Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Total Force, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, March 24, 2004 MILITARY PERSONNEL

Observations Related to 

Reserve Compensation, 

Selective Reenlistment 

Bonuses, and Mail Delivery 

to Deployed Troops 

Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director, Defense 

Capabilities and Management 

GAO-04-582T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-582T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Derek B. 

Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or 

stewartd@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-582T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Total Force, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

March 24, 2004

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Observations Related to Reserve 

Compensation, Selective Reenlistment 

Bonuses, and Mail Delivery to Deployed 

Troops 

Reservists who are called to active duty to support a contingency operation 

are eligible to receive the same pay and benefits as members of the active 

component. Moreover, in constant dollars, basic military compensation has 

increased in recent years. For instance, an enlisted reservist in pay grade E-4 

who is married with no other dependents and who is called to active duty 

experienced a 19 percent increase in basic military compensation between 

fiscal years 1999 and 2003. Despite these increases, income loss is a concern 

to many reservists, although DOD has lacked timely, sufficient information 

to assess the full scope and nature of this problem. Benefits for reserve 

personnel have also improved, notably in the area of health care. As GAO 

has previously reported, given the federal government’s growing deficits, it is 

critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the longer term 

costs and implications of legislative proposals to further enhance military 

pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For example, proposals to 

enhance reserve retirement should be considered in this context. 

Although GAO has not specifically reviewed the use of SRBs to enhance 

reserve retention, GAO has noted shortcomings in DOD’s management and 

oversight of the SRB program for active duty personnel. GAO’s observations 

of this program may be helpful in making decisions for the use of SRBs for 

reservists. Concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late 

1990s, all the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more active 

duty enlisted personnel in a broader range of military specialties, even 

though the program was intended to help the services meet retention 

problems in selected critical specialties. As a result, the cost of the program 

more than doubled in just 5 years—from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to 

$791 million in fiscal year 2002. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of 

SRBs in targeting bonuses to improve retention in selected critical 

occupations is unknown. DOD has not conducted a rigorous review of the 

SRB program. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations to institute 

more effective controls to assess the progress of the SRB program, but has 

not taken action as yet. 

Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their 

families at home. GAO has been reviewing mail delivery to deployed troops 

and expects to issue a report soon. GAO’s preliminary findings show that 

mail delivery continues to be hampered by many of the same problems 

encountered during the first Gulf War. First, DOD does not have a reliable 

accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Second, despite differences 

in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal planners to incorporate 

lessons learned into planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations 

faced many of the same problems, such as inadequate postal facilities, 

equipment, and transportation. Third, DOD has not officially tasked any 

entity to resolve the long-standing postal problems experienced during 

contingency operations. GAO plans to make several recommendations to 

improve DOD’s mail delivery to deployed troops. 

Since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the 

U.S. military has deployed high 

numbers of active duty and reserve 

troops to fight the global war on 

terrorism and for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. Ensuring that U.S. 

military forces are adequately 

compensated and that the morale 

of deployed troops remains high 

have been priorities for the 

Congress and the Department of 

Defense (DOD). 

In response to congressional 

mandates, GAO has reviewed a 

number of issues concerning 

military personnel. For this 

hearing, GAO was asked to provide 

the results of its work on military 

compensation for National Guard 

and Reserve personnel and on the 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

(SRB) program, a tool DOD can use 

to enhance retention of military 

personnel in critical occupational 

specialties. In addition, GAO was 

asked to provide its preliminary 

views, based on ongoing work, 

concerning mail delivery to troops 

stationed in the Middle East. 
Page 1 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work on military 

compensation for National Guard and Reserve personnel1

 and on the 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, as well as our preliminary 

observations concerning mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle 

East. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military 

has deployed high numbers of active duty and reserve troops to fight the 

global war on terrorism and for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Ensuring that 

U.S. military forces are adequately compensated and that the morale of 

deployed troops remains high have been priorities for the Congress and 

the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Our work on reserve compensation has shown that reservists who are 

called to active duty to support a contingency operation are eligible to 

receive the same pay and benefits as members of the active component. 

Moreover, in constant dollars, basic military compensation—which 

includes basic pay, allowances for housing and meals, and the federal tax 

advantage2

—has increased in recent years. As a result, reservists activated 

today are earning more in the military than they did just a few years ago. 

Other pay policies and protections, such as the Servicemembers Civil 

Relief Act, may help to mitigate reservists’ financial hardship during 

deployment. Income loss is a concern to many reservists, although DOD 

has lacked timely, sufficient information to assess the full scope and 

nature of this problem. Benefits for reserve personnel have also improved, 

notably in the area of health care where the Congress has improved 

benefits not only for reservists but for their families as well. As we have 

previously reported, given the federal government’s growing deficits, it is 

critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the longer term 

costs and implications of legislative proposals to further enhance military 

pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For example, proposals 

to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in this context. We 

 1

 We use the generic term “reserves” and “reservists” throughout this statement to refer to 

both National Guard and Reserve personnel. 

2

 The federal tax advantage is included in basic military compensation to account for the 

tax-free status of housing and subsistence allowances. The federal tax advantage is the 

added amount of taxable income that servicemembers would have to receive in cash if 

housing and subsistence allowances were to become taxable in order for them to be as well 

off in after-tax income as they are under the existing system. 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

have ongoing work looking at proposals to change the reserve retirement 

system. 

The SRB program is one tool DOD can use to enhance retention of both 

active duty and reserve personnel. Although we have not specifically 

reviewed the use of reenlistment bonuses to enhance reserve retention, we 

have noted shortcomings in DOD’s management and oversight of the SRB 

program for active duty personnel. Our observations of this program may 

be helpful in making decisions for the use of SRBs for reservists. For 

example, concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late 

1990s, all the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more 

active duty enlisted personnel in a broader range of military specialties, 

even though the program was intended to help the services meet retention 

problems in selective critical specialties. The Air Force in fiscal year 2001 

awarded bonuses to approximately 80 percent of its specialties, which 

were paid to 42 percent of its reenlistees. As a result of the services’ 

expanded use of SRBs for active duty personnel, the cost of the program 

more than doubled in just 5 years—from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to 

$791 million in fiscal year 2002. The SRB budget was expected to rise to 

over $800 million in fiscal year 2005. Despite increased use of the SRB 

program, DOD has cited continued retention problems in specialized 

occupations. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of SRBs in 

targeting bonuses to improve retention in selective critical occupations is 

unknown. DOD has not conducted a rigorous review of the SRB program. 

Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their 

families at home. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were 

delivered to troops serving in theater during 2003. Between February and 

November 2003, the Congress and the White House forwarded more than 

300 inquiries about mail delivery problems to military postal officials. We 

have been reviewing mail delivery and expect to issue a report soon. Our 

preliminary findings show that mail delivery continues to be hampered by 

many of the same problems encountered during the first Gulf War. First, 

DOD does not have a reliable accurate system in place to measure 

timeliness. Second, despite differences in operational theaters and efforts 

by DOD postal planners to incorporate lessons learned into planning for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the same 

problems: difficulty conducting joint mail operations; postal personnel 

inadequately trained and initially scarce in number due to late 

deployments; and inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and 

transportation. Third, DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve 

the long-standing postal problems experienced during contingency 

operations. 
Page 3 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

Now let me turn to each of these issues in more detail. 

One of DOD’s guiding principles for military compensation is that 

servicemembers, in both the reserve and active components, be treated 

fairly.3 Military compensation for reservists is affected by the type of 

military duty performed. In peacetime—when a reservist is training or 

performing military duty not related to a contingency operation—certain 

thresholds are imposed at particular points in service before a reservist is 

eligible to receive the same compensation as a member of the active 

component. For example, a reservist is not entitled to a housing allowance 

when on inactive duty training (weekend drills). If a reservist is on active 

duty orders that specify a period of 140 days or more, then he or she 

becomes entitled to the full basic housing allowance. For contingency 

operations,4

 these thresholds do not apply.5 Thus, reservists activated for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom and other contingencies are eligible to receive 

the same compensation as active component personnel. 

Basic military compensation,6

 in constant dollars, remained fairly 

steady during the 1990s but has increased in recent years. As a result, 

reservists—enlisted personnel and officers—activated today are earning 

more in the military than they did just a few years ago, as shown in figure 

1. For example, an enlisted member in pay grade E-4 who is married with 

no other dependents (family size 2) earned $3,156 per month in basic 

military compensation in fiscal year 2003, compared with $2,656 per month 

in fiscal year 1999, or a 19 percent increase. These figures are calculated in 

constant 2003 dollars to account for the effects of inflation. 

 3

 Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Compensation 

Background Papers: Compensation Elements and Related Manpower Cost Items, Their 

Purposes and Legislative Backgrounds (Sept. 1996). 

4

 A military operation may be designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency 

operation or become a contingency operation as a matter of law. 

5

 Reservists who are placed on active duty orders for 31 days or more are automatically 

enrolled in TRICARE Prime. Family members of reservists who are activated for 31 days or 

more may obtain coverage under TRICARE. 

6

 Basic military compensation consists of basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic 

allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage. It does not include special and 

incentive pays, other allowances, and the value of fringe benefits, such as health care and 

retirement. 

Reserve 

Compensation 
Page 4 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

Figure 1: Annual Basic Military Compensation for Selected Pay Grades for 

Fiscal Years 1990-2003 

Note: GAO analysis. 

In addition to increases in basic military compensation, other pay policies 

and protections may help to mitigate reservists’ financial hardship during 

deployment. For example: 

• By statute, debt interest rates are capped at 6 percent annually for debts 

incurred prior to activation.7

 The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, passed 

in December 2003,8

 enhanced certain other protections. For example, the 

act prohibits a landlord, except by court order, from evicting a 

servicemember or the dependents of a servicemember, during a period of 

military service of the servicemember, from a residence for which the 

monthly rent does not exceed $2,400. The act increased the monthly rental 

limit from $1,200 and required the rental limit to be adjusted annually 

based on changes to a national housing consumer price index. 

 7

 50 U.S.C. App. sec. 527. 

8

 Public Law 108-189 (Dec. 19, 2003). 
Page 5 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

• Some or all of the income that servicemembers earn while serving in 

combat zones is tax-free.9

• For certain contingencies, including Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD 

authorizes reservists to receive both a housing allowance and per diem for 

their entire period of activation, up to 2 years. 

• Emergency loans are available through the Small Business Administration 

to help small businesses meet necessary operating expenses and debt 

payments. 

An issue of concern that is closely tied with military compensation is 

income loss experienced by many reservists activated for a military 

operation. In a recent report, we evaluated information on income 

change.10 We found that DOD lacked sufficient information on the 

magnitude, the causes, and the effects of income change to determine the 

need for compensation programs targeting reservists who meet three 

criteria: (1) fill critical wartime specialties, (2) experience high degrees of 

income loss when on extended periods of active duty, and (3) demonstrate 

that income loss is a significant factor in their retention decisions. Such 

data are critical for assessing the full nature and scope of income change 

problems and in developing cost-effective solutions. DOD data on income 

change has been derived from self-reported survey data collected from 

reservists and their spouses. A 2000 DOD survey of reservists showed that 

of those who served in military operations from 1991 to 2000, an estimated 

59 percent of drilling unit members had no change or gain in family 

income when they were mobilized or deployed for a military operation, 

and about 41 percent lost income. This survey was conducted before the 

mobilizations occurring after September 11, 2001. A 2002 DOD survey of 

spouses of activated reservists showed that an estimated 70 percent of 

families experienced a gain or no change in monthly income and 

30 percent experienced a decrease in monthly income. The survey data are 

 9

 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Armed Forces’ Tax Guide: For 

Use in Preparing 2003 Returns, Publication 3, Cat. No. 46072M. This publication noted 

that all military pay for the month is excluded from income when an enlisted 

servicemember, warrant officer, or commissioned warrant officer served in a combat zone 

during any part of a month or while hospitalized as a result of service in the combat zone. 

The amount of the exclusion for a commissioned officer (other than a commissioned 

warrant officer) is limited to the highest rate of enlisted pay, plus imminent danger/hostile 

fire pay, for each month during any part of which an officer served in a combat zone or 

while hospitalized as a result of service there. 

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: DOD Needs More Data to Address 

Financial and Health Care Issues Affecting Reservists, GAO-03-1004 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 10, 2003). 
Page 6 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

questionable primarily because it is unclear what survey respondents 

considered as income loss or gain in determining their financial status. We 

recommended that DOD take steps to obtain more complete information 

in order to take a targeted approach to addressing income change 

problems. DOD concurred with this recommendation. In May and 

September of 2003, DOD implemented two web-based surveys of 

reservists to collect data on mobilization issues, such as income change. 

DOD has tabulated the survey results and expects to issue a report with its 

analysis of the results by July 2004. These surveys should be insightful for 

this issue. 

Benefits are another important component of military compensation for 

reservists and help to alleviate some of the hardships of military life. DOD 

offers a wide range of benefits, including such core benefits as health care, 

paid time off, life insurance, and retirement.11 Notable improvements have 

been made to the health care benefits for reservists and their families. For 

example, under authorities granted to DOD in the National Defense 

Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, DOD instituted several 

health care demonstration programs to provide financial assistance to 

reservists and family members. For example, DOD instituted the TRICARE 

Reserve Component Family Member Demonstration Project for family 

members of reservists mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring 

Freedom to reduce TRICARE costs and assist dependents of reservists in 

maintaining relationships with their current health care providers. The 

demonstration project eliminates the TRICARE deductible and the 

requirement that dependents obtain statements saying that inpatient care 

is not available at a military treatment facility before they can obtain 

nonemergency treatment from a civilian hospital. Legislation passed in 

December 2002 made family members of reservists activated for more 

than 30 days eligible for TRICARE Prime12 if they reside more than 

50 miles, or an hour’s driving time, from a military treatment facility. Last 

year, the Congress passed legislation for a 1-year program to extend 

 11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Active Duty Benefits 

Reflect Changing Demographics, but Opportunities Exist to Improve, GAO-02-935

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2002). 

12 Public Law 107-314, sec. 702. TRICARE Prime, one of the options under DOD’s managed 

health care program, is similar to a private HMO plan and does not require enrollment fees 

or copayments. 
Page 7 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

TRICARE to reservists who are unemployed or whose employer does not 

offer health care benefits.13

As we have previously reported, given the federal government’s growing 

deficits, it is critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the 

longer term costs and implications of legislative proposals to further 

enhance military pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For 

example, proposals to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in 

this context. We have ongoing work looking at proposals to change the 

reserve retirement system. The key questions we are addressing include: 

• What are the objectives of the reserve retirement system? 

• Is DOD meeting its reserve retirement objectives? 

• What changes to the current reserve retirement system that DOD and 

others have proposed could help DOD better meet its objectives? 

• What factors should DOD consider before making changes to its reserve 

retirement system? 

We anticipate issuing a report addressing these questions in 

September 2004. 

While we have not specifically reviewed the use of reenlistment bonuses 

for reservists, our work has shown that DOD could improve the 

management and oversight of the SRB program with more 

methodologically rigorous evaluations. The SRB program is intended to 

help the services retain enlisted personnel in critical occupational 

specialties, such as linguists and information technology specialists. 

Concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late 1990s, all 

the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more active duty 

enlisted personnel. There were increases in the number of specialties 

that the services made eligible for the bonuses and in the number of 

bonus recipients. The Air Force, for example, awarded bonuses to 158 

specialties (80 percent of total specialties) in fiscal year 2001, up from 

68 specialties (35 percent of total specialties) in fiscal year 1997. During 

this time period, the number of active duty Air Force reenlistees receiving 

bonuses increased from 3,612 (8 percent of total reenlistees) to 

17,336 (42 percent of total reenlistees). As a result of the services’ 

expanded use of SRBs for active duty personnel, the cost of the program 

 13 Public Law 108-106, sec. 1115. 

Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus 

Program 
Page 8 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

more than doubled—from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to $791 million 

in fiscal year 2002.14 The SRB budget was expected to rise to over 

$800 million in fiscal year 2005. About 44 percent of the SRB budget 

growth over the 1997 to 2005 period is attributable to increases in the Air 

Force SRB budget. Despite increased use of the SRB program, DOD has 

cited continued retention problems in specialized occupations such as air 

traffic controller, linguist, and information technology specialist. 

In November 2003,15 we reviewed a congressionally directed DOD report to 

the Congress on the program and found that DOD had not thoroughly 

addressed four of the five concerns raised by the Congress. As a result, the 

Congress did not have sufficient information to determine if the program 

was being managed effectively and efficiently. More specifically, 

• DOD did not directly address the SRB program’s effectiveness or 

efficiency in correcting shortfalls in critical occupations. 

• DOD had not issued replacement program guidance for ensuring that the 

program targets only critical specialties that impact readiness. DOD did 

not address an important change—the potential elimination of the 

requirement for conducting annual reviews. We were told that the new 

guidance will require periodic reviews, but neither the frequency nor the 

details of how these reviews would be conducted was explained. 

• DOD did not describe the steps it would take to match program execution 

with appropriated funding. Our analysis showed that in fiscal years 1999-

2002, the services spent a combined total of $259 million more than the 

Congress appropriated for the SRB program. 

• DOD provided only a limited assessment of how each service administers 

its SRB program. 

• DOD identified the most salient advantages and disadvantages that could 

result from implementing a lump sum payment option for paying retention 

bonuses, and we generally concurred with DOD’s observations. 

On the basis of our work, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

(1) retain the requirement for an annual review of the SRB program and 

(2) develop a consistent set of methodologically sound procedures and 

metrics for reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of all aspects of 

 14 These budget figures are expressed in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars. 

15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: DOD Needs More Effective Controls 

to Better Assess the Progress of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, GAO-04-86

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2003). 
Page 9 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

each service’s SRB program administration. DOD concurred with the 

recommendations but has not yet taken actions to address them. 

Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their 

families at home. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, problems with prompt 

and reliable mail delivery surfaced early in the conflict and continued 

throughout. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were 

delivered to troops serving in theater during 2003. Between February and 

November 2003, the Congress and the White House forwarded more than 

300 inquiries about mail delivery problems to military postal officials. We 

are reviewing mail delivery to troops stationed overseas and plan to issue 

our report next month. In the report, we will assess (1) the timeliness of 

mail delivery to troops stationed in the Gulf Region, (2) how mail delivery 

issues and problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

compare to those during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and (3) efforts 

to identify actions to resolve problems for future contingencies. 

Although our report is not yet final, the preliminary results of our review 

are as follows: 

The timeliness of the mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a 

reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Transit time data 

reported by the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military 

Mail shows that average transit times for letters and parcels into the 

theater consistently fell within the 11 to 14-day range—well within the 

current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, we determined that 

the method used to calculate these averages masks the actual times by 

using weighted averages that result in a significant understating of transit 

times.16 A second source of data—test letters that were sent to individual 

 16 In DOD’s sampling methodology, random samples are selected from all incoming letters 

and packages arriving at a military post office in the Iraqi theater. The samples are then 

divided into three categories: postmark less than 10 days old, postmark between 11 and 

15 days old, and postmark over 16 days old. Each of these three categories is given a weight 

value of 10, 15, and 16, respectively, which represent the break points of each category. The 

sample size in each category is then multiplied by the weight value and averaged to get the 

reported transit time. Consequently, regardless of the sample size or the actual number 

of days the items spent in transit, the resulting average will always be between 10 and 

16 days. 

Mail Delivery 

Timeliness 
Page 10 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

servicemembers at military post offices by the Military Postal Service 

Agency between February and September 2003—indicate that mail 

delivery, on average, met the wartime standard during all but 1 month. 

However, we found that a significant number of test letters were never 

returned, and that test letters do not accurately measure transit time to the 

individual servicemember because they are sent only to individuals 

located at military post offices. It could take several more days for mail to 

get to forward-deployed troops. Even though the data shows otherwise, 

military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to troops serving in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. 

Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners 

to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into the 

planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems were 

encountered. These problems include (1) difficulty in conducting 

joint-service mail operations; (2) postal personnel inadequately trained 

and initially scarce in number due to late deployments; and (3) inadequate 

postal facilities, material handling equipment, and transportation assets to 

handle the initial mail surge. U.S. Central Command—the combatant 

command for Operation Iraqi Freedom—created an operations plan for 

joint mail delivery, but some of the planning assumptions were flawed and 

the plan was not fully implemented. This plan included certain 

assumptions that were key to its success, but some assumptions produced 

unforeseen negative consequences and others were not implemented or 

unrealistic. For example, the elimination of mail addressed to “Any Service 

Member” increased the number of parcels because senders found ways 

around the restriction. In addition, plans to restrict the size and weight of 

letters and parcels until adequate postal facilities had been established 

were never enacted; and the volume of mail was grossly underestimated. 

The plan also directed that a Joint Postal Center comprised of postal 

officials from all services manage and coordinate joint postal operations in 

theater. However, this effort was never fully implemented, and joint mail 

delivery suffered as a result. The Military Postal Service Agency did 

implement one strategy that proved to be successful as a result of lessons 

learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Dedicated contractor airlift 

of mail into the contingency area was employed, avoiding the necessity of 

competing for military air cargo capacity, which greatly improved the 

regularity of mail service to the theater. 

Comparison With 

Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm 
Page 11 GAO-04-582T Military Personnel 

No single entity has been officially tasked to resolve the long-standing 

postal problems seen again during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Military 

postal officials have begun to identify solutions to some of these issues. 

However, despite early efforts made by the Military Postal Service Agency 

to consolidate problems and identify solutions, this agency does not have 

the authority to ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and 

resolved before the next military contingency. During our meetings with 

dozens of key military postal officials serving during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, we collected memoranda, after action reports, and their 

comments regarding the postal issues and problems that should be 

addressed to avoid a repetition of the same postal problems in future 

contingencies. These issues include: improving joint postal planning and 

ensuring joint execution of that plan; early deployment of postal troops; 

preparing updated tables of organization and equipment for postal units; 

improving peacetime training for postal units; and reviewing the command 

and control of postal units in a joint theater. The Military Postal Service 

Agency hosted a joint postal conference in October 2003 to discuss postal 

problems with dozens of key postal participants in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and is currently in the process of consolidating these issues into 

a single document with the intent of developing plans to resolve the issues. 

In addition, the service components and the Military Postal Service Agency 

have taken some initial steps in employing alternative mail delivery and 

tracking systems. 

In our report, we plan to make several recommendations aimed at 

(1) establishing a system that will accurately track, calculate, and report 

postal transit times and (2) designating responsibility and providing 

sufficient authority within the Department to address and fix long-standing 

postal problems identified in this report. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes our prepared statement. We would be happy 

to respond to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee 

may have at this time. 

For future questions about this statement, please contact Derek B. Stewart 

at (202) 512-5559 (e-mail address: stewartd@gao.gov) or Brenda S. Farrell 

at (202) 512-3604 (e-mail address: farrellb@gao.gov). Also making a 

significant contribution to this statement was Thomas W. Gosling. 

Efforts to Resolve Postal 

Problems 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(350510) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal 

government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; 

evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail 

this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to e-mail 

alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading. 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A 

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. 

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a 

single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Public Affairs