IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

 v. : CRIMINAL NO. 05-439

KENNETH H. WATERSTRADT :

GOVERNMENT'S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

The United States of America, by its attorneys, Patrick L. Meehan, United

States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Louis D. Lappen, Assistant

United States Attorney for the district, submits the following sentencing memorandum. 

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 2005, the defendant pleaded guilty to a one-count

Information charging him with one count of transporting a minor in interstate commerce

with intent that the minor engage in illegal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2423(a). This case arose from the defendant’s having arranged and paid for the

transportation for a 15-year old girl to travel from Los Angeles, California to Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania to engage in illegal sexual activity with the defendant. A sentencing hearing

is scheduled in this case for December 6, 2005.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Thursday, June 2, 2005, a 15 year-old girl, known to the government

and identified here and in the information as S.S., was living in Barstow, California. That

evening, S.S. did not return to her home after school as her parents (mother and stepfather)
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had expected. Her parents then observed that all of their daughter’s clothes were removed

from her room, so they called the Barstow Police Department and reported S.S. missing. 

Her parents told the police that their daughter had developed a relationship with an older

man named Ken Waterstradt who was telephoning the house frequently. They said that

Waterstradt had sent roses, chocolates, and a teddy bear to S.S. and that originally they

thought he was a teenager. The parents said that Waterstradt had also bought S.S. a

cellular telephone to use to speak with him and that Waterstradt and S.S. were constantly

talking to each other on the telephone.

 Law enforcement agents from the police department and the FBI ("the

agents") then began to investigate the matter. With the parents’ permission, the agents

searched S.S.’s computer. The search revealed an on-line correspondence between S.S.

and the defendant, Kenneth H. Waterstradt, in which the two professed their love for one

another and suggested that when S.S. turned 18 they could get married. One email from

Waterstradt to S.S. included a photographic attachment depicting what purported to be

Waterstradt’s genitals. 

Agents then investigated airline records and determined that on June 2,

2005, S.S. traveled on a Southwest Airlines flight from Los Angeles, California to

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Southwest Airlines

records showed that S.S. traveled on a one-way ticket that was purchased on May 13,

2005, with a Commerce Bank Visa debit card issued to the defendant. Agents then

investigated Waterstradt's Visa records and determined that the debit card was also used to
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purchase limousine service in Victorville, California for a trip from the Victorville area

(which is near S.S.’s home in Barstow) to the airport in Los Angeles.

Upon investigating further the activity on the debit card, agents determined

that on June 3, 2005, at approximately 10:00 a.m., the debit card was used at the Super 8

Motel at 1015 Pulaski Highway, Joppa, Maryland. The card also had been used a few

hours earlier at an ATM in Bear, Delaware. Based on this information, the government

obtained a complaint and arrest warrant for the defendant. 

In the afternoon of June 3, 2005, FBI Special Agents and Maryland State

Police Troopers traveled to the Super 8 Motel in Joppa, Maryland and coincidentally,

spotted Waterstradt exiting the motel by himself and entering a vehicle. They approached

Waterstradt and asked him to identify himself, which he did. They asked him what room

he was staying in and whether he was with anyone. Waterstradt said that he was in Room

127 and that he was with "a girl." The officers then arrested Waterstradt on the complaint

and warrant and transported him to the Bel Air Barracks of the Maryland State Police.

When they arrived at the barracks, FBI Special Agent Troy Breitenbach

and Task Force Officer Ronald Ogle advised Waterstradt orally and in writing of his

constitutional rights, and Waterstradt waived his rights orally and in writing. The

defendant then also consented orally and in writing to a search of his vehicle, his

residence, and his motel room. Agents then interviewed Waterstradt who stated, in

summary, as follows: 
4

He is a 37 year-old male who is married but recently separated, and is

living with his parents in a trailer in Wilmington, Delaware. He has a 17 year-old

daughter from his marriage. He met S.S. about 1.5 years ago in an internet chat room

called "Airgairdate" which he accessed through his cellular telephone. They started out as

"friends," but developed a relationship such that he considers S.S. to be his "girlfriend"

and "soulmate." He knows that S.S. is 15 years old. Waterstradt bought S.S. a cellular

telephone about eight months ago with service through a Sprint "family plan" so that he

could talk to her regularly. Waterstradt and S.S. then used the phone to speak for several

hours every night. Their conversations included phone sex, and Waterstradt used the

internet service on his telephone to send S.S. a photograph of his erect penis. Waterstradt

understood that S.S. had some emotional problems, as she had "a thing with hurting

herself when she’s in pain." Waterstradt also learned from S.S. that she has suffered

repeated sexual abuse at the hands of older men and that, in particular, when she was

approximately 12 years old, she was raped by one of her mother’s boyfriends.

The defendant said that because he and S.S. wanted to be together, he gave

her his Commerce Visa bank card to pay for limousine transportation to the airport and a

one-way flight to Philadelphia. Waterstradt intended to take S.S. to Florida and find a

way to marry her. On June 2, 2005, Waterstradt picked up S.S. at the Philadelphia

International Airport when her flight arrived from California. They began their drive

south and, after a failed sexual encounter in the car, they stopped in Maryland at the Super

8 Motel where Waterstradt was later arrested. After purchasing a room, Waterstradt and

S.S. engaged in sexual activity. They performed oral sex on each other, which included
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Waterstradt ejaculating in S.S.’s mouth. Waterstradt also inserted his finger in S.S.’s

vagina. Waterstradt rubbed his penis against S.S.’s vagina, but he did not insert it. 

Waterstradt understands that engaging in sexual activity with a 15 year-old girl is illegal

and that traveling to another state "compounds the crime." 

Back at the Super 8 Motel, agents found the victim, S.S., in the room that

Waterstradt had rented. She was wearing a bathrobe. Agents telephoned her parents to

advise them that they found their daughter and asked the parents' permission to interview

her. The parents consented to the interview. S.S. told authorities the following:

She met Waterstradt about three years ago when he contacted her via the

internet after viewing a Nextel profile of S.S. that she had posted S.S. told the defendant

that she was 13 years old, and he said that he was 35. After meeting on the internet,

Waterstradt and S.S. continued to communicate via the internet and telephone. S.S. told

him that she was suffering from numerous emotional problems. She said that she was

raped when she was nine years old, her mother has cancer and is unemployed, her

stepfather does not make much money, and her biological father is a drug addict whom

she has not seen for months. She wanted to get away from her home where she suffers

abuse and where she has twice attempted suicide. 

S.S. said that she was in love with Waterstradt and wanted to be with him. 

She has been talking to Waterstradt about leaving California to join him since January. 

He has bought her numerous gifts, including the cell phone that she uses to communicate

with him daily, clothes, cash, and roses. S.S. confirmed that Waterstradt bought her the

Southwest Airlines ticket that she used to fly to Philadelphia, picked her up at the airport
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for their trip south, and had sex with her as described above. S.S. described an additional

aspect of their sexual activity in the Super 8 Motel that included Waterstradt slightly

penetrating her vagina with his penis.

After Waterstradt was incarcerated in this case, he corresponded by mail

with S.S., again professing his love for her and his desire to be with her. S.S. responded to

his letters also expressing her desire to be with the defendant. The defendant also wrote to

the victim's mother apologizing for his conduct and expressing his love for her daughter

and his intention to marry her. S.S.'s parents then advised the government of Waterstradt's

conduct, and the government requested the Honorable Jacob P. Hart to issue an order

prohibiting Waterstradt from communicating with S.S. The court issued the order as

requested by the government. The government has attached as Exhibit A redacted copies

of the letters received from the victim's family and a Victim Impact Statement prepared by

the victim's parents concerning this offense and the defendant's post-arrest correspondence

with the victim. 

III. SENTENCING CALCULATION

A. Statutory Maximum Sentence

The maximum sentence that may be imposed is as follows: 30 years

imprisonment, including a mandatory term of five years imprisonment, a five-year period

of supervised release, a $250,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. 

B. Sentencing Guidelines Calculation

The government agrees with the Sentencing Guideline calculation as set

forth in the Presentence Report ("PSR"), which results in a total offense level of 29. With
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a criminal history category of I, the Guideline range is 87 to 108 months imprisonment. 

The defendant disputes two of the upward adjustments recommended by the PSR, each of

which adds two levels: (1) that under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, the defendant knew or should

have known that the victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim; and (2) that under

U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2), the defendant unduly influenced a minor to engage in a prohibited

sexual act. The government will address each of these upward adjustments in turn.

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 provides that "[i]f the defendant knew or should have

known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, increase by 2 levels." 

Application Note 2 to this section defines vulnerable victim as one "who is a victim of the

offense of conviction" and "who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental

condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct." This

application note also cautions that the adjustment should not be applied "if the factor that

makes the person a vulnerable victim is incorporated in the offense guideline. For

example, if the offense guideline provides an enhancement of the age of the victim, this

subsection would not be applied unless the victim was unusually vulnerable for reasons

unrelated to age." 

Here, the government is not seeking to apply this enhancement because of

the victim's age; that factor already is incorporated in the guideline range for the offense

of conviction. Rather, the enhancement should apply because the defendant knew of the

defendant's mental condition that rendered her unusually vulnerable to this crime. The

defendant has admitted to authorities and this Court that he knew that his victim had been

repeatedly sexually abused by older men, that she had a tendency to engage in self
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mutilation (cutting herself) "when she was in pain," and that she wanted to leave her home

in California. Plainly, the defendant understood that with this history of abuse and selfdestruction, his victim was unusually vulnerable to the criminally amorous behavior and

sexual advances of an older man. The defendant offered his victim the fantasy of love and

escape -- a fantasy that had enormous appeal to a damaged and desperate young girl. 

Thus, because the defendant took advantage of a vulnerable victim, this Court should

apply this enhancement.

Next, under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2), this Court should find that the

defendant unduly influenced a minor to engage in a prohibited sexual act. Application

Note 4 provides that where the defendant's age is more than 10 years greater than that of

the victim, there is a rebuttable presumption of undue influence. Application Note 1

defines “victim” as “an individual who . . . has not attained that age of 16 years." In

Appendix C to the November 1, 2002 Guidelines, p. 49, the Commission explained that

the presumption was created because persons much older than a minor “are frequently in a

position to manipulate the minor due to increased knowledge, influence and resources.”

See United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1232-33 (11th Cir 2002) (applying

enhancement based on presumption where much older defendant used his superior

knowledge, influence, and resources to attempt to influence an uncertain adolescent to

travel to have sex with him). 

In the present case, the 37-year-old defendant clearly enticed his 15-year

old victim, with whom he developed a relationship when she was only 13, to travel to

Philadelphia for sex. He paid for her limousine to the airport and for her one-way airline
9

ticket. He made plans for them to travel to Florida where they would live together, far

away from and unbeknownst to the victim's parents. The defendant cannot overcome the

presumption that he exercised undue influence over this fragile young adolescent girl and

thus, this Court should apply the two-level upward adjustment.

C. Application of the Sentencing Guidelines to this Case

In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court held

that the United States Sentencing Guidelines, as written, violate the Sixth Amendment

principles articulated in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The Court

determined that a mandatory system in which a sentence is increased based on factual

findings by a judge violates the right to trial by jury. As a remedy, the Court severed and

excised the statutory provision making the Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),

thus declaring the Guidelines “effectively advisory.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757. This

ruling results in a system in which the sentencing court, while informed by the Guidelines,

may impose any sentence within the statutory maximum penalty for the offense of

conviction. The sentence will be subject to review by the Court of Appeals for

“unreasonableness.” Id. at 765.

In the wake of Booker, this Court must make a correct calculation under

the existing Sentencing Guidelines and then consider the final guideline calculation when

determining the sentence to be imposed. As is plainly set forth in Booker, the Guidelines

sentence is not to be based solely on facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See

United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (“a sentencing judge would . . .

violate section 3553(a) by limiting consideration of the applicable Guideline range to the
1/ The courts of appeals have generally stated that the proper sentencing procedure after

Booker is for the district court first to calculate the Guidelines sentence and then to consider the

other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e.g., Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111, 112 (“In order to

fulfill this statutory duty to “consider” the Guidelines, a sentencing judge will normally have to

determine the applicable Guidelines range. * * * . Once an applicable Guidelines range has

been determined, the sentencing judge will have the duty, imposed by subsection 3553(a)(4), to

‘consider’ it, along with all of the factors listed in section 3553(a).”); United States v. Hughes,

396 F.3d 374, 378-79 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Consistent with the remedial scheme set forth in Booker,

a district court shall first calculate (after making the appropriate findings of fact) the range

prescribed by the Guidelines. Then, the court shall consider that range as well as other relevant

factors set forth in the Guidelines and those factors set forth in § 3553(a) before imposing the

sentence.”). As noted below, the government submits that the factors in Section 3553(a) have, to

a large extent, been taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in its development of the

Sentencing Guidelines, and that even a separate accounting of these factors should, in all but the

most exceptional case, result in a sentence within the Guideline range. Cf. Mares, 402 F.3d at

519 (noting that if a sentencing judge exercises discretion to impose a sentence within the

Guideline range, the appellate court on review “will infer that the judge has considered all the

10

facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, instead of considering the applicable

Guidelines range, as required by subsection 3553(a)(4), based on the facts found by the

court.”); see also United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (Booker

contemplates that, with the mandatory use of the Guidelines excised, the Sixth

Amendment will not impede a sentencing judge from finding all facts relevant to

sentencing. The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence

all the facts relevant to the determination of a Guideline sentencing range and all facts

relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence.”). Justice Breyer’s majority

opinion directed that “[t]he district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must

consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” Id. at 767; see

also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[t]he applicable

Guideline range is normally to be determined in the same manner as before

Booker/Fanfan.”).1/
factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines” and it will be “rare” for a reviewing court

to say the sentence is unreasonable). 

11

The Third Circuit has affirmed the trial court’s authority, following

Booker, to determine the appropriate Guideline range under the preponderance-of-theevidence standard. In remanding a case for resentencing, where the original sentence had

been applied before Booker was decided, the Court stated:

We . . . note that the District Court is free to engage in precisely the same exercise

in judicial fact finding as it did in February 2003, so long as such fact finding is

consistent with Booker. Cf. United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 75 (1st

Cir.2005) (“The error is not that a judge (by a preponderance of the evidence)

determined facts under the Guidelines which increased a sentence beyond that

authorized by the jury verdict or an admission by the defendant; the error is only

that the judge did so in a mandatory Guidelines system.”).

United States v. Miller, 2005 WL 1791999, at *4 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005).

The position of the United States is that, absent highly unusual

circumstances, the sentence in a criminal case should fall within the Guideline range as

determined by the Court. This view is shared by Congress and the Supreme Court. As

every Supreme Court justice in the various opinions in Booker recognized, the Guidelines

carry out the express national policy, as articulated by Congress, that sentences be uniform

across the country to the extent possible and be based on the offender’s actual conduct and

history. See, e.g., Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.) (“Congress’

basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing system in the

direction of increased uniformity.”); id. at 744 (same) (“Congress’ basic statutory goal of

diminishing sentencing disparity depends for its success upon judicial efforts to determine,

and to base punishment upon, the real conduct that underlies the crime of conviction.”);
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id. at 783 (dissenting opinion of Stevens, J.) (“The elimination of sentencing disparity,

which Congress determined was chiefly the result of a discretionary sentencing regime,

was unquestionably Congress’ principal aim.”); id. at 789 (dissenting opinion of Scalia, J.)

(“the primary objective of the Act was to reduce sentencing disparity.”).

The Guidelines, aiming to achieve the uniform and appropriate treatment of

like crimes, represent the distillation of nearly 20 years of careful study of sentencing

practices across the country, and correlate as well to the varying severity of crimes as

defined by Congress. The Guidelines, consisting of offense characteristics and various

grounds for departure, address all of the considerations relevant to sentencing, as

articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense

and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” “the need for the sentence imposed --

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide

just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C)

to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the

defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner;” and “the need to avoid unwarranted

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar conduct . . . .”

Thus, fidelity to the Guidelines best accomplishes the purpose of fair and

consistent sentencing, and should occur absent unusual circumstances. Since Booker, the

courts of appeals have emphasized the continued importance of the Sentencing

Guidelines. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained in United States v. Crosby,
13

“These principles change the Guidelines from being mandatory to being advisory, but it is

important to bear in mind that Booker/Fanfan and section 3553(a) do more than render the

Guidelines a body of casual advice, to be consulted or overlooked at the whim of a

sentencing judge. Thus, it would be a mistake to think that, after Booker/Fanfan, district

judges may return to the sentencing regime that existed before 1987 and exercise

unfettered discretion to select any sentence within the applicable statutory maximum and

minimum.” Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also

noted in Mares, “Even in the discretionary sentencing system established by

Booker/Fanfan, a sentencing court must still carefully consider the detailed statutory

scheme created by the [Sentencing Reform Act] and the Guidelines, which are designed to

guide the judge toward a fair sentence while avoiding serious sentence disparity.” 402

F.3d at 518-19. See also United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“Under the new sentencing regime the judge must justify departing from the Guidelines,

and the justification has to be reasonable.”).

A recent decision of the Seventh Circuit in defining the new sentencing

regime is instructive. That court stated:

The Sentencing Guidelines represent at this point eighteen years’ worth of careful

consideration of the proper sentence for federal offenses. When the Supreme

Court directed the federal courts to continue using the Guidelines as a source of

advice for proper sentences, it expected that many (perhaps most) sentences would

continue to reflect the results obtained through an application of the Guidelines. 

But “many or most” sentences cannot mean “all” sentences. Put differently,

Booker does not hold that a Guidelines sentence must conclusively be presumed to

be reasonable. . . . 

But while a per se or conclusively presumed reasonableness test would undo the

Supreme Court’s merits analysis in Booker, a clean slate that ignores the proper

Guidelines range would be inconsistent with the remedial opinion. As Booker
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held, “the district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult

those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” Booker, 125 S.Ct.

at 767. The Guidelines remain an essential tool in creating a fair and uniform

sentencing regime across the country. “The Sentencing Commission will continue

to collect and study [district court] and appellate court decisionmaking. It will

continue to modify its Guidelines in light of what it learns, thereby encouraging

what it finds to be better sentencing practices.” Id. at 766. The best way to

express the new balance, in our view, is to acknowledge that any sentence that is

properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of

reasonableness. . . .

The defendant can rebut this presumption only by demonstrating that his or her

sentence is unreasonable when measured against the factors set forth in § 3553(a). 

United States v. Mykytiuk, 2005 WL 1592956, at *1-2 (7th Cir. July 7, 2005).

The government also commends to the Court’s attention the scholarly

opinion in United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005), which agreed

that, absent unusual circumstances, a sentence should be imposed within the Sentencing

Guideline range. In his assessment in Wilson, on the day after Booker was decided, Judge

Cassell explained at length the reasons supporting this view. As he stated, the Guidelines

represent the product of an expert commission, which has studied the sentencing process

at great length, under the specific mandate of Congress to fashion recommended sentences

which carry out the purposes defined by Congress. The resulting Guidelines, Wilson held,

plainly reflect the public’s will, as expressed by their democratically elected

representatives, in that Congress has repeatedly approved of the Guidelines or acted to

adjust them to Congressional preference. Wilson further observed that guided sentencing

appears to have had a positive impact in deterring criminal conduct throughout the

country, and thus serves the purpose of deterrence as well as punishment and fairness. For

all of these reasons, Judge Cassell determined that “the court will give heavy weight to the
2/ In United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005), Judge Adelman rejected

Judge Cassell’s approach, claiming that it is “inconsistent” with the holdings in Booker. The

government respectfully disagrees with Judge Adelman’s approach. As Judge Cassell noted in a

subsequent opinion in United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005), the Ranum

approach ignores the “carefully calibrated” work of the Commission in determining which

offender characteristics determine a sentence. Id. at 1275. Moreover, Ranum gives insufficient

consideration to the importance of consistent sentencing and avoiding sentencing disparities. As

Judge Cassell recognized, “only close adherence to the Guidelines offers any prospect of treating

similarly-situated offenders equally,” and thus assuring fidelity to the manifest Congressional

purpose. Id. Moreover, the opinion of the Wisconsin court appears inconsistent with later

decisions of its governing Court of Appeals, the Seventh Circuit, as noted above.

15

Guidelines in determining an appropriate sentence. In the exercise of its discretion, the

court will only depart from those Guidelines in unusual cases for clearly identified and

persuasive reasons.” Id. at 912.2/

The United States submits that a sentence within the guideline range is

presumptively reasonable, and accommodates the Congressional purpose, affirmed by the

Supreme Court, of obtaining fair sentences which are uniform to the extent possible. As

the Fifth Circuit stated in Mares,

If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within a

properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer

that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the

Guidelines. Given the deference due the sentencing judge’s discretion under the

Booker/Fanfan regime, it will be rare for a reviewing court to say such a sentence

is “unreasonable.”

402 F.3d at 519. The government anticipates that only sentences outside the guideline

range will be subject to appellate scrutiny for reasonableness in light of the Congressional

mandate. Cf. id. (noting that “[w]hen the judge exercises her discretion to impose a

sentence within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little

explanation is required,” but when the judge gives a non-Guideline sentence, “she should
16

carefully articulate the reasons she concludes that the sentence she has selected is

appropriate for that defendant” because “[s]uch reasons are essential to permit this court to

review the sentence for reasonableness as directed by Booker.”).

III. GOVERNMENT’S RECOMMENDATION

With a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of I, the

applicable Guideline range is 87 to 108 months imprisonment. No unusual circumstances

exist which warrant an exception to the preference for Guideline sentencing. The factors

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) call for a Guidelines sentence. A Guidelines sentence will

reflect the serious criminality of an older man luring a young girl across state lines to

engage in illegal sexual activity. Such a sentence will also promote respect for the law

and deter potential criminals from committing these dangerous offenses that exploit the

vulnerabilities of young adolescents. Likewise, a Guidelines sentence will adequately

punish the defendant and help protect the public from further exploitation of children.

For all of the above reasons, the government respectfully recommends that

this Court impose a period of incarceration within the Guideline range of 87 to 108

months imprisonment.

Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK L. MEEHAN

United States Attorney

______________________________ 

LOUIS D. LAPPEN

Assistant United States Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this date I caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Government's Sentencing Memorandum to be served by First Class United

States Mail upon counsel for defendant:

Brendan T. McGuigan

42 South 15th Street 

Suite 1313

Philadelphia, PA 19102

________________________________

Louis D. Lappen

Assistant United States Attorney

Date: November 30, 2005