IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

STANLEY SKEETERS 

:

:

:

:

:

CRIMINAL ACTION

 

 NO. 05-530-1

MEMORANDUM

Bartle, J. September 18, 2020

The court has before it the motion of defendant 

Stanley Skeeters, acting pro se, for compassionate release under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

I

On March 27, 2006, a jury found defendant guilty of: 

one count of conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); four counts of 

interference with interstate commerce by robbery and aiding and 

abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1952; and four counts 

of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a violent offense 

and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

On August 23, 2006, this court sentenced defendant to 

985 months imprisonment to be followed by 5 years of supervised 

release. Defendant’s term consists of a mandatory term of 7 

years on the first § 924(c) charge and mandatory consecutive 

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terms of 25 years on each of the other three § 924(c) charges. 

Since defendant violated his parole for state crimes when he 

committed the federal offenses, he remained in state custody to 

complete his state sentence and did not begin his federal 

sentence until June 2012. Defendant is currently serving his 

sentence at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg,

Pennsylvania (“USP Lewisburg”) with an anticipated release date 

from federal custody of May 23, 2082. 

II

Defendant’s motion for compassionate release relies on 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) as recently amended by the First Step Act. It 

provides, in relevant part:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once 

it has been imposed except that—

(1) in any case—

(A) the court, upon motion of the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or 

upon motion of the defendant after the 

defendant has fully exhausted all 

administrative rights to appeal a 

failure of the Bureau of Prisons to 

bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf 

or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt 

of such a request by the warden of the 

defendant’s facility, whichever is 

earlier, may reduce the term of 

imprisonment (and may impose a term of 

probation or supervised release with or 

without conditions that does not exceed 

the unserved portion of the original 

term of imprisonment), after considering 

the factors set forth in section 3553(a) 

to the extent that they are applicable, 

if it finds that—

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(i) extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant such a reduction 

. . .

and that such reduction is consistent 

with applicable policy statements issued 

by the Sentencing Commission.

Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies. 

We turn first to the elements that a defendant must meet under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to obtain a reduction in sentence. It 

provides that a court may order compassionate release for 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” but only if the reduction 

in sentence is “consistent with applicable policy statements of 

the Sentencing Commission.” 

Congress has also enacted 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) which 

provides:

The Commission, in promulgating general 

policy statements regarding the sentencing 

modification provisions in section 

3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, shall describe 

what should be considered extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for sentence reduction, 

including the criteria to be applied and a 

list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of 

the defendant alone shall not be considered 

an extraordinary and compelling reason.

The application note 1(A) of section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing 

Guidelines explains that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” 

exist where the defendant is: (1) “suffering from a terminal 

illness” including among others “advanced dementia”; 

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(2) “suffering from a serious physical or medical condition”; 

(3) “suffering from a serious functional or cognitive 

impairment”; or (4) “experiencing deteriorating physical or 

mental health because of the aging process.” The latter three 

grounds also require that the impairment “substantially 

diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care 

within the environment of a correctional facility and from which 

he or she is not expected to recover.” 

III

Defendant asserts that compassionate release should be 

granted because of: (1) the draconian practice of § 924(c) 

“stacking” of sentences which was modified by § 403 of the First 

Step Act; (2) the COVID-19 pandemic and his risk of infection 

due to positive tests at USP Lewisburg and inadequate testing 

procedures; (3) his exceptional rehabilitation and lack of a 

single disciplinary incident in the last seven years; (4) the 

enactment of § 403 of the First Step Act; and (5) his valid home 

plan, job opportunity, and support from family. 

The Government opposes defendant’s motion. It 

maintains that defendant has not stated appropriate reasons for 

compassionate release. The Government argues that § 403 of the 

First Step Act, which modified § 924(c) as to when a 25-year 

sentence is to be imposed, does not apply to defendant because 

Congress explicitly stated that § 403 applies only to offenses 

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committed before the date of enactment when the sentence had not 

yet been imposed. See First Step Act of 2018, § 403, Pub. L. 

No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; see also United States v. Hodge,

948 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2020). Since Congress enacted § 403 

on December 21, 2018, and this court sentenced defendant in 

2006, the Government is correct that § 403 does not apply here. 

The Government asserts that the pandemic alone does 

not constitute sufficient grounds for compassionate release, and 

defendant’s most recent physical from October 10, 2019 indicates 

that he has no medical complaints. In addition, defendant does 

not have any underlying health conditions that are listed as a 

risk factor for more serious cases of COVID-19. He is 

prediabetic, but prediabetes, as opposed to diabetes, is not 

listed as a risk factor for serious cases of COVID-19. See

United States v. Hooks, No. 13-527, 2020 WL 4756341, at *6 (E.D. 

Pa. Aug. 17, 2020). The Government also argues that USP 

Lewisburg currently has no reported positive cases for inmates

and that the 85 inmates who previously tested positive were 

isolated and have recovered. 

The court is, of course, mindful of the devastating 

worldwide pandemic and the special dangers the highly contagious 

coronavirus poses for the defendant and all others in prison. 

However, “the mere existence of COVID- 19 in society and the 

possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone 

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cannot independently justify compassionate release.” United 

States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020). The Bureau of 

Prisons, including USP Lewisburg, has in place protocols to deal 

with this disease, and the Attorney General has issued two 

directives to the Bureau of Prisons concerning early release of 

inmates, which it is following. 

Based on the current record, defendant has not 

established that he has any health condition that constitutes a 

serious medical impairment as defined in the Sentencing 

Guidelines. The serious medical condition under the Sentencing 

Guidelines must be an impairment which “substantially diminishes 

the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the 

environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she 

is not expected to recover.” Defendant clearly does not meet 

this requirement.

Even if defendant has the requisite serious medical 

condition, the court’s analysis does not end there. Section 

3582(c)(1)(A) requires the court to consider the “factors set 

forth in § 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable” before the 

court may reduce his sentence. These factors include the need 

to: “reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant;” “reflect the 

seriousness of the offense;” “promote respect of the law;” and 

“afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”

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In this regard, defendant claims that he should be 

granted compassionate release because he “has taken the 

opportunity to put his life in order” during his incarceration, 

including achieving his general education degree (GED), 

completing various coursework, and going without a disciplinary 

incident for over five years.

The court accepts defendant’s representation that 

while incarcerated he has made efforts to “put his life in 

order.” While the court applauds defendant for any strides he

has made toward rehabilitation, these factors alone do not allow

for his release. Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), Congress has made it

clear: “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be

considered an extraordinary and compelling reason” for

compassionate release. In any event, his rehabilitation does

not outweigh other § 3553(a) factors which support the need for 

him to serve the sentence imposed.

This court cannot ignore the seriousness of 

defendant’s criminal history. Defendant had been found guilty 

of crimes involving armed robberies under state law. His 

subsequent robberies involved in this action occurred shortly 

after his release from state custody and thus violated his state 

parole. His crimes were serious and merit serious sentences. 

Releasing defendant now, only eight years into his federal 

sentence, would not appropriately reflect the nature and 

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circumstances of his offenses, the need to protect the public 

from further crimes of the defendant, and the need to afford 

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.

The court finds that defendant has not established 

extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant his 

entitlement to compassionate release. Accordingly, the court 

will deny his petition under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

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