United States 

Joint Forces Command 

The Joint Warfighting Center 

Joint Doctrine Series 

Pamphlet 2 

Doctrinal Implications of 

Low Collateral Damage 

Capabilities 

27 January 2003 
JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 

27 January 2003

Preface 

 This USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) pamphlet, Doctrinal 

Implications of Low Collateral Damage Capabilities, supports the intent and purpose 

of USJFCOM JWFC Pam 1, Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations (PFJO), 1 March 

2002. This pamphlet is part of a “Joint Doctrine Series” intended to facilitate changes 

to joint doctrine based on the good ideas and other results that emerge from the Joint 

Concept Development and Experimentation (JCDE) Program and related joint 

experiments such as MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 (MC 02). The primary purpose 

of JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 is to raise awareness, promote debate, and discuss doctrinal 

implications associated with “low collateral damage capabilities” (LCDC), a new term 

that encompasses nonlethal weapons for the purpose of this discussion. 

Legal and moral considerations surround the issue of collateral damage and 

drive rules of engagement that often complicate the joint force commander’s (JFC) 

primary task—mission accomplishment. Limiting collateral damage is a planning factor 

mentioned in several joint doctrine publications. But is current joint doctrine sufficient in 

the treatment of this factor? How should the JFC consider planning for and employing 

LCDC in the context of operational net assessment, effects-based operations, and other 

concepts examined in MC 02 and other events? With continuing advancements in 

precision engagement and nonlethal technologies for military application, should the 

joint community develop more comprehensive doctrine focused on the LCDC topic? 

While many current LCDC can be applied at the tactical level, can a full package of 

these capabilities change the way a JFC plans to achieve the theater campaign’s 

operational and strategic objectives? This pamphlet begins to address these issues 

with the intent of stimulating discussion throughout the joint community. 

 

We welcome your comments and ideas on this important topic. Point of contact 

for JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 is Mr. Rick Rowlett, JW2114, 757-686-6167 (DSN 668), 

rowlettr@jwfc.jfcom.mil. 

 

 GORDON C. NASH 

 Major General, U.S. Marine Corps 

 Commander, Joint Warfighting Center 

 Director, Joint Training, J-7 
JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 

27 January 2003

"Today, world events mandate a need to project nonlethal force across all levels of war to enable our 

warfighters and leaders to effectively deal with a 

host of traditional as well as non-traditional threats. 

Now more than ever, the minimal level of public 

tolerance for collateral damage and loss of human 

life, coupled with the tendency for the typical 

adversary to exploit our rules of engagement to his 

benefit, necessitates an effective and flexible 

application of force through non-lethal weapons.”

James L. Jones

General, USMC

32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps and former

DOD Executive Agent for the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program
Table of Contents 

Section I — Background ........................................................................... 1

• Introduction........................................................................... 1 

• Key Terms and Relationships.................................................... 2

• Joint Experimentation on Low Collateral Damage Weapons............. 3

Section II — Low Collateral Damage Capabilities -- Ways and Means... 6 

Section III — Operational Implications of LCDC................................. 8 

• Employment Considerations..................................................... 8 

• Employment Perspectives........................................................ 9 

• Employment Examples............................................................ 11 

Section IV — Doctrinal Implications of LCDC.....................................15

• Current Doctrine Summary....................................................... 15 

• Perspectives.......................................................................... 16 

• Conclusions........................................................................... 17 

Appendix A — Examples of Actual and Potential LCDC Technologies 

 and Systems ........................................................... A-1 

Glossary.................................................................................... GL-1
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Section I — Background 

Introduction 

Collateral damage has long been a consideration in military operations. The 

DOD dictionary defines the term as— 

 “Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that 

would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. 

Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the 

overall military advantage anticipated from the attack.”

1

 

This definition provides flexibility for the commander to attack high-value targets 

even when collateral damage is likely, but it also serves warning that there can be legal 

consequences for indiscriminate attacks that fail to consider this important factor. The 

potential for collateral damage often contributes to restrictive rules of engagement 

(ROE), particularly early in an operation. 

Traditional methods for limiting 

collateral damage include carefully devised 

ROE; thorough intelligence operations to 

identify the intended targets correctly; 

careful planning to strike only the targets 

that provide the desired effects; 

sophisticated tools and methods that help 

planners estimate both the amount and 

pattern of collateral damage caused by a 

wide array of weapons; mitigation 

techniques; and use of precision-guided 

munitions to increase the probability of 

hitting the intended targets. Emerging methods for limiting collateral damage include 

use of nonlethal capabilities that, by their nature, are generally nondestructive (from an 

“explosive” perspective) as well. Activities in the nonlethal arena include publication of 

 

1

 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 

April 2001 as amended electronically through 25 Sep 2002. 

Contents 

Section I: Background 

Section II: LCDC Ways and Means 

Section III: Operational Implications

Section IV: Doctrinal Implications 

Appendix A: LCDC Technologies and 

Systems 

Glossary 
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a DOD directive on nonlethal weapons;2

 implementation of a DOD Non-lethal Weapons 

Program administered by a Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD); significant 

research and experimentation by DOD and national laboratories;3 development of a 

related joint concept;4

 and recent joint experiments conducted by the Joint 

Experimentation Directorate (J-9) in US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). 

USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 is intended to facilitate changes to joint 

doctrine based on the good ideas and other results that emerge from the Joint Concept 

Development and Experimentation (JCDE) Program and related events such as 

Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 (MC02). The primary purpose of this 

pamphlet is to raise awareness, promote debate, and discuss doctrinal 

implications associated with low collateral damage capabilities. The stimulus for 

this topic is conceptualization and experimentation conducted by USJFCOM J-9 on low 

collateral damage weapons during the early-2000 through mid-2001 period, related 

issues examined during MC 02, ongoing work by the Joint Non-lethal Weapons 

Program, and recent discussions on the doctrine implications associated with strategic 

use of these capabilities. 

Key Terms and Relationships 

 Although most current DOD and national laboratory work is in the “nonlethal 

weapons” arena, this pamphlet focuses on “low collateral damage capabilities,” a 

term that subsumes nonlethal capabilities for the purpose of this pamphlet. These will 

include ways and means by which the joint force can limit damage and injury to those 

objects and personnel, which typically are lawful military targets. Following are terms 

relevant to this discussion: 

• Nonlethal weapons (NLW): Weapon systems that are specifically designed 

and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while 

minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to 

property and the environment (DOD Directive 3000.3). 

• Low collateral damage weapons (LCDW): Those weapon technologies or 

systems that have the specific capacity to precisely attack an adversary function 

 

2

 DOD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, 9 July 1996. This policy established the Joint 

Nonlethal Weapons Program and designated the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the program’s 

executive agent. 

3

 Including DOD Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), and 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). 

4

 Department of the Navy, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Joint Concept for Non-Lethal 

Weapons, 5 January 1998. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps is the Executive Agent for the 

DOD Non-lethal Weapons Program and the related joint concept. 
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while minimizing collateral damage and casualties (J-9 Interim Report on NKT 

and LCDW).5

• Low collateral damage capabilities (LCDC): Those weapons, 

technologies, and other capabilities that have the specific capacity to precisely 

achieve a desired effect on an adversary capability (individual target, system, or 

function) while minimizing collateral damage and casualties. LCDC comprises 

a more extensive set of capabilities than NLW and LCDW and includes 

information operations capabilities, which are excluded from NLW by DOD 

Directive 3000.36

 and not considered in the J-9’s LCDW experiments. Although 

not an approved doctrinal term, LCDC could be proposed at some point for future 

incorporation in joint doctrine. 

Joint Experimentation on Low 

Collateral Damage Weapons

During the period from early 2000 through mid 2001, USJFCOM J-9 examined 

LCDW in a set of experimentation events using the following LCDW hypothesis: 

If a set of existing or developmental non-kinetic technologies could be 

weaponized as a complement to current kinetic (explosive and 

penetrating) engagement means, then the joint force could engage critical 

targets and achieve desired operational effects with acceptable collateral 

damage.

USJFCOM conducted the events in collaboration with the Joint Non-lethal 

Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), Sandia National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory. Some examples of LCDW considered in the events included— 

• a robotic mini-torpedo that can swim into a hydro-turbine intake at a dam 

and detonate inside the flow control valve or turbine, disabling the generator; 

• an electronic bomb that can be dropped by parachute next to a building or 

military unit and emits electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to disable the electronic 

equipment in the area; 

• and a system of micro air vehicles that swarm an air defense site, home 

optically on the launchers or guns, and disable them with small precision armor 

piercing warheads. 

 

5

 In March 2001, USJFCOM J-9 conducted a limited objective experiment to investigate the potential use 

of LCDW. The J-9 published an interim report on this experiment on 1 June 2001. 

6

 DOD Directive 3000.3 (footnote 2) excludes any capability not designed specifically for the purpose of 

minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the 

environment, even though these capabilities may have non-lethal effects. 
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USJFCOM Experiments 

Two events—an analytically 

based limited objective experiment (LOE) 

and a leveraged event (US Southern 

Command’s Exercise UNIFIED 

ENDEAVOR 01-3)—were designed to 

address some important warfighting 

challenges related to LCDW. The first 

challenge investigated LCDW that could 

enable the joint force to engage critical 

targets with collateral damage that is 

acceptable within constraining ROE. A 

second challenge concerned the ability 

of the joint force to shape the battlespace 

dynamically (using LCDW to impede the 

adversary while not interfering with 

friendly operations) and achieve 

operational- and strategic-level effects 

rather than just tactical application. The second challenge is the focus of this pam. 

Four key concept elements, highlighted in the accompanying box, provided the basis for 

the events. 

The first event, the LOE conducted in January 2000, investigated LCDW in a 

number of vignettes that could have operational-level implications. These included 

denial to the adversary of bridges, roads, and airports; disablement of hydroelectric 

power plants, thermal/diesel power stations, ships, and surface-to-air missile sites; 

destruction of air defense systems; and immobilization of locomotives. Some vignettes 

focused on using a single type of weapon—for example, attacking the generator 

penstock (the entry to the flow control valve) in a hydroelectric power plant with torpedolike “smart fish” weapons, which contain only enough explosive or abrasive to disable 

the flow control valves or unbalance the generator turbines. If executed correctly, this 

attack would disable the power plant and disrupt the power grid (the desired effect) with 

much lower collateral damage than an attack with conventional weapons. 

Other vignettes used packages of LCDW capabilities to achieve desired effects. 

For example, bridge denial operations combined malodorants to encourage personnel 

to vacate the bridge area; seismic and acoustic unattended ground sensors to detect 

and identify adversary vehicles; a foam-dispensing system with embedded submunitions to provide a barrier to traffic on the bridge; and a number of small robotic 

vehicles armed with various lethal and nonlethal weapons to defend the barrier and 

sensor sub-systems. In the experiment, the net effect of this bridge-denial package of 

LCDW capabilities kept the adversary from using the bridge, but preserved it for later 

use by friendly forces. 

LCDW Concept Elements

1. The use of nonkinetic engagement means 

such as directed energy systems, 

immobilizing systems, and fuel contaminants, 

and aerosols. 

2. Delivery means including manned and 

unmanned platforms, ground and air delivery, 

and long-range precision fire systems. 

3. Experimental modification of current 

doctrine such as JP 3-60 (Joint Doctrine for 

Targeting) to include processes for LCDW 

target selection, means selection, and 

delivery. 

4. An effects-based battle damage 

assessment process.
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The investigation in the second event, UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 01-3 (March 

2001), focused on decision-making regarding use of LCDW rather than traditional 

weapons. During the targeting process, planners considered how to use LCDW for five 

tasks: denying the adversary use of a bridge; stopping power production; denying use 

of key road, rail, and water transportation arteries; disabling a C4I node; and 

destroying adversary air defense. 

The Results 

In the first event, J-9 examined the 

effectiveness of LCDW using the Joint Combat and 

Tactical Simulation (JCATS) model. Assessment of 

experiment results concluded that the LCDW 

modeled and employed were at least as effective as 

traditional systems in creating target effects required 

by the joint force. Figure 1 summarizes that 

exclusive use of nonkinetic technology (NKT) 

capabilities significantly reduced the dollar cost of 

collateral damage and eliminated civilian casualties in 

this scenario. Moreover, the use of LCDW in this 

event actually resulted in a reduced number of 

required sorties than would be expected using 

traditional weapons alone. The results of the second 

event, UNIFIED ENDEAVOR, were not as 

conclusive, but demonstrated that there are several 

decision-making considerations regarding selection 

of LCDW during the targeting process. The doctrinal, 

training, and leader development implications 

associated with future fielding of these weapons are 

worth exploring. Figure 1: Event Results
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Section II — Low Collateral Damage Capabilities – 

Ways and Means 

“As we step forward into the 21st century, we must look for new opportunities to 

leverage developing and emerging technologies that enable warfighting commanders 

to capitalize on the full spectrum of nonlethal capabilities. The value added will 

best be realized when we ensure that technology, operations, and policy are in 

balance, and the education of the American leadership, warfighters, and public is 

complete. These capabilities must become part of our daily lexicon.”

E. R. Bedard 

Lieutenant General, USMC 

Chairman, DOD Joint Non-lethal Weapons 

Program Integrated Product Team 

 Nonlethal weapons are generally grouped in 

the following categories: 

• Electromagnetic: such as radio frequency 

devices; high-power microwave and millimeter 

wave; infrared lasers; visible light lasers; 

ultraviolet lasers. 

• Mechanical: such as blunt impact devices, 

barriers, and entanglements. 

• Acoustic: such as audible and ultrasound. 

• Chemical: such as riot control agents, 

foams, reactants, anti-traction agents, and 

malodorants. 

• Ancillary: such as markers and 

encapsulants. 

The accompanying box shows the core capabilities of NLW.7

 Also, 

“countercapability” (disabling or neutralizing the adversary’s facilities, systems, and 

 

7

 Taken from the Joint Concept for Non-lethal Weapons. 

NLW Core Capabilities

Counterpersonnel

• Control crowds 

• Incapacitate individuals 

• Deny areas to personnel 

• Clear facilities and areas 

Countermateriel

• Deny land, sea, air, and 

space to vehicles 

• Disable or neutralize 

vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and 

equipment 
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weapons of mass destruction) has been described as complementary to the two core 

capabilities.8

Most nonlethal capabilities in the categories listed above are effective at the 

tactical level, particularly against non-military elements in situations with restrictive 

ROE, such as crowd control during a humanitarian assistance operation. Some 

capabilities, such as long-range lasers mounted on various platforms, could engage 

specific air, sea, and land targets with great precision. The effects achieved by 

successful engagement against targets the joint force commander (JFC) designates as 

critical, like WMD-capable mobile missile launchers, could be considered operational or 

strategic in nature. In these cases, however, the JFC must determine if the importance 

of the target would outweigh collateral damage 

considerations. 

As mentioned in Section I, LCDC 

encompass a broader set of capabilities than 

either NLW or LCDW, in large part by adding 

offensive information operations (IO). 

Offensive IO threaten, saturate, exploit, 

disable, jam, misinform, deceive, deter, 

compel, influence, and destroy the 

adversary’s information and related 

capabilities. They can achieve desired direct 

and indirect effects with no collateral damage.9

 

For example, computer network attack (CNA) 

can disable or neutralize an adversary’s C4I 

systems using computer viruses, worms, and 

other methods that affect only the targeted 

systems. Effectively executed IO, such as CNA 

and deception operations, can be 

unrecognizable to the adversary as an attack or 

attempt to influence the decision maker. Some 

offensive IO can engage some adversary 

systems from well outside the actual or 

potential joint operations area (including from 

CONUS). Finally, some offensive IO can be 

used very early in a crisis, potentially limiting 

escalation. Refer to Appendix A for examples 

of actual and potential LCDC technologies and 

systems that affect personnel and materiel. 

 

8

 National Defense University publication Defense Horizons Number 9, “Nonlethal Capabilities: Realizing 

the Opportunities”, by LtGen E. R. Bedard. March 2002. 

9

 There are exceptions that commanders and planners must consider. For example, disabling the 

computers that control power plant operations in order to shut down an urban power grid could affect 

people on life support systems in hospitals and other institutions. Also, some offensive IO involve 

attacking a target with conventional munitions with attendant collateral damage. 

“The joint force commander will 

conduct information operations 

whether facing an adversary during 

a conflict or engaged in 

humanitarian relief operations. 

Such operations will be 

synchronized with those of 

multinational and interagency 

partners as the situation dictates. 

New offensive capabilities such as 

computer network attack techniques

are evolving. . . . . The continuing 

evolution of information operations 

and the global information 

environment holds two significant 

implications. First, operations 

within the information domain will 

become as important as those 

conducted in the domains of sea, 

land, air, and space. . . . . Second, 

there is significant potential for 

asymmetric engagements in the 

information domain. 

Joint Vision 2020
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Section III — Operational Implications of LCDC 

Employment Considerations 

 There is little question that low 

collateral damage capabilities provide 

the joint force a valuable set of tools 

for a variety of missions, particularly 

when the use of lethal means violates 

established ROE or is otherwise 

unacceptable to the JFC. If used 

effectively, LCDC can contribute to 

mission accomplishment and— 

• Limit destruction 

• Reduce fratricide 

• Limit civilian casualties 

• Limit conflict escalation 

• Enhance force protection 

• Limit reconstruction costs 

• Accommodate public expectations 

• Provide employment options earlier in a crisis 

• Leverage our advantage in advanced technologies 

• Push employment decision authority to lower levels 

• Provide a greater range of graduated-response options for leaders 

• Provide a greater range of potential effects against systems and functions 

• Reduce value of some adversary techniques, like hiding among the innocent 

Against these significant advantages, commanders and planners also must 

consider a number of other planning considerations: 

• Risk 

• Media understanding of LCDC 

• Limited duration of some LCDC effects 

• Ways and means to accurately assess effects 

• Creating the best employment balance with traditional capabilities 

• Possibility of promoting a public perception of “zero-casualty” warfare 

• Treaty and legal restrictions (particularly in the area of chemical-like effects) 

“Traditional military weapons require 

commanders to make difficult “trade off” 

decisions regarding the proper balance 

between mission accomplishment, force 

protection, and the safety of noncombatants. 

Non-lethal weapons expand the number of 

options available to commanders confronting 

situations in which the use of deadly force 

poses problems.”

 A Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons 

 Joint Non-Lethal Warfare Directorate 

 5 January 1998
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Employment Perspectives

The Joint Concept for Non-Lethal 

Weapons (footnote 4) is an excellent reference 

that provides a set of guiding principles for 

NLW and discusses their core capabilities. It 

also provides scenarios that illustrate the use of 

NLW in various hypothetical situations. With 

minor modifications, these principles, core 

capabilities, and scenarios could easily 

accommodate the broader LCDC category. 

Section II mentioned the NLW core capabilities. 

The accompanying box lists the guiding 

principles. 

Nonlethal capability typically is 

considered an adjunct to traditional military 

combat capability. In the principle augment deadly force, for example, the Joint 

Concept for Non-lethal Weapons states— 

“The existence of non-lethal capabilities therefore does not represent the 

potential for ‘non-lethal warfare’ or ‘non-lethal operations.’ Unrealistic 

expectations to that effect must be rigorously avoided. Noncombatant 

casualties, to include serious injuries and fatalities, will continue to be a 

regrettable but unavoidable outcome when military power is employed, 

whether or not non-lethal weapons are available.” 

 However, in a 2001 Joint Forces Quarterly article on nonlethal weapons, US 

Army War College professor Stephen Metz took a somewhat different view. He wrote— 

“Moreover, this second revolution must be based on minimum destruction 

since the theater will often be an urban environment crowded with 

noncombatants. The enemy may need to be restrained rather than killed. 

Non-lethality will thus be a defining characteristic of the second 

revolution in military affairs rather than a peripheral one as it is in 

Joint Vision 2020.”10 (emphasis added) 

 Clearly the commander must continue to balance the use of lethal force with 

nonlethal capabilities from situation to situation. Steven Metz seems to suggest that the 

typical balance can (and should) shift in the direction of nonlethal options to 

accommodate the nature of future conflict, perhaps even in those situations in which we 

would traditionally engage the adversary with destructive ways and means. The 

broader LCDC category of capabilities helps enable this shift by adding the low 

 

10 Steven Metz, “Non-Lethal Weapons—A Progress Report,” National Defense University publication 

Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring/Summer 2001, pp 18-22. 

NLW Guiding Principles

• Leverage high technology 

• Enhance operations 

• Augment deadly force 

• Provide “rheostatic” capability 

• Focus on multi-level application 

• Facilitate expeditionary operations

• Maintain policy acceptability 

• Provide reversibility in 

 counterpersonnel effects 

• Apply across the range of military

 operations 
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collateral damage characteristics of information operations as described in Section II. 

This is not to say that our personnel would ever be denied the inherent right of 

self-defense with deadly force or that the commander would have to forfeit the 

mission in favor of lower collateral damage.

 Employment of LCDC at the tactical level (in operations such as crowd control) is 

fairly well defined. For example, under the charter of the Joint Nonlethal Weapons 

program (JNLWP), the Marine Corps has identified a number of nonlethal components 

that comprise a nonlethal weapons capability set. Many of these components are 

currently fielded (such as riot batons, bean-bag rounds, sting-ball rounds, blunt-impact 

munitions, and diversionary devices) and others in the NLW set are under development. 

The Joint Concept for Non-lethal Weapons—published to provide an intellectual 

framework for JNLWP research, development, acquisition, and doctrine—provides 

several hypothetical scenarios for tactical use of emerging NLW capabilities that help 

visualize employment options. There is also a multi-Service publication that describes 

NLW employment procedures.11

This progress notwithstanding, our 

country and military will continue to be 

challenged with employing forces designed, 

organized, and trained for combat operations 

in missions that demand restraint and 

perseverance such as foreign humanitarian 

assistance and DOD support to counterdrug 

operations. Therefore, development of a wider 

range of LCDC will increase the JFC’s flexibility 

when considering potential courses of action. 

Most LCDC currently developed are principally for tactical application in MOOTW 

missions. However, the pursuit of capabilities applicable across the range of military 

operations and levels of war is consistent with goals and objectives in the June 2000 

Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program Master Plan.

12 Employment of LCDC at the 

operational level in higher-intensity combat operations is more problematic than tactical 

employment. An obstacle to the broader use of LCDC in these circumstances is our 

current lack of a fielded family of low collateral damage systems and consideration of 

how to employ them in packages or sets of complementary capabilities that can 

substitute for destructive ways and means. USJFCOM’s experiments (described in 

Section I) addressed LCDC actions to achieve operational-level effects, such as denial 

of a major transportation artery to an adversary while protecting it for later use by the 

joint force. 

 

11 FM 90-40 (Army); MCRP 3-15.8 (Marine Corps); NWP 3-07.31 (Navy); USCG Pub 3-07.31 (Coast 

Guard). Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, October 1998. 12 Page 8, Objectives 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The Master Plan is a product of the Joint NLW Product Team. 

LCDC availability should never 

keep the commander from using 

the best combination of all 

available capabilities to achieve 

the effects required for mission 

accomplishment, given the ROE 

at the time. 
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Another relevant reference that 

examined related issues is the Non-Lethal 

Weapons Policy Study13 conducted in 

1998 by the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies for the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

The study’s purpose was to explore the 

need for a national policy on nonlethal 

weapons. The study’s emphasis was on 

long-range, large-scale weaponization of 

nonlethal technologies for possible use as 

instruments of national policy. The study’s 

members included a Military Options 

Panel, comprised of uniformed military 

officers from all Services. This panel 

examined the potential use of NLW to 

achieve operational and strategic effects in a variety of scenarios. The study found that, 

if implemented correctly, weapons based on nonlethal technologies could be employed 

in an operationally feasible and successful manner. 

Employment Examples 

High-technology LCDC systems have already been used in combat. For 

example, carbon filament bombs (CBU-114) were used in both the 1990-91 Persian 

Gulf Conflict and the more recent conflict in Yugoslavia to disable electrical generators 

and switching yards. Following are additional hypothetical examples of using hightechnology LCDC systems against a capable adversary in various target engagements 

that could achieve operational- or strategic-level effects for the JFC. 

• Early in a crisis, the joint force uses computer network attack capabilities to 

implant a “mole,” a “sniffer,” and a “virus” in the main computer of the adversary’s 

intelligence-gathering system. The mole provides the joint force with access to 

unit locations and readiness information; the sniffer identifies all users who log 

on to the intelligence network; and the virus, programmed to activate on 

command or at a designated time, severely degrades the main computer’s ability 

to access information from the adversary’s intelligence network. Not only does 

this attack threaten the adversary’s capabilities, but it also provides information 

that could give our senior leaders leverage during ongoing diplomatic 

negotiations aimed at preventing the crisis from escalating. 

• In conjunction with other agencies, the JFC also plans for computer network 

attack against the adversary’s economic and infrastructure elements of national 

power. Using national capabilities, this attack targets viruses against the 

 

13 Final Report published 5 February 1999. 

“It is concluded that the capability to 

conduct strategic applications of nonlethal technologies would be of great 

political value to the U.S. in deterring 

aggression, preventing deadly conflict, 

controlling escalation, enjoying major 

advantages in battle, bringing conflicts 

to a favorable conclusion, and 

establishing regional security 

arrangements.” 

 Non-lethal Weapons Policy Study 

 Final Report, 5 February 1999
JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 

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adversary’s maritime and highway shipping control systems, causing significant 

disruption and adverse economic impact. Concurrently, a joint force air 

component B2 launches an AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile 

(JASSM) from outside the adversary’s area defenses. The JASSM flies a course 

to a major rail yard where it dispenses “carbon powder bomb” sub-munitions. 

These blanket the targeted area with highly conductive carbon powder that 

disables any operating locomotive and other vented electronic equipment. 

These combined attacks demonstrate our potential to affect the adversary’s 

entire range of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information 

(PMESII) elements14 and can be used as a persuasive or coercive element to 

limit escalation. 

• At any time during the joint operation, the JFC might decide to disable 

infrastructure power sources, such as hydroelectric power plants and 

thermal/diesel power stations, for either a direct effect on the adversary’s military 

operations or for a psychological effect on the country’s leaders and populace. In 

this scenario, the joint force naval component employs a Joint Strike Fighter with 

AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) against the power plant. The JSOW 

glides to a point near the power plant’s cooling reservoir and dispenses 25 

“minnow” sub-munitions. Each of these contains propulsion and guidance 

systems and a small explosive or expanding foam payload. The minnows 

navigate to the station’s heat exchanger, detonate, and disable power 

production. Concurrently, a special operations team lands by V-22 in the vicinity 

of a hydroelectric power plant and places a number of “smart fish” (containing a 

larger payload than the similar minnows) near the penstock intake grates. The 

smart fish navigate to the intake grates where they eject their explosive packages 

into the high flow-rate water stream. These packages are sucked to the 

generator turbines and detonate near the flow control valve, causing the plant to 

be shut down for repairs. 

• As the crisis escalates, joint force reconnaissance assets locate an important 

military command and control facility in the country’s capital city. Rather than risk 

significant collateral damage by employing conventional munitions, the JFC 

decides to use an enhanced non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapon 

or other radio-frequency weapon to disable the center’s C4I systems. A mediumrange unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) launched from an aircraft carrier delivers 

the weapon. The enhanced EMP is able to penetrate the typical shielding 

expected to be on the adversary’s electronic systems. 

• When intelligence indicates that the adversary is preparing to move ground 

units from garrison to field battle positions, the JFC decides to interdict these 

units to provide time for the joint force land component to position forces. Land 

component planners identify three key bridges that are natural choke points. 

 

14 The PMESII model is described in the USJFCOM J-9’s concept paper, Operational Net 

Assessment. Readers can review the current version of this paper on the USJFCOM J-9 unclassified 

website (www.je.jfcom.mil). Access the “J-9 Web Portal" and sign up for an account; then enter the 

"Concept Development" knowledge community and the “Knowledge-C2 Division” in that order.
JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 

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Rather than destroy them and deny their later use by the joint force, the land 

component employs three bridge/road denial capability sets. Each set is 

comprised of packages that contain bridge clearing capabilities, sensors, 

barriers, and defensive capabilities. 

o The “clearing” package, delivered by JSOW consists of a mix of flashbang devices, frangible vials of malodorants, and riot control agents that 

cause people in the vicinity of the bridge to leave. 

o The “barrier” package, also delivered by JSOW in this case, consists of 

foam-dispensing canisters and anti-personnel and anti-vehicle 

submunitions deployed on the bridge entrances. The canisters dispense 

sufficient quantities of dense foam that hardens in a short time and covers 

the submunitions. Attempts to clear the foam will detonate the 

submunitions. 

o The “sensor” package consists of a number of tactical unattended 

ground sensors (TUGS) delivered by JSOW. Each sensor has the 

capability to identify and provide location information on transient and 

continuous sources at ranges of greater than 500 meters. Sufficient 

sensors are deployed to cover a radius of two km from both entrances to 

the bridge. 

o The “defensive” package is delivered by guided parafoil air delivery 

system (GPADS) from a C-130 at a standoff range exceeding 20 miles. 

The package contains a number of small wheeled and tracked robotic 

vehicles that are linked to the TUGS. These vehicles carry a mix of antipersonnel and anti-vehicle weapons that can cause a combination of 

lethal and nonlethal effects. 

Precise control over emplacement of the bridge denial packages is accomplished 

using a medium-altitude UAV, which can also function as a laser designator for 

additional precision munitions should they be required. 

 The foregoing examples show how the joint force might employ a variety of 

LCDC, including offensive IO, to perform various tasks that contribute to mission 

accomplishment. While the possible benefits of each example are evident, perhaps 

there is even greater value in considering the combination of potential effects if the 

JFC has a wide array of LCDC at his disposal. The use of LCDC to achieve 

operational-level and strategic effects—with attendant advantages and 

considerations mentioned earlier—could become much more routine in the 

future. Nonetheless, LCDC availability should never keep the commander from using 

the best combination of all available capabilities to achieve the effects required for 

mission accomplishment, given ROE at the time. Continued concept development and 

experimentation should help determine the full potential of this critical area. 

Effects-based thinking and planning are key to employing LCDC to their full 

potential. Inherent in the employment of LCDC is the issue of control. Although our 

understanding of weapons effects and our ability to estimate collateral damage 
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continues to improve, planners must still think through potential unintended second- and 

third-order effects of LCDC employment. From a USJFCOM joint experimentation 

perspective, effects-based planning begins with operational net assessment

(ONA)—a continuous and collaborative process that develops a thorough 

understanding of adversary and friendly capabilities. The goal of ONA is to help 

decision makers understand the range of actions available to achieve desired effects 

against the adversary. Collateral damage estimation is an important factor in this 

process. See the USFJCOM J-9 concept papers on the J-9 website (footnote 14) for 

more information on effects-based and ONA constructs. 
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Section IV — Doctrinal Implications

 There are potentially significant DOTMLPF15 implications associated with the 

comprehensive fielding and employment of operational- and strategic-level LCDC. This 

section focuses on the question—Is current joint doctrine sufficient in its treatment 

of this important issue? 

Current Doctrine Summary 

Several joint doctrine publications refer to the use of nonlethal means to attack 

targets. For example, JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, states— 

“Nonlethal fires should be integrated into operations to produce synergistic 

results. Examples are EW, certain PSYOP, smoke operations, and some 

command and control warfare (C2W) operations, which deceive the 

enemy, disable the enemy’s C2 systems, and disrupt operations. The 

employment of nonlethal fires is especially important in military operations 

other than war (MOOTW) when restraint and limitations on the use of 

deadly force are necessary.”

16

The Universal Joint Task List also mentions attack using nonlethal means at the 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels.17 And draft JP 3-70, Joint Doctrine for 

Strategic Attack, mentions nonlethal weapons use at the low end of the conflict 

spectrum. However, nowhere in joint doctrine is there discussion more extensive than 

that quoted above. Likewise, while several joint pubs mention the issue of limiting 

collateral damage, there is no focused discussion on the topic in joint doctrine. For 

example, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, cautions that JFCs “. . apply the combat 

power necessary to ensure victory against combatants, but are careful to limit 

 

15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation 

Master Plan (JIMP), 15 April 2001. The JIMP identifies seven key areas in which to capture desired 

future capabilities: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF). 

16 JP 3-09, 12 May 1998, p. I-7. 

17 CJCSI 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List Version 4.2, 1 July 2002. Tasks SN 3.3.4, ”Apply National 

Nonlethal Capabilities;” ST 3.2.2, “Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using 

Nonlethal Means;” OP 3.2.2, “Conduct Attack on Operational Targets using Nonlethal Means;” and TA 

3.2.6, “Conduct Joint Attacks using Nonlethal Means.” 
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unnecessary injury to noncombatants and damage, especially to protected sites.” 

JP 2-01.3, JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, states “Exclusion 

zones . . .may be used to reduce neutrals’ exposure to collateral damage and incidental 

injury . . .” Similarly, JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, states “Target development 

also assesses collateral damage considerations and LOAC and ROE limitations.” Even 

JP 3-12.1, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, limits discussion of collateral 

damage to a mention of planning factors associated with targeting and employing 

nuclear weapons. There is similar mention of collateral damage in a number of other 

joint pubs. 

Collateral damage estimation has evolved to a sophisticated state. Although 

they are not doctrinal publications, documents such as the Joint Munitions Effectiveness 

Manual contain detailed data on a wide array of weapons and provide a statistical 

starting point for damage estimation. Other manuals provide quantitatively based 

guides to estimating both collateral damage and casualties, and can be used to 

estimate both kinetic and nonkinetic effects. And various computer tools greatly 

enhance the speed of the estimation process and accuracy of the results. Finally, both 

joint and Service training associated with targeting includes instruction on estimating 

and mitigating collateral damage.

Perspectives

One point of view on the question of joint doctrine sufficiency is that current 

doctrine says exactly what it should about using nonlethal means and limiting collateral 

damage. Proponents of this view would contend that collateral damage would always 

be an important planning consideration, but that current doctrine is sufficient as long as 

relevant publications like JP 3-60 and JP 5-00.2 (Joint Task Force Planning Guidance 

and Procedures) mention it. The JFC always should have a variety of ways and means 

available to accomplish the mission. As the set of LCDC grows, the JFC will have more 

employment options. But except for JPs that cover employment of nuclear weapons 

(the JP 3-12 series) and mines (JP 3-15), we typically do not write joint doctrine to cover 

specific weapons. 

An opposite perspective is that current doctrine is deficient and we need a new 

doctrine pub focused on low collateral damage operations. Proponents of this view 

could argue that LCDC employment described in the hypothetical examples in Section 

III demonstrates such significant beneficial possibilities that this could radically change 

the way the JFC plans and employs the joint force if an array of LCDC was available. 

This perspective supports the contention by Steven Metz, mentioned earlier, that 

nonlethality will be a defining characteristic of the second revolution in military affairs. 

Between these two points of view, of course, is one that argues for amplifying 

our current doctrine to clarify how we might use LCDC but contends that a new joint pub 

is not required. In the immediate future, perhaps we should add an LCDC section to 

selected joint pubs that contains principles, planning factors, and employment 
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considerations. However, since we write joint doctrine to describe operations with 

current capabilities, we should guard against straying into the conceptual arena in our 

doctrine. Nonetheless, since our doctrine developers are joint operations subject matter 

experts in their areas of focus, they should closely monitor LCDC conceptual efforts in 

order to project the doctrinal impact of emerging capabilities. 

Conclusions 

 This pamphlet has introduced LCDC as a new term and category that could 

subsume related capabilities currently described as “nonlethal” and “nonkinetic.” This is 

not a formal proposal to include this term in joint doctrine, but rather an attempt to 

stimulate thinking about how to group and use these related capabilities. 

Fielding an array of LCDC would seem to provide the JFC with expanded ways 

and means to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. DARPA and the national 

laboratories are currently investigating a number 

of capabilities that can achieve desired effects 

while limiting collateral damage. USJFCOM J-9 

examined some alternatives for operational-level 

utility during their limited objective experiments 

and determined that LCDC could be just as 

effective as traditional systems in creating target 

effects required by the joint force in certain 

situations, but with fewer sorties and 

significantly reduced collateral damage. However, experimentation to date has not 

been comprehensive enough to examine a full range of possible LCDC ways and 

means in a variety of situations. 

 Employment of an individual LCDC in a specific engagement likely would not 

change the way the JFC and joint force planners structure the joint campaign. 

However, the availability of a full array of LCDC could provide the JFC with alternative 

campaign strategies. Likewise, the joint community can modify doctrine incrementally, if 

required, as LCDC become available. However, if LCDC could fundamentally change 

the way the joint force plans and executes joint operations, then joint doctrine might 

require substantial revision. Collateral damage estimation methods and tools must 

keep pace as LCDC employment becomes more prevalent. And as with any other 

capabilities we develop for offensive use, we must consider defensive measures against 

a potential adversary’s use of similar capabilities against our forces. At present, the 

potential value and associated DOTMLPF impact of LCDC are best explored 

through continued concept development and experimentation. 

USJFCOM JWFC welcomes comments on these and other perspectives 

concerning the potential impact of LCDC development on joint doctrine. 

If LCDC could fundamentally 

change the way the joint force 

plans and executes joint 

operations, then joint doctrine 

might require substantial 

revision.
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 A-1

Appendix A 

Examples of Actual and Potential 

LCDC Technologies and Systems 

 System Personnel Effects 

Ultrasonic generator Projects an acoustic pressure wave to cause discomfort 

Acoustic generator Projects noise to cause disorientation 

Incapacitating Substances Inorganic and organic substances that cause temporary disability

Malodorous substances Create pungent odors that repel 

Irritants Cause eye and respiratory discomfort 

Vomiting agents Cause nausea and vomiting 

Non-penetrating projectiles Stun personnel without penetrating 

High-intensity strobe lights Disorient and confuse 

Stun weapons Subdue or immobilize 

Water cannon Disperse crowds 

Optical munitions Stun, dazzle, or temporarily blind 

Super adhesives Immobilize personnel 

Anti-traction substances Prevent the movement of personnel 

Entanglement devices Ensnare and immobilize 

Enclosure fillers Rapidly fill an enclosed space, immobilizing personnel 

Aqueous foams Impede mobility and create barriers 

Hologram generator Produces holograms as decoys 

Marking agents Overtly and covertly mark personnel for later identification 

Obscurants Disorient and obscure visual observation 

Deception operations Influence adversary decision maker 

Psychological operations Influence adversary military and civilian population 

 System Materiel Effects 

Binding coatings Super adhesives that prevent vehicle movement 

High-voltage generator Disrupts electronic systems 

Non-nuclear EMP Disrupts electronic systems 

Engine killing agents Disable or destroy engines 

Filter clogging agents Clog engine filters, disabling engines 

Conductive particles Short-circuit electronics 

Fuel additives Change fuel characteristics, disabling engine 

Obscurants Obscure electronic observation 

Optical munitions Stun, dazzle, or blind weapon and other system optics 

Anti-traction substances Prevent the movement of vehicles 

Soil destabilization Change soil characteristics, preventing the movement of vehicles

Computer network attack Disable computer systems and networks 

Computer worms & viruses Disable computer systems and networks 

“Smart fish” Disable hydroelectric power plants 

Carbon fiber munitions Disable locomotives and other engines 

Directed-energy systems Precision engagement and destruction of targets 
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 GL-1

Glossary 

Part I — Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CNA computer network attack 

DOTMLPF doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and 

 education, personnel, and facilities 

EBO effects-based operations 

GPADS guided parafoil air delivery system 

IO information operations 

JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile 

JCATS Joint Combat and Tactical Simulation 

JCDE Joint Concept Development and Experimentation 

JFC joint force commander 

JIMP Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan 

JP joint publication 

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon 

JWFC Joint Warfighting Center 

KT kinetic technologies 

LCDC low collateral damage capabilities 

LCDW low collateral damage weapons 

LOE limited objective experiment 

NKT nonkinetic technologies 

NLW nonlethal weapons 

ONA operational net assessment 

PFJO Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters 

SME subject matter expert 

TUGS tactical unattended ground sensor 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

UJTL Universal Joint Task List 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 
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 GL-2

Part II — Terms and Definitions

Collateral Damage. Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects 

that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such 

damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military 

advantage anticipated from the attack. (JP 1-02) 

Low Collateral Damage Capabilities (LCDC). Those weapons, technologies, and 

other capabilities that have the specific capacity to precisely achieve a desired effect on 

an adversary capability (individual target, system, or function) while minimizing collateral 

damage and casualties. (proposed for discussion purposes) 

Low Collateral Damage Weapons (LCDW). Those weapon technologies or systems 

that have the specific capacity to precisely attack an adversary function while 

minimizing collateral damage and casualties. (J-9 Interim Report on NKT and LCDW). 

Nonlethal Weapons (NLW). Weapon systems that are specifically designed and 

primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing 

fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the 

environment. (DOD Directive 3000.3) 
JWFC Doctrine Pam 2 

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Produced by the Doctrine Division of the Capabilities Group 

Joint Warfighting Center 

United States Joint Forces Command

116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

“The joint force, because of its flexibility and 

responsiveness, will remain the key to 

operational success in the future. To build the 

most effective force for 2020, we must be 

fully joint: intellectually, operationally, 

organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.”

Joint Vision 2020