Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

June 2003 MILITARY 

PERSONNEL 

Navy Actions Needed 

to Optimize Ship Crew 

Size and Reduce Total 

Ownership Costs 

GAO-03-520 
The Navy’s use of human systems integration principles and crew size 

reduction goals varied significantly for the four ships GAO reviewed. Only 

the DD(X) destroyer program emphasized human systems integration early 

in the acquisition process and established an aggressive goal to reduce crew 

size. The Navy’s goal is to cut personnel on the DD(X) by about 70 percent 

from that of the previous destroyer class—a reduction GAO estimated could 

eventually save about $18 billion over the life of a 32-ship class. The goal was 

included in key program documents to which program managers are held 

accountable. Although the Navy did not set specific crew reduction goals for 

the T-AKE cargo ship, it made some use of human systems integration 

principles and expects to require a somewhat smaller crew than similar 

legacy ships. The two other ships—the recently cancelled JCC(X) command 

ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship—did not establish human 

systems integration plans early in the acquisition programs, and did not 

establish ambitious crew size reduction goals. Unless the Navy more 

consistently applies human systems integration early in the acquisition 

process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy 

may miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which 

are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process (see 

figure). For example, the Navy has not clearly defined the human systems 

integration certification standards for new ships. 

Several factors may impede the Navy’s consistent application of human 

systems integration principles and its use of innovations to optimize crew 

size: (1) DOD acquisition policies and discretionary Navy guidance that 

allow program managers latitude in optimizing crew size and using human 

systems integration, (2) funding challenges that encourage the use of legacy 

systems to save near-term costs and discourage research and investment in 

labor-saving technology that could reduce long-term costs, (3) unclear Navy 

organizational authority to require human systems integration’s use in 

acquisition programs, and (4) the Navy’s lack of cultural acceptance of new 

concepts to optimize crew size and its layers of personnel policies that 

require consensus from numerous stakeholders to revise. 

Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System’s Development 

The cost of a ship’s crew is the 

single largest incurred over the 

ship’s life cycle. One way to lower 

personnel costs, and thus the cost 

of ownership, is to use people only 

when it is cost-effective—a 

determination made with a systems 

engineering approach called human 

systems integration. GAO was 

asked to evaluate the Navy’s 

progress in optimizing the crew 

size in four ships being developed 

and acquired: the DD(X) destroyer, 

T-AKE cargo ship, JCC(X) 

command ship, and LHA(R) 

amphibious assault ship. GAO 

assessed (1) the Navy’s use of 

human systems integration 

principles and goals for reducing 

crew size, and (2) the factors that 

may impede the Navy’s use of those 

principles. 

To facilitate the Navy’s efforts to 

optimize ship crew sizes and 

minimize total ownership costs, 

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of the Navy: (1) require 

that ship programs use human 

systems integration to establish 

crew size goals and help achieve 

them, (2) clearly define the human 

systems integration certification 

standards for new ships, 

(3) formally establish a process to 

examine and facilitate the adoption 

of labor-saving technologies and 

best practices across Navy 

systems. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-520.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Henry L. 

Hinton, Jr., at (202) 512-4300 or 

hintonh@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-520, a report to 

Congressional Requesters 

June 2003

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Navy Actions Needed to Optimize 

Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total 

Ownership Costs 
Page i GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Navy’s Use of Human Systems Integration to Optimize Crew 

Size and Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary Considerably 

Across Ship Programs 10

Several Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Application of 

Human Systems Integration and May Impede the Navy’s Ability 

to Optimize Crew Size 20

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31 

Appendix II Ships Included in Our Evaluation 33 

Appendix III Defense Acquisition 37 

Appendix IV Summary of DD(X) Destroyer Gold Team 

Trade Studies 41 

Appendix V Comparison of DDG 51 and DD(X) Crew Sizes 42 

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 49 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Tables 

Table 1: Selected DD(X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by 

Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from 

1998-2002 41

Table 2: Comparison of Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A 

and the DD(X) 45

Table 3: Comparison of Crew Size for Selected Special Evolutions 

on DDG 51 Flight IIA and DD(X) Destroyers 48

Figures 

Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a 

System’s Development 6

Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases, 

Milestones, and Key Activities 39

Abbreviations 

DD(X) destroyer 

DOD Department of Defense 

JCC(X) joint command and control ship 

LHA(R) amphibious assault ship replacement 

MSC Military Sealift Command 

T-AKE auxiliary cargo and ammunition ship 

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Page 1 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

June 9, 2003 

The Honorable Jim Talent 

Chairman 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Seapower 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The cost of a ship’s crew is the single largest expense incurred over 

a ship’s life cycle. As such, transitioning from the personnel- and 

workload-intensive ships of the past to optimally crewed ships with 

reduced workloads has tremendous potential to free up resources for the 

Navy to use in recapitalizing the fleet. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

planned procurement rate for fiscal years 2004-2008 is 7.4 ships per year, a 

rate that supports a fleet of about 259 ships—below the 2001 Quadrennial 

Defense Review goal of 310 and farther below the Navy’s desired fleet of 

375 ships. In recognition of the budgetary challenges the Navy faces in 

recapitalizing its fleet, House and Senate conferees have expressed an 

interest in identifying ways to reduce these personnel expenses through 

the acquisition of ships that would require smaller crews.1

One way to lower costs associated with personnel is to use people only 

when it is cost-effective to do so—determining this by using a systems 

engineering approach known as human systems integration. In this 

process, tasks and functions are systematically analyzed and assigned to 

the most cost-effective solution—humans, software, or hardware. When 

applied to ships early in their development and throughout their design, 

human systems integration has the potential to substantially reduce 

requirements for personnel, leading to significant cost savings. 

Additionally, it can improve operational performance by enhancing 

situational awareness and decision making; reduce human error, which 

causes an estimated 80 percent of ship accidents; and reduce training 

difficulty and cost. Human systems integration also has the potential to 

improve shipboard habitability, reduce workload and fatigue, and 

 1

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 Conference Report 107-772 

(Nov. 12, 2002). 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

thereby improve a sailor’s quality of life—key enablers for recruiting 

and retention. 

Because the size of ship crews has such a significant impact on long-term 

costs, you asked us to evaluate the Navy’s progress in optimizing the crew 

size in four new ships that DOD was in the process of developing and 

acquiring: the DD(X) destroyer,2

 the T-AKE cargo ship,3 the recently 

canceled JCC(X) command ship,4

 and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship. 

During our review, three of these ships were in the early stages of 

development while only one ship, the T-AKE, had entered acquisition 

phase three, production and deployment. (App. II includes a description of 

the ships’ missions and acquisition program history and status.) In this 

report, we assess (1) the Navy’s use of human systems integration 

principles and goals to reduce crew size on these four ships and (2) the 

factors that may impede the Navy’s use of human systems integration 

principles in developing new ships. 

To assess the Navy’s use of human systems integration principles and 

crew size reduction goals, we obtained and analyzed key program and ship 

crewing documents as well as human systems integration plans and 

analyses. We also assessed whether and to what extent human systems 

integration principles and crew reduction goals were addressed in the first 

two acquisition phases (concept and technology development and system 

development and demonstration) and reflected in key acquisition 

documents. To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy’s application 

of human systems integration principles, we interviewed DOD officials, 

 2

 At the time the ship’s mission need statement was developed, it was referred to as the 

Surface Combatant 21, a term used in the early stages of the Land Attack Destroyer 

program. It eventually became known as DD 21 and subsequently as the DD(X). For 

uniformity, we will refer to the ship as the DD(X) in all of its stages. 

3

 The ship program was previously known as the Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier (ADC(X) or 

T-ADC(X)). The program subsequently became known as the Auxiliary Cargo and 

Ammunition Ship (T-AKE). For uniformity, we refer to the ship as the T-AKE or the T-AKE 

cargo ship in all of its stages. 

4

 The program was formally named the Joint Maritime Command and Control Capability 

Ship Program, hereafter referred to as the JCC(X) command ship. DOD’s fiscal year 2004 

Program Objective Memorandum canceled the JCC(X) program. Instead, DOD has directed 

that the analysis of alternatives for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), 

examine the feasibility of incorporating as a module or variant an additional mission 

package that provides joint and coalition command and control. MPF(F) ships are the 

Marine Corps’ forward-deployed floating warehouses of military ammunition, fuel, and 

food that are the centerpiece of the Navy’s future sea basing concept. 
Page 3 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

contractors, and human systems integration experts and reviewed 

acquisition guidance to determine the extent to which it discusses or 

requires the use of human systems integration principles in ship programs. 

We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The 

scope and methodology used in our review are described in further detail 

in appendix I. 

The Navy’s use of human systems integration and crew size reduction 

goals varied significantly in the four ship programs we examined. Only the 

DD(X) destroyer program placed a significant emphasis on human systems 

integration early in the acquisition process and established an aggressive 

goal to reduce crew size. The Navy’s goal for the DD(X) destroyer, which 

was included as a principal program goal or key performance parameter, 

is expected to cut the ship crew size by about 60 to 70 percent from that of 

the previous destroyer ship class,5

 a reduction we estimated could save 

about $18 billion (fiscal year 2002 dollars)6

 in personnel-related costs over 

the service life of a future class of 32 ships.7

 This goal was established at 

program initiation, provided the initiative for developing a comprehensive 

human systems integration plan, and was reiterated in the key program 

documents to which the program manager is held accountable at key 

milestone reviews. For the T-AKE cargo ship, the Navy made some use 

of human systems integration and expects to require somewhat fewer 

personnel than the legacy ships it is replacing. It did not, however, 

establish specific crew size reduction goals or apply human systems 

integration principles to the ship’s primary mission, intership underway 

replenishment. The remaining two programs, the JCC(X) command and 

the LHA(R) amphibious assault ships, did not develop comprehensive 

human systems integration plans early in the acquisition process and do 

not have crew size reduction as a formal program goal. Because the Navy 

did not consistently apply human systems integration principles and set 

goals for reducing crew size for three of the ships we reviewed, it may 

have missed opportunities to reduce crewing requirements and lower total 

ownership costs, which are determined largely by decisions made early in 

 5

 A ship class represents a number of vessels built alike or nearly so. 

6

 Unless otherwise noted, all dollars are expressed as current dollars (also known as 

then-year dollars). 

7

 Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is not yet clear how many 

DD(X)s will be purchased. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

the acquisition process but which will be incurred throughout these ships’ 

30-40 year life spans. 

Based on briefings and discussions with agency officials and a review 

of acquisition policies, we found that a number of related factors 

contribute to the Navy’s inconsistent application of human systems 

integration principles and may impede the adoption of innovations to 

optimize crew size. These factors include the following: 

• DOD and Navy acquisition policies allow program managers considerable 

latitude in optimizing crew size and in determining the timing and extent 

to which they employ human systems integration. 

• Funding challenges when acquiring new ships encourage the use of legacy 

subsystems to save near-term costs instead of the investment in research 

and development of labor-saving technologies that would reduce costs 

over the long term. 

• Most Navy organizations responsible for human systems integration 

oversight are not empowered to require the use of human systems 

integration to optimize crew size. The Naval Sea Systems Command’s 

newly established directorate for human systems integration, which is 

responsible for certifying that ships delivered to the fleet have optimized 

crews, had not established a process or criteria for achieving certification. 

• Even when new labor-saving approaches and technologies are identified 

during the concept and technology development phase, implementing 

them is a difficult and time-consuming process due to the Navy’s 

long-standing traditions and culture and the extensive network of 

personnel, safety, training, maintenance, and other policies and 

procedures that affect ship personnel levels. Moreover, there is no process 

to help Navy program managers identify and coordinate with other 

stakeholders to modify or eliminate policies and procedures that may 

impede the introduction of labor-saving practices and technology 

identified during ship design. 

These factors cause Navy decision makers to set goals of not exceeding 

the crew size of 30-year old ships, for program managers to wait until 

preliminary design to begin human systems integration efforts, and 

exclude primary and secondary ship functions from rigorous analysis. As a 

result, the Navy is designing and procuring some new ships that may not 

cost-effectively address one of the biggest cost drivers in the Navy—

personnel. The DD(X) experience also shows that even when these 

practices are followed, the program will still face challenges in achieving 

these goals and encounter pressures to relax the goals as the system 

design progresses, thereby supporting human systems integration experts’ 

view that human systems integration plans and activities should receive 
Page 5 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

continued review and focus throughout the acquisition process. Unless the 

Navy more consistently applies human systems integration at the earliest 

stages of the development process and establishes meaningful goals for 

crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower total 

ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions made 

early in the acquisition process. 

To facilitate the Navy’s efforts to optimize ship crew sizes and minimize 

total ownership costs, we are recommending that the Secretary of the 

Navy (1) require that ship programs use human systems integration to 

establish crew size goals and help achieve them, (2) clearly define the 

human systems integration certification standards for new ships, 

(3) formally establish a policy evaluation function to examine and 

facilitate the adoption of cost-saving technologies and best practices 

across Navy systems. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed 

with our recommendations. 

Decisions made in setting requirements very early in a ship’s development 

have enormous impact on the total ownership costs.8

 Total ownership 

costs include the costs to research, develop, acquire, own, operate, 

maintain, and dispose of weapon and support systems; the costs of other 

equipment and real property; the costs to recruit, retrain, separate, and 

otherwise support military and civilian personnel; and all other costs of 

DOD’s business operations. Navy analyses show that by the second 

acquisition milestone (which assesses whether a system is ready to 

advance to the system development and demonstration phase), roughly 

85 percent of a ship’s total ownership cost has been “locked in” by design, 

production quantity, and schedule decisions while less than 10 percent of 

its total costs has actually been expended. (See fig. 1.) 

 8

 In another report we recommend that DOD treat total ownership costs as a performance 

requirement equal in priority to any other performance requirement prior to beginning 

the acquisition program. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting 

Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs, 

GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2003). 

Background 

Total Ownership Costs 

Are Determined Early in 

a System’s Development 
Page 6 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System’s Development 

Figure 1 depicts the relative apportionment of research and development, 

procurement, and operating and support costs over the typical life cycle 

of a ship program (the complete life cycle of a ship, from concept 

development through disposal, typically ranges from 40 to 60 years). 

Research and development funds are spent at program initiation and 

generally comprise only a small fraction of a new ship’s total ownership 

costs. Then, in the next acquisition phase, procurement funds, comprising 

about 30 percent of total ownership costs, are spent to acquire the 

new ship. The vast majority of the total ownership costs, about 65 percent, 

is comprised of operating and support costs and is incurred over the life of 

the ship. Personnel costs are the largest contributor to operating and 

support costs—approximately 50 percent. 
Page 7 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Recognizing that fiscal constraints pose a long-term challenge, DOD 

policy states that total ownership costs of new military systems should 

be identified and that DOD officials should treat cost as a military 

requirement during the acquisition process.9 This approach, referred to as 

treating cost as an independent variable, requires program managers to 

consider cost-performance trade-offs in setting program goals. 

During the acquisition process, program managers are held accountable 

for making progress toward meeting established goals and requirements at 

checkpoints, or milestones, over a program’s life cycle.10 (See app. III for a 

discussion of the DOD acquisition process). These goals and requirements 

are contained in several key documents. The first to be generated is a 

mission need statement that describes a warfighting deficiency, or 

opportunity to provide new capabilities, in broad operational terms and 

identifies constraints such as crewing, personnel, and training that may 

affect satisfying the need. These capabilities and constraints are examined 

during the initial phase of the program in a second key document, a study 

called the analysis of alternatives. This study assesses the operational 

effectiveness and estimated costs of alternative systems to meet the 

mission need. The analysis assesses the pros and cons of each alternative 

and their sensitivity to possible changes in key assumptions. The analysis 

should consider personnel as both a life-cycle cost and a design driver. 

Systems engineering best practices dictate that the analysis of alternatives 

should be supported by a front-end analysis11 and trade-off studies so that 

better and more informed decisions can be made. Using the results of the 

analysis of alternatives, program objectives are formalized in an 

operational requirements document. This third key document specifies 

those capabilities or characteristics (known as key performance 

parameters) that are so significant that failure to meet them can be cause 

for the system to be canceled or restructured. In establishing key 

performance parameters, DOD officials specify both a threshold and an 

 9

 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 1, 

The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002, sec. 3.23. 

10 According to defense acquisition system policy, the program manager is assigned the 

single point of accountability for accomplishment of program objectives—a minimum 

number of cost, schedule, and performance parameters that describe the program over its 

life cycle. Progress toward meeting these objectives is assessed at milestone decision 

meetings and during interim senior management reviews. 

11 In Navy new ship acquisitions, the front-end analysis consists of a top-down requirements 

analysis supported by a variety of mission and functional analyses that together inform 

designers about the human requirements for the ship under study. 

Defense Acquisition Policy 

Requires Setting Goals to 

Optimize Performance and 

Minimize Cost 
Page 8 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

objective value. For performance, the threshold is the minimum 

acceptable value that, in the user’s judgment, is necessary to satisfy the 

need. For schedule and cost, the threshold is the maximum allowable 

value. The objective value is the value desired by the user and the value 

the program manager tries to work with the contractor(s) to obtain. 

During our review, DOD was revising its acquisition guidance. On October 

30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense canceled three key DOD 

documents governing the defense acquisition process and issued 

interim guidance in a memorandum. DOD officials expect to issue a new 

acquisition guidance in the near future.12 The Deputy Secretary’s interim 

guidance retains the basic acquisition system structure and milestones, 

emphasizes evolutionary acquisition, modifies the requirements 

documents, and makes several other changes. For example, the mission 

need statement and the operational requirements document are replaced 

by three new documents: (1) the initial capability document replaces the 

mission need statement at milestone A, (2) the capability development 

document replaces the operational requirements document at milestone B, 

and (3) the capability production document replaces the operational 

requirements document at milestone C. (See app. III for a discussion of the 

acquisition process and milestones.) 

Human systems integration is a systems engineering approach to optimize 

the use of people. Optimized crewing for ships refers to the minimum 

crew size consistent with the ship’s mission, affordability, risks, and 

human performance and safety requirements. When initiated from the 

outset of a new ship acquisition (during concept exploration and prior to 

establishing key performance parameters) and continued through ship 

design, human systems integration has the potential to reduce workload 

leading to smaller, optimized crews; reduced operating and support costs; 

and improved operational performance. According to human systems 

integration experts, for Navy ship acquisitions, human systems integration 

may begin with a top-down requirements analysis that examines the ship’s 

functions and mission requirements and determines whether human or 

machine performance is required for each task. By reevaluating which 

functions humans should perform and which can be performed by 

 12 On May 12, 2003, DOD released a new version of DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD 

Instruction 5000.2. A streamlined version of the nonmandatory Guidebook is under 

development. Because this guidance was issued following the completion of our audit 

work, the description of the acquisition process in this report is based on DOD’s interim 

guidance issued on October 30, 2002. 

Human Systems 

Integration Has Potential 

to Optimize Ship Crew Size 

and Reduce Costs for New 

Systems 
Page 9 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

technology, human systems integration minimizes personnel requirements 

while maximizing gains from technological applications. A human systems 

integration approach also ensures that a person’s workload and other 

concerns, such as personnel and training requirements, safety, and health 

hazards, are considered throughout the acquisition process. In a recent 

memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs stated, “failure to incorporate HSI [human systems 

integration] approaches can only lead to increasing manpower costs in the 

future that will threaten the ability of the Department to sustain the 

transformation, readiness and investment priorities we have established.” 

Human systems integration has been used successfully in military and 

commercial settings. MANPRINT, the Army’s human systems integration 

program, reports that the Comanche helicopter program, when fielded, 

will avoid $3.29 billion in operating and support costs ($2.67 billion of 

which resulted from personnel reductions) due to the application of 

human systems integration. Human systems integration has also been 

used in airplane cockpit design, aircraft maintenance, and in rear-center 

automobile brake lights design. Additionally, foreign navies’ efforts, such 

as those to develop British Type 23 and Dutch M-Class Frigates, achieved a 

30 to 40 percent reduction in crew size relative to the previous generation 

of ships by employing a human systems integration approach. 

DOD’s acquisition policy for using human systems integration is general in 

nature but requires program managers to develop a human systems 

integration approach early in the acquisition process to minimize total 

ownership costs. The Navy’s acquisition guidance requires that human 

systems integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along 

with other engineering and logistics elements beginning at program 

initiation, but the guidance does not provide for specific procedures and 

metrics.13

 13 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, “Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for 

Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and Non-Major Information 

Technology Acquisition Programs,” December 6, 1996. 
Page 10 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Despite the potential of human systems integration to optimize crew size 

and reduce total ownership costs, the Navy’s use of human systems 

integration and goals to reduce crew size varied considerably across the 

four new ship acquisition programs we examined. Only the DD(X) 

destroyer program used human systems integration extensively to 

optimize crewing during the concept and technology development phase 

of the acquisition. In doing so, the program developed a comprehensive 

plan that describes the human systems integration objectives, strategy, 

and scope and mandated its use by means of key program documents. 

The T-AKE cargo ship program was required to apply human systems 

integration principles to the ship’s design, but not to the ship’s primary 

mission of intership underway replenishment. In contrast, the JCC(X) 

command ship and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship programs had not 

emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process or 

developed a comprehensive human systems integration approach. The 

Navy’s crew size reduction goals for the four ships range from an 

aggressive goal of about 60 to 70 percent on the DD(X) destroyer, to a lack 

of any formal reduction goal on the JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R) 

amphibious assault ship. The inconsistent use of human systems 

integration to optimize ship crews and the lack of formal crew size 

reduction goals for three of the four programs we examined represent a 

missed opportunity to potentially achieve significant savings in total 

ownership costs. 

From the inception of the program through the selection of a design agent 

in 2002, the DD(X) program has had a significant crew size reduction goal 

and has used human systems integration to identify potential ways to 

achieve this goal. Requirements for using human systems integration and 

crew size goals were included in the key acquisition documents to which 

program managers are held accountable. The program began human 

systems integration activities in the first acquisition phase—concept and 

technology development—by inviting industry to develop conceptual 

designs to meet these goals and produce a human systems integration 

plan. Subsequently, the Navy restructured the program in November 2001 

and is reevaluating the ship’s operational requirements, including crew 

size. However, the Navy’s contract with the design agent continues to 

specify a significant crew size reduction calling for a crew of between 

125 and 175. These revised crew size requirements still represent a 

greater than 50 percent reduction when compared to the legacy ship it 

is replacing. 

Navy’s Use of Human 

Systems Integration 

to Optimize Crew 

Size and Efforts to 

Establish Crew 

Size Goals Vary 

Considerably Across 

Ship Programs 

DD(X) Program Has 

Aggressive Crew Size 

Reduction Goals and 

Uses Human Systems 

Integration Extensively 
Page 11 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

From the earliest stages of the program and continuing through award of 

the design agent contract, the program maintained a focus on optimizing 

crew size. For example: 

• The 1993 mission need statement directed “the ship must be automated 

to a sufficient degree to realize significant manpower reductions.” The 

document also required a human systems integration-type analysis,14 to 

recommend options to exploit technology to reduce crewing, personnel, 

and training requirements and directed that trade-offs to reduce these 

requirements be favored during design and development. 

• The 1998 cost and operational effectiveness analysis (currently known as 

the analysis of alternatives) included an analysis of the ship crew and 

personnel requirements for the various alternatives that ultimately 

influenced the Navy’s decision to initially establish an aggressive crew size 

goal of 95 and identify human systems integration requirements to be 

included in the operational requirements document. This goal represents a 

greater than 70 percent reduction in crew size from that of the Arleigh 

Burke-class destroyers developed in the 1980s. 

• In 1997, the DD(X) operational requirements document specified a crew 

size goal of between 95 and 150 as a key performance parameter.15 It also 

required that human systems integration be used to minimize life-cycle 

costs and maximize performance effectiveness, reliability, readiness, and 

safety of the ship and crew. 

• In 1997, the program also established a ship crewing/human systems 

integration integrated process team whose charter requires a top-down 

functional analysis, the analytical centerpiece of the Navy’s human 

systems integration approach, in the early phases to obtain a major 

reduction in personnel. 

• In 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 

continued to hold DD(X) destroyer program managers accountable for 

achieving an aggressive crew size reduction when he required validation 

that the DD(X) crew size will meet the key performance parameter 

threshold before ship construction begins. 

 14 The Surface Combatant for the 21st Century [DD(X)] Mission Need Statement

recommended performing a military crewing/hardware integration (“HARDMAN”) 

analysis in accordance with Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) 

Instruction 5311.7, “Determining Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT) 

Requirements for Navy Acquisitions,” August 12, 1985. HARDMAN is one type of 

human systems integration methodology. 

15 The document specified 95 as the objective value and 150 as the threshold value. These 

values represent a 60 to 70 percent reduction from the DDG-51 class crew level of 365. 
Page 12 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

• The Phase 1 solicitation issued in 1998 for trade studies and analyses and 

development of two competitive system concept designs required that 

both contractors provide a human systems integration plan. 

• The design agent contract awarded in 2002 requires the contractor to 

develop and demonstrate a human systems integration engineering effort 

that addresses the crewing, personnel, training, human performance, 

sailor survivability, and quality of life aspects of the DD(X) design. It also 

relaxed the original crew size goal, stating that crewing requirements shall 

not exceed 175. 

To achieve the proposed reductions, the DD(X) program plans to employ 

human-centered design and reasoning systems, advances in ship cleaning 

and preservation, a new maintenance strategy, and remote support from 

shore-based facilities for certain administrative and personnel services. 

For example, cleaning requirements are expected to be reduced by a ship 

design that capitalizes on commercial shipping practices such as 

cornerless spaces and maintenance-free deck coverings. The ship will also 

rely on an integrated bridge system that provides computer-based 

navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar plotting, and 

automated ship control. 

DD(X) program officials stated that their experience in using the human 

systems integration engineering approach, establishing an aggressive 

crew size reduction goal early in the acquisition process, and including 

this goal as a key performance parameter in the operational requirements 

document has been critical in maintaining a focus on reducing crew size. 

Moreover, these practices led to examining innovative approaches from 

the beginning and holding program managers accountable during program 

reviews. Program officials anticipate that the emphasis on reducing crew 

size will help to minimize DD(X) operating and support and total 

ownership costs once the ship is built and enters the fleet. For illustrative 

purposes, we calculated that the Navy could avoid personnel-related costs 

of about $600 million per ship over a 35-year service life if it achieves a 

crew of 150 sailors rather than requiring the 365 sailors needed to operate 

its legacy ship, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. This could potentially 

save more than $18 billion for a class of 32 ships (both amounts are in 

fiscal year 2002 dollars).16 See appendix V for a comparison of crew 

functions and workload on the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and 

those proposed for the DD(X). 

 16 Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is not yet clear how many 

DD(X)s will be purchased. 
Page 13 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

DD(X) program officials also stated that, even with sustained early 

emphasis on crew size reduction and the use of human systems integration 

for crew optimization, achieving such an aggressive crew size goal remains 

a significant technological challenge as the program is relying on a number 

of immature labor-saving technologies, such as those required to conduct 

damage control and run the ship’s computers. Program officials stated that 

informal goals or those established later in the acquisition process would 

not have been nearly as effective in getting the program to focus on 

achieving significant personnel reductions. However, in recognition of the 

technological challenge of achieving the crew size goal and several other 

technological challenges, the Navy restructured the DD(X) program in 

November 2001 to better manage the program’s risk. As such, it adopted 

an acquisition strategy consisting of multiple capability increments, or 

“flights.” The newly restructured program relaxed the crew size goals to 

between 125 and 175, which still represents a greater than 50 percent 

reduction below legacy ship levels, for the first of three planned DD(X) 

flights. While briefings prepared by Navy officials retain the original crew 

size goals for the third DD(X) flight, it is unclear whether these goals will 

be retained as key performance parameters in the operational 

requirements document currently under revision. 

In developing the T-AKE cargo ship, which is in procurement and is 

expected to become operational in 2005, elements of human systems 

integration were used to streamline intraship cargo handling and to refine 

the requirements for civilian mariners and active-duty personnel. 

However, human systems integration was not applied to the process of 

intership underway replenishment, the transfer of cargo between ships 

while at sea.17 Moreover, early acquisition documents for the T-AKE cargo 

ship program did not establish specific goals for reducing crew size, 

although they required the use of civilian mariners or Merchant Marines 

instead of active-duty Navy personnel and mandated the examination of 

cargo handling innovations to reduce crew workload. Use of Merchant 

Marines or Military Sealift Command personnel generally results in a 

smaller crew because these organizations employ more experienced 

seamen, have reduced watchstanding requirements, and use a different 

maintenance and training philosophy. The T-AKE will be operated by the 

 17 Underway replenishment may be accomplished via connected replenishment (in which 

the receiving and cargo ships are alongside and connected to each other by hoses/cables) 

or via vertical replenishment (in which a helicopter transfers solid cargo from ship to ship). 

T-AKE Cargo Ship Program 

Used Human Systems 

Integration in Some 

Aspects of Ship Design, 

Expects Crew Size 

Reductions, but Did Not 

Establish Specific Crew 

Size Goals 
Page 14 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Military Sealift Command, and its projected crew will be between 5 and 

20 percent smaller than the crew of the command’s legacy ships and about 

60 percent smaller than the legacy ships previously operated exclusively 

with Navy sailors.18

The following examples illustrate the strengths and limitations of 

the program’s use of human systems integration early in the acquisition 

process. 

• The 1992 mission need statement lacked a direct reference to human 

systems integration, although it does indicate that the ship’s size will 

be the result of various trade-offs, including cost and crew size, and 

required that the ship’s design incorporate modern propulsion, auxiliary, 

and cargo handling systems to minimize operating and maintenance 

personnel requirements. 

• The 2001 operational requirements document stated that “human 

engineering principles and design standards shall be applied to the design 

of all compartments, spaces, systems, individual equipment, workstations 

and facilities in which there is a human interface.” However, this 

document also required the T-AKE cargo ship to use U.S. Navy standard 

underway replenishment equipment because of the need to interface with 

other U.S. Navy and allied ships, the lack of any equivalent commercial 

system, and the costs to redesign existing Navy equipment and maintain 

nonstandard equipment. As a result, human systems integration was 

not applied to one of the main drivers of crew size—the number of 

crewmembers required to perform connected replenishment at each 

replenishment station. 

Program officials indicated that, because intership underway 

replenishment involves the interface between the T-AKE cargo ship and all 

other ship classes requiring replenishment at sea, redesign of the Navy’s 

process of underway replenishment was not within their purview and, 

therefore, was not addressed in the program’s human systems integration 

analyses. Instead, the program’s focus was to ensure that the T-AKE cargo 

ship’s design met the current requirements for performing underway 

replenishment and had the flexibility for future equipment modification. 

To address underway replenishment across ship platforms, in 2000 the 

Navy established a naval operational logistics integrated product team 

 18 The Navy’s Military Sealift Command is one of three components of the 

U.S. Transportation Command, the DOD command that manages the defense 

transportation system. 
Page 15 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

whose mission is to establish policy and doctrine for future operational 

systems and ensure the integration of operational logistics systems 

across ships. 

Since reexamining intership underway replenishment was beyond the 

scope of the ship program, program personnel said they focused on 

identifying ways to reduce crew workload. In the first acquisition phase, 

four contractors19 prepared trade studies on the integration of cargo 

handling functions on the ship.20 In the second acquisition phase, one of 

the contractors, National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, was awarded 

the contract to design and construct the ship. Ultimately, labor-saving 

innovations such as item scanners; an automated, rather than paper-based, 

warehouse management inventory system; and safer and easier to operate 

elevator doors were adopted.21

Although the T-AKE cargo ship is expected to require fewer personnel 

than its legacy ships, early acquisition documents did not establish a 

specific crew size goal as a key performance parameter and thus did not 

hold the program manager accountable for specific reductions. Rather, the 

operational requirements document required that the T-AKE be crewed 

largely by U.S. Merchant Marines or Military Sealift Command civilian 

mariners. The Navy currently estimates that the T-AKE will be crewed by 

172 individuals: 123 civilian mariners, 13 active-duty sailors in the military 

department who perform cargo management/inventory functions, and 

36 active-duty sailors in the aviation detachment who perform intership 

cargo transfer using a helicopter (vertical replenishment). 

 19 The following four contractors were each awarded $1.5 million to complete Phase I 

Ship/Cargo Integration Design studies: Avondale Industries (now Northrop Grumman Ship 

Systems Avondale Operations); Halter Marine, Inc. (now Friede Goldman Halter); Litton 

Ingalls Shipbuilding (now Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipbuilding); and National Steel and 

Shipbuilding Company. Phase I concluded on May 5, 2000, and on October 18, 2001, the 

Navy announced it had awarded National Steel and Shipbuilding Company the Phase II 

Detail Design and Construction contract. 

20 The studies addressed one or more of five topic areas: (1) warehouse management 

system/automation; (2) material handling equipment/cargo handling systems/cargo 

elevators; (3) cargo flow studies/modeling and simulation; (4) general arrangements/cargo 

hold and transfer deck design; and (5) cargo heating, ventilation, air conditioning, 

and refrigeration. 

21 T-AKE officials also provided us with the titles of 16 studies involving safety, human 

engineering, manpower, personnel, training, and habitability domains of human systems 

integration that were included in the shipbuilding contract. 
Page 16 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

The T-AKE cargo ship’s projected crew size of 172 personnel will be 

somewhat smaller than that of its Military Sealift Command legacy ships, 

the T-AE 26 Kilauea-class ammunition ships and the T-AFS 1/8 Mars-class 

and Sirius-class combat stores ships, which have crews of 182-215 

personnel and also use civilian mariners. The T-AKE’s crew size is 

significantly smaller than when these legacy ships were crewed by 

active-duty personnel. When crewed entirely by active Navy personnel, 

these ships had crews of 435 and 508 sailors, respectively. Despite the 

smaller crew size, the T-AKE will have a greater carrying capacity for dry 

and refrigerated cargo than its legacy ships. Each T-AKE ship will be able 

to carry at least 63 percent of the combined cargo capacity of a T-AFS 1 

and T-AE 26. 

Although the ship program did not perform the top-down analyses 

recommended by human system integration experts to optimize crewing, 

it did use elements of the approach to finalize staffing requirements. 

To finalize the requirement for civilian mariners, program personnel 

performed a functional analysis (which identified ship functions and their 

crew size requirements) and ultimately determined that the initial crew 

size estimate developed by the Navy could be reduced by 12, resulting 

in a final requirement for 123 civilian mariners. The size of the military 

department is based on an analysis that projects workload and personnel 

requirements for every ship function during the most labor-intensive 

operational scenarios and then allocates the workload and personnel 

requirements to the minimum number of billets and skill levels. 

The recently canceled JCC(X) command ship program made very limited 

use of human systems integration to optimize crew size and planned to 

wait until preliminary design in the next acquisition phase to begin human 

systems integration activities. The program also did not hold program 

managers accountable for reducing crew size below that of the legacy 

command ships. The following are examples. 

• The mission need statement did not require the use of human systems 

integration. Instead, the document required that the ship “be automated 

wherever practical to reduce workload and manpower requirements” 

and directed that operation by Military Sealift Command personnel be 

considered for selected functions rather than Navy personnel. However, 

the document stated that “changes to manpower requirements are not 

expected.” 

• The analysis of alternatives examined crew sizes ranging from 60 percent 

smaller to 50 percent larger than those of current command ships and 

JCC(X) Command Ship 

Program Made Limited 

Use of Human Systems 

Integration and Had No 

Formal Goals to Reduce 

Crew Size 
Page 17 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

using civilian mariners to perform JCC(X) crew functions to reduce crew 

size. The analysis found that using a mix of military and civilian personnel 

rather than all military personnel would reduce personnel costs by nearly 

a third, saving $2.3 billion for four ships over a 40-year service life. 

However, the analysis did not include a full human systems integration 

assessment of each design alternative. 

• At the time of its cancellation, the program had not received approval of 

its operational requirements document, which would have established key 

performance parameters. 

Program officials stated that although achieving crew size reduction was 

not included in key program documents, they expected to achieve some 

crew size reductions on the JCC(X) when compared to existing command 

ships through the use of modern, more reliable equipment, for example, 

diesel propulsion instead of steam propulsion.22 Yet, despite the program’s 

informal interest in reducing the size of the crew needed to operate the 

ship, the analysis of alternatives did not examine optimizing via human 

systems integration one of the main drivers of crew size—the size of the 

embarked command staff. The total crew size of the JCC(X) equals the 

sum of the embarked joint command staff and the crew needed to operate 

the ship and perform basic ship functions. Navy analyses show that the 

crew size needed to operate the ship depends upon the joint command 

staff size and the mission equipment that is to be maintained by the crew. 

Yet, all of the Navy analyses examined joint command staff alternatives, 

ranging from 500 to 1,500 staff, which were larger than the fleet 

commander’s staff of 285 to 449 currently embarked on existing command 

ships. None of the analyses used human systems integration to determine 

the optimal size of the joint command staff. 

The program did fund three crewing studies as part of its early industry 

involvement effort that included ship crewing, workload, and functional 

analyses. However, these analyses were performed only on the command 

ship’s crew and not on the embarked joint staff. These crewing studies, 

prepared by contractors for the JCC(X) command ship program in 

June 2002, also reiterated the importance of beginning human systems 

integration efforts at the earliest opportunity in the ship acquisition 

process and called into question the adequacy of the human systems 

 22 To achieve these reductions, the Navy would have to adopt the latest fleet work practices 

and automation, eliminate functions not relevant to the JCC(X), reduce engineering 

watchstanders, and use a centralized galley and Military Sealift Command-like food service. 
Page 18 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

integration efforts to date. For example, a study by one contractor 

stated that 

“The HSI [human systems integration] team was not part of a larger JCC(X) System 

Engineering effort, as would be expected in a full-up proposal or system development 

activity. The HSI [human systems integration] team also did not have contact with potential 

JCC(X) users or with Navy/Joint HSI [human systems integration] Team members, as 

would be expected and desired in a normal system acquisition environment. This was due 

to the unique nature of a very limited scope manning study with very limited funds.” 

The study also urged the program to adopt a human systems integration 

approach stating that “a human-centered design approach, implemented at 

the front-end and as part of an integrated system engineering process, will 

yield an optimal crew size.” The study also stated that the same human 

systems integration tools could be effectively used to optimize the size for 

the embarked command staff. 

JCC(X) command ship program officials stated that the program planned 

to employ human systems integration to optimize crew size in the next 

acquisition phase by contracting with industry to perform a functional 

analysis. However, according to Navy officials, the program was canceled 

before these efforts began, in part because of the unacceptably high crew 

size estimated for the program. 

The LHA(R) program has not yet developed a comprehensive human 

systems integration strategy to outline the program’s human systems 

integration objectives and guide its efforts. In addition, officials told us 

that very little human systems integration work was done early in the 

acquisition process because officials plan to begin human systems 

integration activities during preliminary design in the next acquisition 

phase, called system development and demonstration. Also, early 

acquisition documents for the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship program 

did not establish formal goals to reduce the number of personnel required 

to operate the ship. The following are examples. 

• The mission need statement required the use of human systems 

integration to optimize manning. However, it also stated that no changes 

to Navy personnel requirements were expected. Currently, the program 

plans only to not exceed the crew size of the older ships that perform 

similar missions. These legacy LHA 1 class ships have a crew of about 

1,230 to operate the ship and can embark about 1,700 Marines. 

LHA(R) Amphibious 

Assault Ship Made Limited 

Use of Human Systems 

Integration and Had No 

Formal Goals to Reduce 

Crew Size 
Page 19 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

• The analysis of alternatives stated that in order for the LHA(R) to achieve 

major reductions in personnel, significant new technology and research 

and development funds to integrate this technology into the LHA(R) 

design would be required as well as changes in culture (organization and 

procedures) to adapt reduced crew size practices of the commercial sector 

to the naval environment. 

• At the time of our review, the operational requirements document for the 

LHA(R) had not been developed. 

The Navy’s plans for the LHA(R) are not in concert with the Chief of Naval 

Operations’ desire for major reductions in the personnel levels for all new 

shipbuilding programs. In August 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations 

commented on the size of the LHA-1 (the legacy ship that the LHA(R) is 

replacing) saying, “I don’t want any more ships like that. The more low 

technology systems that are on it, the more people we will need. And we 

will need more crewmembers for support services. It [the LHA-1’s 

replacement] will be built from the keel up to support the type of striking 

capability that you need in your aviation arm. It is going to be a totally 

different ship.”23

Program officials offered two major reasons for not conducting human 

systems integration early in the acquisition process: (1) they believed it 

was not appropriate to start human systems integration during the very 

early phases of the acquisition program (i.e., in concept and technology 

development) and (2) the program lacked funding to conduct human 

systems integration activities in the first acquisition phase. Program 

officials plan to conduct human systems integration efforts during the 

system development and demonstration acquisition phase when the 

program begins preliminary design efforts. Some of these efforts, 

scheduled to begin in February 2003, are to include a top-down 

requirements analysis and a total ship manpower assessment. 

In contrast to the opinions of LHA(R) program officials, the Navy’s human 

systems integration experts stated that human systems integration is a 

critical part of planning and design in the early stages of acquisition, 

including the concept and technology development phase. In addition, 

experience with the DD(X) program shows that the potential personnelrelated cost savings resulting from the application of human systems 

 23 Kauchak, Marty, “Navigating Changing Seas, Navy Chief Harbors No Illusions About the 

Challenges That Lie Ahead,” Armed Forces Journal International, August 2002. 
Page 20 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

integration early on in a program can be significant. Moreover, experts 

stated that every program, regardless of its funding levels or its reliance on 

legacy systems, can benefit from a comprehensive human systems 

integration approach, especially those developing crew-intensive 

platforms such as the LHA(R). 

The program managers and the human systems integration experts we 

spoke to identified four factors that inhibit the Navy’s ability to 

consistently implement human systems integration across programs. 

These factors are (1) neither DOD nor Navy acquisition policies establish 

specific requirements for using human systems integration, such as its 

timing and whether the approach should be addressed in the key 

acquisition documents; (2) funding challenges often result in decisions to 

defer human systems integration activities and use legacy subsystems 

when acquiring new ships to save near-term costs instead of investing in 

research and development to reduce costs over the long term; (3) DOD 

and Navy oversight of human systems integration activities is limited and 

the Naval Sea Systems Command’s role in certifying that ships delivered to 

the fleet have optimum crew sizes is unclear; and (4) the Navy lacks an 

effective process to change its long-standing culture and the extensive 

network of policies and procedures that have institutionalized current 

manning practices. As a result, some programs we examined set goals not 

to exceed the crew size of 30-year old ships, waited until preliminary 

design in the second acquisition phase to begin human systems integration 

efforts, and excluded primary and secondary ship functions from a 

rigorous analysis. In recognition of these impediments, the Navy has taken 

steps to resolve some of these issues. 

Recent DOD and Navy acquisition guidance provides program managers 

with latitude about the timing and extent of human systems integration 

activities and whether the approach should be addressed in key 

acquisition documents. DOD guidance on the role of human systems 

integration in acquisition is contained in two documents, the Defense 

Acquisition memorandum and the Interim Defense Acquisition 

Guidebook, issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, both dated October 

30, 2002. Compliance with the Defense Acquisition memorandum is 

mandatory; compliance with the Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook

is discretionary. Both documents state that program managers will 

develop a human systems integration strategy early in the acquisition 

process to minimize total ownership cost. Neither document, however, 

specifies how early in the process these efforts should begin or requires 

Several Factors 

Contribute to the 

Inconsistent 

Application of Human 

Systems Integration 

and May Impede the 

Navy’s Ability to 

Optimize Crew Size 

Lack of Specific Navy 

Requirements to Use 

Human Systems 

Integration Results in 

Inconsistent 

Implementation 

Across Programs 
Page 21 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

that human systems integration analyses be performed on the various 

alternatives considered in the formal analysis of alternatives. 

The Navy’s main acquisition instruction requires that human systems 

integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along with other 

engineering and logistics elements beginning at program initiation but 

does not provide for specific procedures.24 The Navy’s section of the 

acquisition deskbook25 provides more detailed guidance on human 

systems integration (such as providing a format for the human systems 

integration plan and discussing the contents of a human systems 

integration program). However, because these sources provide only broad 

guidelines or are discretionary, a program manger can decide when, how, 

and to what extent they will use human systems integration in their 

acquisition program. 

The Navy also has developed other guidance on using human systems 

integration, but its use is also discretionary. For example, human systems 

integration experts developed a guide for the Office of the Chief Naval 

Operations, which states that a human systems integration assessment 

and trade-off of design alternatives should be conducted during the first 

acquisition phase. The Surface Warfare Program Manager’s Guide to 

Human Systems Integration also states that human systems integration 

cost, schedule, and design risk areas for each alternative concept should 

be identified and evaluated. The guidance also recommends that human 

systems integration assessments should be conducted at each milestone 

decision review. 

Because of the wording of DOD guidance and the discretionary nature of 

some Navy guidance, new ship program managers vary in when they use 

human systems integration during ship development. For example, the 

DD(X) program specified using the approach in the mission need 

statement and the analysis of alternatives further specified human systems 

integration requirements be included in the operational requirements 

document. In contrast, the program managers for both the JCC(X) 

 24 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, “Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for 

Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and Non-Major Information 

Technology Acquisition Programs,” December 6, 1996. 

25 “Department of the Navy (DON) Section (Discretionary) of Defense Acquisition 

Deskbook (Reference Library), Appendix XI-Acquisition Program Plans Formats, 

February 12, 1997 (the “Acquisition Deskbook” is now called the “Acquisition Knowledge 

Sharing System”). 
Page 22 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

command ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship told us that they 

planned to begin their human systems integration efforts during 

preliminary design after the design alternative has been selected in the 

next acquisition phase--system development and demonstration. Neither 

program conducted human systems integration analyses of the alternative 

designs during the analysis of alternatives. As such, program officials 

lacked information on how each of the alternatives compared with respect 

to their proposed crew size and how their crew size would affect total 

ownership costs. 

Both JCC(X) and LHA(R) program officials cited challenges in funding a 

new acquisition program as a barrier to using human systems integration 

to optimize crew size and therefore reduce total ownership cost. These 

challenges affect whether programs conduct crew-optimizing human 

systems integration activities in the earliest phases of acquisition and 

whether the program will choose to invest in labor-saving technologies. 

JCC(X) program officials told us that achieving personnel reductions and 

using human systems integration to optimize crew size could increase 

acquisition costs. The Navy’s human systems integration experts stated 

that program managers have long been incentivized to hold down 

acquisition costs without considering how such choices may affect 

operating and support costs, such as personnel-related costs, over the life 

of the ship. According to the Navy’s human systems integration experts, 

labor-saving technology may add to the acquisition cost of a ship but may 

also reduce the operating and support costs incurred over the ship’s 

service life. Whether to use technology or sailors to perform a function 

should be determined by a systematic analysis of costs and capabilities 

performed as part of the human systems integration functional analysis—

an effort not undertaken by the JCC(X) command ship program. 

Similarly, at the time the LHA(R) program was initiated in 2001, the Navy 

decided not to invest in human systems integration activities and research 

and development on new labor-saving technologies for the ship. The 

program plans to capitalize, where appropriate, on systems already in 

development for other ships such as the DD(X) destroyer and the CVN(X) 

aircraft carrier but has not yet identified any labor-saving technologies or 

processes that might be adapted from these programs. Program officials 

said the program was not resourced to develop new technologies, having 

received only $20 million in research and development funds from 

program initiation through fiscal year 2002. However, the up-front savings 

of not investing in research and development and human systems 

Challenges in Funding 

Acquisition Programs 

Discourage Investment in 

Labor-Saving Technology 
Page 23 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

integration activities must be weighed against the higher operating and 

support costs incurred over the life of the ship and the foregone capability 

and quality of life improvements that can accompany new technology and 

human-centered design. For illustrative purposes, we calculated that a 

nominal 25 percent reduction in a 1,245-person crew could provide a 

personnel cost avoidance of nearly $1 billion over the service life of a ship, 

or nearly $4 billion for a 4-ship class.26 In addition, DD(X) destroyer 

program officials were uncertain about the extent to which programs now 

in development outside the DD(X) destroyer family of ships will be able to 

leverage its new technology, citing the costs associated with adapting 

technology to new platforms that perform different missions. Rather, 

DD(X) program officials told us that it is imperative for the new ship 

programs to use human systems integration to inform such decisions. 

Several offices within DOD and the Navy have an advisory role regarding 

the implementation of human systems integration, although they lack the 

authority to require that it be used to optimize crew size and that it be 

addressed in specific acquisition documents or at each acquisition 

milestone. The Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and 

Readiness, and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division) 

Acquisition and Human Systems Integration Requirements Branch both 

review new program acquisition documents and provide guidance on 

human systems integration policy.27 Additionally, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, assists in the development 

of human systems integration policy and addresses policy issues at 

meetings of defense acquisition executives. The Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) Chief 

Engineer, uses human systems integration in its “system of systems” 

examination of capability above the individual ship level to ensure 

that systems can function together across various ships to perform 

the mission.28

 26 Fiscal year 2002 dollars. 

27 The Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division) Acquisition and Human Systems 

Integration Requirements Branch also encourages manning reductions of up to 20 percent, 

if possible, for new acquisition programs. It has, however, no authority to require 

such reductions. 

28 This approach embodies the overarching system requirements for a broad mission need, 

such as surveillance or missile defense. 

DOD and Navy Offices 

Have Limited or Unclear 

Authority to Require 

Human Systems 

Integration Activities for 

Ship Programs 
Page 24 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

In recognition of the need for an organization within the ship community 

to “lead the effort to institutionalize humans systems integration...,” the 

Navy, in October 2002, created the Human Systems Integration Directorate 

within the Naval Sea Systems Command whose missions include 

• establishing human systems integration policy and standards for the 

Naval Sea Systems Command; 

• ensuring the implementation of human systems integration policy, 

procedures, and best practices; 

• assisting program offices in developing and sustaining human systems 

integration plans; and 

• certifying that ships and systems delivered to the fleet optimize 

ship crewing, personnel, and training and promote personnel safety, 

survivability, and quality service.29

Because of its role as the certifying authority for human systems 

integration within the Naval Sea Systems Command, the directorate 

may have more authority than the previously mentioned organizations to 

ensure that human systems integration is implemented. However, the 

memorandum establishing the directorate and the instruction specifying 

its functions do not specify how certification will be accomplished, the 

acquisition stage at which it will be required, or consequences of 

noncompliance. 

Navy acquisition officials also identified the layers of Navy policies, 

procedures, and instructions that affect ship crew levels and cultural 

resistance to novel concepts as impediments to optimizing ship crews. 

They told us that even when human systems integration is used in the 

early stages of an acquisition program to identify ways to reduce crew 

size, it is difficult to achieve a consensus among numerous stakeholders 

within the Navy to change long-standing policies and practices so that 

labor-saving approaches or technologies can be implemented. To facilitate 

this process, the DD(X) destroyer program established a forum to evaluate 

policy barriers to proposed innovations and facilitate needed changes. 

However, this effort was limited to selected ships. Other programs such as 

the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship and the JCC(X) command ship had 

not established a similar forum to resolve the policy barriers to optimize 

 29 Naval Sea Systems Command Notice 5400, “Establishment of the Human Systems 

Integration (HSI) Directorate (SEA 03),” October 15, 2002. 

Navy Policies and 

Culture May Impede 

Introduction of 

Labor-Saving Technologies 

and Approaches 
Page 25 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

crewing on these ships. As a result, the Navy currently lacks an ongoing 

process to facilitate examination of outmoded policies and procedures 

that may impede optimizing crewing in all new ship acquisition programs. 

Navy officials explained that changing policies and procedures is a 

complex and time-consuming task because the current way of doing 

business has been incorporated in instructions at all levels in the Navy, 

ranging from the Secretary of the Navy to commanders of the Atlantic and 

Pacific Fleets, and across a number of areas, such as recruiting, retention, 

training, quality of life, and the environment. In addition, new ways of 

doing business, such as those envisioned for the DD(X) destroyer, will 

affect and require modifications to Navy doctrine, tactics, and operational 

requirements. Furthermore, proposed changes must be evaluated for 

compliance with governing statutes in such areas as compensation, 

occupational safety and health, and aviation. As such, any change involves 

numerous stakeholders who must be consulted and grant approval. 

For example, DD(X) officials told us that it took about 18 months to 

coordinate with numerous stakeholders to change applicable policies to 

reduce the number of crewmembers required during flight operations from 

48 to 15. Moreover, officials told us that this change is just the beginning 

since the DD(X) destroyer program has identified numerous Navy policies 

and procedures across a wide spectrum of topics that need to be changed 

in order to adopt the innovations proposed by industry to meet the 

DD(X)’s cost and capability requirements. 

Officials with the other programs we examined also viewed Navy policies 

as a barrier to optimized crewing. JCC(X) command ship program officials 

reported that current Navy policy and practice would have been a barrier 

to implementing potential crew size reductions had this program gone 

forward. Two examples cited by program officials are bridge 

watchstanding and main propulsion machinery monitoring. At present, 

Navy practice for bridge watch requires approximately 11 personnel in 

contrast to commercial practice, which requires 1 person on watch and 

1 on stand by. Similarly, Navy practice for machinery monitoring requires 

personnel in the machinery space at all times to ensure that power is 

available. This contrasts with commercial practice, which permits putting 

machinery on automatic and using sensors with alarms routed to a 

watchstanders’ stateroom during certain hours. Officials stated that 

implementing these commercial practices would have required evaluating 

their appropriateness for a Navy operating environment and, if approved, 

would have required modifying existing policies and procedures. 

Furthermore, the LHA(R) analysis of alternatives concluded that 

significant changes in organization and procedures are crucial to achieving 

Policy and Cultural 

Impediments 
Page 26 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

a substantial reduction in crew size. Cultural change is a particular 

challenge for the LHA(R) program because the amphibious mission is 

complex and both Navy and Marine organizations would be involved in 

developing and implementing changes. 

Navy officials stated that current funding practices in which personnel 

costs are funded from centralized accounts and not out of the operating 

fleets’ budget do not foster an awareness of the true cost of having sailors 

on board ships and encourage viewing sailors as a “free resource.” 

Additionally, because traditional, time-tested methods and crewing have 

proven successful in the past, officials told us that Navy commanders have 

little incentive to assume the risks associated with adopting new ways of 

accomplishing shipboard tasks with fewer crewmembers, especially when 

they lack awareness of and accountability for personnel costs. 

Because of the magnitude of changes needed to reduce and optimize 

crewing on the DD(X) destroyer, the program established an effort 

to identify and resolve policy barriers to implementing labor-saving 

approaches that conflict with current policy, statutes, or practice. This 

effort includes (1) reaching out to Navywide personnel development and 

training organizations and to Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders and 

(2) establishing the DD(X) Policy Clearinghouse Web-based tool to 

facilitate collaboration with multiple stakeholders and resolve policy 

impediments to implementing innovations planned for the DD(X) 

destroyer. The DD(X) clearinghouse was recently transferred to the 

Naval Sea Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration Directorate. 

However, there are currently no requirements for this forum to address 

the policy barriers to optimizing crewing encountered in all new 

ship acquisitions. 

Given the Navy’s recapitalization challenges, efforts to control personnel 

costs and minimize total ownership costs are becoming increasingly 

important. Applying human systems integration principles to optimize 

crew size has the potential to result in a host of cost and operational 

benefits, including saving billions of dollars by reducing total ownership 

costs and increasing operational performance and ship maintainability. 

The experience to date in the DD(X) destroyer program shows that 

requiring human systems integration from the earliest stages of a program 

(during concept and technology development) and using the results to 

establish a crew size reduction goal as a key performance parameter are 

effective strategies to holding program managers accountable during 

program reviews for making significant progress toward reducing crew 

Navy Lacks a Process to 

Systematically Address 

Impediments to Innovation 

in All New Ship Programs 

Conclusions 
Page 27 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

size. The DD(X) experience also shows that even when these practices are 

followed, the program will still face challenges to achieving these 

goals and encounter pressures to relax the goals as the system design 

progresses, thereby supporting human systems integration experts’ view 

that human systems integration plans and activities should receive 

continued review and focus throughout the acquisition process. In 

contrast, programs such as the JCC(X) and LHA (R) that do not use human 

systems integration early and do not hold program managers accountable 

during program reviews for crew size reduction are less likely to achieve 

the meaningful reduction in crew size. Unless the Navy more consistently 

applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and 

establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss 

opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are 

determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process. 

The Navy’s varied approach to applying human systems integration has 

occurred partly because Navy guidance allows program managers 

considerable discretion in determining the extent to which they apply 

human systems integration principles in developing new systems. In the 

absence of clear requirements that human systems integration programs 

will be a key feature of all future acquisition programs, efforts to optimize 

crew size will continue to vary due to the competing pressures placed on 

program managers, and the Navy is likely to continue to miss 

opportunities to reduce personnel requirements for future ships. As a 

result, the Navy’s funding challenges may be exacerbated, and it may not 

be able to build or support the number of ships it believes are necessary to 

support the new defense strategy. Although the Navy’s recent efforts to 

establish a focal point for human systems integration policy within the 

Naval Sea Systems Command is a positive step, the success of this office 

will depend on its authority to influence acquisition programs in their 

initial stages. Because the instruction establishing this office does not 

clearly explain the process this office will use to certify that ships 

delivered to the fleet will have optimized crews, there is a risk that the 

office may not have sufficient leverage to influence new programs in their 

early stages and that this may result in missed opportunities to reduce 

crew size and achieve long-term cost savings. 

Even when the Navy uses a disciplined human systems integration process 

early in an acquisition program to identify ways to optimize crew size, 

implementation of new technologies and procedures is often hindered by 

the Navy’s culture and traditions, which are institutionalized in a wide 

array of policies and procedures affecting personnel levels, maintenance 

requirements, and training. In recognition of these barriers, the DD(X) 
Page 28 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

program and the operational logistics community have established 

processes to address these barriers for their particular ship or community. 

However, not all new ship acquisition programs have developed or have 

access to such a forum to facilitate removing barriers to optimized 

manning to ensure that costly outdated policies and procedures are 

systematically reexamined as new innovations are developed. 

To ensure that the nation’s multibillion-dollar investment in Navy ships 

maximizes military capability and sailor performance at the lowest 

feasible total ownership cost, we recommend that the Secretary of the 

Navy develop and implement mandatory policies on human systems 

integration requirements, standards, and milestones. Specifically, for each 

new system the Navy plans to acquire, the Secretary of the Navy should 

require that 

• a human systems integration assessment be performed as concepts for the 

system are developed and alternative concepts are evaluated; 

• human systems integration analyses, including trade-off studies of design 

alternatives, be used to establish an optimized crew size goal that will 

become a key performance parameter in the program’s requirements 

document; and 

• human systems integration assessments be updated prior to all 

subsequent milestones. 

To strengthen the Naval Sea Systems Command’s role in promoting the 

use of human systems integration for new ship systems, we recommend 

that the Secretary of the Navy require the command to clarify the Human 

Systems Integration Directorate’s role in and process for certifying that 

ships and systems delivered to the fleet optimize ship crewing. 

To facilitate the review of possibly outdated policies and procedures as 

new labor-saving innovations are identified through human systems 

integration efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy require 

that the Naval Sea Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration 

Directorate establish a process to evaluate or revise existing policies and 

procedures that may impede innovation in all new ship acquisitions. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 29 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 

recommendations and indicated that actions were underway or planned 

to implement them. DOD stated that actions taken in response to our 

recommendations would only enhance ongoing human systems integration 

initiatives; ensure more consistent application of human systems 

integration processes across all ship acquisition programs; and lead to 

optimized ship crews, increased system performance, and reduced lifecycle costs. The Navy intends to implement our recommendation that it 

require ship programs to use human systems integration to establish crew 

size goals and help achieve them, in part, by developing a new program 

called SEAPRINT (Systems Engineering, Acquisition and PeRsonnel 

INTegration), modeled after the Army’s MANPRINT program that we cite 

in our report. The Navy’s SEAPRINT program will develop Navywide 

policy that identifies, mandates, and establishes accountability for human 

systems integration analyses. This policy will mandate that human systems 

integration is to be addressed in 

• a specific plan before the acquisition’s earliest milestone, 

• the initial capabilities document (formerly called the mission needs 

statement), 

• the capabilities development document (formerly called the operational 

requirements document), and 

• assessments performed as part of concept exploration and development 

and updated prior to all subsequent milestones. 

DOD also stated that it endorses a manpower-related key performance 

parameter for all new ship acquisition programs. In response to our 

recommendation that the Navy clearly define human systems integration 

certification standards for new ships, DOD stated that the Navy is 

developing technical human systems integration criteria and metrics that 

will be used for measuring and certifying that ships and ship systems meet 

human systems integration standards. With regard to our recommendation 

that the Navy formally establish a process to examine and facilitate the 

adoption of labor-saving technologies and best practices across Navy 

systems, DOD stated that the Navy has established a new human systems 

integration clearinghouse, implemented a pilot study using the 

clearinghouse, and involved stakeholders from across the Navy. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

DOD’s comments are included in appendix VI of this report. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 30 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at 

(202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Key staff members that 

contributed to this report were Roderick Rodgers, Jacquelyn Randolph, 

Suzanne Wren, Mary Jo LaCasse, Charles Perdue, and Jane Hunt. 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Acting Director, Defense Capabilities 

 and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

To assess the Navy’s use of human systems integration principles to 

optimize crews and goals to reduce crew size on the four new ship 

programs we were asked to review, we obtained and analyzed key 

acquisition documents such as mission need statements, analyses of 

alternatives, and operational requirements documents as well as human 

systems integration plans and analyses. We also interviewed Naval Sea 

Systems Command and Military Sealift Command officials who are 

responsible for the DD(X), T-AKE, JCC(X), and LHA(R) programs to 

discuss the use of human systems integration and crew size goals. We 

obtained current ship crewing documents from the Navy’s Manpower 

Analysis Center and the Military Sealift Command and compared the crew 

size goals for the four ship programs we reviewed to the crew size levels 

for older ships that perform similar missions. We also obtained data from 

the Naval Sea Systems Command on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer 

program on crew sizing and workload to compare with the contractor’s 

crew size estimate for the DD(X). To understand the extent to which the 

T-AKE’s primary mission of underway replenishment affects crew size, we 

interviewed (1) experts from the Underway Replenishment Department at 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Port Hueneme Division) and the 

National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (which designed and will build 

the T-AKE) and (2) a subject matter expert on Navy underway 

replenishment. To gain an understanding of operational logistics and cargo 

storage and warehousing, we interviewed officials from the Chief of Naval 

Operations (Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics) and St. Onge Company 

(a subcontractor for the T-AKE ship program) and visited the Defense 

Distribution Depot Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, one of the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) largest and most automated distribution centers. To 

obtain information on the Navy’s methods of calculating total ownership 

costs, we interviewed officials from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis and 

the Center for Naval Analyses. To calculate the ship crewing cost 

avoidance potential for the DD(X) and LHA(R) programs, we used data 

from the Navy’s Cost of a Sailor study for capturing comprehensive 

personnel costs and converted the data to fiscal year 2002 dollars. 

To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy’s use of human systems 

integration principles, we obtained and analyzed DOD, Joint Staff, and 

Navy systems acquisition directives, instructions, and guidance (e.g., 

the internet-based Defense Acquisition Deskbook and the Program 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 32 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Management Community of Practice).1 We reviewed the interim defense 

acquisition guidance as it pertains to the acquisition process, human 

systems integration, and total ownership cost. We did not assess the ship 

programs’ compliance with the several prior versions of DOD and Navy 

acquisition guidance, but we did evaluate the extent to which human 

systems integration was applied and whether crew size goals were 

established. We also obtained and reviewed numerous articles on 

military and civilian applications of human systems integration. To 

obtain information on the formulation and oversight of human systems 

integration policy and guidance, we met with officials from the offices of 

the Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research 

Development and Acquisition; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Chief 

Engineer; and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition and Human 

Systems Integration Requirements Branch). To obtain additional 

information on the benefits of human systems integration and best 

practices, we interviewed subject matter experts with the Naval Sea 

Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration Directorate, the DD(X) 

Program Office, the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Personnel, Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) 

Directorate, Carlow International Incorporated, and the Office of Naval 

Research’s Human Systems Science and Technology Department, and we 

attended the American Society of Naval Engineers Conference on Human 

Systems Integration. To gain insight on labor-saving technologies and 

changes to policies and procedures required to implement these 

innovations, we met with officials from the Naval Sea Systems Command’s 

SMARTSHIP Program Office; met with officials and toured the Office of 

Naval Research’s Afloat Lab in Annapolis, Maryland; and met with officials 

responsible for the DD(X) Policy Clearinghouse and the Naval Sea 

Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration Directorate. We 

discussed the funding for human systems integration with the Naval Sea 

Systems program managers for the four ship programs we reviewed. 

We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 1

 The program management communities of practice include acquisition, systems 

engineering, total ownership costs, and many other related disciplines. The communities 

may be accessed at http://www.pmcop.dau.mil/. 
Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation 

Page 33 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

In 1995, the Navy established the 21st Century Surface Combatant 

program to develop the next generation of surface combatants that would 

replace retiring destroyers and frigates on a timely basis. In November 

2001, the Navy restructured this program from one intended to develop a 

single ship class of 32 ships into its current form known as the DD(X). The 

new program aims to develop and acquire three new classes of surface 

combatants to include the DD(X) as the centerpiece, a cruiser called 

CG(X), and a smaller littoral combat ship. 

The first DD(X) destroyer is to be procured in fiscal year 2005 and enter 

service in fiscal year 2011. The initial DD(X) is viewed as a “test bed” for 

the host of new technologies under development. The Navy plans to 

employ a spiral acquisition strategy for the ship class in which new 

technology will be phased in over three distinct ship flights. 

Plans call for the DD(X) destroyer to have a number of new features and 

technologies, including 

• an advanced electric-drive/integrated power system for propelling the ship 

that could become the basis for applying electric-drive technology more 

widely throughout the fleet, 

• labor-saving technologies that may permit the ship to be operated with a 

crew of 125 to 175 people instead of the more than 350 needed to operate 

current Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyers, 

• a new hull design for reduced detectability, 

• two new 155-mm Advanced Gun Systems for supporting Marine forces 

ashore, and 

• 128 vertical-launch tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles and 

other weapons.1

The Navy is now reevaluating many of the ship’s operational requirements 

and cost estimates (which were determined and approved under the 

earlier DD-21 program) and may make substantial changes to the originally 

envisioned capabilities, including relaxing the crew size and detectability 

goals, changing the type of gun and amount of munitions carried, and 

reducing the number of vertical launch tubes. 

Previously, the Navy projected the unit procurement cost for the DD-21 

destroyer to be not more than $750 million in fiscal year 1996 dollars 

 1

 The number of vertical-launch tubes is being reevaluated. 

Appendix II: Ships Included in 

Our Evaluation 

DD(X) Destroyer 
Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation 

Page 34 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

(the equivalent of about $795 million in fiscal year 2001 dollars)—

somewhat less than the $950 million unit procurement cost of today’s 

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.2

 The DD-21 was also envisioned to have an 

operating and support cost of not more than $6,000 per hour—about 

one-third less than that of the Arleigh Burke-class, in large part resulting 

from the smaller crew planned for the future destroyer. In April 2002, the 

Navy selected Northrop Grumman Ship Systems as the design agent for 

the DD(X) and the program entered detailed design. 

The T-AKE cargo ship is the new combat logistics force ship to be 

operated by the Military Sealift Command. The ship’s primary mission is 

to shuttle food, ammunition, repair parts, supplies, and limited quantities 

of fuel to station ships and combatants. The new ship will replace T-AE 26 

Kilauea-class ammunition ships and T-AFS 1/8 Mars-class and 

Sirius-class combat stores ships in the Military Sealift Command. 

The ship’s secondary mission is to operate with an oiler (T-AO 187 

Kaiser-class) to provide logistics support to a carrier battle group. In this 

capacity, the T-AKE will replace AOE 1 Sacramento-class ships. 

The ship program initiated development in 1995 and began procurement in 

October 2001. The Navy has purchased 3 of the 12 planned ships for a total 

of almost $1 billion, with delivery expected in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. 

Current plans are to purchase the 4th through 12th ships between fiscal year 

2003 and 2007 for delivery between fiscal year 2006 and 2010. Once all are 

purchased and delivered, T-AKE cargo ships will represent 41 percent of 

the recapitalized combat logistics force fleet (at full operating status). 

Military Sealift Command officials mentioned several factors—mission 

requirements and personnel policies—that explain why, in comparison to 

the Navy, they are able to operate combat logistics force ships with 

smaller crews. Logistics ships in the Military Sealift Command have fewer 

missions and therefore can operate with smaller crews. For example, 

unlike Navy ships, Military Sealift Command logistics ships do not carry 

weapons and therefore their crews do not require weapon operators. 

Military Sealift Command ships also incorporate several other crew 

reduction practices, including an unattended engine room, minimal bridge 

watch by use of integrated bridge system technology, self-service laundry 

 2

 Cost estimates are for the fifth destroyer built by each shipbuilder involved in 

the program. 

T-AKE Cargo Ship 
Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation 

Page 35 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

facilities and food service initiatives. Command officials also said that 

because of their personnel policies, civilian mariners are more 

experienced than their Navy counterparts. Specifically, because there are 

no personnel policies requiring job rotation or that individuals leave the 

service if they are not promoted (“up or out”), civilian mariners are more 

likely to have been in their current job longer than active-duty Navy 

personnel. Command officials said that these personnel policies result in a 

workforce that is more experienced than their Navy counterparts.3

The Military Sealift Command’s operating policies also enable it to operate 

cargo ships with smaller crews than the Navy. For example, command 

officials said that their policy requires 9 crewmembers per underway 

replenishment station and that the Navy requires 20 per station. The 

Military Sealift Command also does not assign a safety officer to each 

underway replenishment station as the Navy does. 

In November 1999, the Navy established the Joint Command and Control 

(Experimental) or JCC(X) program to replace the Navy’s four aging 

command ships built in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, the 

JCC(X) was intended to provide an afloat platform for performing joint 

command and control functions, such as those performed by a joint force 

commander without the need to obtain permission from host countries to 

establish a land-based headquarters operation. 

By November 2001, the Navy had received the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense’s endorsement for an afloat command capability and completed 

its formal analysis of alternatives. This analysis showed that the assigned 

Navy crew (the ship’s operators) would account for roughly half the 

life-cycle cost for a JCC(X). It also showed that a mix of Navy sailors and 

civilian mariners would be capable of performing the crew functions at 

 3

 To confirm whether civilian mariners were more experienced than their Navy peers, 

we compared the average age and tenure of civilian mariners to active-duty Navy 

personnel. Relative to Navy personnel, civilian mariners were older (average age is 

46 years, Navy average is about 29), although they had similar tenure (average tenure in 

the Military Sealift Command is about 8 years; the Navy average is almost 9). The Military 

Sealift Command provided data on civilian mariners. Navy age data was taken from 

Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 2000, dated February 

2002. Navy tenure data was calculated from Tabulations of Responses from the 1999 

Survey of Active Duty Personnel, Volume 2: Programs and Services, Family, Economic 

Issues, and Background, conducted by the Defense Manpower Data Center, dated 

September 2000. 

JCC(X) Command 

Ship 
Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation 

Page 36 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

two-thirds of the personnel cost, saving about $2 billion for four ships over 

a 40-year service life. The analysis further estimated that a newly designed 

ship sized for an embarked command staff of about 800 (these people are 

in addition to the ship’s crew) would cost about $1 billion for a lead ship in 

fiscal year 2006 and $850 million for a follow-on ship if three were built. 

Subsequent to this analysis, the Navy’s draft 2004 budget plan eliminated 

funding for the JCC(X) and instead directed another ship program, the 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future),4

 to study developing joint 

command and control modules or variants. 

In 2001, the Navy established the Amphibious Assault Ship, General 

Purpose (Replacement) or LHA(R) program to replace its five aging LHA 1 

Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships. These ships are primarily 

designed to move large quantities of Marines, their equipment, and 

supplies onto any shore during hostilities. 

The first LHA ship will be replaced by a Wasp-class amphibious assault 

ship, the LHD-8,5

 in approximately fiscal year 2007, and the remaining 

ships will be replaced by a modified version of the LHD 8 no later than 

fiscal year 2024. The modified variant will be made longer and wider to 

accommodate the larger and heavier aircraft the Marines are developing, 

the MV-22 Osprey and the Joint Strike Fighter. 

The Navy estimates the cost for the first ship to be about $3 billion with 

the three successor ships costing about $2.1 billion each.6

 The ship’s 

annual operating and support cost is estimated to be about $111 million. 

The LHA(R) program is currently in the first acquisition phase called 

concept technology and development. 

 4

 The MPF(F) ships will be the Marine Corps’ civilian operated forward-deployed floating 

equipment warehouses. The MPF(F) ships are intended to replace and update the 

capability currently provided by 13 aging Maritime Prepositioning Ships. 

5

 The Wasp-class LHD is the Navy’s largest amphibious assault ship. This class is an 

improved follow-on the to five Tarawa-class LHA ships. The LHD 8, currently under 

construction, will incorporate improvements, including a gas-turbine propulsion system 

and a new electrical auxiliary system that will eliminate steam service. 

6

 All LHD cost figures are in constant fiscal year 2003 dollars. 

LHA(R) Amphibious 

Assault Ship 

Replacement 
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition 

Page 37 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Although its regulatory structure is undergoing change, the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) complex process to deliver a new ship class to the 

fleet occurs in three steps. First, the Navy’s requirements community 

establishes requirements for a new system. Second, the Navy’s acquisition 

organizations and contractors design and produce the ship. Finally, after 

building the ship, the warfighter assumes responsibility for operating and 

maintaining the ship. DOD’s policy is to acquire weapons systems using a 

disciplined systems engineering process designed to optimize total 

system performance and minimize total ownership costs.1

 The regulation, 

requirements, and design aspects of the acquisition process are discussed 

below. 

Weapons systems acquisition is governed by a complex regulatory 

structure ranging from public laws to nonmandatory policies, practices, 

and guidance. Until recently, three major DOD regulatory documents 

guided the management of Defense acquisition: DOD Directive 5000.1, 

“The Defense Acquisition System;” DOD Instruction 5000.2, 

“The Operation of the Defense Acquisition System;” and DOD Regulation 

5000.2-R, “Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 

(MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition 

Programs.” On October 30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

canceled all three documents and by memorandum issued interim 

guidance. On an interim basis, the DOD 5000.2-R was reissued as a 

guidebook, Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, to be used for best 

practices, lessons learned, and expectations; but its guidance is not 

mandatory.2

 Additional, supporting, discretionary best practices; lessons 

learned; and expectations are posted on DOD’s internet Web site, DOD 

5000 Series Resource Center.

3

 The interim DOD guidance retains the basic 

acquisition system structure (i.e., no new phases), emphasizes 

evolutionary acquisition, modifies the requirements generation 

documents, and makes several other changes. Policies and procedures for 

 1

 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 1, 

The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002. 

2

 On May 12, 2003, DOD released a new version of DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD 

Instruction 5000.2. A streamlined version of the nonmandatory Guidebook is under 

development. Because this guidance was issued following the completion of our audit 

work, the description of the acquisition process in this report is based on DOD’s interim 

guidance issued on October 30, 2002. 

3

 See http://dod5000.dau.mil/. Another internet-based aid, commonly known as “The 

Acquisition Deskbook,” is located at http://deskbook.dau.mil/jsp/default.jsp. 

Appendix III: Defense Acquisition 

Defense Acquisition 

Regulatory Structure 

Is Undergoing Change 
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition 

Page 38 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

developing and approving requirements for new systems are also 

under revision.4

DOD’s acquisition process, as outlined in its interim guidance issued 

October 30, 2002, provides an ordered structure of tasks and activities 

to bring a program to the next major checkpoint. These checkpoints, 

called milestones, are the points at which a recommendation is made and 

approval sought regarding starting or continuing an acquisition program 

into one of three phases: concept and technology development, system 

development and demonstration, and production and deployment 

(see fig. 2). The phases are intended to provide a logical means of 

progressively translating broadly stated mission needs into well defined 

system-specific requirements and ultimately into effective systems. A 

fourth phase, operations and support, follows the system acquisition. This 

phase represents the ownership period of the system when a unit, in this 

case a ship, is fielded and operated by sailors for a period of 30 to 50 years. 

A program’s progress toward established program goals, or key 

performance parameters, is assessed at milestones. 

 4

 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01B, Requirements Generation 

System, Apr. 15, 2001. The new CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 3170.01 are expected to be 

reissued in mid-2003. 

The Acquisition 

Process Contains 

Several Checkpoints 

for Assessing 

Progress 
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition 

Page 39 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases, Milestones, and Key Activities 

The concept and technology development phase has two major efforts: 

concept exploration and technology development. This phase begins with 

a milestone A decision to enter concept and technology development. 

Entrance into this phase depends upon a validated and approved initial 

capability document [mission need statement]. Concept exploration 

typically consists of competitive, parallel, short-term concept studies 

guided by the initial capability document (mission need statement). The 

focus of these studies is to refine and evaluate the feasibility of alternative 

solutions to the initial concept and to provide a basis for assessing the 

relative merits of these solutions. Analyses of alternatives are used to 

facilitate comparisons. A project may enter technology development 

when a solution for the needed capability has been identified. This effort 

intends to reduce technology risk and to determine the appropriate set 

of technologies. A project exits technology development when an 

affordable increment of militarily-useful capability has been identified, 

the technology for that increment has been demonstrated in a relevant 

environment, and a system can be developed for production within a short 

time frame (normally less than 5 years). During technology development, 

the user is required to prepare the capability development document 

[operational requirements document] to support subsequent program 

initiation. An affordability determination is made in the process of 
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition 

Page 40 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

addressing cost as a military requirement and included in the capability 

development document [operational requirements document], using 

life-cycle cost or, if available, total ownership cost. 

The purpose of the system development and demonstration phase is to 

develop a system. This phase has two major efforts: system integration 

and system demonstration. The entrance point is milestone B, which is 

also the initiation of an acquisition program. The system integration effort 

intends to integrate subsystems and reduce system-level risk. The system 

can enter system integration when the program manager has a technical 

solution for the system, but has not yet integrated the subsystems into a 

complete system. The critical design review during system development 

and demonstration provides an opportunity for mid-phase assessment of 

design maturity. The system demonstration effort intends to demonstrate 

the ability of the system to operate in a useful way consistent with the 

validated key performance parameters. The program can enter system 

demonstration when the program manager has demonstrated the system 

with prototypes. This work effort ends when a system demonstrates 

its capabilities in its intended environment using engineering development 

models or integrated commercial items (in addition to several other 

criteria). 

The purpose of the production and deployment phase is to achieve an 

operational capability that satisfies mission needs. The decision to 

commit DOD to low-rate initial production takes place at milestone C. 

Continuation into full-rate production results from a successful full-rate 

production decision review. During this effort, units shall attain initial 

operational capability. 

Operations and support has two major efforts: sustainment and disposal. 

The objectives of this activity are the execution of a support program that 

meets operational support performance requirements and sustainment of 

systems in the most cost-effective manner for the life cycle of the system. 

When the system has reached the end of its useful life, it must be disposed 

of in an appropriate manner. 
Appendix IV: Summary of DD(X) Destroyer 

Gold Team Trade Studies 

Page 41 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Trade studies are required to support decisions throughout the systems 

engineering process. During a requirements analysis, requirements are 

balanced against other requirements or constraints, including cost. 

Requirements analysis trade studies examine and analyze alternative 

performance and functional requirements to resolve conflicts and satisfy 

customer needs. As part of the design competition for the DD(X) 

destroyer, the competing contractors conducted trade studies and 

analyses on their system concept designs and the related systems 

requirements. Table 1 highlights some of the 23 trade studies conducted by 

the winning design agent, Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and 

Raytheon. 

Table 1: Selected DD(X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from 

1998-2002 

Study topic Scope of analysis 

Command center design Incorporated analytic processes from Westinghouse Electric commercial nuclear power plant 

design efforts. 

Operator crewing—propulsion, 

electrical, and auxiliary plant 

Studied processes and toured U.S.N.S. Red Cloud,

a

 operated by Maersk Line Limited, Inc,b to 

gain insight into civilian crewing of noncombat portions of ship operations. 

Food service Investigated commercial advanced food service program used by many hotel chains. 

Damage control Investigated chemical plant firefighting methods, particularly telerobotics, for inclusion in the 

automated fire suppression system engineering development model. 

Cognitive work analysis This process, which was the foundation of the human systems integration effort, was 

developed in the Netherlands. 

Training concepts Investigated Ford Motor Company distance learning and “Just-in-Time” training system for their 

maintenance and service department personnel. 

Remote equipment monitoring Received briefings on the Delta Airlines and Boeing Corporation remote monitoring capability 

of in-flight data from their commercial airline fleet. 

Facility maintenance/cleaning Reviewed design requirements and practices of Maersk Line, Ltd., for reductions in the work 

required for common area cleaning and maintenance. 

Self-service laundry Reviewed Maersk Line, Ltd., use of self-service laundry on its United States Naval Ship 

contract ships. Reviewed both reliability of the equipment and crew satisfaction. 

Ashore administrative, personnel, 

and disbursing service 

Reviewed program provided by Northrop Grumman Information Technology to the Navy at the 

precommissioning sites. 

Reduced bridge watchstanders Investigated United States Naval Ship and commercial operations with Maersk Line, Ltd., as 

well as Navy Smart Ship and Sperry Integrated Bridge System programs. 

Portable computing Investigated wearable computers developed by Boeing in Seattle, Washington, and the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab at Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

Source: Navy. 

a

U.S.N.S. Red Cloud is a Watson-class large, medium speed, roll-on/roll-off sealift ship. The ship is 

operated by the Military Sealift Command and crewed by contract civilian mariners. 

b

Maersk Sealand is one of the largest liner shipping companies in the world, serving customers all 

over the globe. 

Appendix IV: Summary of DD(X) Destroyer 

Gold Team Trade Studies 
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

Page 42 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Plans for the DD(X) destroyer envision significant reductions when 

compared to previous destroyer ships in the number of crewmembers 

required to man watches, provide support functions, and perform special 

evolutions. For example, DD(X) plans call for 20 watchstations, requiring 

60 billets,1

 a significant reduction from the DDG 51 destroyer, which has 

61 watchstations requiring 163 billets. Similarly, DD(X) ship crew sizing 

studies project that 833 hours will be required per week for own unit 

support functions such as administration, messing, and supply while the 

DDG 51 requires 5,500 for the same functions. To achieve these proposed 

reductions, the DD(X) plans to employ a new operational crewing 

concept, human-centered design and reasoning systems, advances in ship 

cleaning and preservation, a new maintenance strategy, an automated 

damage control system, and “reach back” technologies and distance 

support. Officials emphasized that the DD(X) plans will continue to evolve 

as the program matures. In addition, changes to the DD(X) destroyer’s 

operational requirements, which are currently being reevaluated, will 

likely further affect these estimates. 

The approach to operational crewing on the DD(X) destroyer will differ 

markedly from that employed on legacy ships. The older ship classes tend 

to have legacy systems and watchstations that are “stovepiped,” meaning 

that they maintain separate stations and databases for such things as 

sensors, weapon systems, and logistics, which are not linked together and 

which require people to be specially trained on these systems. This results 

in an inflexible work environment in which commanders are unable to 

level workload across watchstanders because they are trained in separate 

disciplines. It requires extra people, with little increase in capability. The 

DD(X) concept is to have watchstanders trained functionally across 

warfare areas who can be flexibly employed as the situation demands. 

This approach results in a more compact, flexible watch team, which 

requires fewer augmentations and which is designed to flexibly respond to 

a variety of tactical situations. Underpinning this concept is a strategy in 

which crewmembers will be highly trained across multiple warfare areas 

or maintenance tasks and advanced skills will apply across multiple 

disciplines with specialized skills only being used periodically. 

 1

 Watchstations are manned in three sections, or 8-hour shifts, over the course of a day. 

Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

DD(X) Operational 

Crew Size Concept 
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

Page 43 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

The DD(X) destroyer envisions reducing underway watchstanding through 

greater use of human-centered design and reasoning systems such as 

• integrated bridge system technologies demonstrated in CG 47 

Ticonderoga-class “smart ship” and many commercial ships that provide 

computer-based navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar 

plotting, and automated ship control;2

• the integrated command environment that provides reduced combat 

information center crewing by using “multi-modal watchstation” type 

displays, the ability to monitor more than one watchstation at each 

console, and the use of decision support systems to facilitate 

instantaneous situational awareness; 

• computerized engineering control systems that are extensively used in the 

commercial shipping industry and machinery space design that permits 

zero underway crewing by using remote monitors and sensors; and 

• a flexible watch team-type organization. 

The DD(X) destroyer plans to use advances in ship cleaning and 

preservation to free sailors from traditional maintenance and preservation 

duties and privatizing the preservation work that cannot be engineered 

away. Reliability-centered maintenance3

 and condition-based maintenance4

concepts will be employed on the DD(X) instead of the traditional planned 

maintenance system currently used on DDG 51 destroyers. This change is 

expected to reduce noncorrective type maintenance and significantly 

reduce corrective maintenance induced by the planned maintenance 

 2

 According to the Smart Ship Assessment Report, the experiment aboard a 

Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser has reduced workload and ship crewing 

requirements while enhancing combat readiness and improving the crew’s quality of life. 

The experiment validated the use of cost-effective commercial technology and policy 

changes to allow sailors to focus on their war fighting and professional skills by freeing 

them from repetitive tasks. 

3

 Reliability-centered maintenance is a maintenance scheme based on the reliability of 

the various components of the system or product in question. It requires extensive 

knowledge about the reliability and maintainability of the system and all of its subsequent 

components, including the mean time to repair and failure rates of the product or system. 

Implementing this kind of preventative maintenance program can greatly reduce the cost 

of ownership. 

4

 The objective of condition-based maintenance is to accurately detect the current state 

of mechanical systems and accurately predict systems’ remaining useful lives. This 

enables organizations to perform maintenance only when needed to prevent operational 

deficiencies or failures, essentially eliminating costly periodic maintenance and greatly 

reducing the likelihood of machinery failures. 

Human-Centered 

Design and Reasoning 

Systems 

Advances in Cleaning 

and Preservation 
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

Page 44 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

system. In addition, routine maintenance on the DD(X) is projected to be 

reduced by increased equipment reliability and a strategy of replacing 

failed components on board instead of repairing them at sea. Lastly, 

cleaning is expected to be reduced by better ship design that capitalizes on 

commercial shipping industry best practices such as cornerless spaces and 

maintenance-free deck coverings. 

The DD(X) destroyer maintenance strategy focuses on allowing sailors 

to concentrate on war-fighting tasks and skills rather than on ship 

maintenance and preservation (i.e., “rust busting” skills). The DD(X) 

maintenance strategy envisions no organizational level repair conducted 

on the ship. As such, many repair watches have been eliminated. Three 

key elements of the DD(X) maintenance strategy include 

• reducing maintenance requirements through improved system reliability 

and redundancy and to leverage labor-saving advances in corrosion 

control materials and technology, 

• improving maintenance work efficiency by conducting condition-based 

maintenance instead of scheduled maintenance, and 

• using reach back and remote monitoring support while deployed. 

The DD(X) destroyer will employ extensive automated damage 

control systems, integrated with an optimally manned damage control 

organization to quickly suppress and extinguish fires and control 

their spread. 

The DD(X) destroyer plans to use “reach back” technologies and distance 

support to reduce crew workload. “Tele-systems” initiatives are being 

studied for ship crew reduction in the areas of medicine, personnel, 

pay, training, and maintenance. DD(X) also envisions having real-time 

collaboration between the ship and shore, and between ships. Ships would 

access expertise from the systems commands, industry, and other 

deployed ships on a year round, around the clock basis. 

Table 2 compares the workload and crew composition for the DDG 51 

Flight IIA and those proposed for the DD(X). 

DD(X) Maintenance 

Strategy 

Automated Damage 

Control System 

Use of Reach Back 

Technologies and 

Distance Support 
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

Page 45 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Table 2: Comparison of Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A and the DD(X) 

DDG51 Flight II A watchstations DD(X) watchstationsa

Position(s) No. Position No. Potential workload reduction enablers 

Tactical action officer 1 Tactical action officer 1 No change anticipated 

Combat systems coordinator 

Own ship display controller 

Combat systems office of the 

 watch/combat system 

 maintenance supervisor 

Fire control supervisor 

Radar repairman 

Computer repairman 

Display repairman 

Electronics support supervisor 

8 Command center warfare officer 1 • DD(X) maintenance strategy (increase 

reliability and replace instead of repair) 

will eliminate need for on-station 

repairmen 

• Automated damage control system 

Combat information center 

 supervisor 

1 Watch supervisor cross warfare 

area advanced 

1 No change anticipated 

Engineering officer of the 

 watch 

Propulsion/auxiliary control 

 console operator 

Electrical plant control 

 console operator 

Engine room operator 

Auxiliary system monitor 

Engine room operator 

Propulsion system monitor 

Damage control/integrated 

 survivability management 

 system operator 

Sounding and security watch 

9 Engineering officer of the watch 1 • Use of condition-based maintenance 

philosophy and reliability-centered 

maintenance instead of planned 

maintenance system 

• Increased systems reliability 

• Use of monitors and sensors 

• System redundancy 

• Speedy “plug & play” repairs 

• Automated damage control system 

Tactical information 

 coordinator 

Local area network manager 

2 Information dominance advanced 1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Intelligence console operator 

Intelligence console operator 

Tactical intelligence operator 

3 Cross warfare area basic 

(intelligence) 

1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displaysb

Communications supervisor 

Communication systems 

 manager 

Communications systems 

 operator No. 1 

3 Cross warfare area basic 

communications 

1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Electronic warfare supervisor 

Damage control console 

 operator 

Super rapid blooming off- 

 board chaff operator 

Identification supervisor 

4 Information dominance advanced 1 • DDG 51 workload involves electronic 

warfare “soft kill” signatures 

management. Improved signatures on 

the DD(X) will negate the need for 

countermeasures and chaff operators. 

• Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

• Automated damage control system 
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

Page 46 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

DDG51 Flight II A watchstations DD(X) watchstationsa

Position(s) No. Position No. Potential workload reduction enablers 

Antiair warfare coordinator 

Missile system supervisor 

Radar system controller 

3 Cross warfare area advanced 

(Antiair warfare) 

1 • Multifunction radar provides improved 

capability and reduced human anti-air 

warfare workload 

• Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Land attack warfare 

 coordinatorc

1 Land attack warfare specialist 1 No change anticipated 

Gun fire control system 

 console operator 

Tomahawk weapons system 

 supervisor 

2 Cross warfare area basic (land 

attack warfare) 

1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Tomahawk weapons system 

 operator 

Tomahawk weapons system 

 operators (+3)d

2 Cross warfare area advanced 1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Quarter master of the watch 

Boatswain mate of the watch 

 ship control 

3 Assistant officer of the deck 1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Junior officer of the deck 1 Junior officer of the deck 1 No change anticipated 

Officer of the deck 

Messenger 

Surface detector tracker 

Lookout starboard 

Lookout port 

Lookout aft 

Signal watch 

Supervisor/operator 

 recorder 

8 Officer of the deck 1 • Change to current Navy policy and 

procedures for bridge crewing 

• Use of cameras 

• Electronic log keeping 

• Improved communications 

• Integrated bridge system 

Surface/subsurface/ 

 engagement control officer 

 warfare coordinator 

Surface/subsurface warfare 

 supervisor 

2 Cross warfare area basic 

integrated air/surface dominance 

1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Undersea warfare coordinator 

 sonar supervisor 

2 Cross warfare area basic 

undersea warfare 

1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Undersea warfare console 

 operator 

Undersea warfare console 

 operator 

Undersea warfare console 

 operator 

3 Undersea warfare specialist 1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 

Air intercept controller 

Antisubmarine/surface 

 tactical air controller 

Unmanned aerial vehicle 

 controllere

3 Antisubmarine/surface tactical air 

controller 

1 Human-centered design and reasoning 

systems with integrated information 

displays 
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

Page 47 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

DDG51 Flight II A watchstations DD(X) watchstationsa

Position(s) No. Position No. Potential workload reduction enablers 

 Flex watchstation cross warfare 

areaf

1 

Total (163 watch billets over 

a 3 section watch)g

61 Total (60 watch billets over a 3 

section watch) 

20 

Source: Navy 

a

This table was created by us based on data provided by Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 500). 

Watchstation numbers for the DDG 51 Flight II A destroyer are from the ship’s Preliminary Ship 

Manning Document, dated October 5, 2002, version for Flight IIA. Watchstation numbers for the 

DD(X) destroyer are from the design agent’s (Gold Team) Phase III working document dated 

September 26, 2002, which reflects a summary of the design agent’s Phase II crewing studies. 

Officials stated that this is the closest comparison possible from the DDG 51 to the DD(X). They 

noted that not all responsibilities clearly map to the new system. Officials also stated that these 

numbers will continue to evolve as the program matures. This table has been reviewed by PMS 500 

officials for accuracy and includes official comments provided to us on November 18, 2002. 

b

Officials noted that intelligence system requirements will be dictated to DD(X) and that achieving 

reductions in this area relies heavily on successful software development efforts. The DD(X) design 

agent is currently working on this area. 

c

This is one of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack. 

d

This is three of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack. 

e

This is one of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack. 

f

This position provides flexibility in the event of workload surges. 

g

Total does not equal 3 times 61 due to the fact that some watches are not always manned. 

In addition to the daily shipboard routine of standing watches in the 

various ship’s departments, designated crewmembers also have collateral 

duties to support special events, referred to as special evolutions. These 

evolutions involve activities such as underway replenishment of fuel, food 

and ammunition transferred from either helicopters or other ships, flight 

operations, small boat operations, and anchoring. The number of people 

required and the estimated labor hours per week for these special 

evolutions are other indicators of ship workload. Table 3 compares the 

number of billets and weekly workload required for selected special 

evolutions on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer with those estimated for 

the DD(X) destroyer. Table 3 compares the billets and labor hours 

required per week for special evolutions on the DDG 51 Flight IIA and 

those proposed for the DD(X). 
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and 

DD(X) Crew Sizes 

Page 48 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Table 3: Comparison of Crew Size for Selected Special Evolutions on DDG 51 Flight IIA and DD(X) Destroyers 

 DDG 51 Flight IIA DD(X) Gold Team Phase II 

Evolution Billets 

Labor 

hours per 

week Billets 

Labor 

hours per 

week

Change in 

billets 

Percent 

change in 

labor hours

Fueling at sea 57 228 9 11.61 48 -95

Connected replenishment 38 19 12 6.12 26 -68

Vertical replenishment 32 7.8 11 5.61 21 -28

Boat operations 15 8.4 6 5.67 9 -33

Flight operations 41 351 16 87.50 25 -75

Restricted navigation operations 12 12.2 3 .93 9 -92

Towing/towed 41 5.9 7 3.13 34 -47

Source: Navy. 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 49 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Note: A GAO comment 

supplementing those in 

the report text appears at 

the end of this appendix. 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 50 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

See comment 1. 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 52 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 53 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 54 GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing 

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s letter 

dated May 12, 2003. 

1. We disagree that the tone of our report implies a lack of interest or 

desire on the part of program managers to pursue manpower 

reductions. Rather, our report notes that a number of factors, including 

funding issues, create barriers that make it more difficult for program 

managers to pursue manpower reductions and develop robust human 

systems integration programs. Moreover, we agree that resourcing 

human systems integration and supporting analyses at the earliest 

stages of the program is a responsibility that does not wholly reside 

with the program manager but is shared by the Navy staff. As our 

report clearly points out, given the existing barriers and an absence of 

specific requirements to implement a comprehensive human systems 

integration approach, the JCC(X) and LHA(R) programs did not 

identify or request resources for performing human systems 

integration and related analyses to support the research and 

development required to pursue advanced technology that could have 

enabled workload and manpower reductions. 

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