IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
 

GORDON ROY PARKER, a.k.a. Ray Gordon, d/b/a 

Snodgrass Publishing Group, 

4247 Locust Street, #806 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Learn The Skills Corp., et aI. 

Defendants. 

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CASE NO.: 05-cv-2752 

Hon. Harvey Bartle, III 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this _ day of , 2006, in consideration of Defendant 

Matthew S. Wolrs Second Motion To Dismiss, and all responses thereto, the motion is denied. 

A memorandum opinion is attached. 

SO ORDERED. 

1. 

Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 1 of 11
.......---­

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

'0~ EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

r::::-:::-::=-=--:::-:-:-:::::-:::-::-:-:::-:-:===-----:------:~____==____=__-:_::_:__-__,_-,__------==-----=---~-- FIL

GORDON ROY PARKER, a.k.a. Ray Gordon, d/b/a 

Snodgrass Publishing Group, DEC 052005 

4247 Locust Street, #806 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 MICM~KUNZ,

By, - - Pep. 

Plaintiff, CASE NO.: 05-cv-2752 

v. 

Learn The Skills Corp., et al. Hon. Harvey Bartle, In 

Defendants. 

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANT WOLF'S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 

Plaintiff Gordon Roy Parker, in the above-styled action, submits this Brief In 

Opposition to Defendant Matthew S. Wolfs Second Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum in 

support thereto. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Despite having it pointed out to him that he moved the court for dismissal ofthe entire 

complaint once again (the very conduct which forms the basis of his being a Defendant in this 

action), Defendant Wolf did not correct this error in his motion, though his proposed order reflects 

a motion to dismiss only as to himself. Defendant Wolf also again refers to himself as the Plaintiff 

rather than the Defendant. 

Defendant Wolf summarizes the procedural history of this case in his introductory 

paragraph. Plaintiff restates all of his allegations from the Amended Complaint as if set forth in 

their entirety, in the event Defendant's summary is not whole. 

Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 2 of 11
II. ARGUMENT
 

A.	 PlaintifPs Claims Are Not Incomprehensible; Further, Defendant Did Not Move 

For A More Definite Statement Pursuant To Federal Rule 12(e) 

Defendant, a practicing attorney, claims he cannot make sense out of Plaintiffs claims: 

Plaintiffs claims against me are completely unintelligible. He has not set forth a 

comprehensible claim. This is the third time he has tried to do this against Learn the Skills 

Corp. and other defendants since the court has twice dismissed his pleadings in his 

previous lawsuit. Attached hereto are the Court's rulings pertaining to those pleadings. 

Since these claims have been dismissed twice before and the Plaintiffs claims continue to 

be so vague and incomprehensible, the Court should dismiss them pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).! 

I.	 PlaintifPs Claims Are Not Only Comprehensible, But Simple And Easy To 

Understand. 

Defendant relies upon the dismissal without prejudice of Parker v. LTSC (I) ("the 

first lawsuit"), as if it were some type of adjudication on the merits, when the dismissal was 

anything but: specifically, in the first lawsuit, Judge Kelly (who died mere months after issuing 

this ruling) dismissed the claim not because it lacked merit, and not even because it was 

incomprehensible to an attorney, but because Defendant Geiger was representing himself. This 

Court need not look beyond this section ofthe Order ofDismissal: 

"Although pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted 

by legal counsel, the concern of pro se Defendant Geiger that he has been 

bombarded with an exceedingly long and confusing complaint cannot be ignored."2 

While Defendant is proceeding pro se, he is a licensed, practicing attorney who is 

not held to this standard; no such similar "concern" would apply to him. Further, it is 

disingenuous to say that this Complaint cannot be answered, as the averments specific to each 

Defendant were enumerated separately, with factual averments which can either be admitted or 

denied. Plaintiff has laid out these facts concisely, logically, and in a manner which is easy to 

1 Defendant's Memorandum, p. 1. 

2 Order dismissing Parker v. LTSC (I), pp. 5-6. 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 3 of 11
answer. What is clear, however, is that Defendant appears not to want this case to reach that stage, 

and instead would rather the process be short-circuited. 

In Downing v. York County District Attorney H. Stanley Rebert, et ai, the defense 

attorneys in that case responded to a motion to strike with sentiments which closely mirror 

Plaintiffs arguments here. Indeed, that response cited Parker v. LTSC (I). Counsel for the 

Defense in that case argued: 

The Plaintiffs are alleging claims related to a pattern and practice of behavior 

of unlawful or improper conduct that spans/our years. They were required 

to establish that such a pattern or practice existed. Had they not included 

allegations to support such a claim, Defendant Rebert would no doubt have 

filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) arguing that the Plaintiffs have failed 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It was inevitable tfrat 

Defendant Rebert would/ile a motion to attack the Complaint; it wasju.\'t a 

matter ofwhether that motion would argue that the Plaint~tf~' have said too 

little or too much. (Emphasis Added). 

Plaintiffs abuse of process claims are easy to understand: Defendant, who was 

representing only LTSC, moved this court to dismiss the entire Complaint, even providing 

arguments based on facts for which he could not possibly have performed any due diligence. He 

was not retained by the other defendants, and was therefore acting beyond the scope of his 

representation and therefore abusing the legitimate process of a motion to dismiss for the cl ient he 

was representing. This is not difficult to comprehend factually; any arguments against this claim 

should be based on the law. The same is true of the RICO claim under 18 USC 1962(d), for if the 

abuse of process claim is valid, then any arguments against the RICO claim should be setting forth 

why the standard set forth in Beck v. Prupis does not apply here, yet no such arguments are made. 

2.	 Defendant should have moved for a more definitive statement pursuant to 

Rule 1Ue) rather than for dismissal pursuant to Rule 1Ub)(6). 

This Court should also note that this argument is not properly pled: a motion 

which claims that a Complaint is "unintelligible" should be filed pursuant to Federal Rule I 2(e) 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 4 of 11
rather than 12(b)(6), yet no such pleading is made by Defendant. For that reason alone, his motion 

should be denied. 

Even if this court construes Defendant's Motion as one pursuant to 12(e), and does 

so favorably to Defendant, dismissal is still not appropriate, but rather Plaintiff should be given 

leave to Amend the Complaint. Defendant has argued (in conclusory fashion) that Plaintiff is not 

conforming with the rules to the point that he should be barred from filing future actions without 

leave of the court,3 yet he is not even moving under the correct rule. 

B. Defendant Is Not Entitled To Immunity 

Defendant's argument is incredulous: 

The gist of the Plaintiffs claims against me appear to be that he believes that 1 have 

conspired against him on behalf of other people. All of the allegations relate to 

contentions, statements and averments in pleadings filed with the Court. I am entitled to 

absolute judicial immunity for such actions. See Post vs. Mendel, 510 Pa. 213, 219-220, 

507 A.2d 351,354-355 (1986), FDIC. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 871 (3 Cir, 1994),4 

1.	 The conduct was not material to the "action" for the purposes of this claim. 

In FDIC v. Bathgate, the issue of privilege related to statements made in pleadings 

by the attorney o.lrecord. Specifically, that court noted that "allegations made in pleadings filed 

in an action are privileged as long as they have some relation to the action." In this case, the 

only legitimate relation to the "action" in question was limited to the motion by Defendant to 

dismiss the claims against LTSC and to quash the subpoena to Business Filings, Inc. (its registered 

agent). In the instant case, Defendant was not representing the parties for whom he moved this 

court, and his statements were therefore wholly unrelated to the action. To hold otherwise would 

be to let any attorney, in any situation, make any statement in a pleading, for any purpose, and 

claim that it was "related" to the matter at hand. This court need not rewrite the law to separate 

3 Defendant's Memorandum, Conclusion, '\l III, p.2. 

4 Id, '\l IICB), p.l. 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 5 of 11
the instant case from this precedent, as it is almost unheard of for an attorney to move on behalf of 

a party he does not represent. 

2.	 Defendant Wolf was not acting as an attorney.
 

Defendant Wolf argues on his own behalf:
 

There is nothing wrong with what I did. It Calmot serve as the basis for a RICO 

claim, conspiracy claim or abuse of process claim. I am entitled to act as an advocate 

for my client I without fear of personal retaliation. Suggesting that the Plaintiff s 

claims are so ridiculous, vexatious alld frivolous as to all parties cannot be 

actionable. I can even suggest that the Plaintiff s intentions are obviouslv to harass 

people through frivolous litigation and this cannot be actionable.) . 

By noting his perception of immunity for even the most disparaging claims, 

Defendant Wolf is creating a straw-man (since the statements are not the basis ofthe claim), but 

also undermining his own arguments in that he now has acknowledged that he can take a "free 

shot" at Plaintiff without fear of reprisal, accusing him of any and everything under the sun, in the 

hope that the Court will be swayed. His unsubstantiated allegations of Plaintiffs motives should 

therefore be viewed in light oftheir being made without consequence to the speaker, who is a 

defendant in this case, in addition to being a (paid) advocate for another defendant. 

Defendant's argument fails because the abuse of process claim relates to 

Defendant Wolf moving on behalf of unrepresented parties beyond the scope of his function as an 

"advocate for his client." The other defendants on whose behalf he moved for dismissal were not 

his clients. This also forms the basis for the RICO claim of aiding-and-abetting. Certainly, any 

precedent providing any immunity ofthis type was designed for attorneys acting on behalf of their 

clients and only their clients, and no exception need be carved out to not apply that precedent here. 

5 Memorandum, I(B), pp. 2-3. 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 6 of 11
3.	 Attorneys are not immune to actions for malicious prosecution. 

Under Pennsylvania law, malicious prosecution is divided into two distinct 

categories: 1) abuse of process, a common-law tort, and 2) the Dragonetti Act, which is codified 

(in pertinent part) as follows: 

§ 8351. Wrongful use of civil proceedings. 

(a) Elements of action.--A person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or 

continuation of civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for 

wrongful use of civil proceedings: 

1.	 he acts in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause and primarily 

for a purpose other than that of securing the proper discovery, joinder of 

parties or adjudication ofthe claim in which the proceedings are based: and 

2.	 the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they arc 

brought. 

Since the underlying claim for the motion to dismiss did not terminate in 

Plaintiffs favor (but was dismissed without prejudice, so it did not fully terminate in favor of 

Defendant), only the tort of abuse of process would apply. However, the motion to quash the 

subpoenas for the unrepresented parties could be construed as the initiation of civil proceedings, 

and that motion did terminate in Plaintiff's favor (the motion was denied as to the unrepresented 

parties due to lack ofstanding), if this Court holds that the motion to quash was an "initiation" for 

purposes ofthe law insofar as Defendant acted on his own volition rather than continuing an 

action for the other parties, it may apply. 

The Dragonetti Act, as set forth above, allows for recovery against "a person who 

takes part" in violating the act. This includes attorneys. Given that attorneys can be held liable for 

malicious prosecution under Dragonetti, they also can be held liable for malicious prosecution 

under the tort of abuse of process. See, e.g., Werner v. Plater Zyberk, 2002 Pa.Super. 42,799 

A.2d 776 (Pa.Super. 02/21/2002). In Werner, attorneys Stephen A. Winston (Esq.), Berger & 

Montague, P.e., Joseph Posillicio (Esq.), and Synnestvedt & Lechner, L.L.P. Appellees were all 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 7 of 11
named as defendants in an abuse of process action. Were the immunity Defendant WoIf is 

attempting to claim valid, then the Dragonetti Act would not exist as we know it. 

Defendant is trying to "jam a square peg into a round hole" by ignoring the 

statutory and common-law basis for filing suit against attorneys for conduct relating to legal 

proceedings by citing an immunity that relates to defamation. This argument is disingenuous. 

4.	 The abuse of process claim is irrelevant to the RICO action 

Plaintiff has argued that the abuse of process was done for the purpose of aiding 

and abetting a RICO enterprise. The actions taken constituted providing valuable legal assistance 

which was paid for from the profits of the enterprise. Specifically, the co-conspirators acted out 

against Plaintiff for the benefit ofLTSC, and LTSC then turned around and provided an 

unauthorized attorney to help get the conspiracy charge dismissed. Even without the abuse of 

process/malicious prosecution claim, the RICO claim would survive either way. 

C.	 Plaintiffs Damages Were Not Caused By Incompetence And Extend Beyond The 

Dismissal Of The Litigation. 

Defendant argues: 

The Plaintiff cannot complain regarding any adverse result from the first lawsuit since it 

was dismissed without prejudice by Order dated October 25,2004, and he was given the 

opportunity to re-file an Amended Complaint and cure deficiencies. See Exhibit A 

attached hereto. He did re-file an Amended Complaint but the Court dismissed that as 

well. See Exhibit B attached hereto. It was the Plaintiff's own failure to properly plead his 

first lawsuit that lead to any adverse consequences he suffered. Plaintiff has not alleged 

any damages caused by me that were not, in fact, actually clearly caused by himself and 

his own shortcomings in the eyes ofthe Court.6 

Defendant has neglected the basis for the damage claim: the "full circle" path of the 

RICO activity yielding business for LTSC, which in turn paid for the attorney who argued on 

behalf ofthose engaging in the RICO activity for the benefit ofLTSC. The last thing anyone truly 

not involved in a conspiracy would do is supply an attorney to the alleged co-conspirators, but that 

6 Id, II(C), p.2 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 8 of 11
is exactly what LTSC did. Contrary to Defendant's claims, this was set forth very clearly in 

paragraphs 247-249 of the Amended Complaint (p. 73), which states the following: 

247.	 Defendant Wolf acted with the ulterior motive of harming Plaintiff's ability to 

prosecute Defendant LTSC by cutting off discovery against the other Defendants 

which mayor would have further implicated Defendant LTSC. 

248. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant Wolfs conduct, Plaintiff suffered 

further economic harm at the hands ofthe Seduction Mafia, who felt empowered 

through their "ghost attorney." 

249.	 Defendant Wolfs conduct constitutes the bestowing of economic benefit upon all 

Defendants for whom he moved to have Parker v. LTSC dismissed. 

The key here is the empowerment and encouragement to the co-conspirators to continue 

to act out against Plaintiff. The benefit extends beyond the legal action itself, and presents 

"smoking gun" evidence of a quidpro quo whereby the co-conspirators would post messages in 

violation ofRICO to harm Plaintiff, while simultaneously promoting the LTSC website by 

attempting to enforce the"ASF FAQ" document whereby LTSC declares itself an "owner" of a 

public USENET group (one ofthe only places on the internet where true free speech thrives, and 

which is strongly in the public interest to protect), and to even go a step further by declaring the 

USENET group as "dead," with Plaintiff to blame, and using that as a pretext for redirecting 

traffic to a commercial website. This is akin to a private citizen setting up a toll booth in a public 

park or public square and charging admission, or redirecting traffic to a private park. 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 9 of 11
III. CONCLUSION
 

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Defendant Matthew Wolf, Esq.'s Second Motion 

To Dismiss should be denied, and his Conclusion (paragraph III of his Memorandum) should be 

struck from the record. An appropriate form of order is attached. 

This the 5th day ofDecember, 2005. 

Gordon Roy Parker 

Plaintiff, Pro Se 

4247 Locust Street, #806 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 

(215) 386-7366 

GordonRoyParker@aol.com 

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Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 10 of 11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
 

GORDON ROY PARKER, a.k.a. Ray Gordon, d/b/a 

Snodgrass Publishing Group, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Learn The Skills Corp., et al. 

Defendants. 

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CASE NO.: 05-cv-2752 

Hon. Harvey Bartle, III 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Gordon Roy Parker, hereby certify that I have served the foregoing Brief In Opposition 

To Defendant University of Pennsylvania's Second Motion To Dismiss, Brief in Opposition 

To Defendant LTSC's Second Motion To Dismiss, and Brief in Opposition To Defendant 

Wolfs Second Motion To Dismiss, on the following Defendants, by the following means: 

Trustees of the Univ. of PA 

Dennis G. Young (Counsel) 

Montgomery, McCracken, 

Walker & Rhoads 

123 South Broad Street, 28th Fl. 

Philadelphia PA 19109 

Hand Delivery 

Thom E. Geiger 

817 North McCrary Road 

Columbus, MS 39702-4320 

Regular Mail 

Mary Kay Brown, Esq. 

Buchanan Ingersoll 

1835 Market Street, 14th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Hand Delivery 

Formhandle@fastseduction.com 

Learn The Skills Corp. 

955 Massachusetts Ave, #350 

Cambridge, MA 02139 

Regular Mail 

This the 5

th day ofDecember, 2005. 

Matthew S. Wolf, Esq. 

241 Kings Highway East 

Haddonfield, NJ 08033 

Attorney For LTSC And 

Defendant 

Regular Mail 

FILED 

DEC 05 Z005 

:C~~~

Gordon Roy Parker 

4247 Locust Street, #806 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 

(215) 386-7366 

GordonRoyParker@aol.com 

Plaintiff, Pro Se 

Case 2:05-cv-02752-HB Document 30 Filed 12/05/05 Page 11 of 11