NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0171n.06 Filed: Mar ch 28, 2008 No. 06-1773 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

MONYA TA TE, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,

v. BA RBARA B OCK, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be for e : S ILER , C LA Y, and C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s. S I L E R, Circuit Jud ge. Pe ti ti o n e r M o n y a T a te a p p e a ls f r o m th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e n ia l of his petition for a writ of ha beas c orpus. In 1998, Tate w as convic ted in the Circuit Court of Way ne County , Michig an, on two counts of se cond deg ree murder and one count of possession of a fire arm during the commission of a felony . After exhausting his appea ls in Michigan state cour ts, he filed a petition for a

writ of habe as cor

pus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the district court. He argued, inter

a lia , th a t th e tr ia l c ourt vio late d h is Si xth A me ndme nt j ur y tr ia l right s and

his F ourt e e nth Amendment due pr ocess r ights whe n it (1) recalled an alternate j uror who had been di schar g ed and (2) f ailed to instruct the jury

to beg in deliberating a

new. The district court g rante d a ce rtificate of appea lability

on these c laims. Be cause he has pr ocedur ally defa ulted the first cla im and the sec ond

c la im f a ils on the me ri ts, we a ff

ir m th e de nia l of

his pe tit ion

fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s.Case No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock BACK GR OUND Tate w as tried f

or murder ing G reg ory

Merc er a nd Wi llie Torre nce. T he trial c ourt empane led a jury of 13. Af

t er cl o s ing a

rg uments and jury

instructions, it drew the name of a juror to be desig nated a s an alternate. The trial court then dismiss ed the alternate juror, but ca utioned that she

m i ght be ca lled back if

nece ssary . On the morningof the sec ond full day of deliber ations, a juror

a sk e d th e c ourt to e xcu se he r be c a us e sh e ha d de ve lop e d a

ra sh . Sh e e xpre sse d c on c e rn that th e ra sh might be c ontag ious and stated that she had an appointment with a doctor later that day . The trial

c ourt e xcu se d he r and re c a lle d the a lte rn a te jur or . B e fo re the a lte rn a te jur or arr ive d to joi n th e fu ll j u r y, t h e t r i a l c o u rtg a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r

u c t i o nt o t h e r e m a i n i n g 1 1 m e mb e r s o f t h e j u r y: Obviously , y ou may

have to g o back, a

nd I ’m not g oing to sa

y g o back to squa

re one , but cer tainly y ou will have to share with the ot h er j u ro r how you have be en deliberating, a

nd that juror will then be pa rt of the 12 who w ill decide the c ase. When the alternate ar

rived, the tria l court aske d her “ [C ]an y ou think of any rea son why

y ou couldn’t fairly and re asonably

deliberate on this case and b e fa i r t o both sides? ” She re sponded, “N o, I cannot, your Honor.” The re constituted jury resumed de liberations with the alter nate a nd rea ched a g uilty verdic t. Tate appea led t o the M ichig an Court of Appe als, which a ffirme d his conviction. People v

. Tat e , 624 N.W.2d 524, 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). The Michigan Supreme C ourt then denied le ave to a ppeal beca

use it was not per suaded that the questions should be review ed. Pe op le v . Ta te , 638 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. 2001) (table ). The district c ourt denied Ta te’s petition for a

writ of habe as
c or pu s. AN AL YSI SCase No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock We r e vie w d e no vo the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s de nia l of a pe tit ion

fo r a wr it o f h a be a s c or pu s. Cone

v . B e ll , 492 F.3d 743, 750 ( 6th Cir. 2007) . An application for a wr it of habea s corpus on be half of a per son in custody

pursuant to the judg ment of a State court s hall not be g rante d with respec t to any claim that was a djudicated on the me rits in St ate c ourt proce eding s unless the adjudi cation of the claim (1) r esulted in a de ci s i o n t h at wa s contrar y to, or involved an unre asonable application of, clea rly established F eder al l aw , as deter mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a de cision that was base d on an unre asonable deter mination of the fa cts in light of the evidenc e pre sented in the State c ourt proce eding . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Recalling th e Alternate Juror Tate f irst argues that the trial co u rt ac t ed unre asonably and contr ary

to clear ly established Fe dera l law when it re called the alternate juror who had been discharg ed at the time the jur y beg an its de lib e ratio ns . H ow e ve r, he pr oc e dura lly de fa ult e d th is c la im d

ue to his wa ive r in the tr ia l c ourt
. A fe dera l claimant’s pr o ce d u ral de fault pre cludes ha beas r eview if

the last state cour

t rende ring a judgment in the ca se re sts its judgme nt on the proce dural de fault. Harris v . Ree d , 489 U.S. 255, 262 ( 1989). To deter mine whether

a cla im has been pr ocedur ally defa ulted, we a

pply the four- part test laid out in Ma up in v . S mi th , 785 F.2d 135, 138 ( 6th Cir. 1986). F ir st, the c ourt mus t det e rm ine that the re is a state pr oc e dura l rul e that is a pp lic a ble to the petitioner’s c laim and that the petitioner f ailed to comply

with the rul e. . . . Se c on d, the c ourt

mus t de c ide wh e ther the state c ourt s a c tua lly e nf or c e d th e state proce dural s an ct i on. . . . Third, the cour t must decide whe ther the state proce dural fo rf e iture is an “ a de qu a te and ind e pe nd e nt” state g ro un d on whi c h the state c an r e ly to forec lose revie w of a federa l constitutional claim. . . . Once the court de termines that a stat e pr oc e dura l rul e wa s n ot c omp lie d w ithand that th e ru le wa s an a de qu a te and indepe ndent state ground, t hen the pe titioner must demonstrate . . . that there was “ca use” f or him to not follow the procedura l rule and that he wa s actua lly prejudice d by the alleg ed constitutional err or.Case No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock Girts v. Y anai , 5 0 1 F. 3 d 7 4 3 , 7 5 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Ma up in , 7 85 F .2 d at 13 8) (e mph a sis omitted). The Michig an Court of Appe als held that Tate had waived any argument that the itching jur or wa s im pr op e rl y re mov e d o r r e pla c e d. I t st a te d: Def endant next ar g ues that, even if the court had the discretion to r emove the jur or, the court was without a

uthority to r eca ll a

n alternate juror who ha d been disc harg ed. We ag ain disag ree . Def

ense c ou n s el ’s waive r of a ny err or in the re moval of the itching jur or also oper ates a s a wa iver of a ny err or i n re p lacingthat juror with an alternate who had be en discha rg ed and w as re called. Tat e , 624 N.W.2d at 529. Tate’ s waiver

in the trial court mee ts the Ma up in te st f or pr ocedur al defa ult . H e fa ile d to compl y wi t h M i chigan’ s contempora neous-objec tion rule by

failing to object to the re call of the discharg ed a l ternate. The Michig an cour t enforc ed the pr ocedur al sanc tion for fa ilure to object contempora

neously beca

use it he ld that he had waived the argument. Whil e the Michig an Court of Appea ls discussed the issue of rec alling the juror afte r concluding it had been w aived, id . at 529-30, this analy sis “was simply a supplement to its holding that [he] had wa ived any objection.” Scott v. Mi tc he ll , 209 F.3d 854, 865 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a state cour

t’s discussion of an alternative g round did not undermine a ct u al en fo rcement of the state proce dural g round). Tate’s waiver in the trial court was a

n adequa te and indepe ndent state g round, and he has not demonstrate d

c a us e no r p re

jud ic e ste mmi ngfr om i t. Fai lure to I nstr uc t the

Jur y to B e gin De lib e ra tio ns Ane w Af te r the Alte rna te

Jo ine d th eJur

y Tate c laims that the t rial court’s failure to instruct the jury to beg in deliberating a

new a fter the alter nate wa s rec alled and e mpaneled violate s his constituti onal rig hts. W hile we a re satisfied that he did

no t pr oc e dura lly

de fa ult thi s c la im, his c la im f

a ils be c a us e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fai lur e toCase No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock instruct was not contrary to clea rly established Feder al l aw under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Tate ar g ues that Smith v. Phillips , 4 5 5 U. S

. 2 0 9 (1982), a nd W illiams v. Florida , 3 99 U. S. 7 8 ( 19 70 ), c le arl y establish Fe dera l law that entitles him to relief. We find this argument unpersua sive. I n Sm ith , th e Sup re me Court he ld that “ du e pr oc e ss do e s no t r e qu ir e a ne w tri a l e ve ry

tim e a juror ha s been pla ced in a potential l y co mpromising situation.” 455 U.S. at 217. The Court

reve rsed the or der g ranting habea s relief , finding no violation of the rig ht to a fair tr ial under the Due Process Clause w here the prosec utor knew of but f ailed to disclose the f

act that a juror had a

pplied for a job with a law enfor ceme nt ag ency . Id . at 221. In W illiams , th e Sup re me Court he ld t hat a state may utiliz e a six-person jury

consistent with the Six th Amendment’s guara ntee of a trial by jury

. 399 U.S. at 86. The Court af

firmed the or der de nying ha beas r elief be caus e t h e habe as petitioner wa s
n ot constituti onally

entitled to a twelve- person jury

. Id

. N e i t h e r a u t h o r i t y c l e ar l y e s t a bli sh e s a constitutional right to have the jury instructed to deliber ate a new a fter a

n alterna te is empane led. AFF I RMED.Case No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge, concurr ing in part and d issenting i n part. Iag ree with the

ma jor ity tha t Pe tit ion e r M on y a

Tate ’s fi rs t c la im –

a c ha lle ng e to t

he re c a ll o f a

n a lte rn a te jur or

in his case – ha s been pr ocedur ally defa ulted due his waive r of that c laim under Michig an law. Howeve r, bec ause I

find that the Michig an Court of Appe als’ af firmanc e of the trial court’ s failure to instruct the rec onstitut ed jury to beg in deliberations anew, Pe op le v . Ta te , 624 N.W.2d 524, 531-32 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001), “ involved an unre asonable application of, c lear ly established Fe dera l law, as de termined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)( 1) (2000), I cannot join the majority ’s conc lusion that Tate’s sec ond claim must fail on the merits. Ac c or din g ly , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. I. As the majority

relies on a

n unduly narr ow re ading of our a

uthority to reviewthe district court’s de nial of Tate ’s petition for a writ of habe as cor pus, Ibeg in my

discussion with a consideration of the appropr iate standa rd of r eview. When evaluatinga habe as appe al, this Court reviews the district c ourt’s leg al conclusions, including its denial of a wr it of habea s corpus, de novo while eva luating its fa ctual conclusions for c lear

err or. Girts v. Y

anai , 501 F.3d 743, 752 ( 6th Cir. 2007). As revised by the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act of 1996 ( “AED PA”), Pub. L . No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), the fede ral ha beas statute f

or re view of state court judg ments, 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4, pr ov ide s th a t: An application for a wr it of habea s corpus on be half of a person in custody pursuant to the judg ment of a State c ourt shall not be g rante d with respec t to any claim that was a djudicated on the me rits in St ate c ourt proce eding s unless the adjudication of the claim . . . re sulted in a dec ision that was contra ry to orCase No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock involved an unre asonable application of, c lear ly established F eder al law, a s d e te r mi n e d b y th e Su p r e me Co u rt o f

th e U n it e d

St a te s [. ] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). I n in te rp re tin g § 2 25 4, the Sup re me Court ha s c lari fi e d th a t th e ph ra se “ c le arl y established” f

eder al law r efe rs to “the holding s, as opposed to the dicta , of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the re levant state c ourt dec ision.” W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). “A t the same time, cle arly established fe dera l law under the Act

e nc omp a sse s mo re tha

n ju st b ri g ht- lin e ru le s la id d ow n b y the Sup re me Court . I t a lso c le arl y includes leg al principles a nd standards e nunciated in the Court’ s decisions.” Taylor v. W ithrow , 288 F.3d 846, 850 ( 6th Cir. 2002). Whi le the Ac t “re stricts the source of cle arly established law to [ the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudenc e,” W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. at 412, this Court “may look to lower cour

ts of appea ls' de cisions, not as binding pre cede nt, but rather to infor m the

ana ly sis of

Sup re me Court

ho ldi ng s to de te rm ine wh e the r a le g a l pr inc ipl e ha d b e e n c le arl y established by

the Supreme Court.” Foley v . Parker , 488 F.3d 377, 382 ( 6th Cir. 2007). A s tate c ourt

de c isi on is contrary to clea

rly established fe dera l law if “the state cour t applies a r

ule that contra dicts the g overninglaw set for th in [ Supreme Court] cases” or if “the state cour t confronts a

set of fa cts that are materia lly indisti ng uishable fr om a dec ision of [ the Supreme] Court and never theless ar rives at a result diffe rent fr om [ the Court’s] prece dent.” W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. at 40 5- 40 6. L ike wi se , a state c ourt

de c isi on inv olv e s an unreasonable application of cle arly established fe dera l law if “the state cour t identifies the

corr ect g overningleg al rule f rom [the Supreme] C ourt’s ca ses but unrea sonably applies it to the fac ts of the par

ticular state pr isoner’s c ase.” Id . at 407. A “sta te cour t decision also involves anCase No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock
unrea sonable a

pplication of [the Supreme] Court’s prece dent if the state c ourt either

unre a so na

bly e xten ds a le g a l pr inc ipl e fr om [Su

pr e me Court ] pr e c e de nt t o a ne w c on te xt wh e re it

s h o u l d n o ta p p l y or un re as on ab ly

re fus es to e x te nt t ha t pr inc ipl e to a ne w c on te x t wh e re it sh ou ld a pp ly .” Id . at 408 (e mphasis added)

. II. I n the instant case , Iwould find that the Michig an Court of Appe als unrea sonably applied

c le arl y e sta bli sh e d f e de ra l la w w he n it ne g le c te d to fi nd

that th e Mic hig an tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to direc t the rec onstitut ed jury to beg in deliberations anew violated Tate’s F ourtee nth Amendment ri g ht t o a jur y tr ia l. Th e Sixth A me ndme nt gua ra nte e s th a t “ [i]n a ll c ri min a l pr os e c uti on s, the a c c us e d s ha ll

e njo y the ri g ht t o a

sp e e dy and pu bli c tr ia l, b y

an im pa rt ia l jury of the State and

dis tr ic t w he re in the c ri me sh a ll h a ve be e n c omm itt e d. ” U. S. C O N ST . amend. VI . I n Duncan v . Louisi ana , the Sup re me Court

he ld t hat “ the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt [l ike wi se ] g ua ra nte e s a ri g ht o f j ur

y tr ia l in

a ll c ri min a l c a se s w hic h – we re the y

to b e tr ie d in

a fe de ra l c ourt

– w ou ld c ome wi thi n th e Sixth Amendment’s guara

ntee.” 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). In W illiams v. Florida , the Supreme Court fu rt he r e xpound e d u

po n th e Sixth a

nd F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nts ’ r ig ht t o ju ry tr ia l in the pr oc e ss of ho ldi ngthat th e us e of

a six- pe rs on

jur y , a s o pp os e d to a

tw e lve -p e rs on

jur y , d id n ot v iol a te this fundamental rig ht. 399 U.S. 78, 98-103 (1970). As pa rt of its discussion, the Court identified the “ essential fe ature ” of a jury which may

not be infring ed upon duringa cr iminal trial. Se e id . at 10 0; see also Miller v. Stagne r , 757 F.2d 988, 995 ( 9th Cir. 1985) (eva luating the

c o n s ti tuti o n a li ty

o f Ca li f o r n ia ’ s ju r o r s u b s ti tuti o np r o c e d

u r e s in li g h t o f w h e th e r th e y “ p r e s e r v e []Case No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock the ‘e ssential feature’ of

the jury require d by

the Six th and Four

teenth Amendme nts” (quoting W illiams v. Florida , 399 U.S. at 100)). The Court expl ained this “e ssential feature” of the jury as fo llo ws : The purpose of the jury trial, as we noted in Duncan , is to prevent oppression by

the Gover

nment. “Providing an ac cused w ith the rig ht to be tried by a jury of his peer s g ave him an ine stimable safe g uard a g ainst the corr upt or overzea lous prosecutor a

nd ag ainst the compliant, biased, or ecc entric judg e.” Duncan v . Louisana , [3 9 1 U
. S. a t 1 5 6 ]. Given this purpose, the e ssential feature of a jury obviously

lies in the interposition between the acc used and his ac cuser of the commonsense judg ment of a g roup of lay men, an d in thec om mu nit y participation and shar ed responsibility that results f rom that group’s determination of guilt or i nnocenc e . The pe rfor mance of this role is not a func tion of the pa rticular numbe r of the body that makes up the jury . To be sure , the number should probably be large e nough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at int imidation , and to provide a fair possibility

for o b t a i n i n g a

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c r o s s - s e c t i o no f t h e c o m m u n i t y. W illiams v. Florida , 391 U.S. at 100 (empha sis added). The fa ilure to instruct a jury to beg in its deliberations anewafte r an a lternate has joined its ra nk s is a c le ar i nf ri ng e me nt u

po n th is “ e sse nti a l f

e a tur e ” of the jur y ou tli ne d b y

the Sup re me Court in W

illiams v. Florida . As indicated by the Court, a key

aspec t of this “essential fe ature ” of the jury

is the “ group deliberation” proce ss. Id . ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . In o the r w or ds , th e ri g ht t o tr ia l by jur y me ans that th e de c isi on

a bo ut whe the r t o d e pr ive a c ri min a l de fe nd ant o f h is r ig ht t o liberty shall result not from the private deliber ations of a lone State of ficial, but rather “ from [the ju r y ] gr ou p’ s deter mination of g uilt or innocence .” Id . (empha sis added). This c ollective deter mination cannot occ ur if one of the member s of the jury

is not included in portions of the rest of the g roup’s de liberations. In particula r, the re place ment of a juror with an alter

nate a fter deliberations have begun and without an instruction for the jury to beg in deliberations anew c anCase No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock hinder g roup deliber ation, and ther eby cre ate doubt about whe ther the ve rdict is truly that of the entire jury . As J udg e Posner ha s aptly noted: An alter nate who joins the jury ’s deliber ations after they have be g un, even if

he has not discussed the c ase w ith other people or forg otten the judg e’s ( other) instructions in the interim, will be at a disadvanta g e in holding his own w ith the other juror s, and as a

result the def

endant may

not rea lly

be g etting the jury

of 12 to which he is entitled. Un ite d S tat es v . J os e fik, 7 53 F .2 d 5 85 , 5 87 (7 th C ir . 1 98 5) (P os ne r, J.); se e als o United States v. Lamb , 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 ( 9th Cir. 1975) (“The inhere nt coer cive e ffe ct upon an a lternate juror who joins a jury

that has, as in this case , alre ady ag ree d that the ac cused is guilty is substantial.”).

For this reason, ne arly

all the fe dera l courts which have conside red this issue have found that su bs tit uti on of an a lte rn a te jur or

in p la c e of

a re g ula r j ur or a ft e r d e lib e ratio ns have be g un is only constitutional if “the judg e instructs the re constituted jury to beg in its deliberations anew and the de fenda

nt is not [ otherwise] prejudice d by the substituti on.” Claudio v. Snyder , 68 F.3d 15 73 , 1 57 5 ( 3d

Cir . 1 99 5) (c iti ngc a se s) ; accord Stagne r , 757 F.2d at 995 (finding that the juror substitut ion proce dure e mploy ed by a California

trial court “ prese rved the ‘esse ntial feature’ of the jury ” bec ause the judge “instructed the jury to set aside and disre g ard e arlier deliberations and to b e g in d e lib e ratin g ane w” ); Un ite d S tates v . H illar d , 701 F.2d 1052, 1056- 57 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that “the ‘ essential fe ature ’ of the jur y was pre serve d” whe n the “tria l judge instructed all the jurors to beg in their deliberations anew, e x plaining that ‘a jury verdic t must be the product of the deliberations of all twelve people who re ach that verdict’” ). See also United Sta te s v . G ue v ara , 823 F.2d 446, 448 ( 11th Cir. 1987) (finding no constitutional error w ith jurorCase No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock substitut ion when the tria l judge “questioned e ach of the re maining jur ors as to whe ther they

wo uld be a ble to b e g in t

he ir de lib e ratio ns ane w, . . . o rd e re d th a t a ll n ote s a nd oth e r m a te ri a ls complied by

the jurors duringprevious deliber ations be conf iscated, [and] recha

rg ed the jury

a ft e r t he ne w j ur or

ha d b e e n im

pa ne le d” ); J os e fik, 753 F.2d at 587 (finding no constitutional pr ob le m w itha

jur or su bs tit uti on wh e n th e a lte rn a te jur or

re joi ne d th e jur

y on ly nin e min ute s in to its de lib e ratio ns , w hic h w e re “ sta rt e d o ve r, a t th e tr ia l ju dg e ’s dir e c tio n” ); United States v. Phillips , 664 F.2d 971, 992- 93 (5th Cir. 1981) (a pply ing the rea soning of People v . Colli ns , 552 P.2d 742 (Cal. 1976), to find that no fede ral c onstitut ional violation occurs a s a re sult of juror substitut ion “wher e g ood cause has bee n shown for the substitut ion and the jury has bee n asked to beg in its deliberations anew ”). L ikewise, Rule 24 of the Fe dera l Rules of Criminal P roce dure pr ov ide s th a t “ [i]f a

n a lte rn a te re pla c e s a

jur or a ft e r d e lib e ra

tio ns have be g un , th e c ourt mu st i n s t r u c tt h e j u r

y t o b e g i ni t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s an e w . ” F e d

. R
. C r i m . P
. 2 4 ( c ) ( 3 ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. In

re a c hin g the se c on c lus ion s, our s ist e r c ir c uit s a nd the dr a ft e rs of

Rul e 24 have re c og nize d th a t a trial judg e’s f

ailure to instruct a

jury to beg in deliberations anew a fter a n alternate has be en adde d infring es upon the “ essential fe ature ” of the rig ht to trial by jury g uara nteed in the Six th and Four teenth Amendme nts. I n th e ins tant c a se , th e Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls unr e a so na

bly a pp lie d th is c le arl y established princ iple of fe dera l law when it appr oved the Michig an trial c ourt’s instruction to the

rec onstitut ed jury . Rather than instruc ting the jur y in Tate’s c ase to be g in its deliberations anew , the tr ia l ju dg e sim

ply tol d th e jur or s:Case No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock Obviously

y ou may have to g o back, and I’m not go ing to s ay go ba c k to s qu ar e one , but cer

tainly y ou will have to share with the other juror how y ou have be en deliberating, a

nd that juror will then be pa rt of the 12 who w ill decide the c ase. J .A. at 68 (Tr ial Transc ript) (e mphasis added) . This instruction cannot re asonably be construe d as consistent with the trial cour t’s Four teenth Amendme nt obligation to ensure that the “e ssential feature” of Tate ’s rig ht to jury trial was not infring ed. W illiams v. Florida , 391 U.S. at 100. The instruction did not ensure that the jury would actua lly

beg in its deliberations anew , but rather sug g ested that the jury

could mere ly

provide the a lternate with a summary of their pr ior discussions and then continue f rom the point at which the or igina l jurors had lef t off bef ore the alternate joined them. As such, the instruc tion failed “to e liminate any disadvantag e that the alternate juror may

have f elt as a r esult of her

late introduction into the delibera tions and [failed] to ensure he r full, ef

fec tive and uncoe rce d participation in all aspects of the de liberations.” Cla ud io , 68 F.3d at 1577. I n approvingthis inst ruction, the Michig an Court of Appe als ig nored not only its feder al obligation to preserve the “e ssential fea ture” of Tate ’s rig ht to a jury trial, as

r e qu i r e d b y W illiams v. Florida , but also its own prior opinion in People v . Dry Land Marina , wh ic h r e c og nize d th e “ su bs tanti a l da

ng e r” that an “ a lte rn a te joi nin g a pa ne l w hic h h a s e ng a g e d in deliberations may

be coe rce d and unduly

influence d by

those jury

members who ha

ve alr eady formed a n opinion.” 437 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). III . For the fore g oing r easons, I

would find that the jury

instruction give n in Tate’s tria l vio la te d h is F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt r ig ht t o tr ia l by jur y . T he Mic hig an Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls’ aff irmance of this jury

instruction was an unr easona ble application of clea

rly established fe dera lCase No. 06- 1773

Tate v. Bock law. See W

illiams v. Florida , 3 91 U. S. at 10 0. Ac c or din g ly , I wo uld fi nd that T a te is c ur

re ntl y being held in Michig an custody “in violation of the Constitut ion . . . of the United States,” 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( a ), and

is the re by

e nti tle d to a

wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s.