2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-19-2002

Valladolid v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 1-2361

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Recommended Citation

"Valladolid v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 132.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/132
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 __________ 

 No. 01-2361 

 __________ 

 

 SANTOS VALLADOLID, 

 Appellant 

 

 v. 

 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 __________ 

 

 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

 D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-05919 

 District Judge: The Honorable John W. Bissell, Chief Judge 

 __________ 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 February 12, 2002 

 __________ 

 

 Before: MANSMANN, McKEE, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 

 (Opinion Filed: February 19, 2002 ) 

 ____________ 

 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 ____________ 

 

BARRY, Circuit Judge 

 On October 25, 2000, appellant filed a motion for attorneys' fees 

pursuant to the 

Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C.  2412(d)(1)(A), for 

counsel's work in 

appealing the Commissioner's denial of appellant's claim for disability 

benefits and 

Supplemental Security Income. On April 23, 2001, the District Court 

denied that motion. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291 and will affirm. 

 The parties are familiar with the facts underlying this appeal and we 

will, 

accordingly, discuss them only as necessary to resolve the issue 

presented. 

 This case began more than ten years ago when appellant filed a 

disability claim for 

alleged mental impairment due to depression. Appellant lost before the 

ALJ, lost before 
the Appeals Council, lost before District Court, and ultimately lost 

before us on August 

16, 2000. In sum, the District Court determined that substantial evidence 

supported the 

ALJ's finding that appellant was not disabled, and we summarily affirmed. 

 Just before we affirmed, however, the Commissioner agreed to a remand 

for 

further administrative proceedings, an agreement of which we were apprised 

after our 

order issued. Accordingly, we entered an order vacating our August 16, 

2000 order and 

remanding the case to the District Court, which, in turn, remanded the 

matter to the 

Commissioner. On remand, new evidence in the form of vocational expert 

testimony was 

submitted and appellant prevailed on the merits. Appellant now seeks 

$8,646.55 in 

attorneys' fees "for work performed before the District Court and the 

Court of Appeals 

for the Third Circuit." Appellant's Br. at 10. 

 The EAJA provides, in pertinent part, that a prevailing party shall 

be awarded 

"fees and other expenses . . . , unless the court finds that the position 

of the United States 

was substantially justified." 28 U.S.C.  2412(d)(1)(A). The District 

Court denied 

appellant's motion for fees particularly in light of the fact that both 

that Court and our 

Court had found that the Commissioner's position was supported by 

substantial evidence. 

App. 19-21. We review this determination for an abuse of discretion. 

E.g., Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559 (1988); Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 682 

(3d Cir. 

1998). 

 A position is "substantially justified" when it is "justified in 

substance or in the 

main that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable 

person." Pierce, 487 

U.S. at 565. In other words, the government's position is substantially 

justified "if it has 

a reasonable basis in both law and fact." Morgan, 142 F.3d at 684 

(quoting Hanover 

Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

 Within this framework, it is well settled that the government may 

lose on the 

merits yet still be found to have been substantially justified in its 

position. Similarly, if 

the case turns on an unsettled or "close" question of law, the 

government's position will 

normally be substantially justified notwithstanding the fact that its 

legal position is 

ultimately rejected. Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 961-62 (3d Cir. 

1985). In 
contrast, "[w]hen the government's legal position clearly offends 

established precedent . . 

. its position cannot be said to be 'substantially justified.'" Id. at 

962. 

 The Commissioner bears the burden of showing that his position was 

substantially 

justified. Morgan, 142 F.3d at 684. To carry this burden, the 

Commissioner must show: 

(1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable 

basis in law for the 

theory he propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts 

alleged and the 

legal theory advanced. Id. 

 Here, the Commissioner's position was that appellant was not disabled 

and that the 

ALJ's denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence. In short, 

the ALJ 

concluded that appellant had the residual functional capacity to perform 

work existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy, and that no mental impairment 

existed that 

would preclude such work. App. 31-32 & 41. In addressing two medical 

opinions 

suggesting that severe depression existed, the ALJ observed that the 

reports failed to find 

any specific or significant work-related limitations, were based on 

appellant's subjective 

complaints rather than objective findings, and revealed that appellant 

showed signs of 

"malingering." App. 32-33. In addition, the ALJ found appellant's 

subjective complaints 

not to be credible, and relied on test results showing that appellant had 

normal 

concentration and memory abilities as evidence contradicting at least one 

of the medical 

reports. App. 34. The Appeals Council concurred. 

 Before the District Court, the Commissioner contended that the ALJ's 

findings 

regarding the issue of mental impairment were supported by substantial 

evidence. As the 

Court put it: "The dispute between claimant and the Commissioner arises in 

step two [of 

the five-step sequence in evaluating disability claims]. The Commissioner 

maintains that, 

despite the two opinions concluding that claimant's depression is severe, 

it is not." App. 

38. The District Court, in a thorough opinion, agreed, primarily because 

the doctors who 

offered those opinions failed to adduce objective evidence supporting 

them, which left 

appellant with insufficient proof at step two of the five-step sequence. 

App. 41-49. We 

affirmed "substantially for the reasons" set forth by the District Court. 

Valladolid v. 
Commissioner of Social Security, No. 00-5097, at 2 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 

2000). 

 With this record in mind, we turn to the Commissioner's burden of 

establishing a 

substantially justified position. First, the facts upon which the position 

rested -- the 

statements contained in the doctors' reports, medical test results, and 

the ALJ's credibility 

determinations -- had a reasonable basis in truth. Second, the lack of 

objective findings in 

the doctors' reports and the ALJ's credibility determinations gave the 

Commissioner a 

reasonable basis in law to argue that appellant failed to carry his burden 

and that the 

ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. That we 

ultimately affirmed 

lends support to the reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual and 

legal conclusions 

and the connection of one to the other. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

District Court 

did not abuse its discretion in holding that the Commissioner carried his 

burden of 

demonstrating a substantially justified position. 

 In his attempt to rebut this conclusion, appellant invokes a litany 

of wholly 

speculative contentions as to the reasons for the Commissioner's agreement 

to remand, 

the "delay" in notifying us of that decision, and an alleged "informal 

agreement" by or 

practice of the Commissioner not to challenge fee applications after such 

remands. He 

argues, as well, that the Commissioner erroneously construed the evidence 

in rejecting his 

claim, as evidenced by his ultimate success on the merits. Finally, he 

argues that the 

Commissioner's position "clearly offended" established and forthcoming 

precedent, and 

that the District Court and this Court "ignored" this precedent. Only 

this final argument 

warrants discussion. 

 Remarkably, appellant exerts a fair amount of energy contending that 

we ignored 

Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2000), when we rejected his claim on 

the merits in 

our August 16, 2000 order. We say "remarkably" because Sykes was decided 

more than 

a month after we disposed of appellant's claim on the merits. Appellant 

acknowledges 

this fact, yet insists that we ignored Sykes. It goes without saying that 

we could hardly 

have ignored a decision that did not exist and appellant has not pointed 

to anything that 

would have enabled us, the District Court, or (most importantly) the 

Commissioner to 
foresee our future holdings. In any event, appellant's reliance on Sykes 

is entirely 

unpersuasive. 

 Appellant next claims that the District Court and our Court also 

ignored our prior 

decisions in Jesurum v. Secretary of the United States Dep't of Health & 

Human Servs., 

48 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 1995); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43 (3d Cir. 1994); 

and Gilliland v. 

Heckler, 786 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1986). Appellant's Br. at 17. 

Specifically, appellant 

opines that he "argued before the District Court and before this Court 

that the ALJ would 

not be permitted under Jesurum . . . to utilize the 'framework' of a 

vocational rule in the 

presence of non-exertional limitations," but that this argument 

"ultimately fell on deaf 

ears." Appellant's Br. at 17-18 (emphasis added). This argument fails 

for a number of 

reasons. 

 First, none of the above cases compel an ALJ to use a vocational 

expert where the 

claimant has both exertional and nonexertional impairments, nor do they 

categorically 

preclude the ALJ from utilizing the vocational rules in such cases. 

Indeed, we observed 

in Sykes that "[w]e have never defined what sort of evidence the 

Commissioner must 

present to meet his burden of proof" in such circumstances. Sykes, 228 

F.3d at 273. 

Second, appellant's cases are factually inapposite because each of the 

cases involved 

insufficiently developed factual records or factual findings illustrating 

what work the 

claimant could perform in light of uncontradicted medical evidence that 

conflicted with 

the ALJ's findings. Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 118-20; Adorno, 40 F.3d at 46-

47; Gilliland, 

786 F.2d at 183-84. Here, in contrast, the ALJ made specific and 

supported factual 

findings regarding appellant's ability to perform work, App. 31, and his 

finding of no 

severe mental impairment was supported by the medical evidence. 

 Finally, even viewing these cases in the light most favorable to 

appellant, the 

Commissioner's position can, at worst, be described as a good faith 

argument on an 

unresolved or "close" legal question. As such, the Commissioner's 

position was 

substantially justified. Washington, 756 F.2d at 961-62. 

 We have carefully considered all of appellant's remaining contentions 

and find 

them to be unavailing. 

 We will affirm the April 23, 2001 order of the District Court. 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 

 Kindly file the foregoing Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ Maryanne Trump Barry 

 Circuit Judge