a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2003 NATIONAL 

AIRSPACE SYSTEM

Current Efforts and 

Proposed Changes to 

Improve Performance 

of FAA’s Air Traffic 

Control System

GAO-03-542
To carry out its oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee has focused on 

bringing performance management, accountability, and a more businesslike 

structure to the air traffic control system. It is working with FAA managers 

to refine and implement performance measures that will track safety 

indicators, such as operational errors and runway incursions, as well as the 

cost to provide air traffic control services. The subcommittee also has taken 

some specific actions, as provided in AIR-21, including reviewing and 

approving a budget request and five large procurements that FAA had 

initiated for the air traffic control system. However, the subcommittee has 

encountered obstacles in carrying out its responsibilities, the greatest of 

which has been FAA’s inability to hire a chief operating officer. Without a 

chief operating officer to initiate actions that the subcommittee is 

responsible for reviewing and approving, the subcommittee’s influence has 

been limited. According to the subcommittee, a major difficulty in hiring a 

chief operating officer has been uncertainty about the position's 

responsibilities, reporting relationships, and performance measures. 

The Congress, the administration, the subcommittee, and other stakeholders 

have proposed changes to the subcommittee’s organization and oversight 

responsibilities that they believe would improve the performance of the air 

traffic control system. These changes could clarify uncertainties in the law 

or would modify the subcommittee's approval authority. For example, three 

legislative proposals would designate the FAA Administrator as the chair of 

the subcommittee. While this change could eliminate any uncertainty about 

the chief operating officer’s reporting relationships and could make it easier 

to hire a chief operating officer, it also would reduce the number of private 

sector members and give the greatest authority to the FAA member (see 

figure). Two of these proposals also would alter the subcommittee’s 

approval authority. For example, one would make the subcommittee an 

advisory rather than an oversight body. The merits of these proposals 

depend on the extent to which approval authority is considered necessary or 

desirable to bring about improvements in the air traffic control system.

Current and Proposed Oversight and Management Structure 

Blurred Lines of Authority under AIR-21 Proposed Lines of Authority

Air Traffic Services 

Subcommittee

Source: GAO.

with

five private sector 

members

Air Traffic Services 

Board/Committee

with the

FAA Administrator

as Chair

FAA Administrator

FAA Administrator

Chief Operating 

Officer 

Chief Operating 

Officer 

and four private 

sector members

To accelerate the modernization 

and improve the performance of 

the air traffic control system, the 

Wendell H. Ford Aviation 

Investment and Reform Act for the 

21st Century (AIR-21) created the 

Air Traffic Services Subcommittee 

(subcommittee) to oversee the air 

traffic control system and help the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) address long-standing 

weaknesses in its modernization 

program. The subcommittee is part 

of an aviation advisory council and 

consists of five private sector 

members with business expertise. 

AIR-21 gave the subcommittee the 

authority to approve strategic 

plans, budgets, and procurements 

over $100 million. In addition, 

AIR-21 required FAA to hire a chief 

operating officer to manage the 

system’s day-to-day operations. 

AIR-21 mandated that GAO report 

on the success of the 

subcommittee in improving the 

performance of the air traffic 

control system. Accordingly, as 

agreed with the congressional 

committees’ offices, GAO reviewed 

the (1) actions taken by the 

subcommittee to carry out its 

oversight responsibilities and the 

obstacles that it encountered in 

doing so and (2) changes to the 

subcommittee’s organization and 

oversight responsibilities that have 

been proposed to improve the 

performance of the air traffic 

control system. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-542. 

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gerald L. 

Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-542, a report to 

congressional committees 

 May 2003 

NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 

Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to 

Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic 

Control System 
Page i GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

Subcommittee Has Emphasized Performance-based Management 

and Carried Out Some Responsibilities, but Obstacles Have 

Hampered Its Progress 8

Proposed Changes to the Subcommittee’s Organization and 

Oversight Responsibilities Could Clarify Uncertainties and 

Would Modify the Subcommittee’s Authority 14

Agency Comments 20

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 22 

Appendix II Subcommittee’s Progress in Implementing Specific 

Responsibilities 23 

Appendix III Proposed Legislative Changes Affecting the 

Subcommittee and the Chief Operating Officer 

Responsibilities 24 

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 25 

Contacts 25

Staff Acknowledgments 25

Figures 

Figure 1: Organizational Structure Created by AIR-21 and 

Executive Order 13180 7

Figure 2: Current and Proposed Oversight and Management 

Structure 16

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Abbreviations 

AIR-21 Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for 

the 21st Century 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

IRS Internal Revenue Service 

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product. 
Page 1 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

May 30, 2003 

Congressional Committees 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) manages the busiest, most 

complex air traffic control system in the world. But the agency has had 

difficulty modernizing this system to improve its safety and efficiency and 

expand its capacity to accommodate projected increases in air traffic. 

Over the past two decades, FAA’s air traffic control modernization 

program has had a history of cost overruns and schedule delays. For over 

a decade, bipartisan commissions, oversight organizations, and others 

have documented problems with the air traffic control modernization 

program and have made numerous recommendations, yet the problems 

continue. 

In 2000, the Congress enacted legislation and the administration issued an 

executive order that, together, established a new, three-component 

structure to accelerate the modernization and improve the performance of 

the air traffic control system. The legislation—the Wendell H. Ford 

Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21)—

defines the air traffic control system as the equipment, policies, 

procedures, and personnel required to deliver air traffic services.1

 AIR-21 

established two of the new components: (1) a board of five private sector 

members, called the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee (subcommittee), to 

oversee the air traffic control system and (2) a chief operating officer to 

manage the air traffic control system. Executive Order 13180, issued 

December 7, 2000, created the third component, a new performance-based 

organization within FAA, to be known as the Air Traffic Organization, to 

operate the air traffic control system. The subcommittee is part of the 

Aviation Management Advisory Council (council), which is responsible for 

advising FAA on the perspectives of its aviation industry customers.2

Under the act, the subcommittee oversees “the administration, 

management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the air traffic control 

system” and has the authority to, among other things, “review and 

approve” strategic plans, large contracts, and budget requests for the air 

 1

Public Law 106-181, April 5, 2000. 

2

The Congress authorized the council in 1996 and amended its appointment process and 

composition through AIR-21. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

traffic control system. Under both the act and the executive order, the 

chief operating officer reports to the FAA Administrator and, under the 

executive order, heads the new performance-based organization. 

The subcommittee members were sworn in on January 31, 2001, and the 

subcommittee, which is required to meet at least quarterly, has since held 

eight working meetings. The FAA Administrator, who is responsible for 

hiring the chief operating officer, has retained two recruiting firms, but the 

chief operating officer position has not been filled. Because FAA has 

decided to involve the chief operating officer in establishing and 

implementing the new performance-based organization, FAA is waiting for 

an appointment to be approved before putting the new organization in 

place. 

Since the enactment of AIR-21, the Congress, the administration, FAA, and 

other stakeholders have raised questions about the implementation of the 

legislation and have proposed changes to the subcommittee’s organization 

and oversight responsibilities that they believe would address these 

questions. In the spring of 2003, the administration, the Senate, and the 

House proposed legislation to amend AIR-21 that would, among other 

things, change the organization and responsibilities of the subcommittee. 

AIR-21 requires us to report on the success of the subcommittee in 

improving the performance of the air traffic control system. However, 

because the success of the subcommittee is linked to its interactions with 

the chief operating officer and the new air traffic organization, neither of 

which is yet in place, our analysis was limited to the actions of the 

subcommittee, and we could not assess the performance of the new 

structure as a whole. Accordingly, as agreed with your offices, this report 

addresses the following questions: 

• What has the subcommittee done to carry out its oversight 

responsibilities, and what obstacles has it encountered in attempting to 

do so? 

• What changes to the subcommittee’s organization and oversight 

responsibilities have been proposed to improve the performance of the 

air traffic control system? 

To address both of these questions, we analyzed AIR-21 and its legislative 

history, the executive order, and the three legislative proposals that would 
Page 3 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

amend provisions of AIR-21 relating to the subcommittee. We also 

analyzed the subcommittee’s August 2002 report3

 and interviewed 

stakeholders, including the past and present FAA Administrators; other 

FAA officials; past and present members of the Air Traffic Services 

Subcommittee; and representatives of several aviation industry 

organizations, public policy research organizations, and the two firms 

hired to recruit the chief operating officer. We did not address changes to 

FAA’s—as opposed to the subcommittee’s—organization that some 

stakeholders maintain are essential to improve the performance of the air 

traffic control system. See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of our 

scope and methodology. 

To carry out its oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee has focused 

on bringing performance-based management to the air traffic control 

system and has taken some of the actions specified in AIR-21, but several 

obstacles have hampered its progress. Defining its role as bringing 

measurements, accountability, and a more businesslike structure to air 

traffic services, the subcommittee has worked with FAA managers to 

refine and implement performance measures that will track safety 

indicators, such as operational errors and runway incursions, as well as 

track the cost to provide air traffic control services so that FAA can better 

monitor, improve, and hold its managers accountable for the performance 

of the air traffic control system. The subcommittee also has accomplished 

some of the specific responsibilities set forth in the act, such as reviewing 

and approving budget requests and five large procurements that FAA 

initiated for the air traffic control system. However, the subcommittee has 

encountered several obstacles that have impeded its progress, the greatest 

of which, according to our analysis and discussions with stakeholders, has 

been FAA’s inability to hire a chief operating officer. Without a chief 

operating officer to initiate actions that the subcommittee is responsible 

for reviewing and approving, the subcommittee’s influence has been 

limited. According to the subcommittee, a major difficulty in hiring a chief 

operating officer has been uncertainty about how the chief operating 

officer would interact with the FAA Administrator and the subcommittee 

and how the incumbent’s performance would be measured. Other 

obstacles that the subcommittee has encountered include its members’ 

limited experience with aviation and with FAA’s acquisition and budget 

 3

Air Traffic Services Subcommittee, Report of the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee (Aug. 

28, 2000). 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

processes; turnover on the subcommittee; and, according to the 

subcommittee, FAA’s lack of flexibility to move funds between and within 

accounts. 

The Congress, the administration, the subcommittee, and other 

stakeholders have proposed changes to the subcommittee’s organization 

and oversight responsibilities that they believe would improve the 

performance of the air traffic control system. These changes could clarify 

uncertainties in the law or would modify the subcommittee’s approval 

authority. For example, the administration, the Senate, and the House 

have proposed legislation to separate the subcommittee from and make it 

independent of its parent organization, the Aviation Management Advisory 

Council. These three legislative proposals also would designate the FAA 

Administrator as the chair of the subcommittee. While this change could 

make it easier to hire a chief operating officer by eliminating any 

uncertainty about how the incumbent would interact with the 

Administrator and the subcommittee, it also would reduce the number of 

private sector members from five to four and give the greatest authority to 

the FAA member. Two of the three proposals also would alter the 

subcommittee’s approval authority: the administration’s proposal would 

eliminate the subcommittee’s approval authority entirely and make the 

subcommittee an advisory body, while the House proposal would 

eliminate the subcommittee’s authority to approve the budget request for 

the air traffic control system but would retain the subcommittee’s other 

approval authorities. The Senate proposal would make no changes in the 

subcommittee’s approval authority. Our analysis indicates that the merits 

of the proposed changes depend, in large part, on the extent to which 

approval authority is viewed as necessary or desirable to bring about 

improvements in the performance of the air traffic control system. The 

upcoming reauthorization of FAA creates opportunities to consider the 

merits of these and other proposed changes and to determine whether or 

how changes should be made. 

Department of Transportation officials generally agreed with the facts 

presented in this report and made technical and clarifying comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate. The Air Traffic Services 

Subcommittee did not provide comments beyond those provided by 

department officials. 

More than 20 years ago, FAA began a modernization program to replace 

and upgrade the nation’s air traffic control equipment and facilities to 

meet expected increases in air traffic, enhance aviation safety, and 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

increase efficiency. We and others have identified shortcomings in FAA’s 

management of the air traffic control modernization program, primarily 

problems in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. For example, 

the centerpiece of FAA’s modernization program—the Advanced 

Automation System—was restructured in 1994 after (1) the costs of 

developing the system, estimated in 1983 to be $2.5 billion, tripled to $7.6 

billion and (2) the implementation of significantly less-than-promised 

capabilities was projected to take 8 years or longer than originally 

estimated. FAA attributed many of these problems to federal procurement 

and personnel constraints. In 1995, the Congress exempted FAA from 

many federal procurement and personnel statutes and allowed the agency 

to develop its own systems, which FAA implemented in 1996. However, 

problems with the management of the air traffic control modernization 

program continue.4

 Recently, for example, we reported that the Standard 

Terminal Automation Replacement System, which was estimated in 1996 

to cost $940 million, was expected in March 2002 to cost $1.33 billion, take 

4 years longer than originally scheduled to be implemented, and be 

deployed at 74 rather than 172 facilities.5

To better understand and resolve these problems, the Congress created a 

number of bipartisan commissions to review aspects of FAA’s operations, 

including the provision of air traffic services. These commissions made 

recommendations to the Congress to help FAA accelerate the 

modernization and improve the performance of the air traffic control 

system. For example, in 1997, the National Civil Aviation Review 

Commission, also known as the Mineta Commission, reported that FAA 

must become a performance-based organization to make the best possible 

use of the personnel and procurement flexibilities that the Congress had 

granted to it.6

 The Commission said that air traffic services should be 

overseen by a board of directors and managed by a chief operating officer. 

 4

U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Modernization Investment 

Management Approach Could Be Strengthened, GAO-99-88 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 

1999). 

5

U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Better Cost Data Could 

Improve FAA’s Management of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System, 

GAO-03-343 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2003). 

6

National Civil Aviation Review Commission, A Consensus for Change: Avoiding Aviation 

Gridlock and Reducing the Accident Rate (Washington, D.C.: December 1997). 
Page 6 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

AIR-21 incorporated key suggestions from the Mineta Commission, 

including creating both the subcommittee to oversee the air traffic control 

system and the position of chief operating officer within FAA to manage 

the system. The subcommittee is generally responsible for overseeing the 

administration and management of the air traffic control system and is 

specifically responsible for reviewing and approving (1) strategic and 

major organizational plans, (2) methods of accelerating the modernization 

of the air traffic control system and improvements in aviation safety 

related to air traffic control, (3) contracts of more than $100 million, (4) 

the FAA Administrator’s appointment of a chief operating officer, (5) cost 

accounting and financial management systems, and (6) budget requests.7

The chief operating officer is responsible for implementing the tasks 

delegated by the Administrator. 

Executive Order 13180, issued on December 7, 2000, directed FAA to 

merge two of its organizations—Research and Acquisitions, which 

develops and acquires air traffic modernization equipment, and Air Traffic 

Services, which uses the equipment to provide air traffic services—to form 

the new performance-based Air Traffic Organization and designated the 

chief operating officer as the head of that organization. Under the 

executive order as well as the act, the chief operating officer reports to the 

FAA Administrator. According to the executive order, the new 

organization would improve FAA’s ability to make use of its procurement 

and personnel flexibilities and would focus on achieving results through 

consultation with its customers (the traveling public), direct users (e.g., 

airlines and airports), and federal and local agencies (see fig. 1). 

 7

The subcommittee also has meeting and reporting requirements and is compensated at the 

rate of $40,000 a year for the chairperson and $25,000 a year for the other members. 
Page 7 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Figure 1: Organizational Structure Created by AIR-21 and Executive Order 13180 

The provisions of AIR-21 that apply to the subcommittee are modeled on 

1998 legislation that created the Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board 

to oversee the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) administration, 

management, conduct, direction, supervision, execution, and application 

of tax laws. The Congress established the board to help IRS overcome 

long-standing difficulties in modernizing its information systems and 

improving customer service—difficulties that were viewed as broadly 

analogous to those affecting the air traffic control system. However, the 

board differs from the subcommittee in that it includes the Secretary of 

the Treasury and the IRS Commissioner, whereas the subcommittee, as 

provided in AIR-21, consists entirely of private sector representatives. 

In July 2002, the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, held a hearing on FAA’s progress in 

hiring a chief operating officer and the role of the subcommittee. During 

this hearing, the former FAA Administrator and the former subcommittee 

chairman testified that a lack of clarity in the act on the relationship of the 

chief operating officer to the subcommittee and the FAA Administrator 

had made it difficult to hire a chief operating officer. This spring, the 

administration, the Senate, and the House have proposed legislation to 

reauthorize FAA’s programs that would amend AIR-21 to, among other 

things, clarify this relationship.8

 8

The administration submitted its reauthorization proposal to the Congress on March 25, 

2003; S. 824 was introduced in April 2003; and H.R. 2115 was introduced in May 2003. 

Air Traffic Services Subcommittee:

Private sector members (5)

13 representatives:

Aviation industry (10)

FAA labor (1)

Department of Transportation (1)

Department of Defense (1)

Aviation Management Advisory Council

18 members: 

Source: GAO.

FAA Administrator

Chief Operating 

Officer 

Air Traffic 

Services

Research and

Acquisitions

Air Traffic Organization

advice

oversight
Page 8 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Under AIR-21, the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee has multiple 

responsibilities, but it thus far has focused on assisting FAA in moving 

toward performance-based management. Specifically, the subcommittee 

has defined its role as bringing measurements, accountability, and a more 

businesslike structure to air traffic services. It also has accomplished 

some of the specific responsibilities set out in the act, such as approving 

budgets and large procurements, but it has encountered obstacles that 

have limited its progress. The greatest obstacle has been the lack of a chief 

operating officer to provide senior leadership for implementing change. 

Other obstacles include the subcommittee members’ general inexperience 

with aviation and with FAA’s acquisition and budget processes; turnover 

on the subcommittee; and, according to the subcommittee, FAA’s lack of 

flexibility to move funds between and within accounts. 

In its first annual report, issued in August 2002, the subcommittee 

expressed the view that “setting the proper performance measures and 

then accurately and relentlessly using them to improve the quality and 

safety of the air traffic system will form the foundation of the new 

organization.” Even without a chief operating officer to develop a strategic 

plan for the air traffic control system, including measures of safety, 

efficiency, and productivity, as provided in the act, the subcommittee has 

been working with FAA to identify appropriate measures in each area. 

Specifically, in March 2002, the subcommittee tentatively approved draft 

performance measures outlined by the FAA Administrator in 10 areas, 

including operational errors, runway incursions, delays, and financial 

performance.9

 The subcommittee’s report noted that FAA has developed 

more detailed and useful performance measures in some areas, such as 

runway incursions, and therefore can collect better data for measuring its 

performance. For example, FAA now measures the severity as well as the 

number of runway incursions, and it is better able to target and take action 

to prevent the serious incursions that could cause accidents. The 

subcommittee is continuing to emphasize performance measures, making 

sure that they measure outcomes that are within FAA’s control and can be 

used to hold FAA managers accountable. The subcommittee’s goal is to 

help FAA refine and link its performance measures to FAA’s and the 

Department of Transportation’s strategic plans. 

 9

Operational errors can occur when a controller does not maintain the required separation 

between two aircraft or between an aircraft and terrain and/or obstacles. A runway 

incursion is an incident on the runway, involving an aircraft, vehicle, or object, which 

creates a collision hazard. 

Subcommittee Has 

Emphasized 

Performance-based 

Management and 

Carried Out Some 

Responsibilities, but 

Obstacles Have 

Hampered Its 

Progress 

Subcommittee Is Moving 

FAA toward Performancebased Management 
Page 9 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

In addition to focusing on performance management, the subcommittee 

has carried out several of the specific responsibilities assigned to it under 

AIR-21. For example, to date, the subcommittee reviewed and approved 

• five air traffic procurement projects of more than $100 million,10

• the FAA Administrator’s implementation of a cost accounting system, 

and 

• the Administrator’s plans to reorganize major parts of the air traffic 

control system. 

In each of these areas, the subcommittee’s input was limited because the 

work was largely completed before the subcommittee became involved. 

For example, all of the key acquisition milestones had been completed for 

two of the five procurements, and for the other three, the subcommittee 

did not make any substantive changes. Similarly, the subcommittee noted 

with approval in its report that the cost accounting system implemented 

by the Administrator was tracking 70 percent of FAA’s personnel, 

overhead, and other costs for the air traffic control system, but the 

subcommittee did not address problems with tracking the remaining 30 

percent of these costs, most of which are for labor. As Transportation’s 

Office of Inspector General has reported, problems with FAA’s labor 

distribution system, which is part of the cost accounting system, limit 

FAA’s ability to monitor air traffic controllers’ productivity.11 Because of 

the problems with this system, FAA cannot track the hours worked by 

individual controllers or assign the hours worked to specific functions or 

facilities. According to the Inspector General, the Administrator has 

directed that appropriate internal controls be incorporated into the labor 

distribution system to track the hours worked by all employees. While 

noting that most of the important decisions on reorganizing the air traffic 

control functions will not be made until a chief operating officer is hired, 

the subcommittee approved FAA’s preliminary plans for merging the 

acquisition and operating functions of the agency. 

 10Next-Generation Air/Ground Communication, Oceanic Air Traffic Control Services, En 

Route Communications Gateway, En Route Automation Modernization, and User Request 

Evaluation Tool. 

11Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Reauthorization of the 

Federal Aviation Administration, CC-2003-058 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2003). 

Subcommittee Has Carried 

Out Other Specific 

Responsibilities, but Its 

Input Has Been Limited 
Page 10 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

AIR-21 gives the subcommittee broad authority to influence the budget for 

the air traffic control system, but the subcommittee has not fully exercised 

that authority. Specifically, the act makes the subcommittee responsible 

for reviewing and approving the annual air traffic control budget request, 

submitting this budget request to the Secretary of Transportation, and 

ensuring that it supports the annual and long-range strategic plans for the 

air traffic control system. Additionally, the act requires the Secretary to 

transmit the budget request approved by the subcommittee to the 

President, who is then directed to transmit that request to the House and 

Senate authorizing and appropriations committees “without revision,” 

together with the President’s annual budget request for the rest of FAA. It 

is not clear what role this process allows for Transportation and the Office 

of Management and Budget in developing the budget request for the air 

traffic control system. The IRS Oversight Board has similar authority over 

the IRS budget. The fiscal year 2003 budget for the air traffic control 

system was already under development when the subcommittee was 

established. The subcommittee’s first annual report makes no mention of 

actions taken on that budget; however, discussions with FAA officials 

indicated that the subcommittee reviewed and approved the budget 

requests prepared by the FAA Administrator for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. 

Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the subcommittee did not recommend 

any changes to these budget requests or determine whether the budget 

requests supported the long-range plans for the air traffic control system. 

In a few other areas, the subcommittee did not need to carry out its 

specific responsibilities because FAA did not initiate an action. For 

example, the subcommittee could not review and approve the 

Administrator’s appointment of a chief operating officer because no 

candidate was appointed, and it could not review and approve bonus 

payments for the Administrator and senior FAA executives because no 

bonus payments were made for fiscal year 2001.12 Appendix II summarizes 

our analysis of the subcommittee’s progress in carrying out its specific 

responsibilities. 

Now that the subcommittee has been in place for more than 2 years, it is 

beginning to exercise more influence. For example, according to FAA 

officials, the subcommittee raised questions about the funding, timing, and 

 12According to the FAA officials, the subcommittee has reviewed bonuses for fiscal year 

2002. 
Page 11 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

intellectual property rights for one recent procurement it approved.13

Applying its private sector knowledge of intellectual property rights, the 

subcommittee asked FAA staff about the potential for the government to 

earn money from equipment or materials it has furnished to developers of 

the system. According to an FAA official, these questions led to informal 

discussions about the feasibility of exploring this option. 

Not having a chief operating officer has hindered the subcommittee in 

carrying out its responsibilities. For example, without a chief operating 

officer, FAA has not moved forward with the new air traffic organization 

that is supposed to bring together the air traffic control system’s 

acquisition and operating functions. To date, the subcommittee has spent a 

portion of each of its working meetings discussing the effort to hire a chief 

operating officer. In addition, it recently worked with FAA and the current 

recruiting firm to revise and streamline the position description, but until 

the position is filled, the new three-component structure will not be fully 

functional. For the subcommittee, the chief operating officer is the 

“lynchpin” of the new performance-based air traffic organization—the 

“change agent” responsible for improving the performance and delivery of 

air traffic services. The subcommittee believes that not having a chief 

operating officer has seriously impeded its progress. 

The subcommittee and FAA agreed that uncertainties about the position’s 

responsibilities, reporting relationships, and measurement criteria for 

performance are major factors that have hampered the hiring of a chief 

operating officer. Under AIR-21, the FAA Administrator “may” delegate 

responsibility to the chief operating officer for developing a strategic plan 

and a budget request for the air traffic control system and for “reviewing” 

operational functions, including the modernization of the air traffic control 

system, measures for increasing productivity or controlling costs, and 

training and education. Candidates were unsure what specific duties the 

Administrator would delegate to the chief operating officer or what the 

chief operating officer should do to implement the delegated duties. 

Additionally, it was unclear how the chief operating officer would interact 

with the Administrator and the subcommittee, especially if there were 

differences of opinion between them. Although the chief operating officer 

 13FAA is implementing the En Route Automation Modernization program, which replaces 

the HOST computer system software and hardware and the backup system hardware and 

software. 

Not Having a Chief 

Operating Officer Has 

Been the Greatest Obstacle 

to the Subcommittee’s 

Progress 
Page 12 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

reports to the Administrator under the act, the subcommittee also “has 

broad powers to oversee the work and budget of the air traffic 

organization.” This, according to the subcommittee’s first annual report, 

“creates organizational confusion that has been a factor in dissuading 

some candidates from accepting the position.” Furthermore, candidates 

expressed concern about a lack of criteria for measuring and evaluating 

the chief operating officer’s performance. Without specific criteria, some 

stakeholders suggested, the chief operating officer could be working at 

odds with the Administrator and the subcommittee. Candidates also 

wanted to know what criteria would be used to determine their eligibility 

for a bonus of up to 30 percent of their salary. While the act spells out the 

specific duties of the chief operating officer, and the criteria for evaluating 

his or her performance would be spelled out in the annual performance 

agreement between the Administrator and the chief operating officer, 

candidates wanted a better idea, in advance, of what they would be doing 

and how their performance would be judged. 

Other factors have also made it difficult to hire a chief operating officer, 

some of which have now been resolved or are no longer relevant. One 

ongoing factor is the reservation that candidates and stakeholders have 

expressed about the likelihood of cultural change in FAA’s air traffic 

services organization. According to one of the recruiting firms retained by 

FAA, candidates have questioned whether a regulatory agency with an 

entrenched bureaucracy will embrace the cultural change necessary to 

transform air traffic services into a performance-based organization in 

which individuals will be held accountable for specific goals, such as 

implementing timely technological improvements. 

In response to the revised, streamlined position description that it 

developed with the subcommittee and the second recruiting firm, FAA 

received several applications for the chief operating officer position. In 

March 2003, the recruiting firm gave the Administrator a slate of 

candidates for the position. However, the administration’s proposal 

narrows the scope of the chief operating officer’s responsibilities, so that 

the position would now be responsible for “implementing” the 

Administrator’s direction and for managing the day-to-day operations of 

the air traffic control system, but not for “developing” policy tools, such as 

strategic plans and budget proposals. FAA considers such policy-making 

functions appropriate for a chief executive officer—that is, for the 

Administrator—but not for a chief operating officer. Other stakeholders 

have agreed with FAA, maintaining that AIR-21 created confusion by 

bestowing policy-making functions on the chief operating officer position. 

While these changes, if implemented, may eliminate this confusion in the 
Page 13 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

future, it is unclear how the candidates who applied for the position as 

described in the act and the executive order will respond to FAA’s 

proposed changes to the position’s responsibilities. According to FAA 

officials, proposed changes were discussed with prospective candidates. 

Inexperience with FAA’s acquisition and budget processes has further 

hampered the subcommittee’s progress. AIR-21 requires the subcommittee 

members, collectively, to have experience and expertise in the 

management of large service organizations, customer service, the 

management of large procurements, information and communications 

technology, organizational development, and labor relations so that the 

subcommittee can help FAA address long-standing weaknesses in its air 

traffic modernization program. Additionally, the act prohibits the 

subcommittee members from having any financial ties to any aviation or 

aeronautics business or lobbying firm. As a result, the subcommittee 

members have faced a steep and time-consuming learning curve to 

understand FAA’s acquisition and budget processes as they relate to the 

air traffic control system. To acquire the basic understanding they needed 

to carry out their review and approval functions, for example, they initially 

spent portions of their quarterly or bimonthly meetings on briefings from 

FAA staff and others on these processes. 

Turnover on the subcommittee also has slowed its progress. Since the 

original five subcommittee members were sworn in, in January 2001, three 

have resigned and two of the three have been replaced, leaving four 

current members. The new members have had to go through a timeconsuming learning process, just as the original members did. The 

Secretary of Transportation has not appointed a fifth member to the 

subcommittee because he is waiting to see whether the administration’s 

reauthorization proposal, which would make the FAA Administrator the 

chair of the subcommittee, is approved. The congressional proposals 

would likewise make the Administrator the chair of the subcommittee. 

Still another obstacle to the subcommittee’s progress, according to the 

subcommittee, is FAA’s lack of flexibility to move funds within and 

between accounts. The subcommittee told us that project oversight 

requires the ability to recommend such moves, but congressional budget 

guidelines restrict FAA’s ability to move funds. Therefore, according to the 

subcommittee, these guidelines hinder FAA’s ability to take advantage of 

the subcommittee’s expert business advice and counsel. Both FAA and the 

subcommittee agree that acquisition project management is an area in 

which FAA could use flexibility. For example, FAA officials indicated that 

Other Obstacles Have 

Slowed the 

Subcommittee’s Progress 
Page 14 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

they would like the flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances by 

shifting money within the facilities and equipment account from a project 

that is delayed to a project that is on track and could be cost-effectively 

accelerated. The agency is putting together a paper that will expand on the 

need for this flexibility. 

In general, the Congress restricts an agency’s ability to move funds within 

and between accounts to help ensure that funds are spent on the programs 

and activities for which they were appropriated. Guidelines from FAA’s 

Senate Committee on Appropriations require FAA to seek congressional 

approval for any reprogramming that would increase or decrease funding 

for a project within the facilities and equipment account by more than 15 

percent.14 Transfers between appropriations accounts must be specifically 

authorized by law. If the Appropriations Committee saw a need to provide 

FAA with more flexibility, it could consider raising the reprogramming 

threshold or the Congress could enact legislation to allow FAA to transfer 

money between accounts on a trial basis. 

The Congress, the administration, and other stakeholders have proposed 

changes to the subcommittee’s organization and oversight responsibilities 

that they believe would improve the performance of the air traffic control 

system. These changes could clarify some uncertainties in AIR- 21 and 

would modify the subcommittee’s approval authority. According to our 

analysis, the merits of the proposed changes depend, in large part, on the 

extent to which the subcommittee’s current approval authority is viewed 

as necessary or desirable to improve the performance of the air traffic 

control system. 

The three legislative proposals that addressed the subcommittee’s 

organization and responsibilities would separate the subcommittee from 

the Aviation Management Advisory Council and rename the subcommittee. 

Under the Senate proposal, the new organization would be called the Air 

 14Current guidelines for reprogramming are included in Senate Report 101-398, July 27, 

1990. 

Proposed Changes to 

the Subcommittee’s 

Organization and 

Oversight 

Responsibilities Could 

Clarify Uncertainties 

and Would Modify the 

Subcommittee’s 

Authority 

Legislative Proposals 

Agree on Organizational 

Changes 
Page 15 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Traffic Services Committee; under the House and the administration 

proposals, it would be called the Air Traffic Services Board. This change 

would elevate the subcommittee from a subordinate organization to an 

organization independent of the council to oversee air traffic services, just 

as the Mineta Commission envisioned. The new organization also would 

be structurally similar to the IRS Oversight Board and to a board of 

directors for a private organization. According to the administration 

proposal, this change would improve the functioning of both the council 

and the subcommittee by “simplifying and clarifying their respective 

missions,” enabling the council to focus on providing “user/customer” 

input and the subcommittee to “target the safe and efficient operation of 

the air traffic control system.” 

The three legislative proposals also would make the FAA Administrator a 

member and the chair of the new organization. According to FAA and 

other proponents, this change would streamline and clarify the lines of 

authority between the chief operating officer, the Administrator, and the 

subcommittee, eliminating the “confusion” and “blurring” of the lines of 

authority that, according to the subcommittee’s first annual report, was a 

factor in dissuading some candidates from accepting the job of chief 

operating officer (see fig. 2). Hence, this change could make it easier to 

hire a chief operating officer. According to the subcommittee, which also 

recommended in its first annual report that the FAA Administrator chair 

the subcommittee, the “outside oversight” envisioned under the statute 

would be preserved by this proposal because the four private sector 

members would still constitute a majority and the Administrator would 

need two of their votes for approval of any items. However, this change 

also would reduce the number and influence of the private sector 

members and could affect the subcommittee’s potential for accomplishing 

change. 
Page 16 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Figure 2: Current and Proposed Oversight and Management Structure 

Two of the three legislative proposals and some stakeholders’ proposals 

would, to varying degrees, curtail the subcommittee’s authority to approve 

strategic plans, contracts, and budget requests for the air traffic control 

system. These proposals are designed to address challenges to the 

administration’s policy-making functions that the administration and some 

other stakeholders see in the subcommittee’s approval authority—

especially in the subcommittee’s authority to approve a budget request for 

the air traffic control system. Specifically, the administration has proposed 

to eliminate all of the subcommittee’s approval authority, making the new 

body strictly advisory, and the House and other stakeholders have 

proposed to eliminate some of the subcommittee’s approval authority. 

Neither the Senate nor the subcommittee has recommended any changes 

in the subcommittee’s approval authority. 

Under the administration proposal, the subcommittee would no longer 

approve strategic plans, contracts, and budget requests for the air traffic 

control system. Instead, it would “make recommendations” consistent 

with its expertise in management, customer service, information and 

communications technology, organizational development, and labor 

relations. Furthermore, the Secretary of Transportation would no longer 

be responsible for initiating any process that would transmit a document 

reflecting the subcommittee’s views on the budget to the congressional 

authorizing and appropriating committees. These changes would alleviate 

concerns about the subcommittee’s usurping the executive branch’s 

policy-making responsibilities, especially the executive branch’s 

prerogative to submit a budget that reflects its priorities. According to the 

Proposals Would Alter the 

Subcommittee’s Approval 

Authority to Varying 

Degrees 

Blurred Lines of Authority under AIR-21 Proposed Lines of Authority

Air Traffic Services 

Subcommittee

Source: GAO.

with

five private sector 

members

Air Traffic Services 

Board/Committee

with the

FAA Administrator

as Chair

FAA Administrator

FAA Administrator

Chief Operating 

Officer 

Chief Operating 

Officer 

and four private 

sector members
Page 17 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

administration’s reauthorization proposal, the subcommittee’s review and 

recommendations on the budget for the air traffic control system would 

then be “based on Department of Transportation and Office of 

Management and Budget budget levels and within the normal procedures 

for developing the President’s Budget.” We are not aware of any efforts by 

the subcommittee to challenge the executive branch’s authority. However, 

the former chairman of the subcommittee noted that AIR-21, as written, 

could be interpreted as enabling the subcommittee to circumvent major 

policy decisions of the administration through its authority to approve the 

air traffic organization’s budget, major contracts, and major personnel 

decisions. According to the former chairman, the possibility of such an 

interpretation, while probably not intended, pointed to a need for greater 

clarity in the law. 

Under the House proposal, the subcommittee would lose its authority to 

approve the budget request for the air traffic control system, but it would 

retain its other approval authorities. The subcommittee could make 

recommendations on the budget request, which the Secretary of 

Transportation would be responsible for submitting to the President. The 

President would then be responsible for transmitting these 

recommendations to the congressional authorizers and appropriators. 

While this proposal appears to respond, in part, to the administration’s 

concerns about challenges to the executive branch’s policy-making 

authority, especially the executive branch’s prerogative to submit a budget 

that reflects its priorities, it retains AIR-21’s means of communicating 

views on an executive branch agency’s budget directly to the Congress. 

Even with the Administrator as chair, if at least three members of the 

subcommittee disagreed with the administration, they could formally 

communicate their views to the congressional committees. Appendix III 

summarizes the changes that the three proposals would make to the 

subcommittee’s organization and oversight responsibilities and to the chief 

operating officer’s responsibilities. 

Several stakeholders have proposed to eliminate the subcommittee’s 

authority to approve a budget request and large contracts but to preserve 

its authority to approve strategic plans and performance measures. This 

proposal reflects the view that the subcommittee’s authority should be 

aligned with its expertise and that the subcommittee cannot realistically 

be expected to make meaningful contributions to all of the areas under its 

purview, given that most of its members lack experience with aviation 

issues. However, eliminating the subcommittee’s authority to approve a 

budget request and large contracts could limit its ability to (1) help ensure 

that FAA’s strategic plan for the air traffic control system is aligned with 
Page 18 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

the budget and (2) oversee procurement costs and schedules. While 

acknowledging that the scope of the subcommittee’s responsibilities is 

very large, others maintain that with a staff to provide technical support, 

including analyses of budgets and procurements, the subcommittee could 

be expected to carry out its current responsibilities. 

The proposals for eliminating or curtailing the subcommittee’s approval 

authority could strengthen the accountability of the Administrator and of 

the chief operating officer by increasing their responsibility for improving 

the performance of the air traffic control system. These proposals also 

would remove any ambiguity about the reporting relationship of the chief 

operating officer and the Administrator. However, eliminating the 

subcommittee’s approval authority also would limit the subcommittee’s 

power and fundamentally alter its role. It is unclear how the subcommittee 

without approval authority could carry out its “general responsibility” for 

“oversight” under AIR-21—to “oversee the administration, management, 

conduct, direction, and supervision of the air traffic control system.” 

The head of the Aviation Management Advisory Council proposed to 

eliminate the subcommittee’s approval authority and merge the 

subcommittee with the council. The rationale for this proposal is that the 

resulting expanded advisory council could provide the FAA Administrator 

with both aviation industry and management expertise, as the Mineta 

Commission recommended, and that this cross pollination could lead to a 

fertile exchange of ideas and prevent aviation representatives from being 

too insular and nonindustry representatives from being too naïve. 

However, like the administration proposal, it would eliminate the 

subcommittee’s approval authority. 

To help the subcommittee better understand aviation issues, some 

stakeholders have suggested that at least one member should have 

expertise in aviation. Other stakeholders have disagreed, noting that FAA 

is expected to serve as a resource for the subcommittee, and that the 

members of the council have experience in aviation. These stakeholders 

believe that having a member with expertise in aviation would, therefore, 

be redundant and could dilute the subcommittee’s potential to bring 

expertise in performance management to air traffic services. 

Other stakeholders have suggested that the subcommittee hire a staff to 

provide them with expertise in aviation technology, federal budgeting, 

finance, and contracting. The purpose of such a staff would be to give the 

subcommittee an independent perspective and to ensure continuity when 

Stakeholders Have 

Proposed Other Changes 

That Would Affect the 

Subcommittee’s 

Organization and Ability to 

Carry Out Its 

Responsibilities 
Page 19 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

turnover in the subcommittee’s membership occurs. AIR-21 authorizes the 

chair of the subcommittee to appoint “any personnel that may be 

necessary to enable the subcommittee to perform its duties,” but the act 

does not authorize an appropriation for a staff. To date, the subcommittee 

has relied on FAA staff for information and analysis. The original 

subcommittee members voted to hire staff, and the fiscal year 2002 budget 

provided about $850,000 for that purpose. However, with the resignation 

of two of the original members and the first chairman’s imminent 

departure, the hiring did not occur. According to FAA’s records, the 

money was divided between the council and the subcommittee, and a 

portion of the funding that remained with the subcommittee was used to 

pay part of the salary and benefits of the FAA staff who assisted both the 

council and the subcommittee. 

According to FAA officials, neither the fiscal year 2003 budget nor the 

fiscal year 2004 budget request provides any funds for a staff or other 

outside resources for the subcommittee. FAA officials stated that when, 

and if, it became necessary for the subcommittee to have staff, FAA would 

seek the necessary funds. Until then, FAA will staff the subcommittee. 

According to FAA officials and the current subcommittee chairman, hiring 

a staff would be an unnecessary expense at this time. In addition, the 

current chairman views the work that FAA staff do for the subcommittee 

as educational for the staff, improving their ability to understand the 

subcommittee’s approach to performance management. 

We agree that FAA is the logical source of much of the information that 

the subcommittee may need. However, relying exclusively on FAA for 

information and analysis may not provide the subcommittee with an 

independent perspective. Moreover, as our work has shown, FAA’s 

information may not always be reliable or complete. For example, our 

recent work on the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System, 

one of FAA’s major modernization projects, showed that the reliability of 

FAA’s life-cycle cost estimates is uncertain, in part because FAA was 

relying on data from the contractor that did not reflect the current status 

of the project and had not been independently analyzed as FAA’s guidance 

requires.15 Because the subcommittee members are generally not experts 

in aviation technology, federal budgeting, finance, and contracting, they 

may not be ideally qualified to evaluate the independence, reliability, and 

 15GAO-03-343. 
Page 20 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

completeness of the information they are provided for overseeing the air 

traffic control system. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation and 

the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee for review and comment. On May 

16, 2003, we received E-mail comments from the department. Department 

officials generally agreed with the facts presented in the draft report and 

made technical and clarifying comments, which we incorporated in this 

report as appropriate. The Air Traffic Services Subcommittee did not 

provide comments beyond those provided by department officials. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested Members of Congress, 

the Secretary of Transportation, and the FAA Administrator. We will also 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-2834. I can also be reached by E-mail at 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. Key contacts and contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Gerald L. Dillingham 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

Agency Comments 
Page 21 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

List of Committees 

The Honorable John McCain 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Trent Lott 

Chairman 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Don Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable James Oberstar 

Ranking Democratic Member 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John Mica 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio 

Ranking Democratic Member 

Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 22 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 

Century (AIR-21) requires us to report on the success of the Air Traffic 

Services Subcommittee in improving the performance of the air traffic 

control system. Accordingly, this report addresses the (1) actions the 

subcommittee has taken to carry out its oversight responsibilities and the 

obstacles it has encountered in attempting to do so and (2) changes to the 

subcommittee’s organization and oversight responsibilities that have been 

proposed to improve the performance of the air traffic control system. 

To accomplish both of our objectives, we analyzed AIR-21 and its 

legislative history; Executive Order 13180; and proposals of the 

administration, the Senate, and the House that would amend provisions of 

AIR-21 relating to the subcommittee and the chief operating officer. We 

also reviewed the initial and the revised profiles for the chief operating 

officer’s position and legislation and other documents that created a 

similar oversight structure at the Internal Revenue Service. We analyzed 

the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee’s annual report and the minutes 

from the subcommittee’s meetings, as well as congressional testimony on 

the status of the subcommittee and our reports on transforming federal 

agencies. In addition, we interviewed Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) officials, including the past and present Administrators; past and 

present members of the subcommittee; the head of the Aviation 

Management Advisory Council; and representatives of aviation industry 

organizations, including the American Association of Airport Executives, 

Airport Council International–North America, National Association of 

State Aviation Officials, Air Transportation Association, National Air 

Traffic Controllers Association, Airline Pilots Association, and Cargo 

Airline Association. We also analyzed documentation from FAA officials, 

research organizations, and the two firms hired to recruit the chief 

operating officer. We did not address changes to FAA’s—as opposed to the 

subcommittee’s—organization that some stakeholders maintain are 

essential to improve the performance of the air traffic control system. 

We performed our work from October 2002 through May 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix II: Subcommittee’s Progress in 

Implementing Specific Responsibilities 

Page 23 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

a

Because of the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA Administrator did not give bonuses to 

executives; therefore, the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee did not review this issue. 

b

The subcommittee was formed after the fiscal year 2003 budget process was under way. 

Appendix II: Subcommittee’s Progress in 

Implementing Specific Responsibilities 

Strategic plans – Review, approve, and monitor the strategic plan for the air traffic control system, including the establishment of (1) a mission and 

objectives, (2) related standards of performance, and (3) annual and long-range strategic plans

• Reviewed and approved draft measures in 10 areas (e.g., operational errors, runway incursions, delays, and airport arrival capacity)

• Evaluating constraints to managing and achieving long-range plans (e.g., budget flexibility issues)

Chief operating officer – Review and approve the appointment of a chief operating officer

• Led revision of the position description for the chief operating officer to advance the hiring process

Senior executives – Review the selection, evaluation, and compensation of senior executives who have program management responsibility over 

significant functions of the air traffic control systema

• Reviewed short-term incentives packages for the heads of the Air Traffic Services and Research and Acquisitions

Reorganization – Review and approve plans for any major reorganization that would have an impact on the management of the air traffic control system

• Reviewed and approved plans to merge the air traffic control system’s capital planning (Research and Acquisitions) and operational functions 

 (Air Traffic Services) within the air traffic organization (the new performance-based organization)

• Reviewed and approved plans to create a terminal business unit that combines terminal services, terminal facilities, automation, and surveillance

Financial management – Review and approve a cost accounting and financial management structure and technologies to help ensure efficient 

and cost-effective air traffic control operation

• Reviewed and approved the cost accounting system that tracks 70 percent of the costs to provide specific services

Reports – Report annually on the results of the Subcommittee’s activities

• Issued an annual report in August 2002 

Completed In progress

Source: GAO.

Performance and compensation – Review performance and compensation of managers responsible for major acquisitions 

• Reviewed short-term incentives packages for the heads of Air Traffic Services and Research and Acquisitions

Budget request – Review and approve the budget request for the air traffic control system, making sure that it supports annual and long-range strategic plans

• Approved the fiscal year 2003 budgetb

Meetings – Meet at least quarterly

• Held four working meetings in calendar year 2001, two in calendar year 2002, and two as of April 2003; two other meetings were scheduled

 but canceled following September 11, 2001

Methods and improvements – Review and approve (1) methods to accelerate air traffic control modernization and (2) improvements in aviation 

safety related to air traffic control

• Reviewed draft measures for improvements in aviation safety related to air traffic control

Procurements – Review and approve procurements of air traffic control equipment in excess of $100 million

• Approved five procurement projects

Operational plans – Review the operational functions of the air traffic control system

• Evaluating budget flexibility issues

Subcommittee’s specific responsibilities

Implementation 

status 

Planning

Modernization and improvement

Management

Budget

Administrative requirements
Appendix III: Proposed Legislative Changes 

Affecting the Subcommittee and the Chief 

Operating Officer Responsibilities 

Page 24 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Initiator of proposed change 

Legislative proposal Administrationa Senateb Housec

Modify subcommittee’s structure 

• Separate subcommittee from the 

Aviation Management Advisory 

Council 

X X X 

• Designate the FAA Administrator as 

chairperson 

X X X 

• Reduce the number of private sector 

members from five to four 

X X X 

Modify subcommittee’s approval authority 

• Eliminate all approval authority, but 

allow recommendations 

X 

• Eliminate budget approval authority, 

but allow recommendations on the 

budget 

 X 

• Eliminate budget transmittal 

requirement 

X d e 

• Eliminate additional reporting 

requirement 

 X 

Make other changes to subcommittee 

• Rename subcommittee X X X 

• Eliminate compensation for members X f X 

• Authorize an appropriation for activities X X 

Modify chief operating officer’s responsibilities 

• Oversee day-to-day operations rather 

than review operations 

X X X 

• Implement rather than develop 

strategic plan 

X X X 

• Report performance to authorizing 

committees rather than entire 

Congress 

X X X 

• Review management of 

cost-reimbursable contracts 

 X 

• Submit budget to subcommittee/board 

rather than Secretary of Transportation 

 X 

Source: GAO. 

a

As of March 25, 2003. 

b

S. 824. 

c

H.R. 2115. 

d

Specifies that the budget request for the air traffic control system that is to be transmitted without 

revision by the President to the congressional authorizing and appropriating committees is the preOffice of Management and Budget budget request for the air traffic control system. 

e

Requires the transmission without revision of budget recommendations related to the air traffic 

control system, rather than transmission of a budget request for the system, to the congressional 

authorizing and appropriating committees along with the annual budget request of FAA. 

f

Eliminates compensation for the chair and vice chair but retains compensation of $25,000 per year 

for members. 

Appendix III: Proposed Legislative Changes 

Affecting the Subcommittee and the Chief 

Operating Officer Responsibilities 
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 25 GAO-03-542 Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System 

Gerald Dillingham (202) 512-2834 

Belva Martin (202) 512-2834 

In addition to those individuals named above, Geraldine Beard, 

Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Dave Hooper, Elizabeth Marchak, Kieran McCarthy, 

and Richard Scott made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(540066) 
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