Docket No. 104095.

IN THE

 SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

PAMELA SLATER, Appellee.

Opinion filed March 20, 2008.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Will County,

defendant, Pamela Slater, was convicted of one count of permitting

the sexual abuse of a child (720 ILCS 150/5.1 (West 2002)) and was

sentenced to four years’ incarceration. The appellate court reversed

defendant’s conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. No.

3–04–0640 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We

granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315),

and, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court.
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BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of

a child (720 ILCS 5/12–14.1(a)(1) (West 2002)) and with permitting

the sexual abuse of a child (720 ILCS 150/5.1 (West 2002)). The

State alleged that the child victim in this case was defendant’s 11-

year-old daughter, K.S. Among the several pretrial motions filed by

defendant was a motion to determine her fitness to stand trial. The

court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Randi Zoot, found defendant to be

“alert, oriented to person, place date and situation, and cooperative,”

and that she had a verbal IQ of 81, a performance IQ of 70, and a fullscale IQ of 74. Although defendant’s “overall I.Q. places her in the

borderline range of intellectual functioning and her verbal abilities are

low average,” Dr. Zoot concluded that defendant did “not suffer from

a mental disorder that interferes with her ability to understand the

court proceedings, the role of the court participants or from

cooperating with her attorney in her defense.” The parties stipulated

that Dr. Zoot found defendant fit to stand trial.

Defendant also moved to suppress oral and videotaped inculpatory

statements made by her on July 17, 2003, at the Will County Child

Advocacy Center (Center) and at the Criminal Investigations Office

at the Will County sheriff’s department (sheriff’s department).

Defendant alleged that the statement made at the Center occurred

while she was in custody and without her receiving warnings pursuant

to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct.

1602 (1966). In addition, defendant alleged that the statements were

involuntary because she is intellectually limited and they were made

after she was threatened with the loss of her children. Defendant

further alleged that the subsequent statement given by her at the

sheriff’s department was a direct product of the unlawful statement

obtained at the Center, that the taint could not be removed, and,

therefore, that this statement was inadmissible as well. Defendant

therefore requested that the court suppress all inculpatory statements

made by her on July 17, 2003.

At the ensuing suppression hearing, the evidence revealed that

authorities became aware that K.S. had possibly been subjected to

sexual abuse through a tip called into the DCFS hotline by defendant’s

friend. DCFS investigator Maurice Johnson followed up on this

allegation by speaking to the tipster, who stated that a man named
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Brian Deck was living with defendant’s family, and that he and K.S.

were engaged in a sexual relationship. Johnson performed a criminal

background check on defendant and her husband and found that they

had no criminal history; however, he did discover that at least three

other prior reports had been made to DCFS about the family, and

defendant’s children had been removed. Johnson then visited

defendant’s home, where he spoke to her, her husband and K.S.

Defendant and her husband were told by Johnson that Deck had to

leave the premises and could not return or have any contact with K.S.

until DCFS determined that it was safe for him to do so. Defendant

agreed and signed a written safety plan, which allowed K.S. to remain

in the home pending the outcome of the investigation.

The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that once a

report of abuse is received, it is standard procedure to arrange a

“victim sensitive interview” (VSI) of the minor at the Center. The

Center makes the arrangements for the interview, and before the

interview can take place, a parent must grant permission to speak with

the child. The VSI for K.S. took place on July 17, 2003, and

defendant and her daughter arrived at the Center at 1 p.m. They were

driven to that location by Deck, who planned to wait in the car until

he was called to pick them up at the completion of the interview.

According to protocol, defendant was interviewed by Mary Jane

Pluth, a Center social worker, to obtain permission to speak with K.S.

Defendant gave her consent and, in the course of doing so, denied that

any abuse had occurred. Pluth then separately interviewed K.S., who

also denied that any abuse had taken place.

The State presented the testimony of Detective John Ruettiger, a

member of the Will County sheriff’s department, who stated that he

and his partner, Detective Richard Ackerson, were present at the

Center at the time defendant and her daughter arrived. The sheriff’s

department had received a report from DCFS alleging that K.S. was

the victim of sexual abuse, opened a criminal investigation file, and

assigned him and his partner to attend the VSI. Ruettiger stated that

at that time defendant “was not the focus of our investigation,” and

that it was not unusual that DCFS investigator Johnson and Will

County Assistant State’s Attorney Heidi Brink were also present at

the Center.
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After Pluth spoke with defendant and K.S., Reuttiger stated that

he, Ackerson, Pluth, Johnson and Brink met to discuss the interviews,

and concluded that both defendant and K.S. were being untruthful.

Ruettiger decided that he and Ackerson would speak further with K.S,

and informed defendant that they were doing so because “we didn’t

believe that [K.S.] was being completely honest with us.” Ruettiger

stated that he spoke to defendant in a small meeting room at the

Center, which contained a desk and a few chairs. DCFS investigator

Johnson was already in the room with defendant when he and

Ackerson entered, and the detectives then left defendant in the room

with Johnson to speak with K.S.

Ruettiger then questioned K.S., and she admitted that she and

Deck were having sexual intercourse. K.S. stated that Deck was a

family friend who was in his thirties and who had lived on and off at

her family’s home for several months. After K.S. made this admission,

Ruettiger and Ackerson returned to speak with defendant, who was

still in the interview room with Johnson. Ruettiger stated that the

purpose of this second interview with defendant was twofold: to

inform defendant of what K.S. had just told them and to find out if

defendant knew that K.S. and Deck were having sex in her home.

Ruettiger denied that the purpose of this discussion was to gain a

confession from defendant; rather, he stated that he intended to do

some “fact finding” with respect to the admission made by K.S.

Ruettiger testified that this second interview with defendant lasted

between 10 and 15 minutes. Defendant was not given Miranda

warnings, and she was not handcuffed during their conversation. Both

Ruettiger and Ackerson were in plain clothes and had weapons that

were holstered. When Ruettiger asked defendant if she knew that her

daughter and Deck were having sex, defendant “began to break down

and cry,” and she started to talk. Defendant acknowledged that sexual

contact had occurred between Deck and her daughter, and Ruettiger

stated that at that moment the focus of the investigation changed: “[I]t

became very clear to us that she knew exactly what was going on with

her child and this adult male, and, at that point *** the investigation

began to broaden some.” During their questioning of defendant, the

door to the interview room was closed, but not locked. It was not

Ruettiger’s intent to close the door to keep defendant from leaving;

rather, it was for privacy due to the sensitive nature of the discussions.
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Ruettiger stated that he and defendant had no trouble understanding

each other during their interaction, and that defendant never told him

that she wished to leave.

 Ruettiger testified that he “stopped speaking to [defendant]”

when she began to tell them in detail what had been going on in her

home between K.S. and Deck. Ruetigger then stepped out of the

room and advised Assistant State’s Attorney Brink of what had

occurred. Brink told him to transport defendant to the sheriff’s

department to give her Miranda warnings and to take a formal

statement from her. Ruettiger testified that defendant was not taken

into custody at the Center.

Ruettiger then asked defendant if “she would come with us to the

criminal investigation offices to talk about further what we had talked

about at the Advocacy Center,” and defendant agreed. Defendant

never asked if she had to go, and they did not tell her that she did not

have to accompany them. Ruettiger and Ackerson then escorted

defendant to the sheriff’s department, which was a five-minute walk

from the Center. During the walk, defendant was not handcuffed and

no weapons were drawn.

Ruettiger stated that they arrived at the sheriff’s department at

approximately 4 to 4:15 p.m., and defendant was placed in an

interview room. Shortly thereafter he and Detective Ackerson went in

to speak with her; she was not handcuffed and their weapons were not

drawn. Prior to the start of questioning, Ruettiger read defendant her

Miranda rights from a preprinted form. At approximately 4:45 p.m.

defendant signed the form, indicating that she had received the rights,

understood them and waived them. Defendant never indicated to the

officers that she did not understand her rights, nor did she question

what was contained in the form. He and Ackerson then told defendant

that they wanted to speak to her in more detail about the relationship

between K.S. and Deck. Defendant made an oral inculpatory

statement, and Ruettiger asked if she would allow her confession to

be videotaped. Defendant agreed, and they began the videotaped

statement at approximately 5:30 p.m. Ruettiger testified that he did

not know that defendant and her husband were receiving services for

developmentally disabled persons until defendant mentioned it during

the taped interview.
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The State also called Detective Richard Ackerson to testify at the

suppression hearing, and he largely corroborated the testimony of his

partner, Ruettiger. Ackerson additionally testified that at the time of

the second interview of defendant at the Center, the door to the room

they were in was open at first, but when defendant became upset,

began to cry, and became loud, they decided to shut the door so as

not to disturb others at the Center. In addition, Ackerson testified that

when they interviewed defendant at the sheriff’s department, the door

to the room was closed. Further, Ackerson testified that defendant

was informed that she was under arrest after that interview was

completed and the videotaped statement was concluded.

The State then played the videotaped statement of defendant made

at the sheriff’s department, which corroborated the prior testimony of

Reuttiger and Ackerson. The recording began at 5:30 p.m. and

showed defendant sitting in a room at a table being primarily

questioned by Ruettiger, with Ackerson sitting off to the side.

Defendant stated that Deck had been dating her friend, and that

defendant and her husband let the couple live in their home. In

defendant’s words, Deck became “fascinated” with K.S., bought her

expensive gifts, and started to sleep in the same bed as K.S. Defendant

freely offered information to the officers, spoke in great detail about

her knowledge of the relationship between Deck and her daughter,

and related various specific incidents where they were “acting like

boyfriend and girlfriend.” She was only occasionally prompted by the

officers with questions; for the most part, defendant controlled the

conversation and the topics. At one point, defendant told the officers

that Deck “is a controlling person. He takes advantage of people that

are mentally handicapped and mentally ill like me and my husband, and

anybody else that is that way.” Defendant also volunteered that Deck

provided money to the family for their expenses, that he had planned

to celebrate K.S.’s twelfth birthday by taking K.S. and her 12-year-old

friend to a hotel, and that this incident drove her to now tell the truth

because she no longer wanted Deck with her daughter and she hoped

to prevent him from victimizing other young girls, such as K.S.’s

friend. Defendant acknowledged that when Ruettiger and Ackerson

first brought her to the sheriff’s department, they gave her Miranda

rights and she understood those rights. Ruettiger then showed

defendant a form and she stated that she signed the form and waived
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her rights. The recorded statement concluded at 5:54 p.m. The State

then rested its case.

Defendant called Maurice Johnson to testify on her behalf. He

stated that it is common practice after a VSI to meet with the minor’s

parents and inform them of the likely next steps, and that this was his

purpose of speaking with defendant: “I told [defendant] that based

upon what I observed in the interview she was not being truthful. I

indicated to her that the investigation would continue and that there

was a possibility that the children were at risk of being removed from

her care.” Johnson testified that if he continued to believe that

defendant was not telling the truth about the situation between K.S.

and Deck, he had the power to remove K.S. from the home if he

thought it was in the best interests of the child. At one point, Johnson

stated he was alone in the room with defendant, and after he told her

that she needed to “think about her daughter and she need[ed] to

protect her,” defendant “tells me that she will tell the truth, and she

goes on to relate that *** she believed there was a sexual relationship

between [Deck] and [K.S.] based upon what she had observed.” After

defendant made this admission, Johnson left the room and asked the

detectives to come back in. Defendant then again admitted her

knowledge of the sexual relationship between Deck and K.S. Johnson

could not recall if the door to the interview room was open or closed

during this session.

At this point, Johnson’s timeline of the interviews differs from that

provided by Detectives Ruettiger and Ackerson. Johnson stated that

this discussion with defendant occurred prior to the second VSI of

K.S., whereas the detectives stated that it took place after K.S.’s

second VSI. According to Johnson, during her second VSI K.S.

admitted that she had a sexual relationship with Deck, and thereafter

defendant was interviewed for a third time “to see if she would give

clarification” to what K.S. had revealed. Again, this testimony differs

from that of the detectives, who stated that there were two interviews

of defendant at the Center, and not three. Johnson could not recall if

defendant said anything at that time about being intellectually

challenged or developmentally disabled. Johnson testified that he

believed that defendant was arrested at the Center, but also stated that

he could not recall if the detectives ever told defendant she was under

arrest while there. Johnson stated that he then took K.S. into
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protective custody, and that DCFS subsequently placed defendant’s

other children into protective custody as well.

At the close of the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled as

follows. The court found that there were three separate interrogations

of defendant, with the initial questioning occurring when she first

arrived at the Center and was interviewed by Pluth. The court

determined that no Miranda warnings were required for this session.

The court then found that the second interrogation also occurred at

the Center, when defendant was questioned by the detectives and

Johnson. The court held that defendant should have been given

Miranda warnings and suppressed the inculpatory statements made by

defendant during that session. The trial court found that the third

interrogation occurred at the sheriff’s department. The court held that

defendant was properly Mirandized, that her statement was

voluntarily made, and that there were sufficient intervening

circumstances to eliminate the taint from the invalid questioning at the

Center. The trial court therefore found that defendant’s statement at

the sheriff’s department was admissible.

At defendant’s bench trial, K.S. testified that the sexual abuse

occurred as set forth during the earlier suppression hearing. Johnson

and Ruettiger also testified at trial, and their testimony largely

mirrored that which they previously gave during the suppression

hearing. The parties also stipulated as to what the testimony of

Ackerson would be at trial, based upon his prior testimony at the

earlier suppression hearing. Finally, the videotaped statement made by

defendant on July 17, 2003 at the sheriff’s department was also

admitted into evidence.

The trial court found defendant guilty of the offense of permitting

the sexual abuse of a child (720 ILCS 150/5.1 (West 2002)).

Defendant was acquitted, however, of the charge of predatory

criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12–14.1(a)(1) (West 2002)).

Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging, inter

alia, that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to

suppress her inculpatory statements of July 17, 2003. The court

denied defendant’s motion, and sentenced defendant to four years’

incarceration.

In an unpublished order under Rule 23, the appellate court

reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded this cause for a new
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trial. The appellate court determined that defendant was in “custody”

at the time that she made her inculpatory statement at the Center and

that she should have been given Miranda warnings at that time. In

addition, the court found that this statement was also involuntary, as

defendant’s will was overborne by investigators who knew of her

developmental disability and coerced her to confess. The appellate

court further held that because there were insufficient intervening

circumstances to remove the taint of defendant’s first confession at the

Center from her subsequent statements at the sheriff’s department, the

latter inculpatory statement should not have been admitted at trial.

No. 3–04–0640 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

Additional facts, as necessary, will be considered in connection

with the issues presented.

ANALYSIS

The State contends that the appellate court erred in reversing

defendant’s conviction and remanding this cause for a new trial

wherein the inculpatory statements made by defendant are to be

suppressed. According to the State, the appellate court incorrectly

held that defendant’s second confession at the sheriff’s department

should not have been admitted at trial because it was tainted by her

earlier inculpatory statement at the Center. Defendant argues that this

court should affirm the judgment of the appellate court, in that it

correctly held that the inculpatory statement given by defendant at the

Center was invalid in that it violated Miranda and was involuntary,

and it tainted defendant’s subsequent confession at the sheriff’s

department. We disagree with defendant.

In determining whether a trial court has properly ruled on a

motion to suppress, findings of fact and credibility determinations

made by the trial court are accorded great deference and will be

reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 373 (2005); People v. Braggs,

209 Ill. 2d 492, 505 (2003). We review de novo, however, the

ultimate question posed by the legal challenge to the trial court’s

ruling on a suppression motion. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104,

116 (2005). Further, it is proper for us to consider the testimony

adduced at trial, as well as at the suppression hearing. People v.
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Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 433 (1992). Where a defendant challenges

the admissibility of a confession through a motion to suppress, the

State bears the burden of proving the confession was voluntary by a

preponderance of the evidence. 725 ILCS 5/114–11(d) (West 2002);

Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 505.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct.

1602 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that, prior to the

start of an interrogation, a person being questioned by law

enforcement officers must first “be warned that he has a right to

remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as

evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an

attorney, either retained or appointed,” as long as that person has been

“taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in

any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706-

07, 86 S. Ct. at 1612; see also Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 439. The finding

of custody is essential, as the preinterrogation warnings required by

Miranda are intended to assure that any inculpatory statement made

by a defendant is not simply the product of “ ‘the compulsion inherent

in custodial surroundings.’ ” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,

661, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 949, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2147 (1994), quoting

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 714, 86 S. Ct. at 1619.

The determination of whether a defendant is “in custody,” and,

therefore, whether the warnings set forth in Miranda are required,

involves “ ‘[t]wo discrete inquiries ***: first, what were the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those

circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not

at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” Braggs, 209 Ill.

2d at 505-06, quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 133

L. Ed. 2d 383, 394, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995). When examining the

circumstances of interrogation, this court has found a number of

factors to be relevant in determining whether a statement was made

in a custodial setting, including: (1) the location, time, length, mood,

and mode of the questioning; (2) the number of police officers present

during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of family and

friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure,

such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or

fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the

place of questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup
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of the accused. See, e.g., Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506; Melock, 149 Ill.

2d at 440. After examining and weighing these various factors, we

then must make an objective determination as to whether, under the

facts presented, “a reasonable person, innocent of any crime” would

have believed that he or she could terminate the encounter and was

free to leave. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506; People v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d

51, 66-67 (1994).

As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial court found that

defendant was questioned on three occasions on July 17, 2003: she

was questioned twice at the Center–when she initially arrived at that

location and was interviewed by Pluth, and thereafter when she was

questioned by Reuttiger, Ackerson and Johnson after K.S. admitted

that she had engaged in sex with Deck–and later that afternoon at the

sheriff’s department. As stated, findings of fact made by a trial court

on a suppression motion are accorded deference because that court is

in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the

parties and witnesses, to assess their credibility, and to give the

appropriate weight to the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d

425, 431 (2001). Based upon our review of the record, we hold that

the trial court’s finding that defendant was questioned in two separate

sessions at the Center and thereafter at the sheriff’s department is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Having found that defendant was subject to three questioning

sessions on July 17, 2003, the trial court then framed its analysis and

holdings as follows:

“The initial questioning of [defendant] occurs when she

brings her daughter in for, basically, a VSI *** [a]nd

[defendant] is questioned in a very, I guess not an abnormal

fashion where a parent brings in a child, that there is

information that that child is potentially a victim of abuse. ***

[At that time defendant] at least is suspected of enabling some

type of abuse. But I think that at that initial stage, that

questioning is not at all the type that needs Miranda to apply.

However, then there is a subsequent, a second, interview

at the Advocacy Center where it’s pretty clear that [defendant]

is considered a suspect. She has been–the information she is

providing has already been investigated and somewhat

invalidated. And the second time she is questioned at the
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Advocacy Center, it’s clear to me that she is a suspect in this

action. And it’s also pretty clear to me that she at that point

should have been Mirandized before the questioning

proceeded.

So, I think that, clearly, the second interview at the

Advocacy Center, the defendant is the focus. I suppose at that

point you could argue that she could have walked out. She

could have been free to leave. But I do think that it would

have been much more obvious to her had they followed

[Miranda] and given her her Miranda rights so she would have

been aware of the consequences of her admissions.

So with regard to that second interview, I believe Miranda

should have been given. I have to follow the Supreme Court’s

decisions and suppress those statements that are made.

Now, we get down to, really, what I call the third

interaction where [defendant] has been taken to [the sheriff’s

department]. She is Mirandized, and she gives further

incriminating statements. *** I think at that point the officers

have taken all the steps necessary to protect her rights.

* * *

The in custody, the true in custody investigation [at the

sheriff’s department] creates some additional issues. There,

clearly, Miranda was given. And I suppose there is a question

of whether there was a sufficient intervening of circumstances

that would validate the supplemental questioning and the

videotaped statement that was given. Clearly, at this point

[defendant] is cooperating, is giving what appears to be a free

and voluntary statement.

I know there is [sic] issues regarding her mental state, her

I.Q., her ability to fully understand, but I am not convinced

that the statements made to the officers at the [sheriff’s

department] was [sic] involuntary. *** I am going to allow

the questioning within the [sheriff’s department], and I am

going to bar the prior questioning of [defendant].”

It is readily apparent from a review of the trial court’s ruling that

it failed to specifically resolve the threshold legal issue of whether

defendant was “in custody” during either of the questioning sessions
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at the Center. Despite not having answered the critical question which

determines whether Miranda warnings must be given under a certain

set of facts, the trial court nevertheless concluded that Miranda

warnings were unnecessary for the first questioning session at the

Center, but were necessary for the second interrogation. In both

instances, the trial court misdirected its analysis and pegged its

Miranda holdings upon what it perceived were the varying levels of

suspicion the officers harbored with respect to defendant’s guilt. The

United States Supreme Court has made it clear that “a police officer’s

subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if

undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual

is in custody for purposes of Miranda.” Stansbury v. California, 511

U.S. 318, 324, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 299, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529-30

(1994). In Stansbury, the Court reasoned that as long as the officer’s

beliefs with respect to an individual’s guilt are not revealed to that

person, it does “not affect the objective circumstances of an

interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda

custody inquiry.” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 300,

114 S. Ct. at 1530. If, however, an officer’s beliefs of a person’s guilt

“are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned,”

such beliefs “may bear upon the custody issue.” Stansbury, 511 U.S.

at 325, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 300, 114 S. Ct. at 1530. In turn, such

disclosed beliefs “are relevant only to the extent they would affect

how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being

questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘ “freedom of

action.” ’ ” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 300, 114 S.

Ct. at 1530; see also Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506-07. We note, however,

that even under such circumstances, this would be “one among many

factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in

custody,” and not the sole determinant of that issue. Stansbury, 511

U.S. at 325, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 300, 114 S. Ct. at 1530.

There is no evidence before us that any suspicions that the

investigators may have had with respect to defendant’s potential

culpability were ever communicated to her, and, in fact, defendant

makes no such argument. Further, the trial court made no factual

finding that the officers conveyed in any manner a belief to defendant

that she was guilty or how this knowledge would affect a reasonable

person in defendant’s position with respect to her perception that she
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was free to leave. Accordingly, the trial court erred by basing its ruling

that Miranda warnings were required prior to defendant’s second

statement at the Center solely upon what it believed to be the officers’

focus upon defendant as a suspect. Because the trial court failed to

employ the proper analytical framework and to consider the factors

relevant to assessing whether defendant was subject to custodial

interrogation, we address this issue in the first instance and examine

the relevant factors.

As stated, one factor considered in making a custody

determination is the manner by which the individual arrived at the

place of questioning. It is undisputed that defendant made her own

way to the Center, as she was driven there by Deck, who was also

waiting to pick her and K.S. up and take them home after the VSI.

Defendant’s voluntary arrival at the Center by means of her own

transportation is distinguishable from a situation in which a defendant

is transported to and from the place of interrogation by law

enforcement officers and has no other means of egress from that

location. Cf. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 511-14 (defendant found “in

custody” for Miranda purposes where officers transported her to and

from multiple interrogations). 

We also look to the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the

questioning, as well as the number of police officers present. We first

examine the initial questioning session at the Center. The testimony

was uncontroverted that it was standard procedure for a parent to be

interviewed by someone from the Center prior to a VSI of the child in

order to gain permission for the child’s interview, and that this was the

purpose of Pluth’s discussion with defendant. The evidence showed

that this was a very short encounter of a few minutes duration, that

the discussion was only between defendant and Pluth, and that

defendant granted Pluth permission to interview K.S. and, in the

course of doing so, denied that any abuse had taken place. No police

officers were present during this initial questioning session.

Analyzing these same specific factors in terms of the second

interview of defendant at the Center, we note that it took place in an

interview room which contained a table and chairs. The testimony was

uncontroverted that this session lasted for the short duration of only

between 10 to 15 minutes. Cf. People v. Townes, 91 Ill. 2d 32, 36

(1982) (factors supporting defendant was in custody included his
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interrogation over a 12-hour period). Although the testimony was not

entirely clear as to whether and when the door of the room was

opened or closed, it appears that it was closed at the time that

defendant began to cry and become upset and loud as a means to

ensure not only the privacy of the sensitive discussions but also that

others at the Center were not disturbed. There was no indication that

the door was ever locked.

The evidence was also uncontroverted that this session with

defendant was intended to both apprise her of the fact that her 11-

year-old daughter had just admitted she was having sex with Deck in

defendant’s home, and also, in the words of Reuttiger, to help the

investigators do some “fact finding” with respect to K.S.’s admission

so that they could ensure her safety. In addition, it is undisputed that

Johnson informed defendant that, because he could not believe her

denials that K.S. had not been abused, he could remove K.S. from

defendant’s care if he thought there was a danger to the minor and if

that was in the best interests of the child. There is nothing in the

record to indicate that defendant was ever threatened that her children

would be removed from her care as a result of her failure to confess;

defendant was simply apprised of the next steps that would be taken

to ensure her child’s safety. Further, the record is devoid of anything

to indicate that the investigators harassed defendant or raised their

voices. It is also undisputed that when defendant began to reveal her

knowledge of the relationship between K.S. and Deck, the questioning

immediately ceased. It is likewise uncontroverted that during this

short session, defendant was interviewed alternately by Johnson alone,

and at some point the two detectives also joined him; however, all

three men were not in the room with defendant during the duration of

the questioning.

Although defendant points to the fact that a number of

investigators and law enforcement personnel were at the Center for

K.S.’s VSI, there is no evidence that they converged on defendant as

a group. To the contrary, the record reflects that defendant interacted

with different individuals at different times for different purposes, with

the exception of Assistant State’s Attorney Brink, who appears to

have had no personal contact with defendant while she was at the

Center. We also find it significant that defendant was interacting with

these individuals at the Center and not at a police station, which
 

1

Johnson testified that upon visiting defendant’s home, he could visibly

see that her husband had “very low” intellectual capabilities. 

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would likely present a more foreboding, intimidating and adversarial

environment.

We also note that there were no indicia of formal arrest

procedures during defendant’s questioning at the Center. The record

is devoid of any use of a show of force or weapons, physical restraint,

booking, or fingerprinting. Cf. People v. Brown, 136 Ill. 2d 116, 127-

28 (1990) (factors supporting defendant was in custody included that

police officers searched and handcuffed defendant, took him to the

police station, and filled out an arrest card). Throughout the time

defendant was at the Center, the detectives were in plain clothes and

not uniformed, although they did carry holstered weapons. We also

note that although defendant was not advised that she was free to

leave, she also at no time requested to leave.

In making a custody determination for purposes of Miranda, we

also look to the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.

The record reflects that defendant is a middle-aged adult who took

special education classes and graduated from high school, and who

can read well enough to enjoy a novel. Defendant has no criminal

history and no acknowledged contact with the criminal justice system,

although the evidence reveals that she has dealt with DCFS in the

past. Defendant underwent a fitness evaluation prior to trial, and

although Dr. Zoot concluded that defendant’s full-range IQ of 74

places her in the “borderline range of intellectual functioning,” it was

uncontradicted and stipulated that defendant was fit to stand trial

because she possessed the ability to understand court proceedings and

legal concepts. Cf. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 511-13 (factors supporting

defendant’s interrogation was custodial included fact that she had an

IQ of 54, could not readily understand her circumstances, and had

been found unfit to stand trial). Although there was testimony that

defendant and her husband were receiving services through an agency

for the developmentally disabled, it is unclear whether those services

were primarily directed towards defendant, or whether she was a

recipient of such services as a result of her marriage to her husband.1

Further, the testimony is undisputed that defendant did not have
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difficulty in communicating with anyone at the Center, and that there

was no outward indication whatsoever that she is developmentally

disabled. We also note that during the videotaped confession taken

from defendant later in the day at the sheriff’s department, defendant

speaks very fluently with the officers, engages them in conversation,

and has no apparent communication difficulties. Cf. Braggs, 209 Ill.

2d at 511-13 (factors supporting that the mentally retarded defendant

was in custody included fact that police communicated with her

through her guardian/sister, as defendant was unable to communicate

directly with officers).

Our review of the above factors leads to the conclusion that, based

upon the circumstances presented, a reasonable innocent person in

defendant’s position would have felt free to terminate her encounter

and leave the Center if she so desired. With respect to the first

questioning session between Pluth and defendant, there is nothing in

the record to indicate that this was anything other than a routine

discussion between a member of the Center and a parent who was

requested to give her permission to allow her child to take part in a

VSI based upon information that the child was potentially a victim of

abuse. Accordingly, there is no indication that defendant was in

custody at the time this interaction took place.

With respect to the second questioning session defendant

underwent at the Center, during which she gave an inculpatory

statement, we note that the trial court, while not specifically ruling on

whether defendant was in custody during this questioning, did state

that “you could argue that she could have walked out. She could have

been free to leave.” We also observe that in its ruling the trial court

contrasted the circumstances of the questioning at the Center with the

subsequent questioning of defendant at the sheriff’s department and

characterized the latter interrogation as the “in custody, the true in

custody investigation.” These comments strongly suggest that the trial

court was not convinced that defendant was subject to a custodial

interrogation at the Center.

The appellate court, however, arrived at a contrary conclusion,

holding that defendant was in custody during her second interrogation

at the Center, and therefore Miranda warnings were required. We

observe that the entire extent of the analysis of the appellate court

with respect to the question of whether defendant was in custody is
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comprised of two sentences. The appellate court neither discussed the

factors pertinent in making a determination as to whether a defendant

is subject to a custodial interrogation nor employed the appropriate

analytical framework in arriving at its decision.

Based upon our review of the record, we reject the conclusion of

the appellate court and hold that with respect to the second

questioning session at the Center, a reasonable innocent person, faced

with the circumstances in which defendant found herself, would have

felt at liberty to terminate the questioning and leave. In sum, we hold

that the circumstances surrounding the second questioning session at

the Center were noncustodial, as no innocent person would have

believed that her freedom was restrained. Since defendant was not in

custody, Miranda warnings were not necessary.

Having determined that the inculpatory statement made by

defendant during the second questioning session at the Center did not

violate Miranda, we address defendant’s argument that

notwithstanding the lack of Miranda warnings, her statement was

nevertheless invalid, as it was involuntary. We note that defendant’s

argument echoes the appellate court’s concerns about the

voluntariness of this statement. We also observe that because the trial

court suppressed this inculpatory statement based upon its belief that

defendant was not properly Mirandized, it was unnecessary for that

court to engage in an analysis of whether defendant’s statement was

also voluntary.

Even where Miranda warnings are not required, the fifth

amendment still demands that a defendant’s confession be voluntary.

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8,

96 S. Ct. 1612, 1617 (1976); Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 452. The test for

voluntariness is “whether the defendant made the statement freely,

voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or

whether the defendant’s will was overcome at the time he or she

confessed.” People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). In making

this determination, we consider the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the statement, including: (1) the defendant’s age,

intelligence, education, experience, and physical condition at the time

of the detention and interrogation; (2) the duration of the

interrogation; (3) the presence of Miranda warnings; (4) the presence

of any physical or mental abuse; and (5) the legality and duration of
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the detention. See, e.g., People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 536 (2005);

Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 500-01. The State bears the burden of proving,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the confession was

voluntary. 725 ILCS 5/114–11(d) (West 2002); In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d

37, 49 (2000).

We first consider defendant’s age, intelligence, background,

experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the

time of questioning. As discussed earlier in this opinion, the evidence

is uncontroverted that defendant’s intellectual limitations were not

outwardly apparent to the detectives and did not interfere with her

ability to communicate with them. This is confirmed by our own

review of defendant’s subsequent videotaped statement, wherein she

speaks fluently with the officers in a conversational manner,

engages–and often leads–the officers in conversation, freely offers

details, and is very open and cooperative. There are no outward

indications from our viewing of this recorded statement that defendant

has a disability. Cf. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 516 (factors supporting that

defendant’s confession was involuntary included her inability to

communicate with police, and the officer’s awareness of her severe

disability). Although defendant’s IQ was characterized as “borderline”

by Dr. Zoot, it is uncontroverted and stipulated that defendant was fit

to stand trial. Cf Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 517 (defendant’s unfitness to

stand trial due to mental retardation a factor in finding confession

involuntary). Our conclusion is further supported by the trial court’s

finding that defendant’s intellectual limitations did not render her

subsequent confession at the sheriff’s department involuntary, which

suggests that the trial court implicitly found that defendant’s disability

was not so severe as to render her incapable of making a voluntary

confession.

In examining the legality and duration of the detention and

questioning, as we noted above, it is uncontroverted that defendant

arrived at the Center of her own free will and not by police transport.

Further, it is undisputed that the questioning session during which

defendant gave her inculpatory statement was of short duration–15

minutes or less–and that it was aimed primarily at apprising defendant

in her role as a parent of K.S.’s statement that she had been abused

and in assuring the safety of the minor. During this short session,

defendant was alternatively questioned by Johnson alone and, for
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some period, Reuttiger and Ackerson also were in the room.

However, all three were not in the room for the entire questioning

session. Again, we also note that this questioning occurred in an

interview room at the Center and not in a police station. 

We also find that defendant was not the subject of any physical or

mental abuse by her questioners, including the existence of threats or

promises. The evidence is uncontroverted that defendant was told that

her statements that K.S. had not suffered abuse were not believed, and

that it was possible that K.S. would be removed from defendant’s care

if it was in the best interests of the minor to ensure her safety.

However, the record is devoid of any threat that defendant’s children

would be removed because she failed to confess. In addition, the fact

that defendant first denied the abuse and then changed her statement

indicated that she understood the situation and wished to avoid the

consequences of her permitting her daughter to be further abused by

Deck. In fact, during her subsequent videotaped statement, defendant

candidly admitted that she was telling the truth about what happened

between K.S. and Deck because she not only wanted to keep her

daughter away from him, but also wanted to prevent him from

victimizing other young girls, such as her daughter’s friend. Finally,

we note that although defendant was not told that she could leave the

Center, she never indicated a desire to terminate the questioning and

leave the premises.

We have examined the particular circumstances surrounding

defendant’s questioning, as well as her relevant personal

characteristics, and conclude that she was not induced to make an

involuntary inculpatory statement. We hold that the inculpatory

statement made by defendant during the second questioning session

at the Center was voluntary and not the product of police coercion.

Accordingly, the appellate court erred in holding that the inculpatory

statement made by defendant at the Center was involuntary and

therefore inadmissible.

Because we hold that the inculpatory statement made by defendant

during the second questioning session at the Center did not violate

Miranda and was made knowingly and voluntarily, it was properly

admissible at trial. Therefore, the second inculpatory statement made

by defendant thereafter at the sheriff’s department could not be tainted

by the properly obtained first statement. The validity of the confession
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made by defendant at the sheriff’s department has not been questioned

absent its relationship to the earlier inculpatory statement provided by

defendant at the Center. Because we hold that the first confession at

the Center was valid, the appellate court erred by holding that the

second confession at the sheriff’s department was tainted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is

reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is

affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.