deep Space Network was already four stations

strong with a fifth under construction. The Mercury-Gemini stations could be

adapted for Apollo's near-earth operations, and JPL's 26-meter antennas or ones

like them could reach out to Apollo spacecraft on and near the moon. However,

there was some doubt as to whether there were enough conventional MSFN stations

to enable the controllers to monitor two critical events: the transition from earth orbit to a lunar trajectory and the narrow-corridor, high-speed reentry into earth's atmosphere. And Apollo, with its requirement for television, would be sending back

more telemetry than the Mercury-Gemini stations could receive. NASA would have

to uprate the equipment at existing stations and augment the ground communications system before the network was ready for lunar missions.

In 1962, Edmond Buckley, director of the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition at NASA Headquarters, appointed Gerald Truszynski to lead an Apollo Task

Group composed of specialists from headquarters, Goddard, and JPL. Working

with spacecraft designers at the Manned Spacecraft Center and at North American,

where spacecraft design studies were being prepared under contract, this task group

shaped the Apollo network. Their decision to introduce a unified (and higher) frequency band, the S-band, for Apollo communications was especially important.*

Unified S-band (USB) might have been too great a leap for Gemini, but the experts

considered it a necessity for the manned lunar venture. One unified carrier system on

the spacecraft would take less space, weigh less, cause less heating, and require less

power than a multicarrier system. Another consideration was the better signal-tonoise ratio the ground crews and astronauts would experience at the higher S-band

frequency.t By November 1962, the tracking people were ready with an instrumentation support plan for near-earth Apollo operations, and OTDA had officially requested JPL's assistance with the lunar portion of the flight plan and with the

development of a USB system. Planning over the next year called for the expansion

of Gemini stations with the installation of 9-meter USB antennas and associated

equipment and the construction of three 26-meter USB stations roughly 120 degrees

apart around the globe, located near Deep Space Network antennas at Goldstone

*S-band is that band of radio frequencies extending from 1550 to 5200 megacycles (in the upper portion of the ultra-high frequency spectrum and the lower portion of the super-high frequency). The

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) wanted space communications moved out of the crowded

VHF range and into higher frequencies.

tThe original Deep Space Network stations were equipped with L-band rather than S-band equipment, but in 1962 the decision was made to convert to the higher frequency. Because of ongoing missions

(primarily Ranger) that would suffer from an immediate changeover, an L/S conversion system was

devised. New facilities were provided with S-band; older stations were equipped with the L/S converter.

Complete transition to S-band was completed by 1967. This commitment to S-band by the DSN influenced the MSFN planners' decision to adopt the higher frequency for Apollo.
554 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

(Mojave Desert, California), Canberra, Australia, and Madrid.* USB instrumentation and C-band radar would be installed on 5 tracking ships and VHF/UHF and

USB equipment on 8 aircraft. These mobile stations would add flexible support in

areas where there were no ground stations. As it had for Mercury and Gemini, DoD

would augment the network with its stations, especially in the south Atlantic. The

Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition had

an enormous number of requirements to juggle and a great many participants to

oversee. Their efforts to implement the Apollo instrumentation plan were complicated further by the ongoing Gemini activity in which they could not interfere.

Apollo and network managers planned to streamline the Apollo network after

thc new equipment (especially the USB) proved itself and after lunar exploration

missions became more "routine." But for the first round of manned Apollo flights

the network was a large one, with 14 primary stations (11 of which were equipped

with 9-meter USB antennas), 5 ships (see fig. 5-7), 5 aircraft (see fig. 5-8), 4 secondary stations, and 9 DoD support stations. Along the launch path, Antigua, Ascension, Bermuda, Grand Bahama, Merritt Island, Grand Canary, and the Vanguard

were prime; secondary support came from DoD stations at Cape Kennedy, Antigua,

Ascension, Grand Bahama, Merritt Island, and Patrick Air Force Base. The Madrid

MSFN station was the primary tracking facility in Europe, with support coming

from a nearby DSN antenna (Cebreros). Off the African coast, STADAN's

Tananarive station added its equipment to the net, while DoD's Pretoria operated on

the mainland. In Australia, Carnarvon and the new Canberra station were backed

up by the DSN works at Tidbinbilla. Across the Pacific were Guam and Kauai, plus

the Huntsville, Mercury, and Redstone. The last primary stations on the track were

Goldstone, Guaymas, and Corpus Christi. Secondary support was available for the

DSN Pioneer antenna at Goldstone and DoD's Vandenburg Air Force Base and

White Sands Missile Range (see fig. 5-9).

Network managers insisted that the Manned Space Flight Network be given a

thorough examination before it supported an Apollo mission. As with other network configurations before it, NASA tested the Apollo system with simulations and

calibrated the stations with the help of instrumented aircraft. But to exercise the

near-earth components of the network and evaluate how well the stations and mission control in Houston worked together, network specialists called for the launching of a satellite that MSFN could use as a tracking target. In contrast to the hastily

pulled-together Mercury Scout, four Test and Training Satellites (TTSs) were planned for Apollo, to be launched in 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1971, thereby exercising the

network as it evolved during the program. Designed to be launched piggyback-style

along with another payload by the improved Thor-Delta vehicle, the small tracking

satellite was equipped with a radio transponder that allowed it to receive radio

signals and return them on a different frequency. TTS 1 and 2 were launched and

tracked successfully prior to the Apollo 5 (unmanned) and Apollo 8 (first manned

*By locating the MSFN 26-meter antennas near existing DSN facilities, the manned network could

rely on the deep space antennas as backups in case of equipment failure and as a means for communicating with two lunar spacecraft simultaneously, as would be the case when Apollo's lunar module

separated from the command module and descended to the moon's surface. New MSFN support wings

were built at the three DSN stations so that Apollo ground operations would not interfere with scientific

missions they might be supporting.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQU ISITION 555 

a 

E 

a 

z 

Iz 

I-u 

ZI a3 
556 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

1. ANTENNA CONTROL

2. SPACECRAFT COMM

3. TLM RECORDING HF PROBE

4. SYSTEMS MONITOR ANTENNA

5. GROUND COMM

6. TIMING

7. POWER CONTROL

COMBINED

S-BAND/VHF

ANTENNA

HF TRAILING WIRE

ANTENNA

WEATHER

RADAR

Figure 5-8. Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft (ARIA)

lunar orbital) missions (see table 5-23). To test MSFN's new lunar operations station, NASA exacted a double duty from Lunar Orbiter spacecraft that were

photographing the moon in search of safe and scientifically interesting landing areas

for Surveyor (unmanned) and Apollo. The new facilities at Goldstone, Madrid, and

Canberra, along with MSFN 9-meter stations, passively and actively tracked Lunar

Orbiters in 1966-1967, a valuable experience for the technicians operating the stations and extra insurance for Apollo.*

There was a hiatus of almost two years between the last Gemini and the first

manned Apollo missions. The trackers spent the time installing new equipment,

training personnel, and practicing the many new procedures Apollo would demand

of them. When Apollo 7's crew of three orbited earth in October 1968 in a successful

test of spacecraft operations, the network was also proven operational. In

December, Apollo 8 took its crew to the moon, orbiting earth's natural satellite 10

times. Scientific and engineering telemetry, photographic images, voice communications- all were received in good order by MSFN ground stations. Apollo was on its

way to meeting the ambitious goal President John F. Kennedy had established for

NASA.

*See chapter 3 for information on the five Lunar Orbiter missions.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 557

k

/

l

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<

8
558 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

o
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION

Table 5-23.

Test and Training Satellite (TTS) Characteristics

559

TTS-1 TTS-2

Date of launch Dec. 13, 1967 (ETR) Nov. 8, 1968 (ETR)

(location):

Launch vehicle: Thrust-augmented Improved Thor-Delta (TAID)

Weight (kg): 18.14 18.14

Shape: Octahedral

Dimensions (m):

Height: .61

Each side: .279

Power source: NiCd batteries plus solar cells

Date of reentry: April 28, 1968 Sept. 19, 1979

Cognizant NASA GSFC

cen ter:

Objectives:

Results:

Remarks:

To serve as a target for the Apollo tracking network. Equipped with a transponder,

the satellite could receive radio signals and return them on a different frequency.

The two satellites successfully simulated Apollo earth orbital characteristics, giving

the Apollo network opportunities to practice tracking and communicating with

Apollo-type spacecraft.

Also called TETR-1 and -2. The two satellites were launched with Pioneer 8 and 9,

respectively.

Table 5-24.

Chronology of Manned Space Flight Network

(MSFN) Development and Operations

Date Event

Spring 1945

May 1946

1950

1952

The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) established the

Pilotless Aircraft Research Station at Wallops Island, Virginia. PARD, the

division assigned to the new station, was charged with testing model aircraft

and aerodynamic shapes. Using the Atlantic as their test range, the specialists

tracked experimental vehicles with radar and analyzed the telemetry signals

they received. PARD launched its first rocket on July 4, 1945.

An Army Signal Corps team led by Ozro M. Covington began instrumenting

the White Sands Missile Range.

Guided missile launchings were begun at Florida's Long Range Proving

Ground (LRPG). Downrange tracking and observation stations were

established in the Bahamas and on other nearby islands (1600-kilometer

range). After the Air Force announced its plans in August for the acceleration of its missile program, steps were taken to establish additional tracking

stations in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.

The Air Force Missile Test Center (AFMTC), formerly the LRPG, was planning to extend its missile range to 8000 kilometers with stations at Barbados,

off the coast of Brazil in the south Atlantic, and at Dutch Guiana and French

Guiana. These stations would be connected by an undersea cable communications system. The expanded tracking-data acquisition system would

include equipment borne by aircraft and ships.
560 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 5-24.

Chronology of Manned Space Flight Network

(MSFN) Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

1955-1957

1958

Spring 1958

June 1958

November 1958

Jan. 1959

April 2, 1959

May 21, 1959

Summer 1959

The Naval Research Laboratory planned and put into operation its Minitrack

satellite tracking system. At White Sands and other missile ranges in the

U.S., the radar and communications equipment used for tracking operations

were becoming increasingly sophisticated. The system employed at White

Sands was called MINSTREL (Missile Instrumentation by Electronic

Means), a centralized real-time system. Both Air Force and NACA personnel

had begun to investigate a global tracking scheme for the Air Force's proposed Dyna-Soar orbital lifting body.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) approved the Department

of Defense's (DoD) Discoverer satellite project, which was originally planned

as part of an investigation of the technological problems the Air Force would

face in putting man into space. Although Discoverer did not lead to an Air

Force manned program, it did provide NASA and the services with data on a

number of topics and was instrumental in establishing a worldwide radar network that would benefit the newly established civilian space agency's Project

Mercury.

In March, NACA Director Hugh Dryden suggested that NACA, the military,

and others interested in the subject establish a Working Group on Ranges,

Launch, and Tracking Facilities. ARPA also established an ad hoc committee known as GBIS (Ground Based Information System for Support of

Manned Space Flight). At NACA's Langley center, Edmond C. Buckley of

the Instrument Research Division directed a group of specialists (the Tracking System Study Group) to study spaceflight instrumentation problems, including ground and range instrumentation.

The Air Force published a report entitled "Ground Based Information

Systems for the Support of Manned Space Flight."

On the 5th, NASA established the Space Task Group (STG) to implement the

civilian manned spaceflight program. STG was to have become a part of the

new Beltsville Space Center (later Goddard Space Flight Center), but in the

interim the group was housed at Langley Research Center. NASA set up an

Atlantic Missile Range Operations Office at AFMTC.

It was recommended that STG be relieved of the responsibility for developing

the manned tracking network for Mercury. On the 26th, Buckley's tracking

group was enlarged and became known as the Tracking and Ground Instrumentation Unit (TAGIU). Buckley was assigned to NASA Headquarters

as assistant director for spaceflight operations. G. Barry Graves, Jr., was

named the new leader of TAGIU. Also in January, NASA and DoD officials

signed an agreement regarding global tracking centers.

A preliminary bidders' briefing on tracking, telemetry, and telecommunications plans for Project Mercury was held at Langley.

TAGIU issued its "Specifications for Tracking and Ground Instrumentation

for Project Mercury" (S-45).

NASA contracted with four companies to accomplish tracking and data acquisition tasks: Ford Aeronutronics-radar and trajectory computation

study; RCA Service Corp.-network specification writing; Space Electronics-mission control center design; and MIT Lincoln Laboratories-general consultation and proposal evaluation. TAGIU also sought

the assistance of Goddard computing and communications specialists (under

the management of Goddard's Niles R. Heller).
TRACKINGANDDATAACQUISITION 561

Table 5-24.

Chronology of Manned Space Flight Network

(MSFN) Devdopment and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

June 22, 1959

July 1959

July 29, 1959

July 30, 1959

July-Aug. 1959

Oct. 30, 1959

Jan. 11, 1960

April 1960

July 7, 1960

Sept. 14, 1960

Oct. 1960

Jan. 6, 1961

Spring 1961

Mid-1961

Sept. 13, 1961

Nov. 1961

Nov. 1, 1961

Langley sent requests for proposals to industry based on S-45.

The X-15 High-Range was put into operation with its three radar tracking

facilities. Edmond Buckley had been responsible for much of this work (he

had also worked on the instrumentation of the NACA Wallops Island facility).

A second edition of the network specifications was issued (S-45A).

NASA awarded a letter contract to an industry team-Western Electric, Bell

Telephone Laboratories, Bendix, Burns and Row, and IBM-for the

development of the manned spaceflight network.

NASA informed the following foreign governments that it required their

cooperation in establishing tracking stations: Bermuda, Nigeria, Zanzibar,

Australia, Guadalcanal, Canton Island, Mexico, and Spain (for Grand

Canary Island).

A third edition of the network specifications was issued (S-45B).

NASA executed a definitive contract with WECo, the industry team.

Construction was begun on the first foreign Mercury tracking station.

The first meeting of the Mercury Network Coordination Committee was held

at Cape Canaveral. This group was assigned the task of overseeing problems,

primarily operational, that faced the network.

A Space Flight Ground Environment Panel, part of the newly created

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (interagency), was

established to handle network coordination matters.

Operational testing was begun at the Mercury stations.

The newly created Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Instrumentation and

Tracking (established by STG) held its first meeting. This body was in charge

of studying the problems of tracking, commanding, and communicating with

a manned lunar spacecraft.

Construction of all foreign Mercury tracking stations was completed. Plans

were made to assign responsibility for the operation of the Mercury network

to Goddard during the third quarter of 1961.

Ozro Covington and other personnel from White Sands were transferred to

Goddard to assist with the conversion of the Mercury network into a more

advanced system capable of supporting manned projects beyond Mercury.

Covington became deputy assistant director for tracking and data systems at

Goddard.

The Mercury network functioned as planned during the first orbital flight

(MA-4, unmanned). There were 19 stations in operation (Cape Canaveral,

Grand Bahama, Grand Turk, Bermuda, Grand Canary, Kano, Zanzibar,

Muchea, Woomera, Canton Island, Kauai_ Pt. Arguello, Guaymas, White

Sands, Corpus Christi, and Eglin, plus 2 instrumented ships in the Indian and

Atlantic Oceans. The communications center was at Goddard.

STG moved to the new Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston, Texas.

An attempt to test the Mercury network with a small communications

satellite (Mercury-Scout 1) failed because of a technician's error prior to

launch. The vehicle was destroyed 43 seconds after liftoff.
562 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 5-24.

Chronology of Manned Space Flight Network

(MSFN) Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Feb. 20, 1962

May 24, 1962

June 1962

July 20, 1962

Summer-fall 1962

Oct. 3, 1962

Nov. 23, 1962

March 11, 1963

April 23, 1963

June 1963

Late 1963

The standard Mercury network functioned as planned during the first two

orbital missions (MA-6 and 7).

Goddard engineers advised Project Gemini personnel of the changes that

would be required in the tracking network to support more advanced missions.

NASA announced that a new mission control center would be built at MSC

for Gemini. This center would also assume the mission computing tasks that

had been performed at Goddard.

Goddard specialists worked on definition studies of an Apollo network. At

MSC and at North American Aviation where designers were working on

studies for the Apollo spacecraft, a decision was made to employ unified

S-band (USB) for Apollo communications. Network people had already been

considering th e S-band option, and once the decision was made they directed

their plans for the network accordingly.

The MA-8 mission was six orbits long; three instrumented DoD ships were

added to the net. MSC requested the support of the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory (JPL) in developing a tracking and communications network for

Apollo. JPL personnel (Eberhardt Rechtin and Walter Victor) had been serving as consultants to the Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Instrumentation and Tracking since early 1961 because of their experience with deep

space tracking. Apollo's network would require the technology and services

represented by the Deep Space Network for lunar operations support.

Goddard contributed its plans for an Apollo network in the form of a report,

"A Ground Instrumentation Support Plan for the Near-Earth Phases of

Apollo Missions" (X-520-62-211).

In a NASA Headquarters Apollo management plan, JPL was identified as a

major participant in the MSFN, along with Goddard.

The MA-9 mission was 22 orbits long. Various adjustments were made in the

network to support the additional orbits (DoD sites provided extra tracking

and telemetry capabilities).

Goddard tracking and data acquisition personnel met again with Gemini

managers to discuss their proposed changes to the tracking network, which

had not been met with enthusiasm in Houston the previous year. At this

meeting, project managers agreed to the network plan with two stipulations:

station computers would be used for telemetry processing only, and the USB

proposal could not be implemented. The Gemini net would require fewer

prime stations than had Mercury's, but the primary stations that were

planned would be better equipped (secondary stations with limited facilities

would support the main stations).

Plans for the Apollo network called for the expansion of 7 Gemini stations to

include 9-meter USB equipment; the construction of 9-meter USB stations at

Merritt Island, Ascension, Antigua, and Guam; the construction of 3

26-meter USB stations at Goldstone, Canberra, and Madrid; the addition of

wings to existing Deep Space Network stations at Goldstone (Pioneer

station), Cebreros (Madrid), the Tidbinbilla (Canberra); the conversion of 5

ships to provide USB and C-band radar; and the conversion of 8 aircraft to

provide VHF/UHF and USB. The Apollo Network Implementation Plan

was drawn up on November 11.
TRACKINGANDDATAACQUISITION 563

Table 5-24.

Chronology of Manned Space Flight Network

(MSFN) Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

April 20, 1964

March 23, 1965

May 1965

June 3-7, 1965

Aug. 21-29, 1965

Dec. 4-18, 1965

March-Nov. 1966

Sept.-Dec. 1966

Jan.-June 1967

July 1967-Feb. 1968

Nov. 9, 1967

Dec. 13, 1967

Oct. 11-22, 1968

Nov. 8, 1968

Dec. 21-27, 1968

In answer to plans for an accelerated flight schedule and other changes suggested by MSC, the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition at NASA Headquarters issued a second Apollo Network Implementation Plan.

The first manned Gemini mission (Gemini 3), only three orbits, took place

successfully. The tracking network functioned as planned.

NASA and DoD officials signed a document outlining cooperative activities

the two organizations would be participating in during Apollo: "DOD-NASA

Agreement regarding Land-based Tracking, Data Acquisition, and Communications Facilities."

The first lengthy manned Gemini mission (Gemini 4) was tracked successfully

by the MSFN during its 62 orbits.

During Gemini 5, the new mission control center in Houston assumed

responsibility for the computing aspects of the mission.

Gemini 6,4 and 7 accomplished rendezvous maneuvers on Dec. 15-16. The

tracking network successfully coped with the double load.

Five Gemini missions (Gemini 8, 9,4, 10, 11, and 12) took place in which the

Gemini spacecraft rendezvoused (and at times docked) with target vehicles.

The network tracked these pairs of spacecraft successfully.

The following MSFN stations became operational for Apollo: Carnarvon,

Bermuda, Corpus Christi, Cape Kennedy, Kauai, Guaymas, Guam, and one

of five instrumented ships.

The following MSFN stations became operational for Apollo: Ascension,

Goldstone, Canberra, and Grand Bahama.

The following MSFN stations became operational for Apollo: Antigua,

Madrid, Grand Canary, and the remaining four ships.

The Apollo net participated in the Apollo 4 mission, an unmanned orbital

test of the launch vehicle and spacecraft (command module).

The launch of TTS-I was successful. This small satellite served as a training

target for the Apollo network.

The first manned Apollo mission (Apollo 7), earth orbital, took place successfully, and the tracking net functioned as planned. (Parts of the MSFN

had been used in 1966-1968 to track unmanned Apollo-Saturn development

flights and Lunar Orbiter spacecraft.)

The launch of TTS-2 was successful. This was a second training satellite for

the Apollo net.

The first lunar orbital Apollo mission (Apollo 8) took place successfully with

a crew Of three. MSFN tracked the spacecraft as planned during its 10 orbits

of the moon.
564 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

DESCRIPTION--DEEP SPACE NETWORK

Tracking a man-made object beyond the confines of earth orbit became an official requirement in March 1958 when the Advanced Research Projects Agency

(ARPA) approved the Pioneer lunar probe series, with both the Army and the Air

Force participating independently. Communications specialists at the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) had been alerted to the

possibility of participating in such a mission in late 1957 when Cal Tech's president

and JPL's director had suggested to the Department of Defense that the country

pursue this particular goal.* Having been involved as a partner in the Army's early

missile and satellite work, JPL's experienced tracking-communications team was

able to suggest two possible schemes for tracking a spacecraft that would be

operating at such distances from earth that it would appear as a star, rising and setting each day.

One of JPL's deep space radio tracking plans called for a single station in the

U.S. equipped with a large parabolic dish antenna. The station would be in contact

with the spacecraft during a single period daily when it was in view. Another scheme

included three stations. A network of three antennas located roughly 120 degrees

apart in longitude would provide continuous support for lunar and planetary spacecraft. Obviously, the three-station plan would give project personnel more opportunities for receiving data, monitoring spacecraft systems, and controlling the vehicle. But implementing such a network would require facilities in foreign countries

and a reliable global ground communications system. Because the Army's first

Pioneer lunar probe was scheduled for launch in late 1958, JPL could not build an

entire network, but the tracking specialists did have time to erect a 26-meterdiameter antenna (Pioneer station) in southern California's Mojave Desert and

deploy a mobile station near Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, for the first mission (see fig.

5-11). Unfortunately, none of the early Pioneer probes was successful. The Army's

Pioneer 3 did not achieve the velocity required for a lunar trajectory; Pioneer 4 did

not pass close enough to the moon for its experiments to record lunar data. The

tracking system, however, operated as planned, following Pioneer 4 some 651 200

kilometers.

JPL's tracking team, under the overall direction of NASA Headquarters and the

local leadership of telecommunications expert Eberhardt Rechtin, was occupied

over the next several years with building and improving the three components of

their deep space tracking system: a mission control center at JPL (the Space Flight

Operations Facility); a communications system that linked the tracking stations with

*Because of its increasing interest in advanced propulsion, the Guggenheim Aeronautical

Laboratory (GALCIT) of the California Institute of Technology was renamed the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory in 1943. Rocket propulsion and its possible applications to spaceflight was a natural extension of JPL's work in aeronautics. The lab's relationship with the Army and other organizations was a

contractural one. When NASA assumed responsibility for the Pioneer lunar probe series and other projects in 1958, it also assumed authority for JPL's facilities and personnel. Although technically JPL continued in its role as a contractor, operating a government-owned facility, functionally NASA Headquarters dealt with the lab as if it were another field center.
TRACKINGANDDATAACQUISITION 565

mission control and operated as part of the broader NASCOM (the Ground Communications Facility); and the network of stations (the Deep Space Instrumentation

Facility). The original three-station plan had been altered somewhat. Antennas that

were to have been placed in Nigeria and the Philippines were destined for Spain and

Australia. A South African site was also added to the net. These locations would offer the best support for NASA's lunar and planetary missions. But before construction of the first foreign station was begun, the Mojave Desert site (Goldstone) was

expanded. Echo station, built to track NASA's passive communications satellites,

became operational in April 1960. That fall, a 26-meter antenna near Woomera,

Australia, be_ -me the first overseas facility to begin operations. In time for the first

attempt at se_,ding Ranger probes to the moon, Johannesburg station and a mobile

compatibility test station at Cape Canaveral were added to the list. These additions

gave the network the strength to support two deep space missions simultaneously,

which it did during the fall of 1962 with Ranger 5 and Mariner 2 (Venus flyby). A second Australian station, Tidbinbilla near Canberra, and one in Spain, Robledo near

Madrid, plus a large 64-meter antenna at Goldstone (Mars station) were all under

construction in 1963. The manager of the Deep Space Network (DSN), as this expanding system came to be called, received permission to erect a permanent test station at the Cape in 1964. Goldstone saw one more DSN station put into operation;

Venus station with a 26-meter antenna would serve the net as a research and

development facility.

It was at this juncture that Project Apollo and the Office of Manned Space

Flight intruded on the deep space trackers' world of scientific missions. The Manned

Space Flight Network (MSFN) would be able to support relatively simple earth orbital operations, such as Mercury and Gemini flights, but Apollo planners proposed

operating two spacecraft simultaneously, one in lunar orbit and one on the moon.

Tracking lunar spacecraft was not possible with the manned network as configured

for Gemini; JPL's special expertise with deep space communications was in demand

on two fronts. Top-level managers at JPL were understandably reluctant to become

deeply involved in the Apollo enterprise, especially since the coming years promised

to be very active ones at the Pasadena center. Besides supporting JPL's Ranger lunar

probes, Surveyor lunar landers, and Mariner interplanetary craft, the Deep Space

Network would also be called on to participate in the Pioneer interplanetary probe

series being managed at Ames Research Center and the Lunar Orbiter project of the

Langley center. DSN personnel and facilities would assist with Apollo's operations,

but in a manner that did not negatively influence their primary roles.

The end result of the combined JPL-manned network effort was a hybrid.

Apollo's near-earth activities were supported by existing MSFN stations; lunar

operations were the task of three new 26-meter antennas built near DSN stations at

Goldstone, near Madrid, and in Australia. New wings that housed duplicate control

equipment were built at the three DSN stations so that the manned network could

augment its system or use the DSN antennas as backups without disturbing ongoing

ground operations. At Goldstone, a MSFN wing was added to Pioneer station in

1964. A new station being built near Madrid, Cebreros, was also equipped with a

dual wing. Tidbinbilla near Canberra was the last to get the extra ground equipment

it would need to support Apollo. A joint DSN-MSFN station with a 9-meter antenna

was also established on Ascension Island in 1965. As discussed elsewhere in this

chapter, the Apollo net proved successful in supporting the first manned spacecraft

to orbit the moon in 1968.
566 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

In addition to its traditional role as spacecraft tracker, the DSN was put to use

as a radio astronomy tool. Goldstone's Venus station was especially active in this

area. Built to serve as an advanced engineering and development facility with a highpower radio transmitter, the antenna beamed radar signals to the moon, Venus,

Mercury, Mars, and Jupiter. By measuring the returned signals, scientists speculated

on the surface characteristics of the bodies and added to their knowledge of the

planets' positions and locations. In addition to the 26-meter reflector antenna,

Venus station was equipped with a 1/7-scale model of the large antenna built for the

Goldstone Mars station (see fig. 5-12). With the model, technicians tested the design

and operation of the 64-meter antenna's feed system. After Mars station became

operational in 1966, 5 percent of its working time was also allocated to radio science

experiments. DSN equipment could also be used for other investigations; for example, by measuring the Doppler shift and signal attenuation characteristics of a signal

that has passed through a planetary atmosphere scientists can obtain a temperaturepressure profile of the atmosphere.

JPL's Space Flight Operations Facility was the functional center of the network

(see fig. 5-14). As the net evolved, the operations facility changed with it. Old computers were exchanged for new ones; new ones were used in series; more efficient

techniques for data storage were put to use. The transition from single-mission to

multimission support demanded a multimission telemetry system. And network

managers wanted equipment and procedures that could accommodate the Mariner

Mars 1969 goal of telemetering of 16 200 bits of data to earth during each second of

transmission. In 1968, prototype high-rate telemetry hardware was installed and

checked out at JPL and elsewhere in the net.

Eberhardt Rechtin, leader of the tracking group at JPL throughout most of the

decade, joined JPL in 1949. In a 1963 reorganization of the lab, Rechtin's title was

changed from chief of telecommunications (division 33) to assistant laboratory

director for tracking and data acquisition. In addition, he served as director of the

Deep Space Instrumentation Facility. Also vital to the management of the DSN in a

number of capacities were Walter K. Victor, Nichola A. Renzetti, and J. W. Thatcher. William H. Bayley was general manager of the network from 1963 until 1967,

when he took the lead position from Rechtin, who left JPL to become director of the

Advanced Research Projects Agency. One person at the laboratory was usually

assigned to manage the tracking operations for each individual project or group of

related projects (e.g., in 1965, there was a tracking and data systems manager for

Lunar Orbiter, one for Mariner, Surveyor, and Ranger, and another for Pioneer

and Apollo). The field stations all had directors; supervisors for communications,

data systems, USB systems, and facilities answered to them. The NASA Headquarters Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition had overall management authority for the Deep Space Network and its operations, s
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 567
568 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

\

\

\

\

\

MARS

STATION

GOLDSTONE

DRY LAKE

GOLDSTONE

\

|PIONEER

\

JCOLL TOWER

\

\

ANTENNA

\

MOJAVE _ MOJAVE RELAY SITE ANTENNA RANGE SITE \

s",;v L,c.o w

I

COLL TOWERS

I

ECHO ROAD" 'll// _ C_. I

I _o_ o t

ECHO _0,._ ,

STATION "_ VE ,_,.,

I _ "N_ TO FORT

I'COLL _O / IRWIN

Figure 5-12. Deep Space network 64-meter Antenna. The Deep Space Network extended its

range to the most distant planets of the solar system with the addition of a 64-meter-diameter

antenna at Goldstone. The Mars station parabolic antenna could maintain spacecraft communications to a distance of 21⁄2 to 3 times the range achieved by the 26-meter antennas and

had 61⁄2 times more transmitting and receiving capability. Standing 71 meters" tall, the structure weighed 7.2 million kilograms. Its azimuth-elevadon mount and motors (1300 horsepoweO

couM move the giant dish from a horizon-pointing attitude to a straight-up position in 3 minutes.

Mars station went into operation in 1966, and NASA planned two additional 64-meter stations for ,4 ustralia and Spain.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 569

OUADRIPOD SUPPORT.

7

CASSEGRAINIAN

SUBREFLECTOR ___

ALIDADE _'_

PRIMARY REFLECTOR i

PEDES1

.='...:.."r,r,_: "'. i !_ "

CABLE wRAP-uP' .

/I_/PRIMARY REFLECTOR STRUCTURE

FEED CONE HOIST

ELEVATION WHEEL AND

CK-UP STRUCTURE

_PRECISlON ANGLE-DATA

TEM ASTRODOME

_ ,LEVR, 'ON

A S,M"LY f \ ''ST"UM Nr

¢ _j/ TOWER

"_\\\'_, /2"_/,I......ELEVATION DRIVE

_\,,_ ASSEMBLY

ALIDADE BUILDING

_j AZIMUTH RADIAL

IlllillrilUIIl[l_iil_ EAR'NG

I_ilI_J_IJ_AZlMUTH DRIVE

_--_ ASSEMBLY

Ilm_ n'rrll _=_',,HYDROSTAT_C

lt|l " R J_ "THRUST

...._L.....__._R,NG

Figure 5-13. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Goldstone Space Commun&ations Station in

southern California's Mojave Desert was the site of the largestcollection of NASA tracking

equipment. In addition to the Mojave STADAN satellite station and the Apollo station with

its 26-m antenna, there were four deep space stations at this location: Mars (64-m antenna),

Pioneer (26-m), Echo (26-m), and Venus (26-m). These facilities were built on a 176-squarekilometer plot of land leased by NASA from DoD.
570 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

TELEMETRY J

CAPE

DSS 72,

ASCENSION

CAPE

GOLDSTONE

COMMAN

GOLDSTONE

DSS 61,

ROBLEDO GOLDSTONE

_SS 42,

JOHANNES- TIDBINBILLA

Figure 5-14. Deep Space network Mission Operations. during a mission, the several deep space

stations fed data to the Space Flight Operations Facility at JPL. In turn, the flight controllers

at JPL coordinated the traacking and data acquisition needs of the mission and commended

the spacecraft through the ground stations. This figure depicts the Deep Space Network as

it was configured for the Surveyor lunar landing missions. The arrows indicate what form

or forms the interaction between mission control and the stations took. Note that the communications links available at each station are also indicated.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION

Table 5-25.

Deep Space Network Stations

571

Station Number Antenna (m) MSFN equipment Years operational

Ascension Island 72 9 x 1966-68

Cape Kennedy Compatibility 71 1.3 1965-

Test Station*

Cebrerost 62 26 x 1967-

Goldstone Echo 12 26 1960-

Goldstone Mars 14 64 1966-

Goldstone Pioneer 11 26 x 1958-

Goldstone Venus 13 26 1962-

Johannesburg 51 26 1961-74

Robledot 61 26 1965-

Tidbinbilla 42 26 x 1965-

Woomera 41 26 1960-72

*Before the permanent facility was built, DSN had a temporary station at the Cape.

tCebreros and Robledo were both sometimes referred to as Madrid station.

Table 5-26.

Chronology of Deep Space Network (DSN)

Development and Operations

Date Event

1944-1947

March 15, 1953

Early 1954

Summer-fall 1955

Sept. 1956

Nov. 1957

As part of their work for the Army in developing the Corporal missile,

specialists at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in California devised

guidance and telemetry systems for the liquid propellant missile (Sperry

Gyroscope Co. assisted with the design of the guidance system). The

telemetry system used frequency modulation and phase modulation techniques. Testing of the Corporal began in 1947, with operational deployment

in 1954.

In a report, F.W. Lehan and Robert J. Parks of JPL suggested using a phaselocked loop as a narrow-band tracking filter in the recovery of Doppler data.

Eberhardt Rechtin and Richard Jaffe, also of JPL, followed up this research

and refined the concept.

In a proposal to the Army for the design of the Sergeant missile, JPL suggested a radio system that would provide range and velocity information

(Coded Doppler and Ranging Communications).

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) submitted a proposal to the

Department of Defense (DoD) for an earth orbital International Geophysical

Year (IGY) satellite (Project Orbiter) to be launched by a Redstone booster

and a JPL-designed upper stage. JPL had also devised a telemetry system for

the proposal; tracking would be done optically. DoD chose instead the

Navy's Vanguard proposal, which included a radio tracking scheme.

However, ABMA and JPL continued to work on their design (the launch

vehicle was subsequently designated Jupiter C).

As part of the Reentry Test Vehicle Program, the first Jupiter C was successfully launched down the Atlantic missile range in a test of the vehicle

design and the JPL phase-locked telemetry-tracking system (Microlock). The

Jupiter C test program was completed in August 1957.

In answer to the Soviet Union's success with Sputnik and to delays with

Vanguard at the Naval Research Laboratory, DoD authorized the Army to
572 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 5-26.

Chronology of Deep Space Network (DSN)

Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Jan. 31, 1958

March 1958

Early 1958

Summer 1958

July 1958

Nov. 1958

Dec. 3, 1958

Dec. 6, 1958

March 3, 1959

July 1959

Late 1959

revive their satellite proposal. JPL's Microlock tracking and data acquisition

system was part of the revised plan, which was renamed Project Explorer.

Also in November, JPL Director William H. Pickering and California Institute of Technology President Lee A. DuBridge proposed to DoD that the

U.S. send a probe to the moon by June 1958.

The successful launch of the Army's Explorer 1 took place; the Microlock

system ensured the return of data from James Van Allen's radiationmeasuring experiment.

The newly created Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) announced

that the U.S. would conduct a lunar program with both the Air Force (three

launch attempts) and the Army (two launch attempts) participating. Verifying a tracking and communications design was one of the program's objectives. Specialists at JPL had determined that a large steerable parabolic

antenna would be necessary for ground stations to support a lunar mission. A

JPL survey team chose southern California's Mojave Desert as the site for the

first antenna.

In response to the government's growing interest in space exploration, JPL

specialists suggested a three-station network (each station 120 degrees apart

in longitude) for tracking deep-space probes. Suggested station sites included

Goldstone, California, Nigeria, and the Philippines. ARPA approved JPL's

plans for a network (Tracking and Communication Extraterrestrial, or

TRACE).

Construction of the Goldstone 26-meter antenna station was begun, and a

mobile tracking station was located near Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, for support

of Pioneer. In addition, support was sought from the managers of the Jodrell

Bank (England) 76-meter radio astronomy antenna.

To render their planned three-station network more useful to other future

space projects, its designers proposed that the Nigerian site be shifted to

southern Portugal or Spain and the Philippine site to Australia.

JPL's Ground Communications Facility, which had served as a combined

operations and communications center for Explorer 1, became established as

a separate entity within the laboratory. The Pioneer deep space station at

Goldstone was completed.

The newly created National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

assumed responsibility from the Army for the facilities and personnel of JPL

(as per Executive Order 10793).

The attempt to send Pioneer 3 to the moon was unsuccessful because the

launch vehicle failed. The tracking crews successfully followed the probe in

its try to escape earth's gravity and during its reentry into the atmosphere 38

hours later.

In its second attempt, the Army sent a probe, Pioneer 4, beyond earth's

gravitational pull hut not close enough to the moon for its experiments to

record data concerning it. Again the tracking system functioned well, working for 41 hours until the probe's battery went dead at 651 200 kilometers.

Construction of a second 26-meter antenna at Goldstone commenced.

Tracking experts proposed that a deep space station be located near Johannesburg, South Africa, so that continuous coverage could be provided missions. A site was chosen near the existing Minitrack station.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 573

Table 5-26.

Chronology of Deep Space Network (DSN)

Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

Dec. 1959

March 1960

April 1960

Sept. 1960

Nov. 1960

Jan. 1961

March 1961

May 1961

July 1961

Mid- 1962

Aug. 1962

Oct. 1962

Mid to late 1962

Dec. 1962

Jan. 1963

Feb. 1963

July 1963

Oct. 1963

Dec. 24, 1963

Feb. 12, 1964

Goldstone's second station, Echo, was completed in time to support NASA's

Echo communications satellite experiments (passive).

Construction of a deep space station was begun near Woomera, Australia,

also the site of an IGY Minitrack station.

Goldstone's Echo station became operational.

Woomera station was completed.

Woomera station became operational.

Construction of the Johannesburg station was begun.

A Goldstone antenna was used for radar astronomy experiments (signals

were bounced off Venus).

A mobile compatibility test station was established at Cape Canaveral.

Johannesburg station became operational, supporting Ranger 1 prelaunch

tests.

A decision was made to develop a standard S-band (2388 megahertz) frequency configuration for the deep space tracking network, replacing the lower

L-band (960 megahertz). However, because of existing L-band equipment

and the desire not to interfere with ongoing L-band Ranger spacecraft communications, an L/S conversion system was devised.

Plans for another station in Australia had been approved in early 1962, and

in August Canberra was selected as the general locale for the network's •

newest 26-meter antenna. A specific site, Tidbinbilla, had been chosen by

Jan. 1963. At Goldstone, a research and development station, Venus, went

into operation.

For the first time, two deep space missions, Ranger 5 and Mariner 2, were

supported simultaneously.

Specialists from JPL began searching for a station site in Italy, but after further analysis they determined that Spain would be a better location.

Deep space tracking officials proposed to convert their temporary launch station at Cape Canaveral into a permanent one and prepared a preliminary site

plan for approval. The NASA site was rejected, but an alternate site was

selected on Air Force property nearby.

Radar contact was made with Mars via a Goldstone antenna.

Of the several possible locales for stations in Spain, Robledo, an area

southwest of Madrid, was chosen by the tracking experts.

Construction began on the Tidbinbilla station. At JPL, Deep Space Network

(DSN) officials agreed to support the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN)

during Apollo. Three DSN-type antennas would be required to track Apollo

spacecraft. Existing DSN stations in California, Spain, and Australia would

be modified to serve as backups or supplements to the manned network.

Construction began at Goldstone on a 64-meter antenna for Mars station. At

JPL, the New Space Flight Operations Facility was completed.

The Deep Space Network was officially established as a separate directorate

at JPL under the direction of Eberhardt Rechtin.

A conference was held at Cape Kennedy to establish procedures and initiate

action for the procurement of a site for the Cape Kennedy DSN station.
574 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 5-26.

Chronology of Deep Space Network (DSN)

Development and Operations (Continued)

Date Event

March 1964

April 1964

May 6, 1964

July 1964

Sept. 1964

Oct. 1964

Jan. 1965

March 1965

May 1965

July 1, 1965

Jan. 1966

April 1966

May 1966

Jan. 1967

April 1967

Nov. 1967

Jan. 1968

Construction began on the MSFN support wing at Goldstone's Pioneer station.

An initial investigation was made on Ascension Island to find a site for an Integrated Apollo and Deep Space Station. A site was approved in July.

Final plans for the Cape Kennedy DSN station were delivered to the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers.

The first L/S-band conversion unit became operational at Woomera.

To support the MSFN and provide for improved deep space tracking, a second DSN station was proposed for the Madrid area. The site chosen for the

antenna was Cebreros.

Construction began at Cape Kennedy on the DSN Compatibility Test Station.

Construction of the joint MSFN-DSN facility on Ascension Island was

begun.

Tidbinbilla station became operational, supporting Mariner 4.

The Cape Kennedy station became operational.

Robledo station became operational.

Construction of the station at Cebreros was begun.

The Ascension station became operational. At Tidbinbilla, construction of

an MSFN support wing got under way.

Goldstone's Mars station became operational.

Cebreros became operational.

Transition of the DSN to the S-band configuration was completed

throughout the network (Johannesburg was the last station to be converted to

full S-band operation),

At JPL, construction of the DSN Compatibility Test Facility was begun.

Communications testing between the DSN and spacecraft would be conducted at this facility.

Prototype multiple-mission, high-rate telemetry equipment was installed at

JPL for testing.
TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 575

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1.PropulsionStaff,NASA,"ANationalSpaceVehicleProgram;AReporttothePresident,"Jan.27,

1959;andAeronauticsandAstronauticsCoordinatingBoard,"NationalLaunchVehicleProgram

Summary,"Feb.14,1961.

2.NASAborrowedlaunchersfromtheAirForce,Army,andNavyduringitsfirstdecade.In1961,

DoDassignedtheAirForcethemajorresponsibilityfordevelopment,production,adlaunchingof

militaryspaceboosters (DoD Directive 5160.32, "Development of Space Systems," March 6, 1961).

The Army Ballistic Missile Division, which also supplied the new space agency with boosters, lost its

most important element when the yon Braun team was transferred to NASA in 1960. The Navy

through NRL supplied NASA with the Vanguard vehicle. For more information on military vehicles,

see Ernest G. Schweibert, A History of the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles (New York et al.:

Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); and David Baker, The Rocket: The History and Development of Rocket

& Missile Technology (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1978).

3. Abraham Hyatt, "NASA Launch Vehicle Development Program," paper, Conference on Physics of

the Solar System and Reentry Dynamics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Aug. 1, 1961; NASA, Second Semiannual Report of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

(henceforth 86/2), House Doc. 361 (Washington, 1960), pp. 19-22; and Senate, Committee on

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization Subcommittee, NASA Authorization for

Fiscal Year 1961; Hearings, pt. 2, 86/2 (Washington, 1960), pp. 777-91.

4. Arnold Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (1963-69). NASA SP-4102 (Washington, 1982),

chap. 7; and Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno with Robert L. Rosholt, NASA Historical

Data Book, 1958-1968, vol. 1, NASA Resources, NASA SP-4012 (Washington, 1976), pp. 113-14.

5. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on

Science and Technology, United States Civilian Space Programs, 1958-1978, 97/1 (Washington,

1981), pp. 143-60.

6. Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, U.S. Civilian Space Programs, pp. 199-205; Loyd

S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean; A History of

Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201 (Washington, 1966), pp. 167-90; General Dynamics, "Centaur

Technical Handbook," report GD/A-BPM64-001, Feb. 15, 1964; Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,

"Standard Agena Space Vehicle Technical Description," report LMSC-A397890, Dec. 1, 1964; and

Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans: .4 History of Project

Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (Washington, 1977), pp. 297-321.

7. Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, U.S. Civilian Space Programs, pp. 185-87.

8. Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 208-13; and Courtney G. Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo: .4 History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft, NASA SP-4205

(Washington, 1979), pp. 91-93, 141-42.

9. Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 167-90; MSFC, Saturn/Apollo Systems

Off., "The Mercury-Redstone Project," TMX 53107, Dec. 1964; and Subcommittee on Space Science

and Applications, U.S. Civilian Space Programs, p. 186.

10. NASA-DoD, "Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group Summary Report," vol. 1, LLVPG 105, Sept.

597
598 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

24, 1962; Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, U.S. Civilian Space Programs, pp.

216-17.

I I. Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the ApolloSaturn Launch Vehicles,

NASA SP-4206 (Washington, 1980); and Frederick O. Ordway III and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The

Rocket Team (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979).

12. Vought Corp., "100 Scout Launches," July 27, 1979; and Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, U.S. Civilian Space Programs, pp. 195-99.

13. Subcommittee on Space Science and Application, U.S. Civilian Space Programs, pp. 187-95; and

GSFC, "Delta, 1960-1980; America's Busiest and Most Versatile Launch Vehicle" [n.d.].

14. Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, U.S. Civilian Space Programs, pp. 205-10.

15. Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History, NASA SP-4202

(Washington, 1970). Most sources agree that Vanguard was built on the technology of Viking and

Aerobee sounding rockets. Milton W. Rosen, who was NASA Headquarters's first chief of rocket

vehicle development (1958-59), believes this is a myth "generated by the NRL people who were trying

to sell the Vanguard project to the Stewart committee, in order to mitigate the impression that much

of the project was new development." See Rosen to Monte D. Wright, May 7, 1981.

Chapter 2

NOTES

1. Thomas A. Sturm, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board." Its First Twenty Years, 1944-1964

(Washington, 1967), pp. 80-88. Also see Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C.

Alexander, This New Ocean; A History of Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201 (Washington, 1966),

pp. 23-26, 69-74, 77-82, 91-93.

2. Wernher von Braun and Frederick I. Ordway 111, History of Rocketry & Space Travel rev. ed. (New

York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969), pp. 159-67; Erik Bergaust, Werhner von Braun (Washington:

NSI, 1976), pp. 2, 4-19, 239-47, 269-78; and von Braun, "The Redstone, Jupiter, and Juno,"

Technology and Culture 4 (fall 1963): 452-65. Also see Alice C. Cole et al., eds., The Department of

Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978 (Washington, 1979), pp.

171-75, 311.

3. Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 20, 29, 41-42, 50, 100-01. For the story

of this country's early satellite programs, also see Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask,

Vanguard; A History, NASA SP-4202 (Washington, 1970).

4. Joseph A. Shortal, A New Dimension; Wallops Island Flight Test Range: The First Fifteen Years,

NASA Ref. Pub. 1028 (Washington, 1978), pp. 35-46, 93-97,237-41,590-99; and Robert R. Gilruth,

"From Wallops Island to Project Mercury, 1945-1958: A Memoir," in R. Cargill Hall, ed., Essays on

the History of Rocketry and Astronautics; Proceedings of the Third through the Sixth History Symposia of the International Academy of Astronautics, vol. 2, NASA Conf. Pub. 2014 (Washington,

1977), pp. 445-76.

5. Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., H. Julian Allen, and Stanford E. Neice, "A Comparative Analysis of the Performance of Long-Range Hypervelocity Vehicles," NACA Tech. Rep. 1382, also appearing in a

modified version as Allen, "Hypersonic Flight and the Reentry Problem," Journal of the

Aeronautical Sciences 25 (Apr. 1958): 217-30.

6. Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 75-106.

7. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States; John F. Kennedy, Containing the Public

Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the Preident, Jan. 20 to Dec. 31, 1961 (Washington, 1962),

pp. 396-406. For a discussion of the Soviet and American manned programs, see Edward C. Ezell

and Linda N. EzeU, The Partnership; A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, NASA SP-4209

(Washington, 1978), pp. 61-96.

8. John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon; Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970); Logdson, "The Apollo Decision in Historical Prespective," in Richard P.

Hallion, ed., Apollo: Ten Years since Tranquility Base (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press,

1979), pp. 3-9; and Walter Sullivan, America's Race for the Moon (New York: Random House,
NOTES 599

1962). Also helpful is U.S. House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier; History of the

Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79 (Washington, 1980), pp. 63-93.

9. For an outline of NASA's early management schemes, see Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative

History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 (Washington, 1966). Also useful is Arnold Levine,

Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (1963-69), NASA SP-4102 (Washington, 1982).

10. Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 114-16; and Gilruth, "From Wallops

Island," pp. 469-71.

11. NASA, This Is NASA, NASA EP-155 (Washington, 1979), p. 20; and Thomas O. Paine to Clinton

P. Anderson, Nov. 21, 1969. Also see Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp.

508, 643; Barton C. Hacker and Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans; A History of Project

Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (Washington, 1977), pp. 173-75,387-88,581-82; and Courtney G. Brooks,

Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo; A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft, NASA

SP-4205 (Washington, 1979), pp. 25, ll0-11, 167-68.

12. The following document will give the reader a thorough look at the early planning for Mercury: U.S.

Senate, Project Mercury: Man-in-Space Program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, 86th

Cong., 1st sess. (hereafter 86/1) (Washington, 1959).

13. Shortal, A New Dimension, pp. 633-63, describes the various support, including the Little Joe I

launches, that Wallops gave to Mercury. Other testing included ballon drops of Mercury capsule

models, flight stability investigations, high-altitude parachute drops, and aerodynamic heating

measurements.

14. Systems design for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo is compared in John H. Boynton and Kenneth S.

Kleinknecht, "Systems Design Experience from Three Manned Space Programs," paper 69-1077,

AIAA 6th Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, Oct. 20--24, 1969.

15. The Mercury training equipment included the following: attitude control analog trainers (NASA),

centrifuges (Navy), an air-lubricated free-altitude attitude control trainer (NASA), a slowly revolving

room (Navy), the Multi-Axis Inertia Facility trainer (NASA) an egress trainer (McDonnell), an environmental control system trainer (McDonnell), a ground recognition trainer (NASA), a yaw

recognition trainer (NASA), a vertical image celestial display (Farrand Optical Co.), and two Mercury procedures trainers (manufactured by McDonnell; one was in use at Langley, the other at the

Cape). See Robert B. Voas, Harold I. Johnson, and Raymond Zedekar, "Astronaut Training," in

NASA, Mercury Project Summary including Results of the Fourth Manned Orbital Flight, May 15

and 16, 1963, NASA SP-45 (Washington, 1963), pp. 171-98; and Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 240-48, 413-19. For biographical information on the astronauts, see

U.S. House of Representatives, Astronauts and Cosmonauts; Biographical and Statistical Data,

Report Prepared for the Committee on Science and Technolgoy, 97/1 (Washington, 1981).

16. Charles A. Berry, "Aeromedical Preparations," in NASA, Mercury Project Summary, pp. 199-209;

and Mae Mills Link, Space Medicine in Project Mercury, NASA SP-4003 (Washington, 1965), pp.

44-63, 85-111, 135-68.

17. Leighton I. Davis, "Operational Support from the Department of Defense," in NASA, Mercury

Project Summary, pp. 155-70. For further background material on NASA-DoD relations, see W.

Fred Boone, "NASA Office of Defense Affairs, the First Five Years," NASA HHR-32, Dec. 1970,

pp. 6-9, NASA Hq. History Off. files.

18. Section III of NASA, Mercury Project Summary, deals with flight operations. See also part 3 of

Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean.

19. The importance of rendezvous as it related to lunar missions is discussed in Brooks, Grimwood, and

Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, pp. 61-86; and Hacker and Grirnwood, On the Shoulders of Titans,

pp. 35-38.

20. Hacker and Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans, pp. 125-27, 139-44, 181-89; Alfred J. Gardner,

"Launch and Target Vehicle Support by the Department of Defense," in MSC, Gemini Summary

Conference, NASA SP-138 (Washington, 1967, pp. 167-84; MSC, Gemini Midprogram Conference,

including Experiment Results, NASA SP-121, pt. B (Washington, 1966), pp. 103-52; and Martin

Marietta Corp. "Gemini-Titan II Air Force Launch Vehicle Press Handbook," Feb. 2, 1967.

21. Hacker and Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans, pp. 157-62, 297-303. In response to continued

problems with the GATV main engine, Lockheed and Bell Aerosystems, supplier of the engine,

undertook an extensive series of test firings in 1965-1966 called Project Sure-fire. The 76 firings led
600 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

to modifications to the model 8247 engine. See also Gardner, "Launch and Target Vehicle Support,"

in Gemini Midprogram Conference, pp. 167-84.

22. For details on EVA equipment and operations, see Reginald M. Machell, ed., Summary of Gemini

Extravehicular Activity, NASA SP-149 (Washington, 1967); and MSC, Gemini Summary Conference, pp. 67-148.

23. See Donald K. Slayton, Warren J. North, and C. H. Woodling, "Flight Crew Procedures and Training," in MSC, Gemini Midprogram Conference, pp. 201-12.

24. For details about the Gemini experiments program, see the following papers in Gemini Summary

Conference: Norman G. Foster and Olav Smistad, "Gemini Experiments Program Summary," pp.

221-30; Richard W. Underwood, "Space Photography," pp. 231-90; Jocelyn R. Gill and Willis B.

Foster, "Science Experiments Summary," pp. 291-306; and "DoD/NASA Gemini Experiments Summary," pp. 307-20.

25. Hacker and Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans, pp. 76-77, 117-22.

26. Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, pp. 4-16. Meeting from May to Dec. 1959,

the Research Steering Committee for Manned Space Flight headed by Harry Goett influenced the

authors of the 10-year plan. Also active at this time was the New Projects Panel of the Space Task

Group, chaired by H. Kurt Strass. For information on special committees, see Ivan D. Ertel and

Mary Louise Morse, The Apollo Spacecraft; A Chronology, Volume I through November 7, 1962,

NASA SP-4009 (Washington, 1969), pp. 207-22.

27. The mission mode decision is discussed in depth in Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for

Apollo, pp. 61-86.

28. Convair/Astronautics' study depicted a three-module lunar-orbiting spacecraft based on the lifting

body concept; GE's study utilized a semi-ballistic blunt-body reentry vehicle design; Martin Company's five-part design was similar to the Apollo spacecraft that finally emerged. See Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, pp. 27-29.

29. Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, pp. 212-14.

30. The fire is covered in Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, pp. 213-27; and Ertel

and Roland W. Newkirk with Brooks, The Apollo Spacecraft; A Chronology, Volume IV, January

21, 1966-July 13-1974, NASA SP-4009 (Washington, 1978), pp. 63-126. Original review board

members were Floyd L. Thompson (LaRC), chairman, Frank Borman (MSC), Maxime A. Faget

(MSC), E. Barton Geer (LaRC), George Jeffs (NAA), Frank A. Long (PSAC), Charles F. Strong

(USAF), George C. White (NASA Hq.), and John Williams (KSC). The 21 task panels were instructed to address the following subjects: spacecraft and ground support equipment configuration,

test environments, sequence of events, disassembly activities, origin and propagation of fire,

historical data, test procedures review, materials review, design reviews, analysis of fracture areas,

medical analysis, witness statements, ground emergency provisions, security of operations, board administrative procedures, special tests, final board report, integration analysis, safety of investigation

operations, in-flight fire emergency provisions, and service module disposition. Basic documents

relating to the investigation of the accident include "Report of Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration," Apr. 5, 1967, with appx. A-G; U.S.

Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: Hearings, 8 pts., 90/1,

90/2 (Washington, 1967-1968); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and

Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Investigation into Apollo 204 Accident: Hearings,

3 vols., 90/1, 90/2 (Washington, 1967); and U.S. Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space

Sciences, Apollo 204 Accident: Report, 90/2 (Washington, 1968).

31. For more information on Gemini and Apollo crew assignments, see Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, pp. 373-80. Astronauts who joined in 1962 were Nell A. Armstrong, Frank

Borman, Charles Conrad, Jr., James A. Lovell, Jr., James A. McDivitt, Elliot M. See, Jr., Thomas

P. Stafford, Edward H. White II, and John W. Young; in 1963, Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., William A.

Anders, Charles A. Bassett II, Alan L. Bean, Eugene A. Cernan, Roger B. Chaffee, Michael Collins,

R. Walter Cunningham, Donn F. Eisele, Richard F. Gordon, Jr., Russell L. Schweickart, David R.

Scott, and Clifton C. Willims, Jr.; in 1965, Owen K. Garriott, Edward G. Gibson, Joseph P. Kerwin,

and Harrison H. Schmitt; in 1966, Vance D. Brand, John S. Bull, Gerald P. Carr, Charles M. Duke,

Jr., Joe H. Engle, Ronald E. Evans, Fred W. Haise, Jr., James B. Irwin, Don L. Lind, Jack R.

Lousma, Thomas K. Mattingly 1I, Bruce McCandless II, Edgar D. Mitchell, William R. Pogue,

Stuart A. Roosa, John L. Swigert, Paul J. Weitz, and Alfred M. Worden; and in 1967, Joseph P.
NOTES 601

AllenIV,PhilipK.Chapman,AnthonyW.England,KarlG.Henize,WilliamB.Lenoir,F.Story

Musgrave, and Robert A. R. Parker. For biographical data, consult House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, Astronauts and Cosmonauts Biographical and Statistical Data,

97/1 (Washington, 1981). Selection and training is discussed in Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson,

Chariots for Apollo, pp. 178-80, 260-65,320-26; a popular account of astronaut training and mission

operations is provided in Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: An Astronaut's Journeys (New York:

Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1974).

32. JSC, "Apollo Program Summary Report," JSC-09423, Apr. 1975, p. 3-1; section 3 of this report

presents a science summary.

33. For a detailed account of activities at KSC during the Apollo years, see Charles D. Benson and

William B. Faherty, Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations, NASA

SP-4204 (Washington, 1978); Launch Complex 39 is described on pp. 535-37. Roger E. Bilstein,

Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the ApolloSaturn Launch Vehicles, NASA SP-4206

(Washington, 1980), tells the Marshall Space Flight Center story. The early contributions of the

Langley Research Center can be found in LaRC, Conference on Langley Research related to Apollo

Mission, NASA SP-101 (Washington, 1965).

34. Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, Chariots for Apollo, p. 169.

Chapter 3

NOTES

1. Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science, NASA SP-4211

(Washington, 1980), pp. 11-13.

2. Office of the General Counsel, NASA Hq., "National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as

Amended, and Related Legislation," July 1, 1969, p. 1.

3. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, p. 96.

4. For more on this subject, see Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, chap. 2. Newell discusses the working

relationship of the space scientists and the manned spaceflight specialist in Beyond the Atmosphere,

pp. 290-95.

5. For more on the organization of space science and applications, see Arnold Levine, Managing NASA

in the Apollo Era (1963-69), NASA SP-4102 (Washington, 1982), pp. 167-72; and Newell, Beyond

the Atmosphere, pp. 101-15.

6. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, pp. 394-95,408-10.

7. Jesse L. Mitchell, "Physics & Astronomy Programs Program Review Document," Oct. 26, 1965.

8. [NASA Hq.], "Areas of Research in the NASA Space Sciences Program," Feb. 10, 1959, p. 44; and

Off. of the Assistant Director for Space Sciences, NASA Hq., "The NASA Space Sciences

Program," April 16, 1959, pp. 25-29.

9. [Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory, NACA], "Preliminary Langley Staff Study, NASA

Space Flight Program," May 15, 19581 and Off. of Space Sciences, NASA Hq., "Office of Space

Sciences Ten Year Program," Aug. 17, 1959.

1,0. [Langley, NACA], "Preliminary Langley Staff Study."

11. Ernst Stuhlinger, "Lunar and Planetary Surface Exploration," in Robert M. L. Baker, Jr., and Maud

W. Makemson, eds., Xllth International Astronautical Congress, Washington, D.C., 1961 (New

York and London: Academic Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 801-05; and Senate Committee on Aeronautical

and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1963, Hearings, 87th Cong., 2d sess.

(henceforth 87/2) (Washington, 1962), pp. 256-744, 749.

12. Off. of Programs, Management Reports, NASA Hq., "Program Review, Office of Applications,

Meteorology," June 2, 1962.
602 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

13. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices,

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Appropriations, Hearings, 86/1 (Washington,

1959), pp. 37-40, 148-53.

14. NASA, Space Communications and Navigation, 1958-1964, NASA SP-93 (Washington, 1966) pp.

v, 1.

15. [Langley, NACA], "Preliminary Langley Staff Study," pp. 22-25.

16. See Phillip N. Larsen, "The Management of Commercial Satellite Communications," Perspectives in

Defense Management (Nov. 1967): 29-43.

17. William J. O'Sullivan, interview by Edward Morse, Aug. 28, 1964, in O'Sullivan biog. file, NASA

History Off.

18. George R. Thompson, "NASA's Role in the Development of Communications Satellite Technology,"

NASA HHM-8, Jan. 31, i966; and Edgar W. Morse, "Preliminary History of the Origins of Project

Syncom," NASA HNN-40, Sept. 1, 1964.

19. Eugene T. Jilg, "Engineering Designs for a Commercial Communications Satellite," paper, AIAA

Unmanned Spacecraft Meeting, Los Angeles, March 1, 1965.

20. B. 1. Edelson, H. W. Wood, and C. J. Reber, "Cost Effectiveness in Global Satellite Communications," paper, International Astronautical Federation 26th Congress, Lisbon, Sept. 21-27, 1975.

21. Ronald L. Weitzel, "The Origins of ATS," NASA HHN-83, Aug. 1968; and Gilbert D. Bullock,

comp. and ed., "ATS Program Summary," rev. April 1968.

Chapter 4

NOTES

I. Alex Roland, Research by Committee: A History of the National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics, 1915-1958, NASA SP-4103 (Washington, 1985), pp. 80-87.

2. Irwin Hersey, "Research and Technology: Aeronautics and Space (1963-1968)," in "Preliminary

History of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson,

November 1963-January 1969," unpublished NASA administrative histories project, Jan. 15, 1969,

p. V-4; also available as Hersey, "Advancing the Technology of Flight; Research and Development in

NASA, 1963-1968," NASA Historical Note 38, Oct. 1968.

3. Ibid., pp. V-4 through V-5.

4. Arnold Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (1963-69), NASA SP-4102 (Washington, 1982),

pp. 163-67.

5. Helen T. Wells, Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie Karegeannes, Origins of NASA Names, NASA

SP-4402 (Washington, 1976), pp. 138-41, 150-53.

6. See NASA budget estimates, research and development volumes, for FY 1965-1968.

7. Ibid.; "Statement of Dr. Hermann H. Kurzweg, Director of Research, Office of Advanced Research

& Technology, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, before the Subcommittee on Advanced Research & Tracking [sic], Committee on Science & Astronautics, House of Representatives,"

March 3, 1964; and "Statement of Dr. Hermann H. Kurzweg, Director of Research, Office of Advanced Research and Technology, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, before the Subcommittee on Advanced Research and Technology, Committee on Science & Astronautics, House of

Representatives," March 16, 1967.

8. See NASA budget estimates, research and development volumes, FY 1965-1968; and "Statement of

Milton B. Ames, Jr., Director of Space Vehicles, Office of Advanced Research and Technology, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, before the Subcommittee on Advanced Research and

Technology, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives," Feb. 22, 1968.
NOTES 603

9. FrancisRagallo,"FlexibleWings," Astronautics & Aeronautics 6 (Aug. 1968): 50-54; Aerospace

Technology 21 (June 3, 1968), is a special report on parachute technology; and Richard P. Hallion,

On the Frontier." Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981, NASA SP-4303 (Washington, 1984), pp.

137-40.

10. See Clarence J. Geiger, "History of the X-20A Dyna-Soar," Historical Div., Information Off.

Aeronautical Systems Div., Air Force Systems Com., 3 vols., AFSC Hist. Pubs. Series 63-50-1,

63-50-II, 63-50-1II, Oct. 1963, available on microfilm, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB; vol. I

at JSC History Off.

11. The site selection process is outlined in Thomas P. Murphy, "NASA's Electronics Research Center,"

unpublished paper, ERC file, NASA History Off.

12. For more on NASA's changing life sciences program, see John Pitts, The Human Factor:

Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980, NASA SP-4213 (Washington, 1985).

13. "Transcript of the Briefing for Industry on NASA Space Power and Electric Propulsion Programs,"

April 27, 1967; and a four-part series on electric propulsion in Aviation Week & Space Technology 80

(Jan. 27, Feb. 3, Feb. 10, Feb. 17), gives a good summary of the many projects under way in this field

sponsored by industry, DoD, and NASA.

14. For a look at the nuclear rocket program, see James A. Dewar, "Project Rover: A Study of the

Nuclear Rocket Development Program, 1953-1963," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State

Univ., 1974; and Keith Boyer, "Nuclear Rockets," paper, AIAA 4th Annual Meeting and

Technology Display, Anaheim, CA, Oct. 23-27, 1967. For information on reactor and engine

testing, see Robert W. Schroeder, "NERVA-Entering a New Phase," Astronautics & Aeronautics 6

(May 1968): 42-53. A useful general introduction to nuclear propulsion is William Corliss, Nuclear

Propulsion for Space, part of a series "Understanding the Atom" (Oakridge, TN: AEC, 1967).

15. For general introductory materials, see Corliss and Robert L. Mead, Power from Radioisotopes, part

of a series "Understanding the Atom" (Oakridge, TN: AEC, 1971); and Corliss, SNAP; Nuclear

Space Reactors, part of a series "Understanding the Atom" (Oakridge, TN: AEC, 1966).

16. House of Rep., Com. on Science and Astronautics, Research and Development in Aeronautics: Interim Report, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (henceforth 87/1) (Washington, 1961); Mac C. Adams to Directors, Ames, Lewis, Langley, and Flight Research Centers, "Aeronautics Program," Oct. 14, 1965,

and Charles W. Harper, "Prospects in Aeronautics Research and Development," paper, AIAA Aircraft Design for 1980 Operations Meeting, Washington, Feb. 12-14, 1968.

17. For a brief overview of aeronautics, see David A. Anderton, Sixty Years of Aeronautical Research,

1917-1977 (Washington, 1978). A good introductory work on the mechanics of flight is NASA, Exploring in Aeronautics, an Introduction to Aeronautical Sciences Developed at the NASA Lewis

Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio (Washington, 1971).

18. For a look at the variety of research that falls into the operating problems category, refer to NASA,

Conference on Aircraft Operating Problems, Langley Research Center, May 10-12, 1965, NASA

SP-83 (Washington, 1965).

19. Astronautics & Aeronautics 6 (Sept. 1968) was devoted to V/STOL technology. Also see NASA,

Conference on V/STOL and STOL Aircraft, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California,

April 4-5, 1966, NASA SP-116 (Washington, 1966).

20. Wendell H. Stillwell, X-15 Research Results, NASA SP-60 (Washington, 1965), contains an excellent

bibliography. Another source is Myron B. Gubitz, Rocketship X-15; A Bold New Step in Aviation

(New York; Julian Messner, Inc., 1960). Ronald H. Smith, "Antecedents and Analogues--Experimental Aircraft," in Jay D. Pinson, ed., Diamond Jubilee of Powered Flight: The Evolution of

Aircraft Design (Dayton, OH: Dayton-Cincinatti Section, AIAA, 1978), pp. 80-86, gives a short

history of the early X-series, the X-15, and lifting bodies. Hallion, Supersonic Flight: The Story of

the Bell X-I and Douglas D-558 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1972), thoroughly discusses the early

research aircraft program.

21. For a very readable account of NASA's research aircraft story, see Hallion, On the Frontier, chaps.

4-6, 8.

22. For information on the F-111, the XB-70, and other aircraft, consult John W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane's

All the World's Aircraft, 1968-69 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 278-80, 341-42.
604

Chapter5

NOTES

1.Forfurtherinformation on tracking and data acquisition techniques, see Samuel Glasstone,

Sourcebook on the Space Sciences (New York et al: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 217-39.

2. John T. Mengel and Paul Herget, "Tracking Satellites by Radio," Scientific American 198 (Jan.

1958): 23-29, deal specifically with the Minitrack system. See also Constance McLaughlin Green and

Milton Lomask, Vanguard: .4 History, NASA SP-4202 (Washington, 1970), pp. 145-63. Green and

Lomask relate how the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory optical tracking system was also used

for Vanguard, pp. 149-54.

3. William R. Corliss, "Histories of the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (STADAN), the

Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), and the NASA Communications Network (NASCOM),"

NASA CR-140390, June 1974, pp. 24-57, discusses the evolution of STADAN equipment. For information on communications and data handling operations and equipment, see Corliss, Scientific

Satellites, NASA SP-133 (Washington, 1967), pp. 133-63. For technical information regarding

equipment and facilities, see the following Goddard Space Flight Center reports: "Satellite Instrumentation Facilities Report," GSFC report X-530-62-3, April 1962; "Satellite Tracking and Data

Acquisition Network Facilities Report (STADAN)," GSFC report X-539-64-159, June 1964; and

"Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network Facilities Report (STADAN)," GSFC report

X-530-66-33, Dec. 1965.

4. For more on Goddard's Space Operations Control Center and other data acquisition and tracking

facilities, see Alfred Rosenthal, Venture into Space; Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center,

NASA SP-4301 (Washington, 1968), pp. 65-78.

5. For information on Mercury tracking, communications, and data acquisition equipment, see

Howard C. Kyle, "Manned Spaceflight Communications Systems," in A. V. Dalakrishnan, ed., Advances in Communication Systems, vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1966), pp. 195-204.

6. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History

of Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201 (Washington, 1966), pp. 392-97.

7. For more on the Gemini network, see Corliss, "Histories of the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition

Network (STADAN), the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), and the NASA Communications

Network (NASCOM)," pp. 140-61; and Barton C. Hacker and Grimwood, On the Shoulders of

Titans: .4 History of Project Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (Washington, 1977), pp. 584-92. Kyle,

"Manned Spaceflight Communications Systems," pp. 205-10, describes the equipment and techniques used for Gemini tracking and data acquisition.

8. For information on the Deep Space Network, see Nichola A. Renzetti, ed., "A History of the Deep

Space Network, from Inception to January 1, 1969," JPL tech. report 32-1533, vol. 1, Sept. 1, 1971,

which has a 7-page bibliography; JPL, "DSIF: Goldstone," JPL tech. memo 33-205, 1965; and Corliss, "A History of the Deep Space Network," NASA CR-151915, May 1, 1976. R. Cargill Hall,

Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger, NASA SP-4210 (Washington, 1977), pp. 81-91, relates

how the DSN supported Ranger.
NOTES ON SOURCES

The authors of the NASA Historical Data Book series have necessarily relied on

hundreds of sources to compile the many tables and charts presented. In Volume II,

no attempt was made to list the sources used for each table because the notes would

have overwhelmed the content in many cases. The number of source notes supporting the narrative has also been kept to a minimum. This note on sources will

serve as a guide for the researcher interested in pursuing the material from which this

volume was compiled.

The author relied heavily on the subject and biographical files of the NASA

Headquarters History Office, Washington, D.C., for primary documents from

which to glean the facts and figures. For most topics, the following kinds of

documents can be found in these files: NASA press releases, speeches, congressional

testimony, contractor reports, related articles from periodicals and newspapers, correspondence, and photographs. Mission operations reports and midterm and

prelaunch reviews are an important part of the many "mission" files. When the

author was confronted with conflicting data-not uncommon when working with

material that dates from NASA's first years-mission operations reports (or their

equivalents) and contractor reports were considered the most authoritative sources.

Also very useful was the document collection of the Johnson Space Center History

Office, Houston, Texas.*

In addition to primary sources and project chronologies and histories published

by NASA, the author frequently used a number of general reference works. Most

helpful was the series Astronautics and Aeronautics, Chronology on Science,

Technology, and Policy. Compiled by staff members of the NASA Headquarters

History Office, a volume is available for each year, starting with 1963.t A handy

guide to NASA projects and installations is Helen Wells, Susan H. Whitely, and

*Many of the records formerly held at JSC that pertain to the Mercury and Gemini projects have

been loaned to the Fondern Library, Rice University, Houston, Texas, where they will be catalogued and

made available to scholars.

tThe following chronologies were also useful: Eugene M. Emme, Aeronautics and Astronautics; An

American Chronology of Science and Technology in the Exploration of Space, 1915-1960 (Washington,

1961); NASA, Aeronautical and Astronautical Events of 1961; Report to the Committee on Science and

Astronautics, U.S House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2d sess. (henceforth 87/2) (Washington, 1962);

and NASA, Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962; Report to the Committee on Science and

Astronautics, U.S. _Iouse of Representatives, 88/1 (Washington, 1963).

605
606 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

CarrieE. Karegeannes, Origins of NASA Names, NASA SP-4402 (Washington,

1976). For a quick look at NASA and its predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the author relied on Frank W. Anderson, Jr.,

Orders of Magnitude; A History of NA CA and ?CA SA, 1915-1980, NASA SP-4403

(Washington, 1981). Also useful was a reference work that covers the first 20 years

of U.S. involvement in aerospace activities: House of Representatives, Committee

on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications,

United States Civilian Space Programs, 1958-1978; Report (Washington, 1981). A

standard reference on NASA's early organization is Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 (Washington, 1966). A

report that proved especially helpful was Kennedy Space Center, "A Summary of

Major NASA Launchings," KSC Historical Report 1, revised in 1970. NASA's

semiannual reports to Congress, the last of which was submitted in 1969, were useful

guides. "Pocket Statistics," compiled monthly by NASA (from 1960), provided

selected technical, financial, and manpower data. Another research tool that was

brought out again and again was the History Office's collection of NASA Headquarters and center telephone directories.

The budget tables for all five chapters of Volume II were compiled from two

sources: NASA Chronological History Fiscal Year Budget Submissions, prepared

annually by the Budget Operations Division of the Office of Administration, NASA

Headquarters; and the Budget Estimates (research and development volumes only)

prepared for Congress by NASA each fiscal year. As noted in the introduction to the

budget section of Chapter 1, this volume is only concerned with research and

development monies. This approach reflects advice given the author by the NASA

Headquarters Office of the Comptroller.

The author used the following publications as source material for five chapters

of Volume II. For additional sources, see the source notes. Refer also to the descriptive sections of each chapter.

Chapter 1:

Baker, David. The Rocket: The History and Development of Rocket & Missile

Technology. New York: Crown Publishers, 1978.

Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/

Saturn Launch Vehicles. NASA SP-4206, Washington, 1980.

Brooks, Courtney G., Grimwood, James M., and Swenson, Loyd S. Chariots for

Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft. NASA SP-4205, Washington,

1979.

Green, Constance McLaughlin and Lomask, Milton. Vanguard." A History.

NASA SP-4202, Washington, 1970.

Hacker, Barton C. and Grimwood. On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of

Project Gemini. NASA SP-4203, Washington, 1977.

Levine, Arnold. Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (1963-69), NASA SP-4102,

Washington, 1982.

Marshall Space Flight Center. Saturn Illustrated Chronology; Saturn's First

Eleven Years, April 1957 through April 1968. MHR-5, Huntsville, 1971.

Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, Charles C. This New Ocean: A History of

Project Mercury. NASA SP-4201, Washington, 1966.
NOTES 607

Chapter 2:

Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/

Saturn Launch Vehicles. NASA SP-4206, Washington, 1980.

Brooks, Courtney G., Grimwood, James M., and Swenson, Loyd S. Chariots for

Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft. NASA SP-4205, Washington,

1979.

Brooks and Ertel, Ivan D. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume III,

October 1, 1964-January 20, 1966. NASA SP-4009, Washington, 1976.

Ertel and Morse, Mary Louise. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume I,

through November 7, 1962. NASA SP-4009, Washington, 1969.

Ertel, Newkirk, Roland W., with Brooks. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology,

Volume IV, January 21, 1966-July 13, 1974. NASA SP-4009, Washington,

1978.

Grimwood. Project Mercury: A Chronology. NASA SP-4001, Washington, 1963.

Grimwood, Hacker, Barton C., with Vorzimmer, Peter J. Project Gemini Technology and Operations: A Chronology. NASA SP-4002, Washington, 1969.

Hacker and Grimwood. On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project

Gemini, NASA SP-4203, Washington, 1977.

Logsdon, John M. The Decision to Go to the Moon; Project Apollo and the National Interest. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970.

Manned Spacecraft Center, Gemini Summary Conference. NASA SP-138, Washington, 1967.

Morse and Bays, Jean Kernahan. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume

II, November8, 1962-September30, 1964. NASA SP-4009, Washington, 1973.

NASA. Mercury Project Summary including Results of the Fourth Manned Orbital Flight, May 15 and 16, 1963. NASA SP-45, Washington, 1963.

Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, Charles C. This New Ocean: A History of

Project Mercury. NASA SP-4201, Washington, 1966.

Chapter 3:

Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary.

NASA SP-4401, Washington, 1971.

__. Scientific Satellites. NASA SP-133, Washington, 1967.

Ezell, Edward C. and Ezell, Linda N. On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet,

1958-1978. NASA SP-4212, Washington, 1983.

Green, Constance McLaughlin and Lomask, Milton. Vanguard: A History.

NASA SP-4202, Washington, 1970.

Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger. NASA SP-4210,

Washington, 1977.

Hartman, Edwin P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research

Center, 1940-1965. NASA SP-4302, Washington, 1970.

Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Spa_ Science. NASA

SP-4211, Washington, 1980.

Pitts, John. The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to

1980, NASA SP-4213 (Washington, 1985).

Richter, Henry L. Space Measurements Survey; Instruments and Spacecraft,

October 1957-March 1965. NASA SP-3028, Washington, 1966.
608 NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight

Center. NASA SP-4301, Washington, 1968.

Rosenthal and Corliss. Encyclopedia of Satellites and Sounding Rockets, August

1959 to December 1969. Beltsville, MD: Goddard Space Flight Center, 1970.

Shortal, Joseph A. A New Dimension; Wallops Island Flight Test Range: The

First Fifteen Years. NASA Ref. Pub. 1028, Washington, 1978.

Chapter 4:

Anderton, David A. Sixty Years of Aeronautical Research, 1917-1977. Washington, 1978.

Hallion, Richard P. On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981.

NASA SP-4303 (Washington, 1984).

Roland, Alex, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics, 1915-1958. NASA SP-4103, Washington, 1985.

Chapter 5:

Corliss, William R. "Histories of the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (STADAN), the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), and the NASA

Communications Network (NASCOM)." NASA CR-140390, June 1974.

Thomas, Shirley. Satellite Tracking Facilities: Their History and Operation. New

York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963.

Since 1973, NASA has used the metric system in its publications. Although

many metric weights and measurements are now commonly used in the United

States, some may still sound foreign to the reader. Probably the most frequently

questioned measurement is newtons of thrust (pounds thrust x 4.448 = newtons).

A useful publication for the reader not familiar with the metric system is E. A.

Mechtly, The International System of Units, Physical Constants and Conversion

Factors, NASA SP-7012, 2d rev. (Washington, 1973). Also note that weights of

launch vehicles and spacecraft are "wet weights"; that is, vehicle and fuel. Dates and

times of mission events are local; ground elapsed time is the amount of time

(hours:minutes:seconds) that has elapsed since launch.

The following individuals assisted the author by commenting on the manuscript

or assisting with the research. By so doing, they became valuable "sources."

Frank W. Anderson, Jr.

Edward C. Ezell

James M. Grimwood

Carl R. Huss

Carrie E. Karegeannes

Albert Matelis

Homer E. Newell

Eleanor H. Ritchie

Alex Roland

Milton W. Rosen

Lee D. Saegesser

Arthur L. Sigust

Monte D. Wright
APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION CHARTS
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INDEX

Page references to illustrations or photographs are in italics.

A

Abernethy, L. K., 110

Abbott, Ira H., 5, 406

Abbott Committee. See National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

Able, 24, 29, 67, 68, 72; Able 2, 305;

Able 3, 237, 305; Able 6, 307. See

also Atlas-Able, Thor-Able

Adams, Mac C., 6, 404, 407

Adams, Michael, Jr., 503, 508, 513, 514

Advanced Applications Satellite. See Applications Technology Satellite

advanced research and technology,

403-517; aerospace medicine, 466;

basic research programs, 431-35;

budget, 404, 408-31; electronics and

control programs, 459-66; human factor systems, 340-46, 466-69; management, 405-07; space power and propulsion program, 1, 25, 26, 175, 176,

178, 470-94; space vehicle systems,

435-59; supporting research and

technology (SRT), 404, 437

Advanced Research and Technology, Office of (OART) (formerly, Office of

Aeronautics and Space Research and

Office of Advanced Research Programs), 4-6, 153 n, 299, 340, 403-08,

431-34, 436-39, 442, 445,449, 453,

459-62, 464-70, 473, 474, 479, 482,

488-94, 497; Ames Life Sciences

Laboratory, 468; Division of

Biotechnology and Human Research,

468; Organization, 498

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 44, 54, 56, 93, 95, 98, 99, 301,

303, 348, 351, 544, 560, 566, 572;

Ground Based Information System for

Support of Manned Flight Committee

(GBIS), 544, 560

Advanced Technological Satellite. See

Applications Technology Satellite

Advent, 370, 371, 376, 378, 379, 382;

Advent Management Agency, 382;

Project Advent, 380

Aerobee. See sounding rocket program

Aero Geo Astro Corporation, 372

Aerojet-General Corporation, 34, 35, 50,

53, 54, 62, 63, 66, 72, 73, 80, 84, 86,

87, 192, 272, 275, 277-79, 480-85,

489-93; Aerojet General-Nike, 277;

Space Propulsion Division, 192

Aerolab Corporation, 280, 281

Aeromedical Field Laboratory, 96, 98,

137 n, 467 n; Space Biology Branch,

96

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), 2, 377, 455,

488, 524, 561; Launch Vehicle Panel,

2; Manned Space Flight Panel, 455;

Space Flight Ground Environment

Panel, 524, 561; Unmanned Spacecraft

Panel, 377

Aerospace Corporation, 382, 395

Africa, 136, 546, 547, 552, 554

Agena, 5, 6, 9-11, 24, 29-46, 67, 98,

151-54, 156, 158, 166-68, 193, 313,

320, 476; Agena B, 29, 67, 68, 74,

155,311,448; Agena D, 29, 67, 68,

156, 158

Aggson, T. L., 395

Ahmedabad, India, 540, 542, 575

Aiken, William S., Jr., 497,498

aircraft: B-52, 452, 455,457, 502, 506,

514, 515; C-47, 452, 455; D-558-1,

502; D-558-2, 502; X-series, 502, 522,

524; XS-I research aircraft, 92, 501

Airborne Instruments Laboratory, 244

AiResearch Manufacturing Company, 192

Air Force, U.S. Department of the, 1,

29, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 54, 61, 66, 67,

84, 91-94, 96-99, 134, 150, 152,

154-56, 165, 197, 275-77, 279, 340 n,

343, 347, 364, 372, 382, 405, 451, 452,

456, 476, 479, 486, 488, 501-03,

505-07, 509, 511, 513, 515, 517, 524,

541, 544, 547, 555 n, 560, 564, 572,

573, 581; Aerospace Test Pilots

School, 469; AF 609A, 27; Air

Materiel Command Aircraft Division,

506; Air Research and Defense Command, 94; Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), 44, 97-99,

454, 483; Aviation (later Aerospace)

Medical Laboratory, 467 n; Ballistic

Missile Division (AFBMD), 35, 39, 99,

139, 302, 303, 305, 307; Blue Scout,

66, 465 n, 549; Cambridge Research

Laboratory, 237,254, 258, 278, 282;

Clark AFB, 381; Edwards AFB, 94,

405, 451,452, 469, 496, 502, 506, 507,

515, 521; Eglin AFB, 547, 548, 550,

552, 561,580; Flight Test Center, 451,

453; Headquarters, 99; Hickam AFB,

343; HoUoman AFB, 91 n, 96, 98,

467; Human Factors, Division of, 97;

IRBM, 68, 72, 74-76; "Man-in-SpaceSoonest" scheme, 99; Manned

619
620 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

OrbitingLaboratory(MOL),177n;

MissileTestCenter(AFMTC),559,

560;NuclearMissilePropulsion,Ad

HocCommitteeon,482;PatrickAFB,

548, 554, 589; Randolph AFB, 96;

School of Aviation Medicine, 467 n;

Scientific Advisory Board, 97, 482,

483, 505; Space Medicine, Department

of, 96; Space Systems Division, 155,

489, 490; Systems Command, 101,

102; Trailblazer, 463 n, 464; USAF

MX-770, 482; Vandenburg AFB, 548,

554, 592; Wright Air Development

Center, 137 n, 483,484, 505; WrightPatterson AFB, 96, 467 n

Air Force-NASA Joint Conference on

Lifting Manned Hypervelocity and

Reentry Vehicles, 454

Alabama, 171, 172

Alaska, 538, 540, 542, 543, 575, 581;

Alaska Station, 579

Albuquerque, New Mexico, 137 n, 480,

485

Alcor, 279, 465 n

Aldrin, Edwin A., Jr., 153, 158, 161,

165, 166, 168, 169

Algol I and IIB, 62, 63, 66

Algranti, Joseph S., 115, 120

Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory, 34, 41,

62, 72, 80, 86, 87

Allen, Harry B., 107

Allen, H. Julian, 94, 96, 97

Allenby, R. J., 109, 302

Almy, Donald C., 107

Alouette, 38, 296; Alouette 1, 69, 74,

288-90; Alouette 2, 74, 249, 288, 290

Alphonsus (crater), 318

Altair, 62, 63, 72, 77

American Mariner (tracking ship), 549,

551

American Rocket Society, 97, 454

American Science and Engineering, Inc.,

254

American Standard: Advanced

Technology Division, 264

American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), 364, 373-75, 552 n

Ames, Milton B., 406, 407, 435, 436,

439, 453

Ames Research Center (ARC) (formerly,

Ames Aeronautical Laboratory and

Moffett Field Laboratory), 94, 96-98,

100 n, 103 n, 135, 155-57, 180, 240,

241,243, 250, 251, 254, 256-58, 260,

302-04, 307-09, 341,342, 344-46, 407

n, 431, 433-35, 437, 439, 450-52,

454-57, 469, 495-97, 499-501, 515,

565; Movingbase Landing-Approach

Simulator, 499; Solar Probe Team,

304

Ampex, 264

Anders, William A., 167, 168, 177, 185,

189

Anderson, Clinton P., 479

Anderson, George M., 111

Anderson, Melvin S., 102 n

Andover, Maine, 376

Andrus, A. Marion, 366

Antarctica, 400

Antares, 10, 13, 24, 29, 41,448-50; Antares II, 62, 63; X-254-A1, 465 n

Antigua, B. W. I., 523, 536, 539 n, 540,

542, 548, 552, 554, 557, 558, 562, 563,

575

Antofagasta, Chile, 536, 539, 540, 542,

543, 575

Apache, 272, 273, 281

Apollo, 4, 6, 12, 13, 16-18, 22-24, 48, 50,

53, 56-59, 101-03, 112, 116, 121-23,

128 n, 151, 152, 156, 171-94, 197, 203,

248, 272, 301, 302, 308-10, 319,

321-23, 325-27, 329, 338, 339, 390,

438, 441,444, 445, 448-50, 461,473,

474, 481, 490, 524, 548, 549, 552-57,

559, 562, 563, 565, 566, 568, 569 n,

573-75, 583, 585, 587, 589, 591, 593,

595, 596; Apollo 204 Review Board,

176, 184; Apollo 4, 61, 101, 174, 176,

184, 563; Apollo 5, 59, 176, 184, 554;

Apollo 6, 61, 176, 185; Apollo 7, 55,

59, 176, 177, 179 n, 185, 188, 556,

557, 563; Apollo 8, 2, 61, 101, 177,

178, 179 n, 185, 189, 554-57,

563; Apollo 9, 555 n; Apollo 12, 494;

Apollo Experiments, Ad Hoc Working

Group on, 177; Apollo Instrumented

Tracking Ship, 555; Apollo Lunar

Surface Experiments Package

(ALSEP), 494, 495; Apollo Mission Planning Panel, 183; Apollo Network Implementation Plan, 562, 563; Apollo

Project Office, 179; Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft (ARIA), 549,

556; Apollo-Saturn, 182, 563; ApolloSoyuz Test Project, 121; Apollo

Spacecraft Project Office (ASPO),

172, 179, 182, 185; Apollo Task

Group, 553; Apollo Technical Liaison

Group for Instrumentation and Tracking, 551, 552. 561. 562; astronauts,

176-78, 183-85, 188, 189, 494;

characteristics and chronology, 171-94,

203; funding, 129_, 123. 128-32; Project

Apollo, 17, 18, 22-24, 100, 384, 522,

551, 565; Skylab, 55,461

Applications Technology Satellite (ATS),
INDEX 621

13,29,37,38,40,43,44,206,221n,

224-26,368,384,408,461,474,539,

543,590,592

AppropriationsConferenceCommittee,

128

APT(automaticpicturetransmission)

system,349,356-59,363

Arabian;DonaldD., 116,119

Archives,U.S.National:National

WeatherRecordsCenter,350

Arctic Ocean, 557, 558

Arequipa, Peru, 523, 541

Argentina, 272

Ariel, 437; Ariel 1, 2, and 3, 64, 65, 68,

288, 291-93

Arizona, University of, 316-18

Armstrong, George G., Jr., 120

Armstrong, Harry G., 96, 110

Armstrong, Neil A., 153, 158, 161, 164,

165, 167, 189, 510, 511

Army, U.S. Department of the, 1, 46,

47, 52, 54, 91-93, 96, 140, 180, 235,

276, 286, 303,306, 501, 524, 542, 564,

571-73, 575, 593; Army Ordnance

Missile Command (AOMC), 52, 56,

99, 180; Corps of Engineers, 574;

Guided Missile Center, 52; Map Service, 536, 542; Ordnance Department,

275; Plum Brook Nuclear Rocket

Dynamics Test Facility, 477, 486;

Signal Corps, 275, 559; Signal R&D

Laboratory, 287

Army Air Corps, U.S., 534, 535, 541;

MX-774 project, 541

Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA),

1, 46-48, 54, 56, 87, 91-93, 96, 134,

138, 139, 171, 180, 232, 235, 238, 286,

302, 306, 347, 348, 351, 571; Development Operations Division, 1, 180. See

also Marshall Space Flight Center

Ascension Island, 347, 449, 523, 548,

551, 552, 554, 557, 558, 562, 563, 565,

570, 571, 574, 576

Ashley, William T., 104, 106

Ashworth, C. Dixon, 254, 260, 264

Asia, 380, 382

Asmara, Ethiopia, 381

Astronautics Avco Corporation, 182

Astronomy Missions Board, 198

Atlantic 2. See International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium

Atlantic (coast and ocean), 91, 136, 138,

157, 158, 381, 385, 390, 391, 393, 398,

444, 449, 544, 546, 547, 550-52, 554,

555 n, 557-59, 561, 576, 582, 595

Atlantic Missile Range (AMR), 102, 138,

140, 531, 544, 546, 571; Operations

Office, 560. See also Eastern Test

Range

Atlantic Research Corporation, 72, 192,

278-80

Atlas, 1-3, 9-12, 14-16, 24, 27-45, 51, 74,

83, 84, 92, 94, 96, 98-100, 121, 134,

136-39, 145-48, 153, 155, 171,446,

449, 453,489, 541; Atlas-Able, 3, 10, 11,

27, 214 n, 217 n, 301, 303, 304; AtlasAgena, 9-11, 19-21, 27, 29, 121, 156,

158, 206, 223 n, 334; Atlas-Agena B,

13, 20, 156, 209, 223 n, 270, 309, 311,

313-18, 332, 335, 336, 443, 448, 450;

Atlas-Agena D, 13, 20, 22, 158,262,

270, 321-25, 332, 337-39, 397, 398;

Atlas-Antares, 10, 174, 186, 438, 448,

451; Atlas-Centaur, 2, 3, 10, 27-29,

262, 263, 326-31, 334, 387, 398, 474,

491; Atlas D, 29, 450; Atlas-Hustler,

3, 36; Atlas SLV-3, 29; Atlas-Vega, 29;

Atlas-X259, 27; "FLOX Arias" project, 30

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 64,

405, 438,470, 473-81,483,485,486,

488, 494, 495; Albuquerque Operations Office, 478, 484; Argonne National Laboratory, 478; Chicago

Operations Office, 478; Division of

Reactor Development, 478, 482; Oak

Ridge National Laboratory, 438, 482.

See also Space Nuclear Propulsion

Office

Atoms for Peace program, 485

Atwood, J. L., 184

Aucremanne, Marcel T., 233,249, 264,

303

Augerson, William S., 137 n

Augmented Target Docking Adapter (ATDA), 165

Aurora 7, 146

A urorae. See European Space Research

Organization

Australia, 244, 272, 283, 343, 546, 547,

552, 554, 561, 565,568, 572, 573, 582,

585, 589, 595

Authorization Conference Committee, 204

Avco Corporation, 192, 340; Space

Systems Division, 192

AVCS (advanced vidicon camera system),

349, 358, 359, 361-63, 395

Aviation Medical Acceleration

Laboratory, 467

Azusa, 535, 541
622 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

BabyWac(Corporal),275,571

Bahamas,544,559

Baker,JohnV.,505

Baker-Nunncameras,524,541

BallBrothersResearchCorporation,

254-59

BalticSea,557

Baltimore, Maryland, 154

Barbados, 554, 559

Barents Sea, 557

Barking Sands, Hawaii, 284

Bassett, Charles A., 11, 157, 162, 165

Bauer, Siegfried J., 293, 297, 298

Baumann, Robert C., 271, 291, 293

Bavely, James C., 525, 526

Bayer, William J., 102 n

Bayley, William H., 566

Bay St. Louis, 179 n

Beacon, 66, 69, 288, 299, 368; Beacon 1,

47; Beacon 2, 48; Beacon Explorer,

245, 247; Beacon Explorer A, 81,463

Bean, Alan L., 162, 166, 167

Beaufort Sea, 557

Beckman, Edward L., 118, 120

Beckwith, Walter C., 109

Beggs, James M., 6, 404, 407

Behring, W. E., 258, 259

Belgium, 288 n

Bell, Persa R., 118, 120

Bell Aerospace Corporation, 36, 37, 39,

74-76, 192, 393, 396

Bell Aerosystems Company, 192

Bell Aircraft, 501, 502, 505, 506

Bellcomm, Inc., 192

Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL), 242,

247, 251, 369, 372-75, 378, 379, 382,

384, 388, 395, 546, 561. See also

WECo

Beltsville, Maryland, 197

Beltsville Space Center, 271,286, 536,

560. See also Goddard Space Flight

Center

Bendix Corporation, 192, 361, 546, 552

n, 561; Eclipse Pioneer Division, 264.

See also WECo

Berg, Winfred, 542

Bergen, University of (Norway), 294

Berglund, Ren_ A., 119

Bering Sea, 557

Berliner, Joseph, 377, 378

Bermuda, 145,444, 445, J23, 545-47,

550, 552, 554, 557, 561, 563, 576

Berry, Charles A., 113, 114, 116, 118,

120

Berry, Secrest L., i05, 106

Bethpage, New York, 260

B. F. Goodrich Company, 138, 140, 156,

193,439

Big Joe mission, 28, 33; Big Joe 1, 140,

142

Bilke, Paul F., 451

Bingman, Charles J., 108

Bioletti, Carlton, 344

Biosatellite, 21, 70, 82, 206, 227, 340,

342-46; BIOS I, 340; Biosatellite I, 2,

and 3, 343, 345, 346; Biosatellite C

and D, 345; Project Biosatellite, 344,

378

Bioscience Advisory Committee, 341

Birmingham, University of (U.K.), 291,

293

Bisplinghoff, Raymond L., 5, 6, 404-06

Bland, William M., Jr., 102 n, 112,

114-17

Block I-V, 176, 183-85, 309-16, 326

Blossom Point, Maryland, 536, 538-40,

542, 543, 577

Boehm, Joseph, 238

Boeing Company, 53, 55, 60, 61, 192,

319, 321-25,452, 515, 517

Bogart, Frank A., 107, 108

Bolce, William J., 108

Bolender, Carroll H., 110, 116, 119

Boiger, Philip H., 111

Bollerud, Jack, 108

Bond, Aleck C., 102 n, 112-15, 117, 119

Booz-Allen Company, 261

Borman, Frank, 153, 157, 160, 162, 177,

184, 185, 189

Bothmer, Clyde, 104, 105, 108

Boulder, Colorado, 254

Bourdeau, R. E., 238, 245, 247, 291, 299

Brace, L. H., 250

Brand, Vance D., 189

Brandon, G., 285

Brazil, 272, 373, 559

Brazilia, 536, 540, 542, 543, 577, 588

Bredt, Irene, 505

Briggs, Thomas W., 115, 117

Briskman, Robert D., 525

Bristol Aerospace, 279

Brock, 114, 117, 119

Brockett, H. R., 524-26

Brown, B. Porter, 110

Brown, Clinton, 505

Brown, Harvey H., 497, 498

Brown, J. Robert, 105, 106

Brown Field, California, 590

Brownstein, Herbert S., 108

Brussels, University of, 297

Bryant, Frederick B., 524-26

Buckley, Edmond C., 200, 522, 524-26,

544, 545, 547, 553, 560, 561

Budd Company, 243
INDEX 623

Budget,U.S.Bureauof the(BOB),6,7,

203,362,392,475,485,490

Buglia,JamesJ.,98,100n

Bunze,H. F.,483

Burcham,DonaldP.,340

Burke,J. D., 310-16

Burke,JohnR.,107

Burke,JosephR.,366,370,373,376,

380,393

Burlage,Henry,471

BurnsandRoe,546,561.See also WECo

Bussard, R. W., 482

Butler, H. I. 352

Butler, Paul, 240, 243, 245, 248, 251

C

Cain, Dwight C., 109

Cain Springs, 483

Cajun, 272, 276, 282

California, 145-47, 154, 156, 341, 369,

451,475,522, 526, 544, 546, 553,

571-73, 589, 592

California, University of, 243,259; at

Berkeley, 395; at La Jolla, 379; at Los

Angeles (UCLA), 250, 251, 337, 395;

at San Diego (UCSD), 242, 243,247,

254, 256, 257, 314, 316-18, 395

California Institute of Technology (Cal

Tech), 313, 314, 329, 330, 335, 337,

564, 572; Guggenheim Aeronautical

Laboratory (GALCIT), 564 n. See

also Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Calio, Anthony J., 119

Cambridge, Massachusetts, 405,460

Cambridge, University of (U.K.), 292

Camp Roberts, California, 381

Canada, 233, 236, 249, 272, 277, 288,

550, 591; Defence Research Telecon

Establishment, 289, 290; Defense

Research Board, 289, 290; Transportation, Department of, 354

Canary Islands, 550, 557, 558, 577

Canberra, Australia, 523, 554, 556, 557,

562, 563, 565, 573, 577, 592

Cannetti, Anthony, 108

Canoga Electronics Corporations, 552 n

Canright, Richard B., 6, 104

Canton Island, 523, 546, 548, 550, 552,

561, 577

Cape Canaveral/Kennedy, Florida, 1, 33,

44, 52, 57, 138, 143, 153, 154, 157,

159-62, 164-68, 179, 523, 536, 541,

542, 545, 546, 548, 550, 552, 554, 557,

561, 562, 565,570, 571, 573, 574, 577,

588, 592. See also Kennedy Space

Center

Caporale, A. J., 299, 300

Capsule Coordination Committee, 139,

141 n

Camarvon, Australia, 523, 538 n, 540,

543,548, 552, 554, 557, 563, 577, 588,

593

Carnegie Institute, 567 n

Carpenter, M. Scott, 116, 137 n, 138,

141, 145-48, 551

Carr, Gerald P., 189

Case Institute of Technology, 433

Castor I and II, 62, 63, 75

Catterson, A. D., 120

Causse, Jean-Pierre, 296

Cebreros, 554, 562, 565, 571, 574, 579,

587, 590

Centaur, 1-3, 5, 9, 24, 29-31, 33, 41-45,

171 n, 223 n, 262, 326, 327, 331,379,

399, 470, 473,491, 552

Central Radio Propagation Laboratory,

244

Cernan, Eugene A., 153, 158, 162, 165,

168, 188

Chaffee, Roger B., 159, 176, 184

Chamberlin, James A., 102, 113-15, 117,

119, 139, 141 n, 154, 157

Chance Vought Aircraft Corporation, 61,

62, 181, 182, 449-51. See also LingTemco-Vought Aerospace Corporation

Cherrick, Irwin, 254

Chicago, University of, 237, 243, 307,

309, 313, 328, 330, 337, 433

Chickering, John B., 105, 107

Chilton, Robert G., 102 n

China Lake, California, 444

Christiansen, Everett E., 107, 110

Chrysler Corporation, 46, 47, 51, 52,

55-59

Chukchi Sea, 557

Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, 2,

45. See also Aeronautics and

Astronautics Coordinating Board

Clark, John F., 200, 201,232, 301

Clarke, Arthur C., 364

Clements, Henry E., 116, 118

Cleveland, Ohio, 40, 44, 405, 477, 480,

485, 495

Clummons, D. L., Jr., 298

Coastal Sentry Quebec (tracking ship),

147, 148, 546, 549, 551, 552

Cobby Creek, Australia, 592

Coffee, Claude W., Jr., 244, 246, 253

Cohen, Aaron, 119

Cohen, Haggai, 111

Cohen, William, 471

Cole, 106

College, Alaska, 538-40, 575, 577
624 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

College Park, Maryland, 540, 542, 543,

577

Collins, Michael, 153, 158, 162, 166, 189

Collins Radio Company, 192, 372, 552 n

Coil Towers, 568

Colorado, University of, 339

Columbia University, 314, 355, 433

command and service module (CSM), 172

n, 174-76, 178, 183, 185-94

command module (CM), 173, 188, 189

Commerce, U.S. Department of, 248,

348, 349, 351, 368, 399

Communication by Moon Relay, 364

communications projects, 199, 222, 224,

244, 246, 364-91

Communications Satellite Corporation

(COMSAT), 364, 366, 368, 371, 382,

384, 385, 388-92, 396

Comodoro Rivadavia, Argentina, 523,

541

Condor Committee, 483

Congress, U.S., 2, 7, 93, 95, 99, 128 n,

172, 181, 198, 203, 225, 301, 310, 338,

339, 343, 360, 364, 369, 384, 387, 392,

396, 403,460, 467, 470, 475,482,

484-90, 495, 517; Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy, 484, 486

Conlon, Emerson W., 406

Connor, Joseph, 105, 106

Conrad, Charles, Jr., 153, 157, 158, 161,

164, 167, 168

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation

(Convair), 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41,

42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 57, 92, 94, 96, 481,

484, 485, 535. See also General

Dynamics

Control Data Corporation, 393, 396

Coogan, John, 240

Cooley, J. E., 243

Cooley, William, 5

Cooney, Thomas V., 437

Coons, D. Owen, 116, 118, 120

Cooper, L. Gordon, 137 n, 138, 141,

145-48, 153, 157, 159, 161, 166, 168,

364

Cooper Development Corporation, 282

Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, 515

Cornell University, 337

Corporal. See Baby Wac

Corpus Christi, Texas, 523, 546, 548,

550, 552, 554, 561, 563, 580

Cortright, Edgar M., 107, 109, 200, 201,

301

Cotton, Paul E., 104-08, 407

Coulter, John M., 107

Cover, Joseph W., 110

Covington, Ozro M., 539, 547, 559, 561

Coyne, C. C., 108

Critzos, Chris C., 112

Cross, Carl S., 515 n

Crossfield, A. Scott, 502 n, 507, 509, 510

Crowley, John W., 404, 406

Cuckoo-Raven II, 283

Culbertson, Philip E., 110, 111

Cummings, C. I., 311

Cunningham, Newton W., 310, 332

Cunningham, R. Walter, 164, 176, 185,

188

Curfman, Howard J., Jr., 464

Cutler-Hammer Corporation, 244, 476;

Airborne Instruments Division, 476

D

D'Aiutolo, Charles T., 241, 445

Dallow, Thomas P., 344

Dana, William H., 456, 457, 513, 514

Danberg, James E., 431

Darcey, Robert J., 380, 384, 393, 397,

398

Darwin, Australia, 540, 543, 580

David Clark Company, 157, 192

Davis, Leo R., 247

Davis, William P., 108

Day, LeRoy E., 6, 108, 109

Dayton, Ohio 137 n

D. B. Milliken Company, 193

Deacon, 276

Debre Zeit, Ethiopia, 523, 541

Debus, Kurt H., 179

Decker, James L., 114

Decker, Ralph S., 471

Deep Space Network (DSN), 332, 521-23,

548, 549, 553, 554, 562, 564-96; Compatibility Test Station, 574; Deep

Space Instrumentation Facility, 565,

566; Deep Space Stations, 574

Defense, U.S. Department of (DoD), 1,

4, 17, 29, 86, 87, 93 n, 98, 138, 140,

153, 154, 156, 235,248, 286, 302, 303,

348, 360, 362, 366, 368, 370, 376, 378,

379, 382-84, 392, 393, 399, 465, 487,

488, 490, 497, 500, 514, 524, 539, 541,

544, 546, 548, 549, 551, 554, 560,

562-64, 569, 571, 572, 575, 576, 578,

580, 583, 585, 589, 592, 593, 595, 596;

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 483; Communications Agency,

366; Discoverer, 39, 560; Research and

Development Board, 403 n; Scientific

Satellite Project, 1; Secretary of

Defense, 95, 98, 138, 303, 542; Special

Capabilities, Committee on (Steward

Committee), 87, 235
INDEX 625

DeHavilandAircraftCompany,289,290

Delta,1-3,5,6, 10, 11, 13, 19-21, 24, 67,

68, 77-80, 83, 299

DeMerritte, Fred J., 439

Denicke, Bert A., 105, 110

Denmark, 288 n; Technical University of,

294

Deutsch, George C., 434

Diaz, Rodolfo A., 105, 106, 108

Dickerson, Joe T., 107

Dietlein, Lawrence F., 118, 120

Dionysos, Greece, 541

Disher, John H., 6, 104, 106, 110, 111,

179

Dixon, Franklin P., 110

Dodaira, Japan, 541

Dominican Republic, 541, 559

Donahue, T. M., 284

Donlan, Charles J., 102, 107, 109, 112,

137 n

D'Onofrio, Gus A., 6, 104

Doppler, 534, 542, 545, 566, 571; Coded

Doppler and Ranging Communications, 571

Dorfman, Herman, 107

Dornberger, Walter, 505

Dotts, Homer W., 117, 119

Douglas, W. Harry, 117, 119

Douglas, William K., 112

Douglas Aircraft Company (McDonnell

Douglas), 53, 55-61, 67, 68, 72, 74-76,

80, 83, 181, 182, 351,481,484, 485,

501, 502, 505, 506; E1 Segundo Division, 505

Douglas Sparrow, 278

Dow, N. F., 505

Drake, Hubert, 507

Dreoscher, John J., Jr., 120

Dryden, Hugh L., 369, 370

Dubin, M., 284

DuBridge, Lee A., 572

Dumbo (reactor), 484

Duncan, Robert C., 115, 117

Dunkelman, Lawrence, 292

Dunseith, Lynwood C., 118, 120

DUpont. See E. I. Dupont

Dutch Guiana, 559

Dyna-Soar (X-20), 92, 93, 456 n, 502,

524, 560; Project Dyna-Soar, 93, 98,

99, 452. See also lifting body program

E

Eagle-Picher Company, 192

Eaker, Herbert L., 294, 295, 372

Early Bird, 81, 385. See also International Telecommunications Satellite

Consortium

Earth, 307, 330, 338, 472

East China Sea, 557, 558

Eastern Test Range (ETR), 137, 142-48,

157-68, 186-89, 198, 233, 235-45,

247, 248, 250, 251, 254, 256-59, 262,

263, 266-68, 270, 287, 291,297, 299,

305-09, 313-18, 321-26, 328-31, 335-39,

345, 346, 348, 351, 353-58, 372, 375,

378-80, 383,384, 389, 397-99, 443,

449, 451, 549, 559. See also Atlantic

Missile Range

East Grand Forks, Minnesota, 536,

538-40, 542, 543, 580

East Island, Puerto Rico, 548, 551, 580

Eastman, Ford, 113

Eastman-Kodak Company, 319-25

East Siberian Sea, 557, 558

Echo, 19-21, 38, 67-69, 80, 81,205, 239,

244, 246, 253,368, 376, 565, 569;

Echo I, 68, 81, 83, 369, 371, 372;

Echo 2, 69, 74, 369, 371, 372; Echo

Station, 569, 571, 582; Project Echo,

21, 582

Edwards, John A., 108, 109, 111

Eggers, Alfred J., Jr., 94, 96, 97, 450,

451,453,454

EGO (eliptic orbits), 264, 266, 268, 270

Ehrlich, Eugene, 366

E. I. Dupont, 369, 372

Eisele, Donna F., 176, 185, 188

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 93, 95, 98, 99,

102, 302, 364, 544

E1 Centro, California, 439

Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., 192,

247, 248, 552 n

Electronics Research Center (ERC), 405,

433,437, 460-62, 499; Computer

Laboratory, 463; Control and Information Systems Laboratory, 461; Electronics Components Laboratory, 463;

Guidance Laboratory, 461; Instrumentation Research Laboratory, 462;

Microwave Radiation Laboratory, 462;

Space Optics Laboratory, 462

Electro-Optical Systems, Inc., 396, 476

Elms, James C., 107, 114, 115

Emerson Electric, 442

engines: ABL, 67, 280, 448 n; Bell

("Hustler"), 36, 37, 39, 501; Castor

E-8,465 n, Castor XM 33E3, 465 n;

F-I, 1, 22, 23, 53, 54, 180, 489, 491;

H-I, 22, 23, 54, 56, 59, 182, 492; J-2,

22, 23, 59, 61,491; M-I, 473,491,

492; Recruit XM-19, 465 n; RL-10,

24, 491; RP-I/LOX, 489; S-10, 489 n;

XE-I, 487; XE-2, 487; XLR, 456;
626 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

XLR-I1,452,455-58,502,509,510;

XLR-99,502,503,506,507,509;XM

45,465n

England. See United Kingdom

Engle, Joe H., 511-13

Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA), 70, 80, 347-51,

357-59, 393, 538, 575; ESSA 1 - 9, 82,

348, 349, 352, 357-59; National Environmental Satellite Center, 349, 350 n

Esselen Park, South Africa, 585, 586

Europe, 389, 554, 593

European Satellite Triangulation Network, 399

European Space Research Organization

(ESRO), 288, 294, 297; ESRO 1

(Aurorae), 65, 288,294, 295; ESRO

2,4, 65, 295; ESRO 2B (IRIS), 65,

274, 280, 294, 295

Evans, Albert J., 407, 497, 498

Evans, Harry L., 107

Evans, Ronald E., 188

Evans, Thomas C., ll0

Evans, Wyendell B., 117, 119

Explorer, 19, 21, 38, 46-48, 62, 64, 65,

67-70, 80-82, 93, 197, 205, 210,

232-53,271, 288, 331,437, 441 n, 493,

524, 542, 543; Explorer 1, 1, 46, 87,

235,286, 572; Explorer 2, 47; Explorer 3, 47,235; Explorer 4, 47, 235;

Explorer 5, 47, 235; Explorer 6 (S-2),

68, 73,210, 235, 237, 370; Explorer 7

(S-la), 48,210, 235, 238; Explorer 8

(S-30), 48, 235, 238; Explorer 9

(S-56a), 64, 66, 235, 237, 288, 368;

Explorer 10 (P-14), 68, 216 n, 235,

239; Explorer 11 (S-15), 48, 235, 240;

Explorer 12 (S-3), 68, 235, 240, 241;

Explorer 13 (S-55a), 64, 236, 241,437;

Explorer 14 (S-3a), 69, 236, 241, 242;

Explorer 15 (S-3b), 69, 236, 242; Explorer 16 (S-55b), 64, 236, 242, 437,

440; Explorer 17 (S-6), 69, 236, 243;

Explorer 18 (IMP-A), 69, 236, 243,

245,248; Explorer 19 (AD-A), 64,

236, 244, 288, 368; Explorer 20 (S-48),

64, 236, 244, 299; Explorer 21 (IMPB), 69, 236, 245; Explorer 22 (BE-B),

64, 236, 245, 247, 288, 462, 463; Explorer 23 (S-55c), 64, 236, 246, 437;

Explorer 24 (AD-Injun B), 64, 236,

246, 288; Explorer 25, 64, 236, 246;

Explorer 26 (EPE-D), 69, 236, 247;

Explorer 27 (BE-C), 64, 236, 247, 288,

462, 463; Explorer 28 (IMP-C), 69,

236, 248; Explorer 29 (GEOS-A), 69,

236, 248, 288, 400; Explorer 30 (SEA), 64, 236, 249; Explorer 31 (DMEA), 69, 236, 249; Explorer 32 (AE-B),

69, 236, 250; Explorer 33 (IMP-D),

70, 236, 250; Explorer 34 (IMP-F), 70,

236, 251; Explorer 35 (IMP-E), 70,

236, 251; Explorer 36 (GEOS-B), 69,

236, 252, 288, 400; Explorer 37 (SEB), 65,236, 252; Explorer 38 (RAEA), 70, 236, 253; Explorer 39 (ADInjun E), 69, 236, 253, 288, 368; Explorer 40, 64, 236, 253; Explorer S-l,

235; S-45, 235; S-45a, 235; S-46, 235;

S-66, 236; Project Explorer, 572

extravehicular activity (EVA), 152, 157,

158, 160, 164-66, 168, 192

Faget, Maxime A., 94, 97, 98, 100 n, 102

n, 103, 112-15, ll7, 119, 134, 171 n,

505

Fairbanks, Alaska, 523, 538 n, 575, 581

Fairchild-Hiller Corporation (formerly,

Fairchild Stratos Corporation), 397,

440, 442, 443,476; Space and Electronics Division, 253

Far East, 384

Fastie, W. G., 284

Faith 7, 148

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), 366,

368, 405,497, 514, 515

Federal Communications Commission

(FCC), 364, 373, 374, 388, 552 n

Fero, Lester K., 110

Field, J. Pemble, 108

Fielder, Dennis E., 119

Fields, Edison M., 102 n

Finger, Harold B., 5, 6, 406, 407, 470,

471,479, 480, 487

Fischetti, Thomas L., 264

Flannagan, James R., 471

Flight Investigation of Apollo Reentry

Enviroment (FIARE), 443-44, 448,

450; Project FIARE (Project Calorie),

443,446, 448, 450

Flight Investigation Reentry Enviroment

(FIRE), 32, 41, 183, 186; FIRE 1 and

2, 186, 449-51; Project FIRE, 14, 29,

41, 121,435,439, 448-50, 451

Flight Research Center (FRC), California,

94, 156, 405,439, 451-57, 496, 497,

503, 504, 507, 508, 515, 517; HighSpeed Flight Station, 496, 497, 502,

522, 524, 544

Florence, University of, 299, 300

Florida, 351, 544, 559

Fong, Louis B. C., 201
INDEX 627

FordMotorCompany:AeronauticsDivision,310,311,549;Aeronutronic

Division,314-16,560

Fordyce,DonV.,393,399

FormosaBay,300

Forsythe,DixonL., 5,254

FortChurchill,Canada,272,277,282,

284,285,531n

FortIrwin,568

Fort Myers, Florida, 523, 536, 539, 540,

542, 543, 581, 585

Fort Stewart, Georgia, 536, 539 n, 540,

542, 581

Foster, Norman G., 118

Foster, Willis B., 201

France, 272, 288, 295, 296, 373, 375-77;

Centre d'Etudes Nucleaires de Saclay,

295, 297; Centre d'Etudes des

Telecommunications, 296; Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), 296;

satellites, 64, 221,288, 296

Freden, S., 119

Freedman, Carl, 201

Freedom 7, 143

Freitag, Robert F., 5, 106-08

French Guiana, 559

Frick, Charles W., 113, 179, 182

Friebaum, Jerome, 366, 385

Friendship 7, 100

Fry, W. J., 107

Fucino, Italy, 376

G

Gagarin, Yuri A., 100, 102, 141

Galileo, 259

Gamble, Allen O., 137 n

Gangler, James J., 434

Garbacz, Michael L., 348, 349

Garbarini, Robert F., 201

Gardiner, Robert A., 117, 119

Garland, Benjamin J., 98, 100 n

Garrett Corporation, 192

Gartrell, Harold E., 117, 119

Gassiot High Altitude Vehicle, 283

Gautraud, John A., 104, 106

Gay, Clarence C., Jr., 109

Gemini, 2, 11, 13, 22, 24, 28, 29, 32, 38,

83, 102, 103, 174, 176, 177, 182,

190-94, 355, 441, 450, 548, 549, 552,

554, 556, 562, 563, 565, 575, 580, 589,

591-93, 595; astronauts, 152-70, 174,

442; characteristics and chronology,

149-70; funding, 122, 126, 127, 133 n;

Gemini 3, 464, 552, 563; Gemini 4,

552, 563; Gemini 5, 161, 552, 563;

Gemini 6, 163, 552, 563; Gemini 7,

162, 552, 563; Gemini 8, 164, 563;

Gemini 9, 165, 563; Gemini 10, 166,

563; Gemini 11, 167, 563; Gemini 12,

168, 563; Gemini-Agena D, 157;

Gemini Agena Target Vehicle, 38, 151,

163-68; Gemini Experiments Office,

153; Gemini Launch Vehicle (GLV),

84, 158-61,163-68; Gemini Mission

Evaluation Team, 159-68; Gemini

Operational and Management Plan,

156; Gemini Project Office, 153-55,

157, 158, 174; Gemini-Titan (GT),

152-54, 157-63, 166, 552; Project

Gemini, 30, 37, 40, 85, 100, 101,439,

522, 551,552, 562

General Dynamics, 29, 30, 34, 36, 37, 41,

42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 53, 54, 57, 182,

331,555 n; Astronautics, 261,262,

449, 450; Convair/Astronautics Division, 172, 180, 181. See also Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation

General Dynamics/Astronautics, 261,

262, 449-51,469, 485

General Dynamics/Convair Aerospace,

517

General Dynamics/Electronics, 538 n

General Electric Corporation (GE), 45,

86, 87, 150, 172, 180, 181, 192,

260-62, 340, 343-46, 361, 362, 378,

393, 396, 397, 445,446, 462, 494, 515,

538 n; Missile and Space Vehicle

Department, 182, 446, 448; Spacecraft

Department, 360, 363

General Motors Corporation, 193; AC

Electronics Division, 193

General Purpose Airborne simulator, 505

General Services Administration, 366

Gentry, Jerauld R., 457-59

Geodynamics Experimental Ocean

Satellite (GEOS), 248, 252, 288, 400.

See also Explorer

Geophysics Corporation of America:

Viron Division, 372

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.

See Marshall Space Flight Center

Germany, Federal Republic of, 272, 288

n, 534; Army, 275; Junkers Flugzeugand Motorenwerke GmbH, 297;

Peenemiinde, 505; 534; rockets, 91,

93, 275, 534; scientists, 505; West German Post Office, 374, 377

Gessow, Alfred, 432

Gibberson, Walker E., 326

Gillam, I. T., 6

Gilmore, Alaska, 575, 581

Gilruth, Robert R., 95, 96, 99, 102, 103,

112, 113, 115, 116, 118, 120, 137 n,
628 NASAHISTORICAL DATA BOOK

138, 141

Gilstead, Douglas A., 440

Ginter, Roll D., 5, 6, 407

Glahn, Earl W., 332

Glaser, H., 252

Glenn, John H., Jr., 100, 137 n, 138,

141, 143-45, 147, 148, 548, 551

Glennan, T. Keith, 102, 137 n, 139, 341,

382, 467

Glenn T. Martin Company, 275

Goddard, Robert H., 270, 275; A

Method of Reaching Extreme

Altitudes, 275

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC),

102, 179, 197, 233,237-72, 276, 278,

285-300, 302, 307-09, 313, 328, 335,

337, 339, 340, 348, 349, 351-57, 360,

361, 363, 366, 370, 372, 373, 375,

377-80, 382-85, 389-93, 395-99, 433,

438, 462, 494, 522, 536, 538, 539, 542,

545, 547, 551-53, 558-62, 579, 589;

Goddard Range and Range Rate

Equipment (GRARR), 538, 575,

590-93; Network Test and Training

Facility (NTTF), 539, 543, 577, 589;

Tiros Technical Control Center, 350

Goett, Harry J., 155, 180

Gold, Harold, 477

Goldstone, California, 523, 548, 553,

554, 557, 558, 562, 563, 565-74, 581,

582, 588

Golovin, Nicholas E., 181

Goodrich Company. See B.F. Goodrich

Company

Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, 298

Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, 155

Goonhilly Downs, England, 376

Goozh, Paul E., 6

Gordon, Richard F., Jr., 153, 158, 164,

165, 167

Graduate Research Center of the

Southwest, 307-09

Grand Bahama Island, 523, 541, 546,

548, 550, 552, 554, 557, 558, 561, 563,

582, 583

Grand Canary Island, 523, 546, 548, 552,

554, 561, 563, 577, 583

Grand Central Rocket Company, 86, 87,

140

Grand Turk Island, 536, 539 n, 540-42,

546, 548, 550, 552, 561, 583

Graves, G. Barry, Jr., 114, 115, 545, 547

n, 560

Gray, Edward Z., 109

Great Britain. See United Kingdon

Great Lakes, 349

Greenbelt, Maryland, 102

Greene, William D., 110

Greenhorn, Alvin E., 107

Greenland, 400, 550

Greever, Bill, 240

Gregory, Don T., 113-15

Grissom, Virgil I., 137 n, 138, 141,

144-48, 152, 157, 159-61, 163, 176,

184

Gross, R.J., 297

Grosz, P., 110

Ground Based Information System

(GBIS). See Advanced Research Projects Agency

Ground Communications Facility. See

NASCOM

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, 174, 176, 179, 181-84, 193,

260-63, 361, 369, 372

GT&E, 382

G.T. Schjeldahl Company, 239, 244, 246,

253, 298, 369, 371,442, 443

Guadalcanal, 546, 561

Guam, 523, 548, 554, 557, 558, 562, 563,

584, 594

Guaymas, Mexico, 146-48, 523, 546, 548,

550, 552, 554, 561, 563, 584, 594

Guild, Warren A., 5, 6

Gulton Industries, 264

H

Hage, George H., 109

Hagen, John P., 286, 287

Haglund, Howard H., 326, 329-31

Hagner, Donald R., 111

Haise, Fred W., Jr., 189, 456

Halaby, Najeeb E., 514

Haley, Richard L., 348, 360

Hall, Charles F., 303,307-09

Hall, Eldon W., 5, 104, 106, 108, 110

Hall, Harvey, 104

Hallissy, Joseph M., 445,447

Halpern, Richard E., 254

Hammock, Jerome B., 102 n, 118, 120

Hammond, Victor W., 526

Hampton, Victor W., 526

Hanes, Thomas E., 110

Hanna, William E., Jr., 407

Hanson, W. B., 284

Harper, Charles W., 407, 497, 498

Harrison, Harry, 433

Hartebeesthoek, South Africa, 585

Harvard University, 254, 257, 259, 285,

460; Harvard College Observatory,

437

Hastings, Earl C., Jr., 242, 246, 445, 448

Hathcock, Juanita, 105, 106
INDEX 629

Havana,Cuba,536,539n,540,542,

581,585

Havenstein,P.L., Ill

Hawaii,147,148,343,381, 523, 547,

557, 558, 585

Hawkins, Willard R., 118, 120

Hearth, Donald P., 202, 302, 332, 340

Heaton, Donald H., 4, 5, 105,200

Heberlig, Jack C., 102 n, 171 n

Hecht, Kenneth F., 117, 119

Hedrick, Walter R., 107

Heikkila, W. J., 284

Heller, Niles R., 547, 560

Henry, Richard C., 108

Heppner, James P., 239, 270

Hercules, 282, 283

Hercules Powder Company, 34, 41, 62,

72, 86

Hermes, 275; Hermes C-I, 52

Hess, Wilmot N., 117, 119, 242

Hexcel Products, Inc., 193

Hibbert, John, 110

Hicks, Clairborne R., Jr., 102 n

Highly Eccentric Orbiting Satellite

(HEOS), 70, 80, 82, 288, 297

Hipsher, Harold P., 471

Hittan Associates, Inc., 362

Hjornevik, Wesley L., 113-15, 117, 118,

120

Hoag, Peter, 457

Hodge, John D., 116, 118-20

Hoffman Electronics, 264

Hogarth, L. T., 257-59

Holcomb, John K., 6, 104, 106, 109

Holmdel, New Jersey, 370

Holmes, D. Brainerd, 5, 101, 104, 105

Holmes, Jay, 108

Holtz, John R., 233, 252, 271

Honest John, 280

Honeysuckle Creek, 548, 577, 585

Honeywell, Inc., 193; Honeywell MH-96

Adaptive Flight Control System, 507;

Honeywell Systems & Research Division, 464

Horizon Definition Research Project. See

SCANNER

Horowitz, R., 284

Horton, Vic, 456

Houbolt, John C., 174, 181, 182

House of Representatives, U.S., 7, 209,

214 n, 217, 361; Committee on Science

and Astronautics, 198, 265, 312, 362;

Select Committee on Astronautics and

Space Exploration, 370; Subcommittee

on NASA Oversight, 265, 363; Subcommittee on Science and

Astronautics Applications, 361; Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, 198. See also Congress,

U.S.

Houston, Texas, 100, 103, 134, 139, 141,

154, 156, 159-62, 164-68, 172, 174,

176, 179, 439, 466, 544, 551, 552, 554,

561-63. See Manned Spacecraft Center

Howard, Brian T., 110

Howe, John T., 432

Hubbard, Samuel H., 108, 109, 111, 154

Hugenia, G. R., 285

Hughes Aircraft Company, 182, 311,

320, 325-31, 371, 378, 379, 382-85,

388-90, 392, 396-99

Hughes Research Laboratories, 475-77

Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center.

See Flight Research Center

Humphreys, James W., 108

Huntsville (tracking ship), 549, 551, 554,

555 n, 557, 558

Huntsville, Alabama, 1, 39, 93, 100, 557

Hyatt, Abraham, 2, 4, 5, 505

Hymoqitz, Emil, 292

Hynes, Robert T., 526

Ikard, Wallace, 525

Illinois, University of, 245

Image Dissector Camera System (IDCS),

395

Imperial College (U.K.), 291, 295, 297

India, 272, 542

Indian Ocean, 381, 382, 385, 546, 550,

557, 558, 561, 588, 595

Indochina, 481; conflict, 499

Injun Explorer, 233, 246, 253. See also

Explorer

Instrumentation Radar Acquisition Kit,

546 n

Integrated Apollo and Deep Space Station, 576

Intelligence Agency, U.S. (USIA), 368

Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement

Program, 499

Interagency Chemical Rocket Propulsion

Group, 488

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM),

30, 35, 73, 84, 85, 92, 93, 97, 134,

151, 156, 483, 541 n, 561; IBM 704

computer, 536; IBM 7090 computer,

545. See also WECo

International Geophysical Year (IGY),

47, 86, 87, 93, 197, 235, 271, 276,

282, 283, 286, 303, 347, 524, 535, 536,

541, 542, 571, 573

International Ground Station Committee,

376
630 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

InternationalLatexCorporation,193

InternationalQuietSunYear,249,302;

WorldMagneticSurvey,267

InternationalTelecommunications

SatelliteConsortium(INTELSAT),67,

69,70,80-82,202,364,366,384-91,

558n; INTELSATI- 111, 385, 387-91

International Telecommunications Union

(ITU), 368, 537

International Telephone and Telegraph

Company (ITT), 382, 384, 388, 552 n;

Industrial Products Division, 264

Interservice Group for Flight Vehicle

Power, 405 n

Iowa, State University of, 235, 236, 238,

240, 241,246, 250, 251, 253, 286, 313,

335, 337, 339, 378

Ireland, Fred, 104, 106

Isbaraki Prefecture, Japan, 376

Island Lagoon, Australia, 541

Israel, 272

Italy, 288, 299, 300, 373, 573; Centro

Ricerche Aerospaziale, 299, 300

IVA, 280

J

Jackass Flats, Nevada, 477,480, 483

Jackson, Bruce G., 118, 120

Jackson, John E., 249, 289, 290, 297,

298

Jackson, John L., 244

Jaffe, Leonard, 201, 202, 366, 370, 376,

379, 380, 382, 396

Jaffe, Richard, 571

J.A. Maurer, Inc., 193

Jamaica, 559

James, Jack N., 332, 335-38

James, Lee B., 109

Janus, 351; Janus II, 348; Project Janus,

348

Japan, 272, 373, 551, 552

Jenkins, Thomas E., 109

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (formerly, Guggenheim Aeronautical

Laboratory), 1, 45-48, 61, 172, 235,

275, 288, 302, 307-10, 312-18, 320,

321, 325-32, 334-40, 369, 372, 393,

432, 433,434, 461,462, 475,489, 494,

521, 522, 524, 542, 552, 562, 564-67,

569-73, 582; Functional Design Group,

311; Goldstone Space Communications

Station, 569 n; New Space Flight

Operations Facility, 573; Space Flight

Operations Facility, 566, 570

Jodreil Bank, England, 292, 531, 572

Johannesburg, South Africa, 523, 536,

539, 540, 542, 565, 570-74, 585

Johns Hopkins University, 284, 433; Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), 245,

247-49, 252, 275, 277, 299, 482

Johnson, Bernard L., 108

Johnson, Edwin G., 471

Johnson, Lyndon B., 95, 98, 481,487,

499

Johnson, Vincent L., 4-6, 201, 202

Johnson, William G., 442, 443

Johnston, Richard, 114, 115, 117, 118

Joint Parachute Test Facility, 439

Jones, Allen, 109

Jones, Alton E., 380, 383

Jones, David M., 107, 110

Jones, Walton L., 407, 469

Jones, William W., 349, 358

Juno, 2, 15, 24, 47, 54; Juno I, 3, 46-51,

93, 288, 368; Juno II, 3, 10, 14, 27,

46-50, 209, 238, 240, 288, 303, 306,

351, 368,489; Juno IV, 348, 351;

Juno V, 3, 99, 171. See also Saturn

Jupiter, 3, 10, 15, 48, 51, 87, 121, 134 n,

139, 140, 206, 212 n, 235; Jupiter C,

27, 46, 47, 93, 97,235, 348, 351, 571;

Jupiter IRBM, 47, 48; planet, 330,

470, 472

Jupiter, Florida, 523

K

Kahao, M. J. Barkdull, 108

Kaiser-Fleetwings, Inc., 369, 372

Kano, Nigeria, 540, 543, 546-48, 550,

552, 561, 585

Kashima, Japan, 399

Kasima Nachi, Japan, 540, 543, 586

Kauai, Hawaii, 540, 543, 546, 548, 550,

554, 561, 563, 580, 585, 586

Keating, Gerald M., 246

Kehlet, Alan B., 102 n, 180

Kelleher, John J., 366, 385

Keller, J. Warren, 439

Kelley, Albert J., 406, 407, 460

Kemmerer, Walter K., Jr., 120

Kennedy, John F., 100-02, 141, 149, 172,

181, 182, 185, 203, 379, 480, 485, 514,

556

Kennedy Space Center (KSC), 59, 61,

116, 174, 179, 184, 265, 304, 320, 334,

522. See also Cape

Canaveral/Kennedy

Kenya, 300

Kerr, Thomas B., 471

Khrushchev, Nikita, 364

Kinetics, 264
INDEX 631

Kingsport (tracking ship), 549

Kingsport, Tennessee, 381

Kinny, Archer W., 110

Kiwi, 473,476, 478-88; Kiwi A, B, and

C, 479-81, 483-88; Kiwi Transient

Nuclear Test, 486

Klein, Milton S., 407, 471

Kleinknecht, Kenneth S., 113-16, 119,

141, 154

Knauf, George M., 105, 106, 108

Knight, William J., 513, 514

Kochendorfer, Fred D., 332

Kock, Winston E., 460

Koenig, Charles E., 108

Kokee Park, 586, 587

Kolenkiewicz, Ronald, 102 n

Kollsman Instrument Corporation, 260-62

Konecci, Eugene B., 406, 407, 469

Korean conflict, 499

Kotanchik, Joseph N., 115-17, 119

Kraft, Christopher C., Jr., 102 n, 103,

112-16, 118, 120

Kranz, Eugene F., 120

Kreplin, R. W., 249, 252

Krueger, A., 284

Kubat, Jerald R., 6, 108, 109

Kupperian, James E., Jr., 240, 262

Kurzweg, Richard V., 406, 407, 431

Kwajalein, Marshall Islands, 548, 551,

587

La Gow, H. E., 238

Lakehurst, New Jersey, 380

Lamont Geological Observatory, 328

Lance, 281

Lang, Dave W., 118

Langley Memorial Aeronautical

Laboratory, 62, 92, 94-96, 100, 261,

300, 301, 368-70, 403,404, 505,506,

522, 560; Dynamic Loads Division,

102 n; Flight Research Division, 102

n; Full-Scale Tunnel Research Division, 102 n; Stability Research Division, 102 n; Structures Research Division, 102 n. See also Langley Research

Center

Langley Research Center (LaRC), 1, 29,

33, 47, 49, 61, 66, 92, 102, 134, 137,

139, 141, 171, 174, 181, 184, 197, 233,

239, 241, 242, 244, 246, 253, 265,288,

298, 302, 319-25, 327, 328, 370-72,

404, 432-34, 436-39, 441-52, 454, 457,

462, 464-66, 468, 469, 495-97,499,

500, 502, 503, 508, 515, 544, 545, 547,

560, 565; Instrument Research Division, 102 n, 544, 547, 560; Source

Evaluation Board, 320; Tracking

Systems Study Group, 544

Langmuir probes, 243,466

Lani Bird. See International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium

Lanzkron, Rolf W., 115-18

LaRue, William A., 109

Lasser, Herbert, 303

Launch Complex, 34, 184

launch vehicles, 1-87, 122, 123; Administrative Operations (AO), 7, 8;

budget, 6-24; Budget Operations Division, 7; characteristics, 24-87; Construction of Facilities (CoF), 7, 8;

launch escape system (LES), 173, 186,

187; propulsion systems, 17, 18, 22-25;

Research and Development (R&D),

7-9, 25, 26, 31, 33

Lauten, William T., Jr., 102 n

Lazar, James, 471

Lederer, Jerome, 111

Lee, Chester M., 109, 110

Lee, John B., 102 n

Lee, William A., 105, 106, 115, 116, 179

Leeds, University of (U.K.), 295

Lehan, F. W., 571

Leicester, University of (U.K.), 291, 295

Lemke, George A., 6, 109

Levenson, Stephan S., 111

Levine, Jack, 445, 465

Levine, Robert S., 471

Lewis Research Center (LeRC) (formerly,

Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory

and Aircraft Engine Research

Laboratory), 40, 44, 102 n, 134, 241,

242, 334, 393,405, 432-34, 436, 438,

454, 470, 473,476-79, 481,482, 486,

489-96, 499, 515, 549; Safety Research

and Data Institute, 436

Levy, Edwin Z., 137 n

Liberty Bell, 7, 144

Liccardi, Anthony L., 108

life sciences program, 340-46, 466-69

lifting body program, 94, 121,435,

450-59; HL-10, 439, 452-59; M-l, 94,

97, 450, 454, 473; M-2, 439, 452, 453,

455; M2-FI, 451,452, 454-56; M2-F2,

452, 453, 455-59; M2-F3,452, 456,

457; SV-5D Prime (Precision Recovery

Including Maneuvering Entry), 452;

X-20 (Dyna-Soar), 92, 91,454, 456,

502, 524, 560; X-24, 24, 453,456;

X-24A, 439, 453,456. See also

Dyna-Soar

Lilly, William E., 105, 106, 108

Lima, Peru, 523, 539, 540, 542, 543, 587
632 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Lindell,KeithG.,112

Lindsay,JohnC.,237,256,257,307

Ling-Temco-VoughtAerospaceCorporation,62,449,466;RangeSystems

Division,555n; VoughtAstronautics,

61,66

LinkGroupofGeneralPrecision,184

Little,AlbertP.,108

LittleJoe(LJ), 10,27,49,134,139;LittleJoeI, ll, 12,15,16,24,48-50,

121,134,140;LittleJoeII, 16,24,

27,48,50,121,140,182,186

LivermoreRadioationLaboratory,476, 483

LockheedMissilesandSpaceCompany,

29,36,37,39,57,67,74-76,151,154,

155,182,193,260,262,320,334,343,

344,389,397,476,481,484,485,490,

515

Loftus,JosephP.,Jr. 119

London,Universityof (U.K.),295,297

Longanecker,GeraldW.,247

Long_RangeProvingGround(LRPG),559

Looney,C.H.,248

Lord,DouglasR., 105,106,109,110

LosAlamosScientificLaboratory,476,

478, 480, 483-85; Reactor Division,

482; Weapons Division, 482

Los Angeles, California, 98

Love, Eugene S., 453

Lovejoy, W. L., 6

Lovelace, W. Randolph, 108

Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research, 137 n

Lovell, James A., Jr., 153, 157, 158, 160,

162, 164, 165, 168, 177, 185, 189

Lovell, Powell M., 407

Low, George M., 102, 104-06, 108, 115,

116, 118, 176, 179-81, 185, 200

Lucas, Thomas V., 525, 526

Ludwig, George H., 266, 268, 286

Lunar and Planetary Missions Board, 198

Lunar Mission Planning Board, 184

lunar module (LM), 173-76, 179, 184,

187-94

Lunar Orbiter, 29, 32, 37, 39, 40, 176,

205, 214 n, 215, 310, 319-25, 327, 556,

563, 565, 566; Lunar Orbiter 1

through 5, 319-25; Project Office, 320

Lunar Science Institute, 301

Luskin, Harold T., 107, 110

Lutman, C. C., 106

Lyle, John, 108

M

McClintock, J. G., 116, 119

McCollough, Chester, 506

McDivitt, James A., 152, 157, 160, 161

McDonald, F. B., 240, 241,243,246,

248, 251

McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, 102,

137, 138, 140-43, 149, 150, 153-58,

182, 193,455. See also Douglas Aircraft Company

MacDougall, George F., Jr., 102 n

McElmurry, Thomas U., 110

McGolrick, Joseph E., 6

McGuire, Charles W., 109

Mach speeds, 92, 96, 501-03, 506-08

Machell, Reginald M., 119

McKay, John B., 509-13

McKee, Daniel D., 104, 106

Mackey, Robert J., Jr., 118, 119

McMullen, Thomas H., 109

McMurdo Sound, Antarctica, 347

McTigue, John, 453, 457

Madagascar, 543, 587, 588

Madrid, Spain, 523, 548, 554, 556-58,

562, 563, 565, 571, 573, 579, 587, 590

Magin, Betsy F., 102 n

Magnetometer-Plasma Probe, 239

Mahon, Joseph B., 4-6, 202

Maine, 376

Majunga, Malagasy Republic, 540, 543,

577, 588

Manhattan Project, 482

Manke, John A., 457-59

Manchester, University of (U.K.), 292,

293

"Manned Earth Reconnaissance" mission,

94

Manned Lunar Landing, Ad Hoc Task

Group for Study of, 181

Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC),

Houston, 100, 103, 134, 139, 141,

154-57, 170, 172, 174, 176, 179,

182-84, 188, 189, 285,439, 466, 468,

469, 494, 522, 544, 551-53, 561, 563;

Experiments Program Office, 153;

Florida Operations Office, 179; Lunar

Surface Experiments Panel, 183;

organization, 112-20. See also Space

Task Group

Manned Spacecraft Criteria Board, 183

Manned Space Flight, Office of (OMSF),

4-6, ll, 13, 23, 24, 101, 102, Ill n,

121, 130 n, 179, 182, 301, 319, 320,

340, 341, 405, 466-68, 491,492, 554,

565; Division of Aerospace Medicine,

468; launch vehicle and propulsion

systems, 17, 18, 22-25
INDEX 633

MannedSpaceFlightNetwork(MFSN),

141n, 521-23,526,538,544-63,565,

573-96

mannedspaceflightprogram,15,16,33,

48,51,52,91-194;budget,121-33;

characteristics,134-94;creationand

earlyyears,94-101;management,

101-20;militaryproposals,92-94

Manos,NicholasE.,200

Manville,R.W.,6

Marcotte,PaulG.,241,250,251

Mardel,A.D., 117,119

Mariner,9, 13,14,29,31,32,36-40,

205,216,301,331-38,355,565,566,

573;AdvancedMariner1969,332-35;

Mariner 1, 331, 333-35, 565; Mariner

2, 331, 333, 334, 336, 573; Mariner 3,

332-34, 337; Mariner 4, 303, 332-35,

338, 438, 462, 574; Mariner 5, 303,

332, 333, 335, 339; Mariner 6, 333,

335; Mariner 7, 333, 335; Mariner 8,

333, 335; Mariner 9, 333, 335;

Mariner 10, 333, 335; Mariner A, 333,

334; Mariner B, 333, 334; Mariner

Mars, 216 n; Mariner Mars 1962, 334;

Mariner Mars 1964, 332-34; Mariner

Mars 1966, 332-34; Mariner Mars

1967, 332, 333; Mariner Mars 1969,

332-34, 566; Mariner Mars 1971, 332,

333, 335; Mariner Pioneer, 302;

Mariner Venus 1962 (Mariner R), 13,

331, 333; Mariner Venus 1967, 332;

Mariner Venus-Mercury 1973, 332,

333, 335

Markley, J. Thomas, 112, 115, 116

Marquardt Corporation, 193

Mars, 42, 44, 61, 216 n, 217 n, 301, 311,

331, 332, 334, 335, 337-41,406,

443-40, 470, 472, 475,481,493,494,

566, 573; Mars Station, 566, 568, 569

n, 571,574, 582; Mars Voyager, 301,

439

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC),

Alabama, 1, 39, 40, 44, 48, 52-54,

57-59, 61, 156, 172, 179, 181, 182,

238, 240, 433-35, 437, 440-43, 461,

473,475,476, 478, 481,484-86,

489-92; Future Projects Office, 54

Martin, Frank T., 245, 247, 299

Martin, James A., 497, 498

Martin Company, 83, 84, 86, 87, 151,

154, 155, 172, 180-82, 238, 320, 433,

441,442, 455, 456, 481,484, 485, 508;

Nuclear Division, 494

Martin Marietta Corporation, 53, 54, 57,

84, 327, 452

Maryland, 286, 551, 589

Maryland, University of, 251,285

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(MIT), 239, 240, 243, 250, 251, 254,

258, 260, 262, 307, 337, 339, 433, 460,

462, 560; Instrumentation Laboratory,

172 n, 193; Lincoln Laboratories, 560

Mathews, Charles W., 102, 107, 110,

112-16, 154, 157, 182, 285

Mathews, Wayne C., 366, 385

Mattingly, Thomas K., II, 189

Maui, Hawaii, 541

Maurer, Inc. See J.A. Maurer, Inc.

May, Ralph W., Jr., 436, 439, 449

Mayaguana Island, 541

Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, 564, 572

Mayer, John P., 102 n, 116, 118, 120

Mayer, Norman J., 440

Maynard, Owen E., 115-18

Mayo, Alfred M., 105,200, 407 n

Max Plank Institute, 297

Mead, Merrill H., 407

Mediterranean Sea, 557, 558

Medrow, Karl R., 271

Mendel, J. T., 379

Mengel, John T., 535, 539, 541, 542, 547

Mercury, 2, 11, 12, 15, 16, 24, 27, 31,

48-51, 100, 103, 112, 116, 121-23, 149,

154, 155, 174, 190-94, 281, 364, 448,

450, 456 n, 466, 467, 470, 472, 524,

544, 545, 547-96; astronauts, 29,

141-48, 152; Capsule Coordinator Ofrice, 140; Capsule Review Board, 140;

characteristics and chronology, 134-49;

funding, 122-26; Mercury (tracking

ship), 549, 554, 555, 557, 558, 595;

Mercury 8, 549 n; Mercury 9, 549 n;

Mercury-Atlas (MA-4, 6, 7, 8, 9), 33,

36, 37, 137, 140-42, 547, 549 n, 551,

562, 580, 587, 591, 592, 596; Mercury

Control Center (MCC), 144, 146, 148,

545, 578; Mercury-Gemini, 553; Mercury Mark II, 149, 150, 155; Mercury

Mission Center, 145, 147; Mercury

Network Coordination Committee,

561; Mercury Network Test Vehicle

(MNTV), 66, 549; Mercury-Redstone,

46, 49, 51, 52, 137, 138, 140, 143,

491, 547; Mercury-Scout, 1, 66, 547,

549, 554, 561; Mercury Support Planning Office, 139, 171; planet, 333,

566; Program Planning Office, 139,

171; Project Mercury, 30, 49, 51, 66,

100-02, 134-49, 171, 341, 354, 355,

448, 521, 522, 526, 544, 560

Meredith, L. H., 294, 295

Merritt Island, Florida, 174, 523, 548,

554, 562, 588

Meteorological Flight Experiments, 205

meteorology program, 346-63
634 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Mexico,547,561

Michel,Douglas,440

Michigan,Universityof,254,258,276,

282,433;AeronauticalEngineering

Department,276;Observatory,261

MichiganStateUniversity,433

MichoudAssemblyFacility(New

Orleans),179n

Microlock(trackingscheme),524,542,

571,572,575

MiddleEast,364

Middleton,RoderickO.,110

MidwayIsland,Hawaii,347,551

Milan,Universityof,297

MilitarySeaTransport,555n

Miller,JamesE.,107

Miller,WilliamE.,110

Millick,Tom,456

MillikenCompany. See D.B. Milliken

Company

Milwitsky, Benjamin, 109, 326

Minitrack (M/T) network, 373, 524,

535-37, 539-42, 549, 560, 568, 572,

573, 575, 577, 579-81, 583, 585, 587,

588, 590

Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company, 66, 193,264

Minnesota, University of, 237, 254, 257,

308, 309, 395

Missile Instrumentation by Electronic

Means (MINSTREL), 560

Mississippi Test Facility, Bay St. Louis,

179 n, 183

Mitaka, Japan, 523

Mitchell, Elliot, 5

Mitchell, Harry, 108

Mitchell, Jesse, 201,202, 232

Modisette, Jerry, 118, 119

Moffett Field, California, 302, 342, 405

Mohave, California, 376, 381, 393, 524,

536, 539, 540, 542, 543, 554, 564, 565,

568, 569, 572, 581, 588, 590

Molly Brown (spacecraft), 159

Monitor, 19, 21

Moore, Roger C., 302

Moore, William F., 108

Morocco, 583

Morris, Owen G., 115, 116, 118

Morrison, Clarence R., 407, 525, 526

Morrison, Richard B., 4-6, 200, 201

Morton, D. C., 284

Motorola, Inc., 193, 538 n

MOTS (receiver), 575, 581, 587, 590-93

Mount Hopkins, Arizona, 541

Muchea, Australia, 145,_146, 546, 548,

550, 561, 578, 588

Mueller, George E., 4-6, 102, 108, 109,

154, 179

Muhly, William C., 102 n

Multisatellite Operations Center, 539

Munich, Germany, 297, 374, 377

MX-774 (missile), 96

Myers, Boyd, II, 406, 407

Myers, Richard H., 105

Mylar, 288, 369, 372

N

Nagy, Alex P., 105

Naini Tal, India, 523, 541

Namy, Xavier, 296

NASCOM (NASA Communications

System), 521, 539, 558 n, 565, 572

Nash, Ralph, 434

Natal, Brazil, 282, 285,523

National Academy of Science, 97, 177,

198, 397,405; Space Science Board,

198, 333, 335, 342, 344

National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics (NACA), 1, 8, 29, 49, 61,

62, 91-99, 197, 261, 265, 280, 300,

320, 364, 368, 403-05,454, 476, 483,

494, 496, 497, 505, 506, 522, 544, 559,

560; Aerodynamics, Committee on,

96, 98, 505; Aircraft Engine Research

Laboratory, 405; Aircraft, Missile,

and Spacecraft Aerodynamics, 98;

Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, 96;

Headquarters, 95,404; High-Speed

Aerodynamics, 98; Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, 96; NASA

Organization, Ad Hoc Committee on

(Abbott Committee), 404 n; Pilotless

Aircraft Research Division (PARD),

49, 62, 66, 94, 96-98, 102, 280, 281,

403, 544, 559; Ranges, Launch, and

Tracking Facilities, Working Group

on, 560; Research Airplane Projects

Panel, 501, 505; Space Technology,

Special Committee on, 98

National Aeronautics and Space Act, 1,

95, 99

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): Advanced

Technology Program, 101; animals,

use of, 142, 143, 343; Applications,

Office of, 218 n, 221 n, 271, 347, 366;

Applications and Manned Flights Program Office, 347; Bioresearch, Office

of, 407 n; Bioscience Program Office,

342, 344; budget, 6-24, 121-33, 203-31,

301, 339, 374, 408-31, 490, 526-34;

Chemical Propulsion Office, 491;

Communications and Navigation Pro-
INDEX 635

grams,376,377;cooperationwith

othercountries,272,288-99;creation

of,95,99-103,134,197,232,270,

301,347,572;FlemingCommittee,

181;Headquarters,5-7,53,54,101,

102,104-11,139,150,153,154,171,

174,179,180,182,233,249,252,254,

260,261,264,271,299,302,303,305,

306,310,311,319,326,332,334,

340-42,344,347,360,361,366,370,

373,376,380,382,385,392,393,396,

399,431,439,442,445,446,449-51,

453,455-57,475,476,492,496,503,

522,542,544,545,547,553,560,

562-64,566;HypersonicLiftingVehicle,AdHocCommitteeon,455;InternationalAffairsOffice,364; International Programs Office, 524, 546;

Launch Vehicle Programs Office, 4,

491, 492; Life Sciences, Office of,

341; Lunar Exploration, Working

Group of, 180; Lunar and Planetary

Programs, Office of, 302, 310, 319,

326, 332; Lunar Program Office, 311;

Lundin Committee, 181; Manned

Space Flight, Research Steering Committee on, 180; Manned Space Flight

Experiments Board, 153; Manned

Space Flight Management Council,

182; Meteorological Office, 393;

Missile Firing Laboratory, 1; North

Eastern Office, 460 n; Nuclear Rocket

Development Station (NRDS), 474,

478, 481,482; Nuclear Vehicle Project

Office, 481; Program Planning Office,

171; Propulsion, Office of, 5, 6, 492;

Space Applications Program Office,

348, 366; Space Flight Development,

Office of, 5, 35, 199, 271, 366; Space

Flight Programs, Office of, 344, 347;

Space and Information Systems Division, 172, 182, 193; Space Medicine

Office, 153 n; Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (SNPO), 470, 475, 478-80,

484-87; Space Science, Office of

(OSS), 4, 5, 259, 265, 301, 319, 320,

344, 467, 468; Space Science and Applications, Office of (OSSA), 4, 6, 11,

13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 153 n, 204, 218 n,

219 n, 221 n, 231, 302, 326, 340, 344,

347, 348, 366, 367, 397, 405,438, 440,

466, 469, 473,491; Space Science and

Applications Steering Committee, 198,

344; Space Science and Satellite Applications, Office of, 348; supersonic

research, 501-17

NASA-ARPA Manned Satellite Panel,

95, 99

NASA-Canadian Defense Research Board

project, 233, 236, 249, 289, 290

NASA-Environmental Science Services

Administration experiment, 393

NASA-DoD Gemini Program Planning

Board, 154, 156

NASA-DoD Large Vehicle Planning

Group, 181

NASA-Hughes-DoD team, 378-80

NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Conference, 181

NASA-Industry Program Plans Conferences, 180

NASA-NRL project, 36, 249, 252

NASA-State University of Iowa project,

236, 246, 253

NASA-U.K. project, 291-93

NASA-Weather Bureau-DoD project,

360, 361

National Communications System, 364,

365

National Environmental Satellite Center,

349

National Geodetic Satellites Program,

298, 399

National Geodetic Survey, 399

National Research Council (Canada),

289, 397

National Space Council, 368

National Space Establishment, 97

Naugle, John E., 199, 201, 232

Naval Electronics Laboratory, 372

Naval Equipment Center, 467

Naval Ordnance Test Station, 156, 284,

433, 444, 447

Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory,

282

Naval Research, Office of, 278, 505

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 1, 86,

87, 91, 93, 197, 233,235, 238, 249,

252, 254, 259, 271,272, 276, 280, 286,

287, 290, 313, 347, 372, 524, 534-36,

541, 560, 571; Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory, 98; Radio

Tracking Branch, 536, 541; School of

Aviation Medicine, 96, 467; Vanguard

Division, 1

Navigation Satellite Committee, 368

Navy, U.S. Department of the, 1, 66, 67,

91, 94, 96, 99, 138, 154, 235, 275-77,

364, 501,506, 509, 535, 536, 541, 555,

571, 575; Bureau of Aeronautics, 278,

506

Neise, Stanford E., 94, 96

Nelson, Alfred M., 5

Nelson, Clifford H., 319-25

Nelson, Evart D., 249, 290

Neptune, 472
636 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Ness,NormanF.,250,251

Netherlands,the,288n,295

Nevada,474,483-85

Newell,HomerE.,Jr.,5,6, 199-201

NewHampshire,Universityof,240-42,

247

NewJersey,369

NewMexico,544

NewMexico,Universityof,254,257

NewOrleans,Louisiana,179n

Newton,R.,247

NewZealand,272

Nicks,OranW.,20i,301,340

Nicolaides,JohnD.,201

Nigeria,561,565,572

Nimbus,20,38,69,70,75,77,205,220,

226n, 347,348,360-63,473,493,494,

538,579;Nimbus 1 (Nimbus-A) and

Nimbus 2 (Nimbus-C), 360, 362, 363;

Nimbus 3, 494; Nimbus B, 360, 362,

494; Nimbus Operational System

(NOS), 360, 361; Project Nimbus, 360

Nolan, James P., Jr., 105, 106, 110

Norris, Theodore B., 5, 6

North, Warren J., 104, 113-15, 120, 137 n

North America, 389, 547

North American Aviation Corporation,

48, 49, 52, 56, 58, 60, 134, 140, 152,

155-57, 176, 179, 180, 182, 183, 311,

327, 482, 502, 506-10, 515, 553, 562;

Los Angeles Division, 506; Rocketdyne Division, 29, 30, 34, 36, 37, 41,

42, 45-47, 51, 53-56, 59, 61, 68, 70,

72, 74-76, 80, 193; Rocketdyne

engines, 30, 41, 45, 46, 55, 72, 74-79

North American Rockwell, 508

Northrop Corporation, 193, 312, 343,

344, 452, 455, 457; Norair Division,

452, 455; Ventura Division, 193,439

North Sea, 557

Norway, 272, 294; Norwegian Institute of

Cosmic Physics, 294; Norwegian Space

Committee, 294

Nova, 3, 10, 16, 24, 171, 172, 180, 182,

491 n

Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA), 473,479-88

Nutley, New Jersey, 376

O

O'Bryant, William T., 109

Ocean of Storms area, 328

Ohio State University Research Foundation, 463 n

Olifantsfontein, South Africa, 541, 586

Olympic games, 369, 376

OMEGA Position Location Experiment

(OPLE), 395

O'Neill, James E., 105, 106

Operation Lost Ball, 343

Oppenheim, A. G., 285

Optical Tracking Network (OTN), 523

orbital attitude and maneuvering system

(OAMS), 152

Orbiter, 235, 301, 541; Project Orbiter,

535, 571

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory

(OAO), 13, 29, 32, 37, 39, 43, 44,

205, 209, 211, 232, 254, 288, 362, 538,

543; characteristics and chronology,

259-63

Orbiting Geophysical Observatory

(OGO), ll, 13, 20, 29, 31, 32, 36,

38-40, 69, 70, 75, 205, 209, 211, 232,

288, 362, 437, 538-40, 543, 580;

characteristics and chronology, 264-70

Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO), 11,

13, 21, 67-70, 80-82, 205, 209, 211,

232, 288, 538, 543; characteristics and

chronology, 254-59

Organ Pass, Arizona, 523

Orroral Valley, Australia, 538 n, 540,

543, 589, 593

Ostrander, Ron R., 4, 5

O'Sullivan, William J., 239, 244, 368-70,

505

P

Pacific 2. See International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium

Pacific Missile Range, 281, 531, 591. See

also Wallops Island

Pacific (coast and ocean), 177, 178, 185,

343, 379, 381, 385, 390, 391, 397, 546,

550-52, 554, 555 n, 557, 558, 577, 584,

587, 589, 594-96

Pad Abort-1 and 2, 178, 183, 186

PAEGOS 1, 38, 40, 70, 75, 298,400

Pakistan, 272

Panama, 536, 542

Panel on Operation Meteorological

Satellites, 361

paraglider landing system, 152, 155-57,

435,439

Parkinson, John B., 497, 498

Parks, Robert J., 326, 328

Parsons, John F., 103 n

Pasadena, California, 1, 197, 340, 553,

565

Patterson, Herbert G., 102 n

Paul VI, Pope, 364
INDEX 637

PCM(pulsecodemodulation),551

Pearce,FredT., Jr.,118,120

Pearson,ErnestO.,Jr.,436,439

Pegasus,57,437,440-43; Pegasus 1, 2,

and 3, 58, 441-43; Project Pegasus,

435,437

Penrod, Paul R., 117

Petersen, Forrest S., 509, 510

Peterson, Bruce, A., 456-58

Philco Corporation, 393, 396

Philippine Islands, 381, 565, 572

Philippine Sea, 559

Phillips, Samuel C., 6, 109, 179, 184

Phoebus (reactor), 476, 478, 479 n, 482,

486-88

Pickering, John, 108

Pickering, William H., 572

Pierce, John R., 369

Piland, Joseph V., 118

Piland, Robert O., 112, 114-18, 120, 179,

180

Pioneer, 12, 21, 29, 31, 33-35, 198, 205,

216, 232, 301-09, 332, 566, 569 n, 572;

Pioneer 1, 68, 73, 303, 305; Pioneer 2,

68, 73, 303, 305; Pioneer 3, 48, 303,

306, 564, 572; Pioneer 4, 48, 301, 303,

306, 564, 572; Pioneer 5, 68, 73, 216

n, 302, 304, 307; Pioneer 6, 70, 82,

304, 307, 308; Pioneer 7, 70, 82, 304,

308; Pioneer 8, 82, 304, 308, 559;

Pioneer 9, 82, 304, 309, 559; Pioneer

Station, 568, 571, 582; Project

Pioneer, 582

Pittsburgh, University of, 284

planetary quarantine, 228

Pleumeur-Bodou, France, 376

Pluto, 470, 472

POGO (polar orbits), 264, 267, 269

Point Barrow, 282, 347

Poland, 364

Polaris, 1

Pollux, 281

Pontiac, 451

Portugal, 572

Pozinsky, Norman, 525, 526

Press, Harry, 361, 363

Preston, G. Merritt, 112-15

Pretoria, South Africa, 548, 552, 554,

585, 589

Price, Paul A., 525, 526

Princeton University, 261,284

Prochard, Reuben P., Jr., 110

Prodan, John, 110

Project Adam, 93 n, 99

Project Big Shot, 369, 371

Project Calorie. See Flight Investigation

Reentry Environment (FIRE)

Project Highwater, 57

Project Horizon, 180

Project Man Very High, 93 n, 98

Project MER, 94

Project MX-1953, 33

Project RAND, 351

Project SERB (Study of the Enhanced

Radiation Belt), 236, 242, 540, 542,

577

Project Score, 33, 364

Project Shotput, 369-71

Project START (Spacecraft Technology

and Advanced Reentry Test), 452

Project Swift Stride, 355

propellants and propulsion units, 1, 25,

26, 175, 176, 178, 470-94; chemical,

488-92; electric, 474, 475,492-94;

FLOX, 473,491; nuclear, 475-88

Propulsion Laboratory, 483

Prospector, 205, 215, 338

Pryor, Harold E., 108

Puerto Rico, 272

Purser, Paul E., 94, 97, 102 n, 112,

114-16, 118, 140

Pyrazol, 369

Q

Quass, B. E., 445

Quimby, Freeman H., 200

Quinn, Joseph R., 104

Quito, Ecuador, 523, 536, 539-41,543,

575, 590

R

radar units, 545, 546, 549, 553-55, 562,

566, 573-96

Radiation, Inc., 552 n

Radio and Space Research Station

(U.K.), 294

Radio Attenuation Measurements (RAM),

461,464-66; Project RAM, 121; RAM

A, B, and C, 464-66; RAM C-1 and

C-2, 65

Radio Corporation of America (RCA),

101, 194, 260-62, 310-12, 319, 321-25,

347, 348, 351-57, 361, 372, 376, 377,

384, 388, 545, 546 n, 552 n;

Aerospace Communications and Controis Division, 194; Astro-Electronics

Division, 264, 314-18, 352, 377-79,

476, 477; RCA-ABMA project, 347;

Service Corporation, 560

Radio Research Laboratory, 399
638 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

RadioResearchStation,293

Rados,RobertM.,349,353-57

Rafel,Norman,108

Raffensperger,MauriceJ.,110

Raines,MartinL., 116,118,120

Raisting,Germany,376

Randt,ClarkT.,200,341

Ranger,13,29,31,32,36,38,203,205,

301,309,319,326,338,355,553n,

565,566,573;ProjectRanger,309,

312,318,319,462;Ranger 1, 40, 309,

311, 313, 573; Ranger2, 40, 309, 311,

313; Ranger 3, 40, 310, 311, 314;

Ranger 4, 40, 310, 311, 315; Ranger 5,

40, 310, 312, 316, 565, 573; Ranger 6,

40, 310, 312, 316; Ranger 7, 40, 301,

310, 312, 317; Ranger 8, 40, 310, 312,

317; Ranger 9, 40, 310, 312, 318

Range Tracker (tracking ship), 549, 551,

595

Raymond Engineering Laboratory, 240-42

Raytheon Company, 194

Reaction Motors, Inc., 275, 501, 502, 506

Rebound, 13, 205, 206, 223 n, 377

Rechtin, Eberhardt, 562, 564, 566, 571,

573

Redondo Beach, California, 264

Red Planet, See Mars

Redstone, 2, 10-12, 15, 16, 24, 27, 48,

51, 52, 84, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 121,

134 n, 138-40, 142, 235, 286, 491, 571;

Arsenal, 56, 93, 96, 97; Redstone

(tracking ship), 549, 554, 555 n, 557,

558, 595

Reed, Robert Dale, 451, 454, 456

Reentry Test Vehicle Program, 571

Reeves Instrument Corporation, 545, 546 n

Reiff, Glenn A., 302, 303, 332

Rekos, Nelson F., 497,498

Relay, 21, 69, 80, 81,205, 206, 223, 367,

368, 373, 374, 376-78; Project Relay,

21, 376, 377; Relay 1 and 2, 364,

376-79

Rendevous Techniques, 181

Renzetti, Nichola A., 566

Republic Aviation Corporation, 254, 255,

361,449-51, 502, 506

Research Airplane Committee, 503, 506,

508

research and development, 31, 33, 42-44,

52, 56, 64, 66, 67, 85, 121, 171, 177,

199, 203, 207, 213, 219, 222, 362;

R&D launch, 31, 33, 42-44, 52, 56,

64, 66, 67, 85. See also advanced

research and technology

Research and Technology Advisory

Council, 405 n

Reynolds, Orr E., 201, 202, 341, 344, 469

Rhode, Richard V., 406, 436, 437

Rice University, 103 n, 395

Ricke, William B., 107

Ricker, Harry H., Jr., 102 n

RIFT (Reactor-in-Flight Test), 476, 479,

486; Project RIFT, 473

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 376

Risso, William P., 105, 106

Ritland, Osmond J., 105, 107

Roadman, Charles H., 105, 106

Robbins, M. O., 291, 292

Robert, Frank C., 102 n

Roberts, Leonard, 407

Robledo, 565,570, 571, 573, 574, 579,

587, 590

Rochelle, R. W., 296

Rochester, University of, 254, 256, 258

Rogallo, Francis M., 439 n

Rogers, Donald P., 376

Roman, Nancy, 252, 261, 284

Rome, University of, 299, 300

Roosa, Stuart A., 168

Rosche, Melvin G., 436, 440

Rose Knot Victor (tracking ship), 546,

549, 551, 552, 595

Rosen, Harold A., 378, 382

Rosen, Milton W., 4, 5, 104, 182

Rosenberg, Jerome D., 252, 399

Rosenberry, John W., 5

Rosman, North Carolina, 393, 523,

536-38, 540, 542, 543, 590

Roth, Gilbert L., 109

Round Hill, Massachusetts, 370

Rover, 476, 479, 485,487; Project Rover,

473,476, 479-84, 486; Rover Coordination Group, 484

RTG (radioisotope generators), 473,

493 -95

Ruff, George E., 137 n

Runge-Kutta method, 435

Rushworth, Robert A., 509-13

Russell, Harold G., 109-11

Ryan Aeronautical Company, 155

SA-10 (vehicle), 442

S-45 (ground instrumentation plan), 545,

546, 561

Saigon, R.V.M., 381

Sailplane Corporation of America, 451,

454, 456

St. John's, Newfoundland, 523, 536, 539,

540, 542, 543, 581, 591

St. Lawrence River, 354

St. Louis, Missouri, 102, 137, 143, 154,
INDEX 639

156, 157

Salisbury, Australia, 381

Salmanson, J. A., 5, 6

Sanders, Newell D., 101, 104, 200

Sandia Corporation, 283, 313

San Diego, 536, 537, 539 n, 540, 590

San Fernando, Spain, 523, 541, 542

S_inger, Eugen, 505

S_inger-Bredt design, 505

San Marco, 5, 6; San Marco I, 64, 288,

299; San Marco II, 27, 288, 300

San Nicolas Island, California, 548, 551,

591

Santa Barbara, California, 494

Santiago, Chile, 523, 536, 538-40, 542,

543, 575,591

Sartor, Ronelda F., 102 n

Sasser, James H., 120

Satellite Automatic Tracking Antennas

(SATAN), 538, 575, 581, 587, 588,

590-93

Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition

Network (STADAN). See Space

Tracking and Data Acquisition

Network

satellites: Aeronomy Satellite, 243; Atmospheric Density Satellite, 244;

Cooperative Applications Satellite,

205,221; Direct Measurements

Satellite, 249; geodetic satellites and

investigations, 21, 206, 226, 288, 399,

400, 543; intermediate-altitude, 224 n;

international ionospheric (UK-1), 206,

212 n; international project (UK-2 &

3), 206, 212 n; International Radiation

Investigation Satellite (IRIS), 65, 274,

280, 294, 295; International Satellite

for Ionospheric Studies (ISIS), 249,

290, 543, 586; Micrometeoroid Detection Satellite (MDS), 440; Midas, 2,

40; OV3-IV research, 65; radiation

measurement, 224 n; scientific, 15, 19,

20, 47, 227, 232, 235; S-66, 462, 463;

transitional satellite system, 224 n;

voice broadcasting, 226 n. See also

Geodynamics Experimental Ocean

Satellite (GEOS), Tiros

Saturn, 1, 4, 17, 23, 24, 53-61, 84, 85,

101, 179, 215 n, 338, 472, 474, 481,

491 n; Advanced Saturn, 3; Saturn I,

3, 10, 17, 27, 54, 56-58, 60, 121, 183,

186, 441,443; Saturn 1B (Uprated

Saturn), 3, 10, 17, 28, 55, 56, 58-61,

121, 174, 183-85, 187, 188; Saturn IBCentaur, 441,442, 474; Saturn V, 2,

3, 10, 18, 28, 56, 60, 61, 100, 101,

121, 174, 176, 178, 187, 189; Saturn

C-I, 3, 54, 57, 180, 186, 444, 489;

Saturn C-2, 54, 59, 181; Saturn C-3,

59; Saturn C-5, 16, 54, 60, 61, 174,

182; Saturn S-11, 184; Saturn SA-1

through Saturn SA-5, 182, 183; Saturn

SA-6, 552; Saturn Vehicle Evaluation

Committee, 57; Saturn Vehicle Team,

180

Savage, Melvin, 6, 109

Sawyer, Ralph S., 115, 117, 119

SCANNER, 461; Project SCANNER,

463,464

Schaibley, John R., 104-06, 109

Scheib, Walter S., 471

Scherer, Lee R., 109, 319

Schilling, Gerhard F., 200

Schirra, Walter M., Jr., 137 n, 141, 146,

147, 153, 157, 159, 163, 185, 188

Schjeldahl Company. See G.T. Schjeldahl

Company

Schmerling, E. R., 284

Schmidt, H. R., 471

Schneider, William E., 108-10

Schneiderman, Dan, 332, 339

Schnyer, A. Daniel, 110

Schonstedt Engineering Company, 239

Schubert, W., 5

Schurmeier, Harris M., 310, 312, 316-18

Schwartz, I. R., 471

Schwenk, F. C., 471

Scientific Experiments Panel, 156

Scott, David R., 153, 158, 164

Scott, Walter C., 407, 471

Scout, 1-3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 19-21, 24, 27,

28, 41, 46, 61-67, 174, 210, 233,239,

241,242, 244-47, 249, 252, 253,

292-99, 378, 444, 447, 448, 463,

465-77, 549; R-I through R-6, 444-48;

Reentry Heating Project (Supercircular

Reentry Research Project), 121, 186,

435, 438,443-48; Scout X, 27; Turbulent Heating Experiment Project,

445

Scull, Wilfred E., 266-70

Seamans, Robert C., 155, 182

Sea of Clouds (area), 317

Sea of Japan, 557, 558

Sea of Okhotsk, 557

Sea of Tranquility (area), 316, 317, 330

Seaton, C. H., 471

Seccomb, Milo L., 6, 109

See, Elliott M., Jr., 157, 161, 162, 165

Selvaggi, Philip S., 106

Senate, U.S., 7, 95, 209, 214 n, 217 n,

382; Commerce Committee, 374;

Committee on Aeronautical and Space

Sciences, 198; Preparedness Investigating Committee, 98. See also

Congress, U.S.
640 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Sergeant, 1, 47, 64, 235, 571; SergeantDelta, 370

SERT (Space Electric Rocket Test), 1, 64,

475; Project SERT, 472, 475,476;

SERT 1, 64, 476, 477; SERT 2, 475,

476

service module (SM), 193

Shea, John T., 253

Shea, Joseph F., 104-06, 113-16

Sheffield, University of (U.K.), 293

Shelton, Harvey W. C., 105, 107

Shepard, Alan B., Jr., 15, 120, 137 n,

138, 141, 143-48

Sherburne, R. K., 6

Shows, James C., 119

Shulman, Fred, 471

Sigma 7, 147

Silverstein, Abe, 2, 5, 35, 101, 104, 137

n, 180, 200, 525

Sims, Theo E., 465,466

Singapore, 540, 543, 591

Sinus Medii (area), 330

Sjoberg, Sigurd A., 116, 118, 120

Skaggs, James B., 6, 109

Skylab. See Apollo

Slayton, Donald K., 103, 114-16, 120,

137 n, 141, 143, 146, 147

Slidell, Louisiana, 179 n

Slidell Computer Facility, 179 n

Slivka, William R., 471

Sloan, James E., 105

Sloop, John L., 5,406, 471

Small, John W., 118, 119

Smith, Arvin H., 471

Smith, Charles P., 373, 375, 385, 389-91

Smith, Earl K., 117

Smith, Francis B., 525

Smith, G. Dale, 104, 200

Smith, Henry J., 201, 205

Smith, Norman F., 112

Smith, W. S., 285

Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory

(SAO), 260, 261, 399, 524, 539-41,

585; Celescope, 263; Tracking Network, 541

Smolensky, Stanley M., 6, 104, 106, 108

Smull, Thomas L. K., 200, 201

Smylie, Robert E., 119

Snyder, Samuel, 5,471

SOCS (spacecraft orientation control

system) project, 419

Solant, 540, 543, 591

Solar Electric Propulsion Systems

Technology (SEPST), 475

Sorlie, Donald, 457, 458

Soule, Hartley, 505

sounding rocket program, 205, 206, 209,

220, 228-31, 270-85, 288; Aerobee, 87,

272-74, 276-78, 284; Aerobee-Hi, 35,

73, 275, 276; Arcas, 272-74, 276, 278,

284, 444, 445; Arcon, 274, 279; Argo,

272, 280, 281; Asp, 272, 281;

Astrobee, 272-74, 279, 285; Black

Bryant, 272-74, 276, 279, 280, 285;

Iris, 274, 280; Javelin, 272-74, 280,

284; Journeyman, 272, 274, 281,340;

Nike, 272, 276, 280-82, 438, 439;

Nike-Apache, 274, 281,284; NikeAsp, 274, 282; Nike-Cajun, 273, 274,

276, 282, 285, 370; Nike-Deacon, 276;

Nikc-Tomahawk, 273, 274, 283,285;

Skylark, 272, 274, 283; Tomahawk,

272, 273; vs. earth-orbiting satellites,

271

South Africa, 565

South America, 136, 542

South China Sea, 557, 558

Southeast Asia, 591

South Point, Hawaii, 539 n, 540, 542,

543, 591

Southwest Center for Advanced Studies,

251, 284

Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics

Spacecraft Integration and Sounding

Rocket Division, 271

Space Electronics, 560

Space-General (Aerojet-General), 278

space science and applications, 197-400;

ATS program, 392-99; budget, 203-31;

communications program, 364-91; life

sciences program, 340-46, 466-69;

lunar and planetary program, 300-40;

meteorology program, 346-63; physics

and astronomy program, 232-300

Space Task Group (STG), 102, 103, 134,

137-41, 144, 149, 155, 171 n, 172, 181,

466, 467, 545, 547, 549, 551, 560, 561;

Advanced Vehicle Team, 180;

Aeromedical Consultants Staff, 466;

Engineering and Contract Administration Division, 112 n; Flight Systems

Division, 112 n, 155; New Projects

Panel, 155, 180; Operations Division,

112 n, 113 n; organization, 112-20;

Technical Liaison Groups, 181. See

also Manned Spacecraft Center

Space Technology Laboratories, Inc.

(STL), 34, 35, 72, 182, 194, 237, 255,

265, 266, 302, 303, 305, 307, 320, 327,

376, 377, 485, 538. See also TRW

Space Tracking and Data Acquisition

Network (STADAN), 395, 521-23,

534-43, 569 n, 575-96

Spain, 288 n, 561, 565, 568, 572, 573,

582
INDEX 641

Sparrow, 276

Special Committee on Life Sciences, 341

Spencer, N. W., 243, 250, 267, 269

Sperry Gyroscope Company, 571

Spin Scan Cloud Cover Experiment

(SSCCE), 395

Spreen, William C., 271, 348

Stack, John P., 406, 497, 498

Stafford, Henry N., 380

Stafford, Thomas P., 153, 157-59, 163,

165, 188

Stampfl, Rudolf A., 349

Stanford Research Institute, 378, 382

Stanford University, 237, 307-09, 337,

339

Starfish (high altitude nuclear test), 242,

375

State, U.S. Department of, 364, 366, 368,

524

Station Technical Operations Control,

543

Stephens, Robert R., 525

Sternfield, Leonard, 497, 498

Sterrett, John, 525

Stevens, Samuel R., 296

Stevenson, John D., 110

Stever, H. Guyford, 98

Steward Committee. See Defense, U.S.

Department of

Stoddard, David H., 105, 106

STOL (short takeoff and landing), 501

Stoller, Morton J., 200, 271

Stone, David G., 395,449, 451

Stone, Robert G., 253

Stoner, George, 109

Stoney, William E., 109, 114, 115, 117

Strass, H. Kurt, 180, 436

Stroud, William G., 348, 349, 352, 361

Strughold, Hubertus, 96

Studebaker-Packard Corporation: Cincinnati Testing and Research Laboratory,

194

Stuhlinger, Ernst, 238, 440

Sullivan, Francis J., 407,460

Summerfelt, William A., 108

Sunblazer, 212 n

Sunderlin, Wendell S., 377, 379

supersonic/hypersonic transport, 501-17;

Douglas FSD-1 skylancer, 515 n;

F-100C Super Sabre, 515 n; F-104, 515

n; F-Ill, 517; Lockheed YF-12A

Blackbird, 515 n, 517; North

American A-5A Vigilante, 515 n;

SCAT (Supersonic Commercial Air

Transport), 515; SST, 514-17; SST

Advisory Board, 514; X-15, 502-14;

XB-70, 515-17. See also SCANNER

Sures, Allan H., 260

Surveyor, 14, 29, 31, 32, 42-44, 176, 205,

214 n, 215, 301, 310, 319-23, 325-31,

338, 493, 565, 566, 570; Surveyor 1

through 7, 326-31

Swanson, Andrew G., 445,447

Sweden, 272, 294; Kiruna Geophysical

Observatory, 43

Sweeney, William R., 108

Swigert, John L., 188

Switzerland, 288 n

Sylvania, 393

Syncom, 13, 21, 67, 69, 81,205, 206,

224, 364, 367, 368, 380, 393, 396; Advanced Syncom, 392, 393, 396; Project

Syncom, 377, 379, 385; Syncom 1,

380, 382, 383, 396; Syncom 2, 380-82,

384, 396; Syncom 3, 364, 381, 382,

384, 396

Systems Engineering Group. See WECo

Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power

(SNAP), 360-62, 473,494, 495

Syverston, Clarence A., 453

T

Talbot, John M., 105

Talentino, J., 294, 295

Tananarive, Malagasy Republic, 523, 538

n, 540, 543, 548, 552, 554, 557, 587,

588, 591

Tasman Sea, 343,557

Taylor, B., 297

Taylor, Charles A., 526

Taylor, Eldon D., 201, 202

Taylor, Paul D., 102 n, 111

Taylor, William B., 105, 106, 109, 111

TEL-4 (tracking station), Florida, 548,

592

Telstar, 68, 69, 81,202, 364, 367, 373-75,

377; Telstar I and 2, 373-75

Temco, 361

Temple University, 251, 337

Tepper, Morris, 201, 346, 347, 349

Test and Training Satellites (TTSs), 554;

TTS-1 (TETR-1), 308, 554, 559, 563;

TTS-2 (TETR-2), 309, 554, 559, 563

Test Cell A, 483

Texas A&M University, 355

Textron, 36, 37, 74-76

Thatcher, J. W., 566

Thibodaux, Joseph G., Jr., 115, 117, 119

Thiokol Chemical Corporation, 49, 50,

62, 63, 67, 75, 76, 78-80, 194, 279-83,

489, 490, 502, 506

Thome, Pitt, 202

Thompson, Floyd L., 176, 184
642 NASAHISTORICALDATABOOK

Thompson,MiltonO.,453,456-58,

511-13

Thompson,RobertF.,110,116-19

Thompson,ThomasH., 6,109

Thor,1,2,19,24,27,40,67-83,98,223

n, 491;Thor-Able,3, 10,19,20,27,

206,209,217n,237,302,303,305,

307,351,352;Thor-AbleStar,3;

Thorad,67;Thorad-AgenaD,360,

362;Thor-Agena,3,11,13,19,20,

27,223n,371;Thor-AgenaB,3, 10,

11,20,209,249,289,290;ThorAgenaD, 10,267,269;Thor-Deha,

1-3,10,19,21,27,67,233,239-43,

245,247,248,250-54,256-59,291,

297,299,300,307-09,344-46,353-59,

371,372,375,376,379,380,383,384,

387, 389-91, 554, 559; Thor-Hustler,

3; Thor-Jupiter, 54, 56; ThorVanguard, 303

Tidbinbilla, 554, 562, 565,570, 571, 573,

574, 585, 592

Tikhonoravov, Mikhail K., 270, 275

Tiros (Television Infra-Red Observation

Satellite), 20, 21, 80, 347, 349, 351,

360, 539, 543; Project Tiros, 347, 348;

Tiros 1 through 10, 67-69, 73, 81,

348-57; Tiros A-l, 351; Tiros Operational System (TOS), 348, 351, 357,

362; TIROS-TOS, 220

Tischler, Adelbert O., 5, 6, 104, 106,

407, 470, 471

Titan, 1, 2, 150, 155, 157, 452, 472;

Titan II, 3, 11, 13, 22, 24, 27, 83-85,

121, 151, 154, 156, 158; Titan IIIC, 3,

474; Titan Launch Vehicle (TLV),

165-68

Titania, 472

Tokyo, Japan, 364

Toll, Thomas, 505

Toowoomba, Australia, 393,523, 540,

543, 592

Townsend, John W., Jr., 242

tracking and data acquisition, 521-96;

budget, 526-34; characteristics, 534-96;

management, 525, 526; tracking facility sites, 523, 539, 540. See also Deep

Space Network, Manned Space Flight

Network, Satellite Tracking and Data

Acquisition Network

Tracking and Data Acquisition, Office of

(OTDA), 522, 524, 526, 538, 553, 554,

563, 566; Station Technication Operations Control, 538

Tracking and Communication Extraterrestrial (TRACE), 572

Tracking and Ground Instrumentation

Unit (TAGIU), 545-47, 560

Trailblazer. See Air Force, Scout

Transportation, U.S. Department of, 405,

406 n

Treasury, U.S. Department of the, 368

Trimble, George S., 109, 116, 118

Triolo, J., 395

Triton, 472

TRW Systems, Inc., 194, 251, 264-70,

302-04, 307-09, 320, 384, 385, 388,

389, 391. See also Space Technology

Laboratories

Truszynski, Gerald M., 522, 525, 526,

553

Tsander, F. A., 275

Turner, W. R., 105

Turnock, James H., Jr., 6, 104, 106, 109

Twin Falls Victory (tracking ship), 549,

595

Tycho (crater), 331

U

Underwood, Jack F., 105, 106

Underwood, William J., 437

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR), 91 n, 92, 95, 97, 100, 101,

271, 275, 286, 300, 309, 348, 376, 479,

550, 571; cooperation with the United

Kingdom, 370; cooperation with the

United States, 370-72; Luna, 300;

Sputnik, 300, 479, 542, 571; Sputnik 1

and 2, 97; Vostok 1, 100, 141

United Aircraft Corporation: Hamilton

Standard Division, 194; Pratt &

Whitney Aircraft Division, 42, 44,

54-57, 194

United Kingdom, 272, 274, 283, 373, 375,

377, 382, 534, 593; Air Ministry, 292;

cooperation with the United States

and USSR, 370; Royal Aircraft

Establishment, 293; Science Research

Council, Space Research Management

Unit, 293

United States, 149, 271, 276, 375, 481,

489, 535; cooperation with USSR,

370-72; General Accounting Office,

255, 362; Geodetic Satellite Program,

233, 236, 248, 252; Geological Survey,

316-18, 328-30; link with Far East,

384; manned mission, 100; National

Bureau of Standards, 244, 403;

peaceful space exploration, 470; vs.

Soviet Union, 100, 101, 480

United Technology Center (UTC), 62, 80

UNIVAC, 552

USNS Kingsport, 380
INDEX 643

USS Champlain, 143, 161

USS Essex, 188

USS Guadalcanal, 166

USS Guam, 167

USS Intrepid, 159

USS Kearsarge, 147, 148

USS Mason, 164

USS Noa, 145

USS Pierce, 146

USS Randolph, 144

USS Wasp, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168

USS Yorktown, 189

University College, London, 244, 249,

259, 291, 294

Uranus, 472

Utrecht, University of (the Netherlands),

295

V

V-2 Upper Atmosphere Research Panel,

275

Vale, Robert E., 117

Van Allen, James, 235, 286

Van Allen Belt, 237, 247, 287, 305, 306,

373, 375,443

Vanguard, 1-3, 24, 27, 29, 34, 35, 67, 72,

73, 83, 86, 87, 197, 198, 204, 206,

207, 209, 212 n, 235,288, 368, 370,

437, 491, 536, 539, 541, 542, 571;

characteristics and chronology, 86, 87,

286, 287; Project Vanguard, 86, 87,

93, 271, 535, 541; Vanguard 1, 87,

286, 399; Vanguard 2, 87, 286, 287,

347; Vanguard 3, 87, 212 n, 286, 287;

Vanguard (tracking ship), 549, 554,

555 n, 557, 558, 595

Van Ness, Harper E., 104, 106, 108

Varian Associates, 239

Vavra, Paul H., 114, 115, 117

Vega, 1, 3, 11, 22, 24, 29, 39, 45, 171 n,

309, 311

Venus, 42, 44, 301, 306, 331-36, 339,

341,438, 440, 470, 472, 565, 566, 573;

Venus Station, 567 n, 569 n, 582

Vessely, Jack E., 109

Victor, Walter K., 562, 566

Vietnam: conflict, 217; South, 481

Viking, 86, 87, 235,275, 339, 494, 535,

541; Project Viking, 301, 339, 341

Vinograd, Sherman P., 108

Virginia, University of, 433

Virginia Associated Research Center, 438;

Space Radiation Effects Laboratory,

438

Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 433

Voas, Robert B., 112-14, 137 n

Vogely, Arthur, 506

von Braun, Wernher, 1, 54, 56, 93, 97,

99, 100, 171, 179, 180, 182

Voris, Frank B., 105, 200

Voyager, 61, 205, 216 n, 217, 332, 339;

Project Voyager, 341

V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing), 499-501

VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing), 501

W

Wac Corporal. See Baby Wac

Waddel, Dr., 395

Wagner, Robert L., 6, 109

Wake Island, 548, 551, 592

Walker, Joseph A., 502,503,509-11,515 n

Wallops Flight Center (Wallops Island,

Virginia), 48, 61, 62, 94, 96, 134, 140,

142, 186, 233, 239, 242, 246, 247, 249,

252, 261,272, 277-83, 285,292,

297-99, 405 n, 444, 447, 448, 463-66,

477, 522, 531, 533, 544, 546, 548, 559,

561,562

Wallops Research Station, 66, 96, 179 n,

405 n

Washington, D.C., 93, 95, 101, 341,479,

481,482, 536

Washington, University of, 433

Washington Technological Associates,

291,292

Watertown (tracking ship), 549, 555 n,

596

Watkins, Jufia R., 102 n

Waugh, Merle G., 104, 109

Weather Bureau, U.S., 347-51, 354, 357,

360-62, 437; National Weather

Satellite Center, 348, 350; Panel on

Observations over Space Data

Regions, 361

Webb, James E., 141, 341,460

Weber Aircraft Corporation, 194

Webster, Kenneth, 526

WECo (also Systems Engineering Group),

546, 561

Weiss, Stanley P., 115

West, Julian M., 116, 118

Western Electric, 546, 561. See also

WECo

Western Test Range (WTR), 198, 233,

244-46, 249, 251¢53, 289, 290, 293-96,

298, 358, 359, 363, 371, 372, 589

Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 194,

260-62, 292, 476, 480-82, 485;

Aerospace Division, 251; Aerospace